Aggression in the living environment:

The extension of Parsons' concept of aggression

by describing the context

of jargon, aggression and culture

inaugural dissertation

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Introduction

This work began with the observation that some expressions relieve instinct

have an effect, not in spite of but because of their obvious ones

Irrationality. Statements that obviously claim their own content

contradict, actors offer the opportunity to formally join the normative

to profess the order of their cultural environment and at the same time frowned upon desires

to express that violate the rules of this order. This will neither

trigger cultural and social sanctions. On the contrary: such statements

solidify integration processes by making integration and its costs psychological

make bearable. Following Adorno, I call such statements jargon.

Jargon is not just a life lie, but a life lie of a special kind. You

not only relieves the speaker, it integrates him into the circle of those who belong.

The present is glossed over by jargon, it becomes promising and therefore

made acceptable.

But Adorno's descriptions of the aggressive

Action is difficult to understand conceptually. They melt away under that

View of the consistently working scientist. Because the transfer of such

Impressions into a durable conceptual model pushes the limits of various

social-scientific traditions and therefore quickly gets into trouble.

For so much the advantages of transferring Adorno's critique into another

The conceptual framework is obvious, it is possible to do without Adorno's

Premises are accompanied by the danger that their critical stringency will thereby disappear.

This also raises a number of questions that need to be answered:

For example, how the complexities of modern society are taken into account

can, without ignoring the impulsive elements of social action; as a

such aggressive action expressed in jargon actually looks and

what cultural significance would an act passed down through jargon have.

Adorno's concept of jargon can spark a discussion about it. But he leaves some

Problems untouched, which I have to eliminate from my control room. Adorno

refrains from answering such questions. He may be able to answer this

Forego questions because he claims premises that dedifferentiate

of the social world. Nor does he discuss the specific

cultural framework in which the aggressive action expressed in jargon

acquires its importance at all. Seen from the perspective of this work,

it takes some imagination to comprehend how jargon plays a role in integration

of aggressive impulses can play in a coherent culture. Also the

culture-specific transformation of aggression must be part of such a transformation

be dissertation.

Adorno takes the cultural framework in which this is expressed in jargon

aggression acquires a meaning at all, only to a limited extent or in its

subliminal form. At the same time it is obvious that Adorno is out

precisely such culture-specific elements of expression of aggression

approach.

I have long searched for an adequate example of modern jargon. First

I wrote a longer essay about Fassbinder's film "Martha". His movie as

Taking this as an example made sense to me. But the discussion about my

Interpretation of the film showed that he was conveying my arguments only

made difficult Martha, a middle-class virgin, marries a sadistic man who

torments her in the second half of the film. I think Fassbinder shows one

complicated picture of human submission, but the brutality of Martha's

Husband makes it impossible to get used to the handling of speech and gestures

focus that Martha and her social circle commit this brutality through

to approve their silence. Although I still believe that a

such a reception of the film is not only possible, but also for us

further, I had to realize that an empirical example that creates confusion

donates, the clarification of theoretical questions is not helpful. Another consideration

was to examine a patient's analysis. But as part of an analysis are

cultural actions mainly in relation to personality structure

of the patient. The cultural significance of such acts is therefore

secondary. Central questions of this work are superfluous.

Then the so-called Walser debate began. As text alone would be the

Paulskirchen speech by Martin Walser for an investigation in this context

Suitable: Taken literally, a serious argument is evolving

difficult with Martin Walser's speech in the Paulskirche: Walser's assertion, someone

force him to constantly deal with the horrific events of mass extermination

to employ is simply wrong. But against the background of Adornos

Depiction of the functional role of jargon wins Walser's speech quite a bit

different value. Because the arguments are no longer examined solely as to whether

they are real and therefore valid, but whether they have an effect and how

this effect must be related to the truthfulness of the argument

can. Walser's impression of the Holocaust and the representatives of a "cruel

commemoration service" to be persecuted has no basis whatsoever, the cultural one

importance of his speech. She was enormous. Adorno can help us to understand

for what reason.

From today's perspective, Adorno remains stuck in his time. He overlooks some things that

has meanwhile become a matter of course. Maybe that's why he was

able to see that certain forms of irrationality have an exonerating quality

can have. Integration can thus be accomplished at the expense of the excluded,

without violating cultural or social rules. At this point I want

pointed out some of the limitations of this work. For example, I have to go to a few things

renounce what Adorno describes. However, I can use Adorno's source of

Don't assume discomfort. The inner turmoil of one from the enjoyment of a real one

intersubjective exchange with his fellow human beings I can

understand only translated from my point of view. This translation service

changes the meaning of the discomfort and therefore its effect. Furthermore, you can

From my point of view, this uneasiness can only be brought to bear if

when I first unfold an instinctual concept. In other words, I can't

Introduce a concept of intersubjectivity that is inherently philosophical. frictions that

In my opinion, there is no existential reason to induce actors to act

state can be derived. They arise from the reciprocal

Tensions between cultural demands that are accepted and internalized

are, on the one hand, and of desires that remain frowned upon, on the other.

In order to arrive at meaningful statements about this interaction, one thing is required

relatively time-consuming start-up; because the equipment required for this is with Adorno

unavailable. I resort to Parsons for the necessary

to carry out a social-theoretical expansion. The decision on Parsons

to build up, will certainly not be obvious to one or the other reader

appear. It is true that Parsons has a subject concept to which he gives an instinctual drive

support, but the drives that Parsons thinks he sees in subjects

serve social integration. A potential friction between

Culture and personality do not even emerge. Your conceptual consideration

is therefore not required. Parsons offers me the opportunity to show how

sociological models of the drive-dynamic processes of their explanatory horizon

discard, and at the same time indicate how such elements in social action a

Role-play. I therefore introduce an early work by Parsons which he wrote

has before he has his own thoughts about the consequence of his aggression

later writings has been able to suspend. Consequently, remainder elements remain one

Freudian drive in his portrayal of social action in modern

companies included. It is particularly favorable that Parsons overlooks this work

on Germany and the Holocaust.

Only then do I introduce the reader to Adorno's argument, which he presented in Der Jargon

of authenticity". I hope on the one hand to show at which points

Adorno's work can be linked, but the other does not give the impression

awaken that his approach could easily be adopted. First, I have to

emphasize the cultural specificity that Adorno neglected. Before

against the background of my paper on Parsons' integration model, it is clear

to what extent Adorno's inadequate treatment of the cultural conditions, under

where his impressions first become meaningful, to a deficiency in his approach

are due. At this point is the introduction of Plessners

argument particularly favorable. Plessner's "Belated Nation" examines the

cultural conditions that favored a descent into barbarism. Included

Plessner's analysis continues to take into account the current social

conditions ahead. He just concludes that it would be simplistic to

Holocaust directly derived from the defeat of the First World War. Plessners

Work indicates the need to deal seriously with the meaningful qualities

to be engaged in cultural action.

The last part tries to use the theoretical means that have already been developed

apply to an example. As mentioned above, I hold Martin's

Walser's text on the presentation of the Peace Prize of the German

book trade for suitable to the explanatory power of my argument

check over.

In the following I have tried to outline a theoretical model that it

enables a better understanding of the nature and function of aggression in everyday life

understand.

The gaps in the Parsons model, which is one of the foundations of this work,

mean that in his description of social interaction in a specific

cultural environment important questions are left out. In particular, Parsons gives way

in the description of "shoots" to a scientific position and is therefore

not able to perceive their role in the lifeworld. A way out

Finding this dilemma is far more difficult than it first appears. To the

role of aggression in human development and culture

To understand this, we must first refer to the conceptual framework he has set out

fall back on, because it creates the basis for the meaning and function of

culture both in the human development process and in the living environment

understand. Abandoning this conceptual framework that embraces the growing, integrative

function of culture in all three spheres of society, namely personality,

Highlighting culture and system would mean highly differentiated

Societies towards crudely drawn stereotypes in the Hobbesian tradition

to reduce. Adorno's work is certainly not entirely free of this tendency. Be

Essay The Jargon of Authenticity, however, contains a more subtle subtext, the

I'm trying to reconstruct.

I chose this essay because it offered the opportunity for a more useful one

definition of aggression opened up. However, Adorno's more than a sparse description

of the specific cultural framework, I have to do a second

make an extension. For this purpose I refer to Plessner's work

"The Belated Nation". In this work, Plessner examines the cultural

Conditions that favored the descent into barbarism. He comes to that

concluded that it would be simplistic to derive the Holocaust solely from defeat

deriving from the First World War. Plessner's work indicates the need to

seriously concerned with the meaningful qualities of cultural action

occupy.

A definition of aggression that successfully cleared the rough seas between Parsons and

If Adorno is to steer through, he must constantly take both as a frame of reference. Different

said, the definition of aggression in the lifeworld triggers the inherent in them

contradiction, rather it unfolds on the basis of this

contradiction. In this way, it is also used as a mirror of the social

Frictions productive, like the jargon that perverts them.

The conceptual framework developed below sheds light on how it works

of aggression in a specific cultural situation. Jargon is language. He

presupposes a common, shared, internalized culture, a culture

that is, which not only shapes the individuals, but also their interaction. Jargon shares that

the forbidden by playing it off against the fake and thus creates the

deviating action space beyond the limits of what is normally permitted

out. This interrelationship between jargon and culture and culture and jargon

exists in the empirical world of cultural interaction. Only there and not in the

inner world of conceptual categories, the interplay between jargon and

culture are observed. The one in Germany in October 1998 by Martin Walser

for the peace prize awarded to him by the German book trade in the Frankfurter

Paulskirche held acceptance speech was the starting point of a public

Controversy that circulated widely for months and that provided ample material

offered to trace the ways in which cultural imprinting and aggressive content

find expression in jargon. Jargon and our question about the role of

Aggression in the culture are the result of the interaction between Martin

Walser and his larger audience in culture.

2. The concept of aggression in Talcott Parsons' sociology

In the following text I start from the assumption that the diversity of social

Actions in the lifeworld of a culture only within the framework of a

social science approach can be understood, based on the classics of

Sociology resorts. I cite the relevant work of Parsons as

exemplary example of this tradition. Parsons' approach is structural

designed to cover all three levels of society (personality, culture and social

system) to understand conceptually. In addition, Parsons' work stands out

a high level of stringency. Because of this stringency, Parsons can

Consequences of choosing different premises for the range of a

social-scientific approach can be understood. Against this background

it can be shown that Parsons' premises, which are here representative of those of

classical sociology, a dilution of the concept of instinct as a result

have.

The following work arose from this problem. The initial question was:

Can retain the advantages of the classical structure of social theory

without the extent and intensity of aggression in the lifeworld

to play down socially? In other words, force me in

social science-based approach to those conflicts of social action

to overlook, the actors the opportunity to satisfy frowned upon desires

provide. And if so, how can I continue this approach

use it without running the risk of abandoning the concept of aggression?

Parsons' approach will help me gain some insight into the juxtaposition of those

to give mutually displeasing areas of social life, namely into the

Relationship between culture and personality. He serves as an example of an apodictic

construction of sociological premises. The investigation of that dilution of the

Freudian concept of drive, which I find in Parsons, should enable me to

general statements about the consequences of certain premises for reception

of aggression in sociology. This is why the consistent structure of the

model requirement. Otherwise would have to constantly between arbitrary

utterances and the conclusive consequences of a model.

Furthermore, as part of the treatment of the premises of my approach, I will show

that a sociological reconceptualization of the drive concept for the solution

certain problems is of great benefit. However, this presents us with a problem

because the paradigms, which on the one hand contribute significantly to cohesion

of differentiated societies lead to the task on the other hand

of the classical concept of instinct. In any case, neither the structures of culture nor

that of the social world adequate than solely from the structures of the personality

constructed to be understood. Precisely because culture and society do not focus on that

accumulated consciousness of all individuals, fail sociological

Models based on a philosophy of consciousness. For this reason

I refrain from investigating drive-dynamic processes in culture

those approaches that fall back on the tradition of philosophy of consciousness.

That instincts resist the cultural order must be conceptual

are taken into account. They hide a potential, that of the normative

hostile to the order of a society. This potential must, so my

i, to conceptually do justice to a social science model. otherwise

the social world shrinks to the size of the individual subjects. With others

Words, a concept of social action borrowed from the personality sphere

can only be applied in a knowledge-gaining manner to certain parts of social life

become. The social fabric from which the subject cannot ipso facto escape, that

Structure in which meaning is made would in a derivation

social and cultural structures from the personality structures of a person

Individual not sufficiently considered.

In line with the tradition of classical sociology, I work "from the top down

below", that is, from society or, in this context, from culture to

personality down. Parts 2.1 to 2.4 are 1. the sociological background

my approach, 2. Parsons' concept of culture, 3. his reconceptualization of the

Freudian model and 4. personality in social action. First

then I'll be armed with the tools I need to work on parts 2.5 and

2.6 The self-evident in the lifeworld and the concept of aggression in Parsons

to treat. Here I want to show how a bridge from the personality into the

Culture can be beaten in such a way that neither diversity nor

impulsiveness of social action must be neglected.

2.1 Sociological Background: Aggression as deviant behavior

Traditional sociology starts with a concept of social action that

Drive impulses during the socialization process into culturally understandable ones

fundamentals of motivation transformed. So Trieb says goodbye to the frame

social action in everyday life. Libidinal needs are culturally determined

motivations treated. After all, this understanding already clears socially

bound drive impulses play an important role in social action. The

However, the category of aggression prepares positive sociology for a special one

difficult problem.

I distinguish between that "positive" tradition of sociology that

Delimitation to Hobbes the cohesion of modern societies on the

internalization of norms and values of a culture, and that

"negative" tradition, which - building on Hobbes' argument - in the

selfishness of people sees the cornerstone of social order. To the

"positive" tradition I count among others Freud, Durkheim, Simmel, Marx,

Mead, Parsons and Weber, on the "negative" tradition Hobbes, Nietzsche and

partly Horkheimer and Adorno.

The positive tradition of sociology provides the tools needed to

get a conceptual grip on the differentiation of inherently cohesive societies

get, in particular the coordination of social action in the living environment

these companies. Provided such characteristics of social life

interested, it is natural to turn to the positive tradition of sociology

relate. They can only be dispensed with if one is willing to adopt a radical

flattening out in the conceptualization of the social world.[1] Der

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[1] Honneth's critique of Adorno shows the devastating consequences of coercion
approach clearly (See Honneth, Critique of Power: Reflection Stages of a Critical

analytical separation of three spheres of the social world (personality, culture and

society) are based on structures of validity that are not formally

force. But also the de-differentiation of the social world that

Recourse to an approach based on the assumption of coercion follows,

has an important advantage for me, namely: forms of aggression

find a place in the terminology – albeit again only within the framework

of structures that can hardly be explained with the help of such approaches.

Positive sociology tends to embrace aggression in forms of deviant action

translate. As a result, aggressive components of human action become theirs

rid of impulsive qualities. From actions, through the actors themselves

Creating satisfaction becomes actions that actors use as orientation

can, that is, actions based on goals that are *in terms* of culture

(or subculture) are understandable and compliant. Of course, the goals can change

change at any time, and their justification cannot be based on

culture-external criteria are derived. In this respect, a concept of

rational action per se, which can only exist anyway

if certain modes of action are equated with social action at all

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Social Theory (1985)). Honneth's argument is by no means new. It is based on Durkheim's
work and has already been thoroughly treated by Parsons. However, Honneth's
interpretation of Adorno's writings overshoots the mark. Namely, he applies Adorno's
premises to Adorno's theory of society. While this logical method is formally correct, it
assumes that Adorno is as consistent as Honneth's reconstruction of his premises.
But this assumption is not tenable.

become.2 A universal concept of rational action is based on premises

which the classics of sociology intentionally avoid.3

One way to conceptually tie drive gratification to social action is to

to understand them as the fulfillment of desires. But they don't have wishes

Satisfaction of (drive) needs related to content. They aren't

Drive needs that have a biological origin and their basic form in the

primary experience of the parent-child relationship. wishes are

Longings whose meaning is cultural and whose failure is different

can induce behavior. Based on the sociological information available to us

Medium, the meaning of these wishes can be differentiated.

With their help, one can analytically distinguish between desires that

build either on internalized goals or on norms or on values.

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2 See Parsons: The Structure of Social Action (1937), and: Economy and Society (1956). On the
basis of the term "unit acts" and an examination of utilitarianism, Parsons attempts to develop
criteria for evaluating approaches in the social sciences. Utilitarian approaches, for example,
presuppose a form of rationality that can be used to evaluate action normatively: "The other principal
element of the subsystem of action which is of special interest here may now be approached – the
character of the normative element of the means-end relationship in the unit act.
There has been, in the thought with which this discussion has been concerned, an overwhelming
stress upon one particular type, which may be called the 'rational norm of efficiency.' Hence the
second predominant feature of the developing system outlined here, atomism being the first, is the
problem of 'rational' action. It would not be correct to speak of the rationalism of the wider body of
thought since a large section of it has been marked by the minimization of the role of rational norms.
But in spite of this disagreement over the concrete role of rationality there has been, on the whole, a
common standard of rationality and equally important, the absence of any other positive
conception of a normative element governing the means-end relationship. Departures from the rational
norm have been described in such negative terms as 'irrational' and 'non-rational.' " (Parsons, 1937: 56)
The problem of the normative evaluation of social action will accompany us on the fringes of our
discussion. It would go beyond the scope of this text to illuminate it from all sides.
We will therefore deal with rationality in the lifeworld, but not with the philosophical concept.

3 Who is meant by the term "classic" is controversial in sociology. I take Freud, Durkheim, Parsons,
Simmel, Marx and Weber as classics.

Deviant behaviors that arise from inability to aim or

Doing justice to norms or values can be addressed separately. On

This can be the basis of the ability of actors to act strategically

to differentiate from the values or the norms or the goals of a culture

be grasped with particular clarity. The comparison between Victor Hugo's Jean

Valjean stealing bread to ease his children's hunger and Martin Luther

King, who opposed racist laws to Christian-Jewish ethics, are respectively

paradigmatic examples of *strain at the level of goals* and *strain at the level of*

[4] *values.* It is to Parsons' credit that he introduces categories that enable us

set, these divergent, although according to the legislation to be evaluated similarly

differentiate behaviors according to their social significance. Before this

Background can for example be a tension between societal norms

and values are shown. Martin Luther King and the *Civil Rights Movement*

violated the normative rules of American society at the time

but successful because they the contradiction between racist laws and the

exposed the egalitarian values contained in the American Constitution.

2.2 Parsons: Culture as a place of integration

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[4] See Gould: Revolution in the Development of Capitalism (1987)

Social action is for the scientist by virtue of one he applies

theoretical model accessible. Building on Whitehead, Parsons argues

already in "The Structure of Social Action" (1937) that scientists never

completely abolished hermeneutic circle can outwit by a

Establishing access to the empirical world via the justifiability of the question.

Questions applied to the respective empiricism can only be regarded as answered and

are regarded as knowledge because they have already been transferred to the model and because

it is established that the answers with the implications of the already valid

knowledge are compatible. Otherwise, a new question must be formulated,

suitable for clearing up the ambiguity. So can hermeneutic

Constraints are taken into account conceptually, in such a way that on the one hand the

Danger of a one-sidedly objectifying science, on the other hand the danger

to remain attached to subjective Cartesianism is banned.

Parsons conceptualizes personality as a category for explanation

social cohesion. The multiplicity is to be explained

and the binding qualities of those forms of social action that are modern

Identify societies in a special way. Parsons gets one

Access to Freud through those writings in which Freud played the role of sociological

categories have a conceptual weight.5 In Freud's handling

Parsons sees a convergence of sociological concepts with Durkheim's classic ones

studies on society. On the one hand, individuals can conform to the norms of

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[5] Mainly "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (Freud, 1920) and "The I and the It" (Freud, 1923)

Society does not withdraw, so to speak, their own actions are not untamed

determine. On the other hand, decisions by actors are not subject (at least

not usually) instructions enforced exclusively under duress. actuators

rather have to cope with limitations that result from a culturally

common orientation take place:

> "The formulation most dramatically convergent with Freud's theory of the superego was
> that of the social role of moral norms made by the French sociologist Emile Durkheim – a
> theory which has constituted one of the cornerstones of the subsequent development of
> sociological theory. Durkheim's insights into this subject slightly antedated those of
> Freud. Durkheim started from the insight that the individual, as a member of society, is
> not wholly free to make his own moral decisions but in some sense 'constrained' to accept
> the orientations common to the society of which he is a member."6

According to Parsons, this convergence serves as a proof of the scientific

Justification of his reformulation of Freud and Durkheim. Therefore do

obvious fallacies of Freudian and Durkheimian argumentation

respective project is not terminated. Their enormous scientific benefit can only be

be perceived in the convergence because with it the direction of

reformulation of social theory becomes determinable. Building on that

Durkheimian approach, a social science model can be designed in such a way

that advances in our knowledge of *"social structure and*

Personality" can be achieved. The writings of Freud are said to precede this

be reinterpreted in such a way that they are compatible with sociological

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6 Parsons, 1970:18-19

ideas of social action can be integrated. The place where Freud and

Durkheim are to be connected is, in Parsons' terminology, a system.

A system is formed through the interaction of people. In this respect, the

Interaction of at least two people can be understood as a system. A

System is embedded in a culture, but at the same time analytically separates itself from it,

because only certain parts of the culture within the context of each encounter of

are relevance. Of course, the topics that become topical can change at any time.

This shifts the limits of the system.7

In this context I turn to the consequences of the choice of the place of integration

for theory building. If one considers the interaction of actors as a system,

so the content that is brought into this system must be defined accordingly

can (and should) be. The cultural content of the system is mentioned above

and will continue to occupy us in what follows.

By emphasizing the "place" of integration, Parsons wants to make two things:

on the one hand, that an approach focused solely on the individual

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7 Strictly speaking, it is not possible to mix concepts that relate to Parsons' concept of culture or Habermas' concept of the lifeworld. At least she needs an explanation. Parsons rejects the concept of the lifeworld. Nevertheless, it can be helpful in understanding such shifting processes. Within the framework of this work, the instructional connections between the system and the lifeworld are established. Culture and living environment are not interchangeable terms. We will therefore deal in detail with the concepts of lifeworld, culture and system, which refer to traditions of sociology that are sometimes incompatible with one another. The point will be to take the concepts of personality and lifeworld into account via Parsons' concept of the cultural system in order to create a new

unable to comprehend the meaning of human interaction; for another, that one

Approach that takes the motivational bases of action directly from the system of

social action and the actors the corresponding social functions

attributes, must simplify the motivations of these actors.8 Models that are

solely from the question of either psychoanalysis or classical analysis

sociology, contribute to the fact that important part of the social world "between

the chairs" of these approaches and therefore not within the framework of these models

can be recorded:

> "On the one hand, Freud and his followers, by concentrating on the single personality,
> have failed to consider adequately the implications of the individual's interaction with
> other personalities *to form a system.* On the other hand, Durkheim and the other
> sociologists have failed, in their concentration on the social system as a system to consider
> therefore the implications of the fact that *it* is the *interaction of the personalities*
> which constitutes the social system with which they have been dealing, and that,
> therefore, adequate analysis of the motivational process in such a system must reckon
> with the problems of personality."9

In the context of the Parsonsian system, actors develop relationships that result in

can be differentiated according to their meaning as follows:

> "(1) cognitive perception and conceptualization, the answer to the question of *what the*
> *object is* and (2) cathexis - attachment or aversion - the answer to the question of *what*
> *the object means* in an emotional sense. The third mode by which a person orients himself

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conceptual framework to be based on. We are interested in the implications of this reconstruction for the conceptualization of the unconscious in culture.

" This is intended to appeal to both Freud's and Durkheim's students. (Parsons, 1970: 20)

9 Parsons, 1970:20

to an object is by evaluation – the integration of cognitive and cathectic meanings of the

object to form a system, including the stability of such a system over time. It may be

maintained that no stable relation between two or more objects is possible without all

three of these modes of orientation being present for *both* parties to the relationship."10

The other person facing the actor is determined according to his or her cognitive and

emotional significance, i.e. on the basis of the two questions "What is that

object" and "What does it mean to me?". The answer to these questions and the

Integration of cognitive and emotional perception enable a

Evaluation of the object, which is responsible for the system of action and its stability

has meaning.

2.3 Parsons' reconceptualization of the Freudian model

If one proceeds from the assumptions of the Parsonian approach, it must

Freud's structural model can be expanded quite a bit. The conceptualization of both

the cultural environment of actors as well as their psychic apparatus

be modified. Both can be designed as *systems of social action* and

thus differ from Freud's model.11 The action system in which

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10 Parsons, 1970:20

11 Parsons writes: "We had best begin this next phase of exposure by stating what are to us the two
most fundamental theorems of our general treatment. The first of these is that the primary structure of
the human personality *as a system of action* is organized about the internalization of systems of
social objects which originated as the role-units of the successive series of social systems in which
the individual has come to be integrated in the course of his life history. (...) The second theorem is that

Encountering actors of a culture is built up from the structures of this culture. This

grant stability. Actors can therefore rely on the validity of their statements

leave. Actors know about the importance of the shared language and see how

presupposes, of course, that they will understand statements as they are meant

are.

All three of the modes of perception or evaluation discussed above

are performed against the background of a culture, made in meaning

becomes. The ability of actors to participate in social actions

requires a culture that allows for the coordination of action. One

Reformulation of the psychic apparatus described by Freud is therefore

inevitable. Because if cognitive and emotional perception cultural

Symbols underlie or when they are part of social action

are components of the common culture, the ego and superego must be so in a culture

be located so that their function in the production of meaning is given

can. Because of shared cultural symbols, actors—"except for

further"12 – start from the assumption, their perception of the situation

correspond to those of the other participants.

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this structure of the personality develops, not *primarily* by the process of the modification of 'primary drives' or 'instincts' but by a process of differentiation of a very simple internalized object-system (...) into progressively more complex systems." (Parsons, Family Structure and the Socialization of the Child, 1955: 54)

[12] I use the phrase "until further notice" in this context without mentioning the background against which it originally and strictly acquires meaning. The reader, who knows this background, is rightly taken aback. Because it indicates a claim to Schütz's terminology, admittedly borrowed from Husserl, which is unacceptable without further ado, especially since Parsons, as already mentioned, expressly rejects this model. In this context, however, I am forced to leave contradictions that are to be confronted directly to the fore. In addition, Parsons' claim is not aimed at terms that capture the stability of the system, but at

Internalized cultural symbols form the background against which communication

takes place; in this respect they are also the background against which the system of

communication can be maintained. The modes described by Parsons

the evaluation of objects take place in this context. The cognitive

For example, the importance of a person for an actor changes their emotional importance.

Therefore, according to Parsons, there is a causal relationship between the

factual meaning of an object (the question of what an object is) and the

normative meaning of an object (the question of what an object should be).

By naming a person as father, mother, sister, life companion,

lover (or newfangled life partner) is accompanied by an expectation that

which emerges from the role claimed as well as from

the relationship itself.

In a word, what an object is supposed to be and what an object is can in fact be said

not so clearly distinguish that the one instance is exclusively a normative and

to which only a cognitive function can be ascribed to the other:

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explanation of this stability par excellence. In this respect, even in this context, the terms that describe components of a culture that create cohesion can be used without any problems. The epistemological foundation of these approaches, on the other hand, requires justification. In other words, Parsons' objection to claiming conceptuality does not apply to the concepts but to their conceptual framework. However, I am putting off another problem: namely the meaningfulness of a terminology taken from his approach, which is used in the context of another approach. In this context, I regard the terminology I used as an instrument that I can use from now on, because it can be connected, albeit with difficulty, to the content of Parsons' approach.

"What persons *are* can only be understood in terms of a set of beliefs and sentiments

which define what they *ought to be."* [13]

Simmel is the classic sociologist who studied the influence of social roles on

the meaning of actors most clearly.[14] Parsons leans on this

Simmel,[15] admittedly without mentioning him, in order to gain access to the personality

or more aptly put, to establish the personality in everyday life.

Parsons would like Simmel's epistemological account of coordination

of actions through the internalization of different social roles conceptually

capture without adopting the approach itself. Parsons is concerned with them

The demarcation between culture and personality[16], which takes place during socialization

and which both motivate children's actions during their

Adolescence as well as that of adults explained. The objects to which a

child develops a relationship, introduce them to the social world. The reference person

accepts this mothering role.[17]

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[13] Parsons, 1970:22

[14] See Simmel, Georg: Sociology: Investigating the Forms of Socialization (1992)

[15] Parsons further writes: "With increasing emphasis recent analytical work has borne upon us the extreme importance of the fact that any large scale social system (a society) should be considered not in a 'monolithic' way, but as an intricate network of interdependent and interpenetrating subsystems. This has been one of the most important contributions of the concept of role, to throw into relief the fact that the same individual participates in many social systems not merely one." (Parsons, 1955: 36)

[16] See Parsons: Social Structure and Personality (1970)

[17] It should be emphasized that it does not follow *ipso facto* from Parsons' argument that this reference person must be a woman. Parsons writes: "It is also most important not to confuse the mother-object (...) with the concrete woman as seen in the common sense terms by an adult who knows her." (Parsons, 1955: 44, footnote 14). And further he writes: "Even at this (early) stage we will treat

With Freud, on the other hand, objects cannot be understood as roles, via cultural ones

meaning is conveyed. If objects are carriers of cultural significance,

they are understood against the background of certain patterns. The

Freud's concept of identification must be expanded somewhat, because it is possible

concerned with describing a process by which those objects are appropriated

which instances are formed.18 Two processes are identified with identification

refers to: firstly, the assumption of a role that has been concretely lived out and secondly, the

associated internalization of cultural patterns of meaning, based on which a

social role gains a generally understandable meaning. These roles, the

Determining the goals of action only becomes apparent in their broader cultural significance

understood after the child successfully passed the first stages of socialization

has traveled: "The child may be likened to a pebble 'thrown' by the fact of birth

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the problem first in terms of social interaction, attempting to interweave with this the appropriate consideration of psychological process in both adult and infant. For simplicity we will refer to mother and child, but recognizing that 'agent of care' is the essential concept and that it need not be confined to one specific person, it is the function which is essential." (Parsons, 1955: 44)
Admittedly, Parsons adheres to a terminology appropriate to his time, which easily gives the impression that he actually believes that socialization can only succeed if traditional conditions prevail. It is certainly regrettable that Parsons has done so little to avoid the ambiguities that lead to such an interpretation, given that he has no intention of endorsing traditional family structures. The mother, that is, the one with whom the child has its first relationship, and the one who "exploits" the child's erotic "instincts" to draw them into socialization, is instrumental in transforming the "pleasure principle" into "love." principle" responsible. The character can be a man without affecting Parsons' argument. It is important to remember that Parsons wants to introduce analytic categories. As such, the categories must make roles or functions tangible, but should not contain any content in themselves. It is of course disputed whether Parsons succeeds in introducing such categories, but not that he is striving for it. (See Habermas: Theory of Communicative Action, Volume II (1981))

18 See J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis: The Vocabulary of Psychoanalysis (1967). Here also the two meanings of the term identification are recalled; namely, regarding something (or someone) as identical and actions that make two individuals identical to each other. (J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, 1967: 219ff.) The term gained increasing importance for Freud because he wanted (and had to) explain how the psychic apparatus develops in such a way that an id becomes an ego and from this a superego arises. Otherwise social action would not be conceptually comprehensible.

into the social 'pond.' The effect of this event is at first concentrated at the particular

point of entrance, but as it grows up, his changing place in society resembles the

successively widening waves which radiate from his initial position in his family of

orientation."19 In a word, with each new step the child climbs,

the horizon of his environment expands. Thus, the sociological

The scope of those roles is clear and understandable for the child:

> "... this establishment of an organized ego in the personality through a pattern of sanctions
> designates essentially what Freud meant by identification. Several of Freud's own
> formulations of the concept stress the striving to be *like* the object. This emphasis requires
> elucidation and some qualification. Only in a very qualified sense can one say that to
> infant learns to be like his mother. (...) his behavior – hence his motivation – is organized
> according to a generalized pattern of norms which define shared and internalized
> meanings of the acts occurring on both sides."20

The satisfaction of drive needs forms the motivational background of the

Socialization process or justifies the willingness to actively participate in it

participate. Here it is first about the transformation of the pleasure principle into *love*

principle. According to Parsons, the transformation of lust into love is developmental

a mature self. The ego only develops after the child begins to adapt

Orientation towards love instead of instinctual gratification. So the child says goodbye

from the desire for immediate gratification of erotic needs

seek:

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[19] Parsons, 1955: 36ff.

[20] Parsons, 1970:91

> "More generally, a primary – indeed *the* primary – goal of the developing personality comes to be to secure the favorable attitude of the mother or, as it is often called, her love. Specific gratifications on lower levels, then, have become part of an organization on a wider level, and their primary meaning derives from their relation to the paramount goal of securing or maximizing love. Indeed, I think it a legitimate interpretation of Freud to say that only when the *need for love* has been established as the paramount *goal* of the personality can be a genuine ego be present. The need, then, in an important sense **come** to control the ontogenetically older goal-needs of the organism, including, eventually, that for pleasure."21

Love is a metaphor inasmuch as it plays the role of Cathaxis in the process of

internalization of cultural patterns of meaning. Cathaxis becomes general

translated with cast.22 This translation is not sufficient insofar as it is

relates to Parsons. In Freud, the concept of occupation is used in different ways

Used in different contexts to describe ideas, groups, body zones

etc. to allocate psychic energies.23 Parsons' concept of cathaxis was intended to be the

enormous importance of drive-dynamic processes in socialization

carry. roles, the children first by their mother, then by their father and

subsequently learn from their environment are not just by virtue of cognitive effort

acquired. The motivation to penetrate further into the culture leads Parsons to the

libidinal attachment in the object relationship, creating a role and her

meaning to be internalized. Therefore Cathaxis also includes object choice.

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21 Parsons, 1970:90

22 See J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis: The Vocabulary of Psychoanalysis, Volume I (1967). Here will Occupation defined as Cathaxis.

23 See J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis: The Vocabulary of Psychoanalysis, Volume I (1967:93)

The internalization of those with positive (or libidinal, binding) energy

laden roles is Cathaxis. It is built from the interaction between mother and

child.24 The child becomes concerned about the satisfaction or denial of its needs

steered. The learning processes through the interaction between mother and child

be encouraged, cause children to engage in the importance of gratification

orientate. As a result, children are increasingly moving away from a "direct"

attachment to the pleasure principle. The abandonment of the immediate pleasure principle

in favor of the *love principle* does not in any way mean a suspension of libido in the

Parsons' psychic apparatus. Rather, Parsons means the enormous importance

of the libido at every stage of socialization by showing libido with (first

from the mother) can merge with traditional patterns of meaning. Removed, of course

with each higher level of socialization the reference to action increases

pleasure and pleasure. Therefore, drive impulses can also occur in a regression

can no longer be traced back to their biological source, but only to that one

Level at which further development has failed. According to Parsons, the

Creating pleasure is part of the motivation to socialize

Act. Of course, the needs that are satisfied are actors only *in terms*

understandable of their social transformation.

If we're willing to follow the logic of Parsons' argument, do it

we, insofar as we proceed apodictically, at the same time a new conceptualization of the

---

24 If one wanted to take the difference between language and drive as a basis, one could
Use formulation: a form of communication through which Cathaxis occurs.

psychic apparatus. It is against this background that Freud's description of

Role of patterns of meaning in the psychic apparatus as insufficient. The superego

cannot be understood exclusively as an authority at the service of culture

against unwanted needs. Such a view of culture and

Drive is based on a strict demarcation between them. She assumes that

Parts of the psychic apparatus largely form out of themselves.

Following Parsons' argument, the psychic apparatus must be located in culture

be, so that its respective connection to the culture may be different

functions of the id, ego and superego, but also their dependency

of the structures of a culture from which they emerge.

The superego, which mediates between culture and personality, does not occur somehow

out of the culture in which the actors act, to use all their might against them

to lift. Rather, the mediation of the superego as communication

between personality and culture. The content it conveys

is meaningful because of the structures of meaning from which it is constructed.

In this respect, the superego does not erect a border to the dark world of more personal things

Subjectivity in which culture-hostile needs are nurtured:

> "If the approach taken above is correct, the place of the superego as part of the structure
> of the personality must be understood in terms of the relation between personality and the
> total common culture, by virtue of which a stable system of social interaction on the
> human level becomes possible. Freud's insight was profoundly correct when he focused
> on the element of moral standards. This is, indeed, central and crucial, but it does seem
> that Freud's view was too narrow. The inescapable conclusion is not only that moral

standards, *but all components of the common culture* are internalized as part of the personality structure. Moral standards cannot, indeed, in this respect be dissociated from the *content* of the orientation patterns which they regulate; ..."25

With recourse to the cultural level, an insight into those parts of the

Personality can be won, the content of which can be generally understood.

Action situations can therefore be coordinated because the action of others

Actors can be understood "for the time being" as if they were compatible with the norms of a culture

is compliant. Against this background, the "until further notice" assumption wins out

far-reaching importance within the framework of the conceptualization of social action.

Their consistent application implies an overcoming of that from

philosophy of consciousness originating from the problem of the cognitive always already

isolated subject. Action is based on cultural patterns of meaning that

precisely because they are internalized, not on an authority inherent in the human being ⎯⎯⎯

can be reduced, on the basis of which actors can only be compared to copies of themselves

could orient. Since people are just different, the coordination

of the action to an insolvable problem of sociological approaches. social

Action is consequently presented as fragmentary and random, whose

success is doubtful.

An internalization of cultural symbols (in whatever form)

constructive approach raises communication to the level of intersubjectively valid

Testify. The motivational basis of the individual actor is prior to this

background understood. Deviating action can also be included in the knowledge horizon

---

25 Parsons, 1970, 23

be enclosed by actors. It is all the more noticeable because of the

Expectations of others diverge. Actors recognize frowned upon, inappropriate or

illogical actions as such because they are based on internalized norms and

can relate to patterns of meaning. From them meaningful action is built,

admittedly reduced to those parts of the culture that are relevant to the respective situation

are relevance. The norm is the success of communicative exchange and not

the improbability of its occurrence. Actors can therefore of the

assume that their statements will be understood by other actors

as they themselves intended.

2.4 Personality in social action

Parts of an actor's personality area nevertheless remain for other members

closed to culture. If the other person appears to be acting in accordance with the norm, lie

the reconstruction of his plot is based on two assumptions: first, his

Membership in the same culture and second, his sanity. If

if one of these assumptions turns out to be incorrect, the failure to confirm it must be guaranteed

be problematized, so that the meaningfulness of the action system

can be restored. Precisely because actors are actually from the culture in which they

live, cannot escape, this repair service is possible at any time.26

I would like to elaborate on these two presuppositions already mentioned (membership in

of culture and sanity) of the communicative situation. My

Cognitive interest suggests the analytical distinction between lifeworld

(culture), personality and society. First the overlap

of personality, culture and society in the living environment. A

Case study is designed to show how two sane members of a joint

Culture meet to communicate about something banal.

2.4.1 Example

Actors can do this because of their common membership in a culture

Attribute the actions of others to motives that are familiar to them. The example:

X gives Y money, Y gives X a cigar. Participants and observers go from that

Selling a cigar. Some observers may know more than others, they

conclude from the brand that the buyer has no idea, or laugh because only

People who work in advertising want cigars like this etc. The

In any case, the situation can be adequately interpreted. The interpretation, buying one

---

[26] Habermas writes: "The communicative actors always move within the horizon of their
lifeworld, they cannot step out of it." (Habermas, 1987, 192) Here I would just like to point
out that the assumption that actors are neither through conscious action nor accidentally step out
of their culture , which underlies the approaches of almost all classics of sociology. However, the
immediate impact of this assumption could only be thoroughly examined after sociology
has referred to the communicative situation. It is no wonder, therefore, that Mead, Parsons, and
Habermas give us the most detailed account of this fact of social life. Because they
all strive for an investigation of internalized social action within the framework of a communicative
system in culture.

Having watched cigar is correct. The motives of the acting actors are the

Acquisition of a prestigious, unhealthy product and the turnover

through sale or the fulfillment of work-related obligations.

But it is also possible that the seller is a connoisseur and the buyer is a paint monkey

looks at and despises him. That's why he points to the question "Which ones are the best?"

on those cigars that are considered bad and overpriced. He doesn't care about that

sale, but the humiliation of a complacent man. He advises him

to buy a bad cigar, not because he earns more - because he does

gets a fixed salary regardless of whether he is honest or dishonest   –,

but because he starts from the assumption that most anyway the difference

not notice between a good and a bad cigar. It's in for the buyer

does not matter whether the cigar is good. He doesn't like smoking, but he wants his new one

girlfriend prove that he is a man of the world. He intends to take the cigar

Lighting dinner with acquaintances, looking up into the air and from that

raving about the pleasure of a cigar. He pays quickly because there's a football game coming up

begins and leaves the shop satisfied.

On this (cultural) level, on which the motives of the actors differ from the expectations

deviate, their motives need not remain closed to us, but they are also to us

not directly accessible. The seller becomes his boss, the buyer or

never tell other people he thinks like he loves his job

because he can "cheat" paint monkeys. Neither does the buyer become his

tell friends, her acquaintances, his colleagues that he only smokes because it's in

is fashion and because he finds that in the mouth of a man of stature (like him) a

expensive cigar.

The actions of the seller can be deduced analogously if someone

Observes the scene and asks questions that reveal knowledge about cigars. Then hang up

clear that the seller is either incompetent or that he is his customer

consciously want to outsmart. Of course, it is more likely that the insidiousness of the

seller to a social scientist who interpreted the scene with a trained eye,

didn't even notice him, because, remaining true to Luther's doctrine of renunciation, he

Dealing with cigars repels anyway. But that doesn't have to be the case.

It would also be possible that the scientist also disliked the buyer

finds and out of this dislike the real motives of the seller

see through

These somewhat hidden motives of the acting actors are on the surface

not very important. The motivation to act is overshadowed by

Meaning of action defined by the context of the situation. Provided

both actors are guided by the same cultural norms, it works

system, although their actual motives differ from those suggested in the

given situation are expected of the individual. These deviating

motivations outside the context of the situation do not interfere

the success of social action. The buyer may change the attitude of the seller

It doesn't matter, especially since he actually (dis)likes a good cigar just as much as a bad one

smokes. If the buyer takes the cigar and does not notice that he is at the

is led around by the nose, the attitude of the seller to the supposed remains

Advertisers of no importance in the context of the situation being addressed

For the purpose of that action, namely buying and selling an item.

On the level of interaction, for us, processes that psychoanalysis in the

employ therapy, not immediately visible. Even more: you are for them

Importance of social action within the system not too relevant. The

(Parsonssche) I of both actors is based on the settings that result from the

traceability of the action. The "paint monkey" starts from validity

of the seller's statements, since he only uses this in the role of the seller

can interpret. He understands the statement "This cigar ties in with tradition

by Davidoff, is somewhat mild, burns well and is preferred by connoisseurs," she says

is meant, i.e. as a recommendation to buy. He also understands that the seller

would rather "sell" him a more expensive cigar than a cheaper one. This knowledge diminishes

by no means the nice feeling of being seen as a connoisseur at a party. The

motives of the seller that deviate from the norm, namely to get over the buyer

amuse, the person working in advertising does not perceive. Him is and may

be indifferent that the seller is more concerned with his own private pleasure

oriented than to the wishes of its customers.

Nevertheless, attitudes that one may be indifferent to are not related to those

to confuse us in the context of a "normal situation"

is forbidden. If, in the situation described, one misjudges the other,

the motives lying beneath the surface can be exposed, for example when the

"Lackaffe" isn't one at all. Suddenly a situation arises in which the before was not

assumed attitude towards the other is discussed. The one who works in advertising

People can smile knowingly at the seller and ask for a good cigar

grab it, or he can leave the shop indignant.

2.5 The self-evident in culture

Either way, an unspoken theme is in the horizon of action

been brought into the situation, so to speak, from "bottom up". actuators

always bring new information into their conversations as needed. The

The information they provide is already culturally pre-interpreted. Actors can do that

Take a stand on emerging issues without stepping out of the context

common culture.27 These are mostly

Things that are taken for granted that do not require a new interpretation. the ones in that

Information brought into the conversation can be changed at any time within the context of the situation

be problematized. Because this situation forms a stable system of action,

---

27 The processes in which information is brought into the horizon of a conversation and the structures of the lifeworld from which this information consists also have to be examined in more detail. In this connection I shall refer to the work of Habermas, which undertakes a revision of Schütz and Luckmann so that its somewhat ontological basis is lost, but the tools derived from it are still useful. (See Habermas: Theory of Communicative Action, Volume II (1981) and: Preliminary Studies and Supplements to the Theory of Communicative Action (1984)).

actors assume that the self-evidence of the cultural

Communication to be shared by everyone in the speaking situation. As long as there is no

If there are signs that the system is beginning to falter, there are indications that it should be addressed

of motives or attitudes deviating from the norms of the culture

Reason.

In any case, it is essential that the information brought into a conversation

become, have a cultural meaning. Otherwise they could not be part of

become communication. Information from the system and personality area

can easily be brought into the horizon of a conversational situation. This

Admittedly, information loses the specificity associated with the respective area of social

world comes together.

In this respect, information is mostly provided in the form of already pre-interpreted information

taken for granted on the same level, that is, from the

culture into a situation within culture. At this point I would like to provisionally

Introduce the concept of everyday life as a matter of course. In this context it is

important to remember that all these distinctions are analytical

are nature. In fact, one does not find a pure lifeworld and also no pure ones

Lifeworld structures, since the boundaries of lifeworld, personality and

society are fluid.

However, actors can communicate about the living environment and society.

Meanwhile, translation services take place, which, although the meaning of the

Change processes for people or the system, but do not falsify them.

The changes that occur during the transmission of information from one area of the

social life into another must, in the strict sense of the "genuine"

meaning do not detract. This meaning, in so far as it applies to the culture,

decided in culture. Therefore close the "real" meaning, ie the

Meaning specific to an area of the social world and general

cultural significance are not mutually exclusive.28

Usually, actors do not have the necessary knowledge to

to inquire area-specifically about processes of the personality or the system,

let alone to communicate about it. For that reason alone, they have to

Inputs from both areas are presented in a simplified manner. The Disfigurement

area-specific meanings in the lifeworld that result from their transfer into the

horizon of a "normal" conversation, is none in the stricter sense

distortion of a factual content, but rather a kind of mutual translation.

This translation not only takes the substance of the original "text" around it

translated into another language more accessible to the reader. system and

---

28 This, of course, addresses a complicated problem in social theory, namely the relationship
between culture and system. Building on the concept of the lifeworld, I think one would have
to come to the conclusion that a system can have autarkic traits, but not (entirely) autopoietic
ones. Conversely, it can be concluded that in a crisis every system that has become self-
sufficient must be problematizable *in terms* of its cultural significance. (See Habermas:
Problems of Legitimation in Late Capitalism (1973), and: Theory of Communicative Action,
Volumes I and II). I also assume that a crisis can relate to a culture's goals, norms, and values.
I consider the criticism from Parsonsian point of view that Habermas allows norms
and values to merge into one another in "Problems of Legitimation of Late Capitalism" to be
justified.

Personalities themselves have a meaning in the lifeworld. inputs from both

Areas are put into a situation against the background of general knowledge

fetched if they become relevant. This knowledge is already interpreted and heard

on the "stock of knowledge" of actors in a culture:

> "This stock of knowledge provides the members (of a culture) with unproblematic,
> background beliefs commonly assumed to be guaranteed ; and forms from these
> in each case the context of understanding processes in which the participants proved themselves
> Use situation definitions or renegotiate. The communication participants
> find the connection between the objective, social and subjective world, which they face, already
> interpreted in terms of content."29

Therefore, the translation metaphor covers only one side of the problem. The

Importance of inputs from other parts of the social world is reflected in culture

negotiated. If the general meaning of a statement of their

area-specific meaning diverges, is this not a distortion of the "true"

meaning in the normal sense, but a sign that those states have not

have occurred, requiring a revision of either the area-specific or but

of general meaning. A statement can be made in the

be valid in culture and wrong in the system without being downright wrong. With

In other words: the premises of a culture or lifeworld concept

constructive approach do not require that the area-specific importance with

must correspond to the validity claims of the culture and the systems. systems

and people must be understandable in culture though, their action

---

29 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Volume II, 1987:191.

legit. In this respect, other parts of the social world, i.e. personality and

system, relate their action to those validity claims that exist in the culture

available. Anyway, both the personality and the

System area all examples of actions whose interpretation in the culture a

changing their area-specific meaning.30

It must be emphasized again that actors, for constitutive reasons, are not

are able to problematize culture in ways such as "facts, norms

or experiences."31 It is not visible to them in a similar way.

Actors can therefore obtain information from all three areas of the social world

address it, even question it, but still don't touch the foundation,

on which the validity of statements about personality, culture or system is based:

> "The structures of the lifeworld make the forms of intersubjectivity more possible
>
> understanding. The communication participants owe them the extramundane
>
> position in relation to what is within the world about which they can come to an understanding. The
>
> The lifeworld is, so to speak, the transcendental place where speaker and hearer
>
> meet; where they can reciprocally claim that their statements to the
>
> world (of the objective, the social or the subjective world); and where
>
> they can criticize these validity claims. In one sentence: on language and culture

---

30 That this is so is so obvious that examples need hardly be given.
However, I would like to give the reader an example, from the system area. In the structure of a
system there are logical forms of argument that are illogical in the culture. A
paradigmatic example is the practice of *arguing in the alternative,* which is the basis of
certain legal arguments. A lawyer can present contradictory arguments without getting caught
up in contradictions. For example, if his client has been charged with first degree murder, the
attorney may argue that his client was not in the country at the time of the crime, if he
was in the country he was out of town, if he was in town he was he was in his local bar, if he was
at the scene he would argue with the victim, if he had an argument with the victim he was
not sane.

31 See Habermas: Theory of Communicative Action, Volume II (1981)

the participants in actu cannot take the same distance as to the totality of facts, norms
or experiences about which understanding is possible."32

At this point I would like to summarize the results that are relevant for our further

work are important. In particular, I want to show what consequences

for the description of aggressive actions in the lifeworld from these

results follow. Parsons proceeds from the harmless assumption that the

Socialization serves to introduce children to the culture. From sociological

Perspective, the importance of an unsocialized child is that of an object

similar. Both gain their meaning through perception representing a culture

presupposes in which they can be perceived. Perception creates it

However, not the subject. It exists in the dark imperceptible

Objects, i.e. those objects that we use on the basis of our cultural premises

cannot see, but which are perceptible at any time by means of new assumptions.

This applies equally to science and life, albeit the

Conditions under which such a change is made are radical

distinguish from each other.

"The structure of the conceptual scheme itself inevitably focuses interest on a limited
range of (...) empirical facts. These may be thought of as a 'spot' in the vast encircling
darkness, brightly illuminated as by a searchlight. The point is, what lies outside the spot
is not really 'seen' until the searchlight moves, and then only what lies within the area
into which it beams is newly cast. Even though any number of facts may be 'known'
outside the center, they are not scientifically important to relation with a theoretical
system."33

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32 Habermas, 1987:192

33 Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, 1937:16

In the context of scientific work, Parsons calls this darkness residual

residual category.34 An infant's own experience may

of such a *residual category ,* its importance in the culture

not. Socialization transforms the experience to those inaccessible to us

Areas of the pre-social world belong, in meaning-structured content, to culture

to clarify. In a word, children are placed in a cultural role

born that they learn to understand by internalizing the culture. parsons

according to them, newborn children are endowed with instincts. Those instincts and that

Ability to learn a culture distinguishes newborns from objects.

Man is a bearer of meaning. When he is alone in the forest, his are

thoughts meaningful. Drives contribute to the socialization process by creating children

endow with needs whose satisfaction requires active participation in their

education requires. Parsons considers drives as described by Freud

as part of this biological endowment of humans. The influence of this

innate urges on the action of actors is constantly growing during education

in favor of an orientation towards internalized goals, norms and values

reduced, which are culturally determined. It is important to emphasize that Parsons von

from a single drive. In Parsons, the instinct is a bundle of libidinal instincts

Nature. Its satisfaction is the basis of children's motivation

social overmolding of such instincts begins at birth. She turns instinct into

---

34 Parsons 1937: 17

that love for the primary caregiver that the child adheres to in the oral phase

oriented. In this way, immediate instinctual gratification is achieved through a social relationship with

replaced by cultural significance. Further education serves as an introduction to the

Culture. During the exchange between mother and child, in which a mature ego

emerges, children gain their first impressions of the role of the family in

Culture.

2.6 Parsons' concept of aggression: imperfection as epistemological advantage

Parsons deals specifically with aggression in his essay "On

essential causes and forms of aggressiveness in the social structure of western

Industrial societies"35. The essay written in 1947 is probably one

theoretical examination of the NS movement. Parsons would like to describe

how aggression enters the culture and what consequences it has for modern ones

companies has. Therefore Parsons must make an analytical distinction between

Introduce personality, culture and society.

In this essay, however, Parsons cannot provide a sufficient explanation of the

There are differences between these three parts of the social world. At the time was his

approach has not yet developed to the point where he would have been able to establish his premises

consistent with the interpretation of all three areas of the social world

to work out. Parsons was therefore forced to contradict contradictions in the

interpretation of the social world, which he did in his later writings

encountered directly and which he then clears out. For reasons I have already mentioned,

is already involved in the drawing of the boundary between the personality sphere and the cultural sphere

to reckon with a certain contradiction in the social world. Because

Parsons is not yet able to resolve exactly those contradictions that he is

We find some indications of drive-dynamic processes

in the lifeworld, which for conceptual reasons no longer appear later. In

In this framework I refrain from interpreting Parsons as it was before the

background of his later work would have to happen. Instead I want that

Contrasting with later insights and in some cases even expanding. With it

I show the consequences of the assumption of drive-dynamic

Processes for sociological theory formation.

However, even at this point Parsons understood very well that a destructive

Potential among people (in culture) or in people (in personality)

cannot be equated with that social action from which, for example

social crises follow. Modern societies have institutions

who can channel, mediate and suppress aggression. Also works

the internalization of norms and values of a modern society

inhibitory to actors so that immediate aggressive desires are controlled

become.

---

[35] Parsons, On the essential causes and forms of aggressiveness, 1947.

From the outset, Parsons would like to avoid those category errors that lead to a

confusion of levels of the social world:

> "If it were possible, a statistically reliable estimate of the average
> To gauge the strength of aggressive tendencies in a country's population would be so
> them, *on their own,* as the basis for a probability statement as to whether this
> country would undertake a war of aggression, worthless. The specific goals and
> Objects to which these aggressive dispositions are attached, the way in which
> they are suppressed, deflected, projected by canalizing or counteracting forces
> or can be expressed directly, further the structure of the situations in
> they get into - all this is just as important for determining the actual concrete
> behavior as the general aggressive potential as such."36

In a word, the aggressive potential of individual actors in a society and

the aggressive "act" of this society cannot use the same term

be recorded, especially since they each cause different types of damage. A society can

have a high destructive potential or generate such a high potential,

without that potential being translated into action.

Parsons therefore uses the term aggressiveness instead of aggression. He should

Capturing aggression in culture as opposed to aggression in culture

Personality; the former is aggressiveness; the latter is aggression.

> "'Aggressiveness' is defined here as the disposition of an individual or a
> Entirety to align their actions to goals in which the conscious or unconscious
> Intent is included, the interests of other individuals belonging to the same system

---

36 Parsons, Contributions to Sociological Theory, 1968:224–225

or unlawfully infringe the whole. The term *illegal (or*

illegitimate) implies that the individuals or ensembles in question are in a if

no matter how imperfect the moral order is, theirs

mutual rights and obligations defined. The universality of a moral

Order in this sense represents one of the main theses of modern social sciences

It does not mean that world society is an integrated, moral

forms order in this sense; on the contrary, it is the difference between them

Orders, which represents the main problem of integration. But this

diversity as such is *not* the problem of aggressiveness."37

Let's examine this definition in detail. Aggressiveness is 1. a "disposition",

2. an "individual" or 3. an "entirety".

"Disposition" is an ambiguous term. He could do so much, depending on the frame of reference

like inclination, attitude or attitude. Therefore I will use the terms

Assign disposition, attitude and attitude each to a part of the social world

and treat each as representative of the impulses (or inputs) coming out

come from one of the three parts of the social world and are understood in the culture

can: dispositions are those motivations that come from the personality;

Attitudes those rational or legitimate core beliefs emanating from the culture

come; Attitudes those rational or legitimate views arising out of a

subsystem of society originate. In culture, of course, dispositions

Attitudes and attitudes have a universal meaning.

---

37 Parsons 1968: 223, footnote 1

The term disposition is intended to describe processes in the personality

become, which unfold in the culture. So if there is a disposition of a

there is a totality, then this must mean that actors aim at action goals

orientate, whose selection is determined by considerations that, on the one hand, are not without

further problematizable, which on the other hand, in the strict sense, is also not unconscious

are. In a word, the motivation Parsons calls disposition is one of

unconscious elements colored attitude, which ~~under normal conditions only up~~ to

is addressed to a certain extent. Parsons therefore picks up almost exclusively

the personality level declines when he modernizes the sources of aggression

societies examined.

Such motivation can affect the action of both actors and

influence the actions of a group. Entirety means nothing other than one

action system. This action system can be structured and closes

in this respect both associations and subsystems of society. As before

mentioned, Parsons developed this approach before his sociological model

consistently worked out. As a result, it contains conceptual ambiguities,

which allow me some leeway in their interpretation. Based on

Parsons, I use the term aggression in what follows when I

Processes in the personality, those of aggressiveness when I react to actions

of culture speak. Entities are structured systems of action whose degree

of structuring is indefinite. The concept of the action system closes

Conversational situations, family, clubs and (related to the level of action)

institutions.

Central to the definition of aggressiveness is the "unlawful" violation of

Interests of individuals who are members of a culture. "Unlawful" means

illegitimate rather than illegal. Cultural norms are violated by actions

which by no means need to be codified in the form of legislation. parsons

emphasizes the violation of norms, not because he is about aggressiveness with criminals

want to equate action, but because by emphasizing this violation

sees the possibility of aggressiveness from other forms of social action

differentiate. Describe the concepts of power and aggressiveness (and coercion).

different ways of acting. Already in this essay are the outlines of

Parsons' classic work "On the Concept of Political Power".38

According to Parsons, coercion occurs when targets are met by force or threat

achieved by violence.39 Other forms of persuasion are used

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[38] Parsons, Social Theory and Modern Society, 1967:298

[39] This concept of coercion evident in the social science tradition in the wake
von Hobbes, overlooks all kinds of forms of action that relate to understanding.
Interaction in the social world is figuratively held together by screws that pierce the culture through
coercion to ensure that everything doesn't fall apart. The Hobbesian concept of power all too often
leads to the assumption that aggressiveness and power are interchangeable or that
aggressiveness forms the emotional basis for power. Here power is obviously confused with
coercion. Since Parsons' critique, the Hobbesian concept of power has proved untenable.
Parsons bases his work on power on hints from Durkheim. However, Parsons is not primarily
responsible for the further dissemination of a post-Hobbesian concept of power. Only Foucault, who
unmistakably follows Parsons' work, brought the reformulation of the concept of power to a broad
public. Foucault uses his concept against the background of a completely different tradition,
so that power becomes a medium in itself or is no longer a medium but a meaning-making structure.
The influence of Heidegger is unmistakable and leads to conceptual difficulties in Foucault that
can hardly be cleared up. It says a lot about the state of the social sciences that one of the few
epistemological advances that is generally recognized as such is the overcoming of a coercive
concept of power with a sociological concept of power. (See Parsons: Sociological Theory and
Modern Society (1967), and: Foucault, Surveiller et Punir (1993))

omitted, i.e.: "simply the generalized capacity to attain ends or goals in social

relations, independently of the media employed or of the status of 'authorization' to

make decisions or impose obligations"40

Power is also different from influence. Like influence, power does not build

Violence, however, sets the possibility of applying negative sanctions

in advance. In this respect, power means the ability to persuade people non-violently

enter into binding commitments, provided that the application

(negative) sanctions if these obligations are not complied with:

> "Power then is generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by
> units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with
> reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in the case of the recalcitrance
> there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions – whatever the
> actual agency of that enforcement."41

Against this background, the dividing lines between power, coercion and

aggressiveness clearer. The desire, for the sake of one's own gratification, interests

hurting others is aggression. Through it, the use of force

conceivable, even if no material advantages are achieved as a result.

---

40 Parsons, 1967:298

41 Parsons, 1967:308

Parsons speaks of a norm-violating disposition. It implies the

Assertion that all members of a culture perceive this (norm-violating) action as

(can) perceive a violation. The perception of action takes place in the

culture instead. It is based on cultural patterns of meaning and content. The

Norms by which actors orientate themselves are also part of the culture.

Perception and norm-deviating action naturally differ in

many ways. One thing they have in common is perception and evaluation

of actions in culture. As already mentioned, actors assume that

others evaluate their own actions as culturally "intended".

In other words, the assumptions, those of perception, and the norms

underlying are shared by all members of a culture. The review

of action is based on patterns of meaning based on these assumptions

build up. The criteria by which actors make judgments remain largely in the

sociological meanings are latent, insofar as they only become present if actors are involved

statements or actions that surprise them. Such

Criteria are known.42 Therefore they do not have to be suppressed. Despite it

Actors very rarely reflect on the criteria they are part of

Empower action situation to judge the action of others.

As a result, such criteria are inconsistent with those basic structures

to be equated, from which the problematizable parts of a lifeworld are made

build up.

Now we can turn to the difference that we are dealing with in this framework

interested: namely the difference between norm-deviating perception

and abnormal action. Acting that deviates from the norm is

members of a culture as wrong, illogical, quirky, weird, new, etc.

understood. Acting that deviates from the norm is treated as deviance and calls for a

reaction of other participants. People who are considered illogical, funny or even

are considered irresponsible, get to feel firsthand that

the separation between illogical and norm-deviating actions only

can be done analytically. In fact, it cannot be sustained. Nevertheless is

For example, an illogical statement is something other than a frowned upon action.

The former asks other participants in a conversation to identify the inconsistencies

to interpret these statements in such a way that they are understandable *in terms* of culture. She

requires a repair service, as we have mentioned above. The latter solves

Reactions from, at least insofar as they should remain frowned upon, the normative order

restore the situation.43

Parsons' definition of aggression uses norm violation as one

Scale against which deviation from the normative rules of culture is measured

can be. However, he leaves it undefined whether the acting person is the

is aware of the violation of norms or to what degree he understands the importance of his

action can suppress. This inaccuracy is, however, in a way

intended. The motivational source of aggressive action (of aggressiveness)

Parsons finds in the experiences of socialization, its meaning in the

---

42 See Habermas: Theory of Communicative Action, Volume II (1981)

Culture. Parsons thus escapes the question of how to manage aggression in a society

speaks, in which it is raised to the norm.

In this essay, Parsons starts from several concepts, the exact ones

drafting he does not undertake. In the course of his theory development he arrives at

a monological drive concept.44 Parsons exist in their original form

According to them, drives arise from libidinal impulses that only arise during the socialization process

take shape and direction. In this respect, aggression is not an instinct, but an instinct

Result of failed object relations. Children are not born with one

equipped with an aggressive drive that must be transformed during socialization,

to enable integration into the social world of adults. Unless you

can speak of an aggressive drive in Parsons, it is secondary, that is, a

Drive that arises during socialization and children through partial satisfaction

their libidinal drives to an active participation in their own education

emotional. Children are not born with an aggressive instinct. He doesn't live

In children, even at birth, he contributes to their will, through action

to learn the meaning of their environment. aggression is done

renunciation of the already socialized instincts. With renunciation, children must themselves

from the beginning of education. In addition, affects the functional

Role of the family in modern society favorable to the development of

aggressiveness off.

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[43] See Gould: Revolution in the Development of Capitalism (1987).

Although Parsons' aggression cannot be called an instinct, it can

Compare aggression more easily with a drive than with an irritation or with

Feelings generally associated with (knowing) renunciation of desires. parsons

ascribes to aggression functions resembling the usual (Freudian)

remember drive concept. Aggression is repressed, sublimated, transferred and even

projected. People are no longer aware of their origin. the object of irritation,

that seems to trigger aggression, the object around which aggression crystallizes,

which can thus become a form of social action is mostly found in

the wider environment of the actor. Aggression can therefore be more easily against the

wider environment of actors than against the family in which they are mostly

arises precisely because it is not forbidden outside the family to the same extent as

in her.45 Aggression thrives in children's relationships with their most important ones

Object relationship, namely to the one who takes on the "mother role". if the

Relationship between mother (and later parents) and her children disturbed

these disturbances lead to diffuse destructive feelings, Parsons' aggression

---

[44] Contrary to Parsons, Freud uses a dual drive concept, adding a destructive drive to the libidinal drive.

[45] Parsons' handling of aggression specifically assumes that it is directed against one's own family directed aggression is frowned upon. In this essay, Parsons deals exclusively with aggression in modern Western societies. The societies that Parsons had in mind at the time were also Christian in their religious character. Against the background of developments since the Second World War, the question arises to what extent his approach can be applied to non-Christian modern societies. On the one hand, Christian teaching demands a particularly high level of repression of aggression. As is well known, Freud made the repression of aggression, which was made the most important commandment under Paul, responsible for the vehemence of anti-Semitism. (See Freud: The Discomfort in Culture (1930)).
On the other hand, Christianity places its concept of normative order above that of the family. (See Bellah: Beyond Belief (1970)). Parsons does not examine the impact of a doctrine that normatively places the family above society. It cannot simply be assumed that an increase in the normative obligation towards the family (to the detriment of society) leads to an increase in aggressiveness. This is certainly possible, but essentially rationalistic. Prioritizing familial responsibilities over social responsibilities may also lead to a more direct encounter with aggressive desires and thus more adequate gratification.

names. Interestingly, these disorders often come from forms of

Violation of norms emerges, ie when the child perceives the parents' actions as

feels inappropriate, especially with regard to the donation of

Love.

According to Parsons, feelings of insecurity and unfairness are the causes of

Aggression. Aggression is caused by the unequal distribution of love among the

siblings generated. Having the role of love in the (later) Parsonian model

we already investigated. The transformation of gratification from impulses to

Satisfaction of love needs is for the emergence of an I (ego)

distinctive. The first constellation, from which aggression emerges, is linked

those instinctual impulses that are already present in the relationship between mother and child

have been socialized. Aggression is the (negative) flip side of

Socialization processes that involve a transformation from the pleasure principle to the love principle

accomplish. It is important in this context that Parsons a

reciprocal relationship between drive and love sees gradually with the drive

disappears in favor of love. Aggression develops in

framework of this process. Therefore, it could be determined when in this

Process formed aggression. If aggression is only against the background of one

can develop an ego that has already largely emerged, it acquires another

Meaning than if it is meant to be simply present. Unfortunately, Parsons missed out

to clarify these questions thoroughly. However, his description of the

Functions of aggression in social action suggest that

Aggression accompanied the socialization process from the beginning. Because that's the only way

explain how it can largely be attributed to primary processes.

Feelings of insecurity and "unfairness" during parenting are those

triggers of aggression. Aggression does run in families, but it can

because of the commandment to love, especially for members of one's own family

Dimensions shall not be expressed:

> "Therefore (aggressive impulses) are generally governed by the positive, social
>
> recognized basic attitude system dissociated and 'repressed'. But this one
>
> repressed attitude system persists as such and searches for one
>
> indirect expression, especially in symbolic form. This may seem purely in the imagination
>
> take place, but here is a phenomenon that in our context of
>
> is of particular importance, namely the shifting of the aggressive impulses to one
>
> Scapegoat. If the father, mother or siblings are not openly hated
>
> allowed, then an object outside the circle of people that one loves will take its place
>
> must, and thus the gratification of the aggressive impulses in an indirect way
>
> secured. And precisely because these impulses are repressed, the individual is unaware
>
> of the displacement and through rationalization comes to believe that
>
> his attitude is a reasonable response to something the scapegoat has done
>
> or would do if he had the opportunity" (Parsons, 1968: 228).

It would go beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the

Shifting aggressive impulses toward scapegoating. The

Emergence and accommodation of aggressive impulses is more relevant. parsons

argues that aggression is a concomitant of the object relation between mother

and child, where the trigger is insecurity or unequal distribution of love.

At the same time, however, children learn that aggressive impulses are frowned upon and within the

family as a violation of its basic principles. Therefore such

Transfer impulses to other objects.

2.7 Summary

The aim of this section was to examine Parsons' drive concept in such a way that his

conceptual limitations, but also its usefulness become apparent. Above all wanted

I discuss the conceptual advantages and disadvantages of Parsons' drive concept in her

describe the relationship to each other. Both, I think, come from the same

premises. Parsons' work is ideal for this study because of

because of their consistent structure, his statements easily reach their theoretical level

origin can be traced. So it was possible the disappearance of one

Parsons' drive concept and at the same time a fundamental problem

refer to sociology. I have a work by Parsons on purpose

selected, which from his point of view is unfinished. So I wanted the integration of

Freudian drive theory and a positive sociological model

advance. The sketch presented here can serve as a basis for further

investigations serve. In such a framework, the linguistic composition of

investigate aggressive impulses. Parsons himself points out that such

Impulses can take symbolic forms, but without losing their cultural

to explain the meaning in more detail. This question is the third part of this thesis

dedicated. Adorno's critique of the "jargon of authenticity" should help us here

verbal utterances designed to meet frowned upon needs

to meet without compromising the normative order of each cultural

to hurt the situation.

3. Adorno's jargon concept: the cultural legitimation of aggression

Adorno's text "The Jargon of Authenticity" turns against a special -

time-bound – Mixture of apologetic social theory and

fascist ideas. By using jargon, needs,

that come to light due to given social conditions

and be satisfied. This jargon that Adorno refers to social causes

can only serve as a starting point. Because he describes

one related to the peculiarities of post-war Germany

Phenomenon. For this reason alone, Adorno's concept of jargon can only be used in its context

be gradually removed. Moreover, jargon is not an analytical concept, but

a reservoir of Adorno's poetry. He can therefore not readily

explanation of social action in modern societies.

But if one asks about the functional role of jargon in modern societies,

can the analytical and thus generalizable features of Adorno

used term are worked out. According to Adorno, jargon is

Communication that takes into account those needs that appear to be unsolvable

Conflicts in culture arise. Instead of the social origins of cultural misery

to unmask as law and to demand real change, they become

constants of human existence. social constraints

appear like forces of nature that threaten to crush people if they do

"cross". The cultural achievement of jargon is its dual function.

On the one hand, it enables the objective consideration of those at the action level

become constraints that are exercised on people, and thus serves as

adaptation strategy. On the other hand, at the same time, it expands the scope for action

in which actors move without regard to generally applicable normative rules

can. In this way, those needs can be satisfied that are neither sublimated

can still be acted out.

It can be shown that behind Adorno's "official" approach there is another approach

remains hidden, which is based exclusively on compulsion based on premises

removed, namely an explanation for the positive attitude of the perpetrators to theirs

perpetrators. Only in this way can Adorno criticize the mendacity of the German

lead a post-war society that conceals its own guilt in jargon.46 Im

In the context of this work, I am concerned with deriving from Adorno's work a concept of

---

[46] There are some authors, such as Axel Honneth, who relate Adorno's arguments exclusively to ideas of power and coercion. Therefore, the social science approach is much too superficial to be able to understand the diversity of social action.

cultural and psychological meaning of jargon, that

has analytical traits and is therefore also used to analyze social conditions

can be.

However, Adorno's essays present textual difficulties in which

conventional design methods fail. The conventional way

which follows the lines of argument of the essay, reproduces them and criticizes them

practices, if only because Adorno writes his essays poetically

designs. Causal relationships can only be traced in a text if

if they exist. Honneth47 therefore chooses a different method for interpreting the

Adorno's texts. It consists in listing Adorno's premises in order to set the texts

then read with their help. Starting from the premises, there should be a common thread

be shown, which underlies Adorno's writings, and so the missing one

to make up for rigor.48 The question remains whether they are also doing so for their spirit

to be brought.

I also assume that Adorno's arguments will be worked out

must in order to finally evaluate them. However, I am not building this argument

on the statements that Adorno offers us in "The Jargon of Authenticity",

---

47   Honneth, Critique of Power. Stages of reflection of a critical social theory. Frankfurt am Main, 1985.

48 Goethe's "Faust" basically describes the problem that Honneth wants to avoid, namely that the intellectual bond that holds Adorno's essay together cannot be reduced exclusively to the premises he has made explicit. Honneth attempts to restore Adorno's approach along the premises explicitly introduced by Adorno. However, the approach that he "restores" in this way is from Honneth and no longer from Adorno: "Who wants to recognize and describe something alive / first seeks to drive out the spirit / then he has the parts in

rather I try to work out the assumptions against the background

jargon term makes sense. Irrespective of the question of whether I would like Adorno in a

permissible way, this method has the advantage that I

develop my own term of jargon, which is based on Adorno's impressions, however

has already been transferred to a different conceptual framework.

3.1 The jargon of authenticity: its cultural content

I maintain that Adorno explained to us the effects of drive-dynamic processes on a

would like to present a "living world" that has already been colonized by domination. follow from that

some questions that need to be answered for logical reasons alone.

My reconstruction relates first to these questions. For ambiguity

avoid, I would like to repeat at this point that it is not the goal

my interpretation is to reproduce Adorno's text, but my aim is to

to lay the foundation for an analytical jargon concept.

I'll start with 1. the relationship between drive and jargon. From this arises 2. the question

according to which instance the mediation between drive and social environment

can be awarded, and 3. the question of what is supposed to have become social

Function of "authenticity" and its use as an instrument of

instinct gratification. Only against this background can we 4. Adorno's handling

understand the jargon term. Because jargon associated with exclusion

---

of his hand,/Alas, missing! only the spiritual bond." (Goethe, Faust, first part, quoted from:
Goethes Werke, Hamburg edition, Munich 1986, volume 3: 63)

62

of unwanted people emerges, we must consider exclusion in this framework

Treat component of integration separately. Therefore I ask 5. the question how

Adorno's indirect portrayal of the stranger in modern societies

differs from that of Simmels. The comparison helps me to get clarity about it

win, which 6. is the motivation of those who attract strangers

pursue. Finally, I come 7th for the role of religion in German culture

questions.

Adorno writes in the introduction to his essay "The Jargon of Authenticity":

"In Germany, a jargon of authenticity is spoken, even more written,

hallmark of social elect, noble and homely at once; sublanguage

as upper language. It does not merely extend from philosophy and theology

Protestant academies about education, about adult education centers and youth associations

to the exalted way of speaking of deputies from business and administration. While

he overflows with the pretense of being deeply touched by human beings, meanwhile he is like that

standardized like the world he officially denies; partly due to its mass success,

partly also because it sets its message automatically by its pure nature and

thereby shutting them off from the experience that is supposed to animate them. He has one

modest number of snappy words. Authenticity itself is not the most important thing; rather, it

illuminates the airwaves where the jargon thrives, and the

sentiment that latently feeds him." (Adorno, 1973, 416–417)

This sums up the phenomenon of jargon. It denotes a specific handling

German language that gives some the feeling of being chosen. This

Language, and more importantly its effect, allows a world of horror to flourish

a world in which fake has become real, a world in which the "actual" itself

Adopted by society to reduce destructive tendencies in society

to be of service. It is this "attitude that feeds latent (jargon)."

63

3.2 Satisfaction and Sanction

There is a mutual relationship between jargon and the norms and

Values of German culture, the frowned upon action compatible with Christian morality

might. With the help of jargon one can finally act, although this acting

being hurt by others. Because this action is incompatible with morality,

which Jargon itself upholds again and again, he dresses in the form of a

Folklore, to which everyone should of course orientate themselves.49 The active

Satisfaction of these aggressive needs, therefore, takes place in a form known as

culturally legitimate. As already mentioned, Adorno takes his

Sociology negative tradition sanctions concept. He therefore emphasizes from the outside

impending penalties. On the cultural level, action is replaced by threats of punishment

of the system. At the personality level, people are characterized by the

Internalization of dominance suggests norm-compliant action. internalized

Domination keeps people from the untamed fulfillment of their desires, if

they are not threatened with external sanctions.

Although the emphasis on external coercion often goes hand in hand with the tendency to

It is not possible to simplify sources of motivation for social action

---

49 We will delve further into the subject of religion and jargon below. Adorno writes: "After deducting the existential fuss, what remains is the recommendation of religious customs, detached from religious content; that, as objects of folklore, cultic forms survive their mystery as empty shells is not seen through, but defended with the help of jargon." (Adorno, 1973: 429)

Adorno's disinterest in this regard can be closed. To motivate

Adorno is very comfortable with people, although not with regard to them

Processes that repair children, later (as adults) run smoothly in the

moving culture. As is well known, Adorno exemplifies the positive tradition of sociology

for epistemological reasons,[50] he can also accept theirs

do not follow the motivational theory approach. Nevertheless it works

Adorno with similar questions. Because he wants the basics of motivation from

Understanding people in modern societies conceptually. That's what "The

jargon of authenticity". Adorno's concept of social order shapes his

Description of the motives of human action. Jargon serves the supreme

goal of human action that has become a priority: self-preservation, one

enormous task in view of the misanthropy of modern societies:

> "The miserable splitting of terms takes care of the welfare of the public. Depending on whether a
>
> Follower, for whom it makes little difference which cause he is attached to at the moment, and who himself
>
> which is also now known for its enthusiasm, as a low brow, middle brow or
>
> high brow classifies himself, he can imagine healing as salvation or that
>
> real lives, or social enclaves not yet dominated by industrialism, or
>
> also plain areas where Nietzsche and the Enlightenment have not yet met
>
> got around, or moral states in which the girls kept their wreaths until marriage
>
> hold onto. The slogan of security would probably not be the same worn-out one
>
> play off from dangerous life; who wouldn't want in the world of terror without fear
>
> live." (Adorno, 1973: 429–430)

Public services appease hunger for material change, jargon satiates,

providing for the inclusion of initiates and the exclusion of all others.

Jargon means a life amidst domination for one and for the other

---

[50] See Adorno, Essays on Social Theory and Methodology, 1970.

the social destruction. Aggression is therefore ipso facto the flip side of attachment,

the jargon procures. You should never know this about the downside of security

express. For to say what is known offends the bourgeois-Christian

Moral.

The gratification of the aggression that must result from these conditions

Humans capable of meeting the challenges of a colonized by domination

to do justice to the living environment, albeit by bearing the costs of their survival

relocate to others who then have no way out. This satisfaction raises –

if only temporarily – the reluctance that people rightly feel.

Adorno had difficulties translating his insights into his own

terminology. Because to give linguistic expression to such events would

mean going beyond the scope of his approach. Adorno describes a variety

social roles that his approach takes into account. An explanation of the function

of these roles in differentiated societies can be borrowed from those of him

introduced concepts are worked out conceptually. Adorno renounces

but on a consistent application of his approach and builds his reasoning

on the phenomenon that he examines in "The Jargon of Authenticity".

takes. In this way, Adorno can bypass the burden of his own premises. Be

Text can be described as a reservoir. Gather on its surface

impressions, by virtue of which the pathologies of the present are meaningfully understood

can become. Adorno seizes it in order to hold up our world to us.

Of course, he does not explain to us how we can follow his steps.

3.3 The mediation between drive and culture

My reconstruction of Adorno's text is based on the assumption that Adorno

of a philosophical-anthropological concept of aggression. The

Aggressive drive is initially simply given in the present. The treatment

of a concept of aggression as part of social relationships

conceptual difficulties that cannot be easily resolved.

Basically, the problem is that drive-dynamic processes, provided that

ontological qualities are ascribed to them, not readily into the world

of social conditions. For conceptual reasons alone,

do not mix ontological and sociological premises. We must

therefore attempt to free Adorno's concept of instinct from its burden without

to renounce its enlightening elements.

One way to solve this dilemma is to create an instance in the

postulate the psychic apparatus of man, which has the mediating role

takes over. It mediates between the inner world of psychic processes and the

outer world, a "terrible world", without being *in terms* of any of these worlds

to be fully defined. The tremendous role of self-preservation in Adornos

world can then be understood. Drive gratification makes self-preservation possible, but it is

at the same time only possible as social action. That's why Adorno doesn't have to be on the go

nor do without structures of the living environment. Self-preservation requires both

but strictly speaking it is neither of the two. Because self-preservation and

Instinct pacifications belong to different areas of the social world.

This mediating function entrusts Adorno with a specific use of the

Language he calls jargon:

> "The jargon, however, operates authenticity, or its opposite, out of each such
>
> clear connection. – Certainly no company would use the word order
>
> to calculate where you will be granted one. But such opportunities remain narrow and
>
> abstract. Anyone who oversteps it steers towards a blankly nominalistic theory of language in which
>
> the words are interchangeable tokens, untouched by history. This wanders
>
> however, in every word and withdraws each one from the supposed restoration
>
> Ursinns that the jargon chases after. What is jargon and what is not decides whether
>
> the word is written in the intonation in which it presents itself as transcendent to the
>
> own meaning sets; whether the individual words are charged at the expense of the sentence,
>
> judgment, thought. So the character of the jargon would be overly formal: it cares
>
> for what he would like, to a large extent regardless of the content of the words
>
> is felt and accepted through her presentation. The pre-conceptual, mimetic element
>
> he directs the language in favor of the causal relationships he desires."
>
> (Adorno, 1973: 418)

Adorno's term jargon goes beyond the usual definition. He denotes more than

just a distortion of language, belonging to a class, a

association or a district. He moves away from the dictionary definition51 and

exposes the narrow horizon of the current definition as completely inadequate.

In addition, his jargon concept allows a criticism of the approach of the

---

[51] Wahrig gives the following definition: "Expression of certain social or professional circles of society within a language". Larousse rather emphasizes the distortion of language: 1) Pejor. Langue savate d'un groupe professionnel, d'une science, d'une technique, d'une activité quelconque (distincte de l'argot) – 2) Fam. Langue qu'on ne comprend pas.

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traditional sociology. It is based on a rationalistic approach that

the actual social function of the jargon.52 As a result

are jargon and its function in the culture on milieu-specific characteristics and

idioms reduced. Culturally and normatively mediated rationality becomes

and only roughly captures the logic behind irrational action. The

Significance of the functional roles of jargon in culture finds its expression in

the dim colors of reified categories. She will at will

Presuppositions of an already adapted science flattened. the need

from which jargon takes possession of its social role, namely the

need to breathe constantly to postpone one's own demise,

is amused by the translation of everything irrational into categories that

Have shed the burden of internal and external domination.

3.4 The social function of ontological thinking

Superficial explanations are at the service of those philosophers who are familiar with the

Handling ontology as if it concealed a socially critical approach.

Adorno therefore objects to confusing ontology with

social criticism. Ontology occupies him as a social phenomenon

social function, as an authenticity that becomes actual through social action.

---

52 For example: "The American role theory is so popular because it explains the structure of
rolled out society at all. ..." (Adorno, 1973: 460)

According to Adorno, authenticity has already acquired a form in culture. To that extent

it has already strayed so far from its original roots that

can get hold of in the culture. With the one I already introduced

Conceptually speaking, authenticity consists in one thing

Reference context with lifeworld self-evidence. About them will

usually not discussed. They form the common background of a

Culture.53 Adorno's concept of authenticity is much more than one in culture

understandable content that can be brought into a conversation at any time as required

can.

Authenticity is in itself a carrier of political ideas. your political

Meaning is less a consequence of its construction than of a specific one

philosophical tradition (particularly to Heidegger). authenticity

refers to a way of thinking that is supposedly turned away from society. she will

used because it is associated with political consequences that are simultaneously

be denied. Authenticity owes its social function _____

by no means just a circle of bizarre philosophers. These have in her only conceptually

captured an idea. This idea could only "become real" in society

be accomplished. Therefore, she had to meet needs that ensued

social conditions or from the interaction of individual

Needs and social conditions arise. These social

Circumstances form the background against which authenticity is mixed up with jargon

can fraternize. The power of authenticity feeds on the tension that

---

[53] Lifeworlds are taken for granted. In this respect, their refutation by rational arguments does not mean that actors can give them up without further ado.

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such social conditions. It is based on the assumption

that this tension, which it also promotes, not through change

of social conditions can be abolished. Therefore you must

social origins are denied. This denial makes it so

Horrible in society supported by legitimacy.54

Adorno's depiction of the social function of authenticity draws the contours

of structures that are simply given. But authenticity is not

less dangerous just because they are "real" given the current circumstances

has become. Their illusory nature adds to their dangerousness. through them

Actually flexible so that they are retrieved in an already modified form

can. In this way, authenticity can do justice to those demands that

Personality area and from the social area (in culture), i.e. from

people and are placed on them by the system. It changes as needed.

3.5 Consequences of Adorno's epistemological refusal

An explanation of how a delusion (authenticity) to a structure of

can become a living environment is not to be found in Adorno. an apodictic one

Working out the composition of structures of the lifeworld would have an introduction

sociological concepts made necessary. This would have raised questions

would have demanded an extension of his epistemological premises, namely

regarding the cohesiveness of modern cultures and the creativity of social ones

Action. On this basis, Adorno should have asked the question of how

conceptualization of the rampant authenticity he perceives in

a sociological model could have been accomplished. Adorno assumes

that once ontological structures were capable of assuming real forms, so much so

to acquire meaning. So you can use them as background knowledge for yourself

serve the ever new unfolding horizons of the present. This background knowledge

is a carrier of historical content. Fascist past and present

dominion are intertwined. Nevertheless, the following remains in particular

unclear: how once ontological structures that have now become real are expressed in language

permit. Traditional sociological approaches tend to use their historical language

to undress meaning. Adorno points out this problem: "Certainly none would be

Company to calculate the word order, where you will be given one. But that kind of thing

Possibilities remain narrow and abstract. Whoever spans them, steers a blank

to the nominalist theory of language, in which words are exchangeable chips,

untouched by history..." (Adorno, 1973: 418).

This addresses a striking deficiency of the positively conceived sociology: its

Premises are not designed to have a function in history in themselves

attributed to the making of meaning. Of course, history will be used as the background,

before statements about the present take on meaning, conceptually in

invoiced. You come but a comparatively insignificant role in the

---

[54] Adorno speaks of Heidegger's emphasis on dwelling to illustrate the culmination of this tendency.

making sense to. In other words, historical content will be one

role in understanding processes granted; accept this content as constitutive

treat is untenable from this perspective.55 A detailed treatment of the

Reasons for this are beyond the scope of this work. I just want short

indicate that the transmission of contexts of meaning from one generation to the

presents a difficult task for the next social science models,

especially those models that are based on constitutive elements of society

Remnants of an already questioned philosophical tradition.56

In summary, one can state that the salvation of the concept of history is

consists in conceiving structures of the lifeworld as simply given (see   ____

Habermas' criticism of Schütz and Luckmann). Then actors find their environment

including their history. The idea of a simply given world

is essentially ontological unless it is explained by what act it is

acquires meaning. Habermas clears up these inconsistencies by

Concept of the lifeworld (by Schütz and Luckmann) in one

communication-theoretical approach.57 Adorno does not propose this path

---

55 Presumably this was the unspoken background of the argument between
Parsons and Schütz. Because the concept of the lifeworld should enable us to fill the
epistemological hole that has arisen for many scientists through the questioning of Marx's
approaches, and to do so with means that they considered to be justifiable. In this context I
cannot turn to the question of whether Marx's assumptions have in fact become questionable. I
am speaking here only of the implications of the fact that many scholars take the
questioning of Marxian assumptions as a fact.

56 In Parsons, "constitutive elements" of a culture are understood as patterns of meaning or norms of
social action and accordingly fall out of the perspective of the model.
The idea of a language charged with (driving) energy, which is handed down more and more by the
culture that gives it meaning, goes beyond the scope of such a model anyway. Parsons considers that
the phenomenological tradition on which Schütz and Luckmann built their approach has already been
overcome.

57 See Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2, 1987

a. Instead, he uses a language concept that is phenomenological

is very similar. It should make it clear to us, like the promise of phenomenology

can be redeemed without invoking their tradition, which has become questionable

must.

3.6 The social function of jargon

"Like a ragpicker, the jargon takes hold of the last rebels
Stimuli of the subject, thrown back on himself in the decline, in order to
peddle" (Adorno, 1973: 460)

Performatively, Adorno's argument boils down to the fact that only the

identity-forming function of the jargon can be spoken if those

Constraints are taken into account, arising from all three spheres of social life

(personality, culture, society). In doing so, he writes of self-preservation

a central role. Self-preservation means for necessary gratification in a

world in which there is no longer any real satisfaction. The last

rebellious stirrings of what has been thrown back on itself in the decline

Subjects" (Adorno, 1973: 460) tend to be less libidinal than aggressive.

Nor are they expressed through bodily actions, but through

through the violence of language and its real implications for those who don't

be addressed more. Adorno describes a world in which people

satisfying the communication instruments of the lifeworld.58 How instinct an

should bind distorted language is not easy to imagine - on the other hand, that

Core problem of those who bathe in the dew of a distorted language: how

namely, for an artificially created interiority that has become real, a place in the

social action is to be created in which the unbearable tension of

life can be abolished. When the jargon of instinctual impulses takes over

can and can be exchanged as a commodity, how should the instance then be conceived,

that mediates these urges? Because the mediation between outside and inside must

conceal that a life lie underlies a non-socially constructed inner life

lies. Provided that this deception itself is not shaken

allowed, drive relief ensures security.

Being safe is not a passive behavior. It is the active one, admittedly already for

Attempt doomed to fail to shape the social environment in such a way that

difference between yourself and others disappears. The social origins of

Structures through which the desired is perceived is denied.

Desires should spring from your own soul. For refreshment is only attained

when access to the social is no longer required.59 The boundaries between

Inside and outside do not become blurred because intersubjectivity is human

life finds recognition, but because their misunderstanding promises security.

The perversity consists in the fact that from a fact (namely: intersubjectivity

---

58 At the same time, however, they serve Adorno as a normative lever. It is not surprising that
Adorno consciously indulges in the performative contradiction by repeatedly allowing the
normativity of his description to leak through, but questioning the means that could justify criticism.
59 See Goethe, "Urfaust": "You have not gained refreshment/If it does not flow out of your own
soul." (Goethe, Faust in its original form (Urfaust), loc.cit., volume 3: 373)

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of social life) becomes a deception (namely: supposed intersubjectivity).

Thus, Adorno's perpetrators refuse to distinguish between inside and outside

to take notice. Real conditions should be hidden. Instead of domination

questioning itself only expands the game trail on which to hunt

may, and indeed for everyone - yes, a claim to power for everyone

claimed, provided he can and is allowed to babble jargon. Jargon stamps one as

strangers whose claim to belonging can be shaken. He creates

a circle of initiates:

> "The jargon no longer knows primary and secondary communities; also none
> parties. This development has its real basis. What Kracauer diagnosed
> in 1930 as employee culture, the institutional and psychological superstructure that
> at that time demonstrated to the stand-up collar proletarians who were immediately threatened with falling, they
> are something better, and thereby held on to the bourgeois pole, is meanwhile, in
> the long-lasting economic situation, has become the universal ideology of a society
> which misjudges itself as a united people of medium-sized companies and that of a uniform language
> it can be confirmed that for purposes of collective narcissism the jargon of
> authenticity is most welcome; not only to those who speak it, but to him
> objective mind. The jargon expresses general reliability by a dated
> General stamped particularity of civil origin: the regulation
> choosy sound seems that of oneself. The most important advantage is that of
> certificate of good conduct. No matter what she says, the voice that vibrates
> signs a social contract." (Adorno, 1973: 425f.)

Membership is gained through jargonisms. The jargon vouches for origin and

Reputation. Or to put it more aptly, origin and reputation no longer refer to each other

on recommendations from organizations that people once used

character testimony, but in a language that replaces them. Cheered up

surrender to the simple tones of jargon. This is supposed to be the connection to

to "restore" the missing real thing. Material changes on the other hand

are presented as a deception to make room for seemingly deeper solutions

create.

> "Reverence for that being that is more than it is defeats everything that is insubordinate
>
> low. It is made to be understood that what is happening is too deep for language
>
> profanes what has been said by saying it. The clean hands despise it, to prevail
>
> to change ownership and power relations; the sound does that
>
> contemptuous, like Heidegger, of the merely ontic." (Adorno, 1973: 426)

Adorno's picture of human action could be seen as a kind of drive-related

rationality can be understood. The purpose of action is relief,

strategic action is the means to the end.60 This form of action sets a

Knowledge of applicable standards and their gaps, but they are not allowed

be equated with rational action. The latter refers to a

system-internal, of course, but with recourse to their context of meaning

generally understandable logic. Adorno's conception of rationality is blocked

against a generally binding traceability. The motives

destructive people are not in the context of "normal" social action

always subject to discussion. The goals of their actions see the violation of those rules

that underlie their success. Usually the motives of

People who violate a normative rule through their actions, in general

---

Summing up, Luhmann writes: The theory of purposeful-rational organization must try to bring
its research area into the form of ends/means chains. This is relatively possible as long as one
restricts oneself to a consideration of the course of action in an organized system ...
(Luhmann, Niklas: Concept of purpose and system rationality: on the function of purposes
in social systems (1968))

understandable. On the other hand, there are goals at which drive-dynamic processes take place

orientated, not necessarily culturally comprehensible, especially not when

such goals can be achieved through a "jargon of authenticity" in a norm-compliant manner

should.

It is obvious that an act by the needs of a

directed by an individual differs from the actions of other individuals.

For this reason alone, such an act can not be the basis for a

be a social project. unification processes from which social

Projects should arise only on the background of cultural

understandability of the consensus. Access to a personality

People are largely denied the "normal" encounter between actors.

Therefore, it can hardly be used as a basis for creating a social consensus

serve.61 In this respect, the demand for a society of

Security around the completion of a deception.

According to Adorno, a deception is mediated by reality. Adorno's people are themselves

aware of their situation for two reasons. First are the constraints that

Restrict options for action, real. Perceiving them is therefore rational. This

Knowledge can only be endured if one can indulge in delusion. Secondly

instinct-related processes are largely conscious. people wish

to be exonerated. Adorno describes the psychological processes in a more modern way

people, as if evolutionary processes through which they

Unconscious reached, would have no effect. The crowding out of the

Society dangerous lust and aggression has failed.

Freud, on the other hand, believed that such desires, which people once had through their

given expression to horrible deeds in the course of historical developments

were ousted. Culture is therefore the submission of human needs under

the principle of moral action.62 Culture, however, can show the traces of the past

Don't totally obliterate the conscious. By means of distorted (conscious) perception

expressions of the past find their way into the cultural world of the present. To this

In a way, according to Freud, the transmission of history is constituted. historical

Events are suspended in the unconscious. Your statements shape them

world of consciousness. Adorno flattens the variety of frictions between

repression and culture. Insofar as culture requires repression, it is not its own

succeded. People are more likely to lurk for the opportunity to express their desires

to lend. Because they know that by doing so they bring about only partial satisfaction,

they hasten to destroy every memory of their true condition.

3.7 Simmel: Jargon from the perspective of strangers and perpetrators

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61 See Scarry, The Pain in the Body. The Ciphers of Vulnerability and the Invention of Culture, 1992

62 Freud, S. (1930), Discomfort in culture. GW 14, 419-506

The stranger is to be excluded because he reminds us of this situation. In Adornos

"The jargon of authenticity" we learn the object of contempt only insufficiently

know. With the help of Simmel's essay "The Stranger" I give him flesh and blood.

In addition, the comparison of Simmel and Adorno helps to clarify the presuppositions in

"The Jargon of Authenticity" to further develop.

Simmel ascribes special objectivity to the stranger and attributes this to his

roll back in society.

> "Because (the stranger) does not root for the singular constituents or the
> one-sided tendencies of the group, he faces all of these with the special
> Attitude towards the 'objectives', which is not about a mere distance and
> means indifference, but a special formation from distance and near,
> indifference and commitment" (Simmel, 1908: 766f.)

Because of the shift in how people relate to their social environment,

challenges the mere presence of the stranger, the stranger stands in one

peculiar relationship to those social roles that people under

engage in social interaction. This relationship of "distance and nearness,

indifference and commitment" to societal roles, and consequently

to himself and others, characterizes the stranger. That's why he has the ability

given to regard cultural norms as set.

According to Simmel's well-known formula, the stranger is the one who comes today and

stays tomorrow. Of course, what is interesting about this statement is not that the stranger

comes, but that he stays. Against this background, Simmel can ask the question

ask, which he would like to pursue, namely what characteristics the stranger

actually make out. Because if a stranger stays long enough, sometime is

neither the environment alien to him nor he to the environment. Then the stranger is no more

stranger, but he is known as a stranger. He's more of a member of the

Society, which determines him as an outsider because of his role, as a

Foreigner in the ordinary sense of the word. The stranger carries these for him

intended role, and this carries him. He can therefore use them in the service of his

serve interests.

The irritation that the stranger evokes in others is not exclusive

its presence, but it must be traced back to actions and points of view

that make his role in society possible in the first place. In society

the stranger creates strange things out of everything he touches. He imports ideas that

apparently didn't exist before and shouldn't have existed. For his

The stranger cannot contribute to society without recognition and reward

hope. According to Baumann, the contempt for the stranger results from two factors

Reasons: first, because the stranger came without an invitation, and second, because he

came at all:

> "The stranger comes into the lifeworld and settles here, and consequently it becomes - in
> Difference to the merely unfamiliar - relevant to whether he is a friend or a foe. He has
> made his way into the lifeworld uninvited, which brought me to the
> on the receiving side of his initiative, made me the object of action,
> whose subject he is: all this - a notorious feature of the enemy ... But not only
> for this reason. There are others. For example, the unforgettable and therefore
> unforgivable original sin of later entry: the fact that he entered the realm of
> entered the living environment at a precisely definable point in time. He doesn't belong 'from

> At the beginning', 'originally', 'always', since a safe time in this living environment
> and consequently questions the extemporality of the lifeworld, brings the mere
> 'historicity' of existence to the fore." (Baumann, 1992: 80–81)

The stranger cannot be a landowner. He comes from afar. is uninvited

the stranger, unless he has accepted an invitation. Baumann literally 'uninvited'

to mean, not Simmel. Whether the stranger is with or without an invitation in the

living environment of a culture does little to change its status; because one

Invitation by no means automatically changes the distance ratio between

strangers and locals. More correct is the argument that the presence

of the stranger reminds others of the temporality of the present. This interpretation

However, Simmels needs a means that Simmel does not use: namely

a phenomenological concept of history.

The stranger does not only provoke irritation because he does not belong to the

respective community belongs, but because he is more specific about the constitution of

affiliation seems to know and because he benefits from such

can draw knowledge. In the eyes of the locals, the stranger occupies

Positions that he creates himself in the minds of the natives and therefore without him

would have remained empty. Only if he asserts himself in this world and so on

strangers in the Simmelian sense, he takes part in social processes.

Locals are often unable to perceive these processes. your against

indignation directed at the strangers represents a confusion of the stranger with the

economic conditions that require them to make changes that they

worry. Admittedly, Simmel takes into account those "objective"

Circumstances too short, which the stranger faces and which open him up earlier

respond to societal needs. In general, Simmel neglects them

areas of society and personality. The concept of culture used by Simmel

should be sufficient to justify social action. The assumption lies with him

underlying that inputs of the system and unconscious elements of personality none

require special treatment. Acceptable is this handling of system and

personality in the lifeworld only if the restriction of the

epistemological horizon or to the cultural significance

of the system and the unconscious. However, traces of such inputs can only be analyzed analytically

are excluded, in fact we cannot separate them from the living environment.

Therefore, if we can say that Simmel turned to the world of experience of the foreign

and interprets this world as part of social life in a culture

could also be said that Adorno saw his world from the perspective of those

turns to those who pursue strangers. A threat that is socially constituted

is perceived by Simmel as well as by Adorno. irritations dem

are attributed to strangers, but do not escape that social

context from which they proceed. They take place against the background of those

social roles held by the stranger. These roles are namely a constitutive one

part of modern societies. They enable maintenance

diverse forms of human interactions and establish a normative

attitude to the overall order of society. diversity and unity

are understood in their reciprocal relationship to each other.

At this point, Simmel's and Adorno's paths separate. Adorno is, *needless to*

say, more skeptical than Simmel. His criticism of society runs true

also about a discussion of the Enlightenment. The project of

According to Adorno, enlightenment has people

subjugated and people committed to "self-preservation through adaptation."

It is therefore ludicrous to associate enlightenment with progress. A

Such an image of the Enlightenment misjudges the reality of human history, because the

"completely enlightened earth shines in the sign of triumphant mischief"63. Before this

It is not surprising that Simmel and Adorno

View society differently on the subject. system and personality

are treated in Simmel in their cultural form. Adorno's world (in "Der

Jargon of authenticity") is administered from above and driven from below. She

arises from irresolvable conflicts that require a kind of pseudo-understanding

make. With Adorno, people collide. You are afraid for her

Survive. They no longer notice irritation of the Simmelian kind. You guess

into an uncontrollable, life-threatening panic. The stranger moves less

in a role that he is able to shape within certain limits, but is his

been assigned a role that leaves him little room for manoeuvre. The stranger is with

Adorno is certainly also a source of unwanted friction. Above all, he is

the one who makes many feel the shaking of the world.

---

63 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectics of Enlightenment, Frankfurt am Main 1969

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3.8 The philosophical background against which jargon takes place in the world

The philosophical background against which the role of the stranger in the social world

is perceived, builds on different philosophical traditions that

clear even after their transfer into a sociological conceptual framework

Leave traces. Simmel completes his approach through an argument

with Kant. Society and nature stand in a different relationship

those structures that give them meaning. That applies to society

not that its meaning cannot ipso facto lie in itself. she poses

their own meaning, and to that extent indeed lies the meaning of the

Society in its "things" without giving these "things" ontological qualities

would have to be attributed:

> "But the decisive difference between the unity of a society and the unity of nature
> is this: that the latter - for the Kantian point of view presupposed here -
> comes about exclusively in the observing subject, exclusively from him
> and is generated from the inherently unconnected sense elements; whereas the
> social unity of its elements, since they are conscious and synthetically active,
> is readily realized and requires no observer. That sentence of Kant: connection
> can never lie in things, since it is brought about only by the subject
> not for the social connection, which is actually in the 'things' -
> which are here the individual souls – directly takes place." (Simmel, 1992: 43)

According to Adorno, the step from nature to society must be accomplished differently.

With the help of his reversal of the Kantian approach, Simmel can

understand the social production of meaning. However, he neglects it

the domination of the system.

Adorno uses the approach of the young Hegel to understand the lifeworld

turn to In "The Jargon of Authenticity" he assumes a simple

given disruption of shared subjectivity, people for survival

want to try to pick up. That requires the connection of jargon and

Authenticity, society and ontology, sense and nonsense. Jargon is that

Link between the world and needs in a culture in which there is a bond with the

Real is out of the question. Such a world compels man to

to orientate towards forms of alternative satisfaction. The underlying thought is

relatively simple, but its consequences cause headaches: Because one

mendacious answer to a genuine request must already be the genuineness of the

correspond to mendacious. Mendacity must be the truthfulness of this desire

recognize, so as to recognize the place that genuine desire has occupied,

to be able to fill it yourself. The mendacious only becomes effective when it relates to the

enters the realm of the real. Only in this way can the real desire from a surrogate

be covered. A sense of security spreads where once there was

need for intersubjectivity was felt. This does not happen despite

but because of the contradiction of such a transformation of real into

fake. That is why Adorno speaks of the "late bourgeois form of real need",

which is "processed by consciousness in the feeling of meaninglessness". The feeling

of meaninglessness, which refers to real conditions and is therefore understood

he associates it with self-deception:

> "The subjects' free time withholds from them the freedom they secretly hope for,
> and chains them to what is always the same, the apparatus of production, even where it is them
> on leave. (...) At the same time, the late-bourgeois figure appears in the feeling of meaninglessness

real need, the permanent threat of doom, processed by consciousness. It

turns what he dreads as if it were innate in him, and so weakens what he fears

no longer humanly appropriate to the threat. That meaning, which one too

always, everywhere seems powerless against evil; that nobody can be won over from him

and the fact that his protestation may further promote it is seen as a lack of

metaphysical content, preferably registered in religious-social ties." (Adorno,

 1963–64: 436f.)

Adorno's world draws its validity from the inner contradiction

mendacious intersubjectivity. It reinforces the need for interpersonal relationships

Relationships, however, prevents the establishment of new ones that meet these needs

oncoming ties. With the help of a kind of partial satisfaction, the

just maintain old conditions. Adorno's depiction of cohesion

conferring qualities of mendacious relationships does not, of course, contain a sufficient one

explanation of the living environment.

Anyway, these needs are those around maintaining the present

must be satisfied for the sake of order, not exclusively of an existential nature

Adorno combines the urge for intersubjective bonding with the urge for

drive relief. This creates the motivation to use jargon. The way

this motivation is understood, Adorno takes from the writings of the young Hegel.

Nevertheless, Hegel's influence on "The Jargon of Authenticity" is relatively clear,

as a quote from Habermas makes clear:

> Rather, the dynamic of destiny results from the disruption of
> Symmetry conditions and the reciprocal recognition relationships of an *intersubjective*
> constituted context of life, from which one part isolates itself and thus also
> alienated all other parts of themselves and their life together. This act of

> Tearing away from an intersubjectively shared lifeworld *creates* a subject-object
> Relationship. This becomes a foreign element, at least only afterwards
> Relationships introduced, which innately form the structure of an understanding between
> Subjects - and not obeying the logic of objectification by subject.
> The 'positive' also takes on a different meaning as a result. The absolutization
> of a conditional to the unconditional is no longer based on an *expanded* subjectivity
> that overstretches its claims, but to the alienated subjectivity
> who renounced their life together. And the repression that results
> aims at disrupting an intersubjective equilibrium rather than at subjugation
> of an objectified subject" (Habermas, 1988: 41).

We can use the parts from "The Jargon of Authenticity" in which the social

Features described by jargon can only be understood once we know a

Search for lost intersubjectivity forms the background against which

Jargon unfolds its power. It is the disruption of an "intersubjectively constituted

context of life" (Habermas), which gives power to the jargon.

The longing for a once-existing but long-lost "intersubjective

shared living environment" is perverted and thereby reinforced. The perversion

of such longings, however, sets an analytical distinction between form

and content ahead, even if this difference has actually disappeared. Form,

those who embrace such desires result from the perversion of the desire of

People according to shared intersubjectivity. Your content is the desire for genuine

Intersubjectivity, which is as real as the constraints imposed by society

be exercised. The compromise that allows for partial gratification is found

the basis of the perversion of these longings. What shape this

accepting perverted longings is, in turn, through the societal

conditions shaped.

Against this background, the desire for security wins

psychological and cultural significance. He leaves the framework of

personality area and henceforth has an effect on culture. In it there can be security

rely on impulses from other areas of the social world, or rely on them

seize. Safety is a regressive attitude with cultural significance

and political consequences. The system encourages regression, people

tempted to turn the real stranger within into an illusory stranger without

to transform themselves. Reflexive relationships in which the "strangers"

elements are taken into account shall be destroyed once and for all. reified

becomes the external object in the hope that this will eliminate the need for

Change in social conditions done. This step takes place on

expense of the stranger. His social role is consequently passed him

completed.64

The other that has become an object enables participation in one with others

Associated shared false intersubjectivity. This deception is happening

regardless of those to whom she gives an acquittal on parole. The

Temporaryness of a freedom based on deception and based on a

change in the exclusion policy can be revoked at any time, yours does

no loss of effectiveness. The daring lends nonsense the aura of one

adventurous, revolutionary project. The effectiveness therefore does not relate

solely on the negativity of this regression, but it also prevents it

---

64 See Horkheimer on anti-Semitism (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1947).

Recognition of a need that only a society free of domination

could be fair.

The emergence of a subject-object relationship through "breaking away from a

intersubjectively shared lifeworld" is the result of an alienated subjectivity that

prohibits a restoration of the moment. According to Habermas, this increases

"the 'positive' ... takes on a different meaning" (Habermas, 1988, 41). In the

world of Adorno, the effects of these moments are something like impulses,

who are already perverted when consciously registered. On the

At the personality level, Adorno swaps primary and secondary processes for one another

after defining both differently from Freud. The need for

Security is based on an unconscious, primary desire for

Intersubjectivity, which Adorno in a segregated form together with such

Discovering desires in the level of action means that joy to the unconscious

assigns. Secondarily, reflections that are doomed to fail build on it,

because they orient themselves to the negative demands of the culture and so from

close off the possibility of finding satisfaction in the first place. You could do this

moment somewhat generously call it dialectical, although it is more of a self

increasing interaction of negativity. Because this is where you step

Spurs on the plan, which, according to Adorno's account, are conscious components

must include. People consciously want satisfaction in a living environment

find, whereby their real needs have already been repressed into the unconscious

have been. The lifeworld itself is the place where this conflict takes place

becomes. The system sets the limits of "freedom" within which people without

external restrictions are allowed to act. The personality provides the energy

Available that enables action. The result is a longing (or

Longing) for something that is not tangible, a longing that is already there

attached to existing destructive structures of the living environment. (The promise will

not only granted from the top down. Humans desire "freedom" to conform to the

to perish unelect.)

Against this background, it is not difficult to get an idea of the political

to make consequences of the jargon. The security as something experienced inside

Feeling should be transferred to external reality. The inwardness that the

Culture should subvert, because of its content, creates an intensified

discomfort. The needs that drive this process are already within her

origin social. Freud's drives involve objects and can insofar as

partly be understood in a socially structured way, but must not be confused with social ones

structures are confused. Therefore, culture requires repression. After Adorno

the content, which according to Freud is repressed, gains the upper hand over the social

because the culture absorbs it. This starts a process similar to Freud's

gang, but causes other harms: namely, harms that are inherently social

and which can only be fixed with social tools.

The jargon feeds on this described disorder, which depends on the

Horizon of interest of the actors involved different adjustment services

require from them. The motivation of the actors to become factual in the world

Subjugating to given rule in order to be considered "conformist" is impossible

reduced to the fear of an omnipotent organ of power. The jargon says "yes",

to take a word from Foucault.[65] Through jargon, desires can

network of life-world relationships that conform to the norms of these

contradict the world in such a way that the disregard for the norms

bound sanctions do not have to be imposed. The jargon is a kind

Charter permitting, under certain conditions, perversity into the

"Normality" of life-world relationships may be brought in. up

the human acts in accordance with the instructions announced by the system. In the

The reciprocity of interpersonal exchange remains apparent in the living environment

untouched. The validity of statements seems to depend on these changes

Environment that jargon manages to be affirmed, provided they at

outsiders of all kinds are carried out. The acknowledgment of the own

Successes achieved through action also give the actors a

psychological relief that temporarily takes away anxiety. The contradiction is the

hub between these moments. Because he leaves the unrealizable in one

Kind of appearing real, accommodating the demands of all three spheres of the social world

becomes. In the lifeworld itself, i.e. the place where such demands

have to be negotiated, the importance of religious thinking increases.

It is obvious that one form of irrationality merges with another form

fraternized. However, Adorno sees more than just one function of religion

Side effect of an already similar phenomenon. Above all, Adorno emphasizes the

functionality of religion. Religion gives jargon a sacred aura

---

[65] Foucault, Power/Knowledge. Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977, 1980.

which provides motivational "grants". It is about the power of

Contradictory, and not a simple alloy of phenomena that

are generically interchangeable. The contemporary man sees himself

forced to fall back on the reservoir of an irrational tradition for himself

not to be ashamed of the origin of his thinking. He denies religion

which he uses. Therefore, he uses what appears to be secularized language to describe himself

to articulate meaningfully in a world that has already been demythologized. Because in the

Modernism can only provide the use of religious imagery

be meaningful that people deny their religious origins. This

A little bit of "rationality" remains all the more in the service of the "irrational": "The

Angelic tongues, with which he registers the word man, he draws from the teaching

of the likeness of God. It sounds the more irrefutable and captivating, ever

the more carefully it seals itself against its theological origin." (Adorno, 1973,

455) Below the level of a world disenchanted by enlightenment may itself

do not regress busy rhetoric.

Here you can see the glimmer of differentiation processes that take place in the

modernity take place against the background of a secularization of the living environment.

However, not in the sense of recognizing enlightened values. Adorno sees in

of pseudo-sacred imagery, the remnants of an already questioned one

system of values that people use to express their statements

to give pseudo-validity. Such is the persistence of that magical thought

be made possible that still really moves people. The latter is

the language that "forces the hearts of all listeners with primal complacency" (Goethe:

Fist). One seals oneself off against religious arguments because, strictly speaking,

recognizes their nonsense and still uses them because they make a difference.66 The

Contradiction of a language constructed with the help of religious imagery, which at the same time

veiling their sacred origins, paves the way for those of the jargon

induced exclusion can take place. The inconsistency does not represent

barrier; because at her the contradictory demands of

Society, living environment and personality are completed. Due to the

Inconsistency, validity claims can be made that are based on their

Effect instead of being measured by its justification, so no negative

sanctions must be feared.

In this context, Adorno makes use of Marx's and Freud's

criticism of religion and also accepts their de-differentiation. Adorno wants

the excesses of religious formation of meaning are epistemologically taken into account.

In doing so, he refers to developments that can be described as religious,

but which only show the contours in their special historical context

he ascribes a universal validity. This is how Adorno leads us into the living world

Germany, whose landscape he traces and whose peculiarity he does

underestimated, but at the same time never lose sight of it. The historical origin

of authenticity is self-evident to people.

---

66 In this connection it should perhaps be repeated that modernity frowns on regression into the
myths of the past. See Habermas: "The modern consciousness of time forbids any thought
of regression, of the abrupt return to mythical origins." (Habermas, 1985: 108)

Before we go any further, however, we must make some observations that are contained in this

Conceal the self-evident, understand social science. That's why I want

I would like to introduce Plessner's book "The Belated Nation" at this point to look for the

culturally specific components of the "cult of the

authenticity" to ask.

3.9 The importance of religion in Germany's environment

Like The Jargon of Authenticity, The Belated Nation is an attempt at

to expose the social background on which the Nazis relied. Adorno and

Plessner proceed from the assumption that the economic and

political conditions prepared the ground for National Socialism, that they

but alone are not a sufficient explanation for the success of the Nazi movement:

> "The ability to respond to National Socialist policy and ideology can be seen from the
> immediate realities of Versailles, inflation   ..., the partisan
> structure and the disproportion of the lower middle class between '18 and '33
> the traditional parties and from the radicalizing effects of the big ones
> Unemployment since '29 can only be understood to a limited extent." (Plessner, 1994: 12)

Compared to Goldhagen's argument,[67] it is an eliminatory one

Anti-Semitism was the basis for National Socialism is the approach

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[67] See Goldhagen. Furthermore, Brede and Karp, Eliminatorischer Antisemitismus: How is the thesis to be held? Psyche 51, 606-621, 1997.

Plessners tended to cater to the presuppositions inherent in such thinking

underlie. But the starting point is surprisingly similar: den

National Socialism alone with a view to the economic and political situation

Explaining Germany ignores the cultural specificity of the response.

However, Plessner endeavors to describe the scotoma in German thought

because it senses its emptiness, longs for a filling. Plessner wants that

Understand the origin and nature of those structures of meaning that

determine culture-specific attitudes towards society. anti-Semitism as

Motivational background is therefore not ruled out, but was not suggested by him

explicitly subjected to an analysis.68

Based on the conviction "that there are not two Germanys",69 one of the

outstanding writer, artist and scientist and one of barbarism,

Plessner reconstructs the historical background from which these two parts

emerge from Germany. The retardation of political developments is his

Topic: his field is that living environment, which the democratic institutions just the

Refused validity that they needed for their continued existence.

Plessner is not satisfied with his description of the political situation

ostensibly a description of those political forces that the Nazis

have supported, but about the interaction of political institutions with

---

68 Of course, the accusation that Plessner underestimated the importance of the
anti-Semitism neglected.

69 Plessner therefore initially quotes Thomas Mann, Germany and the Germans: "What I told you in
told with ragged brevity ... is the history of German inwardness. One likes this

an inwardness anchored in the lifeworld. That's why Plessner starts with one

Analysis of the significance of the German defeat in World War I. defeats

alone are not carriers of any particular cultural or political significance. She

can trigger renewal processes, or, as in German-speaking countries (here

henceforth: Germany), cause a social regression, a movement

that is, interpreting defeats in a specific way. It is only successful if

it is possible to relate already pre-interpreted attitudes towards society to them,

so that a message emerges from it that can be understood culturally.

That is why disappointment at losing a world war alone cannot

Explain the emergence and institutionalization of the Nazi movement.

> "There are defeats that even a proud people can accept. Just have to feel it
> have been awakened by them and reminded of their true destiny. For
> The defeat was unbearable for Germany because it was as senseless as the war and because it
> remained pointless." (Plessner, 1994: 36)

Plessner continues:

> "So (Germany's) protest against the peace of 1919 is not simply the expression
> his defeat, not even the mere answer to the ideas of democracy and the
> civil liberties with which the opponents won it. He is the protest against
> the historical fate that a central European state far more
> Grounds of its ambiguous tradition as through simple violence paved the way to national
> Unity denied." (Plessner, 1994: 37)

Plessner describes the interaction between undemocratic political

attitudes and inwardness. She turns defeat into disaster.

---

bring history to heart: that there are not two Germanys, one bad and one good,

The theoretical presuppositions of the analysis are interesting for us, the Plessner

used to describe this interaction. Plessner's systems are though

become self-sufficient, but not autopoietic. They grow out of the lifeworld of one

Culture. Therefore, culture and system overlap. Even if the system is on

can appeal to itself, it ultimately remains based on legitimacy from culture

reliant. The authoritarian state rules not only over the heads of its subjects,

but at the same time is deeply rooted in their thinking. Because of this preliminary decision

Plessner emphasize the decay of democratic institutions without going overboard

either ignore structural difficulties (e.g. defeat) or face them

to overrate.

What is striking is the small distance between life and politics behind

his description of Germany's political development. Plessner

namely argues that Germany in its radical, inward-looking

Rejection of the Catholic tradition coming from Rome the opportunity

failed to take part in those civilizing processes from which (also in

their Enlightenment rejection) the concept of the nation arises, which the idea of the

people superfluous. The term nation protects against fascism not only because it is

reflected in the form of a constitution, but also because the nation for the

citizen of a country has an identity-forming effect. French, English or American too

it only makes sense within the framework of a certain political culture. She sets one

Equality of members of society before those criteria that precede the

---

but only one whose best turned out to be evil through devilish cunning." (Plessner, 1994: 9)

determine membership in society. This is what nation and identity are like for Plessner

interwoven in the lifeworld:70

> "For the Anglo-Saxon states, Calvin has become decisive. For France
> the Enlightenment. Both powers are involved in the independence of the individual
> decisive part in the transformation of the state from the spirit of the personal
> Freedom. Both powers work in the direction of the inner-worldly way of life, for
> which guarantees the separation of church and state in France. This secularization
> feels the state in its pure expediency, in its parliamentary formality
> not on. She would only come into conflict with him if he made claims on the individual
> wanted to raise people, in a metaphysical sense." (Plessner, 1994: 62)

To be proud of being a member of a country with a tradition as a nation state means

ultimately, to be a constitutional patriot. On German soil, however

this statement implies recourse to a time before the founding of the state

existing primal right that is either inherent in one or never fully granted

may be:

> "It is not determined by the real origin of the people from prehistoric times
> Historical picture of the state, but in their liberating and reconciling, the burden
> conscious of past existence-erasing abstractness and conceptual dignity
> recorded idea of law." (Plessner, 1994: 63)

The main problem is cultural because it relates to the structures, the people

enable one to "understand": "There the original sense (one

democratic) apparatus nature no longer understood. (In such countries)

missing ... the corresponding prerequisites that go back to the religious."

(Plessner, 1944: 62) Understanding is the key word. It points to defective structures

---

70 Plessner, 1994: 37

that give meaning to statements. Such structures are created in the lifeworld

manufactured. Therefore, with Plessner, both the place of validity supply and

also the position of this place in the maintenance of political institutions

be determined. The motivation of the acting actors is thus in the

moved to the foreground. Because provided political organs on their abilities

are instructed to make actions in the lifeworld understandable is the

Maintaining such institutions only against the background of their

Communicability in culture possible. Of course, Plessner knows that from this

Insight does not equate lifeworld and system. That's why he describes it

the structural constraint that affects the actions of decision-makers

has. It is also clear to him that not every decision made by a political body

is problematized in the lifeworld.

That's not what I was talking about. For Plessner, the question arises as to what proportion

the fundamental political structures of a society relate to its culture.

His answer is that such structures are part of the lifeworld of a society

must be produced, because the lifeworld ultimately conforms to those structures

gives inner-human meaning to the members of a society

more than unquestionably occurs. In other words, that of Plessner as

metaphysical undemanding characteristic of democracy

a lifeworld matter of course that does not need to be questioned because it

"without further ado" is considered a shared acceptance of social action in the lifeworld.

She can be questioned; but this happens under normal circumstances

not. Against the background of this interpretation, the exchange between system

and living environment clearly. It also has the advantage that it is the

The motivation of the actors in the context of theory formation concedes an adequate role.

A confusion of the personality with the system level is therefore of

excluded from the outset. At the same time, the lifeworld becomes that part of

social world on which systems are built. In summary, therefore

be said that Plessner because he understood the importance of the lifeworld for politics

seriously, must explain why the Germans are making a delusional movement

willingly supported.

In the historical development of German Protestantism, Plessner sees

most important source of those patterns of meaning, understanding (also about oneself)

enable and thus explain the motivation of people's actions. The of

The internal reorientation suggested by Luther changed the character of the structures

the lifeworld. It therefore also influenced those who believed in religion either

rejected or belonged to other denominations:

> "Because ... Protestantism becomes the leading force of life, it shapes new people,
> even where they still cling to the old faith" (Plessner, 1994: 56).

And elsewhere:

> "Thus, the existence of a state church of Lutheran character in a denominational
> divided milieu not only in the general direction of secularization,
> but a specifically Lutheran-religious worldliness and worldly piety
> called, which figure in the German political and ideological ideology
> wins." (Plessner, 1994: 66f.)

Luther's doctrine of God provided German culture with meanings that

Assumptions became a matter of course in everyday communication and

therefore, under normal circumstances, should not be exposed to problems:

> "On the Luther side, on the other hand, in the relationship between piety and professional work
>
> that creative, because it itself draws on the creation and the connection of the
>
> Temporal with the eternal founding intimacy arise, which the profane through the
>
> action sanctifies. In it is the functional change of the religious from the ecclesiastical to the
>
> laid out in worldly life. Therefore its completion is in existence and in the concept of
>
> Culture a Lutheran Category and a German Destiny" (Plessner, 1994: 75)

These structures challenge an attitude to the world that, first, is universal

Protestant movement following the here low world strongly emphasized and secondly

from other forms of Protestantism (principally Calvinism) to that extent

diverges, as the gospel is the primary endorsement of moral action

of man should be. The Phenomenon of an Inward Christian

Belief that is at the same time related to the world (worldly) and ultimately from

you turn away (piously), Plessner calls world piety.

Luther's teaching states that the moral content of action is not related to its success

may be measured, but by the ability with which one follows the teaching of God

follows. In the world of action, that is, the world in which loyalty to God is proven

should be, action is measured by "internal" criteria. One on that

"Worldly" thoughtful action is despised because it is the locus of sacred activity

profaned. The gap between Calvinist and evangelical doctrine

is also affected by their different attitudes towards society

enlarged; Because of their tendency to inwardness, Luther's children stand

relatively indifferent, if not skeptical, to political activity. She

prefer to focus on "the essentials", namely family and work71:

> "Through the fact of an authoritarian church and the inner-emotional
> Anchoring the career idea, however, develops a dualism between one
> non-religious state life and a religious, extra-church professional and private life.
> Calvin's teaching put a stop to this privatization of faith. By her staunch adherence to the
> principle of the supremacy of the church over the state
> from the very beginning it had a different relationship between the claim to the rule of God
> right faith and social-state life." (Plessner, 1994:
> 74)

For reasons already mentioned above, Plessner can play the constitutive role

of religion in a quite rich way. As a result of

Shifting the system into the lifeworld moves both spheres of the social world

closer together. Therefore, the emergence of a system on the background

certain religious currents of a culture differently (as for example with Weber)

be conceptualized. Systems can be understood as self-sufficient without the

"metaphysical undemanding" of the parliamentary democracy to which they

need to refer again and again can be ignored.72

According to Plessner's approach, the negative impact of a positive attitude

preserved. The function of religion in the making of meaning in the

lifeworld and in the legitimation of political organs arises in

Germany from the teachings of Luther. Secularism thrives alongside secularization.

Secularism disenchants culture without losing its religious power.

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71 See Habermas on Heine: Habermas, A Kind of Claims Settlement, 1986.

Plessner thus argues that the structures of the lifeworld depend on the doctrine of God

Luthers were strongly influenced and that on this basis the specificity of the

German inwardness can be understood. Starting from the interaction

between the lifeworld and the system and the assumption that the lifeworld is the system

provided with validity, Plessner concludes that the German lifeworld is political

Institutions with the necessary validity could not provide because their

democratic constitution was not understood. Against this background,

Plessner consider the factors affecting the building of a democratic

impede social order.

Plessner's work suggests that democracy in Germany is not merely that

failed as a result of an economic crisis and a lost war, but rather

because the value structure on which democracy is built is not sufficient

was internalized. The relationship was "played" and not "lived". I guess,

that this is no longer the case, but that it is an abuse of our current

normative order in the terms of our common democratic values

must be plausibly explainable. If this assumption is correct, then the value of the

Jargons are increasing in today's conditions where non-democratic

Aspirations will be forced to surrender their democratic creeds

demonstrate to achieve their anti-democratic goals.

The initial consideration is that Plessner's arguments about the historical and

religious underpinnings of modern society are still valid.

---

[72] This is no less the case when the entitlement of such institutions to a
living environment existing "questionable self-evidence" is based.

Although the social structures that make up a democracy and its institutions

have moved away from their religious and traditional origins,

its effects can still be felt. My work assumes that

democratic structures have taken root in Germany and that these

Structures require actors to conceptualize their positions

which they can justify themselves within the framework of these structures and with which they

can be understood within the framework of these structures. Nonetheless remembered

Plessner reminds us that our beliefs even when they take the form

of rational ties to institutions are still in

connected to our past. This connection is culture specific

pronounced. The historical and cultural traditions of the United States are

radically different from those of Europe. Partly because of these differences

a stable democracy emerged in Germany later than in the

United States.

Nevertheless, the democratic institutions in Germany are stable, and you

Success has led to both rational attachments to her and at the same time that

Understanding of their underlying values within the German cultural

and historical context. Obviously, both at the level of

understanding (the cultural level) as well as on the level of attachment (the

individual and cultural level) these ties differently than in others

cultural contexts. However, they are no less important.

A change occurs as soon as democratic structures are institutionalized

have been established and the ties to them are stable and enforceable. If this one

process has been successful, past cultural and historical

Traditions in terms of their relevance (and comprehensibility) to them

democratic institutions.

Plessner's work helps us understand the German cultural tradition as it emerges

interpreted from the perspective of democrats and their institutions. That is the

positive side of what we can learn from Plessner. The negative side hangs

also with these traditions. Actors can non-democratic

Traditions and their historical contexts in the lifeworld horizons of everyone

Bring in discussion for either positive or negative purposes. jargon there

actors the opportunity to express themselves in a way antithetical to democracy

to relate historical events without violating a taboo and without being forced

to be having to justify these references in terms that are acceptable today. In the

In the German context, this has profound implications. We can see well

how such references work if we turn to Martin Walser. It will

become clear that religious thought structures and anti-democratic traditions

can be made relevant without taking too much into account the democratic context

question in which they are articulated. Walser, who gave a speech among other things

held before elected officials is a paradigmatic example. The meaning

of his speech is evident from the fact that it is presented in understandable democratic terms

was while at the same time being a particular group or selected individuals

excluded from the rights that tradition provides. Plessner enlightens the

cultural context from which the logic of exclusion feeds.

4. Walser: The integration achievements of aggression

If you remember the cultural background that Martin Walser referred to in

related to his speech at the presentation of the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade

has, its effect becomes understandable. To this background and his

To explore psychological meaning, I turn to Adorno and Plessner

I've introduced because they're both - albeit in very

different ways - with the role of German inwardness both in

everyday life as well as in the political developments in Germany before and after

dealt with the war. As has already been made clear above, Adorno's criticism was of that

in Germany after the war, the "jargon of authenticity" was spreading

ultimately intended as a reckoning with Heidegger. But his essay reads

in some places almost like an *interpretation handbook* for Walser's speech. On

its basis can be the reciprocal relationship between the

philosophical tradition, which Walser strongly in explaining his position

introduces, and trace the satisfaction of frowned upon needs. Plessner

in turn explains the religio-sociological background of this philosophical one

Tradition. A picture of social action emerges which, on the one hand, always

is related to cultural contexts of meaning, on the other hand instinctual motives are not

got rid of. In other words, the cultural knowledge that Walser uses

is made in a culture that makes sense, but one where people love and

hate without being allowed to express these feelings.

On the level of the psychological effect of language, according to Adorno, there is a

causal relationship between alogical argumentation and exoneration -

provided that the reasoning is done at the expense of outsiders.

Walser's speech changes its inconsistency if Adorno's thesis

is valid, little of its real meaning. It retains its factuality because it

relieved. That's what she's designed for; their cultural meaning is related to this.

Instinctive needs that fail due to social and cultural sanctions

may be satisfied, shelter is given by jargon. So can yours

be given expression. However, according to Adorno, there are no such needs

immediately drive-dynamic, but social. In other words, they are cultural

reshaped and thus have a meaning in the social world by the actors

of a culture is shared. The aggressive desires faced by such people

want to give free rein, are directed against objects by a respective

culture are selected as hateful. This role overrides the normative

Obligation to treat one's neighbor as oneself. At their own expense

won the acquittal of the psychological distress of modern life forms

become.

Jargon needs legitimation. Without her, he would just be a string

aggressive statements. According to Adorno, there is a reciprocal relationship

certain philosophical tradition (Heidegger), the social one

conditions and a culture-specific ethical attitude (German

Inwardness). Walser takes up this philosophical tradition in order to expand the moral one

To take the standard as a basis, based on which he the already so unpleasant

Intellectuals and their commemorative service condemned. German inwardness is that

Background against which his claims have some logical justification

win.

4.1 Walser

Walser means to speak for the "people" when he says he bears the burden of the

constant mention of the Holocaust. He takes possession of the voice of "des

Volkes" and makes it his own, which can no longer be separated from him. Where Walser

ends and people begins is not clear.73 At first I just want this ambiguity

point out. That's why I use terms like "we" or "the",

Designations, that is, which are associated with the designation of an individual or part of a

group to make a general statement about the whole group. Such

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73 Of course there are indications that Walser is right, but the dichotomization between "we" and "they", which force people to make sweeping judgments, always include accepting undifferentiated statements.

Generalizations are intended to reflect the premises of Walser's argument.

This includes, for example, the claim that the people suffer from the constant presence

of intellectuals and their narratives of the omnipotence of

mass destruction. Not even a meal in the country is sacred! Also there lurks

Auschwitz. Suffering is a crucial moment in the making of modernity

Slang. In its function, this suffering is interchangeable with Adorno's compulsion. It

legitimizes the repulsion that then ensues.

Martin Walser's speech gives the impression that he doesn't really care

power of persuasion to influence the opinion of the audience. He renounces that

usual demonstration of new points of view.74 It would be superfluous anyway. Instead of

of which he preaches to those who are already convinced. His speech should help the listener to

to stand by his opinion. It should give new strength to those who are afraid, or

as Walser likes to say, out of audacity not ready to speak "the truth".

are. The significance of Walser's speech therefore does not consist in the fact that it is new

Makes "bold" arguments - who has never had a disparaging opinion about them

heard about compulsory employment with Auschwitz? – but that she rolls up old ones in such a way that

they gain topicality. Walser's project works because his interpretation of the

reality coincides with the perception of most of his listeners. To that extent

the function of Walser's speech is to encourage his listeners to

official attitude to Germany's historical burden in line with theirs

---

74 In his laudatory speech, Schirrmacher praised Walser for his "poetic investigation of the world". What was certainly meant was his poetic investigation "in the world". This praise was the announcement that a socially critical statement on current politics was not to be expected from the awarding of the Peace Prize. The terminology that Schirrmacher uses implicitly is that of Heideggerian security. I will speak at length about Walser's borrowing from this tradition below.

to bring actual thoughts. Not only are they right, they are also the

truthful. The media, the intellectuals and the Sunday speakers of politics

want to switch sides. *They* want to make it clear that they are better than *us.*

They even want us injured. Fighting back is therefore only defense:

> "My nothing but trivial reaction to such painful <u>sentences: I ho</u>pe it's true
>
> not what w<u>e ar</u>e being told so blatantly. . . . It goes beyond my moral, so to speak
>
> beyond political imagination to take what is said to be true. With me it turns out
>
> an unprovable suspicion: Those who appear with such sentences want to hurt us,
>
> because they think we deserve it. They probably want themselves too
>
> injure. But us too. All. One restriction: All Germans. Because that's already
>
> clear. In no other language in the last quarter of the 20th century could such a
>
> spoken by a people, by a population, by a society. That can only be said of Germans.
>
> At most, as far as I can see, by Austrians. Everyone
>
> knows our historical burden, the immortal shame, not a day when it us
>
> is not maintained. Could it be that the intellectuals who accuse us
>
> by holding the shame up to us, succumbing to the illusion for a second, they
>
> would have changed a little be<u>cause they worked again in the</u> cruel memorial service
>
> sorry, be even closer to the victims than the perpetrators for a moment."

I wonder against what background such a description of the

reality makes sense? Does anyone think that intellectuals and others in the

Remembrance service want to hurt *us Germans* - everyone.

Walser is better able than his literary colleagues to express reality linguistically

recorded, Schirrmacher asserted in his laudatory speech. Walser's tone therefore shows

direction to those who hunger for "true" and "real." The

For Schirrmacher, the meaning of the term reality means something like "conservative":

Someone who deals with reality deals with reality,

as it is, and not as it could be dreamed of. Conclusion: Walser is not

social dreamer. Therefore, "we", the listeners, should pay particular attention to it

be interested in what Walser considers worthy of change in his Sunday speech. It

will certainly be something tangible: "What will Walser's own impulses be, there

has reality proved him right, as seldom before a poet?" asks

Schirrmacher, knowing the answer well.

Walser's speech is designed to break down the boundaries between him, the speaker

Writers, and the audience, especially Germany's political and cultural

Elite, make it disappear. Walser did not begin his speech in the first person.

Walser speaks of *him,* the "chosen one" from whom a Sunday speech is expected

becomes. *He* was unsure, undecided, presumably how the listener would be in his place,

what *to* say His insecurity should be agreeable to the listeners. She relieved

that historical burden that they apparently took with them to the Paulskirche:

namely the burden of expectation of being confronted with history again,

to endure the cruelty and the eternal reproaches once again

for which they no longer want to be liable. Instead, Walser seizes the

Surprise. In his place, he continues, viewers would have considered

whether they shouldn't rather say something nice, "that means something beneficial, invigorating,

Peace Prize-like". Maybe even about trees, "(because) talking about trees

is no longer a crime because many of them are now sick". The

Allusion to Brecht is sure to please one or the other in the audience, the

she stands out. But the vast majority understood the subtext without dealing with Brecht

to have dealt with. Only sick, pitiable people or forest dieback, things

who are preparing a guilty conscience are allowed to take up the topic of a Sunday speech in

be the Paulskirche:

> "A Sunday lectern, Paulskirche, public public, media presence, and
> then something nice! No, that was already without any help for the person selected for the prize
> became clear from the outside, that was not allowed to be. But when he was then clearly told
> The fact that he was expected to give the critical Sunday speech was something he resisted
> freedom-thirsty soul yet again. That I had my potpourri of beauty
> had to justify, it was already clear to me:"

The main message of Walser's Sunday speech is already in nuce in this statement

contain. First, there is a shift in perspective in these sentences. *He* joined

to those who genuinely appreciate the real value of beautiful things

want to share with others in this world. *He* and *I* know about them, though

Expectations of a Sunday Speech. Both know that they are by default with

have to torment a bad conscience that they don't really feel. *He*

refrains from criticizing this unwritten rule and remains silent. *I* desire

against it and speaks out what both are thinking anyway.

However, the change from *he* to *I* is only deceptive or "appearance" to one of

take up Walser's preferred term. Neither *he* nor *I* is congruent with

Walser. *He* and *I* tend to be interchangeable, "anytime" terms.

They capture Walser's feelings and those of the audience in equal measure.

In this respect, the boundaries between *him* and *I blur.*

The Walser speaking in the first person occurs only after this one quoted above

statement on. Only then can he take possession of his own person. However has

the message that Walser conveys takes on a life of its own surprisingly quickly.

Walser literally speaks from the soul of his listeners. It's also her anger

the Walser creates an outlet by, when he was still *he ,* being informed of the wishes of the

"chosen ones" spoke. The fear of the "moral club" Auschwitz unites. Because just

this is expected from a Sunday speech in the Paulskirche. However, the fear will

Picked up piece by piece, beginning with the pointed comment, "And soon these

Justification (when talking about trees): Talking about trees is not

More crime because so many of them are now sick." Walser's goal is

less to speak for itself than to tell the viewers: I'm on your side,

I know you, I, the writer, in his role as an intellectual

enjoys the freedom of fools and can therefore say, ... I understand you. I know that you

the people, are forced to atone daily for the guilt charged to "us". me, the

now daring to speak in my own voice becomes representative of

push yourself hard against the pressure from outside. I refuse these impositions

continue to endure. Nevertheless, I would like to modest my small resistance

begin. Because like you, I'm just humble. I start "(preferably) with

such confessions: I shut myself off from evils that I do not care about remedying

can contribute. I've had to learn to look the other way."

It is interesting why Walser decided to continue working with the

considers the past to be morally reprehensible. The *I,* whose Walser uses,

finds another confrontation with the Holocaust uncomfortable. It is not

Anti-Semite who thinks like that, rather a person who gets rid of his beautiful thoughts

feels undeservedly distracted. The yardstick that ultimately goes beyond the moral

legitimacy of the discussion about Germany's past decides

puts security instead of justice. Will the secure interior of the

Disturbed thinking, those responsible must be held accountable.

But it doesn't have to come to that. Because jargon is also used preventively.

He "shields him from the inconvenience of speaking seriously on the matter

which he understands nothing, and yet allows him, if possible, super-objective relationships

to pretend to her. The jargon is so well suited for this because it is always of its own accord

combines the appearance of an absent concrete with its ennoblement."

(Adorno,1973: 467) The aggression against the stranger, which through his

Presence that disturbs security is nothing other than the downside of

People who appreciate only inner attitude and worldly action

despised, especially when she is successful. Plessner named such an attitude

worldly piety and regarded it as a prerequisite for German fascism.

I suppose it was the message - certainly more than the arguments - that Walser

also feels irritation in the presence of the victims, which touches the hearts of his listeners

brought to flutter: the language gesture is that of eye to eye. ... Who

looks you deep in the eye, wants to hypnotize you, want to gain power over you, always

already with the threat: are you faithful to me? No traitor?, no Judas? ..."

(Adorno,197:465)

Walser does not threaten. He's responding to a threat. The democratization of jargon

has distributed its exercise more evenly. In other words, don't threaten

you hit back with words. Under these conditions, even the enlightened

Democrats demand their rights and the troublemakers - like boys - on theirs

reject deserved place. In this context, it was about nothing but about

the rank of the victims in the present; whether to stand him as part of the now

can leave, or whether the irritation caused by the shame they represent is too great.

Against this background, Bubis' intervention was part of the message.

Bubis only confirms the statement that Walser wants to convey. His outrage should

really make it clear to everyone: we don't want to see Bubis anymore.

Because Bubis, yes, his person, is the memory par excellence of the shame. To the

good, truly capable, i.e. "worldly pious" people who care little about the

takes care of the world and its events and therefore all the more about truthfulness

of his own actions, becomes particularly angry when he realizes that

his sincere feelings are not appreciated.

> "But security as an existential element turns the longed for and the denied into a now
> and present here, regardless of what prevents them. Directs the feeling of
> Feeling secure at home with yourself, that's how it underscores the summer freshness for the
> Life. How landscape becomes uglier in front of the admirer, who with the words: How
> Nice! it disturbs, so fare the customs, habits, institutions that are
> bargain by emphasizing their own naivety instead of preventing it.
> Kogon's report that the worst atrocities in the concentration camps were committed by younger ones
> peasant sons judges all talk of security." (Adorno, 1973: 430)

Walser cites a quote from Hegel: "The conscience, this deepest inner

Loneliness with itself, where all appearance and limitations have disappeared,

this continuous seclusion is in itself." Walser puts this quote

like this:

> "Result of the philosophical help: A good conscience is not one. Everyone is alone with their conscience.
> Public acts of conscience are therefore in danger of becoming symbolic.
> And nothing is more foreign to the conscience than symbolism, how well meant it is. This
> consistent withdrawal into oneself is not representable. she must
> remain inner loneliness. No one can ask of the other what he would like,
> but who does not want to give."

Walser's introspection gives a sacred meaning to statements that were previously frowned upon

Nimbus. The step from inner loneliness to rebellion is not far. He

seizes the frowned upon wishes of his audience in order to make these people theirs

seeming to get rid of external constraints. However, the compulsion that

Germany's historic burden is being carried out, allegedly on the back of the

carried out by the people is no longer social in the narrower sense, but

cultural. *Ich* uses a contemporary jargon. In place of

Threat of an omnipotent power is the threat of cunning and

unlawful disseminators of a guilty conscience.

The power the people are supposed to be afraid of may be a delusion. she is

but tailored to modern conditions. Therefore, this power can act

of actors, since all those involved accept that a violation of the

rules to which it relates triggers legitimate sanctions. For this reason I have

I distinguished above between power, coercion and influence, power being the

includes legitimate use of coercion if agreed terms of a

legitimate appointment are not fulfilled. Cannot influence any such

resort to sanctions. Coercion is used when an agreement

not achievable under culturally acceptable conditions.75

Walser's "opinion soldiers" who aimed their "morality pistols" at the people's chests

hold, have at most power and mostly only influence. The power of these soldiers

is supposedly based on reminding the Germans of a historical burden.

A burden that is known, but should finally stop, by mentioning yourself to everyone

day to make noticeable:

> "Everyone knows our historical burden, the immortal shame, not a day when
>
> they are not held against us. Could it be that they, the intellectuals, they us
>
> hold out for a second under the illusion that because they are back in the
>
> cruel memorial service, a little apologies, be for one
>
> moment closer to the victims than to the perpetrators"

"The intellectuals" are the tormentors, the "us" (Germans) an artificial one

demand attitude. From this they promise themselves to give themselves exactly that burden

get rid of, which they glorify by apparently dealing exclusively with it

deal with Walser has the task of reading the Germans the Levites, which they already know

according to the sole function of accusing those intellectuals seeking to assign blame

relieve those who want to join the ranks of the victims.

Many critics of Walser's speech have raised the question of who

blanket term "intellectuals" could be meant. Walser quoted

---

75   See Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society, 1967: 297-354.

two such intellectuals, without naming them, seem to make a whole

To want to designate a subculture: it consists of those who are committed to the cause of

committed to reappraisal of history. Walser doesn't say who he's talking about

means. He speaks from his personal impression, knowing that he

shared by most listeners. Critics pointing to Walser's claims

pointing out that they are downright wrong, misunderstand the message

his speech. As a result, they fail to interpret the function of his speech,

because that does not require the refutation of obviously false statements, but the

Exploring their psychological impact and cultural function.

According to Adorno, the deception of jargon is effective, among other things, because it

gives the best possible "wrong" answer to a "real" problem. therefore can

Jargon, as I formulated it above in the style of Foucault, say "yes". slang

is effective only when the distortion of the social "reality" it promotes

places where real changes can take place. The term

real refers to the material foundations of society. Instead of unequal

to talk about economic conditions that lead some to deal with a

having to put up with existence without shelter, one speaks of public services. The misery,

countering the jargon with cunning means is not entirely without foundation. Much more

the jargon perverts the source of needs.

Therefore, jargon remains an answer to a human challenge that

in its original form was not a mere illusion. jargon puts in places,

in which human needs could be expressed, so much the more so

urge of these needs to take effect in a now distorted form. If

Adorno's concept of jargon is to be taken seriously, one must therefore ask

which "needs" Walser recognizes and in a distorted form in the service of a

misleading treatise on Germany's historical burden. With others

Words, Walser's criticism can only be answered by going one step further

goes than his critics and asks the following question: What does Walser have from a nearly perspective

of all listeners correctly recognized and distorted? It was probably this disfigurement of one

genuine need that pleased his listening.

To get to the level where this question can be answered,

Let's take a step back to first define the concept of needs.

Because in Adorno's "The Jargon of Authenticity" the term acquires a (im

stricter sense) strange meaning. A need is first – how

ordinary – something like a feeling that urges one to choose goals for action,

that bring relief. It is remarkable that in Adorno's Der Jargon der

authenticity" these pressing feelings are mostly known and at most preconscious

are. In other words, Adorno's needs are impulsive, but there are no impulses in him

Freudian sense. You are not repressed. In fact it can be from an unconscious

process cannot be spoken.

   1. Because their source is "social". It comes from the perversion of

      intersubjective moment from which a satisfaction of the anthropological

      philosophical needs of people could have emerged. In

      Adorno's willingness to meet such needs with the help of anthropological

grasping philosophical categories harbors the danger of

insufficient consideration of their cultural specificity. Of the

Assuming the perversion of human needs per se replaces that

Concept of cultural action through an ontological concept of human

Needs. That is why I included Adorno's description of such needs in the

Conceptuality of this approach translated to the sociological content of its

Being able to capture statements *in the terms* of my own approach.

4.2 Walser's cultural background

The question remains unanswered as to whether Walser's speech is designed to

To provide an outlet for the audience's aggressive mindset and attitude. At

exploring the ever-changing meaning of proscribed statements is the

Considering the passion of the plot from both the psychological and

also relevant from a cultural perspective. Trying to be more passionate

Doing the plot conceptually justice must be meticulously driven.

Walser refers to a religious tradition that Plessner called the

sums up world piety. The sociological background of religion

Walser's criticism is a matter of course for the listeners. Just this matter of course

allows Walser to present his approach as universally valid. its premises

therefore need neither be justified nor critically examined. You only need

the mention.76

Of course, Walser's criticism is not anti-Semitic agitation. She is a call to

conscience. Borrowing from .... Levy's snide remark, the

Imagine that Walser's speech was nailed to a door as an appeal. But one

appeal against what? – Against the intellectuals, presumably, against the "Holocaust

Preacher".

Against this background, the origin of Walser's assessment of the role

Classify the function and form of memory. Walser mobilizes – of course

unknowingly – all sorts of classic criticisms of Judaism and puts them into service

his reservations about the "remembrance workers". Walser becomes a Protestant.

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[76] Levy, on the other hand, in his role as an observer traveling through Germany, quickly became aware of the cultural specialty of this religious background. He writes: "And if Martin Walser were simply on the point of thinking he was Martin Luther? What if this Catholic took it into his head to literally speak like Luther? Oh, not like Luther the anti-Semite. Not like the one from the 'Table Talk' at the end: 'Burn the Talmuds!' Rather like the Luther of the call to conscience. The Luther of the 'single faith', of mute, commanding 'inwardness'. A Luther who, adapted to Walser's taste of the day, would say to us: Against the ritualization of memory, against the simultaneously Jewish and Catholic way of remembering, I appeal to an autistic inwardness of conscience with oneself and with God. 'Alone against everyone,' says Walser. 'I am alone against everyone, but I will not be dissuaded'. And as an echo one hears Luther's 'I can't help it. Here I stand before Charles V. (...) Religion and politics. Even in the most current debates, the oldest religious questions reappear. Or as Laurent Dispot, who accompanies me on this trip as the 'elephant driver', says: 'You can't do enough sociology of religion when you're trying to understand contemporary Germany'. (...) Martin Luther ...

Martin Heidegger ... Martin Walser.
At every decisive turning point in German history: a Martin? In other words: a 'great reformer' who offers his 'great founding speech': Luther's '95 theses' at the church gate in Wittenberg; Heidegger's 'principal speech' in Freiburg; and this time the speech of thanks for the 'Peace Prize of the German Book Trade'.(...) But let's see if that's not what he has in mind when he complains about this 'commemorative service' – 'Service ': also a word of Heidegger's - which today's Germans would have to put up with. Let's see if that's not exactly what all those who took his side in this affair think. That morning the taxi driver: 'Don't you think it's funny that we're being bored with this memorial just at the moment when, as if by chance, the Jews are asking money from banks and insurance companies?' " (Schirrmacher The Walser-Bubis Debate: A Documentation, 1999: 631-632)

The lesson: Get rid of your cultural environment as much as possible and

its historical background. Be an individual, not a mere member of one

Community. In any case, conscience cannot be transferred to them. Most

The rituals experience contempt. They are merely an expression of memorial service:

"Auschwitz is not suitable for becoming a routine threat, anytime

A means of intimidation or a morale bludgeon or even just a compulsory exercise. What by

comes about is of the quality of lip prayer." The echo of the interpretation

of Jewish customs, which can be found in Hegel, for example, sounds in

to these sentences. Laws that evoke the past have always been experienced

contempt for protesting Christians. The accusation was that such laws abrogated

the subject of his moral judgment, moreover, led to mere submission

and prevented the self-evident inner revelation. can only believe

be accomplished inside. Rituals are therefore the counterpart of the reprehensible idea that

A person's morals thrive in a community, i.e. in living together

Customs borne by a community. The equality of rituals

with "lip service" is seen as only logical.

However, Walser's determination should not lead one to conclude that he is

aware of the meaning of his statements in the historical context. On the contrary.

I presume Walser only feels a dislike that is part of his

general criticism of "the" intellectuals, memory service workers, media and

Well-known to journalists, even occurs in a similar way. Walser feels the impertinence in

that the autonomous conscience is appropriated, relieved of its inviolable shell

and is handed over to an authority foreign to him. Every person is entitled

to protest against it. In other words, against the background of this supposedly

self-evident moral-ethical attitude are the consideration of taboos

of a society and the ritualization of cultural messages

denigration of man's proper vocation, according to conscience

to judge right and wrong.

The culturally legitimate background of Walser's statements is of enormous importance,

not only because he alone enables Walser to deal with the current issue

to condemn the Holocaust in such a way, but because as

self-evident assertions against this background on their

validity to be checked. It is the interaction of the culturally legitimate

with frowned upon statements, but which are taken for granted by most and therefore

are properly felt, reflecting the cultural efficacy of these claims

secures.

Walser's critique can be based on the primary norms and values of von Plessner

described "secularism" understood and comprehended by everyone

become. Should taboos fall, Martin Walser wants to tell us, then they would have

not even allowed to arise.

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