

Functional Safety with ISO 26262 Principles and Practice Dr. Christof Ebert, Dr. Arnulf Braatz Vector Consulting Services

# Welcome to the Webinar Functional Safety

# with ISO 26262

Webinar Part 1, Principles and Practice Speakers: Dr. Christof Ebert, Dr. Arnulf Braatz



#### **Technical Notes**

#### ► Audio

There should be music to hear.

If the audio transmission over the Internet is not working, ask for the participation in a conference call. Contact the "host" in the "chat" window.

▶ Screen

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#### Feedback & communication

Open and review the "chat" window to get all organizational messages of the "hosts". Use the "chat" window to the "host" to contact all organizational WebEx and transfer requests or disturbances. Use the "Q & A" window instead of the "chat" window for substantive questions about the webinar. Ask your questions at "All Panelists". Questions are answered online during and after the presentation.

#### Slides & Presentation

Within 1-2 days after the webinar, you will receive a link to the presentation slides and additional information. After the webinar a link will guide you to a feedback form.

We are looking forward to receiving your feedback to continuously improve our services.





## Content

 Challenges with
Implementing
Functional
Safety

Basic Concepts


Vector
Experiences



# Success Factors




## Vector Worldwide





# Challenges in 2014 – Results from Vector Client Survey



#### Survey results: Four clear focus areas


- Efficiency improvement
- Cost reduction

- Robust products
- Innovation



## Vector Consulting Services – Business Field

#### Performance improvement in product development





### **Industry Diversification**



Automotive

#### Aviation & Defense

IT





#### Introduction of Safety Processes (Examples)

- Introducing ISO 26262, starting with analysis of the current state, including technical and process measures and building up safety culture
- Training und coaching for functional safety, sustainable safety culture
- Implementing consistent tool support, such as PREEvision

#### Safety Management (Examples)

- Provisioning (interim) safety managers
- Performing safety audits and supplier safety audits

#### Safety Engineering (Examples)

- Providing software components and platforms, such as MICROSAR Safe
- Facilitating safety analyses, e.g. HARA, FMEA, FMEDA, reviews
- Developing and reviewing safety concepts









# Content

 Challenges with Implementing Functional Safety

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Vector
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## Functional Safety – Recent Call-Backs



Problems with acceleration: Car unintentionally accelerates thus causing personal damage Japanese OEM, 2013


Problem with automatic gear control: Gear is unintentionally switched to neutral *American OEM, 2013*  Problems with airbag control: Airbags and seat belt pre-tensioner are not or too late activated *German OEM, 2013* 

Source: autoservicepraxis.de

#### Many incidents → Risk of liability



# Functional Safety: Broad Exposure



#### Exposure of almost many E/E functions → Risk of liability




# Functional Safety – Mandatory Standard



- ISO 26262 is an "International Standard" for the automotive industry, based on the generic safety standard IEC 61508
- Functional safety is considered critical to product liability
- OEMs demand fulfilling the standard from their suppliers
- Mature development processes (e.g. SPICE L3, CMMI ML3) facilitate implementing ISO 26262

#### Not yet integrated to product life-cycle → Risk of falling short






#### Wide impact on entire life-cycle $\rightarrow$ Risk of gaps and inconsistencies



# Functional Safety – Many Methods



Many methods and techniques → Risk of uninformed usage



10 Parts


43 Chapters

100 work products

180 engineering methods

500 pages

600 requirements



Source: ISO 26262

#### Complex standard → Risk of overheads and bureaucracy




ISO 26262 is intended to be applied to safety-related systems that include one or more electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems and that are installed in series production passenger cars with a maximum gross vehicle mass up to 3 500 kg. ISO 26262 does not address unique E/E systems in special purpose vehicles such as vehicles designed for drivers with disabilities.

[...]

ISO 26262 addresses possible hazards caused by malfunctioning behaviour of E/E safety-related systems, including interaction of these systems. It does not address hazards related to electric shock, fire, smoke, heat, radiation, toxicity, flammability, reactivity, corrosion, release of energy and similar hazards, unless directly caused by malfunctioning behaviour of E/E safety-related systems.

- Systems with safety-related functions,
- realized in E/E systems (e.g. control unit).
- Common passenger cars.
- Series production.
- ► < 3,5 t.






# Why?

- Trust in products (i.e. contractual liability)
- Moral commitment: "The prevention of accidents must not only be considered as a regulation by law, but as a matter of human commitment and economic reason."

- Werner von Siemens -


Legal obligation – Product liability, Manufacturer's liability

#### How?





#### The Question of Liability



#### Manufacturer's Liability

The manufacturer has to organize the company in a way that design, production and documentation faults are eliminated or detected by checks.

#### **Reversal of Evidence**

The manufacturer has to show that he is not responsible for a fault.


#### Product Liability



A product, that is put in service, must provide the level of safety which can be expected by general public.

Manufacturer's liability is excluded, if a failure can not be detected using current state of science and technology at the time the manufacturer put the product into market.






- Standards are the lower limit of the state of the art of science and technology.
- ISO 26262 is published and thus part of the state of the art of science and technology.
- Maturity models, like CMMI and SPICE, are also part of the state of the art of science and technology.
- Their application is therefore expected.




## A Structured Approach




Source: ISO 26262-1:2011









vgl. IEC 61508:2010



# Development – Determination of ASIL

<u>R</u> isk	<u>S</u> everit	у	<u>P</u> robabi	lity		
R =	= S	x P <sub>E</sub> x	κ Ρ <sub>C</sub>	x P <sub>I</sub>		
			C1	C2	C3	
		E1	QM	QM	QM	
	S1	E2	QM	QM	QM	
	51	E3	QM	QM	A	
		E4	QM		В	
		E1	QM	QM	QM	
	S2	E2	QM	QM	A	S: Severity E: Exposure
	52	E3	QM		В	C: Controllability I: necessary Integrity
		E4	А	В	С	QM: Quality Management
		E1	QM	QM	A	
	S3	E2	QM		В	
		E3	A	B	С	
		E4	В	С	D	Source: ISO 26262-3:2011




# Development – Classification Example Brake-by-wire-System

Failure Mode	Vehicle State	Road Condition	Environment Condition	E	С	S	ASIL
No Braking Effect	> 100 km/h	Wet	Highway	E3	C3	S3	С
Unexpected Braking Effect	> 50 km/h < 100 km/h	Dry	Main Road	E4	C2	S3	С
Asymmetric Braking Effect	Parking < 10 km/h	Dry	Side Road	E4	C2	S1	A

- Exposure:
  - E3: 1-10% of average operating time
  - ► E4: >10% of average operation time
- Controllability (Average Driver):
  - C2: Hazardous situation is usually controllable
  - C3: Hazardous situation is usually not controllable
- Severity:
  - S1: Light to moderate injuries
  - S3: Critical injuries



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# Content

 Challenges with Implementing Functional Safety

Basic Concepts


# Vector Experiences







# Vector Experiences – Safety Plan



#### Use consistent process, DIA, project schedule and manual for Safety Plan



# Vector Experiences – Development Interface Agreement (DIA)

List of relevan artifacts				scope: facts		Projec	ts	sp					tailoring tracking		olica	ition	
A Identify and agree on work products	D	E	F	G	Н	1		k ∣ L ne the				≀ R	S	Implement t	U he interface	V	W
2		Min s	cope	Tailoring				DEM				ier	Document exchange	Implement		, 	
Work product	Explanation, Notes, additional requirements	NSC	SC	Specific document	Applied	Justification	R	SI	A	R	SI	A	Extent	Milestone	Due date	Actual dat	Status
3	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	-	л		v	-				×		* ×					*
Part 6 - Product development at the software level																	
Design and coding guidelines for	This includes the definition of the application of the	X	х							Х	Х		Document exchange	G3			
modelling and programming languages	MISRA:2004 standard. Any deviations with corresponding rationale shall be documented.																
Configuration and calibration data	This includes the final data. The review of	X	х							х	Х	:	Document exchange	G3			
57 specification	configuration and calibration data ensures the right application of safety related mechanisms.												-				
Software architectural design specification	Defines the technical solution which will fulfill all SW requirements. This includes the SW architecture (e.g. block diagram), allocation of functionality to architectural elements, critical resources, interfaces, design decisions A joint walkthrough demonstrates sufficient quality to HKIIC and enforces the finalization of the SW design before SW implementation.	x	x							x	x		Joint walkthrough	G3			
71 Software safety analysis report	See comment on Safety analysis report in Part 4		х							Х	Х		Joint walkthrough	G3			
Dependent failures analysis report	This may be a subset of the software safety analysis report		х							х	Х	1	Joint walkthrough	G3			
75 Software verification plan	This plan includes the test strategy for all SW test levels like SW unit test, static code analysis, SW integration test and SW test. It shall cover both safety-related and non-safety-related requirements and design elements. A joint walkthrough is needed to align the test strategy between HKIUC and the supplier. This walkthrough may be combined with the walkthrough of the validation plan in part 4.	x	x							x	x	:	Joint walkthrough	G3			
Software verification specification	This document specifies all test cases for verifying the SW. An insight is needed on demand, e.g. when defects occur during customer tests or in order to check the test coverage.	x	х							x	x		Insight on demand	G3			
Software verification report	This includes evidence on MISRA application and metrics on C0 and C1 test coverage.	x	х							x	х		Document exchange	G5			

# Use the DIA for comprehensive definition of the interface to your customer and/or supplier, extend the usage to not safety related artifacts



# Vector Experiences – Including the Customer and Supplier


- Often insufficient information shared between OEM and Tier-1 supplier and Tier-1 and Tier-2 suppliers concerning safety-critical functions and related hazards
- Risk that system and component design is not optimized to balance safety and costs
- Our experience shows that companies which tried more intense suppliercollaboration, continue to do so for all critical interfaces



#### Perform joint workshops on requirements and design



# Vector Experiences – Performing Audits and Assessments



#### Safety Audit

- Purpose: Evaluate implementation of the processes required for functional safety
- Perform periodic audits in projects
- Combine with SPICE assessments
- Perform short supplier audits before nomination, and comprehensive audits in B sample stage



#### Safety Assessment

- Purpose: Evaluate achieved functional safety within the defined item
- Continuously compile the safety case as basis for the assessment
- If the OEM requests assessment by a third party, involve the third party early

# Demand audit and assessment results from suppliers, consider the independency requirements for auditors and assessors



# Vector Experiences – Tool Support for Hazard & Risk Analysis

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*Model Viev	w (AZ Configuration) 🕴 📃 🗖	🛙 🎬 *HazardAnalysis 🛛										
	~	Hazard Description	Operation Scenarios	Operating Modes	Exposure Comment	E	Severity Comment	S	Controllability Comment	С	ASIL	Safety Goals
🗸 🖌 🗸	8 % 🖌 🞏 🖻 🗉 🖽 🛃 😫	The lane departure function activates under invalid	Country Roads (E3)	/ -;- (Operating Mode)	Situation can occur in	E4	Can have severe	S3	Intentional manouvers	C3	ASIL-D	The driver shall be able to cancel the lane departure warning by
arch	٩	driving conditions either by allowing the driver to			every journey		consequences		are suppressed, e.g. to avoid unexpected obstructions in town			applying a counteractive steering angle or by applying the brakes.
	Variants / -;- (Variant Package)	activate the function when not allowed or by the function activating itself. This		~					traffic, that are reaction-time critical. This may lead to			
	Customer Features Catalog / -;- (Customer Common Requirements Catalog / -;- (Requ	can lead to the suppression of intentional manouvers,							accidents that would otherwise have been avoided.			
	🖳 🕞 DS Driving Scenario Catalogue / -;- (Re	e.g. to avoid unexpected obstructions in town traffic.							avoided.			
	🖶 📅 🖬 Driving Scenario Table / -;- (Table)		Parking (E4)	OC.3 Gear Engaged / -;- (	Operating Mode)	-						All actions taken by the lane
	DS. 1 Country Roads / -;- (Operatic			OC.4 Low Speed / -;- (Ope OC.5 High Speed / -;- (Op	erating Mode)							departure system shall be validated and if detected as
				OC.6 Cruise Control Active		1						incorrect, the lane departure
		1		OC.7 Limp Home / -;- (Ope		· .						system shall be forced into a safe
												inactice state and the driver
	DS.5 Motorway Roadworks / -;- (O											warned that the system is no longer active
	DS.6 Motorway Unexpected Obsta											
	DS.7 Parked / -;- (Operational Situi 🗏											
	DS.8 Parking / -;- (Operational Situ											
	DS.9 Town / -;- (Operational Situat											
E	🗄 🕞 OC Operating Conditions / -;- (Require		Town (E4)									
	Operating Conditions Table / -;- (Table	The lane departure function	Main Roads (E4)	Cruise Control Active	There is a low probability	E2	Could cause potentially	S3	If the driver has not so	C2	ASIL-A	All actions taken by the lane
	OC. 1 Engine Off / -;- (Operating M	does not activate when			of the driver straying		fatal accidents due to		far noticed that he is			departure system shall be
	OC.2 Idle / -;- (Operating Mode)	required and as expected by the driver. This may lead to			from the lane requiring the lane departure		high speed and lack of controllability (e.g.		inadvertently straying from the lane, then he is			validated and if detected as incorrect, the lane departure
	OC.3 Gear Engaged / -;- (Operatin	an accident when			warning to be activated.		driver has fallen		unlikely to notice that			system shall be forced into a safe
	OC.4 Low Speed / -;- (Operating M	inadvertently straying from the lane.			-		asleep).		the lane departure warning has not been activated and will			inactice state and the driver warned that the system is no longer active
1	OC.6 Cruise Control Active / -;- (O	<							a covercer enter with			ionger deuve

#### **Vector PREEvision:**

- Supports working with predefined operation scenarios and operating modes
- Supports automatic ASIL calculation
- Supports traceability of safety goals to requirements and design artifacts



## Vector Experiences – Tool Support for FMEA


FMEA 🛛									
ID	Design Intent	Failure Mode	Failure Effects	SEV	Class	Cause	occ	Prevention Measures	Detection Measures
	Determine the lane position position based on visual markings on the road ahead.	No visual information is delivered by the camera	A lane departure is not recognized	1 <mark>2</mark> . 8 SEU-8		Camera lens is obscured by dirt or other objects	2: <u>-</u> 5 0:c-5	Camera is placed within the upper part of the windscreen where dirt is unlikely to collect and the area is regularly washed through wiper wash and rain.	The lane departure warning function analyses the picture to determine whether a lane markings are visible
						Camera has an internal defect	1:- <mark>2</mark> 4 0CC-	Certified camera components are used.	Self test at startup
						Connection to camera is faulty	±: <u>₩</u> 3 0CC-	None as present	Signal detection to determine whether the connection is good
<		1111		1					
🔁 Project View 💷 Property View	🛛 🔶 Mapping View (	No Filter) 🕕 Information	View 🔀 E/E-Model (	Online Che	eck 📲 🖬 M	letric Dependencyviev	v 🖾 Gene	eric Editor 💷 🕏 🛃 🗢	<>   №   ◎ - 8
General Current Prevention Measures Current Detection Measures	Current Preve	ntion Measures nera - Ommision Cau	se 1 (FMEA Caus	e)					
RPNs Data Context Requirements Mapping Timing Path Attribute	Preventior		Camera is placed with wash and rain.	in the upp	er part of	the windscreen when	e dirt is unli	kely to collect and the area is	regularly washed through
Diagrams Documentations Version Object	Current Pr	evention Measures:							
Object Information	Index 1 2	Position of Camera				Name			

#### Vector PREEvision:

- Supports usage of system requirements and design data with full traceability, thus avoiding to replicate system structure in a separate FMEA tool, thus achieving significant cost savings
- Supports consistency checks to ensure coverage



# Vector Experiences – Tool Support for Analysis and Design



#### Vector PREEvision:

- Provides single source for item definition, based on features, requirements, operating scenarios, dependencies
- Facilitates model-based design of functional and technical safety concept, including ASIL decomposition and requirement based tests



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
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# Functional Safety Challenge: Complexity and Competences





# Success Factor – Change Towards Safety Culture

Classic Development Culture	Safety Culture
Insufficient budget and time for relevant safety measures	Necessary measures are planned according to safety analysis – and reliably implemented
Shadow organization of safety experts and staff teams	Safety expertise is embedded into the regular line and project organization
Risk analysis is done superficially for documentation purposes and not maintained	Risk analysis and FMEA are developed at the beginning of system development and are continuously updated
System architecture is not considered in safety goals and requirements	System architecture explicitly covers the safety goals and requirements
Changes are accepted at any time for practically all system parts	Changes are analyzed with respect to their effects on functional safety using a strict change management
Safety audits are conducted only sporadically	Safety audits are established as a normal and standardized behavior

## Implementing functional safety implies a profound culture change



#### Products

#### **Technical measures**

against hardware and software failures to - **avoid failures** and - make **unavoidable** failures **safe**.

Examples: **Redundancy**, **Reuse** with AUTOSAR

#### Processes

All development activities are concerned as well as production and field observation.

Examples: Hazard analysis during concept definition, consistent modeling in PREEvision

#### People

New **roles** and **skills** as well as **cultural changes** for engineering and management staff.

Examples: Safety engineering skills, safety manager role, safety culture



#### Implementation needs to address products, processes and people



- Automotive OEMs in many cases still need to improve their process capabilities to fulfill the requirements of the safety standards and to better collaborate with suppliers
- Suppliers of established safety critical components need to further improve field observation and abilities for complete safety case. Examples: Engine management systems, driving dynamics
- Suppliers of new and innovative components need to build up good basic process capabilities as a reliable foundation for safety.
  Examples: Innovative driver assistance functions and powertrain
- ISO 26262 will evolve based on experiences and to cover new challenges and development techniques
- **Safety capabilities** will become part of standard supplier evaluations

Functional safety can be achieved on the basis of mature development processes together with a competent partner.







# Good success with implementing Functional Safety!

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