

Trotsky's 'Amalgams:'

**Trotsky's Lies, The Moscow Trials As
Evidence, The Dewey Commission**

Trotsky's Conspiracies of the 1930s

Volume One

By Grover Furr

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Acknowledgements and Dedication

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* * * * *

I would like to thank Montclair State University for giving me a sabbatical leave in the Fall semester of 2015 for the purpose of working on this book.

* * * * *

Dedication

I dedicate this book to Karla Cecilia Schultz (Furr) — hard-working school nurse; dedicated opponent of racism; good, objective critic; wonderful, supportive daughter.

Introduction

Why another book about Leon Trotsky? Several new books on Trotsky are published every year. At least ten Trotsky biographies have been published just since the year 2000.

The justification for this book is twofold. First, during the past several decades a great many primary historical sources have been made available for the first time. Second, none of those who have written about Trotsky have made use of these sources.

These primary sources are important. They permit us to know a great deal more about Trotsky's activities during the 1930s than ever before. Yet despite this fact – or, perhaps, because of this fact – they have been almost entirely neglected.

These new primary sources are:

- * The Trotsky Archive at Houghton Library, Harvard University, open since January 2, 1980. In this book we refer to this as the "Harvard TA" or simply "TA."
- * A flood of documents from former Soviet archives published since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 and continuing to this day.

Other collections of primary sources include the Trotsky-Sedov correspondence at the Hoover Institution, and documents made available but not published at various archives in Russia and elsewhere.

The documents from former Soviet archives have revolutionized our knowledge and understanding of Soviet history of the Stalin period, and thus of Soviet history as a whole. They permit us to see that much of what was written about Stalin and his era during Khrushchev's time, then during Gorbachev's tenure, and still today, is deliberately false – in plain language, lies.

The documents in the Harvard TA, and the research based on them by the late Pierre Broué, plus an article by American historian Arch Getty, continue to be neglected by all writers on Trotsky even though - or perhaps because - they demand of us a radically different view of Trotsky's activities during the 1930s and even before.

These primary sources now make it possible to check many of the fact-claims made by defendants in the Moscow Trials in the course of their testimony. For the first time we are able to objectively evaluate this important body of evidence by verifying some of the statements made in the Moscow Trials against independent sources.

This too has never been done. Since Nikita Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" to the XX Party Congress in February 1956 virtually all historians have dismissed the Moscow Trials testimony as false. The paradigm of the Moscow Trials has been that of innocent defendants forced to mouth false confessions to crimes they never committed by means of threats to themselves, against their families, etc. Their testimony has been universally rejected as fabricated, faked, "scripted" by the NKVD investigators, the prosecution, "Stalin."

But there has never been any *evidence* that the Moscow Trials testimony was fabricated. This has simply been asserted. This assertion has been "believed," accorded almost universal credence, because it has been voiced by seemingly diverse authorities: by Trotsky himself; by Soviet émigrés and dissidents who fled the USSR in the 1930s and thereafter; then by Khrushchev and by commissions and writers during his time; then by Mikhail Gorbachev and the commissions and writers sponsored by him; and since 1991 by both Russian and Western historians who claim to be drawing upon the newly-available documentation from former Soviet archives.

However, the truth is not constituted by any "consensus" of authorities. Nor is "credibility" a category of analysis. Whether a

statement, fact-claim, etc. is “believed” has no bearing at all on whether it is true, no matter how many “authorities” affirm it. Only primary sources are evidence.

These newly-available primary sources – evidence -- permit us to see for the first time that the history of the Soviet Union during the Stalin period, including the roles of Stalin and Trotsky, is very different – indeed, in many respects the diametrical opposite – from what we have been taught, and from what is still the “mainstream,” “consensus” version.

* Thanks to these newly-available sources we can now see that Khrushchev, and then Gorbachev, lied about Soviet history of the Stalin period.

* We can also see now that Trotsky lied *too* — deliberately, as did Khrushchev and Gorbachev. Like them, Trotsky lied a lot.

I have written a number of books and articles about the lies perpetrated under the auspices of Khrushchev and Gorbachev, about anticommunist historians East and West who have drawn upon their lies, and about the new version of Soviet history that emerges from the newly-available archival sources. In the present volume and in the one that will follow it I will identify and study some of Trotsky’s lies and examine how this changes our understanding of Trotsky’s activities and of Soviet history during the 1930s.

Trotsky’s Lies

We owe, in great part, our introduction to the fact that Trotsky lied to a number of seminal works of research. First is the work of the late Pierre Broué, the foremost Trotskyist historian in the world during his time (Broué died in 2005). Second is the seminal article by J. Arch Getty, “Trotsky in Exile: The Founding of the Fourth International,” published in *Soviet Studies* in January, 1986. Third is the brilliant article by Sven-Eric Holmström, “New Evidence Concerning the ‘Hotel Bristol’ Question in the First Moscow Trial of 1936,” published in *Cultural Logic* for 2008. Inspired by the efforts of these researchers I have discovered some more lies by Trotsky.

Verifying The Moscow Trials Testimony

Part One of the present book consists of the process of verification of those fact-claims made by defendants in the three Moscow Trials that we can now check from other, independent sources. This project is important for understanding what Trotsky was doing during the 1930s.

According to the Moscow Trials testimony Trotsky, in the leadership of his clandestine followers within the USSR and in a political bloc with many other Oppositionists, was involved in the following conspiracies:

- * to assassinate Stalin and other Soviet leaders (called "terror" or "individual terror" in Russian);
- * to sabotage as much of the Soviet economy as possible, principally in industry, in mining, and in transportation;
- * to conspire with commanders of the Soviet armed forces in order to promote a *coup d'état* against the Stalin regime;
- * to take over leadership of the Soviet Union with the help of Hitler's Germany, militarist Japan, and other foreign powers at the price of making important economic concessions and of ceding parts of the Soviet Union to them, stopping support for the Comintern, and returning much or most of the economy back to private ownership.

Trotsky vigorously denied all of this. Especially since Khrushchev and Gorbachev, Trotsky's denials have been almost universally believed. But the primary source evidence available to us today enables us to see that at the very least many, and perhaps all, of the charges against Trotsky and the confessions made by the Moscow Trials defendants were true. On the evidence, Trotsky's denials were lies.

We will examine those lies of Trotsky's that bear directly upon his conspiratorial activities and upon our verification of the Moscow

Trials testimony. I do not mean to imply that these were all Trotsky was lying about. The more we study, the more lies of Trotsky's we discover.

Lenin's "Peppery Dishes" Statement

One example of a lie by Trotsky that does not bear directly upon his conspiracies or upon verification of the Moscow Trials testimony will serve to illustrate the fact that Trotsky lied a great deal. This is his claim that Lenin opposed Stalin's appointment as General Secretary of the Party because of his crude behavior towards others, which Trotsky called "peppery dishes."

We begin with what we believe to be the first time that Trotsky used this story. This was in his speech of October 23, 1927, to a combined meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee, called to consider his expulsion from the Party.

Троцкий.—Через Октябрьскую революцию наша партия получила в свои руки могущественный аппарат принуждения, без которого немислима пролетарская диктатура. Средоточием диктатуры является Центральный Комитет нашей партии (Шум). При Ленине, при ленинском Центральном Комитете организационный аппарат партии был подчинен революционной классовой политике мирового масштаба. Правда, Сталин, в качестве генерального секретаря, внушал Ленину опасения с самого начала. «Сей повар будет готовить только острые блюда»,—так говорил Ленин в тесном кругу в момент X съезда партии. Сегодня было сервировано здесь одно из таких острых блюд под видом сообщения о военном заговоре. (Шум).

The earliest version of Trotsky's "cook ... peppery dishes" story

Pravda November 2, 1927.

Троцкий.—Через Октябрьскую революцию наша партия получила в свои руки могущественный аппарат принуждения, без которого немислима пролетарская диктатура. Средоточием диктатуры является Центральный Комитет нашей партии. При Ленине, при ленинском Центральном Комитете организационный аппарат партии был подчинен революционной классовой политике мирового масштаба. Правда, Сталин, в качестве генерального секретаря, внушал Ленину опасения с самого начала. «Сей повар будет готовить только острые блюда», — так говорил Ленин в тесном кругу в момент X съезда.¹

Translated:

Trotsky:—Through the October Revolution our Party received into its hands a powerful apparatus of compulsion without which the proletarian dictatorship is unthinkable. The concentration of the dictatorship is the Central Committee of our Party. In Lenin's time, in the time of Lenin's Central Committee, the organizational apparatus of the Party was subordinated to revolutionary class politics of a global scale. True, Stalin in his capacity of General Secretary instilled fear in Lenin from the very beginning. "This cook will prepare only peppery [literally: sharp – GF] dishes," – so said Lenin to a small circle at the time of the X Party Congress.

¹ "Rech' tov. Trotskogo." *Pravda* November 2, 1927. Felix Kreisel has usefully put a photographic reproduction of this page of *Pravda* at <http://web.mit.edu/fjk/www/images/Pravda/1927-11-02-4.pdf> and transcribed the somewhat different version of Trotsky's speech from the MS in the Harvard TA at <http://web.mit.edu/fjk/www/Trotsky/sochineniia/1927/19271023.html>

In this its first occurrence the “cook ... peppery dishes” story is clearly separated from Stalin’s being made General Secretary. Trotsky states that Lenin made this remark “at the time of the X Party Congress,” which took place March 8 – 16, 1921. Stalin was named to the post of General Secretary as a result of the XI Congress held a year later, March 27 – April 2, 1922.

This would have been a good opportunity for Trotsky to name others that also heard Lenin make this remark. It would, arguably, have helped him, given his speech more impact, if he had done so. But he did not. This makes us suspect that perhaps he *could* not do so – that the story may be false.

It is difficult to prove that Lenin did *not* make this remark. Most events do not leave a paper trail. For our purposes what is most important here is that even Trotsky does not claim that Lenin made the remark in connection with Stalin’s being made General Secretary.

In February 1929, the same month he went into exile to Turkey, Trotsky once again cited the “peppery dishes” story.

“This cook will prepare only **peppery dishes**,” Lenin warned the party as early as 1922.

- “How Could This Happen?” February 25, 1929. WLT ‘29. p. 38.

Here Trotsky does not explicitly tie the story to Stalin’s gaining the General Secretary post. But he does so implicitly by shifting the date from 1921 to 1922, the year of the Eleventh Party Congress, the year Stalin was chosen as General Secretary. Here are some of the citations of this statement in Trotsky’s works (I don’t claim that this is an exhaustive list):

Trotsky on “Peppery Dishes”

When at the Tenth Congress, two years after the death of Sverdlov, Zinoviev and others, not without a hidden thought of the struggle against me, supported the can-

didacy of Stalin for General Secretary – that is, placed him de jure in the position which Sverdlov had occupied de facto – Lenin spoke in a small circle against this plan, expressing his fear that “this cook will prepare only **peppery dishes**.” That phrase alone, taken in connection with the character of Sverdlov, shows us the differences between the two types of organizers: the one tireless in smoothing over conflicts, easing the work of the Collegium, and the other a specialist in **peppery dishes** – not even afraid to spice them with actual poison.

- “On the Suppressed Testament of Lenin (December 1932).”

<https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1932/12/lenin.htm>

The necessity of removing the boss who was specializing in **peppery dishes** became clear to Lenin immediately after his return to work.

- Ibid.

In 1921, warning his most intimate comrades against electing Stalin as general secretary, Lenin said, “This cook will prepare only **peppery dishes**.”

- “Some Results of the Stalin Amalgam” WLT ‘34-’35 ; also

<https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1935/01/amalgam.htm>

From being the instrument of the revolution, the G.P.U. has become the instrument of the soviet aristocracy, the personal instrument of Stalin, about whom Lenin warned in 1922: “This cook will prepare only **peppery dishes**.”

- “The Moscow ‘Confessions’” 18 Dec. 1936

In 1922, when Stalin was first elected general secretary of the party, Lenin remarked warningly to a small circle: "This cook will give us only **peppery dishes**."

- "Is Stalin Weakening or the Soviets?" January 1932. WLT 1932 p. 38.

True to his evaluation of people and circumstances, Lenin in March 1922 spoke out decisively against the appointment of Stalin as general secretary ("that cook will make only **peppery dishes**")...

- "From the Archives," Sept. 1932 WLT 1932 p. 208.

Lenin saw the democratization of the administration as the most important task of the dictatorship. "Every cook must learn how to govern." The process that has taken place is quite the reverse. The number of administrators did not grow to include "every cook"; it constricted instead to a single chef, and at that a specialist in **peppery dishes** only.

- "Alarm Signal!" March 3, 1933. WLT 1932-33 p. 112.

In 1921, warning his most intimate comrades against electing Stalin as general secretary, Lenin said, "This cook will prepare only **peppery dishes**."

- "Some Results of the Stalin Amalgam." January 12, 1935. WLT 1934-35 p. 207.

You may remember that in 1921 Lenin had strongly advised the party against electing Stalin to the post of general secretary. "This cook" -- Lenin literally said -- "will prepare only **spicy dishes**." In any case, Lenin

could not at that moment have had the slightest idea of just how spicy this cook's dishes would be.²

- "Stalin Is Not Everything." August 23, 1936. WLT 1935-36 p. 411.

From being the instrument of the revolution, the GPU has become the instrument of the Soviet aristocracy, the personal instrument of Stalin, about whom Lenin warned in 1922: "This cook will prepare only **peppery dishes.**"

- "Shame!" December 18, 1936. WLT 1935-36 p. 496.

It is astounding how persistent Zinoviev was, as he pulled Kamenev along, in preparing over a number of years his own tragic finale. If not for Zinoviev's initiative, Stalin would have hardly become the General Secretary of the Party. Zinoviev was bent on utilizing the episodic trade union discussion in the winter of 1920-21 for a further struggle against me. Stalin appeared to him -- and not without foundation -- the man most suitable for the behind-the-scenes work. It was during these very days that Lenin, objecting to the appointment of Stalin as General Secretary, made his famous remark: "I do not advise it -- this cook will prepare only **peppery dishes.**" What prophetic words!

- "Pages from Trotsky's Journal," 1936-1937.

In March 1921 Lenin had already given the advice not to choose Stalin as the general secretary since, as he put it, "This cook will prepare only **peppery dishes.**"

² The Russian term is "ostrye bliuda," literally "sharp dishes," meaning "spicy" or "peppery." For some reason the translators used the term "spicy" here but "peppery" elsewhere.

... Thus the Kremlin "cook" came to the most peppery "dishes" in the form of the Moscow trials.

- "Statement to Journalists on the Dewey Verdict." December 13, 1937. WLT 1937-38 p. 98-9.

Lenin did not trust Stalin in 1921, when Zinoviev recommended him for the post of general secretary. Lenin gave the following warning: "I don't advise this. This cook will prepare only **peppery dishes**."

- "Behind the Moscow Trials." March 3, 1938. WLT 1937-38 p. 203.

It was precisely at this point that Stalin brought into complete view the dangerous qualities which Lenin had warned against: rudeness, disloyalty, propensity to abuse power. The "cook of the Kremlin" had indeed prepared **the most peppery of dishes**.

- Ibid. p. 205.

... why it was precisely Stalin ("the cook of **peppery dishes**," according to Lenin's definition as far back as March 1921) who became head of the avid and conservative caste of usurpers of the revolution;

- "The Priests of Half-Truth." March 19, 1938. WLT 1937-38 p. 280.

Lenin proposed in his testament (January 1923) to remove Stalin from the post of general secretary of the party, giving as his reasons Stalin's rudeness, disloyalty, and tendency to abuse power. Two years earlier Lenin warned: "This cook will prepare only **peppery dishes**." No one in the party liked or respected Stalin... That is why the cook of **peppery dishes** became the leader of the totalitarian bureaucracy.

- "The Comintern and the GPU. The Attempted Assassination of May 24 and the Communist Party." WLT 1939-40 p. 349 - 350.³

Trotsky made this claim many times. He vacillates between 1921 and 1922 as the year Lenin supposedly said it. Trotsky also vacillates over the question of to whom Lenin made this remark. Trotsky wrote "in a small circle," "his most intimate comrades," "his famous remark," "warned the party," "to a small circle," "spoke out decisively," "strongly advised the party," "gave the following warning."

Trotsky always claimed that others besides himself had heard Lenin make this remark. His accounts differ significantly about who and how many those people were, and never specifically name anybody but himself. In addition, only Trotsky records it, no one else. These considerations might provide reason enough to reject this oft-repeated story of Trotsky's as a lie.

There is a yet more essential point: After his initial version of the story in October 1927 Trotsky usually ties it to the discussion around the choice of Stalin as General Secretary of the Party, which took place at the XI Party Congress in March-April 1922. This is how we know Trotsky was lying. First, because initially even Trotsky did not connect the story with Stalin's appointment. Second, because, by all accounts, it was Lenin himself who proposed Stalin as General Secretary.

³ This statement is also to be found three times in Chapter 12 of the English language edition of Trotsky's biography of Stalin. But this book was not completed at Trotsky's death. It was completed by Charles Malamuth, who was later criticized for adding materials of his own. (My thanks to David Walters for this information.) It is not in the Russian version edited by Yuri Fel'shtinsky from, he says, the copy in the TA. But of course it would not be, for that volume only goes up to the year 1917.

Yuri Fel'shtinsky is a prominent and devoted Russian Trotskyist scholar who, predictably, hates Stalin. Fel'shtinsky writes:

Отметим, что до начала болезни Ленина никаких политических разногласий между Лениным и Сталиным не было. (Vozhdy 250)

Translated:

We note that before the onset of Lenin's illness there were no political disagreements between Lenin and Stalin.

The XI Party Congress took place immediately *before* Lenin became ill.

Fel'shtinsky does not cite any other source for the "peppery dishes" statement. In fact he does not endorse it himself but merely quotes Trotsky's text (p. 274). He then goes on to quote (p. 333, note 5) Lenin's ringing endorsement of Stalin at this 11th Party Congress from the Russian edition of Lenin's *Complete Collected Works*:

Вот Преображенский здесь легко бросал, что Сталин в двух комиссариатах А кто не грешен из нас. Кто не брал несколько обязанностей сразу. Да и как можно делать иначе. Что мы можем сейчас сделать, чтобы было обеспечено существующее положение в Наркомнаце, чтобы разбираться со всеми туркестанскими, кавказскими и прочими вопросами. Ведь это все политические вопросы. А разрешать эти вопросы необходимо, это - вопросы, которые сотни лет занимали европейские государства, которые в ничтожной доле разрешены в демократических республиках. Мы их разрешаем, и нам нужно, чтобы у нас был человек, к которому любой из представителей наций мог бы пойти и подробно рассказать, в чем дело. Где его разыскать. Я думаю, и Преображенский не мог

бы назвать другой кандидатуры, кроме товарища Сталина.⁴

Translated:

Here is Preobrazhensky casually tossing out the remark that Stalin is head of two commissariats. But who among us is not guilty of the same thing? Who has not taken several responsibilities at the same time? Moreover, how could it be otherwise? What can we do now to guarantee the current situation in the Commissariat of Nationalities, to deal with all the Turkestan, Caucasus, and other questions. For these are all political problems. And it is essential to resolve these problems, these are problems that have occupied European powers for centuries and which are scarcely resolved in the democratic republics. We are resolving them and we need a man whom any of the national representatives can approach and explain in detail what is the matter. Where can we find him? I think that even Preobrazhensky could not name another candidate besides comrade Stalin.

Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, a ferociously anti-Stalin writer, stated that Stalin was elected General Secretary on April 3, 1922, "at Lenin's proposal."

Еще при первом послесталинском "коллективном руководстве" вышел Энциклопедический словарь, где в биографии Сталина прямо и недвусмысленно написано следующее: "После XI съезда партии, 3 апреля 1922 пленум Центрального Комитета партии по

⁴ Lenin, *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii* 45, p. 122. At http://nglib-free.ru/book_view.jsp?idn=001579&page=122&format=html Also in the transcript of the 11th Party Congress: *XI съезд РКП (б). 27 марта — 2 апреля 1922 г.* — М.: Партиздат, 1936, p. 150 (March 27). This is the first edition of the transcript of this Party Congress (Worldcat Accession Number 83723613).

предложению В. И. Ленина избрал И. В. Сталина генеральным секретарем ЦК партии. На этом посту И. В. Сталин работал до октября 1952, а затем до конца своей жизни являлся секретарем ЦК" (разрядка моя. - А. А.) (Энциклопедический словарь в 3 томах. М. 1955, т. III, стр. 310).⁵

Translated:

During the first post-Stalin period of "collective leadership" the *Encyclopedic dictionary* was published, where in the biography of Stalin we find written, directly and unequivocally, the following: "After the XI Congress of the Party, on April 3, 1922, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, according to the proposal of V.I. Lenin, elected J.V. Stalin as General Secretary of the CC of the Party. J.V. Stalin worked at this post until October 1952, and then until his death was Secretary of the CC" (emphasis mine - A.A.). - [*Encyclopedic dictionary in 3 volumes. Moscow, 1955, vol. 3, p. 310*].

Molotov agrees and even says that Lenin worked hard to overcome objections to this proposal.

— Неожиданно для себя в 1921 году я стал Секретарем ЦК. Из трех секретарей был секретариат: Молотов, Ярославский, Михайлов, как было опубликовано, Молотов — Ответственный секретарь. Не было тогда еще первого, генерального, был ответственный. Приемные дни были опубликованы. Я встретился с Лениным. Мы с ним побеседовали по ряду вопросов, потом гуляли по Кремлю. Он говорит: «Только я вам советую: вы должны как Секретарь ЦК заниматься политической работой, всю техническую работу — на замов и помощников. Вот был у нас до сих пор

⁵ А. Авторханов *Загадки смерти Сталина*.. Барнаул. Алтайское книжное издательство, 1993. At - <http://mario21.narod.ru/docs/stalin/7.htm> Also in *Novyi Mir* 1991, p. 205.

Секретарем ЦК Крестинский, так он был управделами, а не Секретарь ЦК! Всякой ерундой занимался, а не политикой!»

Это — после X съезда партии. А на XI съезде появился так называемый «список десятки» — фамилии предполагаемых членов ЦК, сторонников Ленина. И против фамилии Сталина рукой Ленина было написано: «Генеральный секретарь». Ленин организовал фракционное собрание «десятки». Где-то возле Свердловского зала Кремля комнату нашел, уговорились: фракционное собрание, троцкистов — нельзя, рабочую оппозицию — нельзя, демократический централизм тоже не приглашать, только одни крепкие сторонники «десятки», то есть ленинцы. Собрал, по-моему, человек двадцать от наиболее крупных организаций перед голосованием. Сталин даже упрекнул Ленина, дескать, у нас секретное или полусекретное совещание во время съезда, как-то фракционно получается, а Ленин говорит: «Товарищ Сталин, вы-то старый, опытный фракционер! Не сомневайтесь, нам сейчас нельзя иначе. Я хочу, чтобы все были хорошо подготовлены к голосованию, надо предупредить товарищей, чтобы твердо голосовали за этот список без поправок! Список «десятки» надо провести целиком. Есть большая опасность, что станут голосовать по лицам, добавлять: вот этот хороший литератор, его надо, этот хороший оратор — и разжижат список, опять у нас не будет большинства. А как тогда руководить!»

А ведь на X съезде Ленин запретил фракции.

И голосовали с этим примечанием в скобках. Сталин стал Генеральным. Ленину это больших трудов стоило. Но он, конечно, вопрос достаточно глубоко продумал и дал понять, на кого равняться. Ленин, видимо, посчитал, что я недостаточный политик, но в секретарях и в Политбюро меня оставил, а Сталина сделал Генеральным. Он, конечно, готовился, чувствуя болезнь свою. Видел ли он в Сталине своего преемника?

Думаю, что и это могло учитываться. А для чего нужен был Генеральный секретарь? Никогда не было. Но постепенно авторитет Сталина поднялся и вырос в гораздо большее, чем предполагал Ленин или чем он даже считал желательным. Но предвидеть все, конечно, было невозможно, а в условиях острой борьбы вокруг Сталина все более сколачивалась активная группа — Дзержинский, Куйбышев, Фрунзе и другие, очень разные люди.⁶

Translated:

Unexpectedly, in 1921, I became a Secretary of the Central Committee. The Secretariat was comprised of three secretaries: Molotov, Yaroslavsky, and Mikhailov. As has been published, Molotov was executive secretary. There was not at that time a first or General secretary but an executive secretary. Reception days were made public. I met with Lenin. We discussed a number of questions and then walked around the Kremlin. He said: "But I advise you: as Secretary of the CC you must take care of the political work. Leave, all the technical work to your second-in-command and assistants. Here we had until now Krestinsky as Secretary of the Central Committee but he was a business manager, not Secretary of the CC! He occupied himself with every trivial matter but not with politics!"

This was after the X Congress of the Party. And at the XI Congress appeared the so-called "list of ten" - the names of proposed members of the Central Committee, Lenin's supporters. And beside Stalin's name in Lenin's hand was written: "General Secretary." Lenin organized a factional meeting of the "ten." Somewhere near Sverdlovsk Hall of the Kremlin I found a room.

⁶ Felix Chuev, *Molotov. Poludnerzhavniy Vlastelin*, pp. 239-241. This is an expanded version of the book published in English as *Molotov Remembers*.

They were persuaded: this is a factional meeting, Trotskyists, workers' opposition, the Democratic Centralists – don't invite them, only the firm supporters of the "ten," that is, the Leninists. I gathered, I think, about twenty people from among the strongest organizations before the vote. Stalin even reproached Lenin, saying that we are having a secret or semi-secret meeting during the convention, something factional is taking place, and Lenin said: "Comrade Stalin, you are an old, experienced factionalist! Have no doubt, we can't do otherwise now. I want everyone to be well prepared for the vote, it is necessary to warn the comrades to vote for this list without amendment! We need to carry through with the list of 'ten' as a whole. There is a great danger that if people vote for individuals they will say: Here is a good writer, we need him; this is a good speaker – they will tear up this sheet and once again we will not have the majority. And then, how can we lead!"

But at the X Congress, Lenin had banned factions.

And they voted with this note in brackets. **Stalin became General Secretary. This cost Lenin a lot of work.** But he, of course, had thought through the question deeply enough and made it clear who to rely on. Lenin apparently decided that I was not enough of a politician, but he left me as a Secretary and in the Politburo and made Stalin General Secretary. He, of course, was preparing himself, feeling his sickness. Did he see Stalin as his successor? I think you can count on that. But what was the need for a General Secretary? There had never been one. But gradually Stalin's authority rose and grew into something much larger than Lenin had anticipated or even thought desirable. But of course it was impossible to foresee everything, and under conditions of sharp struggle an ac-

tive group began to form itself around Stalin -- Dzerzhinsky, Kuibyshev, Frunze and others, very different people.

Robert Service cites Molotov here, and does not question what he says. For Service, Lenin either "chose Stalin" or "supported a proposal" by someone else.

He [Lenin] was eager to have Stalin back at his side. Having recruited him to the Leninist cause in the trade union dispute, Lenin supported a proposal to make him General Secretary of the Russian Communist Party.

Conventionally it has been supposed that Stalin was put in office because he was an experienced bureaucrat with an unusual capacity for not being bored by administrative work. The facts do not bear this out.... The reason why Lenin chose Stalin was less administrative than political. He wanted one of his allies in a post crucial to the maintenance of his policies. (Stalin 189-190)

Other sources agree that at the XI Party Congress Lenin nominated Stalin to the post of General Secretary. Stalin was formally appointed on April 3, 1922, at the first meeting of the new Central Committee after the Congress. In fact I cannot find any source that disagrees - except, implicitly, Trotsky, and Trotskyist writers who just echo what Trotsky later wrote.

Trotsky contradicted himself about when Lenin supposedly made the remark, under what circumstances, and who heard him make it. Therefore the "peppery dishes" story is a lie. But Trotsky told it over and over again, many times over a number of years. Eventually he even called it Lenin's "famous remark." This is a propaganda technique: claim the remark is so "famous" that "everybody knows it" and no evidence for it is necessary.

It's easy to see why Trotsky liked this story and wanted others to believe it. It made himself look close to Lenin, part of the "small

circle," one of Lenin's "most intimate comrades." It made Stalin look like someone whom Lenin opposed from a date much earlier than 1923, when Lenin was very ill.

But how could Trotsky think that he could get away with repeating this lie over and over again? For one thing, it would not have been easy to refute it in the 1930s. The proceedings of the XI Congress were not published until 1936. Very few people would have bothered to check them. The rest of the sources we cite here were not to be published for many years.

We should also consider to whom Trotsky was addressing this lie and the other lies we document in this work. This was, in the main, his supporters, the Trotskyists. Who else was reading Trotsky's materials? (Trotsky also wrote articles for the capitalist press. Naturally, whatever lies he told in his own publications had to be repeated there too. But readers of the capitalist press were not his primary audience.)

Trotsky's followers *believed* Trotsky. Virtually no one else did. And Trotsky wanted his own followers to believe that he, not Stalin, had been Lenin's closest associate. Trotsky's essays were published, in the main, in Russian in his *Biulleten' Oppozitsii*. Many were translated and distributed in pamphlets and in newspapers but always by Trotsky's own supporters.

This specific lie of Trotsky's is relatively easy to expose today. But we can't find that it has been exposed before. One might think that members of the Trotskyist movement might have done so. After all, few other people in the world are really interested in Trotsky, really motivated to study his works carefully and use them in judging Soviet history. We noted above that Yuri Fel'shtinsky noticed this incongruity between Trotsky's "peppery dishes" tale and the reality that Lenin had proposed Stalin as General Secretary. But even Fel'shtinsky, surely among the most capable Trotskyist historians today, did not come out and state: "Trotsky must have been lying; he must have fabricated this story," etc.

Whatever the difficulty of uncovering this specific lie of Trotsky's, it is much harder to uncover those of Trotsky's lies we discuss and utilize as evidence in this book. We were only able to find them because we were looking for them. We were guided by the hypothesis that Trotsky often lied. This hypothesis suggested itself to us after studying the research of Pierre Broué, Arch Getty, and Sven-Eric Holmström. They had uncovered the fact that Trotsky lied about important matters.

At length it occurred to us to wonder: "If Trotsky lied about these things, maybe he also lied about other important things too?" Only then did we begin to look for other lies by Trotsky. And, sure enough, we discovered some.

The Structure of This Book

Trotsky's "peppery dishes" lie is, in terms of its practical impact, not very important. I include it here because it illustrates an interesting fact about Trotsky that we will see in other contexts many times: Trotsky lied a lot!

Trotsky was not afraid to lie even when it was not important, at that moment, to tell that particular lie. After all, in telling this "cook...peppery dishes" lie Trotsky took some chance that his lie would be discovered. But what did he stand to gain by telling it that he would not have gained if he had not told it? Nothing, as far I can determine. If he had never told this particular lie no one would have missed it because no one would have expected it in the first place. Probably no one became a Trotskyist, or gave money to the Trotskyist movement, just because of that story. The most one can say for this fable is that it is consistent with Trotsky's overall project of presenting himself as Lenin's closest confidant, his best student, and therefore his rightful heir.

Perhaps this is the reason that Trotsky was willing to lie repeatedly even when there was little gain to be had and despite the fact that there was always a risk of being exposed as a liar. And that was a possibility. Anyone who found that speech of Trotsky's in the November 2, 1927, issue of *Pravda* and compared the

"cook...peppery dishes" version there with the way Trotsky told it repeatedly during the 1930s could easily see that Trotsky had changed his story.

This is a very interesting fact about Trotsky. It is a kind of bravado or arrogance: "I can make stuff up, and people will believe it." How much more, therefore, should we expect Trotsky to be willing to lie when there *was* something important at stake, something to be gained by lying and/or to be lost by not lying? Under such circumstances we should expect Trotsky to lie readily, whenever he thought it expedient to do so. And that is exactly what we have found.

Part One of this book reproduces the process of checking up on, verifying, Moscow Trials testimony. The rich archival materials now available to us make this possible. For the first time we do not have to either accept or reject the Moscow Trials testimony on the word of others, whether pro- or anti-Stalin. For the first time we can independently verify some important testimony - statements, fact-claims - made by Moscow Trials defendants. We will go through this process, studying all the evidence in detail.

An important part of the evidence we draw on is Trotsky's own proven lies. Both parts of this book may be read as an examination of those of Trotsky's lies that we can now recognize as such and the beginning of the task of examining what they imply for our understanding of the history of that time.

Our conclusion is unequivocal: on the evidence, by means of an objective verification process, the only legitimate conclusion is that the Moscow Trials testimony is genuine, in that it represents what the defendants themselves chose to say. This conclusion will be unacceptable to some readers on political grounds. We will consider that fact as well.

Part Two is the discussion of some interesting and bold lies by Trotsky that I have discovered, and the implications of those lies. I will argue that, together with other evidence, Trotsky's lies reveal

much about his clandestine conspiratorial activities. Moreover, what they reveal is consistent both with Moscow Trials testimony – testimony whose validity we can now accept, having tested and proven it in Part One – and with other primary source evidence.

Trotsky's lies – those discovered first by others like Broué, Getty, and Holmström, and some that I have discovered – are central to both parts of the book. The book as a whole can be read as a commentary on some very interesting falsehoods that Trotsky chose to propagate, and which he was, on the whole, successful at getting others to believe. Indeed, they are still widely believed today.

The facts uncovered and discussed in this book should be of great interest to those who wish to learn the truth about the high politics of the Soviet Union during the 1930s, and also those who have a genuine interest in the prominent political actors of that period, including Trotsky himself.

Some quotations are repeated in different chapters. I have done this because many readers will read the chapters individually, rather than read the book from beginning to end. I wish the chapters to be as understandable as possible if read in this way.

All boldface emphases are by me unless otherwise noted.

My special thanks to Bill Sacks, whose advice and criticism has been more helpful than I can truly say; to Mike Bessler, my tireless publisher, editor, and friend; and to Dr. Susana M. Sotillo, incisive critic, great scholar, and supportive *compañera*.

Part One. Trotsky's Lies and The Moscow
Trials Testimony As Evidence

Chapter 1. The Moscow Trials As Evidence

Our task in this first section of this book is to determine the reliability of the confessions and statements – the fact-claims – made by defendants at the three Moscow Trials of 1936, 1937, and 1938 by comparing those fact-claims with other, independent evidence.

Source Criticism of Evidence

When confronted with a body of testimony like the Moscow Trials transcripts we need to figure out how to deal with it. The Moscow Trials testimony is evidence. It can and must be evaluated as a source like all evidence should be. All evidence must be evaluated according to objective criteria, a process often called source criticism. This applies to the Moscow Trials testimony no more and no less than to all other evidence used in any kind of research, from scientific to historical.

One objective procedure, in this and in all such cases, is to begin by studying the Moscow Trials testimony carefully, reading it many times. This is done very rarely if at all. The logical fallacy at play here is that of *petitio principii* – in plain English, “begging the question,” or “assuming that which must be proven, not assumed.” The fact is this: there is not now nor has there ever been any evidence that the Moscow Trials defendants were in reality innocent, compelled or persuaded by some means (threats to them or against their families, loyalty to the Party, etc.) to testify falsely.

This false hypothesis and logical fallacy result from, are in service to and under the domination of, what I have called the “anti-Stalin paradigm.” Under its influence the Moscow Trials testimony is declared to be false *a priori*, without any attempt to evaluate it, to subject it to source criticism in the same way as all historical evidence should be evaluated.

Years of study have convinced me that the reason for this striking failure on the part of generations of historians of the Stalin period Soviet history is – fear. If the Moscow Trials transcripts were shown to be reliable as evidence, the “anti-Stalin paradigm” of Soviet history – and therefore of world history – would be dismantled, with consequences for the dominant paradigm of world history too.

This would be unacceptable to the controlling authorities in the field of Soviet history, who are closely tied to political authorities in many countries because of the hostility between the communist movement and the capitalist powers. The field of Soviet history itself was instituted in the West to be in service to the political project of discrediting and destroying the communist movement.

There is no other way to account for the nonsense that dominates in the field of Soviet history of the Stalin period and about the person of Joseph Stalin himself – for example, the common lapse by experienced scholars into well-known logical fallacies, unsupported and unquestioned assumptions, assertions without proof, the language of vituperation and moral condemnation – except by attributing it to the overwhelming ideological influence of the obligatory “anti-Stalin paradigm.”

The Moscow Trials are routinely *regarded* as fabrications concocted by the NKVD investigators, the Soviet Prosecution, and ultimately by Stalin. It is generally *assumed* that the defendants confessed to crimes that they did not commit; that the confessions were forced upon them, dictated, or scripted; that the innocent defendants were forced to falsely testify by threats of some kind against themselves or their families. Because there has long been a “consensus” that the Moscow Trials were fabrications and the testimony given there is false, the more than 1500 pages of the trial transcripts have been little studied and seldom even read.

Once the Trials transcripts have been studied carefully, the next step should be to compare the contents with other evidence now

available in order to determine whether the trials testimony can be either confirmed or contradicted by other evidence.

I have set about to do this. I have found that every time I can check a statement made at the Moscow Trials against evidence from outside the trials, it turns out that the Moscow Trial testimony or charge is verified.

This means that we have no objective basis to reject the confessions made at the Moscow Trials as false or fabricated. And this means that the Moscow Trials testimony is in fact what it appears to be - evidence.

Source Criticism of the Moscow Trials Testimony

In this and in all source criticism the student must begin by studying the evidence, beginning by reading it carefully and repeatedly. We must attempt to determine the reliability of the Moscow Trials testimony to see whether some of the fact-claims contained in it can be verified in other sources that are independent of it. When a number of *independent* sources agree on the same fact-claim, the likelihood that the fact-claim is true increases dramatically. If we can verify a number of fact-claims made by Moscow Trials defendants through independent sources, then we have established that the Moscow Trials testimony should be considered to be legitimate evidence. This is the process we have undertaken to carry out in the first section of the present book.

A few scholars who believe in the "prosecution-fabrication" theory and have studied parts, at least, of the testimony have seriously distorted that testimony in an attempt to force it to fit the Procrustean bed of the anti-Stalin paradigm. In the 1960s and 1970s Stephen F. Cohen studied Nikolai Bukharin's testimony in the Third Moscow Trial of March 1938. Cohen proposed a novel conclusion: that Bukharin had confessed only in very general terms to crimes that he did not specify but had refused to confess to any specific crimes.

Some years ago Vladimir Bobrov and I studied Cohen's argument and evidence. In our article we demonstrate that Cohen is completely incorrect. In his trial testimony Bukharin did indeed confess to a number of very serious and, the important point here, very specific crimes. At the same trial Bukharin stubbornly proclaimed himself innocent of other very serious crimes with which the Prosecution charged him. We argued there that, under the influence of the predominant "anti-Stalin" paradigm, Cohen seriously misread Bukharin's testimony. (Furr and Bobrov Cohen)

Yet Cohen's fallacious characterization of Bukharin's testimony has been widely accepted as accurate. Even Mikhail Gorbachev's Politburo commission appointed to study and to find evidence to support Gorbachev's predetermined decision to "rehabilitate" Bukharin was misled by Cohen's false conclusion. One of the commission members, P.N. Demichev, said:

Если вздуматься, он по сути дела от всего отказался.

Translated:

If we consider this carefully, in essence he [Bukharin] denied everything. (RKEB 3 40)

In 2010 Matthew Lenoe concluded that Genrikh Iagoda, another defendant in the Third Moscow Trial, later retracted the confessions that he had made prior to the trial and earlier in it. Our study of Lenoe's argument published in 2013 shows that Lenoe seriously misunderstood Iagoda's testimony, and that in fact Iagoda did not at all retract his confession of guilt. We concluded that Lenoe forced his conclusions into the predetermined framework of the anti-Stalin paradigm, seriously distorting Iagoda's testimony in the process. (Furr Kirov Ch. 15)

Cohen's and Lenoe's misreadings of the trial testimony can be best explained by the power of the anti-Stalin paradigm. *The fact is this: there is not now, nor has there ever been, any evidence that the Moscow Trials defendants were in reality innocent, compelled or per-*

suaded by some means (threats to them or against their families, loyalty to the Party, etc.) to testify falsely.

The Role of Logical Fallacies

The out-of-hand rejection of the Moscow Trials testimony as evidence rests on the naïve acceptance of a number of logical fallacies. Among the most common are the following:

* The Moscow Trials testimony has been *assumed* to be false. This is the fallacy of *petitio principii* - "begging the question," or "assuming that which must be proven, not assumed." No evidence, in any scientific inquiry, should ever be either accepted or rejected without critical examination.

* The appeal to "expert" authority. The truth is never constituted by a "consensus of authorities or experts," no matter how many of them there are, still less by the consensus of anticommunist and Trotskyist "authorities."

This fallacy is close to the "where there's smoke there's fire" or "hasty conclusion" fallacy where "what everybody knows" substitutes for evidence.

* The argument from incredulity. This takes the form: "The charges against the defendants at the Moscow Trials are absurd, therefore they are false (or more likely to be false)." This is equivalent to saying: "I *consider* these charges absurd, therefore they are false." This is a statement about the person making the statement, not a statement about the charges in the Moscow Trials. Likewise, it would be invalid to say: "The charges against the defendants are credible, therefore they are true (or more likely to be true.)"

* Another form this fallacy takes is the "failure to persuade": "I am not persuaded by your argument, therefore it is wrong (or, more likely to be wrong, etc.)."

* The argument from ignorance. This fallacy often takes the form: "This statement has not been proven to be true, therefore it is false

(or "likely to be false," or "therefore we can assume that it is false until proven otherwise.")

* The "*ad hominem*" argument. Like practitioners of any scientific inquiry historians are supposed to strive to be objective. Historians are supposed to be on guard against their own biases so as not to be swayed by them. Yet it is very common for historians of the Stalin period to continually apply derogatory moral terms to Stalin and other leading figures. Most historians of the Stalin period do not make any effort even to disguise their own bias and subjectivity, let alone to make allowances for it by adopting strategies to minimize the effects that their biases will have on their research.

* The "demand for certainty." A common form that lack of objectivity takes is the demand for "certainty." For example, we have a great deal of circumstantial evidence that Leon Trotsky did in fact collaborate with German and Japanese intelligence. How can this evidence be accounted for, except to conclude that Trotsky did in fact collaborate? The most common form is denial. "There is no certainty, therefore it is false."

* "It might be a lie." It is not a refutation of a fact-claim to state that it "might be a lie." At any time any person might be deliberately lying, making false statements in good faith, or telling the truth. The same is true for any document. No evidence should be rejected because it "might be a lie." Instead, the researcher must try to verify the fact-claims in the document as far as possible.

* The "lack of material evidence." Leon Trotsky was the first to state that the lack of material evidence at the Moscow Trials helped to disprove the charges. This argument has been repeated by many historians since.

The logic is patently false. Any police force capable of compelling seasoned revolutionaries to confess in open court to crimes they did not commit would also be able to forge incriminating documents and force the defendants to swear that they were genuine.

Moreover, in a conspiracy seasoned revolutionaries would either destroy incriminating documents or, more likely, would never commit their plans to paper in the first place. Therefore not the absence but the *presence* of substantive "material evidence" in a case involving a serious conspiracy would logically raise suspicions of fakery.

The Need For, and Lack of, Objectivity

Everybody has biases. But everybody can learn to be objective in studying any subject, whether it be physics or history. The techniques are basically similar. Objectivity as a scientific method is a practice of "distrust of the self." One can learn to be objective by training oneself to become aware of, to articulate, and then to doubt one's own preconceived ideas. One must be automatically suspicious of evidence that tends to confirm one's own preconceived ideas, prejudices, and preferences. One must learn to give an especially generous reading, to search especially hard for, to lean over backwards to consider, evidence and arguments that contradict one's own preconceived ideas.

This is simply what every bourgeois detective in every detective story knows. As Sherlock Holmes said:

It is a capital mistake to theorize before you have all the evidence. It biases the judgment. (Conan Doyle, *A Study in Scarlet*)

In other words: keep your mind free of precipitate conclusions. Get the facts before you form your hypotheses. Be ready to abandon a hypothesis that does not explain the established facts.

If one does not begin one's research with a determined attempt to be objective, accompanied by definite strategies to minimize one's own biases, then one cannot and will not discover the truth. Put colloquially: if you don't start out to look for the truth you will not stumble across it by accident along the way, and what you do find will not be the truth.

This principle is well known. Therefore the real purpose of most research into Soviet history is *not* to discover the truth. Instead it is to arrive at politically acceptable conclusions and to disregard the evidence when that evidence does not support those politically acceptable conclusions. This is the "anti-Stalin paradigm."

The fallacies cited above are widely known. How is it possible that they are so commonly applied to the Moscow Trials testimony by scholars and other educated persons? I believe this is due to the power of the "anti-Stalin paradigm." Stalin has been so maligned, by so many "experts" and for so long a time, that many people believe "where there's smoke, there's fire" -- "there must be something to this." This is all wrong.

There is no substitute for evidence. In this study we examine the evidence and draw conclusions from the evidence alone. This is the only rationally defensible way of proceeding, in history as in any other field of scientific investigation.

Verifying the Moscow Trials Transcripts as Evidence

What's the historian's job? Many people would probably say: To find out what "really" happened, or what "probably" happened. I think this is the wrong question, leading to a wrong method.

What's the "right question"? To formulate a hypothesis. To ask: "What hypothesis best accounts for the evidence that we have?"

Concerning the Moscow Trials testimony we have considered two possible hypotheses:

- * The hypothesis that the Moscow Trials testimony is a fraud, a fabrication by the investigation and the prosecution.

- * The hypothesis that the Moscow Trials testimony is what it purports to be; that the defendants testified as they chose to testify and were not forced to testify falsely.

I chose to test the second hypothesis because in the course of my research on Soviet history I had run across a lot of evidence that appeared consistent with it. I have never encountered any evidence that appeared consistent with the first hypothesis. Therefore it appeared to me that the second hypothesis would be more fruitful. I present the results of my study in this first section of this book.

Every time we can check a statement made in Moscow Trials testimony against independent evidence, we find that the Moscow Trials testimony or charge is verified. This means that we have no objective basis to reject the confessions made at the Moscow Trials as false or fabricated. And this means that the Moscow Trials testimony is in fact what it appears to be – evidence

I came to adopt this hypothesis in much the same way Stephen Jay Gould, in his essay "Dinosaur in a Haystack," describes how his colleague Peter Ward decided to test the "Alvarez hypothesis," the so-called Cretaceous-Tertiary catastrophic extinction that contradicted the hitherto widely accepted theory of the gradual dying out of so many life-forms about 60 million years ago.¹

In the course of reading many documents from various archives for other research projects I had identified a number that appeared to provide evidence that verified testimony by defendants in the Moscow Trials. It seemed to me that more such documentary evidence might well be found if I actually set out to look for it. I also realized that, if no one ever set about looking for it, it would probably never be found and we would never know.

The fact that we have formed this hypothesis does not at all mean that we have predetermined the result of our research. Some hypothesis or "theory" is a necessary precondition to any inquiry.

¹ Stephen Jay Gould, "Dinosaur in a Haystack" *Natural History* 101 (March 1992): 2-13. It is widely available online, including at <http://www.inf.fu-berlin.de/lehre/SS05/efs/materials/Dinosaur-Leviathan.pdf>

Gould reminds us of Darwin's perceptive statement made to Henry Fawcett in 1861:

How odd it is that anyone should not see that all observation must be for or against some view if it is to be of any service!

The present study is a "test" in Gould's sense: "a fine example of theory" - Gould means "hypothesis" here - "confirmed by evidence that no one ever thought of collecting before the theory itself demanded such a test."

I have also been mindful of Gould's caution that a test does not prejudice the inquiry itself:

Please note the fundamental difference between demanding a test and guaranteeing the result. The test might just as well have failed, thus dooming the theory. Good theories invite a challenge but do not bias the outcome.

In the first section of this book we undertake to evaluate the Moscow Trials testimony with a view to verifying, or disproving, its validity as evidence. Our first step was to carefully study the transcripts of the three Moscow Trials of August 1936, January 1937, and March 1938. Our next step was to compare the fact-claims made in these transcripts with other evidence now available. Our goal has been to determine whether the trials testimony can be either confirmed or contradicted by other evidence.

"Rehabilitations"

By the final years of the existence of the Soviet Union while Mikhail Gorbachev was head of state all the defendants in the Moscow Trials had been "rehabilitated" - declared to have been innocent victims of a frameup - by high-level government and Communist Party commissions and judicial bodies. Elsewhere we have shown that many of the "rehabilitations" of persons convicted and pun-

ished during the 1930s of crimes against the State are in fact fraudulent in nature. (Furr Khrushchev Lied 163-196)

Trotsky has been "rehabilitated" with respect to his exile to Siberia on December 31, 1927, his banishment from the USSR on January 10, 1929, and the removal of his Soviet citizenship and ban on returning to the country of February 20, 1932.² Trotsky and Sedov were not formally convicted of the crimes alleged in the three Moscow Trials because they were never brought to trial. The verdict in the First Moscow Trial of August 1936 stated only that they were "subject, in the event of their being discovered on the territory of the U.S.S.R., to immediate arrest and trial." (1936 Trial 180) Trotsky and Sedov never returned to the USSR and so were never tried and convicted of any crime. Trotsky and Sedov have been declared innocent *de facto* by implication: those through whom they were supposed to have worked have been declared innocent, so they are assumed to have been innocent as well.³

However, no evidence to support these decisions has ever been released. It seems safe to conclude that if any such exculpatory evidence did exist in Soviet archives it would have been found and published by now. But a great deal of evidence of Trotsky's and Sedov's *guilt*, rather than of their innocence, has been discovered and continues to be published. We will examine some of it in the present book and more of it in volume two of this study.

² 'Milaia moia resnichka'. Sergei Sedov. *Pis'ma iz ssylki*. Sbp: NITS "Memorial"; Hoover Institution Archives (Stanford University), 2006, p. 133. Online at <http://www.sakharov-center.ru/asfcd/auth/?t=page&num=1481>

³ Trotsky's relatives and supporters reportedly advocated for his and his son Leon's "rehabilitation" during the Gorbachev years. But it soon became evident that the Soviet, and then the Russian, authorities were bent on demonizing all Bolshevik leaders, including those they later found to have been unjustly convicted. That would no doubt be the case with Trotsky, whose use of violence during the Civil War was notorious. Also, with the disappearance of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (it was declared illegal in 1991) Trotsky cannot be "reinstated in Party membership." The successor party to the CPSU, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, is firmly anti-Trotsky.

Today we have access to evidence that was not available to historians only a few years ago. We are no longer in the position of being forced to "believe" or "disbelieve" the testimony given at the Moscow Trials, Trotsky's denials, or the Gorbachev-era "rehabilitation" statements. We can now check many statements made by Moscow Trials defendants by comparing them to other evidence.

In addition to the Moscow trial testimony and Trotsky's own denials we now have more sources from both Soviet and non-Soviet evidence upon which we can draw. We'll discuss these sources in detail.

Non-Soviet Evidence

The non-Soviet evidence will be of particular interest since it cannot have been fabricated by the Soviet investigation or prosecution. However, we do not mean to suggest that this evidence is more valid in any *objective* way than is the Soviet or partly Soviet evidence. It is *subjectively* more important to those people who have been influenced by the propaganda which has long contended that Soviet evidence is *ipso facto* of less validity because it "might have been fabricated" even when there is no evidence that fabrication has taken place. Non-Soviet evidence may *seem* to be "more credible" to many people than Soviet evidence does. This is, in fact, an example of the "argument from incredulity."

All evidence, regardless of its origins, must be studied carefully to determine whether it is valid or not. It is never the case that Soviet evidence is *ipso facto* less valid than non-Soviet evidence. In reality, both Soviet and non-Soviet evidence must be critically examined in the same way to determine its validity.

We will examine the following non-Soviet evidence:

- * Documents from the Harvard Trotsky Archive.
- * Valentin Astrov's 1989 and 1993 testimony concerning his January 1937 testimony, as well as that testimony itself which is not, of course, non-Soviet.

- * Statements by NKVD defector Genrikh Samoilovich Liushkov to his Japanese handlers.
- * The Mastny-Benes note of February, 1937.
- * The memoir of Jules Humbert-Droz, published in Switzerland in 1971.
- * The reports of Sedov confidant and NKVD spy Mark Zborowski to his Soviet handlers in 1937 and 1938.
- * The testimony of John D. Littlepage and of Carroll G. Holmes.

Soviet Evidence

There is a great deal of Soviet evidence that confirms the genuine character of the Moscow Trials. One rich source of such evidence is in the recent (2013) and hard-to-find volume *Politbiuro i Lev Trotskii. Tom 2*. In the second volume of the present work I will subject the several hundred documents in this volume to detailed examination.

Here we will consider some other documents of Soviet origin that confirm the genuineness of the testimony of the defendants in the Moscow Trials:

- * The statement by Mikhail Frinovsky, the second-in-command to Nikolai Ezhov in the NKVD, of April 11, 1939.
- * The appeals of their sentences by a number of the defendants in the Moscow Trials.
- * Pretrial statements by Grigori Zinoviev.
- * Evidence of Trotsky's collaboration with Germany and Japan confirming the genuine character of the Second and Third Moscow Trials since Trotsky was charged with these crimes there. We will examine this fascinating question in detail in volume two of the present study. Here we discuss only:

+ Marshal Semion Budyonny's letter to Marshal Kliment Voroshilov.

- * The Arao Document.
- * Nikolai Ustrialov's confessions.

Differential confessions

Many Moscow Trials defendants stubbornly denied some of the accusations leveled at them by the Prosecution while confessing guilt to other serious crimes. The most famous example of such differential confessions is that of Bukharin, who confessed to a number of specific, serious crimes but spent much of his testimony and almost all of his final remarks stoutly rejecting his guilt in yet other serious crimes with which the prosecution had charged him. This itself is good evidence that Bukharin's confessions were not the result of force.

Evidence and Conspiracy

The Oppositionist groups within the USSR, including the Trotskyists, and Trotsky and his son Leon Sedov who were outside the USSR, were engaged in conspiracies. The Trotsky archives at Harvard and the Hoover Institution have revealed some information about Trotsky's conspiracies during the 1930s. However, there is a great deal that these archives do not disclose to us. The Moscow Trials concern conspiracies carried on in secret, of which little - if, indeed, any - written documentation can be expected.

It would be absurd to blame Trotsky for using conspiratorial techniques in his conspiracy (many would blame him for the conspiracy itself, however). But we must take these conspiratorial techniques fully into account when we discuss evidence. It is just as absurd to expect the same level of evidence in the case of a conspiracy as we would expect to find in documenting other kinds of historical events.

To those who refuse to accept the logic of the evidence we put the following question: What kind of evidence would you accept, from among the kinds of evidence that it is reasonable to expect might exist?

- * There is a huge amount of Soviet evidence. No evidence exists that any of this Soviet evidence has been fabricated or faked.
- * We have significant non-Soviet evidence that corroborates the Soviet evidence.
- * Some of the non-Soviet evidence that corroborates the Soviet evidence is from the Harvard Trotsky Archive – from Trotsky and Sedov themselves.
- * Trotsky's archive at Harvard has been purged of incriminating documents.
- * Only Sedov and Trotsky knew the full extent of their conspiracy.

We will consider all of these points in the present book.

Significance of Our Results

We can now verify many of the statements made in the testimony of Moscow Trials defendants. We can also show that, in a few cases, Moscow Trials defendants lied in their testimony. All the lies we have identified, with one exception, concealed important matters from the Prosecution. In each case (with the one exception mentioned) this appears to be an attempt by the defendant to shield himself in some way, not an attempt to confess to additional wrongdoing.

The one exception is the so-called "mercury affair" (*rtutnoe delo*) in the Third Moscow Trial. One of the defendants, P.P. Bulanov, confessed that he and former NKVD chief G.G. Iagoda had conspired to poison Nikolai Ezhov, head of the NKVD, with mercury. The Prosecution in the Third Moscow Trial was indeed fooled.

Subsequent investigation under Lavrenti Beria, the new head of the NKVD, uncovered the fact that Ezhov himself had instructed Bulanov to fabricate this lie in order to give himself, Ezhov, additional credibility. The "mercury affair" was indeed a fabrication foisted upon a Moscow Trials defendant by the NKVD. But it was done behind the backs of the Prosecution and, of course, of Stalin.

This first section of the present book is devoted to the source criticism of the Moscow Trials testimony. Our research has validated the Moscow Trials testimony as evidence. The implications of this fact for this study may be stated simply. There is no reason to believe that the defendants were forced to testify to matters they knew were false or, therefore, that the defendants were innocent of the crimes to which they themselves confessed. Moscow Trials testimony may be cited as evidence alongside any other evidence.

In the following chapters we will examine fact-claims made by Moscow Trials defendants that can be checked in non-Soviet or Soviet sources now available. The chapters are organized around the examination of the non-trial evidence to be used as the control or "check" on the Trials testimony.

In this book we are primarily interested in this non-Trials evidence for the purpose of verifying the Trials testimony. However, we will also discuss other important aspects of the documents containing this non-Trials evidence. In many cases these documents are of great interest not only for their usefulness in providing a check on the Moscow Trials testimony, but as evidence in the investigation of other important events in Soviet history. We will provide some overview of the importance of this evidence in the investigation of these other important events as well.

Chapter 2. Non-Soviet Evidence – The Harvard Trotsky Archive

In 1939, 1940, and again in 1953 Leon Trotsky's archives were sold and transferred to Harvard University. Trotsky stipulated that the personal section remain closed until 40 years after his death. It was opened to researchers on January 2, 1980. (Van Heijenoort History)

Among the first to study its contents was Pierre Broué (1926-2005), at that time the foremost Trotskyist historian in the world. From 1980 until his death in 2005 Broué edited the journal *Cahiers Léon Trotsky* (hereafter CahLT) in which he published many articles outlining his discoveries in the Harvard Trotsky Archive (TA). His 1987 biography of Trotsky made some use of these discoveries, as did his 1993 biography of Leon Sedov.¹

Very soon after the TA was opened Broué and his team began to discover that Trotsky had deliberately lied in his published works. First they found evidence that the bloc of Oppositionists, including Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Rights, and others, had really existed. The activities of this bloc were the major allegation in all three of the Moscow Trials. Trotsky and Sedov always denied that any such bloc existed and claimed that it was an invention by Stalin. Broué identified documents in the TA that proved that Trotsky and Sedov had lied: the bloc had indeed existed.

¹ *Trotsky*. Paris: Fayard, 1987; *Léon Sedov. Fils de Trotsky, Victime de Staline*. Paris: Editions Ouvrières, 1993. A detailed discussion of Broué's life and activities can be read in the bibliographical article "The Meaning of Pierre Broué (1926-2005). A biographical sketch." At http://www.trotskyana.net/Trotskyists/Pierre_Broue/Pierre_Broue_Meaning.html The publication *Cahiers Léon Trotsky* is discussed, with a table of contents of each issue, at http://www.trotskyana.net/Research_facilities/Journals/journals.html#clt

In subsequent articles Broué disclosed other lies by Trotsky. Most of his evidence was found in the Harvard TA. Some of it came from the collection of Trotsky-Sedov correspondence in the Nicolaevsky Collection at the Hoover Institution.²

Broué always claimed that these lies by Trotsky were of very limited significance. He insisted that Trotsky and Sedov lied only to protect those Trotskyists in the underground within the USSR. But in fact Broué never explored the significance of Trotsky's lies for evaluating the Moscow Trials testimony as evidence or for understanding Trotsky's activities generally. Like non-Trotskyist anticommunist researchers, he continued to assume, without evidence, that the Moscow Trials testimony was fundamentally false, coerced from innocent defendants by the NKVD investigators, by the Soviet prosecution, and therefore by Stalin.

Broué wrote:

I think that the new data concerning the "Opposition bloc," the organization of two Communist blocs of Oppositions, the attempt to unify the Communist Opposition, definitively destroys all the legends and preconceived ideas about an all-mighty, blood-thirsty, machiavelian Stalin. The Soviet Union in the thirties was passing through a serious economic and political crisis. Stalin was more and more isolated and many people, including some from the ranks of privileged bureaucracy of which he was only the best expression and the unifier, began to think about the necessity of getting rid of him. The Moscow Trials were not a gratuitous crime committed in cold blood, but a counter-stroke in a conflict which was really, as Trotskii wrote, "a preventive civil war." (Broué POS 110)

² This collection is outlined at this page:
http://www.trotskyana.net/Research_facilities/PublicArchives_America/publicarchives_america.html#hoover

This remark by Broué is more than enigmatic. It begs the whole question: had the conspiracies alleged in the Moscow Trials really existed, or not? If, as Broué says here, the Moscow Trials were a “counterstroke,” then does this not imply that the originating “stroke” was, or were, conspiracies by those who wanted to get rid of him (Stalin)? And since the evidence on which Broué based this paragraph was that of Trotsky’s falsehoods, does that not mean that Trotsky was also a party to these conspiracies?

In this article we see Broué carefully approach the question of a completely new view of the Moscow Trials and the conspiracies alleged in them. But then Broué retreats. He never develops this idea. As far as we know, he never mentions it again.

In 1985 and 1986 American historian Arch Getty published the evidence, also discovered in the TA, that Trotsky and Sedov had lied about Trotsky’s continued contact with some of his supporters within the USSR. Trotsky had either maintained or renewed relations with some of them long after he had claimed to have cut off all contact with them. Getty identified evidence of this in the TA.

Getty also discovered that the TA had been “purged” – materials had been removed. Getty logically concluded that these materials must have been incriminating, politically sensitive materials. Broué, who knew and referred to Getty’s research, never mentioned this very important discovery by Getty. This is curious, since Broué had himself suggested that other materials had been removed from the TA. Later in this book we explore this pregnant omission of Broué’s.

Most of the falsehoods by Trotsky that Broué discovered are directly or indirectly related to the Moscow Trials. Some of Trotsky’s lies that we ourselves have discovered concern the Kirov Assassination of December 1, 1934. Trotsky’s lies about the Kirov murder became relevant to the Moscow Trials subsequently, when members of the bloc of oppositionists confessed to having planned and executed Kirov’s murder.

Broué's interest in Trotsky's and Sedov's falsehoods was curiously limited. We do not know why Broué never chose to explore the implications of Trotsky's lies. This is a striking omission, as we will point out in future chapters. It is possible that Broué sensed that the full implications of the lies by Trotsky and Sedov that he had discovered, plus those discovered by Getty, would necessitate a more radical revision of Trotsky's activities during the 1930s than he himself was prepared to face.

* * *

In the following chapters we will demonstrate that the lies by Trotsky that Broué and Getty discovered, as well as some further lies discovered by Swedish scholar Sven-Eric Holmström and some that we ourselves have found, are directly relevant to our evaluation of the validity of the Moscow Trials testimony. Trotsky's falsehoods provide one of the major sources by which we can verify Moscow Trials testimony.

In addition, Trotsky's falsehoods provide important evidence about Trotsky's conspiracy within the USSR during the 1930s. We will also explore this topic in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3. Non-Soviet Evidence – The Bloc of Oppositions

The earliest and most dramatic discovery emerged from the Harvard Trotsky Archive within months of its opening to researchers on January 2, 1980. This was the proof that the bloc of oppositionists inside the Soviet Union had really existed. The existence of the bloc was the chief framework for the conspiracies charged against the defendants in all three Moscow trials. The bloc was the link among the different conspiratorial oppositionist groups in which the Moscow Trials defendants confessed membership.

Pierre Broué, whose team made this discovery, minimized its significance. He never explored the implications of his own discovery of the bloc's existence for our understanding of the Moscow Trials, of Trotsky's own activities, and of our understanding of the high politics of the Soviet Union during the 1930s. All researchers after Broué have either done likewise, like Vadim Rogovin, or have ignored the discovery altogether. Gorbachev's men in the USSR, then Russian and Western anticommunist researchers since 1991, have also ignored this important revelation.

In this chapter we outline the discovery of the bloc and the evidence for it, and explore its significance for our project of verifying the testimony at the Moscow Trials.

The Bloc of Oppositions

Defendants in all three Moscow trials testified that Trotskyists, Zinovievists, and other oppositionists inside the Soviet Union had formed a bloc and agreed to carry out assassinations (in Russian, to employ "terror") against Soviet leaders.

In the transcripts of each of the three Moscow Trials the word "bloc" occurs dozens of times. Here are just a few citations:

First Moscow Trial

The investigation has also established that the Zinovievites pursued their criminal terroristic practices in a direct **bloc** with the Trotskyites and with *L. Trotsky*, who is abroad. (1936 Trial 11)

The testimonies of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov, Mrachkovsky, Bakayev and a number of others accused in the present case, have established beyond doubt that the only motive for organizing the Trotskyite-Zinovievite **bloc** was their striving to seize power at all costs ... (12)

Another member of this centre, Reingold, during examination on July 3, 1936, testified:

"...The main thing on which all the members of the **bloc** agreed was... the recognition of the necessity of consolidating all forces to capture the Party leadership. I must admit that the fundamental aim of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite **bloc** was to remove by violence the leadership of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government, and Stalin in the first place. At the end of 1932 the centre adopted a decision to organize the fight against the leadership of the C.P.S.U. and the Government by terroristic means. I know that the Trotskyite section of the **bloc** received instructions from L. D. Trotsky to adopt the path of terrorism and to prepare attempts on the life of Stalin." (Vol. XXVII, p. 52) (13)

VYSHINSKY: What was the attitude of the Trotskyite part of your **bloc** on the question of terrorism?

ZINOVIEV: In our negotiations on the formation of a united centre this question played a decisive part. By

that time the so-called Zinovievite part of the **bloc** was fully ripe for such decisions.

VYSHINSKY: Did Smirnov display any activity in relation to this, or not?

ZINOVIEV: Smirnov, in my opinion, displayed more activity than any one else, and we regarded him as the undisputed head of the Trotskyite part of the **bloc**, as the man best informed about Trotsky's views, and fully sharing these views. (53)

KAMENEV: ...When we returned to Moscow, we made no changes whatever in the basis of our **bloc**. On the contrary, we proceeded to press forward the terroristic conspiracy. (66)

ZINOVIEV: ...At the same time (says Zinoviev), I conducted negotiations with Tomsy, whom I informed about our **bloc** with the Trotskyites. Tomsy expressed complete solidarity with us. (73)

SMIRNOV: I admit that I belonged to the underground Trotskyite organization, joined the **bloc**, joined the centre of this **bloc**, met Sedov in Berlin in 1931, listened to his opinion on terrorism and passed this opinion on to Moscow. (85)

Second Moscow Trial

RADEK: Pyatakov and I arrived at the conclusion that this directive sums up the work of the **bloc**, dots all the i's and crosses all the t's by bringing out very sharply the fact that under all circumstances the government of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite **bloc** could only be the government of the restoration of capitalism. (6)

PYATAKOV: Kamenev came to visit me at the People's Commissariat on some pretext or other. He very

clearly and distinctly informed me about the Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre which had been formed. He said that the **bloc** had been restored; then he mentioned the names of a number of people who belonged to the centre ...(36)

PYATAKOV: It was during this conversation with Radek that we discussed the question about the very great predominance of Zinovievites in the main centre, and whether we should not raise the question of making certain changes in the composition of the main centre.

VYSHINSKY: In which direction?

PYATAKOV: In the direction of introducing more of the Trotskyite faction in the Trotskyite-Zinovievite united **bloc**.

RADEK: From the moment the **bloc** was formed the circle of persons against whom it was intended to carry out terrorist acts was known. (76)

LIVSHITZ: Yes. I considered that since we were carrying on a struggle for the coming to power of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite **bloc**, it was necessary to do this. (118)

ROMM: I was Tass correspondent in Geneva and Paris. I went to Moscow on official business and met Radek who informed me that in pursuance of Trotsky's directives, a Trotskyite-Zinovievite **bloc** had been organized, but that he and Pyatakov had not joined that centre. (139)

SOKOLNIKOV: In comparison with what we had had, to some extent, since 1932 and, in the main, since 1934, when the defeatist attitude of the **bloc** finally took shape. (154)

SEREBRYAKOV: In the autumn of 1932, Mrachkovsky came to see me and informed me about the creation of a Trotskyite- Zinovievite **bloc**, told me who were the members of this centre, and then informed me that the centre had decided to create a reserve centre in the event of its being exposed. (168)

Third Moscow Trial

The title of the transcript of this trial is:

"Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet '**Bloc** of Rights and Trotskyites."

...the accused in the present case organized a conspiratorial group named the "**bloc** of Rights and Trotskyites,"...(5)

GRINKO: Along with wrecking activities in the sphere of capital construction and agriculture, the **bloc** of Rights and Trotskyites carried on quite extensive undermining activities in the sphere of trade turnover. (81)

IVANOV: Fully and entirely. I consider myself responsible and guilty of the gravest crimes. I was one of the active members of the group of the Rights, the "**bloc** of Rights and Trotskyites. " (110)

VYSHINSKY: Ivanov states that he learnt from you of the existence of a **bloc** between the Trotskyites, the Right groups and the nationalist groups. Do you corroborate this?

BUKHARIN: I do. (137)

VYSHINSKY: Did you know that the program of this centre and of the whole group of the **bloc** of Rights and Trotskyites included terrorist acts?

ZUBAREV: Yes, I did know. (144)

VYSHINSKY: Will it be right or wrong to say that in the period of the years 1932-33 a group was organized which we may call the Anti-Soviet **Bloc** of Rights and Trotskyites?

RYKOV: It was so in fact. Its organizational expression, since 1933-34, was the so-called contact centre. (180)

VYSHINSKY: This **bloc**, you said, included the Rights. Who else was included in this **bloc**?

RYKOV: The Rights, the Trotskyites and the Zinovievites. (181)

VYSHINSKY: ...Were Tukhachevsky and the military group of conspirators members of your **bloc**?

BUKHARIN: They were.

VYSHINSKY: And they discussed with the members of the **bloc**?

BUKHARIN: Quite right. (189)

VYSHINSKY: As the preliminary investigation and the Court proceedings in the present case have established, the dastardly assassination of S. M. Kirov on December 1, 1934, by the Leningrad Trotskyite- Zinovievite terrorist centre was organized in accordance with a decision of the "**bloc** of Rights and Trotskyites."

Trotsky always denied this accusation, as in the following passage from his testimony to the Dewey Commission in April, 1937:

GOLDMAN: Did you ever discuss with anyone the possibility of organizing a united center between your political followers and the followers of Zinoviev and Kamenev in the Soviet Union, after the break-up of your bloc with Zinoviev and Kamenev?

TROTSKY: Never. My articles show that it is absolutely impossible. My appreciation of them, my total contempt after the capitulation, my hostility to them and their hostility to me, excluded that absolutely.

GOLDMAN: Have you read the testimony of Zinoviev and Kamenev and the other defendants in the first Moscow trial?

TROTSKY: Yes.

GOLDMAN: Wherein these defendants claimed that you instructed several of them to establish a united center between your political followers and their political followers? Have you read such testimonies?

TROTSKY: Yes.

GOLDMAN: What have you to say about that?

TROTSKY: It is a falsehood organized by the GPU and supported by Stalin. (CLT 87-88)

Evidence of the Bloc in the Harvard Trotsky Archive

In 1980 Trotskyist historian Pierre Broué discovered materials in the Harvard Trotsky Archive that proved that a bloc of oppositions was indeed formed with Trotsky's agreement.

C'est en effectuant à la Bibliothèque du Collège de Harvard les recherches documentaires prévues pour l'édition des volumes des oeuvres des années 1936 et 1937 que les chercheurs et collaborateurs de l'Institut

Léon Trotsky ont été amenés à une découverte d'importance: l'existence, en Union soviétique en 1932, d'un « bloc des oppositions » contre Staline.

Translated:

While doing documentary research at the Library of Harvard College for the edition of the volumes of the works of the years 1936 and 1937 the researchers and assistants from the Institut Léon Trotsky made an important discovery: the existence, in the Soviet Union in 1932, of a "bloc of oppositions" against Stalin. (Broué 1980, 5)

Trotsky and Sedov had lied about this, obviously for the purpose of preserving their conspiracy. A Trotskyist as well as a scholar, Broué explicitly excused Trotsky's lying on these grounds.

Broué denied that the parties in the bloc agreed upon "terror." He also claimed that the bloc had been dissolved shortly after being formed without having done anything. But Broué cited no evidence to support these assertions. The evidence shows that the bloc did continue to function. In a future chapter and in the second volume of this work we will examine the evidence that the Rightists and Trotskyists in the bloc did indeed agree to use "terror" against the Soviet leadership, as the prosecution in the first and Second Moscow Trials alleged and as the defendants admitted.

The "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" Existed

The evidence of the bloc's existence discovered by Broué is contained in a complex of documents in the TA:

- * A copy of a letter in German from Trotsky to his son Sedov.
- * This is accompanied by a letter from Trotsky's secretary Jean van Heijenoort dated July 3, 1937, who made the copy of - retyped - Trotsky's letter.

The original of Trotsky's letter is missing. It must have been destroyed when the Trotsky Archive was "purged" of incriminating materials. We know about this "purging" because it was done imperfectly. We will discuss this "purging" later in this study.

Broué reported that his team uncovered one more piece of evidence concerning the bloc:

- * A letter in invisible ink from Sedov to Trotsky in which the formation and composition of the bloc is outlined.

Some curious statements in Broué's 1980 article suggest that he and his team found other materials which they do not directly identify.

- * Broué states (7) that Trotsky replied on November 3, 1932, to the letter in invisible ink written by his son. But the copy of Trotsky's letter retyped by van Heijenoort and identified by Broué bears no date. On the previous pages (5-6) Broué had dated it "at the end of 1932, in October or November," by internal evidence.

Broué is unlikely to have simply imagined a date as precise as "November 3, 1932." Therefore, this remark suggests either that Broué had seen another letter by Trotsky that he does not further identify, or that he has made an error here.

- * Broué states that the letter from Sedov to Trotsky in invisible ink enumerates the groups in, or about to enter, the bloc as follows:

Le lettre à l'encre sympathique de Léon Sedov fait apparaître l'existence des groupes suivants: le groupe trotskyste d'U.R.S.S. («notre fraction»), les «zino-viévistes," le groupe d'I.N. Smirnov, le groupe Sten-Lominadzé, le groupe «Safar(ov)-Tarkhan(ov)," «les droitiers» et «les libéraux.» (7)

Translated:

The letter in invisible ink of Leon Sedov's revealed the existence of the following groups: the Trotskyist group in the USSR ("our fraction"), the "Zinovievists,"

the group of I.N. Smirnov, the group of Sten-Lominadze, the group "Safar(ov)-Tarkhan(ov)," "the Rights" and "the liberals." (7)

However, the letter in question does not mention Rightists ("droitiers") or liberals ("libéraux") at all. The letter of Trotsky to Sedov referred to above does mention "Rightists" ("die Rechten"), implying that they will "become more involved." None of the three documents makes any mention of "liberals." Assuming again that Broué did not simply imagine that "Rightists" and "liberals" were mentioned, it follows that he conflated in his mind at least two separate documents: the letter in invisible ink, in which the other groups are mentioned, and another letter or document that mentions "Rightists" and "liberals" as being part of the bloc.

We do not know who was meant by the term "liberals." Sedov refers to I.N. Smirnov and those around him, including Eduard S. Gol'tsman, by this term in his *Red Book (Livre rouge sur le procès de Moscou)*¹. But Sedov did this while he and Trotsky were denying any contact with Smirnov. Broué discovered that Trotsky was indeed in touch with Smirnov. Smirnov was in fact the leader of the clandestine Trotskyist group inside the USSR and the central figure in the bloc. That suggests that in calling Smirnov a "liberal" in his book Sedov may have been "covering" for him.

The following cryptic remark of Broué's suggests that he and his team located other documents that mention the bloc:

Elle a découvert également d'autres allusions au «bloc," toute une discussion sur les conditions nouvelles créés par son apparition, dans la correspondance entre Trotsky et son fils, ainsi que des textes, dont certains avaient été publiés, qui éclairent cette période de l'histoire de l'U.R.S.S. (7)

¹ Paris: Editions Ourviers, 1936, 97-98

Translated:

The team [of researchers, led by Broué] has also discovered other allusions to the bloc and a whole discussion on the new conditions created by its appearance, in the correspondence between Trotsky and his son, as well as texts, of which some have been published, that shed light on this period of the history of the USSR.

According to Broué Trotsky discussed the "liberals" in a letter to Sedov of October 12, 1932, which he identifies as No. 4777 of the Harvard Trotsky Archive. (16 and n. 42)

On the same page Broué suggests that there must have been other documents that made clear who the "liberals" were and what they had done for the Trotskyists - documents that, he suggests, "have probably been destroyed." (16) This is an interesting remark by Broué, for he deliberately omits any mention of the discovery by Arch Getty that the Trotsky Archive has been "purged," with incriminating documents removed from it.

As we shall see, Broué's further discussion of the bloc rests upon several assumptions, one of which is that the bloc came to nothing because there is no mention of it in the Trotsky Archive after these documents of 1932. As Broué admits in passing in a later work, even this latter claim is not true. Later we'll explore Broué's self-contradictions on the question of the bloc.

Trotsky's remark that they must not "yield the field to the Rightists" implies that the Rightists were already active on their own accord. Writing in 1980 Broué stated that there was no evidence of any activity by those known at the time as the "Rightists" - Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskii and their followers. (12-13) However, thanks to documents published since the end of the USSR we know today that the Rightists were indeed active at this time.

Broué's article thus supposes at least the following documents, only some of which are extant and identified:

- * Correspondence between Trotsky and Sedov about setting up the bloc (not extant);
- * A letter from Sedov to Trotsky of October 12, 1932, concerning participation of the "liberals," no doubt in the bloc (#4777, Broué p. 16, extant);
- * Trotsky's letter to Sedov accepting the proposal of a bloc (#13095, extant);
- * Sedov's letter in invisible ink to Trotsky announcing that the bloc has been formed (#4782, extant);
- * Trotsky's response to this letter dated November 3, 1932 (Broué p. 7; not further identified);
- * Trotsky's letter of October 30, 1932, concerning the "liberals" and mentioning the "Rightists." (#10047, Broué p. 16, extant);
- * Another letter of Sedov to Trotsky in invisible ink naming "Rightists" and "liberals" as among the groups in or about to join the bloc (Broué p. 7 and p. 14; not further identified);
- * Other documents "not found at Harvard and which were probably destroyed" (Broué p. 16).

Judging from the one document by Trotsky that we have that mentions the Rightists and from Broué's discussion of other documents we have not seen, it seems clear that the Rightists were in fact a part of the bloc from 1932. This accords with the testimony of Valentin Astrov in January 1937. We will examine it later.

Soviet Rehabilitation Reports Lie About the Bloc

The existence of this bloc provides additional evidence that Soviet "Rehabilitation" reports of both the Khrushchev and Gorbachev eras are dishonest and untrustworthy, political whitewash jobs rather than honest reviews of the cases and determinations of innocence on the basis of evidence.

The "Zapiska" of the Shvernik Report, commissioned by Khrushchev in 1962 and finished no later than February 18, 1963, concluded that all the accusations against the accused at the Bukharin Trial were falsified and denied the existence of a "bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" itself. (RKEB 2 625-30)

Никакого «Антисоветского право-троцкистского блока» в действительности не существовало и осужденные по этому делу контрреволюционной деятельностью не занимались.

Translated:

No "Anti-soviet bloc of Rights and Trotskyists" existed in reality and those condemned in this case did not engage in any counterrevolutionary activity. (630)

In 1989 the Gorbachev-era "Rehabilitation Commission" of the Central Committee of the CPSU came to the same conclusion:

Установлено, таким образом, что после 1927 г. бывшие троцкисты и зиновьевцы организованной борьбы с партией не проводили, между собой ни на террористической, ни на другой основе не объединялись, а дело об «объединенном троцкистско-зиновьевском центре» искусственно создано органами НКВД по прямому указанию и при непосредственном участии И. В. Сталина.

Translated:

It has been established therefore that after 1927 the former Trotskyists and Zinovievists did not carry out any organized struggle against the party, did not unite with each other either on a terrorist or any other basis, and that the case of the "United Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center" was fabricated by the organs of the NKVD upon the direct order and with the direct participation of J.V. Stalin. (Izv TsK KPSS 8 (1989) 94)

Установлено, что обвинение осужденных в «преступной связи» с Л. Д. Троцким и Л. Л. Седовым является необоснованным. Это же показала и специальная проверка, проведенная Прокуратурой СССР в 1988 г.

Translated:

It has been established that the accusation against the accused of "criminal ties" with L.D. Trotsky and L.L. Sedov are without foundation. This was also proven by a special verification process of the USSR Procuracy in 1988. (Izv TsK KPSS 9 (1989) 49)

Как теперь с несомненностью установлено, дело так называемого «антисоветского правотроцкистского блока» было полностью сфальсифицировано

Translated:

As has now been established beyond any doubt, the case of the so-called "Anti-Soviet Right-Trotskyite Bloc" was completely fabricated... (Izv TsK KPSS 5 (1989) 81)

В действительности ни «блоков» ни так называемых «центров» не существовало.

Translated:

In reality, neither the "blocs" nor the so-called "centers" existed. (RKEB 3 342).

Aleksandr Iakovlev, Gorbachev's expert who led the anticommunist campaign from the Politburo, repeated the falsehood that no bloc had existed.

Ягоду искусственно включили в состав не существовавшего «правотроцкистского» блока.

Translated:

Yagoda was falsely included among the members of the nonexistent "Right-Trotskyite Bloc." (RKEB 3 328)

This means that both the Shvernik Report and the Soviet "Rehabilitation" reports are falsified.² Already in 1980 the Harvard Trotsky Archive yielded to Broué unmistakable evidence that a broad bloc of oppositionist forces, including Trotskyists, Zinovievists, and others, did in fact exist. The NKVD of the 1930s termed the complexly-interlocking set of oppositional conspiracies the "klubok," or "tangle." If any of these conspiracies were acknowledged to have existed, it would be difficult to deny the existence of the rest, since all the defendants implicated others in a chain that, directly or indirectly, connected them all.

The Gorbachev-era "Rehabilitation" report on the 1936 Trial defendants is likewise falsified. Though it has not been officially published and is still secret in Russia today the Decree of the Soviet Supreme Court dated June 13, 1988, is in the Volkogonov Archive. It states, concerning Gol'tsman:

Э.С. Гольцман в судебном заседании ... заявил, что до ареста о существовании троцкистско-зиновьевского центра не знал. Эти объяснения Э.С. Гольцмана ничем не опровергнуты.

Translated:

² Parts of the 1988 "Rehabilitation" report on the Moscow Trial of August 1936 are copied verbatim, or almost so, from the Shvernik Commission of twenty-five years earlier. No one could know this in 1988, since the text of the Shvernik Report was not published until 1993-1994.

During the trial E.S. Gol'tsman ... declared that before his arrest he did not know about the existence of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist center. These explanations by E.S. Gol'tsman remain without refutation.³

This statement is false. Trotsky's and Sedov's correspondence in 1932, published in part in French translation by Broué, shows that Gol'tsman was the person who carried messages concerning the formation of the bloc to Smirnov inside the USSR (Broué 1980 35-37; Broué POS 99). What's more, this information was available to the Soviet authorities in 1988, when they began once again to deny that the bloc had ever existed (Khrushchev's men had denied it too).

In 1991 Getty's article was published, in Russian translation, in the authoritative Party journal *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*. At the end of the article Boris Starkov, acting for the Party journal, denied as best he could the contents of Getty's article.⁴ In today's Russia too most of these investigative materials remain effectively classified.⁵ This proves that the "Rehabilitation" report itself is a fraud.

Valentin Astrov's Testimony

On January 11, 1937, Valentin Astrov, one of Bukharin's former students and a participant in the conspiratorial meetings that constituted the Rightist part of the bloc, gave a confession statement to NKVD investigators. Two days later Astrov confronted Bukharin and accused him directly.

³ "Postanovlenie No. 79-88 Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR. 13 iyunia 1988 g.," p. 7. (151). Volkogonov Papers Reel 3 Container 4 Folder 16. In the author's possession.

⁴ Getty, Dz.A. "Trotskii v izgnanii. Osnovaniya IV Internatsionala." *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* 5 (1991), 72-83. Starkov's "commentary" is at the end, pp. 82-83.

⁵ In volume two of this study we will discuss and publish some of these materials that have become available only very recently.

In his January 1937 confession to the NKVD Astrov was specific that the Rightists had joined a bloc with the Trotskyists in 1932.

В начале 1932 года СЛЕПКОВ у него на квартире на совещании актива организации обосновывал необходимость заключения блока с троцкистами. Он говорил, что «троцкисты приняли хозяйственную платформу правых, а правые — внутрипартийную платформу троцкистов. Тактика террора объединяет нас. Разногласия между нами и троцкистами несущественны.»

Ссылаясь на свой и МАРЕЦКОГО опыт многочисленных подпольных встреч с троцкистами в Москве, Самаре, Саратове и Ленинграде, СЛЕПКОВ утверждал, что троцкисты эволюционируют, приближаясь к нам. СЛЕПКОВ сообщил совещанию, что его точка зрения на необходимость заключения блока с троцкистами согласована с БУХАРИНЫМ, т.е. с центром правых и совещание приняло эту точку зрения. Через несколько дней БУХАРИН на квартире у СЛЕПКОВА в присутствии МАРЕЦКОГО подтвердил необходимость такого блока.

Translated:

In the beginning of 1932 in a meeting of the active members of the organization in his apartment Slepko justified the necessity of forming a bloc with the Trotskyists. He said that "the Trotskyists have accepted the economic platform of the Rightists, and the Rightists, the inner Party platform of the Trotskyists. The tactic of terror unites us. Differences between us and the Trotskyists are secondary."

Referring to his and Maretskii's experience of numerous underground meetings with Trotskyists in Moscow, Samara, Saratov, and Leningrad, Slepko asserted that the Trotskyists were evolving, coming close to us. Slepko informed the meeting that his views on the necessity of forming a bloc with the Trotskyists had been agreed to by Bukharin, that is with

the Rightist center, and the meeting accepted this view. A few days later in Slepko's apartment and with Maretskii present Bukharin confirmed the necessity of such a bloc. (Lubianka 1937-1938 32)

Both Broué (13) and Astrov name Slepko and Maretskii as members of the Rightist part of the bloc. Broué says:

L'ensemble du matériel montre que le « bloc » ou, au moins, l'une de ses parties constituantes était en contact avec le group Rioutine-Slepko, « les droitiers ». (Broué 1980 16)

...les comptes rendus de réunions du secrétariat international de l'Opposition de gauche et quelques lettres de Léon Sedov font apparaître qu'il désigne systématiquement à l'époque par le terme de « droitiers » ce que les historiens désignent par « groupe Rioutine, » un groupe original apparu précisément en 1932. Nous ne possédons sur son existence et son activité que des témoignages indirects et ses documents n'ont jamais été connus, même partiellement. Rioutine ... avait, avec P. A. Galkin, constitué un groupe dont personne ne nie le caractère conspiratif organisé, dans lequel se retrouvaient des éléments d'origine diverse comme les disciples de Boukharine, fleurons de l'Institut des professeurs rouges, Alexandre Slepko et Dimitri Maretsky, ... (Broué 1980 13)

Translated:

The material as a whole demonstrates that the bloc, or at least one of its constituent parts, was in contact with the Riutin-Slepko group, "the Rights."

... the transcripts of the meetings of the International Secretariat of the Left Opposition and a few letters of Leon Sedov's make it clear that it [the term "droitiers", or "Rightists" - GF] regularly designated at the time by

the term "Rightists" what the historians call the "Riutin group," an original group that appeared precisely in 1932. We have only indirect evidence about its existence and activities, and its documents have never been made public, even in part. Riutin... with P.A. Galkin, constituted a group whose organized conspiratorial nature has never been denied by anyone and in which persons of different origins could be found, including pupils of Bukharin's, products of the Institute of Red Professors, Alexander Slepkov and Dmitri Maretsky ,...

Astrov himself was also a former student at the Institute of Red Professors.

Did the Bloc Shut Down by Early 1933?

In 1980 Broué claimed that the bloc was no more by sometime in early 1933 with the arrests of some of its leading members.

Pourtant, quand ces textes paraissent à Berlin dans le *Biulleten Oppositsii*, le «bloc» -- si tant est qu'il ait pu se traduire autrement dans la réalité et, par exemple, tenir des reunions formelles -- est déjà terminé par l'arrestation de ses principaux protagonistes. La lettre de Sedov qui indique les composantes du bloc mentionne à la fois l'arrestation des dirigeants du groupe d'I. N. Smirnov et de Smirnov lui-même et l'effondrement des « anciens » de l'Opposition de gauche. (Broué 1980 19)

Translated:

However, when these texts appeared in Berlin in the *Bulletin of the Opposition*, the bloc -- if it could be said to have had a real existence and, for example, hold formal meetings -- had already been terminated by the arrests of its principal protagonists. Sedov's letter identifying the composition of the bloc mentions at

the same time the arrest of the leaders of I.N. Smirnov's group and of Smirnov himself and the collapse of the "old ones" of the Left Opposition.

Broué repeated this claim in his 1987 biography of Trotsky. According to Broué Smirnov's arrest and imprisonment and the exile of Zinoviev and Kamenev brought the bloc to an end.

Ce n'est que peu à peu que la vérité s'impose à lui et à Sedov. L'exil de Zinoviev et de Kamenev, la condamnation d'I.N. Smirnov, qui purge sa peine à Souzdal, ont sonné le glas du bloc des oppositions.⁶

Translated:

Only gradually did Trotsky and Sedov come to understand the truth. The exile of Kamenev and Zinoviev, the conviction of I.N. Smirnov, who was serving his time at Suzdal, had sounded the funeral bell of the bloc of oppositionists.

Broué's Misreading of Safarov's Deposition

Broué claims that Safarov testified "publicly" about the bloc's "decomposition":

Safarov, définitivement brisé en prison et clairement devenu informateur, sera le premier, en tant que témoin à charge au procès de Zinoviev et Kamenev en janvier 1935, à parler publiquement de la naissance et de la décomposition du bloc⁴⁹. (Broué, Trotsky Ch. 44)

Translated:

⁶ Broué, *Trotsky*, Ch. 44 note 49. At https://www.marxists.org/francais/broue/works/1988/00/PB_tky_44.htm#sdfootnote49anc

Safarov, definitively broken in prison and clearly turned informant, would be the first, as a witness at the trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev in January 1935, to speak publicly about the birth and decay of the bloc.⁴⁹

Note 49 to this passage reads as follows:

49 Déposition de Safarov au procès de Zinoviev et Kamenev, *L'Humanité*,⁷ 17 janvier 1935.

Translated:

49. Deposition of Safarov at the trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev, *L'Humanité* January 17, 1934.

But this is not true. In the corresponding passage in *L'Humanité* of January 17, 1935, Safarov said nothing about any "decay" (*décomposition*) of the bloc:

Caractérisant les méthodes contre-révolutionnaires employées par le groupe illégal Zinoviev dans sa lutte contre le pouvoir soviétique, un des participants, Safarov (dont l'affaire est soumise à une instruction complémentaire et sera examinée séparément) déclara «Après des rencontres particulièrement fréquentes et animées en 1932, quand les conspirateurs comptaient inscrire à leur actif certaines difficultés temporaires qui eurent lieu durant la transition du premier au second plan quinquennal, **tous les cercles du groupe illégal, effrayés par la débâcle du groupe contre-révolutionnaire de Rioutine, revinrent à leur activité secrète, à la contre-révolution rampante.**»⁸

⁷ *Humanité* was (and still is) the daily newspaper of the French Communist Party

⁸ "Zinoviev, Kamenev et 17 complices devant le tribunal militaire de l'U.R.S.S." *L'Humanité* 17 janvier 1935 p.3 col 7.

Translated:

Characterizing the counterrevolutionary methods used by the illegal Zinoviev group in its struggle against Soviet power one of the participants, Safarov (whose case has been submitted to further investigation and will be examined separately) declared: "After especially frequent and lively meetings in 1932, when the conspirators had to take account of certain temporary difficulties that occurred during the transition between the first and second Five-Year Plans, **all the circles of the illegal group, frightened by the downfall of the Riutin counterrevolutionary group, returned to secret activity, to rampant counterrevolution.**

Far from attesting to any "decay" of the bloc Safarov stated that "all the circles" (the cells) "of the illegal group" (the bloc) returned to secret activity, meaning to "rampant counterrevolution." *Safarov claimed that the bloc continued to exist and to be active - the opposite of what Broué claimed.*

We will leave aside the question of whether Broué somehow misread this passage or whether he deliberately falsified Safarov's words in order to convince his readers that the bloc really had ceased to function. Even if Safarov had testified to the court that the bloc had ceased to function, that would not mean it really had ceased, for such testimony could simply be an attempt at self-protection. But in fact Safarov stated just the opposite: the bloc continued its work, only in a more clandestine manner.

Broué continued to repeat this claim that the bloc was "dismantled" shortly after February 1933.⁹ However, Broué has no evidence that the bloc came to an end. We discuss what we call

⁹ E.g. Broué, "Liova, le 'fiston'". CahLT 13 (1983), 17.

Broué's, and Vadim Rogovin's, "coverup" in the chapter on the purging of the Harvard Trotsky archive.

Broué's main error here is his assumption that the bloc was ended when some of its principal members were arrested. This assumption is false. Astrov testified that the bloc continued even in prison:

В Суздальской тюрьме я и участники нашей организации ХАХАРЕВ, ДОМАШИН... и СОМОВ установили связь и дружбу с сидевшими там троцкистами: ГАЕВСКИМ, БОЛОТНИКОВЫМ и МИХАЛЕВИЧЕМ. Мы все сходились на почве взаимного признания террора как метода борьбы с партией и советской властью.... Аналогичные террористические настроения высказывались троцкистом СОМЕРОМ, правым РАДИВИЛИНЫМ, троцкистом ГАЕВСКИМ.

Translated:

In Suzdal' prison I and the participants of our organization Khakharev, Domashin ... and Somov established contact and friendship with the Trotskyists also imprisoned there: Gaevskii, Bolotnikov, and Mikhalevich. All of us came together on the basis of mutual acceptance of terror as a method of struggle with the party and Soviet power. ... Analogous terrorist attitudes were expressed by the Trotskyist Somer, the Rightist Radivilin, and the Trotskyist Gaevskii. (Lubianka 1937-1938 37)

We know that Astrov's testimony here was truthful because he confirmed it in 1993, after the end of the Soviet Union, when he could have denied it and no one would have known. We examine Astrov's testimony as evidence in another chapter.

Astrov claimed that the bloc of Rights and Trotskyists which, he repeats, was explicitly organized around terror continued to be active in Suzdal' prison, a political "isolator," or special prison with better conditions for political prisoners. In his biography of Trotsky Broué states that Smirnov was also in Suzdal' prison:

L'exil de Zinoviev et de Kamenev, la condamnation d'I.N. Smirnov, qui purge sa peine à Souzdal, ont sonné le glas du bloc des oppositions. (Broué Trotsky Chapter 44)

Translated:

The exile of Zinoviev and Kamenev, the conviction of I.N. Smirnov, who was serving his sentence in Suzdal, sounded the death knell of the opposition bloc.

Broué is correct that I.N. Smirnov was imprisoned in Suzdal' prison. Biographical accounts of Smirnov's life and a commemorative plaque at the former site of the prison itself attest to that fact.¹⁰ We know that the Trotskyists whom Astrov names as participants of the bloc with him while they were in Suzdal' prison were adherents of Smirnov's group. Gaevskii and Bolotnikov are identified as members of Smirnov's Trotskyist group in a Gorbachev-era "Rehabilitation Commission" meeting of May 29, 1990.¹¹

Astrov's statement proves that the bloc of Rights and Trotskyists did not end but continued to plan terrorist activities in Suzdal' prison. I.N. Smirnov, the leader of the Trotskyist group and imprisoned at the same prison, may have participated in it too. At the first Moscow trial in August 1936 Smirnov said that after 1931, when he "received Trotsky's instructions on terrorism" and passed them on, he did not resign from the bloc but "did no work." It may

¹⁰ Biographical accounts of I.N. Smirnov's life that mention his imprisonment in Suzdal' prison include: the Russian language Wikipedia on him: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Смирнов,_Иван_Никитич ; The "Memorial Society"'s list of "victims of Stalinism," at <http://lists.memo.ru/d30/f361.htm#n199> . The plaque at the site of the former prison may be seen at http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d4/Мемориальная_плита_в_Спасо-Евфимиевом_монастыре.JPG

¹¹ *Reabilitatsiia. Kak Eto Bylo. Seredina 80-kh godov -1991*. Moscow: MDF, 2004. Razdel IV. No. 13, pp. 337 ff. At <http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/67974>

be that Smirnov did not participate in meetings of the bloc while in Suzdal'. But there can be no doubt that the bloc continued to meet "on the basis of mutual acceptance of terror." And in fact we do have some evidence that Smirnov had remained active in prison, from a remark by Sedov of May 1934.

Sedov's remark of May 1934

In his short biography of Sedov published in 1993, in the midst of a discussion of the events of 1932, Broué quotes a report Sedov made in May 1934 to the "international secretariat" of Trotsky's Fourth International. Sedov wrote:

Il faut indiquer que, parmi ces camarades, se trouvent aussi I.N. Smirnov et d'autres, qui nous ont quittés dans le temps, mais qui sont revenus et qui, voici plus d'une année déjà, se trouvent emprisonnés sous le régime d'isolement le plus sévère.¹²

Translated:

It should be noted that among these comrades are also I.N. Smirnov and some others who left us in the past but who have returned and who have now been imprisoned under conditions of the severest isolation for more than a year.¹³

Broué assumes that Sedov is referring here to the events of 1932. This appears to reflect Broué's conviction that the bloc was finished by the beginning of 1933. In reality there is no reason to think that Sedov was referring here to the formation of the bloc in 1932. Broué characterizes Sedov's tone as "modest and triumphant."

¹² The report is published in Léon Sedov, "La situation des bolcheviks-léninistes russes," CahLT 24 (1985), 116-120; the quote is on page 120. It is also quoted by Pierre Broué, *Léon Sedov. Fils de Trotsky, Victime de Staline*. Paris: Éditions Ouvrières, 1993, p. 79.

¹³ As we will see, Ante Ciliga's memoir shows that the "isolationi" in the Suzdal' isolator was anything but "severe."

phant" (79). Why would Sedov have been "triumphant" about a bloc that had collapsed more than a year beforehand? In terms of psychology, as well as of chronology and simple logic, we must assume that Sedov was referring to the contemporary situation in May 1934.

At that time Smirnov had been in prison for about 16 months. Why would Sedov report that he "and some others" had "returned" unless they were still active in May 1934? As we have seen, Astrov testified that he was still discussing "terror" with Trotskyists in Suzdal' prison. And Smirnov never denied that he remained a part of the Trotskyist conspiracy after 1932, only that he "did no work." There is no reason to think that Smirnov was being truthful here.

So Broué and Rogovin are guilty at least of the fallacy of presuming that the bloc was no longer active after 1932 because there was no further evidence of it in the Trotsky Archives. It is also possible that they did recognize the significance of Sedov's May 1934 remark but deliberately hid it from their readers. For Broué and Rogovin crossed the line from logical error into the realm of deliberate deception when they ignored Getty's discovery that the Harvard Trotsky Archive had been purged (we discuss their coverup of Getty's discovery at the beginning of Chapter 6, below). Thanks to Getty we know that evidence of Trotsky's contacts with oppositionists, supporters, and others in the USSR was among the materials purged.

Again, suppose the purging of the Trotsky archive had been thorough enough to remove not only the letters Trotsky sent to Oppositionists in the USSR but the certified mail receipts that Getty found. We would not know that Radek was telling the exact truth when he said he had received a letter from Trotsky in the spring of 1932. Trotsky and Sedov both denied such contact. Many people would reject Radek's claim at trial and "believe" Trotsky and Sedov. Yet the contact – the correspondence – would still have taken place. We discuss this letter in another chapter.

The "Conspiracy" Factor

Conspirators commit as little as possible - ideally, nothing at all - to writing. They confine knowledge of details of the conspiracy to as few persons as they can. This was the case even with Trotsky and Sedov, who were outside the USSR but always aware that they were under surveillance and that their correspondence could be stolen - as, indeed, some of Sedov's archives were stolen in Paris.

Vadim Rogovin identified one letter that Sedov wrote to Trotsky on the eve of the First Moscow Trial in which "some peculiarities," such as the use of the formal *vy* for "you" instead of the familiar *ty* suggest Sedov thought it might be intercepted. In it Sedov repeats his and his father's version of the Gol'tsman-Smirnov story, i.e. that Gol'tsman did not meet with Trotsky. But the fact that Sedov wrote it in anticipation that it might be "seized" compromises it as evidence: it is not secure, let alone secret, correspondence.¹⁴

Anyone who studies Jean van Heijenoort's memoir or NKVD agent Marc Zborowski's notes to his handler will realize that these trusted secretaries actually knew very little about Trotsky's and Sedov's contacts with the USSR. In February 1980 Trotskyist historian Pierre Broué interviewed Lilia (Lola) Dallin, formerly Estrina, Sedov's most trusted secretary during the 1930s. She told Broué:

Il est faux qu'Étienne ait pu trahir autre chose que Sedov ou des archives: les adresses du BO qu'il avait étaient celles de l'extérieur de la Russie. Sedov cloisonnait tout. Il était seul à savoir, par exemple, qui allait en Russie, les gens qui en sortaient etc. Je ne savais pas ce que faisait Étienne et réciproquement. En fait, pour "savoir," il aurait fallu faire parler LD et Liova. (Broué Léon Sedov 210)

Translated:

¹⁴ Rogovin 1937 64-65. The document is identified as Trotsky Archives, document n. 4858.

It is not true that Etienne [the name Zborowski used – GF] could have betrayed anything except Sedov or the archives: the addresses of the B[ulletin of the] O[pposition] that he had were those outside of Russia. Sedov compartmentalized everything. He was the only person who knew, for example, who was going to Russia, the people who were coming out of Russia, etc. I did not know what Etienne was doing and vice versa. To “know” you would really have had to make LD [Trotsky] and Lyova [Sedov] tell you.

Broué too was of this opinion: only Trotsky and Sedov knew about political activity and contacts with the Soviet Union:

Bien que rien ne prouve qu'il ait été au courant du détail de l'activité politique de Sedov, notamment de ses liens avec des oppositionnels russes...¹⁵

Translated:

Although there is no evidence that he was familiar with the details of Sedov's political activity, especially of his ties with the Russian oppositionists...

Again, according to Broué Sedov even refused to give Zborowski, his own personal address!

En fait, cet homme jeune était un vieux conspirateur: Lola Estrine nous a confié qu'elle n'a jamais su, par exemple, de quelles tâches était chargé Etienne et que ce dernier ne savait rien de ses tâches à elle. En 1955, Etienne lui-même a raconté que Sedov avait refusé de lui donner son adresse personnelle, et qu'il l'avait fi-

¹⁵ Broué, “Le GPU à la chasse aux trotskystes.” CahLT 70 (2000), 91.

nalement obtenue en passant par "les Français" ce qui avait provoqué une grande colère de Sedov.¹⁶

Translated:

In fact this young man was an old conspirator. Lola Estrine has told us that she never knew, for example, what assignments Etienne had been charged with and that he knew nothing about her own assignments. In 1955 Etienne himself told how Sedov had refused to give him his own personal address, and that he had at last obtained it through "the Frenchmen," which had made Sedov very angry.

Dallin/Estrina was a devoted worker for Sedov. It was she who told Sedov to "keep his mouth shut" when Sedov expounded to Zborowski upon the need to assassinate Stalin. When, in the 1950s, Zborowski met with her again and explained that he had spied on Sedov for the NKVD Dallin/Estrina immediately severed all ties with him.¹⁷

This kind of secretive behavior is, of course, to be expected in the case of any conspiracy, including Trotsky's. It would be absurd to blame Trotsky for using conspiratorial techniques in his conspiracy. But we must take these conspiratorial techniques fully into account when we discuss evidence. It is just as absurd to expect the same level of evidence in the case of a conspiracy as we would expect to find in documenting other kinds of historical events.

¹⁶ "Liova, le 'fiston'" 19.

¹⁷ See "Testimony of Mrs. Lilia Dallin, New York N.Y." *Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States . . .* March 2, 1956. Part 5. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 136-150.

Chapter 4. Non-Soviet Evidence - Trotsky's Contacts Inside the USSR

Testimony of defendants in the Moscow Trials claimed that Trotsky was in contact with Radek, Sokol'nikov, Gaven, Piatakov, and Preobrazhensky. Trotsky denied contact with them after his exile (with Preobrazhensky, by implication). But evidence in the TA confirms that Trotsky lied: he did in fact have contact with all these men.

During the First Moscow Trial Gol'tsman claimed he had met with Leon Sedov multiple times. Trotsky at first denied any contact with Gol'tsman. But Sedov had already admitted such contact, so Trotsky changed his story. Trotsky and Sedov at first claimed only one meeting between Sedov and Gol'tsman. Later they admitted that there had been a number of such meetings.

Each of these cases represents a verification that Moscow Trial testimony was accurate and Trotsky was lying.

* * *

In January 1986 American historian Arch Getty revealed that the Harvard Trotsky Archive¹ had been "purged." Someone had removed materials from it at some point before it was opened to the public on January 2, 1980. In Getty's words

At the time of the Moscow show trials, Trotsky denied that he had any communications with the defendants since his exile in 1929. Yet it is now clear that in 1932 he sent secret personal letters to former leading op-

¹ This used to be known as the "Closed Archive," since it was closed by Trotsky's instructions until 40 years after his death. (Van Heijenoort, History 295)

positionists Karl Radek, G. Sokol'nikov, E. Preobrazhensky, and others. While the contents of these letters are unknown, it seems reasonable to believe that they involved an attempt to persuade the addressees to return to opposition.¹⁸ (Getty TIE 27-8)

(TIE n.18 p. 34) Trotsky Papers, 15821. Unlike virtually all Trotsky's other letters (including even the most sensitive) no copies of these remain in the Trotsky Papers. **It seems likely that they have been removed from the Papers at some time.** Only the certified mail receipts remain. At his 1937 trial, Karl Radek testified that he had received a letter from Trotsky containing 'terrorist instructions,' but we do not know whether this was the letter in question.

In his 1985 book Getty was less hesitant in concluding that the archive had been purged. He discovered certified mail receipts of letters to five persons of whom three were Trotsky supporters and two, Kollontai and Litvinov, never had been. He also revealed some new information about dates and destinations for some of the missing letters.

Although Trotsky later denied that he had any communications with former followers in the USSR since his exile in 1929,¹⁹ it is clear that he did. In the first three months of 1932 he sent secret letters to former oppositionists Radek, Sokolnikov, Preobrazhenskii, and others.²⁰ Although the contents of these letters are unknown, it seems reasonable to believe that they involved an attempt to persuade the addressees to return to opposition. (Getty Origins 119.)

(Origins n. 19 p. 245) The Dewey Commission, *The Case of Leon Trotsky*, New York, 1937, 91, 264, 273. See also *Biulleten' oppozitsii*, no. 52-3, Oct. 1936, 38-41."

(Origins n. 20 p. 245) Trotsky Papers II, 15821. The letters are dated from April 1932 to December 1932. Those to Sokolnikov and Preobrazhenskii were sent to London, **that to Radek in Geneva**. Other letters were sent to Kollontai and Litvinov. **Copies of these letters have been removed** from Trotsky's papers, but whoever removed them failed to retrieve the certified-mail receipts signed by Trotsky's secretaries.

Trotsky's Letter to Radek in February-March 1932

Getty wrote:

At his 1937 trial, Karl Radek testified that he had received a letter from Trotsky containing 'terrorist instructions,' but we do not know whether this was the letter in question. (TIE n.18 p.34)

In fact we can be certain that this was indeed the letter in question. In his testimony at the January 1937 trial Radek mentioned a number of letters from Trotsky, beginning with one that he received in February 1932. A little later Radek said "The letter from Trotsky was received in February or March 1932." (1937 Trial p. 92). Postal imprints on the certified mail receipt of Trotsky's letter to Radek, consulted in Harvard's Houghton Library, show that it was delivered on March 3, 1932. This corresponds exactly to Radek's account during the 1937 trial:

VYSHINSKY: How are these dates to be reconciled - February 1932 and the spring?

RADEK: February in Geneva is already the beginning of the spring, and so I conceived this period as the spring. It may have been in March. (1937 Trial 93)

Radek described the contents of this letter of Trotsky's as follows:

Trotsky wrote that the information he possessed led him to conclude that I had become convinced that he was right, and that without the realization of the Trotskyist demands the policy would find itself at an impasse. Trotsky further wrote that since he knew me to be an active person he was convinced that I would return to the struggle.... At the end of the letter Trotsky wrote approximately as follows: "You must bear in mind the experience of the preceding period and realize that for you there can be no returning to the past, that the struggle has entered a new phase and that the new feature in this phase is that either we shall be destroyed together with the Soviet Union, or we must raise the question of removing the leadership." **The word terrorism was not used, but when I read the words "removing the leadership," it became clear to me what Trotsky had in mind. ... Trotsky informed me that not only the Trotskyites but also the Zinovievites had decided to return to the struggle and that negotiations for union were under way. I sent no reply, believing that the matter must be thought over very thoroughly. (1937 Trial 86-7.)**

Sedov's letter to Trotsky, partially reprinted in French translation by Broué, confirms Radek's words about the Zinovievists.

The [bloc] has been organized. It includes the Zinovievists, the Sten-Lominadze group, and the Trotskyists (the former "[capitulators]").

Radek testified that he had confirmed that Trotsky intended "terrorism" in a talk with Sergei Mrachkovsky that took place at the end of October or beginning of November 1932.

VYSHINSKY: What did Mrachkovsky reply?

RADEK: He replied quite definitely that the struggle had entered the terrorist phase and that in order to carry out

these tactics they had now united with the Zinovievites and would set about the preparatory work.... It was clear that **since terrorism was the new position**, the preparatory work must consist in assembling and forming terrorist cadres. (1937 Trial 88.)

According to Radek's testimony here it was only later in 1932 that Trotsky explicitly used the word "terror." This corresponds with information from Valentin Astrov. In January 1937 Astrov testified that the Rightists formally decided to form a bloc with the Trotskyists and others at their August 26-September 1, 1932, conference. Only at this time was terror specifically approved as a method of struggle. The fact that in 1932 the main members of the bloc were the Trotskyists and the Zinovievists is confirmed in the letter from Sedov to Trotsky that Broué and Getty found in the Harvard Trotsky archive.

Radek:

When the question arose against whom terrorism should be directed, it concerned terrorism directed against the leading core of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U, and the Soviet government. And although not a single name was mentioned during this conversation, I ... did not have the slightest doubt that the acts were to be directed against Stalin and his immediate colleagues, against Kirov, Molotov, Voroshilov and Kaganovich. (89)

As a result, Radek testified, a plot to assassinate Sergei Kirov, Party leader in Leningrad, was hatched in April 1933.

RADEK: The conversation about Kirov was connected with the fact that in April 1933 Mrachkovsky asked me whether I could mention any Trotskyite in Leningrad who would undertake the organization of a terrorist group there.

VYSHINSKY: Against whom?

RADEK: Against Kirov, of course. (1937 Trial 90)

Kirov was actually killed in December 1934 by Leonid Nikolaev, a member of a clandestine terrorist Zinovievist opposition group in Leningrad.²

Getty surmised that the letter Radek said he had received from Trotsky in February or March 1932 while he, Radek, was in Geneva, "involved an attempt to persuade the addressee[s] to return to opposition." Radek confirmed that Trotsky's letter did contain such an appeal but that it closed by saying "We must raise the question of removing the leadership."

The terms "remove" (*ustranit'*, *ubrat'*, *ustranenie*) are used several times by the defendants in the Moscow Trials.

Mrachkovsky goes on to say that already in 1931 this Trotskyite group openly discussed the question of terrorism.

I. N. Smirnov, who had visited Berlin, brought back instructions from Trotsky, which he received through Trotsky's son, L. Sedov, to the following effect: "Until we put Stalin out of the way ("uberem"), we shall not be able to come back to power."

VYSHINSKY: What do you mean by the expression: "Until we put Stalin out of the way ("uberem")"?

MRACHKOVSKY: **Until we kill ("ub'iem") Stalin.** At that very meeting, in the presence of Smirnov, myself, Ter-Vaganyan and Safonova, I was given the task of organizing a terrorist group, that is to say, to select reliable people. (1936 Trial 41; Russian original: *Pravda* August 20, 1936, p. 4)

² Though the fact is denied by Alla Kirilina and Matthew Lenoe, the two most recent scholars of the Kirov assassination, the evidence that Nikolaev was indeed a member of a clandestine Zinovievite group in Leningrad is unequivocal. See Furr Kirov.

VYSHINSKY: That is to say, you received a letter from Trotsky through Sedov and Shestov?

PYATAKOV: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: What was in this letter?

PYATAKOV: In this letter, which was written in German,...

VYSHINSKY: You know German fairly well?

PYATAKOV: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: And you write and read it quite fluently?

PYATAKOV: I do not write it quite grammatically, but I read it quite fluently and also converse.

VYSHINSKY: What did the letter say?

PYATAKOV: The letter, as I now recall, began as follows: "Dear friend, I am very glad that you have followed my request..." It went on to say that fundamental tasks were facing us, which he briefly formulated. **The first task was to use every means to remove ("ustranit") Stalin and his immediate assistants. Of course, "every means" was to be understood above all as violent means.** Secondly, in this same note Trotsky spoke of the necessity of uniting all anti-Stalin forces for this struggle. (1937 Trial 32; Russian edition 27-28)

We have already quoted Radek's statement that in 1932 Trotsky wrote him "we must raise the question of removing (**"ustraneni**) the leadership... when I read the words "removing (**"ustranenie**) the leadership," it became clear

to me what Trotsky had in mind." (1937 Trial 87; Russian edition 52)

Astrov confirmed that these were the terms used among the Rightists. It appears that all who used this term claimed that they understood it in the way Radek did - as meaning assassination. It was natural that they did so, for the only other means of "removing the leadership" was by winning a majority of the Central Committee - something they had been unable to do during the 1920s when they could campaign openly within the Party in the USSR. In a later chapter we discuss the "Remove Stalin" issue in more detail.

Trotsky Denied Contact with Radek

If the letter that Trotsky unquestionably sent to Radek in Geneva in the Spring of 1932 had been an innocent one Trotsky could have simply published it, or presented it to the Dewey Commission³ as proof that Radek was falsifying the content of that letter. Trotsky and others presented a great many documents to the Commission which were retained in its exhibits.

Instead, Trotsky lied. He claimed that he had not been in touch with Radek or with Piatakov since 1929, when he had been exiled from the USSR. In his opening statement to the Dewey Commission Trotsky's lawyer, Albert Goldman, stated:

The testimony will show that Trotsky has had no connection either direct or indirect with Radek since the time of his expulsion from the U.S.S.R., and that he has neither received from Radek nor written to him a single letter. (CLT 10)

Trotsky did indeed make that statement in his testimony.

³ The Dewey Commission held hearings in 1937, supposedly to investigate the charges against Trotsky and his son at the Moscow Trials. We discuss its proceedings in two later chapters.

GOLDMAN: Now, were you in communication with Radek, either directly or indirectly, since you left the Soviet Union, Mr. Trotsky?

TROTSKY: The only communications are represented by the quotations; no other communication.

GOLDMAN: You mean that you wrote about him, but you did not write to him?

TROTSKY: Never.

GOLDMAN: Did you receive any letters from him?

TROTSKY: Never.

GOLDMAN: Did you send letters to him through an intermediary?

TROTSKY: No. (CLT 116)

Goldman's assertion is false. Trotsky's testimony did not *show* that Trotsky had had no communication with Radek. Nor could he do so. Trotsky just *asserted* that he had not and the Dewey Commission accepted Trotsky's assertions.

Goldman was Trotsky's lawyer. Perhaps he assumed it was his duty to "defend" Trotsky — to interpret his client's statements and evidence in the most positive light for his client. That makes sense in a trial at law, where there would also be a prosecutor to set forth the argument *against* the defendant. It was up to the Dewey Commission members to perform this function. This they failed to do.

Throughout the Dewey Commission hearings Trotsky acted as though he would simply, gullibly, be believed with respect to charges made in the Moscow Trials. The very friendly Dewey Commission members did not call him on any of these attempts, as any objective student, much less a prosecutor or "devil's advocate," certainly would have done.

The Sten-Lominadze Group

At a meeting, which Astrov says took place between August 26 and September 1, 1932, the "leftists" Sten, Lominadze, Shatsky "and others" joined a bloc with the Rightists.

На первом же заседании конференции СЛЕПКОВ информировал присутствующих о том, что к нему на днях приходил СТЭН и от имени группы «леваков» предложил нам заключить с ними блок. СЛЕПКОВ вступил с ним в связь, сказав, что поставит этот вопрос на обсуждение актива организации. Вопрос этот обсуждался на втором заседании конференции, и было постановлено заключить блок с группой леваков (ЛОМИНАДЗЕ, СТЭН, ШАЦКИЙ и др.).

Translated:

At the very first session of the conference Slepkov informed those present that a few days earlier Sten had come to him and in the name of the group of "Leftists" had proposed that we form a bloc with them. Slepkov entered into contact with them, saying that he would put this question up for discussion among the active participants of the organization. This question was discussed at the second session of the conference and it was decided to conclude a bloc with the group of Leftists (Lominadze, Sten, Shatsky and others).

6) Подтвердить правильность принятой центром правых тактики блока с троцкистами и заключить блок с леваками (ЛОМИНАДЗЕ, СТЭН, ШАЦКИЙ).

Translated:

6) To confirm the correctness of the tactic, taken by the center of the Rightists, of a bloc with the Trotskyists and to conclude a bloc with the Leftists (Lominadze, Sten, Shatsky). (Lubianka 1937-1938 35-36)

This confirms what we know from Sedov's letter to Trotsky, where Sedov says that the Sten-Lominadze group is part of the bloc.

[The bloc] is organized. In it have entered the Zinovievites, the Sten-Lominadze group and the Trotskyists (former "[capitulators]."

There can be no doubt that these two completely independent sources – Sedov and Trotsky, on the one hand, and Astrov, on the other – are describing the formation of the same bloc and agree that it was formed in the second half of 1932. According to Broué the Rightists also entered the bloc with the Trotskyists.

Here the words bloc and "capitulators" have been physically cut out from the original with a knife or razor but have been added by Broué and are undoubtedly correct.⁴ The quotation marks around the excised word "capitulators" are in the original. The "capitulators" had only pretended to capitulate to Stalin, as Broué recognized:

Lev Sedov called the Smirnov group either the "former capitulators" or the "Trotskiite capitulators." **Everybody had known**, from 1929 on, that people in the Smirnov group had not really capitulated but were trying to fool the apparatus, and were capable of organizing themselves as an Opposition within the party: the fact was so universally known that Andrés Nin, the Spaniard deported from the Soviet Union in August 1930, explained it openly to his German comrades of *Die permanente Revolution* who printed his declaration without apparent problem. (POS 104)

⁴ Broué says nothing about these excisions except to note them. It seems likely that they were done by Broué's assistants. Trotskyists had a clear motive to hide evidence that Trotsky had lied. Broué's team had been the first to study the TA in detail after its opening in January 1980. The person or persons who had earlier "purged" the Trotsky Archive would have simply removed the whole document.

Broué does not say whom he means by "everybody" here. Stalin certainly did not know that Smirnov's "capitulation" was phony. Between 1929 and his arrest in January 1933 Smirnov held high-ranking positions in the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry, as did Iurii Piatakov. They would never have obtained those or any other positions of influence and trust if their "capitulation" – disavowal of Trotskyism and pledge that they now supported the Party line – had been recognized as dishonest.

We have seen that both Sedov and Astrov mention the Sten-Lominadze group, which is also mentioned repeatedly in the First Moscow Trial of August 1936.

I. N. Smirnov stated:...

"I admit that Ter-Vaganyan, who with my knowledge conducted negotiations with the Leftists and the Zinovievites in the name of the Trotskyite group, formed in 1932 a bloc with Kamenev, Zinoviev and **the Lominadze group** for joint struggle against the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government, and that L. Trotsky's instructions regarding terror against the leaders of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet state were made the basis of this bloc." (Vol. XXIX, pp. 93, 104.) (1936 Trial 17)

The accused Mrachkovsky testified as follows:

"... In the middle of 1932, I. N. Smirnov put before our leading trio the question of the necessity of uniting our organization with the Zinoviev-Kamenev and **Sten-Lominadze groups** ... It was then decided to consult L. Trotsky on this question and to obtain his directions. L. Trotsky replied, agreeing to the formation of a bloc on the condition that the groups uniting in the bloc would agree to the necessity of removing by violence the leaders of the C.P.S.U. and Stalin in the first place." (Vol. XVIII, pp. 44, 45) (1936 Trial 21-22)

Mrachkovsky then goes on to tell the Court about the activities of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite terrorist centre. The members of this centre were Zinoviev, Kamenev, **Lominadze**, Mrachkovsky, Ter-Vaganyan and others. (1936 Trial 44)

In connection with Mrachkovsky's testimony, the accused Ter-Vaganyan is examined. He admits that negotiations for the formation of a united Trotskyite-Zinovievite terrorist bloc were started as far back as June 1932 and that in the first stages of the negotiations he, Ter-Vaganyan, had served as intermediary between **Lominadze** and Kamenev, and between Smirnov and Zinoviev. (1936 Trial 45)

... Reingold says: "I can confirm that Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bakayev, Evdokimov, Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, Ter-Vaganyan and Sokolnikov were members of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre. Negotiations were carried on about joint activity with the 'Leftists': Shatsky, **Lominadze and Sten**, and also with the representatives of the Right deviation: Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky." "The idea of the Zinovievites uniting with the Trotskyites," says Reingold, "arose as far back as 1931. Meeting Zinoviev in his apartment and in his villa that year, I heard him say that it was a pity that we had fallen out with Trotsky." Continuing his testimony, Reingold states that in discussing the general political situation, Zinoviev emphasized that the economic position of the Soviet Union had become stronger and that it was absolutely no use talking about collapse. It was necessary to unite all the forces opposed to the present leadership. That is how the way was paved for a bloc with the Trotskyites. The basis for the union of the Trotskyites with the Zinovievites, emphasizes

vievites, emphasizes Reingold, was terrorism. (1936 Trial 54-55)

Continuing, Zinoviev says: "At the same time certain underground groups of the Right as well as of the so-called 'Left' trend, sought contact with me and Kamenev. Approaches were made by the remnants of the 'Workers' Opposition': by Shlyapnikov and Medvedev. Approaches came from the groups of the so-called 'Leftists': that is, **Lominadze**, Shatsky, **Sten** and others. Approaches also came from the so-called 'individuals,' to whose numbers belonged Smilga, and to a certain extent, Sokolnikov. (1936 Trial 71-72)

TER-VAGANYAN: Yes, it was terrorist.

"In the autumn of 1931," continues Ter-Vaganyan, "my very close connection and friendship with **Lominadze** began. I met Lominadze frequently, and on these occasions we talked about a bloc." Continuing his testimony, Ter-Vaganyan says that at that period the Trotskyites began negotiations for union with the Zinovievites and the "Leftists," and that the terroristic stand was perfectly clear.

VYSHINSKY: When was that?

TER-VAGANYAN: After Smirnov came back from Berlin.

VYSHINSKY: At that period was the terroristic stand clear?

TER-VAGANYAN: Yes, it was clear, because the instructions had already been brought. (1936 Trial 110-111)

In clarifying the question as to the basis on which the bloc with the "Leftists" was formed, Comrade Vyshinsky puts a number of questions to the accused Smirnov. Smirnov's replies make it clear that the bloc was formed on a terroristic basis.

VYSHINSKY(to Smirnov): Did you organize the bloc or not?

SMIRNOV: I instructed Ter-Vaganyan to negotiate with Lominadze.

VYSHINSKY: What for?

SMIRNOV: For a union.

VYSHINSKY: Did the union take place?

SMIRNOV: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: With the "Leftists"?

SMIRNOV: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: Did you join the bloc?

SMIRNOV: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: At the time the instructions regarding terrorism were in operation?

SMIRNOV: Yes. (1936 Trial 111)

According to Valentin Astrov the bloc was formed around an agreement to use "terror" against Stalin and the Soviet leadership associated with him.

В начале 1932 года СЛЕПКОВ у него на квартире на совещании актива организации обосновывал необходимость заключения блока с троцкистами. Он

говорил, что «троцкисты приняли хозяйственную платформу правых, а правые — внутрипартийную платформу троцкистов. Тактика террора объединяет нас. Разногласия между нами и троцкистами несущественны.»

Translated:

At the beginning of 1932 Slepkov in a meeting of activists of the [Rightist] organization in his apartment was justifying the necessity of forming a bloc with the Trotskyists. He said that "the Trotskyists have accepted the economic platform of the Rights, and the Rights the Party platform of the Trotskyists. The tactic of terror unites us. The disagreements between us and the Trotskyists are secondary." (Lubianka 1937-1938 32)

This is not mentioned in the documents discussed by Broué. This is not surprising, however, since the Trotsky archive has been purged. We shall return to the questions of Trotsky's attitude towards terror and the post-Soviet verification of Astrov's testimony.

Contact with Other Oppositionists: The Case of Yuri Gaven

In 1990 Pierre Broué announced that he had discovered that Trotsky and Sedov had lied concerning their ties to some Party members inside the USSR. One of these figures was Yuri Petrovich Gaven or, in its Russian form, Gaven, an Old Bolshevik of Latvian background. At the 1936 Moscow Trial Gaven was named by I.N. Smirnov, one of the chief defendants and leader of the clandestine Trotskyists in the Soviet Union, as the person who had met with Trotsky in 1932 and received terrorist instructions from him — that is, instructions to assassinate Stalin and, perhaps, others.

Vyshinsky, quoting Smirnov:

"... I admit that the attitude which regarded terrorism as the only way of changing the situation in the Soviet Union was known to me from a conversation with Sedov in Berlin in 1931 as his own personal position. I admit that this line on terrorism was confirmed by L. Trotsky in 1932 in his personal instructions conveyed to me through Y. Gaven." (1936 Trial 17)

VYSHINSKY: Another question to Smirnov. Do you corroborate the testimony of Mrachkovsky that in 1932 you received a reply from Trotsky through Gaven?

SMIRNOV: I received a reply from Trotsky through Gaven.

VYSHINSKY: And in addition, did you receive verbal information on the conversation with Trotsky?

SMIRNOV: Yes, also verbal conversation.

VYSHINSKY: You, Smirnov, confirm before the Supreme Court that in 1932 you received from Gaven the direction from Trotsky to commit acts of terrorism?

SMIRNOV: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: Against whom?

SMIRNOV: Against the leaders.

VYSHINSKY: Against which?

SMIRNOV: Stalin and others. (1936 Trial 42)

Smirnov stated that he had also had contact with Sedov but that Gaven had conveyed to him a letter from Trotsky himself.

VYSHINSKY: Was the letter you received through Gaven sent by Sedov or by Trotsky?

SMIRNOV: Gaven brought a letter from Trotsky. (1936 Trial 83-84)

...

VYSHINSKY: What then do you admit?

SMIRNOV: I admit that I belonged to the underground Trotskyite organization, joined the bloc, joined the centre of this bloc, met Sedov in Berlin in 1931, listened to his opinion on terrorism and passed this opinion on to Moscow. I admit that I received Trotsky's instructions on terrorism from Gaven and, although not in agreement with them, I communicated them to the Zinovievites through Ter-Vaganyan. (1936 Trial 85)

Smirnov insisted that though he passed on the instructions about terrorism to the Zinovievites and was a member of the center, or leadership of bloc, he "did no work" in it – a point Vyshinsky energetically contested. (85)

Smirnov returned to this topic in his last plea.

This was the mistake I made, which later grew into a crime. It induced me to resume contact with Trotsky, it induced me to seek connections with the Zinovievite group, it brought me into a bloc with the group of Zinovievites, into receiving instructions on terrorism from Trotsky through Gaven in November 1932, it brought me to terrorism. I communicated Trotsky's instructions on terrorism to the bloc to which I belonged as a member of the centre. The bloc accepted these instructions and began to act. (1936 Trial 171)

Both Sedov and Trotsky denied any meetings with Gaven. But Sedov's letter confirms that Smirnov was telling the truth about the

bloc with the Zinovievites. Broué found evidence that Trotsky did meet with Gaven and send a message back to the USSR with him.

Sedov:

Faut-il répéter que Trotsky n'a pas transmis par l'intermédiaire de I. Gaven, pas plus que par l'intermédiaire de quelqu'un d'autre, des instructions terroristes et ne s'est pas rencontré à l'étranger avec Gaven, pas plus qu'il ne s'est rencontré avec aucun des accusés? (Livre rouge 100)

Translated:

Is it necessary to say that Trotsky did not transmit through I. Gaven, any more than through anyone else, any kind of terrorist instructions and did not meet with Gaven abroad, any more than he met with a single one of the defendants?

Trotsky, at the Dewey Commission hearings:

GOLDMAN: Did you ever hear of a man by the name of Gaven?

TROTSKY: Yes.

GOLDMAN: Who is he?

TROTSKY: He is a Latvian Bolshevik. He, if I remember, gave all his sympathies at a certain time to the Opposition. As Holtzman, for example. In 1926 or 1927, he was connected for a time with Smilga, a member of the Central Committee. But he disappeared from my eyes absolutely after 1926.

GOLDMAN: In the testimony of Mrachkovsky, and also Smirnov, there is a reference that you sent communications through Gaven to Smirnov about the necessity of killing Stalin.

TROTSKY: I don't know anything about it. No, it is an absolute falsehood. He is not among the defendants.

GOLDMAN: No, he is not. He is a witness.

TROTSKY: Not even a witness.

GOLDMAN: That's right.

TROTSKY: He disappeared.

GOLDMAN: It is simply mentioned by Mrachkovsky, by the defendant Mrachkovsky. (CLT 225-226)

In 1985 and again in 1990 Broué revealed that Trotsky and Sedov had lied.

Gaven est «Sorokine," comme Holzman est «Orlov," et Smirnov «Kolokoltsev," dans la correspondance de Sedov et de son père.

Translated:

Gaven is "Sorokin," as Holzman is "Orlov," and Smirnov is "Kolokoltsev," in the correspondence between Sedov and his father.⁵

In another article (published in English) Broué states:

In 1936 Trotskii and Sedov denied having any contact with him [Gaven]. In fact, they had. Allowed to go to Germany in order to receive medical care, Gavenis wrote to Trotskii and got an interview with Lev Sedov, who wrote an account of it. Gavenis gave information about the bloc, supplementing Holzman's. He also gave information about his own "O"-group (probably Osinskii) and seems to have agreed to bring back to the Soviet Union a message to the Trotskiite group it-

⁵ "Compléments à un article sur les trotskystes en U.R.S.S," CahLT 24 (1985), 69.

self – in spite of his worry about the latter having been infiltrated by the OGPU. (POS 99)

Broué does not identify the letter or letters either in the Sedov Papers at the Hoover Institution or in the Trotsky Archive at Harvard in which Trotsky and his son discuss Gaven.⁶ In Broué's 1988 biography *Trotsky* we read only this:

Gaven, l'ancien «émissaire» de Trotsky, est fusillé sur une civière.⁷

Translated:

Gaven, Trotsky's old "emissary," was shot on a stretcher.

The detail of being shot "on a litter" is taken from Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, a completely unreliable book full of Khrushchev-era falsifications. This is only a rumor, though treated as "fact" by Broué, Medvedev, and Conquest. It is interesting to note how the story becomes elaborated. Medvedev writes: "In the thirties he was carried on a stretcher to be shot." Conquest paraphrases Medvedev's account. But Broué states flatly that Gaven was actually on a stretcher when he was shot.⁸

⁶ Broué suggests that the information that Sedov did meet with Gaven is in a letter in the Hoover collection, but does not give further details. Cf. Broué, *Trotsky*. Ch. XLIV note 34: "34 Lettre de Gaven à Moscou et rapport de Sedov à Trotsky sur son entretien avec Gaven, A.H.F.N. Également, P. Broué « Compléments sur les trotskystes en U.R.S.S. », CahLT, n° 24, décembre 1985, p. 69." But this final citation does not identify the letter. The abbreviation A.H.F.N. used by Broué means "Archive Hoover Fonds Nicolaevsky" – Hoover Archive, Nicolaevsky Collection. Broué does not identify any specific letter. In POS 111, note 4, Broué announces his plan to publish all the Trotsky-Sedov correspondence, but this project was never realized.

⁷ Chapter 56. At http://www.marxists.org/francais/broue/works/1988/00/PB_tky_56.htm

⁸ Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge: the origins and consequences of Stalinism*. (New York, 1971), p. 273. This is Robert Conquest's only source for this "fact" as well: *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 104 and n. 159, p. 500.

In the same chapter of his biography of Trotsky Broué also accepts Medvedev's account that Stalin had Sergo Ordzhonikidze assassinated – a story for which there is no evidence at all and which has long been abandoned even by anticommunists who insist that Sergo committed suicide. But, as Vladimir Bobrov has recently demonstrated, this "suicide story" is also a falsehood invented during the Khrushchev era. There is no reason to doubt the official story that appeared in the Soviet press the day afterwards, that Ordzhonikidze had died of a heart attack.⁹

Broué writes:

The correspondence between Trotskii and Sedov demonstrates that father and son were astounded at the beginning of the trial when they saw that Smirnov and Holzman, already guilty in Stalin's eyes, did not content themselves with confessing the truth but accused themselves of fantastic crimes. (POS 99)

It would be important to see the text of such letters, as they might constitute evidence that Smirnov's and Gol'tsman's testimony was false. But in this article Broué neither quotes the text nor cites the specific letters in which this exchange supposedly took place. In his biography of Trotsky Broué identifies the document as Harvard 4868. (Broué, Trotsky, Ch. LIII n.15) Rogovin, who also cites it, puts it in context:

После появления первых сообщений о процессе 16-ти Седов отправил с нарочным письмо Троцкому. Опасением того, что оно может быть каким-то образом перехвачено, объясняются некоторые особенности этого письма (обращение к адресату на "вы" и т. д.).

⁹ Vladimir L. Bobrov, "Taina smerti Ordzhonikidze," at <http://vif2ne.ru/nvz/forum/archive/238/238967.htm> ; fully footnoted Russian version at <http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furr/research/bobrov-ordzhon08.html> ; English translation at msuweb.montclair.edu/~furr/research/bobrov-ordzhon08eng.html See also Furr, Khrushchev Lied 116-118.

Translated:

After the appearance of the first announcements about the Trial of the Sixteen [the August 1936 Zinoviev-Kamenev Trial], Sedov sent a letter by special courier to Trotsky. **Fear that it might somehow be seized** explains some of the peculiarities of this letter (using the formal "vy," etc.). (Rogovin 1937 64)

Therefore we cannot consider this letter as evidence that Trotsky and Sedov really were "astounded," as Broué claims. A letter written with a special style for fear it might be intercepted is, obviously, a letter that does not reveal anything secret, as actual terrorist communications would.

Judging from the number of citations to the Harvard and Hoover Trotsky archives in his books Rogovin appears to have had extensive access to both. Yet he cites only a letter in which Sedov discusses what he and Trotsky should admit and what they should conceal. This would not constitute evidence that they thought Smirnov's and Gol'tsman's testimony false.

The question is not whether Smirnov brought a letter from Trotsky to the Trotskyists within the USSR - all agree that he did -- but whether that letter contained terrorist instructions. Broué and Rogovin deny this but neither has any evidence to support his denial. And without evidence, how could they possibly know this? This is their Trotskyist bias speaking. Neither Broué nor Rogovin makes any attempt to maintain that objectivity without which no historian's work is of any value. This ruins their works as historical studies.

We have evidence that Trotsky and Sedov lied when they publicly claimed that Trotsky had not met with Gaven. Gaven had indeed met with Sedov and, in Broué's words, Gaven "seems to have agreed to bring back to the Soviet Union a message to the Trotskyite group itself." Smirnov confessed that this letter, which he dates to November 1932, contained terrorist instructions.

The volume *Politbiuro i Lev Trotskii t.2* published in 2013 contains many interrogations and statements in which Gaven's role is exactly as Smirnov outlines in his trial testimony - that is, that Gaven carried a message from Trotsky that "terror" must be the new tactic for the opposition. We will examine these very important materials in the second volume of the present work.

Trotsky's Contacts with Trotskyists inside the USSR

Contact with Sokol'nikov

TROTSKY: Sokolnikov has original ideas. He has a very inventive mind, and that is the reason why he is not fit, he does not fit into the bureaucratic régime.

GOLDMAN: Did you ever have any communication from him when you left Russia?

TROTSKY: Never.

GOLDMAN: Did you in any way communicate with him since you left Russia?

TROTSKY: No.

GOLDMAN: Either directly or indirectly?

TROTSKY: No. (CLT 123)

We can now confirm that the following statement made by Sokol'nikov in his final statement at trial, is false:

I can add nothing to the information and the evaluations which were here given by the members of the centre - Pyatakov and Radek. I think that these evaluations have been sufficiently frank, and I fully share them. But I cannot add anything of my own, because **I was not in direct communication with Trotsky, I was not directly connected with him**, and received information through third persons. (1937 Trial 555.)

Getty found a certified mail receipt of a letter to Sokol'nikov in London that Trotsky mailed sometime during 1932. Assuming the letter reached him - a similar letter did reach Radek - it follows that Sokol'nikov falsely denied having been in contact with Trotsky in 1932, although Radek admitted he had received Trotsky's letter in the same year. We don't know why Sokol'nikov did this.

Contact with Piatakov

Trotsky also specifically denied any contact with Piatakov since 1928:

TROTSKY: He capitulated openly, publicly; he capitulated in February, 1928. He was the first "Trotskyite" who capitulated publicly.

GOLDMAN: And after that did you have any correspondence with him at all?

TROTSKY: None.

GOLDMAN: Either when you were in the Soviet Union or outside of the Soviet Union?

TROTSKY: Exactly. (CLT 117)

As we have seen, Trotsky also denied any contact with Radek. We know Trotsky was lying because Getty found the certified mail receipt of a letter to Radek in the Trotsky archive. There is no such evidence in the archive of letters to Piatakov. However, we must be mindful of the fallacy of the argument from silence. "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" - especially since Getty discovered that the Harvard Trotsky Archive has been purged.

Sedov's "Slip of the Tongue"

But Holmström has uncovered other evidence of Trotsky-Piatakov contact in the pages of *Het Volk*, the newspaper of the Dutch social-democratic party Arbeiderspartij. On January 28, 1937, *Het Volk*

published an account of an interview with Trotsky's son and principal political assistant Leon Sedov. In it Sedov says:

Dit tweede proces is veel beter dan het eerste in elkaar gezet. De tegenstanders worden nu niet voornamelijk als belagers van Stalin, als politieke tegenstanders voorgesteld. En juist het omgekeerde is eerder het geval. De beschuldigen in het eerste proces waren het in hun hart niet eens met Stalin, al capituleerden zij dan ook voor hem. Zij waren om hun critiek en politieke activiteit jaren voor het begin van het proces verbannen of gearresteerd: Smirnow 3 ½ jaar tevoren, Zinowjew en Kamenew anderhalf jaar voordien. Radek en Pjatakow waren echter tot het laatste toe aanhangers van Stalin en waren zijn ideeën volledig toegedaan. Met hen hebben de Trotzkiïsten veel minder in verbinding gestaan dan met de anderen. Om het precies uit te drukken: in geen enkel verband.

Translated:

The second trial has been organized much better than the first. The defendants are now not presented as enemies of Stalin, as political opponents. Just the opposite is clearly true. The defendants in the first trial were in their hearts not in agreement with Stalin, even though they capitulated to him. They had been exiled or arrested years before the start of the trial for their criticism and political activity: Smirnov 3 ½ years earlier, Zinoviev and Kamenev one and a half years before. Radek and Piatakov were two of the last supporters of Stalin and were totally committed to his ideas. The Trotskyists have had much less contact

with them than with the others. To be more exact: no contact at all.¹⁰

This interview, in a provincial edition of the newspaper, was noticed by the Communist press, which called Sedov's remark a "slip of the tongue." (*Arbeideren*, Oslo, February 5, 1937; *Arbejderbladet*, Copenhagen, February 12, 1937.) Thanks to Getty we now know that the Communist press was correct. Sedov's first remark, about "much less contact" – that is, *some* contact – was accurate: Trotsky had indeed been in touch with Radek.

Sedov tried to withdraw his "slip" about Radek and Piatakov. But he did not even attempt to retract the information that preceded it, that "the Trotskyists" had indeed been in contact with "the others": Smirnov, Zinoviev, and Kamenev. Broué agrees that Gol'tsman carried at least one letter from Trotsky to Smirnov. Sedov's 1932 letter in invisible ink to his father about the bloc revealed that Zinoviev and Kamenev had joined the bloc. This is perhaps enough to show that Trotsky, or at any rate "the Trotskyists," had indeed been in touch with them. Moreover, unless they had been in touch with them how could Sedov or Trotsky have known that the defendants at the First Moscow Trial, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, and others, "were in their hearts not in agreement with Stalin"?

The *Het Volk* interview would have revealed a great deal if anyone had taken it seriously. But the capitalist media did not notice or publicize Sedov's slip. Only the communist press caught it. The Dewey Commission and Trotsky himself ignored it. No one else paid it any attention. Trotsky was lucky.

¹⁰ "Het proces te Moskou. Wie Niet Wil Bekennen Al Doodgeschoten? Trotski Jr. uit zijn opvatting." ("The Moscow Trial. Not all who want to confess are shot? Trotsky Jr. about its conception.") *Het Volk*, Haarlem edition, January 28, 1937, p. 5. My thanks to Sven-Eric Holmström for providing me with this article.

In 2015 we obtained a part of Piatakov's NKVD investigation file. Among other materials it includes a long statement Piatakov wrote to Ezhov in December 1936. In it Piatakov goes into considerable detail about his own oppositional activities. It includes a lengthy account of Piatakov's secret visit in December 1935 to Trotsky in Norway, in which Piatakov outlines in some depth Trotsky's views and instructions. The second volume of the present study will include a careful study of this statement and an English translation of it.

Contact with Preobrazhensky

In the Second and Third Moscow Trials, defendants named Evgeny A. Preobrazhensky as one of the clandestine Trotskyist members of the bloc. It appears that Trotsky did not explicitly state that he had not been in touch with Preobrazhensky. Getty discovered that Trotsky had written Preobrazhensky in 1932: one of the certified mail return receipts in the TA is of a letter to Preobrazhensky.

Contacts with Gol'tsman

At the August 1936 Moscow Trial defendant Gol'tsman – his name is often Anglicized as "Holtzman" – claimed that he had met with Trotsky's son Sedov "many times." He further claimed that, at Sedov's suggestion, he had travelled to Copenhagen in late November 1932, when Trotsky was visiting that city to make a public speech, and met with both Sedov and Trotsky. This alleged visit is known as the "Hotel Bristol" affair.

At the Dewey Commission hearings in April 1937 in Mexico Trotsky firmly denied any contact with Gol'tsman.

GOLDMAN: Have you in any way had any communications with any Holtzman since you left Russia?

TROTSKY: Never.

GOLDMAN: Directly or indirectly?

TROTSKY: Never. (CLT 91)

However, in late 1936 Sedov had already admitted meeting with Gol'tsman. In Chapter 14 of the *Red Book* the French reads "these meetings"; the English, "this meeting."

Par tout le caractère de **ces rencontres**, il est absolument évident que Goltzman ne reçut ni «instructions» ni lettre, et qu'il n'en demanda pas non plus. (*Livre rouge* 98)

Translated:

From the entire character of **this meeting**, it is absolutely clear that Holtzman received neither "instructions" nor a letter, and did not ask for any either.

Trotsky was compelled to send a correction to the Dewey Commission on June 29, 1937, noting this indirect contact. We will return to it below.

In the third volume of his biography of Trotsky Isaac Deutscher wrote as follows:

Lyova and Goltzman **often** met and discussed developments in the Soviet Union.¹ (165)

Deutscher says these meetings occurred "early in the autumn" of 1931. This is an error. Getty and Sedov himself agree that contact with Gol'tsman occurred in the fall of 1932. Getty says "sometime in October" (TIE 28); Sedov "in the fall of 1932" ("en automne 1932," *Livre rouge* 97)

In the footnote appended to the sentence above Deutscher wrote:

This account is based on Lyova's correspondence with his father, and on his deposition to the French Commission of Inquiry which, in 1937, conducted investigations preparatory to the Mexican counter-trial. *The Archives*, Closed Section.

Deutscher's account agrees with what Gol'tsman testified at trial: "Thus I met him six or eight times in the course of four months." (1936 Trial 100) According to the published account of Sedov's testimony to the French Commission of Inquiry to which Deutscher refers Sedov said:

Je ne suis pas à même de préciser combien de fois j'ai rencontré Holzman, mais il ne fait pas de doute que je l'ai rencontré plusieurs fois.¹¹

Translated:

I cannot now be precise about the number of meetings I had with Holzman, but there's no doubt that I met him several times.

In his *Red Book* Sedov suggests that he had only one meeting with Gol'tsman, although there is a bit of vacillation in the French edition. The Russian version, published in Trotsky's *Biulleten' Oppozitsii* No. 52, uses the singular – *vstrecha* (genitive singular *vstrechî*):

Из всего характера *встречи* совершенно очевидно, что никаких "инструкций" или писем Гольцман не получал...

The English version also uses the singular here:

From the entire character of this *meeting*, it is absolutely clear that Holtzman received neither "instructions" nor a letter...

The French version, published as *Livre rouge sur le process de Moscou*, equivocates. At the passage above it uses the plural one time, "these meetings":

¹¹ "Sedov et V. Serge devant la commission rogatoire." CahLT No. 41 (July 1990), p. 89.

Par tout le caractère de *ces rencontres*, il est absolument évident que Goltzman ne reçut ni «instructions» ni lettre... (98)

Translated:

By the whole nature of these meetings, it is absolutely obvious that Goltzman did not receive either "instructions" or a letter...

But the referent is vague because the meeting between Sedov and Smirnov had been discussed immediately before this. So the term "these meetings" could be construed as referring to meetings with both Smirnov and Gol'tsman and not necessarily more than a single meeting with Gol'tsman. Furthermore, Sedov immediately reverts to the singular, unmistakably indicating a single meeting:

Main comme pour les buts de la Guépéou, *cette entrevue* de Goltzman avec Sédov ne donnait rien... (98)

Translated:

But since for the goals of the G.P.U. *this interview* of Goltzman with Sedov did not give anything...

The Russian version also uses the singular here (*svidanie*):

Но так как для целей ГПУ *это свидание* Гольцмана с Седовым ничего не давало,...¹²

...while the English also uses the singular "meeting" instead of the more technically correct word "interview."

The French version is the only one that even gives a hint that there was more than one meeting between Sedov and Gol'tsman before

¹² *Biulleten' Opozitsii* No. 52 (октябрь 1936), «Связь Троцкого с подсудимыми», «Смирнов и Гольцман». At <http://web.mit.edu/fjk/www/FI/BO/BO-52.shtml>

reverting to the singular. But which is the original? The Russian version was published in the October 1936 issue of the *Biulleten'* with a note that it is a translation from French:

(Перевод с французского. Л. Троцкий, интернированный в Норвегии, лишен возможности писать по-русски).

Translated:

(A translation from the French. L. Trotsky, interned in Norway, is deprived of the possibility of writing in Russian.)

On the face of it this is absurd: Trotsky claims that while in Norway he is not permitted to write in Russian but, therefore, somehow he is allowed to write in French? A possible explanation for this is that Sedov had had to promise the French authorities that he would stay aloof from politics during this stay in France. But Trotsky had been obliged to make a similar pledge to the Norwegian authorities. Evidently Sedov and Trotsky soon decided that claiming that Sedov wrote the *Red Book* would not endanger the status of either of them.

The French edition, dated October 28, 1936, by Sedov, states that the French is a revised version of the Russian text:

Il a déjà paru en langue russe, comme article rédactionnel dans le *Bulletin de l'Opposition*; l'auteur l'a revu pour l'édition française. (7)

Translated:

It has already appeared in Russian as an editorial article in the *Bulletin of the Opposition*; the author has reviewed it for the French edition.

This vacillation concerning the number of meetings between Sedov and Gol'tsman in a text that has admittedly been revised and translated numerous times suggests that Sedov and Trotsky had not decided whether to admit to more than a single meeting. At the

Dewey Commission hearing Sedov used the singular only (*rencontre*) until directly asked how many times he had met with Gol'tsman.

When questioned about the notes to which he kept referring, he said that they pertained only to the first meeting. The questioner did not pursue the matter of what Sedov and Gol'tsman had discussed during their other meetings.

This was - to say the least - curious and unfortunate, since it left the main issue completely unexplored. We know from the Harvard Trotsky Archive that Gol'tsman had been the "informer" (*informateur*) who had been the mediator between I.N. Smirnov and Sedov. It was Gol'tsman who had brought Smirnov's idea of a bloc to Sedov, who then obtained his father's permission.

Broué says that Smirnov brought "**at least one** document from the pen of one of the leaders of the groups in the bloc":

L'«informateur» a incontestablement apporté à Sedov **au moins un** document de la plume d'un des dirigeants des groups constituant le bloc... (Broué 1980, 17.)

Translated:

The messenger had certainly brought to Sedov **at least one** document from the pen of one of the leaders of the groups that comprised the bloc...

Sedov and Trotsky admitted only to this document. Even Broué suspected there may have been more. Given the plurality of meetings between Sedov and Gol'tsman and Sedov's reluctance to discuss them, Broué's suspicion is reasonable.

At the 1936 trial Gol'tsman confessed to bringing "Trotsky's personal instructions to organize terrorist acts" back to the bloc. (1936 Trial 40) Gol'tsman testified that Trotsky had used the term "remove Stalin," saying this could only be done by terrorism (i.e.

violence). A turn to "terror," together with the discussions necessary to justify it in Marxist terms, at the present conjuncture, and perhaps arrangements for Gol'tsman to hear it from Trotsky directly, might well have occupied those several mysterious meetings.

It appears that Sedov had gone into the hearing intending to claim that he had met Gol'tsman only once. Then, when asked directly, he changed his mind and decided to admit to the multiple meetings. In effect Sedov counted on the Dewey Commission not to follow up on this matter and probe him about what was discussed in the other meetings, and they did not. The Dewey Commission's final report, *Not Guilty*, states that after Sedov's first meeting with Gol'tsman there were "several subsequent meetings." (Not Guilty 61) Sedov's two accounts contradict one another, and the earlier account in the *Livre rouge*, as well as all the text in the English *Red Book* and that in the Russian *Biulleten' Oppozitsii*, are false.

In his book Deutscher did not mention that Gol'tsman had brought a proposal for a bloc of Trotskyists with Zinovievists and others. But we know that he did; both Getty (TIE 28; Origins 119) and Broué (1980) discuss this. Broué published an excerpt from a letter of Sedov to Trotsky (1980 36-37) and the full text of a letter of Trotsky's to Sedov (1980 35-36) in which Gol'tsman's role is discussed.

This is one of the matters we know Sedov refused to disclose to the French Commission. Like Trotsky, Sedov lied to the Dewey Commission as well as in the *Red Book*. Sedov and Trotsky both denied sending terrorist directives through Gol'tsman. Of course they would deny doing this whether they had done so or not. Trotsky and Sedov lied when they thought it was expedient to do so. They had to lie, as every conspirator must. But it does mean that we cannot believe what they said or wrote.

Chapter 5. Non-Soviet Evidence – Other Lies By Trotsky

The “Hotel Bristol” story in the First Moscow Trial

At the First Moscow Trial Gol'tsman testified as follows:

In November I again telephoned Sedov and we met once again.

Sedov said to me: “As you are going to the U.S.S.R., it would be a good thing if you came with me to Copenhagen where my father is.”

VYSHINSKY: That is to say?

HOLTZMAN: That is to say, Trotsky.

VYSHINSKY: Did you go?

HOLTZMAN: I agreed, but I told him that we could not go together for reasons of secrecy. I arranged with Sedov to be in Copenhagen within two or three days, to put up at the Hotel Bristol and meet him there. I went to the hotel straight from the station and in the lounge met Sedov. About 10 a.m. we went to Trotsky. (1936 Trial 100)

Shortly after the trial the fact was widely publicized that there was no “Hotel Bristol” in Copenhagen. Trotsky utilized this fact to attack the credibility of the trial itself. Testimony about the “Hotel Bristol” issue took up a good deal of space in the Dewey Commission hearings.

In his 2008 article “New Evidence Concerning the ‘Hotel Bristol’ Question in the First Moscow Trial of 1936” Sven-Eric Holmström examined this issue carefully. Holmström suggested that Gol'tsman could have misidentified the Grand Hotel Copenhagen

as the "Bristol" because of the large sign beside its door for the adjacent "Bristol" Konditori (café and pastry shop). We refer interested readers to this article rather than repeat here the quotations and documentation carefully amassed and reproduced by Holmström.

In view of the many lies that Trotsky and Sedov told concerning the Moscow Trials it is interesting to note that they did not bother to get the correct story about the former Hotel Bristol. Trotsky said that "the Hotel Bristol was demolished in 1917,"¹ "torn down as far back as 1917."² During the Dewey Commission hearings Albert Goldman, Trotsky's lawyer, stated that the Hotel Bristol "was burned down in 1917." (CLT 167) But the Hotel Bristol had neither been torn down nor burned in 1917. It was sold to an insurance company, which maintained the building. It is hard to understand why Trotsky and his supporters never bothered to verify what had in fact happened to the Hotel Bristol.³

The "Hotel Bristol" story in the *Bulletin of the Opposition*

Holmström has shown that Esther Field, one of the witnesses at the Dewey Commission hearings, lied about the relative positions of the Grand Hotel Copenhagen and the Konditori Bristol, testifying that they were not next to each other when she had visited them in 1932.⁴ Since her testimony was designed to help Trotsky, Trotsky must have known about her lie in advance. Perhaps he had even asked her to lie for him.

¹ "An Interview for Americans," (January 1937). WLT 1936-1937, 97.

² "A New Moscow Amalgam," (January 21, 1937), Ibid. 125.

³ See Holmström for all the appropriate documentation. On this point see p. 13, note.

⁴ Sven-Eric Holmström, ""New Evidence Concerning the 'Hotel Bristol' Question in the First Moscow Trial of 1936." *Cultural Logic* 2008. At <http://clogic.eserver.org/2008/Holmstrom.pdf>


Three months after his testimony to the Dewey Commission Trotsky published yet another version of the "Hotel Bristol" story in which he contradicted this earlier account. In an article titled "Hotel Bristol" published in July 1937 but dated March 13, 1937, Trotsky wrote:

Only in February of this year the press of the Comintern made a discovery that saved them: true, there is no Hotel Bristol in Copenhagen, but there is a Bristol pastry-shop [NOTE: *konditerskaia*, in Danish *Konditori*], which is attached to the hotel by one wall. True, this hotel is called "Grand Hotel Copenhagen," but it is a hotel. True, a pastry-shop is not a hotel, but it is called "Bristol." According to Gol'tsman's words the meeting took place in the vestibule of the hotel. True, the pastry-shop has no vestibule. But the hotel, which is not called Bristol, does have a vestibule. **In addition it must be added that, as is clear even from the drawings printed in the Comintern press, the entrances of the pastry-shop and the hotel are on different streets.** Where then did the meeting take place? In the vestibule without the Bristol, or in the Bristol, without the vestibule?

In one respect this version is more accurate than Trotsky's account to the Dewey Commission. There Trotsky's witnesses Esther Field and A. Vikelsø Jensen testified that the Bristol Konditori was *not* adjacent to the Grand Hotel Copenhagen. Holmström has proven this to be untrue. Here Trotsky admitted that they were indeed attached to each other.

The only "Comintern press" account we know of is that of the Danish Communist Party newspaper *Arbejderbladet*. It printed a single drawing - Trotsky mentions "drawings." As Trotsky admits, the drawing clearly shows that the pastry-shop and hotel are adjacent. However, Trotsky added the curious, and false, statement that the entrances are "on different streets." This explains why Trotsky did not refer specifically to the drawing he mentioned, much less re-

produce it. The drawing shows that the entrances are side by side and on the same street, Vesterbrogade. Trotsky's readers would have had no way of locating the drawing from the vague description Trotsky gave.⁵



Revolving door entrance to hotel beside entrance to Bristol Konditeri, showing door connecting Bristol Konditeri to hotel. From Holmström 2009 (*Arbejderbladet* January 29, 1937, p. 8)

Trotsky also failed to mention that the drawing in question shows an interior passageway between the pastry-shop and hotel. One could access the hotel and its vestibule by entering the pastry-shop door, the one immediately beside the large "Bristol" sign.

⁵ Holmström has confirmed this fact with great care. The drawing in question is reproduced on p. 21. Holmström's whole article repays careful study.

However, it is not necessary to assume Gol'tsman did that. Holmström has verified that the entrances of *both* pastry-shop and hotel were also right next to each other, and that it would have been natural for anyone to confuse the large sign "Bristol" with the name of the hotel and go directly into that entrance.

Not only are Trotsky's two accounts of the "Hotel Bristol" matter both false; they also contradict each other. Trotsky did not bring his two mutually contradictory versions into agreement. He could easily have done so: the second version was not published till three months after the Dewey Commission hearings. He could also have sent a letter of correction to the Dewey Commission as he did about his indirect contact with Gol'tsman (CLT 592-3). But he did neither.

Why did Trotsky lie about "Bristol"?

Trotsky took a terrible risk in permitting both stories to stand. Once again he was lucky. Aside from the communist press no one seems to have noticed the contradiction between Trotsky's two versions. Had they done so Trotsky's Dewey Commission testimony and Trotsky's general truthfulness would have been called into question at a crucial time. Why did Trotsky take such a risk?

Trotsky had certainly been in Copenhagen at the end of November 1932. He tried to prove Sedov had not been able to get to Copenhagen, even though Sedov's wife did manage to do so (Not Guilty 88). In light of Trotsky's other falsifications to the Dewey Commission there is no reason to simply "accept" Sedov's alibi. But even if Sedov was not in Copenhagen, why did Trotsky not stop there? That would have been enough to refute Gol'tsman's claim that he had met Sedov in the vestibule of the "Bristol Hotel." Why did Trotsky proceed to falsify the relative positions of the Bristol Konditori and the Grand Hotel Copenhagen (Esther Field's testimony to the Dewey Commission), and then, three months later, proceed to publish an account in *Bulletin of the Opposition* that both contradicted this version and also contained yet another falsehood?

Why tell a lie when the truth is on your side? It is very unlikely that Trotsky would take such a risk, tell falsehoods that could easily have been discovered, unless he were trying to hide something important. So let us suppose Trotsky had something to hide. The question is: What? The most obvious thing Trotsky could possibly be hiding that was worth the risk of being caught in a serious lie was that he had in fact met with Gol'tsman much as Gol'tsman had testified.

But why did Trotsky not admit to meeting with Gol'tsman? Apparently Sedov did not have a prepared story ready for the Dewey Commission. As we have seen, Sedov at first lied to the Commission by saying that he and Gol'tsman had met only once. Only at the last moment of his testimony did he change his mind and admit to a number of meetings with Gol'tsman. Sedov was only able to get away with remaining silent about the content of these subsequent meetings through the complaisant attitude towards him on the part of the Dewey Commission members, who simply let the matter drop. Aggressive questioning of Sedov concerning the contents of his numerous other meetings with Gol'tsman might well have turned up something interesting.

We have already suggested a reason for Sedov's insistence, which he maintained until almost the very end of his Dewey Commission testimony, that he had met only once with Gol'tsman in Berlin. Gol'tsman testified that he met with Sedov "six or eight times in the course of four months." So many meetings over such a period of time would certainly suggest that a good deal of business was being conducted. Trotsky and Sedov had admitted only that Gol'tsman had delivered an article on the economic situation in the USSR that Trotsky published in the *Bulletin* in November 1932. Sedov stated that this information had been conveyed during the first meeting, which he initially said had been the only meeting.

At the 1936 Moscow trial Gol'tsman testified that he brought back terrorist instructions from Trotsky. This would explain the numerous meetings with Sedov. It would also explain the subsequent meeting of Gol'tsman with Trotsky in Copenhagen in November, 1932. As he testified during the First Moscow Trial of August 1936,

Smirnov did not consider Sedov to be an "authority." He wanted to get the instructions for terror via Gol'tsman from Trotsky himself.

There appears to be no explanation for the fact that Trotsky took the risk of flagrantly lying about the "Bristol" affair when he could have simply told the truth without endangering anyone - unless the meeting was not an innocent one, unless "something happened" that Trotsky did not wish brought to light. In any case, Trotsky's denial of meeting with Gol'tsman in Copenhagen cannot be trusted. Broué and Getty have established that Trotsky lied whenever he considered it in his interest to do so.

Did Gol'tsman meet with *Sedov* first, as he claimed? We do not know. None of the evidence that Trotsky submitted in an effort to prove that his son was not in Copenhagen is definitive. Neither is Gol'tsman's unsupported word. We know that Trotsky lied very frequently both when he wrote about the Moscow Trials and about other issues as well. But that does not in itself mean that he was lying here.

Ongoing research by Sven-Eric Holmström suggests the possibility that Gol'tsman may have said he had met with Sedov in order to conceal the identity of some person or persons he had really met with but whose identity he wished to conceal. Everyone already knew Sedov was his father's chief representative, so perhaps Gol'tsman named Sedov instead of another person. According to Holmström, who has been researching this question for years now, something like that appears to be involved in the case of Iurii Piatakov's alleged flight to Norway to meet personally with Trotsky in December 1935.

We can establish that some of the other Moscow Trial defendants lied deliberately to the court. For example, at the January 1937 trial Karl Radek let slip the name of Marshal Tukhachevsky, but was then quick to assure the court that he knew Tukhachevsky to be a completely loyal Party member. This was of course untrue and Radek had to know it - for Bukharin knew it, and Bukharin was closely in touch with Radek. Again, Bukharin claimed he had

“made a clean breast of things” not only at the 1938 Moscow trial but also in pre-trial interrogations and statements that we now have and were never intended for publication. Yet we know now that Bukharin knew that Nikolai Ezhov, the Commissar of Internal Affairs, was a member of the bloc of conspirators, yet Bukharin said nothing about it. We discuss this issue later in the present book.

Therefore Gol'tsman too may have told a story that was partly true - a real meeting with Trotsky in Copenhagen - but partly false - that Sedov met him there. That would account for the following facts:

- * Gol'tsman's error in confusing the name of the hotel with that of the Konditori “Bristol” - a mistake that, as Holmström has convincingly shown, could never have been invented by anybody, but could only have been made by someone who had actually been there briefly, as Gol'tsman claimed he had been.

The NKVD file on Gol'tsman has recently been declassified. Thanks to my Moscow-based colleague Vladimir Bobrov I have obtained a copy. It fully confirms Holmström's conclusions here. We will discuss it, and reproduce the relevant texts, in the second volume of this study.

- * Trotsky's lying - twice - about the “Hotel Bristol” matter in a way that could have caused him serious embarrassment if anyone had done the slightest checkup on his story.

- * The fact that Sedov and Trotsky concentrated all their effort on trying to establish that Sedov could not possibly have been in Copenhagen during this period of time.

This was a “red herring.” The essence of the matter was, of course, not yet another meeting between Gol'tsman and Sedov, but a meeting between Gol'tsman and Trotsky. At the Dewey Commission hearings Trotsky was successful in keeping the focus on the question of whether Gol'tsman had met with Sedov. The real issue - whether Gol'tsman had met with Trotsky and received terrorist

instructions, as Gol'tsman claimed at the 1936 Moscow Trial, was barely mentioned.

* Sedov's claim that he had met with Gol'tsman only once - a story that he changed at the last minute, when he had no "cover story" ready about what was discussed at all the meetings after the first one.

Why would Sedov have not just freely admitted that Gol'tsman was correct when he referred to "six or eight" meetings? The only plausible reason would be an attempt to hide something - an attempt nearly botched by, it seems, indecision and lack of planning.

The obvious purpose of Gol'tsman's visit to Trotsky in Copenhagen would have been to hear Trotsky's instructions for terror from Trotsky's own lips. At the 1936 Moscow trial Smirnov and Mrachkovsky both said that Sedov was not an authority for them, but Trotsky was.

VYSHINSKY: Did Smirnov speak about Trotsky?

MRACHKOVSKY: Yes, he spoke about Trotsky, since Sedov was no authority either for him or for us.

VYSHINSKY: Accused Smirnov, is it true that Sedov was not an authority for you?

SMIRNOV: No, Sedov was not an authority for me. (1936 Trial 80)

Smirnov then testified that he had accepted Gaven's message because it had come directly from Trotsky rather than from Sedov. Likewise Gol'tsman would have wanted, or have been instructed, to get the terrorist instructions not just from Sedov but from Trotsky himself. Gol'tsman's testimony was that Trotsky told him orally to convey to Smirnov that "it was 'necessary to remove Stalin.'" (1936 Trial 100)

Reich-Johannson

Trotsky does not comment on Reich-Johannson, who figures significantly in Bessonov's testimony. On pp. 45-47 of the transcript of the Third Moscow Trial Bessonov relates the story of a Soviet citizen, an engineer named Reich who worked for the Berlin Trade Representation and had been a Trotskyist since 1923 (45). Bessonov claimed that Reich became a Danish citizen in order to make it easier for him to go from one European country to another without attracting attention, and was afterwards known as Johannson [sic]

VYSHINSKY: What sort of a naturalization was it if he had never been to Denmark?

BESSONOV: The passport was an official one, a real one.

VYSHINSKY: But actually?

BESSONOV: Actually there was a double citizenship. At the end of 1931, or the beginning of 1932, Reich, while a Soviet citizen and a member of the staff of the Trade Representation, thanks to the assistance of the Trotskyites and money, became a Danish citizen. In the spring of 1932 he was commissioned to go to Moscow, but he did not return to Moscow and became a deserter. And from that time I knew him as Johannson, who served as liaison man between me and Trotsky.

VYSHINSKY: Reich became a Dane and a deserter. He was a double.

BESSONOV: For some period of time he had two citizenships, of which one Soviet citizenship was open, and the Danish citizenship was secret.

VYSHINSKY: Which citizenship was open?

BESSONOV: The Soviet citizenship, but the Danish citizenship was secret.

...

VYSHINSKY: Did this Reich play an important role as a liaison man in Trotskyite affairs?

BESSONOV: Undoubtedly, he played an important role. I know that Reich carried out commissions for Trotsky in a number of other countries. I want to speak only about what I know.

(1938 Trial 47)

The activities of Reich-Johannson are mentioned frequently in other passages of testimony by Bessonov. (48; 62; 63; 65). He is also mentioned by Krestinsky:

KRESTINSKY: No, that was an entirely different person.

Reich-Johannson was Bessonov's man, with whom he maintained connections. (1938 Trial 265)

KRESTINSKY: ...Bessonov conveyed this letter to Trotsky, who at that time was still in Norway. My impression then was that Bessonov did it by sending for Sedov, but as it turns out he sent the letter through

Reich-Johannson, and a reply was received to this letter. Trotsky replied that he agreed. (1938 Trial 282)

This strange story sounds false on its face. But in 1985 Pierre Broué made a discovery that led him to conclude that it was most likely true.

Le compte rendu du procès Boukharine mentionne deux autres «trotskystes» dans les services de Berlin, Birkengof et Reich. Nous ne savons rien d'autre du premier. L'accusé-témoin de l'accusation, Bessonov, assure que Reich, ingénieur métallurgiste, organisateur des «voyages» en U.R.S.S. refusa de revenir en U.R.S.S. à son rappel en 1932 et devint citoyen danois, avec un passeport au nom de «Johanson.» Les trotskystes ont nié à l'époque cette affirmation, mais il y a à cette époque, à Copenhague, un abonné du *Biulleten* qui s'appelle Reich et Jo Jacobsen, qui utilise en 1933 la boîte à lettres d'un autre Reich célèbre, Wilhelm, le père de la «sexpol». On note aussi la présence, mais beaucoup plus tôt, au début des années 20, d'un Ilya Reich dans la délégation commerciale soviétique.⁶

Translated:

The Report of Court Proceedings of the Bukharin trial mentions two other "Trotskyists"...in the service of Berlin, Birkengof and Reich. We know nothing else about the first. The accused witness, Bessonov, asserted that Reich, a metallurgical engineer and organizer of "trips" to the USSR, refused to return to the USSR when he was recalled in 1932 and became a Danish citizen with a passport in the name of "Johanson." The Trotskyists denied this statement at the time but there was, at that time, in Copenhagen, a subscriber to the *Biulleten*' named Reich and Jo Jacobsen, who in 1933 was using the postal box of another famous Reich, Wilhelm, the father of "sexpol." We also note the presence, though much earlier, at the beginning of the 1920s, of an Ilya Reich in the Soviet trade delegation.

⁶ Broué, "Compléments à un article sur les trotskystes en U.R.S.S.," CahLT 1985 (24), 65-66.

Broué repeated this discovery in an article published in English in 1990.

Victor Serge, who was personally acquainted with all the defendants in the second trial, wrote to Sedov that he thought it necessary to discover real "discussions" and real "grouplets" as the only way to throw some light on what he thought to be more "provocation" than "lies." One example will be enough to demonstrate the necessity of such an investigation: Procurator Vyshinskii mentioned in the third trial as a "Trotskyite agent" a Russian engineer named Reich, who later became, according to him, a Danish citizen under the name of Johanson. Trotsky and his friends denied any knowledge of a Dane, formerly named Reich and now called Johanson. However, we can find in the list of subscriptions to *Biulleten Oppositsii* in Denmark the name of Reich, also called Jacobsen. We must admit that a bit of truth was hidden behind the false charge. (POS 108)

Trotsky fails to comment on the story about Reich-Johannson/Jacobsen at all, though it occupies two pages in Bessonov's testimony. Anyone who might be reading the trial transcript with care might well have noted this curious omission. After all, if no such person existed, why would Trotsky miss the chance of exposing yet another "amalgam" of Stalin's?

Thanks to Broué's research we know that such a person did exist. It is expecting too much of coincidence to think that Bessonov was lying about a Copenhagen "Reich-Johannson" and yet, by accident, a different person known as "Reich-Jacobsen," who lived in Copenhagen, read Russian, and subscribed to Trotsky's Russian journal, did exist.

Perhaps Trotsky did not wish to draw attention to this person. Broué states that Reich-Johannson had a subscription to Trotsky's *Bulletin*, which was published in Russian. There could not have

been many Danes who did, and so Trotsky had to assume he might be known to the Danish police. Even a denial by Trotsky might lead the police to investigate Reich-Jacobsen (or Reich-Johanssen) and imperil his usefulness to Trotsky.⁷

Iakov Bliumkin

In 1929 Iakov Bliumkin was tried and convicted in the USSR for being a spy for Trotsky, who by this time was in exile in Turkey. Bliumkin had been Trotsky's adjutant when the latter was People's Commissar for the Army and Navy. Bliumkin had edited Trotsky's book *How The Revolution Armed Itself* (1923). Bliumkin then became an agent in the foreign division of the OGPU under Feliks Dzerzhinsky. In 1929 he was OGPU resident in Constantinople.

In 1929 Bliumkin contacted Trotsky. Evidence now available suggests that he worked for Trotsky there. The OGPU discovered this and, upon his return to the USSR, Bliumkin was arrested, tried, and executed. Trotsky admitted that he had met with Bliumkin after the latter had met his son Leon Sedov by chance on a street in Constantinople. Trotsky told the Dewey Commission that it was Radek, in whom Bliumkin had confidence, who had informed on Bliumkin.

Trotsky wrote extensively about Bliumkin immediately after he had been executed. He interpreted Bliumkin's execution as evidence that Stalin was very much afraid of the Trotskyist movement, "which abroad, in a number of countries, was having serious success in ideological and organizational ways." (*Biulleten'* No. 9, January - March 1930)

In the same issue of his *Bulletin* Trotsky claimed that a "rumor" was current that Bliumkin had gone first to Radek but that Radek, as a "capitulator," had insisted that Bliumkin turn himself in to the

⁷ Sayers and Kahn state that Reich-Johanssen was the same person who in December 1935 under the name Gustav Stirner arranged for Piatakov's passport and clandestine flight to Norway to see Trotsky. They cite no evidence for this statement. See Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy: The Secret War Against Soviet Russia*. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1946, p. 279, note.1.

OGPU. Thanks to discoveries in the Harvard Trotsky Archive, we now know that Radek had not, in fact, genuinely "capitulated" to Stalin at all. Trotsky also speculated that I.N. Smirnov and Preobrazhensky might have played some role in Bliumkin's demise. We know now too that Smirnov was the head of the Trotskyist underground in the USSR and that Preobrazhensky was a part of it as well. Trotsky's naming of Radek, Smirnov, and Preobrazhensky was therefore a "cover," an attack intended to disguise the fact that they were really part of the Trotskyist movement.

According to Soviet Prosecutor Vyshinsky, Radek, in interrogations before the Second Moscow Trial of January 1937, had testified that he, Radek, was helping Bliumkin distribute smuggled Trotskyist literature within the USSR:

In 1929, according to Radek, "he, Trotsky, having persuaded the Trotskyite Blumkin to organize the smuggling of literature into the U.S.S.R., sent his son Sedov to Radek's hotel with the instruction to organize raids on Soviet Trade Representations abroad for the purpose of obtaining money which Trotsky needed for his anti-Soviet activities." (1937 Trial 485-486)

Perhaps in revenge for Radek's testimony and final denunciation of him Trotsky began to claim that it was Radek who had denounced Bliumkin.

TROTSKY: Blumkin, a member of the Bolshevik Party and a former member of my military secretariat, was in Constantinople on an official mission.

GOLDMAN: When?

TROTSKY: In Constantinople, he visited me and also met my son in the street.

GOLDMAN: In Constantinople?

TROTSKY: In Constantinople. He took him to his room, to his hotel. My son saw Blumkin.

Blumkin said: "I will see the old man." My son came to me and said: "He will see you." I said,

"Absolutely impossible. It is too risky." He insisted so that I had to accept, but very secretly. He went to Russia, to Moscow. Radek came from Siberia as a capitulator. He had absolute confidence in Radek – an old confidence.

GOLDMAN: You mean Blumkin had?

TROTSKY: Yes, Blumkin. He was younger than Radek. He visited him, and Radek denounced Blumkin immediately to the GPU.

GOLDMAN: Blumkin visited Radek, and, according to your information, what did Blumkin say to Radek?

TROTSKY: He informed him about his visit to me, on his own initiative. Because, if he had asked me about telling of this visit, it would have been absolutely impossible for him to do such a stupid thing.

GOLDMAN: What did Radek do after Blumkin informed him of his visit to you?

TROTSKY: He denounced him for his visit to me.

GOLDMAN: What happened to Blumkin?

TROTSKY: He was shot. (CLT 105-106)

Pierre Broué discovered that all of Trotsky's stories about Blumkin were lies, probably intended to cover up Blumkin's close collaboration with Trotsky.

La version donnée en 1930 de l'affaire Blumkin par Trotsky et Sedov était une version défensive, en ré-

alité destinée à limiter les dégâts après cette arrestation catastrophique ⁸. Les mencheviks avaient probablement raison sur le fond quand ils assuraient alors que Blumkine travaillait pour Trotsky, effectuant les liaisons les plus importantes, et que la visite de l'été ou de l'automne 1929 n'était pas un hasard résultant d'une rencontre fortuite avec Sedov dans la rue à Istanbul. Blumkine rendit effectivement visite à Trotsky, probablement en août, ce qui nous a été confirmé par plusieurs de ses visiteurs qui l'ont rencontré et à qui fut donnée la version du hasard ⁹. Mais Sedov a fait savoir le contraire à la postérité en précisant de sa main sur le document en question que c'était Blumkine qui avait rédigé, le 2 avril, à sa demande et celle de Trotsky, une notice nécrologique sur Dreitser qui avait été son compagnon d'armes, mais qu'eux ne connaissaient pas¹⁰. (Broué Compléments 64.)

Translated:

The story given out in 1930 about the Bliumkin affair by Trotsky and Sedov was a defensive story, in reality aimed at limiting the damage after this catastrophic arrest. The Mensheviks were probably basically correct when they asserted at that time that Bliumkin was working for Trotsky, maintaining the most important contacts and that his visit in the summer or fall of 1929 was not an accident resulting from a chance meeting with Sedov on a street in Istanbul. In reality Bliumkin was visiting Trotsky, probably in August. This has been confirmed to us by several of his visitors who met him (Bliumkin) and were told the story of the chance meeting. But Sedov informed posterity of the opposite when he put in his own handwriting on the document in question that it had been Bliumkin who had edited, on April 2, at his request and that of Trotsky, an obituary notice on Dreitser who had been

his companion-in-arms but whom they [Sedov and Trotsky] did not know.

This account of Broué's is sufficient to show that Trotsky was lying again. Curiously, Broué's account has its own inaccuracies as well. At the Dewey Commission hearings Trotsky admitted that he did know Dreitser (spelled "Dreitzer" in the hearings volume.) Dreitser was later a defendant in the First Moscow Trial of August 1936.

GOLDMAN:...Do you know E.A. Dreitzer, Mr. Trotsky?

TROTSKY: Yes, he was of the younger generation. Dreitzer was an officer of the Red Army. During and after my expulsion from the Party he had, together with ten or twelve officers, organized a guard around my home. He was among them. (CLT 89)

Bliumkin's confession to the OGPU was published in 2002.⁸ In it he stated that he met Trotsky only once, on April 16, 1929, in Turkey. According to Broué here, Sedov stated that he was already working with Bliumkin on April 2, 1929. So Bliumkin lied in his confession.

According to the annotations by Oleg Mozokhin, the FSB⁹ researcher who edited and published Bliumkin's confession, Bliumkin told a number of other lies in his confession. This probably had something to do with the decision to execute him. In 1918, when he had been a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, Bliumkin had murdered the German ambassador Count Mirbach, in an attempt to sabotage the Bolsheviks' attempt to make a separate peace with Germany. Bliumkin had been amnestied, evidently on condition that he work as a foreign agent. No doubt it was understood that he refrain in future from any other attempts to undermine Soviet policy. That alone might well have been enough to account for his execution.

⁸ "Isproved' terrorista." *Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv* No. 6 (2002), 25-59.

⁹ "Federal'naia Sluzhba Besopasnosti" – Federal Security Service, the continuer of the KGB, MGB, NKGB, and ultimately of the security divisions of the NKVD.

But Bliumkin did state that Radek, along with Smilga, tried to draw him (Bliumkin) "into some new fractional work." Since both Radek and Smilga were Trotskyists, this could only have been Trotskyist work. So Trotsky's claim that it was Radek who denounced Bliumkin to the OGPU is another lie.

Moreover, how could Trotsky possibly know who, if anyone, had denounced Bliumkin? If the Dewey Commission members had really been what they claimed to be, objective investigators carrying out an honest investigation to see whether Trotsky were guilty or not, they would have at least asked him this question. We discuss the Dewey Commission and its problems in another chapter of the present work.

The Slogan "Remove Stalin"

According to testimony at the First Moscow Trial and the 1937 statements of Valentin Astrov the oppositionists in the bloc used the slogan "remove Stalin" as a euphemism meaning "assassinate Stalin." Evidence in two Trotsky Archives, as cited by Broué, shows that Trotsky and Sedov were discussing the relative merits of employing this slogan in the second half of 1932, at exactly the same time as the bloc of oppositionists was being formed inside the Soviet Union and its members were discussing the same slogan in the sense of "assassination."

At the January 1937 trial Karl Radek testified that, in his letter of the Spring of 1932, Trotsky had said that once "union" with the Zinovievists had been achieved "the question of removing the leadership" would have to be raised. This term - "remove Stalin" - can be *partially* traced in both the Trotsky-Sedov correspondence of late 1932 and in Astrov's confession and confrontation with Bukharin of January 1937.

During the Second Moscow Trial of January 1937 Radek described the contents of this letter of Trotsky's as follows:

Trotsky wrote that the information he possessed led him to conclude that I had become convinced that he was right, and that without the realization of the Trotskyite demands the policy would find itself at an impasse. Trotsky further wrote that since he knew me to be an active person he was convinced that I would return to the struggle.... At the end of the letter Trotsky wrote approximately as follows: "You must bear in mind the experience of the preceding period and realize that for you there can be no returning to the past, that the struggle has entered a new phase and that the new feature in this phase is that either **we shall be destroyed together with the Soviet Union, or we must raise the question of removing ("ustraneni") the leadership.**" The word terrorism was not used, but when I read the words "removing the leadership," it became clear to me what Trotsky had in mind. ... Trotsky informed me that **not only the Trotskyites but also the Zinovievites had decided to return to the struggle and that negotiations for union were under way.** I sent no reply, believing that the matter must be thought over very thoroughly. (1937 Trial 86-7/ Russian ed. 52)

Sedov's letter to Trotsky partially reprinted in French translation by Broué confirms Radek's words about the Zinovievites.

The [bloc] has been organized. It includes the Zinovievists, the Sten-Lominadze group, and the Trotskyists (the former "[capitulators]").

Radek testified that he had confirmed that Trotsky intended "terrorism" in a talk with Sergei Mrachkovsky that took place at the end of October or beginning of November 1932.

VYSHINSKY: What did Mrachkovsky reply?

RADEK: He replied quite definitely that the struggle had entered the terrorist phase and that in order to carry out

these tactics they had now united with the Zinovievites and would set about the preparatory work.... It was clear that **since terrorism was the new position**, the preparatory work must consist in assembling and forming terrorist cadres. (1937 Trial 88.)

According to Radek's testimony here it was only later in 1932 that Trotsky explicitly used the word "terror." This corresponds with the information from Astrov. In January 1937 Astrov testified that the Rightists formally decided to form a bloc with the Trotskyists and others at their August 26 - September 1, 1932, conference. Only at this time was terror specifically approved as a method of struggle. The fact that in 1932 the main members of the bloc were the Trotskyists and the Zinovievists is confirmed in the letter from Sedov to Trotsky that Broué and Getty found in the Harvard Trotsky archive.

Radek:

When the question arose against whom terrorism should be directed, it concerned terrorism directed against the leading core of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U, and the Soviet government. And although not a single name was mentioned during this conversation, I ... did not have the slightest doubt that the acts were to be directed against Stalin and his immediate colleagues, against Kirov, Molotov, Voroshilov and Kaganovich. (1937 Trial 80)

As a result, Radek testified, a plot to assassinate Sergei Kirov, Party leader in Leningrad, was hatched in April 1933. Kirov was actually killed in December 1934 by Leonid Nikolaev, a member of a clandestine terrorist Zinovievist opposition group in Leningrad.¹⁰

¹⁰ Though the fact is denied by Alla Kirilina, Matthew Lenoë, and Åsmund Egge, the three most recent students of the Kirov murder who work within the "anti-Stalin paradigm,"

Getty surmised that the letter Radek said he had received from Trotsky in February or March 1932 while he, Radek, was in Geneva, "involved an attempt to persuade the addressee[s] to return to opposition." Radek confirmed that Trotsky's letter did contain such an appeal but that it closed by saying, "We must raise the question of removing the leadership."

The terms for "remove" (*ustranit', ubrat', ustranenie*) are used several times by the defendants in the Moscow Trials.

Mrachkovsky goes on to say that already in 1931 this Trotskyite group openly discussed the question of terrorism.

I. N. Smirnov, who had visited Berlin, brought back instructions from Trotsky, which he received through Trotsky's son, L. Sedov, to the following effect: "Until we put Stalin out of the way ("uberem"), we shall not be able to come back to power."

VYSHINSKY: What do you mean by the expression: "Until we put Stalin out of the way ("uberem")"?

MRACHKOVSKY: **Until we kill ("ub'iem") Stalin.** At that very meeting, in the presence of Smirnov, myself, Ter-Vaganyan and Safonova, I was given the task of organizing a terrorist group, that is to say, to select reliable people. (1936 Trial p. 41; Russian original: *Pravda*, August 20, 1936, 4)

We have quoted Piatakov's and Radek's comments on the question of "removing" Stalin in a previous chapter and will not repeat them here.

At the 1936 trial Gol'tsman confessed to bringing "Trotsky's personal instructions to organize terrorist acts" back to the bloc.

there is overwhelming evidence that Nikolaev was indeed a member of a clandestine Zinovievist group in Leningrad. For a detailed discussion see Furr, Kirov.

(1936 Trial 40) Gol'tsman testified that Trotsky had used the term "remove Stalin," saying this could only be done by terrorism (i.e. violence). A turn to "terror," together with the discussions necessary to justify it in Marxist terms, at the present conjuncture, etc., and perhaps arrangements for Gol'tsman to hear it from Trotsky directly, might well have occupied those several mysterious meetings with Sedov.

The Slogan "Remove Stalin" in the Trotsky Archive

At the January 1937 trial Karl Radek testified that, in his letter of the Spring of 1932, Trotsky had said that once "union" with the Zinovievists had been achieved "the question of removing the leadership" would have to be raised. This term - "remove Stalin" - can be partially traced in both the Trotsky-Sedov correspondence of late 1932 and in Astrov's confession and confrontation with Bukharin of January 1937.

We say "partially traced" because, in reality, only excerpts - called "vyderzhki" or "vypiski" at the top of each document - from the correspondence on this subject remains in the Trotsky-Sedov correspondence in the Harvard Trotsky Archive. Evidently these excerpts - all have been retyped in a uniform manner - were prepared by a secretary, probably Jean van Heijenoort, for possible use at the Dewey Commission hearings in Paris, which took place later than those in Mexico.

The full texts of these letters is not in the Archive. They have been removed at some time. This is further evidence of what Getty called the "purge" of the Trotsky Archive, involving incriminating materials.

Broué outlines the discussion between Trotsky and Sedov concerning the use of this slogan in several of his published works. In the documents we have, Sedov appears to have been the more ardent partisan of the slogan "remove Stalin." Trotsky agreed with the concept but in October 1932 told Sedov that they should not

adopt it as yet, in order not to alienate other potential allies.¹¹ Broué concedes that “we do not know which one convinced the other” (Léon Sedov 81). Writing in Russian Rogovin puts quotation marks around the phrase: “*ubrat’ Stalina*.”¹²

Trotsky also says that the “allies” and the “Rightists” support the slogan “remove Stalin.” (Broué 20) This corresponds exactly to Astrov’s assertions:

...положение не изменится до тех пор, пока СТАЛИН «не будет убран из ЦК»

Translated:

... “the situation will not change until Stalin is removed (*ubran*) from the CC” [Bukharin in 1928]

Лозунг — «убрать СТАЛИНА» уже на этой стадии деятельности организации всячески культивировался в целом ряде встреч и бесед...

Translated:

The slogan “remove (*ubrat’*) Stalin” was already cultivated in every way at this stage of the organization’s activity in a whole series of meetings and conversations... [from 1928 on]

Он подверг резким нападкам СТАЛИНА, который «губит страну и должен быть во что бы то ни стало убран.»

Translated:

¹¹ Broué, Trotsky et le bloc 20-22; Broué, “Liova le ‘fiston”” 15.
¹² Rogovin, 1937. Ch. 44.

He [Bukharin in 1928] subjected Stalin to harsh attacks, saying that he "is leading the country to ruin and must be removed (*ubran*) at any cost."

МАТВЕЕВ заметил, что главная задача — это убрать СТАЛИНА любыми средствами, в том числе и террором.

Translated:

[In 1931] Matveev remarked that the main task is to remove (*ubrat*) Stalin by any means, including by terror.

Остановившись на крупнейшей роли СТАЛИНА, БУХАРИН сказал, что СТАЛИНА как главную силу в этом руководстве необходимо будет во что бы то ни стало устранить.

Translated:

[In 1930] Speaking about Stalin's role, one of the greatest importance, Bukharin said that it was essential to get rid of (*ustranit*) Stalin at any cost, as he was the main force in this leadership.

(Lubianka 1937-1938 23, 24, 30, 27)

Astrov repeated this in his confrontation with Bukharin two days later:

ЕЖОВ. В своих показаниях вы говорите относительно того, что впервые вопрос о смене партийного руководства в резкой форме, в форме убрать Сталина возник на совещании в 1928 году на даче в Зубалове, где присутствовали Бухарин, Слепков и вы. Подтверждаете вы эти показания?

АСТРОВ. Да.... Затем Бухарин сказал, что положение не изменится, если Сталин не будет убран.¹³

Translated:

EZHOV: In your confessions you say that the question of replacing the Party leadership in its sharpest form, in the form "remove (*ubrat'*) Stalin," arose for the first time at a meeting in 1928 in the dacha in Zubalovo, where Bukharin, Slepkov, and you were present. Do you confirm this?

ASTROV: Yes.... Then Bukharin said that the situation will not change if Stalin is not removed (*ubran*)..

Astrov did say that in 1928 "most Rightists" did not understand the word "remove" as meaning "kill."

ЕЖОВ. Что тогда имелось в виду под термином убрать?***

АСТРОВ. На этом этапе, во всяком случае, как я понимал, и думаю, что большинство правых так понимали, террористический акт под этим не подразумевался. (90)

Translated:

EZHOV: What was meant at that time by the term "remove" (*ubrat'*)?

ASTROV: At this state, at any rate as I understood it, I think that the majority of the Rights understood it not as an act of terrorism.

Бухарин сказал, что Сталин своим руководством губит страну и поэтому должен быть устранен.

¹³ "...Ni razu ne govorilos' otnositel'no terrora.' Stenogramma ochnoi stavki N.I. Bukharina s V.N. Astrovym v Politburo TsK VKP(b) 13 ianvaria 1937 g." *Istochnik* No. 2, 2001, 99.

ЕЖОВ. Подразумевалось ли тогда более конкретно, что нужно сделать?

АСТРОВ. Нет еще. (91)

Translated:

Bukharin said that Stalin, by his leadership, is ruining the country and therefore must be gotten rid of (*ustranen*).

EZHOV: Was this understood at that time more concretely, as to what should be done?

ASTROV: Not yet.

This too corresponds with the excerpts from the Trotsky Archive. It does seem that, at first, Trotsky may not have wished the slogan "remove Stalin" to mean assassination. Of course, Trotsky may well have been lying on this point, as he did on so many others. Also, we have only "excerpts" from the Trotsky-Sedov correspondence concerning the slogan "Remove Stalin." It is always possible that the aim of assassination was contained in other correspondence. The full correspondence, and even the full texts of the letters excerpted, is no longer in the Trotsky Archive. These items were among the materials "purged."

In a report published in the book *Politbiuro i Lev Trotskii. Tom 2*, NKVD chief Iagoda stated that a letter from Trotsky seized in the USSR revealed the "unexpected" discovery that in 1931 Trotsky did not endorse the slogan "Remove Stalin." This corresponds with the materials in the Trotsky archive identified by Broué and also with Astrov's testimony that "terror" was not decided on until 1932. (PiLT 2, 37) Its existence is good evidence that in 1931 the GPU was looking for the truth, not trying to "frame" Trotsky. We will discuss this valuable collection of materials in volume two.

Astrov said that Bukharin repeated this to him privately when they were together on a hunting trip in 1931 or 1932:

Я помню, что мы говорили о роли Сталина в партии. Бухарин сказал, что с точки зрения правых необходимо убрать Сталина. (92)

Translated:

I recall that we were talking about Stalin's role in the Party. Bukharin said that from the point of view of the Rightists it was essential to remove (*ubrat*) Stalin.

Bukharin at a meeting of his supporters in 1930 or 1931:

Бухарин сказал, что Сталина, как главную руководящую силу в партийном руководстве, в процессе этой борьбы придется устранить. (94)

Translated:

Bukharin said that Stalin, as the main leading force in the Party leadership, must be gotten rid of (*ustranit*) in the process of this struggle.

There are a number of striking correspondences between documents in the Harvard Trotsky Archive, on the one hand, and Astrov's and Radek's testimony on the other. The chief difference we wish to consider now is the question of assassination – in Russian, "individual terror" or just "terror."

Both Radek and Astrov claim that Trotsky (Radek) and the Trotskyists, like the Rights with whom they were in a bloc (Astrov), supported "terror." In their public statements Trotsky and Sedov strongly and consistently denied the accusation that they advocated terror and argued that it was inconsistent with Marxism. There is no indication in the Trotsky Archive documents that Trotsky or Sedov urged their followers or the bloc generally to kill Stalin or others.

Broué regards this as definitive. But why? Getty discovered that the Trotsky Archive at Harvard has been purged. As we argue in the present essay, it is most likely that the materials removed were considered incriminating by those who removed them. Trotsky's

and Sedov's lies and falsifications, which we also discuss elsewhere in the present essay, suggest that they were anxious to keep some of their actions hidden. If they were advocating that Stalin and other Soviet leaders associated with him be murdered it is logical that Trotsky and Sedov would have wanted to deny this fact publicly in order to keep it secret.

In the next chapter we examine Broué's attempt at what can only be called a coverup, an attempt to conceal from his readers Getty's important discoveries. The obvious motive for this coverup is to leave unchallenged the notion that the bloc ended shortly after it had begun and consequently that Trotsky could not have instructed his followers to resort to "terror" against the Stalin leadership, as alleged in the Moscow Trials.

Chapter 6. Non-Soviet Evidence – The Trotsky Archive Purged

Pierre Broué's coverup

When he wrote his biography of Trotsky Broué knew and cited Getty's research on the Harvard Trotsky Archive.¹ He refers to it as follows:

On pourrait faire les mêmes remarques à propos du bloc des oppositions de 1932 que d'autres chercheurs ont aperçu sans le reconnaître, faute d'un outil chronologique suffisant ou du fait de préjugés solides et d'idées préconçues. Comment expliquer la difficulté à donner à cette découverte la publicité qu'elle méritait ? Le premier écho à l'article de 1980 où je mentionnais le bloc et reproduisais les documents qui l'attestent²⁰ est de l'Américain Arch J. Getty et date de 1985.²¹

Translation:

One could make similar remarks concerning the bloc of oppositions of 1932, which other researchers have noticed without recognizing it for lack of a suitable chronology or because of firm prejudices and preconceived ideas. How else to explain the difficulty of giving this discovery the publicity that it deserves? The first echo of the 1980 article in which I mentioned the bloc and reproduced the documents that attest to it²⁰ is by the American Arch J. Getty [sic] and dates from 1985.²¹

¹ Pierre Broué. *Trotsky*. Paris: Fayard, 1988. Online edition at <https://www.marxists.org/francais/broue/works/1988/00/index.htm> This citation at https://www.marxists.org/francais/broue/works/1988/00/PB_tky_48.htm, note 21. (Broué Trotsky)

Broué's note 20 is to his own 1980 article. His note 21 that follows only a few words later reads:

"J. Arch Getty, *Origins of the Great Purge. The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered*. Cambridge, Ma., 1985, pp. 119 & 245, n. 24."

Getty's note 24 again cites Broué's 1980 article.

But Broué does *not* cite Getty's note 20, the one that documents the purging of letters from Trotsky's archive. In his book at note 20 Getty's statement is definite, conclusive – the archive *has* indeed been purged.² Broué also ignores the second of the striking discoveries in Getty's article: the certified mail receipts that prove Trotsky was in touch with at least Radek, Sokol'nikov, and Preobrazhenskii. Broué does not *challenge* Getty's conclusion that the archives opened in 1980 had been purged. Instead he *ignores* it, together with the certified mail receipts which are the evidence for it.

It is obvious that Broué "covered up" – deliberate concealed – from his readers the fact that the archive was purged and the evidence that proves it. The purging of the archive is as significant a discovery as was the proof that a bloc had really existed.

Why did Broué cover up such an important discovery? Perhaps because the fact that the archive was purged would invalidate Broué's central conclusion: that the bloc was "ephemeral," that it had collapsed almost immediately, that it had led to nothing. It would also leave open the possibility that Trotsky had indeed plotted "terror" against Stalin and other Soviet leaders and had collaborated with Germany and Japan.

Only if the archive had *not* been purged could Broué submit the lack of further references to the bloc as evidence that the bloc did

² See Chapter Four above for the text of Getty's notes.

indeed collapse. Getty's discovery that the archive had been purged removes the basis for Broué's notion that the bloc had ceased to function soon after it had been formed.

This, therefore, is the likely reason for Broué's coverup. The pretense that the archive had not been purged was necessary for Broué to preserve his belief that the charges in the first and subsequent Moscow trials were fabrications. For Broué to admit that the archive had been purged would entail the corollary that the bloc might well have continued but that evidence of its continuation had been among the purged materials.

If the bloc had continued, the possibility would exist that it could have had terrorist aims. If Trotsky's archive was purged, the possibility would exist that Trotsky had been in contact with his Soviet followers after 1932 and been advocating "terror," as the Trotskyists in the Moscow trials confessed. The dominant Trotskyist-anticommunist paradigm of Stalin would be seriously crippled.

Vadim Rogovin's account

In his own discussion of the bloc Vadim Rogovin cites Broué's work. Like Broué Rogovin ignores Getty's discoveries of Trotsky's missing letters to Radek, Sokol'nikov and others and of the purging of the archive. Rogovin does not explicitly take up the question of whether the bloc lasted after 1932. But he does refer to the bloc as "the 1932 bloc," thus tacitly accepting Broué's contention that the bloc did not survive.

In a lecture he delivered in May 1996 Rogovin stated:

Although many members of these opposition tendencies were arrested at the end of 1932 and in early 1933, not a single one of them gave information about the formation of this single united anti-Stalinist bloc. Only in 1935 and 1936, when a new wave of arrests followed the murder of Kirov in December of 1934 and **many people were subjected to the worst tortures**, did the secret police, the GPU, find out about the existence of the united bloc from

1932. This was one of the main factors which drove Stalin to unleash the Great Terror.³

In his book *1937* published in Moscow the same year (1996) Rogovin elaborated this same point:

Антисталинский блок окончательно сложился в июне 1932 года. Спустя несколько месяцев Гольцман передал Седову информацию о блоке, а затем привёз в Москву ответ Троцкого о согласии сотрудничать с блоком.

В отношениях Троцкого и Седова с их единомышленниками в СССР была отлично отлажена конспирация. Хотя ГПУ вело тщательную слежку за ними, оно не смогло обнаружить никаких встреч, переписки и иных форм их связи с советскими оппозиционерами. Далеко не все оппозиционные контакты были прослежены и внутри Советского Союза. Хотя в конце 1932 - начале 1933 года была осуществлена серия арестов участников нелегальных оппозиционных групп, ни один из арестованных не упомянул о переговорах по поводу создания блока. Поэтому некоторые участники этих переговоров (Ломинадзе, Шацкий, Гольцман и др.) до 1935-1936 годов оставались на свободе. Лишь после новой волны арестов, развернувшихся вслед за убийством Кирова, после допросов и передопросов десятков оппозиционеров Сталин получил информацию о блоке 1932 года, послужившую одним из главных импульсов для организации великой чистки.⁴

³ Rogovin, "Stalin's Great Terror: Origins and Consequences." University of Melbourne, May 28 1996. At <http://www.wsws.org/exhibits/1937/lecture1.htm>

⁴ Rogovin, *1937*. Ch. 9. At <http://trst.narod.ru/rogovin/t4/ix.htm>

The anti-Stalinist bloc finally took form in June 1932. After a few months, Goltsman passed information to Sedov about the bloc, and then brought back to Moscow Trotsky's reply about agreeing to collaborate with the bloc.

In relations between Trotsky and Sedov and their cothinkers in the USSR, the conspiracy was outstandingly maintained. Although the GPU conducted careful surveillance of them, it was unable to uncover any meetings, correspondence or other forms of their contact with Soviet oppositionists. And far from all of the opposition contacts inside the Soviet Union were tracked down. Although there was a series of arrests of participants in illegal opposition groups at the end of 1932 and the beginning of 1933, not a single one of those arrested mentioned negotiations about the creation of a bloc. For this reason several of / 64/ the participants in these negotiations (Lominadze, Shatskin, Goltsman and others) remained at liberty until 1935-36. Only after a new wave of arrests following Kirov's assassination, after interrogations and reinterrogations of dozens of Oppositionists, did Stalin receive information about the 1932 bloc, which served as one of the main reasons for organizing the Great Purge.⁵

In his 1996 lecture Rogovin alleges that the arrestees who did confess about the bloc's existence were tortured into doing so. Neither Rogovin nor anyone else has ever had any evidence that these prisoners were tortured at all, much less "subjected to the worst tortures." And Rogovin later dropped this claim.

This is not only a lie. It is a "tell" – a sign that Rogovin was dishonest, not above fabricating falsehoods when he needed to do so. But why did he feel that he needed to do so in this case? Perhaps because the defendants in the Moscow Trial confessed to something

⁵ Rogovin, 1937. Ch. 9. At <http://trst.narod.ru/rogovin/t4/ix.htm> (Rogovin 1937); Rogovin, 1937. Stalin's Year of Terror. Translated by Frederick Choate. Oak Park, MI: Mehring Books, 1998, 63-64.

truthful, something Rogovin could not deny: the existence of the bloc. To preserve his belief that the *rest* of the defendants' confessions were false Rogovin felt impelled to posit that they had been tortured.

But let us consider the logic of this specific falsehood of Rogovin's. It is particularly revealing. Rogovin falsely assumed that the NKVD had tortured the prisoners – *and then the prisoners had told the truth!* In fact we have no evidence that the prisoners were tortured. But even if they had been tortured, they revealed something truthful – the existence of the bloc. That would logically suggest that (a) the NKVD was attempting *not* to fabricate false stories, but to discover the truth; and therefore (b) other parts of the confessions made by these prisoners, including Moscow Trial defendants, were also true.

Perhaps Rogovin belatedly realized the logic of his lie about torture. That would explain why he omitted the claim about torture in the account in his book, where he only mentions "interrogations and reinterrogations." His lie about torture contradicted his central thesis that the defendants had lied about Trotsky's conspiracy.

In reality Rogovin had no evidence whatever that the defendants had been tortured. Nor did he have any evidence that the rest of what they confessed – Trotsky's involvement in conspiracies to murder Kirov and other Soviet leaders – was false. Like Broué, Rogovin seems to have thought it unacceptable to admit the possibility that Trotsky had been plotting these murders, and therefore that the testimony to that effect by the Moscow Trial defendants was true. This must have been a very important value to these two Trotskyite researchers for them to have recourse to such blatant falsifications and illogicalities.

Despite some minor differences Rogovin's overall analysis is the same as Broué's. Both claim the Moscow Trials were an "amalgam": not pure fiction, but 90% falsehoods combined with 10% truth. Neither has any evidence – none whatever – to support the "90% falsehood" part of their assertion. The "10% true" is taken

from the title of the tenth chapter of Rogovin's book *1937. Stalin's Year of Terror: "Ten Percent of the Truth, or What Really Happened."* Rogovin took it from a statement by A.N. Safonova, the former wife of I.N. Smirnov, who in 1956 told Khrushchev's KGB and Procuracy that her confessions and those of Mrachkovskii, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov, and Ter-Vaganian "to the degree of 90% did not reflect reality." ⁶

Neither Broué nor Rogovin considers the possibility, even theoretically, that Trotsky may have been lying when he claimed he did not instruct his followers to engage in "terror." But why not? After all, both Broué and Rogovin admit that Trotsky and Sedov lied about the bloc and about Gaven. Both ignore Getty's discovery that Trotsky lied about being in contact with Radek and others, though they certainly knew about it.

Both Broué and Rogovin excuse Trotsky's recourse to falsehood as a necessity imposed by the need to act in a conspiratorial manner. However, if Trotsky had in fact instructed his Soviet followers to engage in "terror" and sabotage, he would certainly have denied it. After all, he denied much less serious accusations such as the formation of the "bloc" and his correspondence with Radek and others. Here as elsewhere, then, the fact that Trotsky denied advocating "terror" means nothing.

There are no rational grounds to reject out of hand the hypothesis that Trotsky may have indeed advocated "individual terror" – individual violence – against Stalin and his associates, as charged in the Moscow Trials. Trotsky was well acquainted with violence. He participated in a great deal of it during the Civil War. Trotsky used the strongest possible language against Stalin. And we have Zborowski's reports to his NKVD handlers. We will examine them in a later chapter.

⁶Safonova's remark is quoted in *Reabilitatsiia. Politicheskie Protsessy*, p.181.

Broué's and Rogovin's refusal to consider this possibility can be explained only by their strong preconceived bias in favor of Trotsky. They both take it for granted that Trotsky would never have done this, though they have no grounds for this assumption. They could have even claimed that plotting to kill Stalin was the right thing to do, as van Heijenoort stated to his biographer Anita Burdman Feferman.

We can't be certain why Broué and Rogovin found admitting this possibility so distasteful that they were willing to lie in order to avoid it. Whatever the reason, though, Broué and Rogovin are not alone. Virtually every mainstream anticommunist historian assumes, without evidence, of any kind, that the defendants at the Moscow Trials, Trotsky and Sedov included, were innocent. Trotsky's innocence of any conspiracy to use "terror" is a constituent part of the "anti-Stalin paradigm" of Soviet history – the paradigm that Trotsky did much to inaugurate but that did not achieve widespread acceptance until Nikita Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956.

The Purge of the Harvard Trotsky Archive

Getty discovered that the Harvard Trotsky Archive has been purged. But who did the purging?

There are only four persons who could possibly have purged the Trotsky archive. One is Trotsky himself. This can't be completely ruled out. But Jean van Heijenoort, who managed the Trotsky archive in the 1930s, prepared it for shipment to Harvard, and then oversaw the cataloguing of the entire archive, does not mention that Trotsky was involved in the archive. As far as we know he relied on his secretaries to manage his archive for him. This hypothesis also fails to explain Deutscher's and van Heijenoort's silence about what we know had remained in the archive – a matter we discuss below.

Natalia Sedova

Trotsky's widow Natalia Sedova had access to the Harvard Trotsky Archive. In 1959 she gave Isaac Deutscher access to what was then referred to as the "closed archive." But Sedova spent no time at Harvard. She lived the last years of her life in Mexico and in Paris. Van Heijenoort testified that she did not use the archive in connection with her work with Victor Serge on a biography of her husband, of which he writes:

Long passages printed between quotation marks were written or dictated by Natalia Sedova. They contain valuable information but ... she did not have the opportunity of using the archives in order to refresh her memory. Hence these texts contain inaccuracies, in particular glaring errors of chronology. (WTIE p. 151)

In a previous article I wrote:

Trotsky's wife also had access. But at least one very personal letter of Trotsky's to his wife remains in the archives – something that his wife might be expected to have removed. (Furr, Evidence 38 at note 35)

It is unlikely that Sedova purged the archive.

Deutscher and van Heijenoort

Both Deutscher and van Heijenoort omit any mention of the materials found by Getty and Broué, such as the existence of the bloc of oppositionists; Sedov's and Trotsky's discussion and approval of it; Trotsky's correspondence with Radek, Sokol'nikov, and others whom he denied having any contact with; etc.

Obviously the materials found in the archive in the early 1980s must have been there when van Heijenoort worked with the archive over many years and when Deutscher used it. Broué even published the letter from van Heijenoort to Sedov of July 3, 1937, in which the former reminds Sedov of the other two documents

concerning the bloc: the letter from Trotsky to Sedov and another, probably the answering letter, of Sedov to Trotsky.

One might wonder why either Deutscher or van Heijenoort would fail to mention the materials found by Getty and Broué when they knew that this failure would show them to be liars after January 1980, when the archive was scheduled to be opened. Deutscher was born in 1907. He could have reasonably expected to be alive at the age of 73 in 1980 (in fact he died in 1967, only sixty years of age).

Isaac Deutscher

Deutscher gained access to the "closed archive" of correspondence in 1959 in time for his research on the third volume of his trilogy on Trotsky's life *The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky, 1929-1940* (pp. x, xii). Deutscher wrote that there was nothing surprising in the "closed archive."

...there was little or nothing strictly confidential or private in the political content of that correspondence. Indeed, with much of it I had become familiar in the nineteen-thirties - I shall presently explain in what way - so that re-reading it in 1959 I found hardly anything that could startle or surprise me. (xii)

Deutscher does not mention the materials documenting Trotsky's approval of the bloc of Rights and Trotskyites. Nor does he mention the secret letters of 1932 to Radek, Sokol'nikov, Preobrazhensky, Kollontai and Litvinov identified by Getty from their certified mail receipts.

How can we account for these striking omissions by Deutscher? There are a limited number of possible explanations. It may be that Deutscher did a quick, careless job and missed a great deal of evidence, including the material in question. In van Heijenoort's opinion Deutscher made many errors:

I must also say that, at the beginning, Mr. Mieke used, in good faith, Isaac Deutscher's book, and this book is notoriously deficient as far as dates, places, spelling of names and so on, are concerned.⁷

In his memoir van Heijenoort gives almost two pages of corrections to Deutscher's account (153-155). He attempts to explain Deutscher's errors in the following way:

My impression is that Deutscher worked hurriedly in the archives, more like a reporter who grabs any information than a historian who sifts the documents. (WTIE 154)

We may also attribute Deutscher's omissions to his strong pro-Trotsky bias. His biography often lapses into hero-worship. He seldom draws upon historical sources – for example, on contemporary newspaper and magazine accounts – other than Trotsky's own writings and papers. Nor does Deutscher note contradictions in Trotsky's own writings and statements of the kind we and Holmström have pointed out.

A work of history like this in any other field would have long ago been dismissed as shoddy, incompetent, and unreliable. But in the topsy-turvy world of Soviet history, where books are too often judged according to whether they have reached acceptably anticommunist and anti-Stalin conclusions rather than on the merits of their scholarship, Deutscher's biography has always enjoyed a respect that is entirely unmerited.

Deutscher's pro-Trotsky bias could coexist easily with a rushed and slipshod approach. The work of a researcher in a hurry would be guided by the biases he already possessed. Although it may have been Deutscher who purged the Trotsky archive, it is also

⁷ Van Heijenoort, J. "The History of Trotsky's Papers." *Harvard Library Bulletin* July 1980, 296. (van Heijenoort 1980) Patrick Mieke catalogued the papers for Harvard Library. (Ferman 297)

possible that Deutscher did not study the archive thoroughly. His omissions may have been due to hasty and careless work rather than, or in addition to, deliberate suppression.

Jean van Heijenoort

Van Heijenoort was Trotsky's secretary longer than anyone else. He was in charge of putting together the Trotsky archive, including the "closed archive." He too omitted any mention of Trotsky's letters to Opposition figures or the purging of this archive as noted by Getty, or the evidence of the bloc that both Broué and Getty examined.

The most detailed account of the Trotsky Archive is chapter fourteen of Feferman's 1993 book. Feferman took most of the information for her book from interviews with van Heijenoort himself. But in this chapter she also cites independent sources, so we can be sure van Heijenoort did in fact know the archive, including the "closed archive," extremely well – better than anybody else, Trotsky included. Van Heijenoort himself had written some of the materials in it. He had gone through everything many times: probably multiple times when he was Trotsky's secretary from 1932 to 1939, again when he put the TA together for shipment to Harvard in 1939 (290), again during several trips to Harvard beginning in 1940 (291). He went through it yet again "in the early 1950s" (291) "to organize it, to catalogue it, and to make its contents accessible" (292).

There was no one who knew more about the archives or their creator than he, no one who had the proximity and, at the same time, the neutrality... As for the archive itself, as in all things, he had an intense desire to be exact, to correct the mistakes others had made, and to insure that the record was as complete as possible. (292-3)

Feferman doesn't tell us what she meant by van Heijenoort's "neutrality." She rather naively depicts him as both non-political and as

a far-Rightist who nevertheless retained a great deal of regard for Trotsky. Perhaps these views appeared to Feferman to cancel each other out and leave “neutrality”? Whatever Feferman may have believed, van Heijenoort was anything but objective in his handling of the Trotsky archive.

Feferman quotes the words of Douglas Bryant, head of Harvard libraries, spoken at a memorial gathering for van Heijenoort at Harvard in April 1986. Bryant had begun his career at Harvard working on the Trotsky archive. According to Bryant,

“He [van Heijenoort] alone organized and directed the immense job of cataloguing the vast and complex archive of Leon Trotsky which Harvard had acquired in two parts.” (294)

Van Heijenoort published his memoir, *With Trotsky in Exile* (WTIE), in 1978 and his essay on the archive in the *Harvard Library Bulletin* in 1980. Thus he wrote about the archive on the threshold of its being made public, and again when it opened.

In his 1978 memoir van Heijenoort wrote of the preparation for the Dewey Commission, in the course of which he once again went through the whole of Trotsky’s archive,

Needless to say, in all this work [in searching the archives and preparing materials for the Commission hearings – GF], there was nothing falsified, nothing hidden, no thumb pressed upon the scales. (WTIE 109)

In a talk delivered on the occasion of the opening of the archive van Heijenoort said:

Finally, I want to speak on the significance of the correspondence, that is, of the part of the archives that has just been opened. One should not expect startling revelations on the political plane. Trotsky was not a man to have two sets of ideas, one presented in his published writings and one reserved for his private

letters. The continuity on the political plane between the published writings and the correspondence will be apparent to all. There is no contradiction. (Van Heijenoort 1980, 297)

We know today that this is not true at all, for we have van Heijenoort's letter to Sedov in which he discusses the bloc of 1932 and states that he will not submit it to the Paris session of the Dewey Commission hearings (Broué 1980 34-5). In that letter van Heijenoort refers to the other two letters, also reproduced by Broué, in which Trotsky discusses the bloc. As the person who prepared the TA van Heijenoort must have also known the letters to Soviet Oppositionists whose certified mail receipts Getty found and about which Broué remained silent. We also know that van Heijenoort copied excerpts from letters between Trotsky and Sedov. But the full texts of those letters is not in the TA. Van Heijenoort must have known that too.

Therefore van Heijenoort lied in his memoir. He knew that very important materials were withheld from the Dewey Commission. Contrary to what van Heijenoort wrote in 1978 and said in 1980, Trotsky did indeed publicly deny what he was doing in private. He did indeed have "two sets of ideas, one ... in his published writings and one reserved for his private letters." Van Heijenoort knew this. He chose to deliberately mislead his readers.

Let us consider van Heijenoort's claim of 1980: "One should not expect startling revelations on the political plane." How could he have made this statement when the doors to the formerly "closed archive" had been thrown open and it would be subject to the closest scrutiny? We cannot attribute it to a superficial, careless, or hurried acquaintance with the archive, as van Heijenoort himself assumed of Deutscher. Van Heijenoort could have made these statements only if he had first assured himself that the horde of students about to scrutinize the newly-opened archive would not immediately prove him a liar.

The most likely explanation may be that van Heijenoort assumed the second sentence was literally true. Those who would consult the TA “should not expect startling revelations” because van Heijenoort was certain that those revelations were no longer there – because he himself had taken them out. Getty discovered that someone had purged the Trotsky Archive. That person must have been Jean van Heijenoort.

It may be objected that this conclusion assumes van Heijenoort did not do a “perfect job.” Obviously whoever did the purging did not do it perfectly – or we would have no evidence internal to the archive itself that it had been purged. Despite an attention to detail for which he was evidently well-known van Heijenoort failed to find and destroy all the traces of his expurgations.

It is conceivable that Isaac Deutscher confiscated some materials while working on the last volume of his trilogy. I consider this unlikely for the reasons I examined above. Moreover, Deutscher could simply not have done so without van Heijenoort’s collusion since van Heijenoort might well have noted that some documents were missing. Most likely Deutscher did no more than fail to mention anything that conflicted with Trotsky’s own published accounts and with his own romanticized vision of a heroic, tragic Trotsky. Therefore, the overwhelming likelihood is that the “purger” of the Trotsky archive was van Heijenoort. If Deutscher were involved in the purging van Heijenoort was a party to it as well.

Van Heijenoort had an additional motive, one shared by no other person, for purging the Trotsky archive of incriminating materials. For if Trotsky’s deceptions came to light, Trotsky’s would not be the only reputation adversely affected. Van Heijenoort had known Trotsky’s archive at the time it was being formed more closely than anyone else. He had prepared it for shipment and then gone through it again and again. Of all living persons only van Heijenoort would be called upon to account for any of Trotsky’s secret deceptions, should they come to light.

Chapter 7. Non-Soviet – Soviet Evidence –

Frinovsky, Liushkov, Mastny

The commission of the Central Committee set up by Mikhail Gorbachev to study and, in essence, to find evidence that Bukharin had been unjustly convicted at his trial in 1938 was unable to find any such evidence at all. The proceedings of this commission published in 2004 show the commission members' consternation at this failure.

The result was that the decree (*Postanovlenie*) of the Plenum of the Soviet Supreme Court which was issued on February 4, 1988, and which declared that Bukharin had been forced to make a false confession was never published and remains secret in Russia to this day. Its text, only recently discovered, shows that the central piece of evidence of Bukharin's innocence cited in it is, in fact, a deliberate falsification.¹

In it the confession-statement of Mikhail Frinovsky, a document that provides strong evidence of the guilt of Bukharin and other defendants in the First and Third Moscow Trials, was deliberately misquoted so it could be employed as evidence that Bukharin was innocent.² In fact Gorbachev's experts could find no evidence whatever to support their theory that Bukharin was innocent.

¹ Vladimir L. Bobrov and I have prepared an edition of this document and an accompanying article as Chapter Two in our book *1937. Pravosudie Stalina. Obzhalovania ne podlezhit!* Moscow: Eksmo, 2010. Glava 2. "Reabilitatsionnoe" moshenichestvo, 64-84.

² Frinovsky's confession-statement was published in early 2006 and is available on the web at <https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrgr/research/frinovskyru.html>. I have put an English translation of it on the web here <https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrgr/research/frinovskyeng.html>. Both Russian and English web versions have the full bibliographical information of the original publication. For Frinovsky's statement of Bukharin's guilt see pp. 40, 42, 47-8, or just search for the word "Bukharin" («Бухарин»).

We now have a number of statements from other high-ranking conspirators who implicate Zinoviev and Kamenev in their own confessions.

For instance, Mikhail Frinovsky stated:

Во время процесса ЗИНОВЬЕВА, КАМЕНЕВА и других, когда было опубликовано в печати о БУХАРИНЕ, перед концом процесса, ЕВДОКИМОВ был в Москве. Он очень волновался и, в разговоре со мной, говорил: «Черт его знает, как удастся выкрутиться из всего этого дела. Никак не понимаю ЯГОДУ, что он там делает, зачем расширяет круг людей для репрессий, или у этих поджилки слабы — выдают. Но можно было бы поставить таким образом ход следствия, чтобы всячески обезопасить себя».

Translated:

At the time of the trial of Zinoviev, Kamenev and others, when the testimony about Bukharin was published in the press, Evdokimov was in Moscow. He became very upset and in a conversation with me, said: "The devil only knows how he [Iagoda] will be able to extract himself from this whole affair. I just don't understand Iagoda at all, what he is doing, why he is broadening the circle of persons for repression, or maybe the nerves of these people are weak – they will give out. But it could have been possible to direct the course of the investigation in such a manner as to leave oneself safe in any case." (41)

Zinoviev and Kamenev

Zinoviev and Kamenev knew about NKVD Commissar Iagoda's involvement in the conspiracy of Rightists but did not reveal that fact before or at their August 1936 trial. We know this now because in 1997 eight pretrial interrogations of Iagoda were published in Russia in the provincial city of Kazan' in a tiny press run of only 200 copies. In 2004 a semi-official volume of documents

copublished by Yale University and the Aleksandr N. Iakovlev Fund also published one of these interrogations, making it clear that they are genuine.

Iagoda rushed Kamenev and Zinoviev to execution before they could expose yet more of the conspiracy. From other similar events Stalin concluded that the Oppositionists had an agreement to kill any of their number who named names. Stalin concluded that the unsupported word of a former Oppositionist should no longer be accepted at face value. We have reproduced Iagoda's and Stalin's statements in other chapters of the present study.³ Like Bukharin Iagoda certainly knew about Ezhov's participation in the conspiracy as well, and like Bukharin he did not tell "the whole truth" at his trial.⁴

Rehabilitation Documents of Bukharin

The decree of the Plenum of the Soviet Supreme Court of February 4 1988 by which Bukharin and other defendants in the March 1938 Moscow Trial were "rehabilitated" is still secret in Russia. Only very short fragments of it have been published.

Some years ago I discovered a copy of the original Rehabilitation Decree in the Volkogonov Archives, on microfilm at the Library of Congress.⁵ It bears the title "Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR of 4 February 1988."⁶

³ For Stalin's remarks online see

<http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furg/research/stalinonoppsvi11995.html>

⁴ This is confirmed both in Iagoda's confessions in the 1997 volume *Genrikh Iagoda. Narkom vnutrennikhdel SSSR, General'niy komissar gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti. Sbornik dokumentov*. Kazan', 1997, and in the April 11, 1939 confession-statement by Ezhov's right-hand man Mikhail Frinovsky, a translation of which may be consulted at

<http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furg/research/frinovskyeng.html>

⁵ General Dmitri Volkogonov was given unprecedented access by Mikhail Gorbachev to official, secret archives of the Soviet period. With their aid he wrote highly tendentious works including biographies of Lenin, Stalin, and Trotsky. Volkogonov photocopied thousands of pages of documents, and somehow many or all of them were transmitted to Western libraries, including the Library of Congress. For a brief summary of Volkogonov's career

The Rehabilitation Decree quotes the statement-confession made by Mikhail Frinovsky, Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs under Nikolai Ezhov. Together with Ezhov and other of his men Frinovsky was arrested for massive fraudulent repressions and murders, and was tried and executed with Ezhov on these charges in February 1940.

Frinovsky's statement was first published in early 2006. We can now see that the Soviet Supreme Court's Rehabilitation Decree falsifies what Frinovsky wrote.

The Rehabilitation Decree reads:

According to Frinovsky's confessions Ezhov talked with Bukharin, Rykov, Bulanov and others of the accused several times; **he assured each of them that the court would preserve their lives if they confessed their guilt.** (Postanovlenie 1988, 6)

This is a lie. Frinovsky did not say this at all. Instead he *confirmed* the guilt of Bukharin and Rykov as participants in a Right conspiracy, while also confirming that Ezhov and he himself were also involved in a similar and related conspiracy.

До ареста БУХАРИНА и РЫКОВА, разговаривая со мной откровенно, ЕЖОВ начал говорить о планах чекистской работы в связи со сложившейся обстановкой и предстоящими арестами БУХАРИНА и РЫКОВА. ЕЖОВ говорил, что это будет большая потеря для правых, после этого вне нашего желания, по указанию ЦК могут развернуться большие мероприятия по правым кадрам, и что в связи с этим основной задачей его и моей является ведение следствия таким образом, чтобы, елико возможно, сохранять правые кадры.

and his relationship with politics and archives, see Amy Knight, "U. S. POWs and Russian Archives," *Perspective* Volume IX, Number 3 (January - February 1998), at <http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol9/Knight.html>

⁶ "Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR от 4 fevralia 1988 g." Volkogonov Archives, Library of Congress, Washington DC.

Translated:

Before the arrests of BUKHARIN and RYKOV, speaking frankly with me EZHOV began to talk about his plans for Chekist [= NKVD, GF] work in connection with the situation that was taking shape and **the imminent arrests of BUKHARIN and RYKOV. EZHOV said that this would be a serious loss for the Rights. After this, whether we like it or not, by direction of the Central Committee there might be undertaken large-scale measures concerning the Rightist cadres, and that in connection with them his and my fundamental task was to guide the investigations in such a matter that, to the extent possible, the Rightist cadre would be preserved safe. (Lubianka 3 42)**

Frinovsky discussed the "preparation" for the Bukharin trial a second time in another part of his statement. Here too he made it clear that Bukharin and the rest were guilty. There is nothing about "preparing" the defendants to make false confessions implicating themselves. Frinovsky said that Ezhov's falsifications concerned keeping Ezhov's own ties with the leaders of the Rights out of the defendants' statements at trial.

Подготовка процесса РЫКОВА, БУХАРИНА, КРЕСТИНСКОГО, ЯГОДЫ и других

Активно участвуя в следствии вообще, ЕЖОВ от подготовки этого процесса самоустранился. Перед процессом состоялись очные ставки арестованных, допросы, уточнения, на которых ЕЖОВ не участвовал. Долго говорил он с ЯГОДОЙ, и разговор этот касался, главным образом, убеждения ЯГОДЫ в том, что его не расстреляют.

ЕЖОВ несколько раз беседовал с БУХАРИНЫМ и РЫКОВЫМ и тоже в порядке их успокоения заверял, что их ни в коем случае не расстреляют.

Раз ЕЖОВ беседовал с БУЛАНОВЫМ, причем беседу начал в присутствии следователя и меня, а кончил беседу один на один, попросив нас выйти.

Причем БУЛАНОВ начал разговор в этот момент об отравлении ЕЖОВА. О чем был разговор, ЕЖОВ мне не сказал. Когда он попросил зайти вновь, то говорил: «Держись хорошо на процессе — буду просить, чтобы тебя не расстреливали.» После процесса ЕЖОВ всегда высказывал сожаление о БУЛАНОВЕ. Во время же расстрела ЕЖОВ предложил БУЛАНОВА расстрелять первым и в помещение, где расстреливали, сам не вошел.

Безусловно, тут ЕЖОВЫМ руководила необходимость прикрытия своих связей с арестованными лидерами правых, идущими на гласный процесс.

Translated:

The preparation of the trial of RYKOV, BUKHARIN, KRESTINSKY, IAGODA, and others

Actively taking part in the investigation generally, EZHOV kept his distance from the preparation of the trial. Before the trial there occurred the face-to-face confrontations of the arrestees, the elaboration of details, in which EZHOV did not take part. He spoke with IAGODA for a long time and this conversation concerned, in the main, assurances to IAGODA that he would not be shot.

EZHOV spoke several times with BUKHARIN and RYKOV and also in the course of calming them assured them that under no circumstances would they be shot.

Once EZHOV had a conversation with BULANOV, and he began the conversation in the presence of the investigator and myself, and ended the conversation one on one, having asked us to leave.

On that occasion BULANOV at that moment began talking about the poisoning of EZHOV. EZHOV did not tell me what the conversation was about. When he asked us to come in again, he was saying: "Conduct yourself well at trial - I will ask that you not be shot." After the trial EZHOV always expressed regret about BULANOV. At the time of the execution itself EZHOV proposed that BULANOV be shot first, and did not himself enter the building where the executions were taking place.

Without question, here EZHOV was moved by the necessity of covering up his own relations with the arrested leaders of the Rights who were undergoing the public trial. (Lubianka 1939-1946, 47- 48.)

The Rehabilitation Decree falsifies the contents of Frinovsky's statement by giving it the opposite meaning from that it really bears. Frinovsky *confirmed* the existence of a conspiracy of Rights, his and Ezhov's participation in it, Bukharin's participation in it as well, and therefore Bukharin's guilt.

Had the Soviet Prosecutor and Supreme Court found any evidence to impugn Bukharin's confessions they would surely have cited it. Instead, in the interest of their purposes - to make a case that Bukharin and the other defendants at the Third Moscow Trial were innocent - they were forced to have recourse to falsifying Frinovsky's statement, a document that was still secret at that time. Then they kept the Rehabilitation Decree itself secret, as it still officially is in Russia.

The Commission had access to 276 volumes of the investigative files on Bukharin. (RKEB 3 33) The fact that this blue-ribbon commission, with all of the archives at its disposal, could find no evidence to exculpate Bukharin or cast doubt upon his confession is itself the strongest evidence we are likely to ever have - that is, that no such evidence exists.

The following correspondences assure us that the document in question from the Volkogonov Archives, hereafter called the Rehabilitation Decree, is in fact the genuine text of the Supreme Court decree rehabilitating Bukharin.

* The header of the first, and end of the last, pages of this same document are photographically reproduced in *Izvestia TsK KPSS* 1, 1989 at page 121, and in text format in a volume of "rehabilitation" documents published in 1991.⁷ The texts of both correspond exactly to the respective parts of the document from the Volkogonov Archive.

* In the official collection *Reabilitatsia: Kak Eto Bylo. Seredina 80-kh godov -1991*⁸ a quotation is given from the "Decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR of 4 February 1988" (*postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR ot 4 fevralia 1988 g.*) which corresponds exactly to a passage at the bottom of page 5 of the document from Volkogonov Archive. On page 615 at note 31 another passage is cited from the same "postanovlenie," and this one can also be found in the Volkogonov Archive document towards the top of page 7.

The Rehabilitation Decree contains the following passage:

Former Vice-Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR [NKVD, GF] Frinovsky, in his statement of April 11, 1939, admitted that employees of the NKVD of the USSR "prepared" arrestees for the interrogations at face-to-face confrontations, pressing on them the answers they should give to possible questions. Ezhov often conversed with those under interrogation. If the arrestee renounced his confessions, the investigator was given directions to "restore" the arrestee, i.e. to obtain from him his previous false confessions. (6)

⁷ *Reabilitatsia. Politicheskie Protsessy 30-50-kh godov* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1991), pp 240-1.

⁸ RKEB 3 614, n.30.

The same statements are made with slightly different wording in the "Protest," or request for reconsideration, from the State Prosecutor (*Prokuror*) to the Soviet Supreme Court in this case:

The former Vice-Commissar of Internal Affairs Fri-novsky, convicted on February 3, 1940, for falsification of criminal cases and of massive repressions, in his statement of April 11, 1939, indicated that workers of the NKVD of the USSR prepared arrestees for face-to-face confrontations, discussing with them possible questions and answers to them. The preparation ended with the publication of previous confessions concerning the persons with whom face-to-face confrontations were planned. After this Ezhov would summon the arrestee to him or he himself would drop in to the investigator's room, ask the person under interrogation whether he would confirm his confessions, and as though in passing, reported that members of the government might be present at the face-to-face confrontation. If the arrestee renounced his confessions Ezhov would go away and the investigator was given directions to "restore" the arrestee, which meant to obtain from him his previous false confessions.⁹

⁹ "Plenumu Verkhovnogo suda Soiuz SSR Prokuratura Soiuz SSR. Protest (v poriadke nadzora) po delu N.I. Bukharina, A.I. Rykova, A.P. Rozengol'tsa, M.A. Chernova, P.P. Bulanova, L.G. Levina, I.N. Kazakova, V.A. Maksimova-Dikovskogo, P.P. Kriuchkova, Kh.G. Rakovskogo. 21 ianvaria 1988 g." ("To the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Union SSR of the Procurator of the Union SSR. Protest (in the order of oversight) concerning the case of N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov, A.P. Rozengol'ts, M.A. Chernov, P.P. Bulanov, L.G. Levin, I.N. Kazakov, V.A. Maksimov-Dikovskiy, P.P. Kriuchkov, Kh.G. Rakovsky. January 21, 1988.) *Izvestia TsK KPSS* 1989 № 1, pp. 114-119. p.118. This text is reprinted in the collection *Reabilitatsia. Politicheskie Protsessy 30-50-kh godov*. Moscow: Izd-vo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1991, pp. 235-240.

Publication of the full text of Frinovsky's statement of April 11, 1939, which had remained classified until early 2006,¹⁰ now permits us to affirm with confidence that these statements in the Rehabilitation Decree constitute a deliberate deception by the Soviet Supreme Court.

Frinovsky did state something resembling the quotations above. However, in this passage Frinovsky was not discussing "preparation" of the defendants at the 1938 Trial but a different case.

Later in the same document Frinovsky does comment on Ezhov's "preparations" for the March 1938 Trial as follows:

При проведении следствия по делу ЯГОДЫ и арестованных чекистов-заговорщиков, а также и других арестованных, особенно правых, установленный ЕЖОВЫМ порядок «корректировки» протоколов преследовал цель — сохранение кадров заговорщиков и предотвращение всякой возможности провала нашей причастности к антисоветскому заговору.

Можно привести десятки и сотни примеров, когда подследственные арестованные не выдавали лиц, связанных с ними по антисоветской работе.

Наиболее наглядными примерами являются заговорщики ЯГОДА, БУЛАНОВ, ЗАКОВСКИЙ, КРУЧИНКИН и др., которые, зная о моем участии в заговоре, показаний об этом не дали. (47)

Translated:

¹⁰ "NARODNOMU KOMISSARU VNUTRENNIKH DEL SOIUZA SOVETSKIKH SOTS. RESPUBLIK - KOMISSARU GOSUDARSTVENNOI BEZOPASNOSTI 1 RANGA: BERIA L.P. Ot arestovannogo FRINOVSKOGO M.P. ZAIAVLENIE" 11 apreliia 1939. ("To the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Union of Soviet Soc. Republics – Commissar of State Security of the First Rank Beria L.P. From the arrestee Frinovsky M.P. Statement." April 11, 1939.) In *Lubianka. Stalin i NKVD - NKGB - GUKR "SMERSH" 1939- mart 1946*. Moscow: 2006, pp. 33-50; also online at <http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrgr/research/frinovskyengl.html> Russian original at <http://frinovskyru.html>

In the course of the investigation in the case of IAGODA and the arrested Chekist conspirators, and also of other arrestees, especially the Rights, the procedure established by EZHOV of "correction" of the transcripts followed a purpose - that of the preservation of the cadres of the conspirators and the prevention of any possibility of the failure of our participation in the anti-Soviet conspiracy.

I could cite dozens and hundreds of examples in which the arrestees under investigation did not give up the names of persons with whom they were involved in their anti-Soviet work.

The most graphic examples are those of the conspirators IAGODA, BULANOV, ZAKOVSKY, KRUCHINKIN and others who, though they knew of my participation in the conspiracy, did not reveal it in their confessions.
(47) .

Frinovsky does admit that Ezhov - obviously with the assistance of subordinates like Frinovsky himself - did falsify the transcripts of interrogations in the cases of arrested NKVD men and especially in the cases of arrested Rightists like Iagoda. *But this was done not to make the innocent appear guilty but for the opposite reason: to prevent yet more conspirators, and especially Ezhov and his men themselves, from being disclosed.*

Statements by NKVD defector Genrikh Liushkov to his Japanese handlers

NKVD general Genrikh Samoilovich Liushkov defected to the Japanese on June 13, 1938, by crossing the border into Japanese-occupied Manchuria. He gave some press conferences and wrote articles attacking Stalin and the Soviet party and government. In his press conferences, arranged by the Japanese for propaganda

purposes, Liushkov claimed that all the Moscow Trials were frameups and that no conspiracies existed at all.

But he told his Japanese military handlers something very different. American professor Alvin D. Coox spent years tracking down the former Japanese military men who had been assigned to handle Liushkov. In 1968, and again in 1998, Coox published lengthy, detailed articles about what these men reported Liushkov had told them.

In an article published in March 1939 in Japanese for anti-Soviet propaganda purposes Liushkov claimed that all the conspiracies in the USSR were fabrications. But to his Japanese handlers Liushkov made it clear not only that Stalin himself believed there was a real military conspiracy but that he, Liushkov, also knew that there was, or had been, a real military conspiracy that involved Gamarnik, a member of the Tukhachevsky group who committed suicide on May 31, 1937, when he learned that he would soon be arrested.

The Tukhachevsky Conspiracy

According to Lyushkov, the interrogations of Deribas, Zapadni, and Barminski established that in the NKVD and the border guard forces, a plot centering on Gamarnik had been fomented. (Coox 1 156)

General Ian Gamarnik was one of the leading figures in the so-called "Tukhachevsky Affair" of high-ranking military conspirators. He is named a number of times in the Third Moscow Trial by Grigori F. Grinko, one of the defendants.

GRINKO:... How did I carry out the tasks that were entrusted to me by this national-fascist organization?

Firstly, connections with the Right and Trotskyite centre. I maintained these connections with Gamarnik, Pyatakov and Rykov. I established connections with Gamarnik through Lyubchenko, who had connections with Yakir and Gamarnik. Through Gamarnik I estab-

lished connections with Pyatakov, and then with Rykov. Simultaneously I carried out tasks in foreign politics, in so far as Pyatakov and Gamarnik had told me that Trotsky had agreed to paying compensation at the expense of the Ukraine for the military assistance that we were to receive in our fight against the Soviet power.

Simultaneously with the establishment of connections with the "bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" I accelerated the establishment of connections with foreign forces through Krestinsky, with whom Pyatakov had connected me.

I established connections with Gamarnik, Pyatakov and Rykov about the end of 1935. (1938 Trial 71)

VYSHINSKY: In short, in Rosengoltz's criminal activities there were the same defeatist motives as in your activities?

GRINKO: They lay at the base of everything.

VYSHINSKY: So we can say that it is not only Rykov and Bukharin, but also Rosengoltz, I have one more question. Did you know about the Tukhachevsky plot, and if so, from whom?

GRINKO: From Gamarnik. (1938 Trial 87)

Liushkov also confirmed at least the intention of these Party and military conspirators to conspire with the Japanese and to support a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union:

In concert with Lavrenty Lavrentiev (former First Secretary of the Regional Committee of the Party until January 1937), with Grigory Krutov (shot in April 1938), and with the army plotters Sangurski, Aronshtam, and others, Deribas supposedly intended to

conduct a putsch in the Far East and to reach agreement with the Japanese for help and for combined operations against the Soviet Union. In the NKVD the plotters had recruited Transtok, Chief of the 2nd Section, and many others. Lyushkov gave the names of about 20 officials, mostly NKVD types, and of ten border guards, all of whom he asserted were involved in the plots. (Coox 1 156)

Coox emphasizes that Liushkov outlined this information to the Japanese in a manner that convinced them that he believed they were genuine:

About this murderous period as a whole, Lyushkov said little to the Japanese, but his enumeration of the suspects was straightforward, without any admission of NKVD-fabricated evidence, such as he said had occurred at Leningrad in the era of the Kirov assassination. (Coox 1, 156)¹¹

Aleksei Rykov

Liushkov told the Japanese that the commanders in the Far Eastern Army had been in secret contact with Rykov. Along with Nikolai Bukharin Rykov was one of the top leaders of the clandestine Rightist conspiracy.

Liushkov confirmed the connection of the Rights, convicted in the March 1938 Moscow Trial, with the military conspirators. For example, Liushkov told the Japanese:

For a long time Deribas had been in contact with Rykov and was the latter's "hidden conspirator."
(Coox 1 156)

¹¹ Quoted from Furr, Kirov 345-346.

Liushkov mentioned Rykov elsewhere as well (see below). He also revealed that the charges against Lavrent'ev (Kartvelishvili), arrested in July 1937 but not tried and executed until August 1938, were true.

Liushkov also revealed that Marshal Bliukher had been conspiring with Rykov and the Rights.

But in private conversations to Japanese officers and others with whom he interacted, Liushkov incriminated Rykov along with Marshal Bliukher and others:

[One] group of traitors belonging to the staff of the Far Eastern Army, people near to Blyukher himself, such as [Yan] Pokus, Gulin, Vasenov, Kropachev and others, tried to get round Blyukher and to draw him into politically dangerous conversations. Blyukher showed them the secret confessions of arrested plotters [without] the authority to do so. After his arrest Gulin told me that after the recall of Pokus to Moscow, Blyukher, when drinking with them, cursed the NKVD and the arrests recently carried out, and also Voroshilov, [Lazar] Kaganovich and others. Blyukher told Gulin that before the removal of Rykov he was in connection with him and had often written that the "right wing" wished to see him at the head of the armed forces of the country. (Coox 1 158)

All this was exactly the opposite of what Liushkov was telling the world for propaganda purposes in his press conferences. The Japanese were convinced that Liushkov was telling them the truth.

Liushkov's revelations to the Japanese are directly relevant to the Third Moscow Trial, where a number of the defendants testified about their involvement in and knowledge of Marshal Tuk-

hachevsky's military conspiracy. Liushkov's testimony is strong evidence that the testimony at the Moscow Trials was genuine.¹²

The Mastny-Benes Note of February 9, 1937

Since 1987 we have had archival evidence from a source in the German government, from January-February 1937, that the Soviet military was indeed planning a *coup d'état* and a reversal of Soviet policy from enmity towards friendship with Nazi Germany.¹³

Dramatic indeed! But few people are aware of this evidence. It has been virtually ignored since it was discovered.¹⁴

In 1987 Ivan Pfaff published an account of a note he found in the Czech national archive. This is a note from Voytech Mastny, Czech minister in Berlin, to Eduard Benes, Czech Prime Minister, dated February 9, 1937. In it Mastny recorded that the German official with whom he had been dealing, Maximilian Karl Graf zu Trauttmansdorff, had informed him that Hitler was no longer interested in a settlement with Czechoslovakia because he expected a military coup in the Soviet Union and a subsequent turn of Soviet policy towards positive relations with Germany.

Most importantly, with regards to the current delays, he considered the possibility, requesting absolute secrecy, that the real reason behind the Chancellor's hesitation was his assumption that, according to certain reports which he received from Russia, there was a growing probability of a sudden turn of events very soon, the fall of Stalin and Litvinov, and the imposition

¹² See the fuller discussion in Furr, Kirov Chapter 17: "Liushkov's Essay."

¹³ Ivan Pfaff. "Prag und der Fall Tuchatschewski." *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 35, 1 (1987), 95-134. Pfaff's translation of the note from the Czech into German is on pages 120-121.

¹⁴ Some years ago I obtained a copy of the document from the Czech national archive, where it is held. Then I paid a professional translator to translate it into English and give me the rights to publish her translation.

of a military dictatorship. Should that happen, the Reich Chancellor would supposedly change the entire position towards Russia...¹⁵

Documents from the German Foreign Ministry Archive were published in 1974 that showed a special interest in Tukhachevsky on the part of the German General Staff at exactly this time, February 1937.¹⁶

This is strong corroboration that Marshal Tukhachevsky was indeed planning a coup against the Stalin regime, as he confessed in late May 1937. There is also a great deal of evidence from within the Soviet archives that the Tukhachevsky conspiracy really existed and that the Soviet commanders were guilty.

In the Third Moscow Trial of March 1938 defendant Arkadii Rozengol'ts confessed that he had gotten in touch personally with Tukhachevsky and Rykov on behalf of Trotsky.

ROSENGOLTZ: Krestinsky said that he had instructions with regard to Rykov and Rudzutak. Sedov spoke a lot about the necessity of the maximum, the closest possible connections with Tukhachevsky, inasmuch as, in Trotsky's opinion, Tukhachevsky and the military group were to be the decisive force of the counterrevolutionary action. During the conversation it was also revealed that Trotsky entertained fears regarding Tukhachevsky's Bonapartist tendencies. In the course of one conversation Sedov said that Trotsky in this respect even expressed the fear that if Tukhachevsky successfully accomplished a military coup, it was possible that he would not allow Trotsky into Moscow,

¹⁵ Archive of the National Museum, Mastny papers (ANM-M).

¹⁶ See Grover Furr, "New Light On Old Stories About Marshal Tukhachevsky: Some Documents Reconsidered." *Russian History* 13, No. 2-3 (Summer-Fall 1986; actually published in 1988), 293-308.

and in this connection he referred to the necessity for the greatest vigilance on our part. (1938 Trial 245-246)

Defendants Bessonov, Rykov, Bukharin, Grinko, and Krestinsky also testified about their collaboration in or knowledge of Tukhachevsky's conspiracy.

Rykov

RYKOV: I knew about Tukhachevsky's military group.

VYSHINSKY: What did you know?

RYKOV: This military group was organized independently of the bloc, independently of shades—Trotskyite or Bukharinite. The military group set itself the object of violently removing the government of the [Soviet] Union and, in particular, it took part in the preparations for a Kremlin coup.

VYSHINSKY: You were aware of that?

RYKOV: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: When did you learn of it?

RYKOV: I learnt of it from Tomsy in 1934.

VYSHINSKY: In 1934?

RYKOV: Probably. (1938 Trial 84)

Bukharin

VYSHINSKY: Wait a while, it still remains to be seen how you objected. We want to establish what actually happened. So Tomsy told you that it would be necessary or expedient to open the front?

BUKHARIN: Yes, he inclined to this opinion.

VYSHINSKY: That it would be expedient to open the front to the Germans in case of war?

BUKHARIN: Yes, in case of war.

VYSHINSKY: And what does this mean?

BUKHARIN: It means high treason.

VYSHINSKY: And as to how to open the front, who spoke to you about that?

BUKHARIN: Tomsy spoke about it, that there was such an opinion among the military men.

VYSHINSKY: Which military men?

BUKHARIN: The Right conspirators.

VYSHINSKY: Concretely, who?

BUKHARIN: He named Tukhachevsky, and Kork, if I am not mistaken; then the Trotskyites. (188)

VYSHINSKY: ...Were Tukhachevsky and the military group of conspirators members of your bloc?

BUKHARIN: They were.

VYSHINSKY: And they discussed with the members of the bloc?

BUKHARIN: Quite right.

VYSHINSKY: That means that Kork, Tukhachevsky and the Trotskyites generally intended to open the front in case of war with Germany, and it was of this that Tomsy spoke to you?

BUKHARIN: Yes, that there was such an opinion among them. (189)

Krestinsky

VYSHINSKY: Permit me to interrogate Krestinsky.

Accused Krestinsky, do you know that the Trotskyites belonged to the "bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" of which we are speaking here?

KRESTINSKY: I learnt from Pyatakov, when he spoke to me about this in February 1935, that an organization had been formed, which united the Rights, Trotskyites and military men, and which set itself the aim of preparing for a military coup. I also knew that the leading centre included Rykov, Bukharin, Rudzutak and Yagoda from the Rights, Tukhachevsky and Garmarnik from the military, and Pyatakov from the Trotskyites. He never told me that representatives of national-democratic organizations were included in this centre, and when I was in this centre with Rosengoltz in 1937, there were no representatives of these organizations in the centre then either. (184)

The Mastny-Benes note thus provides strong evidence from a high-placed German source that the Tukhachevsky conspiracy really existed.

Why has this important document been ignored? Because the hypothesis that the Tukhachevsky Affair really existed, and was stopped by Stalin, the Politburo, and the NKVD, is unacceptable to anticommunists and Trotskyists, and therefore to the Soviet history establishment, East and West.

Pfaff and Igor Lukes, who also discussed the Mastny-Benes note¹⁷, said that Trauttmansdorff must have been lying to Mastny, to try to "frame" Tukhachevsky and so lure Stalin to kill off his best military commanders and weaken the country. A tale like this was indeed spread right after World War Two by three former German intelligence men. We have discussed it briefly in a 1988 article.¹⁸ This story was widely publicized after the war.

Khrushchev's men heard about this "SD forgery plot" story and checked in the Soviet archives for any evidence to support it. Khrushchev's Shvernik Commission studied this story in detail and searched in the archives for any trace of it. They found none, and ended by rejecting it completely, along with the documents supposedly produced in it. (RKEB 2 737-738) But this false story is retained by anticommunists because the opposite - that "Stalin" (the Soviet leadership) actually disarmed this dangerous conspiracy - might reflect well on Stalin.

There is a huge amount of other evidence to support the charge that Tukhachevsky and the rest were guilty. But here we actually have an archival document - German evidence from a Czech archive, and it is virtually ignored.

We might consider for a minute what WW2 would have been like if Tukhachevsky and his co-conspirators had been successful. The industrial and military might of the Soviet Union, plus its resources of raw material and manpower, would have been teamed up with those of Hitler's Germany. The history of Europe - of the whole world - would be dramatically different, and far, far worse.

This fact - and it is a fact, we have a huge amount of evidence to support it - changes dramatically the way historians should look

¹⁷ Igor Lukes, *Czechoslovakia between Stalin and Hitler*. The diplomacy of Edvard Benes in the 1930s. London: Oxford University Press, 1996, Chapter 4, 99ff.

¹⁸ Furr New Light 302-304 and the footnotes there.

at the history of Europe in the 1930s, the Stalin regime in the USSR, and World War. One could conclude, without exaggeration that in uncovering and stopping this conspiracy the Soviet leadership - "Stalin" - saved European civilization from Nazism. But in the fatally politicized world of Soviet historiography such a conclusion is simply "not permitted" because far from documenting a "crime" by Stalin it tends to make Stalin look good. So, it is ignored, in fact lied about. Stalin "framed" these poor generals! He *must* have done so - and the evidence be damned!

The transcript of the 11-hour long trial of Tukhachevsky and the other seven military commanders is still top secret in Russia today. No one is allowed to see it, not even the most ferociously anti-communist researchers. But we do have two reports of the trial.

One is by Col. Viktor Alksnis, whose grandfather was a member of the military tribunal who tried Tukhachevsky and the rest. In 1990 he was allowed to read the transcript. Alksnis went from someone who had always believed that the Soviet generals had been framed, to firmly believing that they were guilty. Since him, no one else has been allowed to see the transcript.

The other report is that of Marshal Semion Budyonny, in a letter to Marshal Voroshilov. We study these materials briefly in other chapters of the present book.

Chapter 8. Non-Soviet Evidence – Humbert-Droz, Littlepage, Holmes

Jules Humbert-Droz's memoir

Jules Humbert-Droz had been a close friend and political ally of Bukharin's in the Communist International. In his memoir published in Switzerland in 1971 Humbert-Droz revealed that Bukharin told him in 1928 that he, Bukharin, and his followers, the Rights, were already plotting to assassinate Stalin.

There can be no question of this testimony having been forced from him under pressure. Humbert-Droz had long since quit the communist movement and was living peacefully in his native country of Switzerland. Indeed, it is not an important part of his memoirs, occupying less than two pages in a long work.

Avant de partir, j'allai voir une dernière fois Boukharine, ne sachant si je le reverrais à mon retour. Nous eûmes une longue et franche conversation. Il me mit au courant des contacts pris par son groupe avec la fraction Zinoviev-Kamenev pour coordonner la lutte contre le pouvoir de Staline. Je ne lui cachai pas que je n'approuvais pas cette liaison des oppositions: «La lutte contre Staline n'est pas un programme politique. Nous avons combattu avec raison le programme des troskystes sur des problèmes essentiels, le danger des koulaks en Russie, la lutte contre le front unique avec les social-démocrates, les problèmes chinois, la perspective révolutionnaire très courte, etc. Au lendemain d'une victoire commune contre Staline, ces problèmes politiques nous diviseront. Ce bloc est un bloc sans principes, qui s'effritera même avant d'aboutir.»

Boukharine me dit aussi qu'ils avaient décidé d'utiliser la terreur individuelle pour se débarasser de Staline. Sur ce point aussi je fis d'expresses réserves: l'introduction de la terreur individuelle dans les luttes politiques nées de la Révolution russe risquait fort de se tourner contre ceux qui l'emploieraient. Elle n'a jamais été une arme révolutionnaire. «Mon opinion est que nous devons continuer la lutte idéologique et politique contre Staline. Sa ligne conduira, dans un avenir proche, à une catastrophe qui ouvrira les yeux des communistes et aboutira à un changement d'orientation. Le fascisme menace l'Allemagne et notre parti de phraseurs sera incapable de lui résister. Devant la débâcle du Parti communiste allemand et l'extension du fascisme à la Pologne, à la France, l'Internationale devra changer de politique. Ce moment-là sera notre heure. Il faut donc rester disciplinés, appliquer les décisions sectaires après les avoir combattues et s'opposer aux fautes et aux mesures gauchistes, mais continue la lutte sur le terrain strictement politique.» **Boukharine a sans doute compris que je ne me liais pas aveuglément à sa fraction, dont le seul programme était de faire disparaître Staline.** / 380 / Ce fut notre dernière entrevue. Manifestement il n'avait pas confiance dans la tactique que je proposais. Il savait aussi bien sûr, mieux que moi, de quels crimes Staline était capable. Bref, ceux qui, après la mort de Lénine, sur la base de son testament, auraient pu liquider politiquement Staline, cherchaient à l'éliminer physiquement, alors qu'il tenait fermement en main le parti et l'appareil policier de l'Etat.¹ (Humbert-Droz 379-380)

Translated:

Before leaving I went to see Bukharin for one last time not knowing whether I would see him again upon my return. We had a long and frank conversation. He

brought me up to date with the contacts made by his group with the Zinoviev-Kamenev fraction in order to coordinate the struggle against the power of Stalin. I did not hide from him that I did not approve of this liaison of the oppositions. "The struggle against Stalin is not a political programme. We had combatted with reason the programme of the Trotskyites on the essential questions, the danger of the kulaks in Russia, the struggle against the united front with the social-democrats, the Chinese problems, the very shortsighted revolutionary perspective, etc. On the morrow of a common victory against Stalin, the political problems will divide us. This bloc is a bloc without principles which will crumble away before achieving any results."

Bukharin also told me that they had decided to utilise individual terror in order to rid themselves of Stalin. On this point as well I expressed my reservation: the introduction of individual terror into the political struggles born from the Russian Revolution would strongly risk turning against those who employed it. It had never been a revolutionary weapon. "My opinion is that we ought to continue the ideological and political struggle against Stalin. His line will lead in the near future to a catastrophe which will open the eyes of the communists and result in a changing of orientation. Fascism menaces Germany and our party of phrasemongers will be incapable of resisting it. Before the debacle of the Communist Party of Germany and the extension of fascism to Poland and to France, the International must change politics. That moment will then be our hour. It is necessary then to remain disciplined, to apply the sectarian decisions after having fought and opposed the leftist errors and measures, but to continue to struggle on the strictly political terrain."

Bukharin doubtlessly had understood that I would not bind myself blindly to his fraction whose sole programme was to make Stalin disappear. / 380 / This was our last meeting. It was clear that he did not have confidence in the tactic that I proposed. He also certainly knew better than I what crimes Stalin was capable of. In short, those who, after Lenin's death and on the basis of his testament, could have destroyed Stalin politically, sought instead to eliminate him physically, when he held firmly in his hand the Party and the police apparatus of the state.

Relevance to the Moscow Trials Testimony

Humbert-Droz's memoir confirms Bukharin's confessions, both before and at the March 1938 Moscow Trial, that he and his followers had plotted to kill Stalin. Since Bukharin was already advocating Stalin's assassination in 1928 it stands to reason that he might have done so in later years as well. Valentin Astrov testified to something very similar, as we shall see.

The Testimony of Two American Engineers in the Soviet Union

Contemporary testimony of two American engineers who had been hired to work in the Soviet Union during the early to mid-1930s, gives independent evidence of some of the striking testimony by Iurii Piatakov in the Second Moscow Trial of 1937. John D. Littlepage and Carroll G. Holmes witnessed examples of different forms of industrial sabotage that closely parallels the testimony given by Piatakov and others at this trial.

John D. Littlepage

John D. Littlepage was an American mining engineer who hired on to work in the Soviet gold industry during the 1930s. He left valuable confirmation of Iurii Piatakov's testimony in the Second Moscow Trial of January, 1937. Littlepage himself attested to sabotage in the goldfields.

A short summary of Littlepage's conclusions as expressed in his articles in the *Saturday Evening Post* is given by Sayers and Kahn:

In a series of articles concerning his experiences in Soviet Russia, published in the *Saturday Evening Post* in January 1938, Littlepage wrote:

I went to Berlin in the spring of 1931 with a large purchasing commission headed by Pyatakov; my job was to offer technical advice on purchases of mining machinery...

Among other things, the commission in Berlin was buying several dozen mine hoists, ranging from 100 to 1,000 horse-power... The commission asked for quotations on the basis of pfennigs per kilogram. After some discussion, the German concerns [Borsig and Demag]... reduced their prices between 5 and 6 pfennigs per kilogram. When I studied these proposals, I discovered that the firms had substituted cast-iron bases weighing several tons for the light steel provided in the specifications, which would reduce the cost of production per kilogram, but increase the weight, and therefore the cost to purchaser.

Naturally, I was pleased to make this discovery, and reported to members of the commission with a sense of triumph... The matter was so arranged that Pyatakov could have gone back to Moscow and showed that he had been very successful in reducing prices, but at the same time would have paid out money for a lot of worthless cast iron and enabled the Germans to give him very substantial rebates. . . . He got away with the same trick on some other mines, although I blocked this one.

Later, Littlepage observed several instances of industrial sabotage in the Urals, where, because of the work of a Trotskyite engineer named Kabakov, production in certain mines was deliberately kept down. In 1937, states Littlepage, Kabakov was "arrested on charges of industrial sabotage. . . . When I heard of his arrest, I was not surprised." Again, in 1937, Littlepage found further evidence of sabotage in Soviet industry directed personally by Pyatakov. The American engineer had reorganized certain valuable mines in southern Kazakhstan and left detailed written instructions for the Soviet workers to follow so as to ensure maximum production. "Well," writes Littlepage, "one of my last jobs in Russia, in 1937, was a hurry call to return to these same mines... Thousands of tons of rich ore already had been lost beyond recovery, and in a few more weeks, if nothing had been done meanwhile, the whole deposit might have been lost. I discovered that...a commission came in from Pyatakov's headquarters... My instructions had been thrown in the stove, and a system of mining introduced throughout those mines which was certain to cause the loss of a large part of the ore body in a few months." Littlepage found "flagrant examples of deliberate sabotage." Just before he left Russia, and after he had submitted a full written report on his findings to the Soviet authorities, many members of the Trotskyite sabotage ring were rounded up. Littlepage found that the saboteurs had used his instructions "as the basis for deliberately wrecking the plant" by doing exactly the opposite of what he had instructed. The saboteurs admitted, Littlepage stated in the *Saturday Evening Post* that "they had been drawn into a conspiracy against the Stalin regime by opposition Communists, who convinced them that they were strong enough to overthrow Stalin and his associ-

ates and seize power for themselves." (Sayers and Kahn 223-224; quotation verified against the original *SEP* article.)

At the January 1937 Trial Piatakov had testified that he had met Trotsky's son Leon Sedov in Berlin in 1931. From Sedov he had received instructions to give orders for equipment from two specific German firms, Borsig and Demag. These firms would then give kickbacks to Trotsky, who would use them in furtherance of his conspiracy within the Soviet Union.

PYATAKOV: Without any beating about the bush, Sedov said: "You realise, Yuri Leonidovich, that inasmuch as the fight has been resumed. money is needed. You can provide the necessary funds for waging the fight." He was hinting that my business position enabled me to set aside certain government funds, or, to put it bluntly, to steal.

Sedov said that only one thing was required of me, namely, that I should place as many orders as possible with two German firms, Borsig and Demag, and that he, Sedov, would arrange to receive the necessary sums from them, bearing in mind that I would not be particularly exacting as to prices. If this were deciphered it was clear that the additions to prices that would be made on the Soviet orders would pass wholly or in part into Trotsky's hands for his counter-revolutionary purposes. There the second conversation ended.

VYSHINSKY: Who named these firms?

PYATAKOV: Sedov.

VYSHINSKY: Did you not enquire why he named these firms particularly?

PYATAKOV: No. He said that he had connections with these firms.

VYSHINSKY: You had connections with other firms as well?

PYATAKOV: Yes, I had very many connections. But Sedov mentioned these firms, apparently because it was with them that he had connections.

VYSHINSKY: Consequently, it was clear to you that these particular firms were mentioned by Sedov for specific reasons?

PYATAKOV: Of course, that is what he said.

VYSHINSKY: And what was the nature of these connections?

PYATAKOV: I have just said that I do not know. He, Sedov, said that since I, Pyatakov, could not steal money, what was required of me was to place as many orders as possible with the firms I have mentioned.

VYSHINSKY: And those firms were named by Sedov himself?

PYATAKOV: Yes, and he added that he would secure the necessary sum from them.

VYSHINSKY: You did not ask how, through whom ?

PYATAKOV: I considered it inconvenient to ask that.

VYSHINSKY: Were you personally connected with representatives of these firms in a conspiratorial way?

PYATAKOV: No. True, I had connections with the chief of the Demag firm, but I never permitted myself to speak of these subjects in order not to compromise myself and give myself away.

VYSHINSKY: And you did what Sedov advised?

PYATAKOV: Quite correct.

VYSHINSKY: Tell us, what form did this take?

PYATAKOV: It was done very simply, particularly since I had very many opportunities. and a fairly large number of orders went to these firms.

VYSHINSKY: Perhaps orders were given to these firms because that was more advantageous to us?

PYATAKOV: No, not for that reason. As to Demag, it could be done very easily. Here it was a question of prices; it was paid more than, generally speaking, it should have been paid.

VYSHINSKY: That means that you, Pyatakov, by virtue of an arrangement with Sedov, paid the Demag firm certain excessive sums at the expense of the Soviet government?

PYATAKOV: Unquestionably.

VYSHINSKY: And the other firm?

PYATAKOV: As regards the Borsig firm, a certain amount of effort was required.

VYSHINSKY: It was more advantageous to place the orders with other firms?

PYATAKOV: Demag in itself is a high-class firm and no effort was required in recommending that orders be placed with it.

VYSHINSKY: All that was required was to make a big addition in prices?

PYATAKOV: Yes. But as regards Borsig it was necessary to persuade and exercise pressure in order to have orders passed to this firm.

VYSHINSKY: Consequently, you also paid Borsig excessively at the expense of the Soviet government?

PYATAKOV: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: Consequently, from the standpoint of the interests of our industry and our state, it was not advantageous to place orders with Borsig, and it was advantageous to place orders with other firms, but nevertheless you, guided by criminal motives, deliberately placed orders with the Borsig firm.

PYATAKOV: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: By virtue of your agreement with Sedov?

PYATAKOV: With Sedov.

VYSHINSKY: And did not Sedov tell you that Trotsky had an arrangement with these firms?

PYATAKOV: Of course, that is what he began with. Only he did not say what exactly the conditions were, what the technique was, how it would be done.

VYSHINSKY: And what did he say?

PYATAKOV: He said that if I placed orders with these firms he would receive money from these firms.

VYSHINSKY: By agreement?

PYATAKOV: Yes. (1937 Trial 26-28)

In a few pages of his memoir Littlepage discusses this charge and declares that it was quite credible, as he had had experiences that partly confirmed Piatakov's testimony.

I was particularly interested in that part of Piatakoff's confession which concerned his actions in Berlin in 1931, when he headed the purchasing commission to which I was assigned as technical adviser. It then became clear to me why the Russians around Piatakoff had not been pleased when I discovered that German concerns had substituted cast-iron for light steel in specifications for mine-hoists.

Piatakoff testified that anti-Stalin conspirators, headed by Leon Trotsky, the exiled former Commissar of War, needed foreign currency to build up a fund for their work abroad. Inside Russia, with so many conspirators occupying important positions, he said it was easy to get funds, but Soviet paper money was no good abroad. Trotsky's son, Sedoff, according to Piatakoff, therefore worked out a scheme to get foreign currency without rousing suspicion.

At his trial Piatakoff testified that he met Sedoff in Berlin in 1931, by previous arrangement, in a restaurant near the Zoo. He added, "Sedoff said that only one thing was required of me—namely, that I should place as many orders as possible with two German firms—and that he, Sedoff, would arrange to receive the necessary sums from them, bearing in mind that I would not be particularly exacting as to prices."

Questioned by the prosecutor, Piatakoff added that he was not required to steal or divert Soviet money, but only to place as many orders as possible with the firms mentioned. He said that he made no personal contacts of any kind with these firms, but that the matter was arranged by others without any further action on his part than throwing business to them.

Piatakoff testified: "It was done very simply, particularly since I had very many opportunities and a fairly

large number of orders went to those firms." He added that it was easy to act without rousing suspicion in the case of one firm because that firm itself had a fine reputation, and it was simply a question of paying slightly higher prices than were necessary.

The following testimony then was given at the trial:

PIATAKOFF: But as regards the other firm, it was necessary to persuade and exercise pressure in order to have purchases placed with this firm.

PROSECUTOR: Consequently you also paid this firm excessively at the expense of the Soviet Government?

PIATAKOFF: Yes.

Piatakoff then went on to say that Sedoff did not tell him exactly what the conditions were, what the technique was for this transfer of money, but assured him that if Piatakoff placed orders with these firms Sedoff would receive money for the special fund.

This passage in Piatakoff's confession is a plausible explanation, in my opinion, of what was going on in Berlin in 1931, when my suspicions were roused because the Russians working with Piatakoff tried to induce me to approve the purchase of mine-hoists which were not only too expensive, but would have been useless in the mines for which they were intended. I had found it hard to believe that these men were ordinary grafters, as they did not seem to be the kind interested in feathering their own nests. But they had been seasoned political conspirators before the Revolution,

and had taken risks of the same degree for the sake of their so-called cause.

Of course, I have no way of knowing whether the political conspiracy mentioned in all confessions at this trial was organized as the prisoners said it was. I never attempted to follow the ins and outs of political disputes in Russia, and wouldn't have known what anti-Government conspirators were talking about if they had tried to drag me into their affairs, which none of them ever did.

But I am absolutely sure that something queer was taking place in Berlin in 1931 during the period mentioned by Piatakoff at his trial. I have already said that my experiences at that time puzzled me for years, and that I couldn't work out any sensible explanation until I read Piatakoff's testimony in the Moscow newspapers at the time of his trial.

Another part of this testimony that some Moscow journalists found it hard to believe was that German firms should give commissions to Sedoff. But I have already mentioned in an earlier chapter that Russian émigrés were in the habit of collecting commissions from German firms for using their alleged influence to throw Soviet business in their direction. The managers of these German firms might consider that Sedoff was simply another Russian émigré, and would make the same kind of a deal with him that I know they had been making for years with other émigrés.

In such cases it was the usual procedure for German firms merely to work the promised commissions into their prices, and if the Russians accepted the prices nothing more was necessary. But in the case of these mine-hoists the commission

must have been put so high that the firm had to juggle the specifications in order to clear its profit. When they did this my attention was attracted and the deal was blocked. Piatakoff testified that he had to exert pressure to have some orders passed, and I have told how pressure was put on me.

The testimony at this trial roused a great deal of scepticism abroad, and among foreign diplomats at Moscow. I talked with some Americans there who believed it was a frame-up from beginning to end. Well, I didn't attend the trial, but I did follow the evidence very closely, and it was printed verbatim in several languages. A great deal of the testimony about industrial sabotage sounded more probable to me than it did to some of the Moscow diplomats and correspondents. I know from my own experiences that a good deal of industrial sabotage was going on all the time in Soviet mines, and that some of it could hardly have occurred without the complicity of highly placed Communist managers.

My story is valuable, so far as this trial is concerned, only as regards the incident in Berlin. I have described what that was, and how, so far as I was concerned, Piatakoff's confession cleared up what had happened.¹

In 1938 Littlepage published three articles in the *Saturday Evening Post* about his experiences in the USSR. In the first of them, "Red Wreckers in Russia," he outlined additional evidence of sabotage involving Piatakov.²

¹ John D. Littlepage and Demaree Bess, *In Search of Soviet Gold*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938. I have used the edition by George Harrap & Co. Ltd, London, 1939, 101-104.

² Littlepage, "Red Wreckers in Russia." *SEP* January 1, 1938, 10-11, 54-55.

Source Criticism

In 1979-1980 I undertook to check Littlepage's background in order to assess the reliability of his accounts in three articles in the *Saturday Evening Post* and in his memoir, *In Search of Soviet Gold*. I contacted a number of people who had known Littlepage, who had died in 1946. All attested to the fact that he was a technical expert who was not interested in politics and was conventionally anti-communist. He had taken the job in the Soviet Union because work was scarce during the Great Depression in the United States.

I interviewed Professor John Hazard of Columbia University, at the time the greatest expert on Soviet law outside the USSR. As a graduate student Hazard had lived with the Littlepage family in the Soviet Union and knew Littlepage personally. He confirmed the characterization of Littlepage as a technical man with little interest in any kind of politics and no interest in or sympathy with communism.

Carroll G. Holmes

Holmes was another American engineer who went to work in Soviet industry in 1931. In an article in *Soviet Russia Today* Holmes wrote about his experiences with sabotage in the USSR. He documents the purchase of unnecessary German equipment at a machine-building foundry in Moscow.

I soon discovered that the whole equipment for this plant was being purchased under the same conditions, which could only be described as sabotage. In some cases machinery was ordered far in excess of any possible requirements - in other cases types of machinery they could have no use for at all. The chief engineer, who was an appointee of Piatakov's, then assistant commissar of Heavy Industry, backed the German consultant every time and my plans were rejected.

According to Holmes when he returned to the plant in 1934:

[t]hey were using the German equipment and methods I had opposed. The place was full of cranes and other equipment purchased at the Demag firm in Germany far in excess of requirements.

In 1932 Holmes worked in Nizhnii Tagil in a huge locomotive and rail car building plant. He wrote:

Dozens of conveyors and large amounts of other material for which there was absolutely no need in this plant were being purchased in Germany.

Holmes continues to report that I.N. Smirnov, who was the assistant director of Glavtransmash, the central directorate for the production of transportation machinery, tried to offer him a contract which would have taken him back to Moscow and out of direct contact with the factory. Smirnov told him that "it will be necessary to hold back production of the Nizhnii Tagil plant" and wanted Holmes' collaboration to do this. Holmes knew there was something wrong since the shortage of railroad stock was constantly being made known in the USSR.

I.N. Smirnov was indeed a high official in the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, chief of the directorate of new construction (*nachal'nik upravliennia novopostroek*). He was also the head of the clandestine Trotskyist network within the USSR.

Back in Nizhnii Tagil in January 1935 Holmes witnessed the results of yet more sabotage, which he worked to correct. He then records this incident:

While I was working at Nizhnii Tagil Piatakov arrived one day to look over the plant. He was shown around by Mariasin, chief of construction. They stood next to me, where I was working on the castings that day, and I heard Piatakov say to Mariasin, "Get rid of that American!"

Holmes' article, of which we have only given a brief notion here, is worth study. I have not been able to independently check up on

Holmes himself. During the late 1930s rumors circulated among anticommunists that Holmes had somehow been coerced to write this article by the Soviets, but no evidence to support such accounts was cited. Like Piatakov's testimony at the Second Moscow Trial, Holmes's account is consistent with that of Littlepage, a source that can be checked. Thus there seems no reason to doubt it.³

³ Carroll G. Holmes, "I Knew Those Wreckers!" *Soviet Russia Today* April, 1938. Available at http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrgr/research/holmes_wreckers_srt38.pdf

Chapter 9. Soviet Evidence – Appeals, Budyonny's Letter, Zinoviev

Appeals of Moscow Trials Defendants

In September 1992 the texts of ten appeals for clemency of defendants in the three Moscow Trials were published in *Izvestia*, by this time a regular capitalist newspaper. The appeals are those of Kamenev, Zinoviev, I.N. Smirnov, and Natan Lur'e, from the First Moscow Trial of August 1936; of Piatakov and Muralov, from the Second Moscow Trial of January 1937; and of Bukharin, Rykov, Krestinsky, and Iagoda from the Third Moscow Trial of March 1938. Bukharin and Rykov each composed two appeals.¹

In 2013 the uncorrected Russian text of the transcript of the Third Moscow Trial was published. Some other materials are included in this important book, including texts of the appeals from all the defendants who had been sentenced to death, plus one from Dr. D.D. Pletnev, who had been sentenced to 25 years in prison. The confessions of Bukharin (2 appeals), Rykov (2 appeals), Krestinsky, and Iagoda were republished along with those of V.I. Ivanov (2 appeals), M.A. Chernov, G.F. Grin'ko, I.A. Zelensky, A. Ikramov, F. Khodzhaev, V.F. Sharangovich, P.T. Zubarev, P.P. Bulanov, L.G. Levin, I.N. Kazakov, V.A. Maksimov-Dikovsky (2 appeals), P.P. Kriuchkov, plus that by Pletnev. No appeal of Kh. Rakovsky, who had been sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, was published. Presumably he did not submit one.²

¹ "Rasskaz o desiati rasstrel'iannykh" ("Story of ten who were shot"), *Izvestia* September 2 1992, p. 3.

² *Protsess Bukharina 1938. Dokumenty*. M: Mezhdunarodniy Fond "Demokratiia" i Fond Stivena Koena i Katriny Vanden Kheuvel, 2013, 737-750.

All the convicted men affirmed their guilt, often in the strongest terms.

Bukharin, short appeal:

I am deeply guilty before my socialist homeland, and **my crimes are beyond measure**. I acknowledge all their profundity, and all their shame.

Bukharin, long appeal:

I consider the sentence of the court to be just punishment for the very serious crimes that I have committed against my socialist homeland, her people, the party, and the government. In my soul there is not a single word of protest. **For my crimes I should be shot ten times over.**

I do not say, and would not dare to say, that I could atone for my guilt. The crimes I have committed are so monstrous, so enormous, that I could not atone for that guilt no matter what I did in the rest of my life.

Not out of fear of **death, on the threshold of which I stand as before a just retribution**, do I ask the presidium of the Supreme Soviet for mercy and clemency.

I retain knowledge and abilities, my whole cerebral machine, whose activity was previously directed in a criminal direction.

The **counterrevolution** has been crushed and rendered impotent.

I am glad that the proletarian power has smashed all **the criminal business** that saw in me its leader and **the leader of which I was in reality.**

I have translated Bukharin's appeals and put them online in English. They are online in Russian as well.³

Zinoviev's appeal is notable for this phrase:

I beg you to believe me that **I am not an enemy any longer...**

I.N. Smirnov, leader of the Trotskyist underground in the USSR, renounced Trotsky:

At the end of my life **I made an enormous mistake: I followed Trotsky**, and for a number of years I struggled against the party as a Trotskyist.

This struggle, oppositional at first, became **counter-revolutionary...I admit my guilt before the party and the workers' state in full measure**. For a long time the party tried to help me correct my errors, but I stubbornly adhered in them. I deceived the party and behaved hypocritically ("two-facedly").

Natan Lur'e, convicted of plotting to murder some of the Soviet leaders, repeated his confession:

Following the assignment of Trotsky, the leader of the terrorist center, I wanted to deprive the Soviet people and the whole world proletariat of its leader Stalin and other leaders of the great Communist party. I repeatedly prepared terrorist acts against Voroshilov, Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Kaganovich, and Zhdanov, **having armed myself for the fulfillment of this plan.**

³ In English: <https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrgr/research/bukharinappeals.html>; in Russian: <http://istmat.info/node/45780> (short appeal); <http://istmat.info/node/45781> (long appeal).

Following the assignment of Franz Weitz, a representative of the Gestapo, I really was preparing the murder of Voroshilov.

Piatakov:

I disclosed everything that I know about **the counter-revolutionary activities of the Trotskyists**, including about my own activities.

Interpreting this evidence

These reiterated confessions of guilt are further evidence of guilt and of the genuineness of the confessions made by these defendants during the Moscow Trials.

One could say: "Perhaps they were made insincerely. Perhaps these men reiterated their confessions of guilt in a final hope that doing so might secure a prison sentence instead of the death penalty. Doesn't this possibility annul any evidentiary value these appeals might have?" It is important to respond to such questions, especially since they are so commonly voiced in respect to the Moscow Trials.

Any statement, made by anyone, at any time, *might* be a lie. It is invalid to *assume* that a statement is a lie unless there is some *evidence* that it is. Doing so would lead to an absurd conclusion: it would mean that, *a priori*, no evidence for *any* historical event would ever be valid because, after all, "it might be a lie" (a fabrication, forgery, etc.), even though there were no evidence that it is. If no evidence of fabrication or fakery can be found, to take the position, "Because it *might* be a lie, therefore it is of no interest," is invalid. To do so would be to commit the logical fallacy of *petitio principii*, "begging the question" - assuming that which should be proven.

Yet undeniably there are many people who are incapable of objectively judging the evidence from the Moscow Trials, or indeed any evidence that tends to show that Stalin and the Soviet leadership

of his day were *not* guilty of some alleged crime or other. The fact that this whole line of thinking is invalid does not mean that it is not also very common.

Materialists in any field of inquiry – the sciences are the clearest example – decide truth based upon evidence. History too is an evidence-based field of inquiry. It is an affront to materialism and the spirit of the Enlightenment itself to claim to decide upon the truth or falsehood of any hypothesis other than by the evidence. Yet when it comes to considering the historical events concerning Stalin and the Soviet Union of his time such as the Moscow Trials, many people give their biases free rein and make no serious attempt to be objective, to decide on the basis of evidence rather than according to one's preconceptions.

Let us try to state the problem before us in a more objective way. If one were to formulate the hypothesis: "Bukharin's appeal is insincere, does not represent a genuine confession of guilt," it now becomes clear that one must have evidence to support that hypothesis. A hypothesis that can't be supported by evidence does not require refutation. Such a hypothesis "falls of its own weight."

These appeals support the contrary hypothesis: "The defendants at the Moscow Trials were guilty of the crimes to which they confessed." Moreover, the evidence of the appeals is consistent with *all* the other evidence that exists concerning the Moscow Trials. There is no question of a "preponderance of evidence." There is no evidence whatever to support the hypothesis that the defendants were innocent of the crimes to which they confessed. The hypothesis that the defendants were guilty is the only hypothesis that is supported by evidence.

Budyonny's Letter to Voroshilov

On May 22, 1937, Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky, one of the five Marshals of the Red Army, was arrested in Kuibyshev. Within two days he had begun to give detailed confessions about his conspiracy with many other military commanders, with civilian Party

leaders, with the German General Staff, and – significantly – with Leon Trotsky, to overthrow the Stalin-led Soviet government.

Tukhachevsky and seven other top military commanders were tried behind closed doors by a military tribunal on June 11, 1937. They were found guilty and shot the next day. During the Khrushchev era Tukhachevsky and the other military commanders were officially “rehabilitated” – said to have been the victims of a frameup by Stalin and his supporters and declared innocent. From traitors they became regarded as heroes, a status they retain in Russia today.

Today we have a great deal of evidence that they were guilty. To discuss all this evidence, as well as the arguments and evidence that these men were innocent, would take a volume. In the present study we briefly discuss other important pieces of this evidence: the Mastny-Benes letter of February 9, 1937, and Genrikh Liushkov's statements to his Japanese handlers in previous chapters; and, in future chapters, the Arao document, and Nikolai Ustrialov's confession.

Another important piece of evidence is the report to Marshal Voroshilov, People's Commissar for Defense and a close Stalin associate, by Marshal Semion M. Budyonny, a member of the military court. This document is still top-secret in Russia. It has been cited occasionally since the end of the USSR in excerpts only. In the ongoing effort by Russian officials to deny the guilt of these men – and here they follow the Soviet leadership since Khrushchev – those excerpts have been carefully chosen to distort the meaning of Budyonny's document through significant omission. The thrust and therefore presumed purpose of these omissions is to preserve the impression that Tukhachevsky and the others were innocent.

Some years ago I found a copy of the entire text of Budyonny's report to Voroshilov in the Volkogonov Papers in the Library of Congress. In 2012 Vladimir L. Bobrov and I published a lengthy article in which we study the document and review its dishonest use by

previous writers. At present this article is only available in Russian.⁴

According to Russian law the transcript of the trial itself ought to have been officially “declassified” because the 75-year period of classification has expired. Nevertheless, as of this writing (August 2015) the transcript is still inaccessible. No one is permitted to read it. But in 1990 one person did receive special permission from the KGB to read the entire transcript: Col. Viktor Alksnis, at the time a member of the Duma of the USSR.

Col. Alksnis went into the experience convinced that the commanders were innocent victims of a frameup. This had been a fundamental credo in his family for more than 50 years. General Jan Alksnis, Col. Alksnis' grandfather, had been a member of the military tribunal that tried Tukhachevsky and the others and that passed on them the death sentence. The following year General Alksnis was arrested, convicted, and executed as a member of a Latvian nationalist organization.

After studying the transcript, Alksnis changed his mind. On the basis of what he read, he now insists that the accused must have been guilty. He published articles in 2000 and again in 2009 about this experience.⁵ In a 2002 interview with Vladimir Bobrov Alksnis reiterated his certainty that the generals were guilty. Alksnis said that the transcript is “a cannon aimed at the present” – that there are serious political consequences today in finding the generals guilty:

Похоже, что там, в [19]30-х годах, стоит некая пушка, которая может выстрелить по нам, по нашему времени. И все может тогда повернуться совершенно иным

⁴ Vladimir Bobrov and Grover Furr, “Marshal S.M. Budiennyi on the Tukhachevsky Trial. Impressions of an Eye-Witness” (in Russian). *Klio* (St. Petersburg) No. 2 (2012), 8-24.

⁵ “Poslednii polkovnik imperii,” *Elementy* No. 3 (2000). Now online at <http://arctogaia.org.ru/article/423>; “Ia ne soglasen!” *Russkii Obozrevatel'* October 31, 2009. At <http://www.rus-obr.ru/opinions/4577>

образом. А пока... Пока создано определенное представление о тех событиях и делается все, чтобы именно такое представление поддерживать...

Translated:

It seems that there, in the '30s, there is some kind of cannon that could fire upon us, upon our own time. And then everything would turn out to have been completely different. And meanwhile...meanwhile a certain version of these events has been prepared and everything is being done to maintain this version.

The Tukhachevsky Affair and the Moscow Trials

In the chapter on the Mastny-Benes letter we noted the importance of the Tukhachevsky Affair to the Moscow Trials. The military conspiracy figured prominently in the Third Moscow Trial, where a number of the defendants testified that the military figures were working in conjunction with their own conspiracies.

In the chapter on Liushkov's statements to his Japanese handlers we discussed Liushkov's matter-of-fact revelations that military conspiracies did exist in the Soviet Far East and that Marshal Bliukher had been in contact with Aleksei Rykov, one of the major defendants in the Third Moscow Trial.

In his letter to Voroshilov Budyonny briefly outlines the role of these civilian conspiracies, and especially the role of Trotsky, with the military conspiracy.

Concerning the bloc:

Другими словами шли разговоры о неудовлетворительном руководстве армией, неправильном отношении со стороны руководства партии и правительства к «известным» «большим» людям зиновьевско-троцкистской и правой оппозиции. Также были подвергнуты резкой критике мероприятия

партии и правительства при коллективизации 1930-31 г.г.

В 1934 году от этих «беспринципных разговоров» перешли к объединению единомышленников и в своем кабинете ТУХАЧЕВСКИЙ заявил, что от слов пора переходить к делу и тогда же было решено, что деловыми вопросами должны стоять вербовка единомышленников в РККА. Для этого наиболее подходящими в армии были троцкисты, зиновьевцы и правые. Было решено этих людей всячески популяризировать в общественно-армейском мнении и продвигать по службе на ответственные посты по строевой, политической и хозяйственной линии, а также по вооружению и организационно-мобилизационной работе.

Как на политическую фигуру заговорщики ориентировались на Троцкого и его блок, в который входили троцкисты, зиновьевцы, правые, националисты, меньшевики, эсеры и т.д.

Translated:

In other words there were discussions about unsatisfactory leadership of the army, an incorrect treatment by part of the party leadership and government towards "well-known," "great" men of the Zinoviev-Trotsky and Right Opposition. The measures taken by the party and government in the collectivization of 1930-31 were also subjected to sharp criticism.

In 1934 from these "unprincipled talks" they went over to the unification of like-minded persons and in his office Tukhachevsky stated that it was time to move from words to deeds and then and there it was decided that the recruitment of like-minded persons in the Red Army should become the business of their work. For this the most suitable persons in the army were the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, and Rights. It was decided to popularize these people in every way in so-

cial and military opinion and promote them to responsible positions in military, political, and economic spheres, and also in armament work and organizing mobilization.

As a political figure the conspirators were oriented towards Trotsky and his bloc, in which were included Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Rights, nationalists, Mensheviks, S-Rs, etc.

Concerning the opposition and its ties to Germany:

Видимо, предполагает КОРК, руководители заговора, в лице ТУХАЧЕВСКОГО, от него многое скрыли, как, например, работу ГАМАРНИКА по Востоку и связь с Троцким, Бухариным и Рыковым. Однако КОРК показал, что ему все же было известно, что руководители военно-фашистской контрреволюционной организации смотрят на связь с Троцким и правыми, как на временное явление. Об этом ТУХАЧЕВСКИЙ говорил КОРКУ в том смысле, что троцкисты, правые и т.д. только попутчики до поры до времени, а когда будет совершен вооруженный переворот, то он, ТУХАЧЕВСКИЙ, будет в роли Бонапарта. И 29 ноября 1934 года, как показывает КОРК, ТУХАЧЕВСКИЙ, у него на квартире, об этом заявил совершенно определенно, при всех присутствовавших там.

Translated:

Obviously, Kork suggested, the leaders of the conspiracy, specifically Tukhachevsky, had hidden many matters from him, like, for example, Gamarnik's work in the East and the contact with Trotsky, Bukharin, and Rykov. However Kork confessed that he was aware all the same that the leaders of the military-fascist counterrevolutionary organization regarded the contact with Trotsky and the Rights as a temporary phenomenon. Concerning this Tukhachevsky had told Kork, in the sense that the Trotskyites, Rights et al. were only

fellow travelers for the time being, but when the military coup had taken place then he, Tukhachevsky, would play the role of Bonaparte. And on November 29, 1934, as Kork confessed, Tukhachevsky had in his apartment stated this completely and categorically, in the presence of all those who were there.

Budyonny continued:

ПРИМАКОВ: А отсюда я делаю вывод, что мы, заговорщики, вообразили, что можем руководить великой страной, советским народом и что для этого нужно пол-дюжины, или дюжина Наполеонов. Мы были Наполеонами без армии. Мы работали на фашистскую Германию. Но совершенно ясно, что из этой пол-дюжины Наполеонов остался бы один Наполеон и именно тот, который беспрекословно выполнял бы волю Гитлера и фашистской Германии.

Translated:

PRIMAKOV: And from this I draw the conclusion that we, the conspirators, imagined that we would be able to lead this huge country and the Soviet people and that to do this we would need a half-dozen or dozen Napoleons. We were Napoleons without an army. We were working for fascist Germany. But it is completely clear that of this half-dozen Napoleons there would remain only one Napoleon and that would be the one who most slavishly carried out the will of Hitler and of fascist Germany.

According to Budyonny Primakov and Putna said that they had had special ties to Trotsky.

Primakov:

ПРИМАКОВ очень упорно отрицал то обстоятельство, что он руководил террористической группой против

тов. ВОРОШИЛОВА в лице ШМИДТА, КУЗЬМИЧЕВА и других, а также и то, что он, якобы, до ареста руководил ленинградской террористической группой в лице БАКШИ – бывшего начальника штаба мехкорпуса и ЗЮКА. Отрицал он это на том основании, что, якобы, ему, ПРИМАКОВУ, ТРОЦКИМ была поставлена более серьезная задача – поднять в Ленинграде вооруженное восстание, для чего он ПРИМАКОВ, должен был строго законспирироваться от всех террористических групп, порвать свои связи со всеми троцкистами и правыми и тем самым завоевать авторитет и абсолютное доверие со стороны партии и армейского командования.

Translated:

Primakov very insistently denied the allegation that he had led a terrorist group against com. Voroshilov made up of Shmidt, Kuz'michev, and others, and likewise that he had supposedly before his arrest led a Leningrad terrorist group made up of Bakshi, the former chief of the staff of the mechanized corps, and Ziuuk. He denied that on the basis that supposedly he, **Primakov, had been entrusted by Trotsky with a more serious task – to raise an armed insurrection in Leningrad, for which he, Primakov, must keep himself strictly apart from any terrorist groups, break his ties with all Trotskyites and Rights, and at the same time win for himself authority and absolute trust from the party and the army command.**

Primakov:

В связи с этим специальным заданием ТРОЦКОГО, ПРИМАКОВ обрабатывал 25 кавдивизию во главе с командиром дивизии ЗЫБИНЫМ. По его словам, ЗЫБИН должен был встретить на границе ТРОЦКОГО при овладении повстанцами Ленинградом.

Translated:

In connection with this special assignment of Trotsky's, Primakov had worked on the 25th cavalry division headed by the commander of the division Zybin. According to his words Zybin had been supposed to meet Trotsky at the border once the rebels had taken over Leningrad.

Primakov:

А я, ПРИМАКОВ, являюсь охвостом так называемой мелкой буржуазии с троцкистскими настроениями, прошедший школу троцкизма от начала до конца в течение 18 лет. В этой школе сосредоточились отбросы человеческого общества. Самым злым и заядлым врагом являлась и является троцкистская оппозиция и люди в ней участвующие.

Translated:

And I, Primakov, am the tail end of a so-called petty bourgeoisie with Trotskyite leanings, having passed through the school of Trotskyism from beginning to end in the course of 18 years. In this school the rejects of human society were concentrated. The Trotskyite opposition and the people who take part in it are the most evil and confirmed enemy.

Primakov:

Я не желаю никому на свете попасть в эту фашистско-троцкистскую яму.

Я должен сказать честно и открыто перед судом, что мы нарушили красноармейскую присягу и нас всех надо расстрелять и уничтожить, как гадов, преступников и изменников советскому народу.

Translated:

I do not wish that anyone in the world should fall into this fascist-Trotskyite pit.

I must say honestly and openly before the court that we have violated our Red Army oath and you should shoot and annihilate all of us like vermin, criminals, and traitors to the Soviet people.

Putna:

Путна в своем заключительном слове сказал: «Конечно, никакой пощады от суда я не прошу, но прошу суд учесть, что я – командир РККА, во время революции дрался за нее. Тем не менее после гражданской войны я стал крепким сторонником ТРОЦКОГО. Я считал: то, что говорит ТРОЦКИЙ – это все правда. Разумеется, я не вникал в большевистскую сущность революции, хотя органически чувствовал, что я с большевиками, но тем не менее оставался троцкистом. Я никогда не задумывался о том, куда меня приведет моя троцкистская позиция.

Translated:

Putna in his final word said: "Of course, I don't ask for any mercy from the court, but I do ask the court to consider that I was a commander of the RKKA, during the revolution I fought for it. Nevertheless, after the civil war I became a firm supporter of Trotsky. I thought: everything that Trotsky says is the truth. Obviously, I did not understand the Bolshevik essence of revolution although organically I felt that I was with the Bolsheviks, but nevertheless I remained a Trotskyite. I never thought about where my Trotskyite position was going to lead me.

Did the Tukhachevsky Conspiracy Exist?

Since Khrushchev, the Soviet leadership, and now the Russian leadership, have insisted that Tukhachevsky and the rest were innocent, victims of a frameup. That is, the situation is the same as

that concerning the Moscow Trials, Trotsky's conspiracy with Germany and Japan, and many other events of Soviet history during the Stalin period.

That mainstream Soviet, Russian, and Western history of the Stalin period is seriously and deliberately falsified there can be no doubt. We have published about this in the past and there is much more to do. In any case, the question in history is not "What is the consensus of experts?" Much less is it: "What is the consensus of anti-Stalin experts?" For all honest researchers the question is: "What is the evidence?"

We have cited only a tiny quantity of the evidence now available that Tukhachevsky and the rest were guilty. Their testimony interlocks with that of the Moscow Trials and the allegations of Trotsky's ties both to the Soviet-based conspiracies and to his collaboration with Germany. There is no evidence that this material has been faked, and every reason to conclude that it is valid.

Zinoviev's Statements of 1935-1936

On January 15-16, 1935, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and some of their Moscow-based supporters were put on trial for maintaining a clandestine "center" of oppositionists who discussed politics and remained in communication with a similar center in Leningrad. The Leningrad center had murdered Sergei M. Kirov on December 1, 1934. A number of its arrested members had named Zinoviev and Kamenev as their leaders, while not yet implicating them in the murder itself.

On January 13, 1935, just *before* the trial took place, Zinoviev wrote a statement more than 3,000 words in length in which he confessed that there was indeed a "center." This statement was first published in the official journal *Izvestia TsK KPSS* No. 7, 1989, and republished in the collection *Reabilitatsiia. Politicheskie Protsessy 30-50-kh godov* in 1991.

In it, Zinoviev stated the following:

Я утверждал на следствии, что с 1929 г. у нас в Москве центра б. «зиновьевцев» не было. И мне часто самому думалось: какой же это «центр» — это просто Зиновьев плюс Каменев плюс Евдокимов плюс еще два-три человека, да и то они уже почти не видятся и никакой систематической антипартийной фракционной работы уже не ведут.

Но на деле — это был центр.

Так на этих нескольких человек смотрели остатки кадров б. «зиновьевцев», не сумевших или не захотевших по-настоящему раствориться в партии (прежде всего остатки «ленинградцев»).

Так на них смотрели все другие антипартийные группы и группки... Все антипартийные элементы выдвигали опять наши кандидатуры.

Translated:

I stated during the investigation that since 1929 we in Moscow have had no center of former "Zinovievites." And I have often thought about this: What kind of a "center" is this — it is simply Zinoviev, plus Kamenev, plus Evdokimov, plus two or three more persons. And they practically never see each other any more and no longer carry out any systematic antiparty fractional work.

But, in fact, this was a center.

The remaining cadres of former "Zinovievites" regarded it as such. They either did not know how to really dissolve their group into the Party or did not want to do so (especially the remaining "Leningradists").

All the other antiparty groups and grouplets also regarded it as such. ...All the antiparty elements once

again set forth our candidacies [in discussions about the Party leadership – GF] (R-PP 160-161)

In an interrogation of December 22, 1934, Zinoviev had denied any continued oppositional activity and any contact with other oppositional centers. Zinoviev knew he was obliged, like other Party members, to inform the Party about oppositional centers but had not done so. As a result, at the January 1935 trial Zinoviev was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

On April 14, 1935, Zinoviev wrote a letter to Stalin, parts of which were published in 1989. In it, Zinoviev wrote as follows:

Одного я должен добиться теперь: чтобы об этом последнем вершке сказали, что я осознал весь ужас случившегося, раскаялся до конца, сказал Советской власти абсолютно все, что знал, порвал со всем и со всеми, кто был против партии, и готов был все, все, все сделать, чтобы доказать свою искренность.

В моей душе горит одно желание: доказать Вам, что я **больше не враг**. Нет того требования, которого я не исполнил бы, чтобы доказать это... Я дохожу до того, что подолгу пристально гляжу на Ваш и других членов Политбюро портреты в газетах с мыслью: родные, загляните же в мою душу, неужели же Вы не видите, что я **не враг Ваш больше**, что я Ваш душой и телом, что я понял все, что я готов сделать все, чтобы заслужить прощение, снисхождение...

Translated:

Now I want to achieve one thing: that about this last period of my life it be said that I recognized the whole horror of what has happened, repented everything, told the Soviet power absolutely everything that I knew, broke with everything and everyone who was against the party, and was prepared to do anything, anything, to prove my sincerity.

My soul burns with one desire: to prove to you that I **am no longer an enemy**. There is nothing that I would not do in order to prove this...I have come to the point where I stare fixedly and for a long time at your portrait and those of other Politburo members in the newspapers with the thought: Dear friends, please look into my soul, do you not see that I **am no longer your enemy**, that I am yours body and soul, that I have understood everything, that I am prepared to do anything to earn forgiveness and mercy...⁶ (R-PP 184)

The highlighted phrase is the same one Zinoviev later used in his appeal of his death sentence, which we have quoted above.

In 1936 the investigation into the Kirov murder had been reopened. By July some members of Zinoviev's group were accusing him of involvement in Kirov's murder. Arch Getty describes some ensuing parts of the investigation as follows:

By 23 July, Kamenev was admitting membership in a counterrevolutionary center that planned terror, but he denied being one of the organizers; he implicated Zinoviev as being closer to the matter. Three days later Zinoviev was confronted by one of his followers, Karev, who directly accused him. Zinoviev asked that the interrogation be stopped because he wanted to make a statement that, in the event, amounted to a full confession of organizing assassination and terror. (Getty Yezhov, 191)

Zinoviev went on to confess to direct participation in the planning of Kirov's murder and that of other Soviet leaders.

⁶ Originally published in *Izvestia TsK KPSS* 8 (1989), 89-90.

Я действительно являлся членом объединенного троцкистско-зиновьевского центра, организованного в 1932 году.

Троцкистско-зиновьевский центр ставил главной своей задачей убийство руководителей ВКП(б), и в первую очередь убийство Сталина и Кирова. Через членов центра И. Н. Смирнова и Мрачковского центр был связан с Троцким, от которого Смирновым были получены прямые указания по подготовке убийства Сталина.

Translated:

I was indeed a member of the united Trotskyist-Zinovievist center organized in 1932.

The Trotskyist-Zinovievist center considered as its chief task the murder of leaders of the VKP(b) and, first and foremost, the murder of Stalin and Kirov. The center was connected with Trotsky through its members I.N. Smirnov and Mrachkovsky. Direct instructions from Trotsky for the preparation of Stalin's murder were received by Smirnov.⁷

Я также признаю, что участникам организации Бакаеву и Кареву от имени объединенного центра мною была поручена организация террористических актов над Сталиным в Москве и Кировым в Ленинграде.

Это поручение мною было дано в Ильинском осенью 1932 года.

Translated:

⁷Getty & Naumov, 251-252; *Izv. TsK KPSS* 8 (1989) 101; R-PP 198.

I also confess that Bakaev and Karev, members of the organization, were entrusted by me, in the name of the united center, with the organization of terrorist acts against Stalin in Moscow and Kirov in Leningrad.

These instructions by me were given in Il'inskoe in the fall of 1932.⁸

Zinoviev gave more details in other pretrial confessions – we have only one of them at present – and at the August 1936 First Moscow Trial.

By this point Zinoviev had proven himself to be completely untrustworthy. In his December 1934 interrogation he had denied any oppositional activity. Exposed by members of his group he had only partially confessed at the January 1935 trial. In letters to Stalin in April and May 1935 he had sworn that he had revealed everything and had completely repented. His July and August 1936 confessions proved that these statements too were lies.

Zinoviev's duplicity had gone even further. During the eighteen months of his imprisonment prior to his confessions of July-August 1936 he had composed a 540-page typescript in which he claimed to confess all of his guilt towards the Party. It was intended to be a demonstration of the thoroughness with which he had supposedly examined his anti-Party actions and repented of them.

We have obtained and studied this lengthy document. In it Zinoviev says nothing about his involvement in the planning of Kirov's murder and plans for future assassinations. He says nothing about the secret bloc with the Trotskyists and the Rights, about which we know from the Sedov-Trotsky correspondence in the Harvard Trotsky Archive. In essence this is a 540-page attempt by Zinoviev to cover up his involvement in the bloc of oppositionists and in

⁸ Zinoviev. Transcript of interrogation of July 23-25, 1936; translation by Getty & Naumov, 232 (they omit the words "in Il'inskoe"); *Izv. TsK KPSS* 8 (1989) 104; R-PP 199.

Kirov's murder by "confessing" at great length to a host of lesser misdeeds.⁹

Ironically, in his post-conviction appeal of his death sentence, dated August 24, 1936, 4:30 a.m., Zinoviev again used the same phrase – "I am no longer an enemy" – that he had used in his April 1935 letter to Stalin. Zinoviev had nothing to lose by saying it. But Stalin would have been a fool to believe him this time.

In addition to evidence of his own guilt Zinoviev's confessions provide evidence of Trotsky's involvement in Kirov's murder and in other planned assassinations – "terror." When Trotsky indignantly denied this he also denied the existence of any bloc with the Zinovievites. Like Zinoviev, Trotsky was lying too.

Conclusion: The Moscow Trials and the Evidence

The appeals by the Moscow Trials defendants, Budyonny's letter to Voroshilov, and Zinoviev's statements and pretrial confessions are consistent with all the other evidence we have reviewed in our study of the Moscow Trials. They all provide evidence that supports the hypothesis that the defendants' confessions of guilt at these trials were truthful.

⁹ "Zasluzhennyi prigovor."

Chapter 10. Non-Soviet – Soviet Evidence – The Arao Document

Non-Soviet / Soviet Evidence

The Arao Document

Nikita Khrushchev had Marshal Tukhachevsky “rehabilitated” in 1957. According to the information now public the sentence passed by the Military Collegium of the Soviet Supreme Court on June 11, 1937 was set aside on January 31, 1957. All the executed military leaders were reinstated in their Party memberships by the Party Control Commission on February 27, 1957. (Viktorov 234)

Normally there was some kind of study or report prepared beforehand – usually an appeal, or “Protest” by the Soviet Prosecutor, and a following report by the Supreme Court. Normally too, the Soviet Prosecutor’s “Protest” was based on some kind of investigation. Viktorov gives a very general idea of what kind of investigation took place in 1956. But we can’t tell much about it.

It’s clear that there had been a decision to exculpate the military leaders beforehand, and that the decision was a political one. We have the decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU posthumously reinstating Tukhachevsky and the others tried with him to their Party membership. The “Molotov Commission” set up in 1956 by Khrushchev evidently in order to officially rehabilitate the Tukhachevsky defendants among others, was sharply divided. Within weeks after it ceased its operation Molotov,

Malenkov, and Kaganovich tried to oust Khrushchev but failed and were ousted themselves instead.¹

For reasons never made clear, in the months before the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 Khrushchev decided to sponsor another investigative report on the Tukhachevsky case. A commission was established under the chairmanship of Nikolai M. Shvernik, an Old Bolshevik of working-class origins who had spent most of his Party career as a trade union bureaucrat and was at the time the Chairman of the Party Control Commission. It is possible that Khrushchev was hoping that Shvernik's researchers would discover some "smoking gun" evidence of, perhaps, a frameup of the military men. If so, he was disappointed. The commission found nothing of the kind. This may account for the fact that the report was not published during either Khrushchev's or Gorbachev's tenure.

Shvernik's Commission issued a report addressed to Khrushchev, to which Shvernik added the following note:

Товарищу Хрущеву Н.С. Посылаю Вам справку о проверке обвинений, предъявленных в 1937 году судебными и партийными органами тт. Тухачевскому М. Н., Якиру И. Э., Уборевичу И. П. и другим военным деятелям в измене Родине, терроре и военном заговоре.

Материалы о причинах и условиях возникновения дела на т. Тухачевского М. Н. и других видных военных деятелей изучены Комиссией, созданной Президиумом ЦК КПСС решениями от 5 января 1961 года и от 6 мая 1961 года. Н. Шверник. 26.VI.1964 г.

Translated:

To Comrade N.S. Khrushchev. I am sending to you a report concerning the verification of the accusations presented in 1937 by judicial and party organs against

¹The documents available related to the "Molotov Commission" are published in Razdel III (Section 3) of RKEB 2, 150-274.

comrades Tukhachevsky M.N., Iakir I.E., Uborevich I.P. and other military figures, of treason to the motherland, terror, and military conspiracy.

The materials about the causes and conditions in which the case against com. Tukhachevsky M.N. and other prominent military figures arose, have been studied by a Commission created by the Presidium of the CC CPSU by decisions of January 5, 1961, and May 6, 1961. N. Shvernik, June 26, 1964.

The Arao Document

It's reasonable to suppose that the purpose of the Shvernik commission was to uncover evidence that would justify the rehabilitation of the Party members convicted in the three public Moscow trials and the Military purges. The mere fact of such a study implies that whatever reports had been prepared in 1956 for the official "rehabilitations" had been lacking in such evidence. No doubt the commission had the additional goals of further blackening Stalin's name and, especially, the names of his leading supporters who were still alive - people like Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov.

The Commission duly reached the predetermined conclusion that Tukhachevsky and those tried and executed with him were innocent. But rather than proving their innocence, the report contained evidence that contradicted it. One bit of such evidence is the "Arao document."

Here is what we know of it, from the 1964 "Shvernik" report to Khrushchev, first published in 1993.

г) Действия разведки Японии и ее роль в «деле» Тухачевского

В ходе проверки «дела» Тухачевского был обнаружен в Центральном государственном архиве Советской Армии важный документ, спецсообщение 3-го отдела ГУГБ НКВД СССР, которое было направлено Ежовым наркому обороны Ворошилову с пометкой «лично» 20

апреля 1937 г., то есть в момент, непосредственно предшествовавший арестам крупных советских военачальников. На этом документе, кроме личной подписи Ежова, есть резолюция Ворошилова, датированная 21 апреля 1937 г.: «Доложено. Решения приняты, проследить. К. В.». Судя по важности документа, следует предположить, что доложен он был Сталину. Ниже приводится это спецсообщение в том виде, в каком оно поступило к Ворошилову:

«СПЕЦСОБЩЕНИЕ

3-м отделом ГУГБ сфотографирован документ на японском языке, идущий транзитом из Польши в Японию диппочтой и исходящий от японского военного атташе в Польше - Савада Сигеру, в адрес лично начальника Главного управления Генерального штаба Японии Накадзима Тецудзо. Письмо написано почерком помощника военного атташе в Польше Арао.

Текст документа следующий:

«Об установлении связи с видным советским деятелем.

12 апреля 1937 года.

Военный атташе в Польше Саваду Сигеру.

По вопросу, указанному в заголовке, удалось установить связь с тайным посланцем маршала Красной Армии Тухачевского.

Суть беседы заключалась в том, чтобы обсудить (2 иероглифа и один знак непонятны) относительно известного Вам тайного посланца от Красной Армии № 304.»

Спецсообщение подписано заместителем начальника 3-го отдела ГУГБ НКВД СССР комиссаром государственной безопасности 3-го ранга Минаевым.

Фото пленки с этим документом и подлинник перевода в архиве НКВД не обнаружены.²

Translated:

(c) Actions of Japanese intelligence and its role in the Tukhachevsky "case"

In the course of verifying the "case" of Tukhachevsky an important document was discovered in the Central State Archive of the Soviet Army, a special communication of the 3rd department of the GUGB [Main Directorate for State Security] of the NKVD [People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs] of the USSR, which had been sent by Ezhov to Voroshilov, the People's Commissar of Defense, with the annotation "personal," on April 20, 1937, that is at the time immediately before the arrests of the major Soviet military commanders. ... We reproduce here this special communication in the form in which it reached Voroshilov:

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION

The 3rd department of the GUGB has photographed a document in the Japanese language that was in transit from Poland to Japan by diplomatic pouch and that originated with the Japanese military attaché to Poland, Savada Sigeru, addressed personally to the director of the Main department of the Japanese General Staff Nakazima Tetsudzo. The letter is written in the hand of Arao, aide to the military attaché in Poland.

The text of the document is as follows:

² Telegram of April 12 1937 concerning Tukhachevsky's contacts with Japanese. "Tragedia RKKA," Spravka of Shvernik report, *Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv*, No. 2 (1997), 29-31. Also in RKEB 2, 753.

"Concerning the establishment of ties with a prominent Soviet figure.

12 April 1937

The Military Attaché in Poland Savada Sigeru.

On the matter mentioned in the title, we have been successful in establishing contact with a secret emissary of Marshal of the Red Army Tukhachevsky.

The essence of the conversation concluded that there should be a discussion (2 characters and one sign indecipherable) concerning the secret emissary from the Red Army No. 304 who is known to you."

The special communication is signed by the assistant head of the 3rd section of the GUGB NKVD USSR, Commissar of State Security 3rd class Minaev. Neither the photograph that accompanied this document nor the original of the translation have been discovered in the archive of the NKVD.

The authors of the Shvernik report went on to claim that they believed this document was a "provocation," faked to incriminate Tukhachevsky.

Эта дезинформация была тем или иным путем подброшена советским органам японской разведкой, быть может, в кооперации с польской разведкой, а возможно, и немецкой.

Translated:

This disinformation was passed by one means or another to the Soviet organs [of security - GF] by Japanese intelligence, perhaps in cooperation with Polish intelligence, or perhaps with the Germans.

The Arao Document evidently presented the researchers on Shvernik's Commission with a considerable problem. Here was

documentary evidence that Tukhachevsky was in contact with Japanese intelligence – was, in fact, a Japanese spy!

The Commission attempted damage control to discredit their discovery. In 1937 the document had been turned over to a prisoner, a certain R.N. Kim, an NKVD "worker" – his former job was not specified – who had been himself arrested as a Japanese spy. The whole sequence of events merits a careful look.

В связи с тем, что качество фотодокумента было плохим и иностранный отдел НКВД, куда был передан для расшифровки этот документ, не смог выполнить этой работы, заместитель начальника 3 отдела ГУГБ Минаев-Цикановский предложил М. Е. Соколову, работавшему тогда начальником 7-го отделения этого отдела, выехать с документом в Лефортовскую тюрьму к находившемуся там арестованному работнику ИНО НКВД Р. Н. Киму и поручить ему, как квалифицированному знатоку японского языка, расшифровать документ. Ким был арестован 2 апреля 1937 г. по подозрению в шпионаже в пользу Японии, и следствие по его делу вел аппарат отделения, возглавляемого Соколовым.

Как сообщил сейчас в ЦК КПСС Соколов, этот плохо сфотографированный документ Киму удалось расшифровать после двух-трех визитов к нему. Ким был крайне возбужден, когда сообщил Соколову, что в документе маршал Тухачевский упоминается как иностранный разведчик. Соколов утверждает, что содержание спецсообщения, которое было направлено Ворошилову, совпадает с содержанием перевода, сделанного Кимом, причем в то время Соколов и другие его сотрудники, знавшие содержание документа, были убеждены в его подлинности. Теперь же Соколов считает, что они тогда глубоко заблуждались, и документ, видимо, является дезинформацией со стороны польской или японской разведок с расчетом, что за эту фальшивку ухватятся.

Translated:

Since the quality of the photographic copy of the document was poor and the Foreign Section of the NKVD, where it had been sent for the decoding of the document, could not accomplish this work, the Assistant Chief of the 3rd Office of the GUGB Minaev-Tsikanovskii proposed to M.E. Sokolov, who during that period worked as the chief of the 7th section of this Office, to take the document to the Lefortovo prison to R.N. Kim, an arrested employee of the Foreign Section of the NKVD who was imprisoned there, and to assign him, as a qualified expert in the Japanese language, to decode the document. Kim had been arrested on April 2, 1937, under suspicion of espionage for Japan and the investigation of his case was led by the staff of the section headed by Sokolov.

Sokolov has now informed the CC of the CPSU that Kim succeeded in decoding this poorly photographed document after two or three visits. Kim was very excited when he informed Sokolov that in the document Marshal Tukhachevsky is mentioned as a foreign spy. Sokolov confirms that the contents of the special communication that was sent to Voroshilov agrees with the contents of the translation done by Kim. Moreover, at that time Sokolov and other coworkers who knew the document's contents were convinced that it was genuine. Now, however, Sokolov considers that they were then deeply mistaken and that the document was obviously disinformation by Polish or Japanese intelligence who counted upon our seizing upon this forgery.

There are some issues to consider here.

* Why would a document of this importance be turned over to a suspected Japanese spy for a reliable translation? If Kim had in fact been a Japanese agent, the possibilities this presented to him for creating a havoc of distrust within the Soviet leadership would have been immense. And were there in truth no experts in the Jap-

Japanese language who were at liberty, and *not* under suspicion of being Japanese agents, to whom the NKVD could have turned?

В своем объяснении в ЦК КПСС проживающий сейчас в Москве Ким подтверждает, что действительно в апреле 1937 г. Соколов, со ссылкой на приказание наркома Ежова, поручил ему перевести с японского языка документ, который никто из работников ГУГБ, слабо зная японский язык, не смог прочитать из-за дефектов снимка. Киму было обещано, что если он расшифрует документ, то это благоприятно отзовется на его судьбе.

Translated:

In his explanation to the CC of the CPSU Kim, who is now living in Moscow, confirms that in reality in April 1937 Sokolov, referring to an order by People's Commissar Ezhov, assigned him to translate from the Japanese a document that none of the employees of the GUGB, because their knowledge of the Japanese language was weak, could read because of the defective nature of the photograph. Kim was promised that if he decoded the document, that would have a positive effect on his fate.

* The Commission claims that it located and questioned Kim, living in Moscow in the early 1960s. Kim supposedly told them that he had been given the document at the instruction of Ezhov along with an unspecific promise that it would "affect his fate in a positive manner."

The Kim of 1962, however, did not testify that he had been pressured to concoct a false reading of the document. Instead he claimed that he had doubted the genuineness of the document from the first, and had written a note suggesting that this was Japanese disinformation.

Как утверждает Ким, после перевода документа он написал еще и заключение, в котором сделал вывод, что этот документ подброшен нам японцами. Такого

заклучения в архивах не найдено. Документ, с которым имел дело Ким, состоял, с его слов, из одной страницы и был написан на служебном бланке военного атташата почерком помощника военного атташе в Польше Арао (почерк этот Ким хорошо знал, так как ранее читал ряд документов, написанных Арао); в документе говорилось о том, что о том, что установлена связь с маршалом Тухачевским, документ посылается в адрес генштаба. Все эти данные Ким сообщил в ЦК КПСС до предъявления ему текста спецсообщения.

Translated:

Kim asserts that after he had translated the document he also wrote a conclusion in which he deduced that the document had been passed to us by the Japanese. This conclusion cannot be found in the archives. The document that Kim dealt with was composed, in his own words, of one page and was written on the official form of the military attaché in the handwriting of the Assistant Military Attaché in Poland Arao (Kim knew this handwriting well since he had previously read a series of documents written by Arao). The document stated that a document had been sent to the General Staff concerning the fact that contact had been established with Marshal Tukhachevsky. Kim reported all these facts to the CC of the CPSU before the text of the special report had been presented to him.

This story provides a possible avenue of refutation of the "Arao document." Kim, the Japanese language expert, wrote that it was a fake, disinformation (though not a forgery – see below), but the NKVD did not pass this on.

That created an opportunity for placing the blame on Ezhov, who had supposedly directed that it be given to a person who might be amenable to concluding whatever Ezhov wanted. Blaming Ezhov would have allowed for blaming Stalin, Khrushchev's main target, since Khrushchev had claimed that Ezhov did nothing without checking with Stalin first. But Kim instead wrote a note exculpat-

ing Tukhachevsky. In this scenario Ezhov did not pass Kim's note along to the Politburo, but also failed to punish Kim for coming to the "wrong" conclusion.

A further difficulty in the Shvernik Commission's discussion of the document is that GUGB officer Sokolov, who had brought the Arao document to Kim, knew nothing about Kim's "note" in the early 1960s. For if he had known, he would never have given the testimony that he did give to the Commission.

Соколов утверждает, что содержание спецсообщения, которое было направлено Ворошилову, совпадает с содержанием перевода, сделанного Кимом, причем в то время Соколов и другие его сотрудники, знавшие содержание документа, были убеждены в его подлинности. (RKEB 754)

Translated:

Sokolov confirms that the contents of the special communication that was sent to Voroshilov agrees with the contents of the translation done by Kim. Moreover, at that time Sokolov and other coworkers who knew the document's contents were convinced that it was genuine.

Sokolov, who had supposedly dealt with Kim directly, could not have believed the document was genuine in 1937 if Kim really had written a note saying that he suspected the document was phony, disinformation. Obviously Sokolov's view about the document *bona fides* would have come from Kim. But Sokolov and his coworkers did believe in April 1937 that it was genuine. Therefore, at that time Kim must have believed that too.

Moreover, how could Kim, a man imprisoned for suspected espionage for Japan, have gotten out of prison to "communicate these matters to the Central Committee" - much less "before he had been presented with the text"? If he had done this, how could Sokolov and his coworkers not have known about all this?

The Shvernik Commission report states that Kim was able to identify the handwriting of the document as that of Arao because "he had previously read a series of documents written by Arao." The Assistant Military Attaché of Japan to Poland would not have been writing to the Soviets at all, much less in handwritten Japanese. So we can conclude that Soviet intelligence had intercepted other handwritten documents by Arao, intended for delivery to Japan, before this, and had given them to the same R.N. Kim to translate. This specific Arao Document was indeed a bombshell, or so it appears to us today. But it must have been far from the first document by Arao that Soviet intelligence had received.

This means that Kim's story of the early '60s about his "note" was itself a lie. Everyone concerned - Kim, Sokolov, and no doubt Ezhov and Voroshilov - had believed the note was genuine.

The Commission chose not to confront these problems, and dismissed the Arao Document as follows:

Оценивая имеющиеся японские материалы, можно сделать следующие выводы.

Во-первых, «документ Арао,» посланный Ежовым Ворошилову, надо признать провокационным. Эта дезинформация была тем или иным путем подброшена советским органам японской разведкой, быть может, в кооперации с польской разведкой, а возможно, и немецкой.

Не исключено также, что этот документ был сфабрикован в НКВД с прямой провокационной целью или что так называемый тайный посланец, если он так объявил себя в Варшаве, в действительности являлся агентом НКВД.

Во-вторых, несмотря на сомнительную ценность в качестве свидетельства против Тухачевского, «документ Арао,» дошедший до Ежова, Ворошилова и, вероятно, до Сталина, мог все же ими браться в расчет и сыграть в условиях апреля - мая 1937 года

определенную роль в формировании обвинения против Тухачевского.

Вместе с тем, видимо, именно неправдоподобностью этого документа надо объяснить тот факт, что на следствии вопрос о «тайном посланце Тухачевского» и о связях его с японской разведкой вообще никак не допрашивался. В деле нет ни самого документа, ни его копии. Никакой оперативной разработки вокруг этого перехваченного японского документа не проводилось; его использовали против Тухачевского в том виде, в каком он оказался в руках работника НКВД.

Translated:

After evaluation of the available Japanese materials it is possible to make the following deductions.

First: we must consider the Arao Document that Ezhov sent to Voroshilov as a provocation. This disinformation was passed by one means or another to the Soviet organs by Japanese intelligence, perhaps in cooperation with Polish intelligence, and possibly also with German intelligence.

The possibility cannot be excluded that the document was fabricated by the NKVD with a directly provocative purpose or that the secret sender, if he called himself that in Warsaw, was in reality an NKVD agent.

Second, despite the dubious value as evidence against Tukhachevsky the Arao Document that reached Ezhov, Voroshilov, and probably Stalin also, could have been taken under consideration by them and in April – May 1937 could have played a certain role in the formation of accusations against Tukhachevsky.

At the same time, the fact that during the investigation the question about the “secret representative of Tukhachevsky” and about his ties with Japanese intelli-

gence played no role in the interrogations could be explained precisely by the implausibility of this document. In the [Tukhachevsky Affair] case file there is neither the document itself nor a copy of it. No operational work was developed concerning this seized Japanese document; it was used against Tukhachevsky in the same form in which it existed in the hands of the NKVD worker.

According to the Commission's analysis, the Document was some kind of provocation by either Japanese, Polish, or German intelligence, or some combination of them, or possibly even an NKVD forgery – despite Kim's attestation that he recognized Arao's handwriting.

The Commission then contradicted itself by claiming that the fact the document was not used in the investigation and prosecution of Tukhachevsky at all and that this could be explained by "precisely the improbability of this document" – and *then* claims that "it was used against Tukhachevsky." But if the case against Tukhachevsky was intentionally fabricated from the beginning, the "improbability" of the document – assuming that it was "improbable" – would not have been an issue. Furthermore, NKVD man Sokolov, who dealt with Kim, thought it was genuine.

We can best make sense of all the contradictions in the Shvernik Commission's report about the Arao Document by recognizing that its editors were trying to find a reason to dismiss this document, since they had been tasked to find evidence to exonerate Tukhachevsky and the rest. One hypothesis would be that those who compiled the report did not wish to conceal from their powerful superiors this document that their researchers had uncovered, so they supplied an explanation that would permit their superiors to disregard it, if they so wished.

Since the Commission's report informs us that Voroshilov had seen the document and, therefore, Stalin knew about it too, the most likely reason it was not used in the prosecution of Tukhachevsky is that it was not needed – other evidence was available. We can't

know for certain, since the Tukhachevsky case file (*delo*), like those of all the other military defendants, has never been declassified and only selected researchers have been able to see even parts of it. But the fact that it was not used in the case against Tukhachevsky does not imply anything about whether it was genuine or not.

We do not know whether the actual Arao Document is still extant somewhere. We know about it only from the Shvernik Report. Either it is among the Tukhachevsky investigation materials that are still top-secret in Russia today, or it has been destroyed. It is not mentioned by Iulia Kantor, author of three books on Tukhachevsky, who was given special permission by the Marshal's family to see his investigative file and in whose works a great deal of evidence pointing not towards Tukhachevsky's innocence, but towards his guilt, may be found. Kantor herself, with no pretense of objectivity, firmly takes the position that all the military commanders were innocent victims of a frame-up.

The Arao Document represents good evidence that Tukhachevsky was in direct contact with the Japanese military figures in Poland. The attempted refutation of the Document contained in that report is filled with contradictions and should be discarded.

We have documented in another chapter that the Tukhachevsky Affair features prominently in the Third Moscow Trial. We have a great deal of documentary evidence that the Tukhachevsky conspiracy did exist. This evidence is relevant to our task of verifying the Moscow Trials testimony from other, independent sources.

Chapter 11. Soviet Evidence – Ustrialov's Confession

Ustrialov on Tukhachevsky's Contacts with the Japanese

The consideration of Nikolai Ustrialov's confession requires some explanation. Ustrialov's is a Soviet - NKVD confession-interrogation. This will raise in the minds of some readers the possibility that Ustrialov might have been "forced" to falsely confess, that these confessions might be fabrications, and so on.

In reality, there is no evidence that this is the case and much evidence against it. Therefore, it may be useful to examine this issue here.

Ustrialov's confession cannot have been an attempt to "frame" Tukhachevsky or even to get additional evidence against him, since by the date it was given - July 14, 1937 - Tukhachevsky, executed on June 12, 1937, had been dead for more than a month.

Might it be an attempt to "frame," or at least get more evidence against, Bukharin and the Rights? As we shall see, they are in fact mentioned in the confession. But this is impossible for a number of reasons:

* The allusions to Bukharin and the Rights are all hearsay. Ustrialov simply reported what one Japanese journalist-spy who called himself Nakamura had told him. Nakamura had no direct knowledge about the Rights. He just repeated what he had been told by still other parties. Such testimony would have been useless in any criminal trial, including in the USSR in the 1930s.

* Why would the NKVD or prosecution fabricate material that could not be used? When, during the Ezhovshchina or "Great

Terror" the NKVD fabricated confessions they did so to falsely incriminate innocent people. In this case they would have fabricated direct testimony, forced Ustrialov to say that he had direct knowledge of the Rights' desires to overthrow the Soviet government, make deals with Japan and Germany, and so on. But they did not do that.

* Liudmila A. Bystriantseva, the expert on Ustrialov's life and thought who edited and introduced this confession, is convinced that it is genuine despite the fact that it contradicts the reigning historical paradigm according to which Tukhachevsky et al. were innocent, "framed" by Stalin, Ezhov, or both. At the end of this chapter we will review what she says.

* The confession might well be useful to the NKVD for further investigation. But that would mean that the investigators were in fact trying to discover the truth. That, in turn, would mean that they did not fabricate Ustrialov's confession.

* Ustrialov's confession is consistent with the Soviet charges against Tukhachevsky and against the Rights. We now have good corroborative evidence, including non-Soviet evidence, that these charges were accurate. The prevailing paradigm of the Moscow Trials and the Tukhachevsky Affair cannot account for this evidence. Therefore, the prevailing paradigm must be discarded.

All this suggests that the confession is genuine. We have no grounds to think that it might be a fabrication by the investigators or the prosecution, and every reason to think it was not. And the confession itself is very interesting - in fact, a bombshell. Not surprisingly, it has been virtually ignored by those who are committed not to discovering the truth but to what I have elsewhere called the "anti-Stalin paradigm" of Soviet history.

These are our grounds for including this somewhat lengthy discussion of Ustrialov's confession here.

Nikolai Vasil'evich Ustrialov was a Russian philosopher who had taught law at Moscow University during World War I. He had been a member of the Kadet (Constitutional Democrat) Party, the leading party of businessmen and intellectuals. During the Civil War he supported the White generals Kolchak and Denikin against the Bolsheviks.

Eventually he settled in Harbin, China, and worked for the China East Railroad, jointly owned by China and the USSR. During his years of exile he visited Japan several times and met with Japanese government figures. These visits became the focus of interest when the railroad was sold to Japan in 1935 Ustrialov returned to the USSR with other Russian nationals.

Once back in the USSR Ustrialov was hired to teach as a professor of economic geography at two universities in Moscow. Clearly Soviet authorities believed that he had accepted the Bolshevik Revolution and his stated desire to support the USSR for nationalist reasons.

Ustrialov was arrested on June 6, 1937.

В СССР работал профессором экономической географии в Московском институте инженеров транспорта и некоторое время — в Московском государственном университете. Но 6 июня 1937 года был арестован органами НКВД СССР, а 14 сентября 1937 года военной коллегией Верховного суда СССР по обвинению в "шпионаже, контрреволюционной деятельности и антисоветской агитации" (статьи 58-1, 58-8, 58-10, 58-11 УК РСФСР) приговорён к расстрелу. Приговор приведён в исполнение в тот же день в Москве.¹

Translated:

¹ "Ustrialov, Nikolai Vasil'evich." (Biographical article). At <http://www.hrono.info/biograf/ustryalov.html>

In the USSR he worked as a professor of Economic Geography at the Moscow Institute of Transport Engineers and for a time at Moscow State University. But on June 6, 1937, he was arrested by the NKVD of the USSR, and on September 14, 1937, he was sentenced to be shot by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR for "espionage, counterrevolutionary activity and anti-Soviet agitation" (articles 58-1, 58-8 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Republic). The sentence was carried out on the same day in Moscow.

From another source we learn that Ustrialov pled guilty at trial to espionage for Japan.

Судом Устрялов признан виновным в том, что "с 1928 г. являлся агентом японской разведки и проводил шпионскую работу. В 1935 г. установил контрреволюционную связь с Тухачевским, от которого знал о подготовке террористических актов против руководителей ВКП(б) и Советского правительства и о связи с антисоветской террористической организацией правых. Кроме того, Устрялов вел активную контрреволюционную пропаганду и распространял клевету на руководство ВКП(б)" (из приговора, л.д. 52). В тот же день приговор в отношении Устрялова Н.В. был приведен в исполнение (л.д. 53). ... [О]бвинение в шпионаже и иной контрреволюционной деятельности основано только на признательных показаниях Устрялова, которые он дал на предварительном следствии и подтвердил в судебном заседании.²

Translated:

² Bystriantseva, L.A. "Arkhivnye materialy po N.V. Ustrialovu (1890-1937)."
http://lib.irismedia.org/sait/lib_ru/lib.ru/politolog/ustryalov/documentation.txt.htm

Ustrialov was declared guilty by the court in that "since 1928 he has been an agent of Japanese intelligence and has carried out espionage. In 1935 he established counterrevolutionary contact with Tukhachevsky, from whom he learned about the preparation of terrorist acts against the leaders of the VPK(b) and the Soviet government and about contact with the anti-Soviet terrorist organization of the Rights. In addition Ustrialov conducted active counterrevolutionary propaganda and slandered the leadership of the VKP(b)" (from the sentence, p. 52). "The sentence against Ustrialov N.V. was carried out the same day (p. 53)." ... The accusation of espionage and other counterrevolutionary activity was based solely on Ustrialov's confessions, which he gave during the preliminary investigation and confirmed at trial.

Ustrialov was himself convicted of espionage for Japan. This constitutes our main interest in him here. It's important to note, however, that Ustrialov did *not* confess to everything his interrogator accused him of. Specifically, he rejected the accusation that he had returned to the USSR at the instruction of the Japanese.

ВОПРОС: Вы напрасно сводите свою деятельность только к контрреволюционной пропаганде. Следствию известно, что в СССР вы приехали по прямому предложению японской разведки, со специальными заданиями — вы признаете это?

ОТВЕТ: Я этого не признаю.³

Translated:

QUESTION: It is useless for you to reduce your activity only to counterrevolutionary propaganda. The investigation is aware that you arrived in the USSR upon

³ Bystriantseva, L.A. "Ustremenie k istine. Protokol doporosa N.V. Ustrialova." *Klio* (St. Petersburg) No. 1 (1999), 246-256.

the direct proposal of Japanese intelligence with special assignments – do you admit this?

ANSWER: I do not admit this.

This kind of differentiated confession -- confession of guilt to some charges while rejecting other charges – suggests an effort on the part of the defendant to be truthful at least about the charges to which the defendant has confessed guilt.

Bystriantseva argues convincingly that Ustrialov did not “spy” in the ordinary sense of the word, and in the sense that the NKVD interrogator at first accused him of. But she fails to point out the obvious: that Ustrialov’s discussion with the Japanese agent Nakamura (see below) itself constituted a form of espionage – that is, secret collaboration with a hostile foreign power – if not reported to the authorities.

The transcript of one of his interrogations, that of July 14, 1937, was published in 1999. Here we quote only those sections of the interview that are directly relevant to the question of Japanese collaboration.

In this interrogation Ustrialov outlined the contents of a conversation he had with Tukhachevsky at Tukhachevsky’s own home sometime in the autumn, probably September, of 1936. He then summarizes a ninety-minute discussion he had in late December 1936 with a Japanese agent, one Nakamura, who was traveling under journalistic cover.

We’ll comment on these two sections of Ustrialov’s confession separately. After that, we’ll consider issues of authenticity.

Part One. Autumn 1936: Ustrialov discusses his talk with Marshal Tukhachevsky

ВОПРОС: Изложите содержание этой беседы?

ОТВЕТ: Я постараюсь дословно изложить нашу беседу — поскольку она мне осталась памятной. Тухачевский вначале коснулся основных проблем нашей политики и интересовался моей точкой зрения. Я ответил, что, по моему мнению, в данной исторической обстановке внешняя политика Советского государства ведется по единственно возможному для нее курсу, если иметь в виду ориентацию на мир. Я почувствовал, что мой собеседник не разделяет этой точки зрения. В очень осторожных, скупых, окольных выражениях он стал говорить, что ориентация на мир требовала бы некоторого смягчения наших отношений с Германией, ныне отравляющих всю международную атмосферу.

Я немедленно заметил, что отнюдь не мы виноваты в напряженности этих отношений. Я твердо убежден, что, пока фашизм в Германии у власти, никакие улучшения наших отношений не возможны.

Экспансия на Восток — краеугольный камень внешнеполитической программы Гитлера. «Да, но на востоке Германии лежит Польша, — бросил реплику Тухачевский. — Территориальные вопросы допускают различные варианты решений.» Из дальнейших, весьма, впрочем, осторожных его высказываний, получилось, что он мыслит себе совсем иной рисунок европейского равновесия, нежели тот, который существует теперь. В его словах воскресла известная концепция так называемой «германской ориентации», о которой так много говорилось и писалось в свое время.

Было совершенно очевидно, за чей счет мыслилось в таком случае урегулирование спорных территориальных проблем «Не каждая польская кампания кончалась Рижским договором — был ведь в истории «Венский конгресс»».

Этот афоризм моего собеседника был более чем ясным намеком.

Я — «Но ведь наши противоречия с Германией не исчерпываются территориальными проблемами. Нельзя упустить из вида глубочайшие

противоположности режимов."

социально-политических

Тухачевский — «Да, конечно, но режимы развиваются, эволюционируют. В политике нужна гибкость. Всякий конфликт есть начало соглашения.»

<с.253>

Я — «Однако есть основные, фундаментальные установки, которые составляют сущность политического строя. У нас эти установки определены программой правящей партии».

Тухачевский — «Да, но кроме программы есть люди. Партия — это люди. В партии есть **реальные политики**, и им принадлежит будущее».

Из дальнейших его высказываний явствовало, что он не только «теоретизирует», но и уже нащупал кое-какую почву под ногами. **«Реальные политики»** в партии не фикция, а реальность. Не фикция — и слова о новом курсе по отношению к Германии

Из этих слов, несколько отрывочных, но все же достаточно ясных, мне не трудно было понять основные политические устремления моего собеседника. Мне оставалось задать лишь ему один вопрос о конкретной внутривнутриполитической программе тех **«реальных политиков»** в партии, о которых он упоминал. На этот вопрос Тухачевский ответил, что их внутривнутриполитическая программа исходит из необходимости сгладить остроту противоречий между Советским государством и внешним миром, хотя бы даже за счет некоторого отступления от проводимой ныне партией политической линии. Поскольку такое смягчение противоречий диктуется обстановкой — на него нужно идти.

После этого ответа я окончательно понял, что под кличкой **«реальных политиков»** Тухачевский имеет в

виду правую партийную оппозицию, бухаринско-рыковскую группу.

Translated:

QUESTION: Describe the contents of this conversation.

ANSWER: I will try to present our conversation word for word insofar as I am able to remember it. Tukhachevsky first touched upon the main problems of our politics and expressed interest in my point of view. I told him that, in my opinion, in the current historic situation, Soviet foreign policy is being conducted upon the only possible line, if we bear in mind the orientation toward peace. I felt that my companion did not share this point of view. In very careful, laconic, roundabout terms, he began to say that the orientation towards peace would require some mitigation of our relations with Germany, which now poison the whole international atmosphere.

I immediately remarked that we are not to blame for the tensions in these relations; that I firmly believed that as long as fascism is in power in Germany no improvement of our relations is possible.

Expansion to the East is the cornerstone of Hitler's foreign policy. "Yes, but to the East of Germany is Poland - replied Tukhachevsky. - Territorial questions allow for a variety of solutions." From his further, although cautious, statements it turned out that he had a very different picture of the European equilibrium than the one that now exists. In his words the well-known concept of the so-called "German orientation" was revived, about which so much was said and written at one time.

It was clear at whose expense in such a case the settlement of the disputed territorial problems was con-

ceived. "Not every Polish campaign ended in a Riga Treaty. History also knows the 'Congress of Vienna.'"

This aphorism by my interlocutor was a more than clear hint.

I - "But our contradictions with Germany are not limited to territorial problems. We can not lose sight of the profound opposition of our social and political regimes."

Tukhachevsky - "Yes, of course, but regimes develop, they evolve.⁴ In politics we need flexibility. Every conflict is the beginning of the agreement."

<p.253>

I - "However, there are basic, fundamental conditions which constitute the essence of the political system. With us these conditions are defined by the program of the ruling party."

Tukhachevsky - "Yes, but besides the program there are people. The party is people. In the Party there are **realist politicians**⁵, and the future belongs to them."

From his further remarks it was clear that he was not only "theorizing," but already felt a certain amount of ground under his feet. The "**realist politicians**" in the Party were not a fiction but a reality. Not fiction either were the words about a new course towards Germany

⁴ Ustrialov was a central figure in the "Smenovekhist" movement. He believed that the USSR would "evolve" towards a more bourgeois capitalist form of state. This fact may explain Tukhachevsky's interest in him. According to Bystriantseva, Ustrialov had abandoned these views by the mid-1930s, but he was - and is - still famous for them.

⁵ I have put the phrase "realist politicians" in boldface in both Russian and English in order to draw the reader's attention to it.

From these words, somewhat disjointed but still quite clear, it was not hard for me to understand the basic political aspirations of my interlocutor. It only remained for me to ask him one question about the specific domestic program of those "**realist politicians**" in the Party that he had mentioned. To this question Tukhachevsky replied that their internal political program was based on the need to smooth the acuteness of the contradictions between the Soviet state and the outside world, even at the cost of a certain retreat from the political line currently being carried out by the Party. Since this lessening of contradictions is dictated by the situation – it was necessary to take this path.

After this response I finally realized that under the nickname of "**realist politicians**" Tukhachevsky had in mind the Right opposition in the party, the Bukharin-Rykov group.

Analysis

A significant point for our purposes is that the main subject of Ustrialov's interrogation was Marshal Tukhachevsky. At the date of the interrogation, July 14, 1937, Tukhachevsky and the seven other high-ranking military leaders who had been arrested with him had all been tried and executed. What would have been the purpose of fabricating an interrogation that implicated a person already dead and other minor figures some of whom, as we shall see, were never repressed?

Ustrialov had been arrested on June 6, 1937, a few days before the trial and execution of Tukhachevsky and the rest and during the continuing investigation of the military conspiracy. We don't know what led to Ustrialov's arrest.

As an attempt to investigate networks of Japanese espionage the interrogation makes perfect sense. The NKVD was also gathering further information on the Rights, on their connection to the mili-

tary conspirators and others. Bukharin had already begun to confess about this in his first confession of June 2, 1937. (Furr and Bobrov Bukharin) So had Iagoda, Krestinsky, and others who would eventually figure in the March 1938 Moscow Trial.

Ustrialov knew that Bukharin and Rykov had been arrested - their arrests had taken place on February 27, 1937, during the February-March 1937 Central Committee Plenum. But he could not have known how closely the confessions they had already made were consistent with what Ustrialov reported about Tukhachevsky's views.

As Ustrialov described his conversation with Tukhachevsky, it began by his professing his loyalty to the Soviet "orientation to peace" - no doubt the attempted rapprochement with the Western capitalists, entry into the United Nations, the new Constitution, and other reforms. Tukhachevsky immediately began to question this policy, which was also predicated on an attempt to build "collective security" - a set of alliances - against Hitler's Germany.

The Marshal said that "some degree of softening" (*nekotorogo smiagcheniia*) of Soviet opposition to Nazi Germany was needed. He said that the hostile relations between the USSR and Nazi Germany were "poisoning the whole international atmosphere." That is, Tukhachevsky was telling Ustrialov that he thought the whole policy of anti-Fascism and collective security against Nazi Germany was wrong.

In Ustrialov's words Tukhachevsky was "resurrecting" the notion of a "German orientation." The two "losers" of the Versailles peace after World War I, the USSR and Weimar Germany, had collaborated secretly under the provisions of the Treaty of Rapallo. Tukhachevsky and many other Soviet officers, including most of those executed along with him, had trained in Germany. Such ties had been terminated at Hitler's rise to power.

When Ustrialov referred to Hitler's *Drang nach Osten*, the cornerstone of his foreign policy since the beginning and enshrined in his

credo Mein Kampf, Tukhachevsky replied that Poland, not the USSR, could satisfy Hitler's territorial ambitions. He referred to the Treaty of Riga (March 1921) in which Poland had acquired much of Ukraine and Belorussia at the expense of the newly-socialist Russian Republic.

To that treaty Tukhachevsky counterposed the Congress of Vienna at which in 1815 Russian imperial control over Poland had been established with a fig-leaf of Polish independence which was snuffed out by the Tsar in 1832. In effect Tukhachevsky seemed to be hinting that under a new political leadership the USSR could be a German ally once again and help to put an end to the Polish state.

To this Ustrialov objected in surprise that the socio-political differences between Germany and the USSR were "deeply contradictory to one another." Tukhachevsky's response was that "regimes develop and evolve." But the only "evolution" he spoke of was of a change in the Soviet regime and Party, guided by "**realist politicians**" (*real'nye politiki*). According to Ustrialov Tukhachevsky said nothing about Nazi Germany's "evolving."

Tukhachevsky then said that the "internal political program" of these "**realist politicians**" would flow from the "necessity to remove the sharpness of the contradictions between the Soviet state and the outside world." Given what he had already said, however, it is clear Tukhachevsky meant the contradictions between Nazi Germany and the USSR, on the one hand, and the existence of the Comintern on the other. By the autumn of 1936 there were already serious and deepening contradictions between France and Germany. But all the capitalist countries were in agreement in their hostility to the Comintern.

The exact same term "realist politicians" (*real'nye politiki*) was used by Karl Radek in the Second Moscow Trial of January 23-30, 1937, in the same way that, in Ustrialov's account Tukhachevsky used it in speaking to Ustrialov in the autumn of 1936.

Radek:

Я сказал г. К., что ожидать уступок от нынешнего правительства – дело совершенно бесполезное, и что правительство может рассчитывать на уступки **“реальных политиков в СССР,”** т. е. от блока, когда последний придет к власти.

Translated:

“I told Mr. K. that it was absolutely useless expecting any concessions from the present government, but that the ... government could count upon receiving concessions from the **realist politicians** in the U.S.S.R., i.e., from the bloc, when the latter came to power.

(1937 Trial 9)

Radek:

Это было в мае 1934 года. Осенью 1934 года, на одном дипломатическом приеме известный мне дипломатический представитель средневропейской державы присел ко мне и начал разговор. Он сказал: **“Наши руководители (он это сказал конкретнее) знают, что господин Троцкий стремится к сближению с Германией. Наш вожь спрашивает, что означает эта мысль господина Троцкого? Может быть, это мысль эмигранта, когда ему не спится? Кто стоит за этими мыслями?”**

Ясно было, что меня спрашивают об отношении блока. Я сказал ему, что **реальные политики в СССР** понимают значение германо-советского сближения и готовы пойти на уступки, необходимые для этого сближения. Этот представитель понял, что раз я говорил о **реальных политиках**, значит есть в СССР **реальные политики и нереальные политики; нереальные – это советское правительство, а реальные – это троцкистско-зиновьевский блок.** И понятен был смысл того, что я сказал: если блок придет к власти, он пойдет на уступки для сближения с вашим

правительством и со странюю, которую оно представляет.

Translated:

RADEK: This was in May 1934. In the autumn of 1934, at a diplomatic reception, a diplomatic representative of a Central European country who was known to me, sat down beside me and started a conversation. Well, he started this conversation in a manner that was not very stylish. He said (speaking German): "I feel I want to spew. . . . Every day I get German newspapers and they go for you tooth and nail; and I get Soviet newspapers and you throw mud at Germany. What can one do under these circumstances?" He said: "**Our leaders**" (he said that more explicitly) "**know that Mr. Trotsky is striving for a rapprochement with Germany. Our leader wants to know, what does this idea of Mr. Trotsky's signify? Perhaps it is the idea of an émigré who sleeps badly? Who is behind these ideas?**"

It was clear that I was being asked about the attitude of the bloc. I could not suppose that this was an echo of any of Trotsky's articles, because I read everything that was written by Trotsky, watched what he wrote both in the American and in the French press; I was fully informed about what Trotsky wrote, and I knew that Trotsky had never advocated the idea of a rapprochement with Germany in the press. If this representative said that he knew Trotsky's views, that meant that this representative, while not, by virtue of his position, a man whom his leader treated confidentially, was consequently a representative who had been commissioned to ask me. Of course, his talk with me lasted only a couple of minutes; the atmosphere of a diplomatic reception is not suited for lengthy perorations. I had to make my decision literally in one second and give him an answer, and I told him that alter-

cation between two countries, even if they represent (diametrically opposite social systems) is a fruitless matter, but that sole attention must not be paid to these newspaper altercations. I told him that **realist politicians** in the U.S.S.R. understand the significance of a German-Soviet rapprochement and are prepared to make the necessary concessions to achieve this rapprochement. This representative understood that since I was speaking about **realist politicians** it meant that **there were realist politicians and unrealist politicians in the U.S.S.R.: the unrealist politicians were the Soviet government, while the realist politicians were the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc.** And he also understood that what I meant was: if the bloc comes into power it will make concessions in order to bring about a rapprochement with your government and the country which it represents. (1937 Trial 108-109)⁶

Radek:

И через несколько месяцев, приблизительно в ноябре 1935 года, на одном из очередных дипломатических приемов подошел ко мне военный представитель этой страны...

Председательствующий: Не называйте ни фамилий, ни страны.

Радек: ...и начал жаловаться на полное изменение атмосферы между обеими странами. После первых слов он сказал, что во время господина Троцкого между обеими армиями обеих стран существовали лучшие отношения. **В дальнейшем он сказал, что Троцкий остался верен своим старым взглядам на**

⁶ The English transcript of the January 1937 Second Moscow Trial is much longer than the Russian transcript.

необходимость советско-немецкой дружбы. После ряда его таких дальнейших высказываний он начал напирать на меня, как на проводившего ранее раппальскую линию. Я ему на это ответил той же самой формулировкой, которой ответил на первый зондаж, что **реальные политики** в СССР знают значение советско-немецкой дружбы и готовы итти на уступки, необходимые для обеспечения этой дружбы. Он мне ответил, что надо было бы, наконец, когда-нибудь собраться, совместно поговорить подробно к конкретно о путях сближения.

Я сказал ему, что когда будет соответствующая обстановка, я охотно проведу с ним вечер. Этот второй разговор показал мне, что тут есть попытка перехвата тех отношений, которые начались между Троцким и соответственными кругами Германии, руками военных кругов, или же проверка реального содержания тех переговоров, которые велись. Быть может, дело шло также о проверке, знаем ли мы то, что конкретно предлагал Троцкий.

Translated:

RADEK: Several months later, approximately, November 1935, at one of the regular diplomatic receptions, the military representative of that country. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Do not mention his name or the country.

RADEK: ... approached me and began to complain about the complete change of atmosphere between the two countries. After the first few words he said that during Mr. Trotsky's time the relations between the armies of the two countries were better.

He went on to say that Trotsky had remained true to his old opinion about the need for Soviet-German friendship. After speaking in this strain for a little while longer he began to press me hard as one

who had formerly pursued the Rappalo line. I replied to this by uttering the same formula which I had uttered when I was first sounded, namely, that the **realist politicians** of the U.S.S.R. appreciate the significance of Soviet-German friendship and are prepared to make the necessary concessions in order to ensure this friendship. To this he replied that we ought at last to get together somehow and jointly discuss the details, definitely, about ways of reaching a rapprochement.

I told him that when the circumstances permitted I would be glad to spend an evening with him. This second conversation revealed to me that there was an attempt on the part of military circles to take over the connections which Trotsky had established with certain circles in Germany, or that it was an attempt to verify the real content of the negotiations that were being conducted. Perhaps, also, it was an attempt to ascertain whether we knew definitely what Trotsky had proposed. (1937 Trial 444-445)

In his summing-up statement to the court Prosecutor Vyshinsky referred repeatedly and sarcastically to Radek's use of the term "realist politicians." (1937 Trial 480).

Ustrialov concludes this part of the interrogation with the remark that he realized this was the plan of the "Rightist Party opposition, the Bukharin-Rykov group." Evidently enough information about the political program of the Rights had been published by this time, or at least bruited about in conversations, perhaps at *Izvestiia* of which Bukharin was the editor and where Ustrialov himself was to publish an article in December 1936. The program of the bloc was shared by both the Trotskyists and the Rights. Ustrialov would have naturally been drawn more to the Rights.

If there were any reason to think that Ustrialov's confession were an NKVD "fabrication" we might attribute the use of the term "real-

ist politicians" to an NKVD attempt to falsely link the confession, and thereby the Rights, with the Trotskyists of the Second Moscow Trial of January 1937, which had taken place only a few months earlier. But, as we have seen, there is no reason to think that Ustrialov's confession is a fabrication.

Therefore the recurrence of the term "realist politicians" represents what Radek meant by it: a coded reference to the bloc of Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Rights, and other oppositionists that, in collaboration with the Tukhachevsky group and Germany, planned to overthrow the Stalin leadership.

Part Two. Late December 1936: Ustrialov Meets with a Japanese Agent

Ustrialov:

Однако вскоре я узнал гораздо более конкретные вещи, заставившие меня думать о возможно кардинальных изменениях в руководстве ВКП(б) и всей проводимой Советским государством политики: я узнал о непосредственной связи между группой Бухарина-Рыкова и Тухачевского.

ВОПРОС: От кого вы это узнали?

ОТВЕТ: Об этом мне при встрече в конце 1936 года рассказал один японец.

ВОПРОС: О каком японце идет речь? Где вы с ним встретились?

ОТВЕТ: Вскоре после напечатания моей статьи «Самопознание социализма» в декабрьском номере (1936 год) «Известий» мне позвонило по телефону неизвестное лицо с просьбой о свидании, передав при этом привет от «харбинских знакомых». На мой вопрос, с кем я имею честь говорить, последовал ответ: «Вы меня не знаете, поэтому фамилия вам безразлична, однако мне крайне необходимо с вами лично повидаться и передать вам привет от «харбинских друзей».

После некоторых колебаний я изъявил согласие на встречу, и мы договорились встретиться в тот же день около десяти часов вечера в Лосинке, неподалеку от Института НКПС. В назначенное время я пришел в условленное место. В начале одиннадцатого к институту подошла машина. Из нее вышел окутанный в шубу человек, по внешности японец. Подойдя ко мне и назвав меня по фамилии, японец отрекомендовался фамилией Накамура, заявил, что он является корреспондентом одной из токийских газет, что он следует транзитом из Японии в Европу и задержался на несколько дней в Москве.

Накамура передал мне привет от Танака и выразил пожелание обменяться со мной мнениями по некоторым интересующим его вопросам.

<с.254>

Весь разговор велся между нами на французском языке.

ВОПРОС: Обстоятельства встречи с Накамура, как вы их излагаете, с несомненностью свидетельствует о том, что подобная встреча заранее вами обусловлена при отъезде из Харбина в СССР, иначе совершенно непонятны мотивы, побудившие вас встретиться в Москве с совершенно неизвестным вам японцем. Признаете ли вы это?

ОТВЕТ: Вы совершенно правы, я вовсе не собираюсь скрывать, что еще в конце 1934 года Танака при разговоре со мной в Харбине предупредил меня, что в случае необходимости получения от меня консульский по тому или иному вопросу, связанному с так называемой русской проблемой, японцы попытаются искать возможностей для установления со мной связей в Москве. Я утверждаю, однако, что никакой окончательной договоренности об обстоятельствах этой встречи между нами установлено не было.

ВОПРОС: Вернемся к обстоятельствам вашей встречи с Накамура. Где и о чем вы с ним разговаривали?

ОТВЕТ: Накамура пригласил меня к себе в автомобиль и в течение примерно полутора часов разъезжал со мной между Москвой и Лосинкой, и все время беседовали. Вначале он говорил о моей статье в «Известиях», спросил, давно ли я сотрудничаю в этой газете и знаком ли я с Бухариным и его друзьями, на что я ответил отрицательно. Он интересовался далее, в каких кругах я вращаюсь, и снова говорил о среде бухаринско-рыковской группы, называя ее группой реальных политиков, гораздо более дальновидных и более снабженных социальной опорой, нежели недавно провалившаяся группа Зиновьева -Каменева. На мою реплику, что теперь едва ли можно серьезно говорить о роли бухаринско-рыковской группы, он заметил, что эта группа, по его мнению, вовсе не так слаба, как кажется, и что у нее имеются немало явных и тайных сторонников в различных звеньях советского аппарата. Затем он спросил меня о настроениях советской интеллигенции и о собственной моей оценке политического положения. Я вкратце сообщил ему свою точку зрения.

ВОПРОС: Что вы сообщили Накамура?

ОТВЕТ: Я изложил Накамура свою оценку существующего в стране положения под уклоном зрения моей теории «бонапартизма», — я говорил, что революция неуклонно устремляется по бонапартистскому пути, развивается этот бонапартизм особого порядка — прежде всего как принцип безграничного единовластия вождя.

Затем я обратил внимание Накамура на такие мероприятия правительства, как установление званий, орденов, введение института маршалов, восстановление казачества и т.д. ... Появление «знатных людей» как бы подчеркивало создание новой знати, т.е. Бонапарта. Я говорил, что казнь зиновьевцев — есть первое в истории русской революции применение якобинских методов борьбы с революционерами: мокрая гильотина — вместо сухой. В таком же духе я

дал оценку и другим событиям внутренней жизни страны.

ВОПРОС: Как реагировал Накамура на изложенные вами вопросы?

ОТВЕТ: Как бы в ответ на эти «бонапартистские нотки» моих замечаний, мой собеседник неожиданно для меня перешел к теме Красной армии и отметил, что, по его сведениям, у правых есть сторонники и в ее среде, точнее, в среде ее верхушки. Правые вовсе не так бессильны, как я полагаю. Японцы имеют насчет этого достоверную информацию не только собственную, но и почерпнутую из союзного им источника, столь же, как они, заинтересованного в борьбе с Коминтерном.⁷ Есть основание утверждать, что надежды и планы правых вовсе не беспочвенны. И чтобы не быть голословным, он даже может назвать одно имя, представляющее в этом отношении достаточно веским: по его данным, «господин Тухачевский» связан тесными политическими симпатиями с группой правых коммунистов. А Тухачевский — имя импонирующее: его хорошо знают политические круги всех иностранных государств, и еще русская эмиграция прочила его в «русские Наполеоны». Вместе с тем, как один из маршалов, он популярен в СССР.

На мой вопрос моему собеседнику, как же мыслит он политическую программу такого право-военного блока, он развил мне ряд соображений, напоминающих изложенные выше суждения Танака, в 1934 году.

В случае политического успеха, правительство бухаринско-рыковской группы, в корне изменило бы курс советской политики в сторону сближения с пожеланиями иностранных государств. В частности, Япония ожидает от этого правительства прекращения

⁷ Presumably Germany.

работы Коминтерна в Китае и предоставления Японии полной свободы рук в Китае. Вместе с тем Япония рассчитывает на значительное расширение различных концессий в пределах Советского Дальнего Востока, а возможно, даже и на полюбовное соглашение о продаже ей на приемлемых условиях северной части Сахалина. Все это радикально смягчит нынешнюю напряженность отношений между Японией и СССР.

На мой вопрос о позиции такого правительства в сфере европейской внешней политики Накамура ответил, что должно произойти резкое улучшение советско-германских отношений. Изменение режима монополии внешней торговли вызовет оживление торговых связей между обеими странами, германскую торговую экспансию в СССР. Территориально-политические трудности могут быть разрешены в значительной мере за счет Польши. Свертывание деятельности Коминтерна идет навстречу основным установкам Гитлера. Словом, здесь можно ожидать решительной перемены всей современной международной ситуации и установления мирового равновесия на новых основах. Советский Союз прочно войдет в общество «нормальных» государств, ведущих политику здорового национального эгоизма.

...

Прощаясь со мной, японец дал мне понять, что был бы весьма заинтересован услышать от меня более подробные и конкретные соображения по затронутым (в нашей беседе) вопросам. Он выразил надежду, что на почве сотрудничества моего в «Известиях» мне удастся повидать Бухарина либо еще кого-либо из правых коммунистов, а также при их посредстве встретиться с Тухачевским. Он добавил, что через несколько месяцев на обратном пути из Европы в Японию он хотел бы снова встретиться со мной. На этом наша беседа, продолжавшаяся около полутора часов, закончилась.

ВОПРОС: После вашей встречи с Накамура вы пытались связаться с Бухариным и его окружением?

<с.255>

ОТВЕТ: Нет, я не связывался. Встреча с Накамура состоялась в конце декабря, а в середине января 1937 года уже было известно о предстоящем процессе параллельного центра, а еще спустя месяц прошел слух об аресте Бухарина и Рыкова. Все последние события заставили меня занимать выжидательную позицию, и на этом меня застал арест.⁸

Translated:

[USTRIALOV]: However, soon I learned much more concrete things that forced me to think about possible cardinal changes in the leadership of the VKP(b) and of the whole political line of the Soviet government, and learned about the direct connection between the Bukharin-Rykov group and Tukhachevsky.

QUESTION: From whom did you learn this?

ANSWER: A Japanese man told me about this when I met him at the end of 1936.

QUESTION: What Japanese man? Where did you meet with him?

ANSWER: Soon after my article "The Self-Awareness of Socialism" appeared in the December issue (1936) of *Izvestia* a person unknown to me called me on the telephone and asked for a meeting, giving me greetings from "Harbin acquaintances." When I asked to whom I had the honor of speaking the latter answered: "You do not know me, so my name is irrelevant, but it is essential for me that I meet personally

⁸ Bystriantseva, "Ustremlenie..." 252-254.

with you and transmit to you greetings from 'Harbin friends.'"

After some hesitation I consented to a meeting and we agreed to meet each other the same day around ten o'clock in the evening in the Losinka [probably the park of that name, GF], not far from the Institute of the People's Commissariat of Transportation. At the agreed-upon time I arrived at that place. Soon after 10 p.m. an automobile approached the Institute. Out of it stepped a man, Japanese in appearance, wrapped in a fur coat. The Japanese man approached me, called me by my name, said his name was Nakamura, and stated that he was a correspondent of one of the Tokyo newspapers and that he was in transit from Japan to Europe and was staying for several days in Moscow.

Nakamura gave me greetings from Tanaka and expressed the desire to exchange views with me about a few questions that interested him.

<p. 254>

Our whole conversation was carried on in French.

QUESTION: The circumstances of your meeting with Nakamura, as you describe them, unquestionably show that this meeting had been arranged by the two of you when you left Harbin for the USSR. Otherwise the motives that prompted you to meet in Moscow with a Japanese man completely unknown to you are incomprehensible. Do you admit this?

ANSWER: You are quite correct, I do not at all intend to conceal the fact that at the end of 1934 Tanaka, during a conversation with me in Harbin, warned me that if it became essential to receive a consultation from me about one or another question connected with the so-called Russian problem, the Japanese would try to seek the possibility of establishing contact with me in

Moscow. I assert, however, that no final agreement about the circumstances of this meeting between us had been agreed upon.

QUESTION: Let us return to the circumstances of your meeting with Nakamura. Where and about what did you talk with him?

ANSWER: Nakamura invited me to sit in his automobile and for about an hour and a half we drove between Moscow and the Losinka, talking all the while. At the outset he spoke about my article in "Izvestiia," asked whether I had worked at this newspaper long and whether I was acquainted with Bukharin and his friends. To this I answered in the negative. He was further interested to learn what circles I frequented, and again spoke of the milieu of the Bukharin-Rykov group, which he called the group of **realist politicians**, much more far-sighted and possessing more social support than the Zinoviev-Kamenev group that had recently failed. To my reply that now it was scarcely possible to speak seriously about any role for the Bukharin-Rykov group, he noted that this group, in his opinion, was not at all as weak as it seemed, and that it had many overt and secret supporters in the different links of the Soviet apparatus. Then he asked me about the mood of the Soviet intelligentsia and about my own evaluation of the political situation. I briefly informed him about my point of view.

QUESTION: What did you tell Nakamura?

ANSWER: I set forth to Nakamura my evaluation of the situation in the country from the viewpoint of my theory of "Bonapartism." I said that the revolution was steadily moving along a Bonapartist road, that this Bonapartism of a certain sort was developing - above

all as the principle of the limitless personal power of the leader.

Then I turned Nakamura's attention to such measures of the government as the establishment of titles, awards, the institution of the rank of Marshal, the re-establishment of the Cossacks, etc. ... The emergence of "notable people" as it were emphasized the creation of a new aristocracy, that is it once again reminded one of the analogy to the Bonaparte epoch. I said that the execution of the Zinovievites was the first example in the history of the Russian Revolution of the acceptance of the methods of the Jacobins in struggle with revolutionaries: the "wet" guillotine instead of the "dry." In this spirit I gave him my evaluation about other events of the internal life of the country.

QUESTION: How did Nakamura react to the questions you laid out?

ANSWER: As though in answer to these "Bonapartist notes" of my remarks my interlocutor, unexpectedly for me, began to speak on the topic of **the Red Army and mentioned that, according to his information, the Rights had supports in its ranks also, more precisely in the milieu of its high command. That the Rights were not as powerless as I believed. The Japanese had reliable information about this, not only their own, but also that obtained from an allied source, just as interested as they were in the struggle against the Comintern.**⁹ There were reasons to affirm that the hopes and plans of the Rights were not at all baseless. And, so as not to be too vague, he could even name one name that was, in relation to this, rather weighty. **According to his information**

⁹ Presumably Germany.

"Mister Tukhachevsky" was connected by close political sympathies with the group of the Right communists. And Tukhachevsky was an impressive name, well known to political circles of all foreign governments, and that even the Russian emigration predicted that he was a "Russian Napoleon." Moreover, as one of the marshals, he was popular in the USSR.

To my question how he imagined the political program of such a Right-Military bloc he developed to me a series of conceptions that reminded me of the judgments expressed by Tanaka in 1934.

In the event of political success, the government of the Bukharin-Rykov group would fundamentally change the course of Soviet politics towards the side of coming closer to the desires of foreign states. In particular, Japan expected that this government would stop the work of the Comintern in China and would give Japan full freedom of action in China. At the same time Japan was expecting the significant expansion of various concessions in the Soviet Far East, possibly even an amicable agreement about the sale to it on acceptable terms of the northern part of Sakhalin. All this would radically lessen the current tense relations between Japan and the USSR.

To my question about the position of such a government in the sphere of European foreign policy Nakamura answered that **a sharp improvement in Soviet-German relations would take place.** A change in the system of the monopoly of foreign trade would reinvigorate commercial ties between both countries and German commercial expansion in the USSR. Territorial-political difficulties could be decided, to a significant extent, at the expense of Poland. The decommissioning of the activities of the Comintern would meet

Hitler's basic conditions. In a word, here we could expect a decisive turn in the whole contemporary international situation and the establishment of a peaceful equilibrium on a new basis. The Soviet Union would firmly enter the society of "normal" states that carry out the politics of healthy national egoism.

...

As he said goodbye to me the Japanese man gave me to understand that he would be very interested to hear more detailed and concrete thoughts from me about the questions touched upon in our talk. **He expressed the hope that on the basis of my collaboration on "Izvestiia" I would succeed in seeing Bukharin or some other Right communists, and also with their help meet with Tukhachevesky.** He added that in a few months on his way back from Europe to Japan he would like to meet with me again. On this note our conversation, which had lasted about one and a half hours, ended.

QUESTION: After your talk with Nakamura did you try to get in touch with Bukharin and his circle?

<p. 255>

ANSWER: No, I did not. The meeting with Nakamura took place at the end of December [1936], and in the middle of January 1937 we already knew about the upcoming trial of the parallel center [the Second Moscow Trial of January 23-30, 1937], and a month after that there came the rumor of the arrests of Bukharin and Rykov. All these events impelled me to take a position of waiting, and during this period came my arrest.

Ustrialov believed there was a connection between his publication of a philosophical article in *Izvestiia* in December 1936 and his being contacted by a Japanese agent and subsequently meeting with

him at the end of that month. At this time Bukharin was editor of *Izvestiia* and was publishing articles by well-known former oppositionists. Ustrialov was a former leading member of the Kadet (Constitutional Democrat) Party, the main capitalist party at the time of the Revolution, and former minister in the White Russian government of Admiral Kolchak. He had returned to the USSR when the Soviet share in the Chinese-Eastern Railway had been sold to Japan in 1935.

Though by this time he had "accepted" the Soviet regime as a Russian patriot he was also known as a right-winger in politics, founder of the *Smenovekhist* movement of exile Russian intellectuals who believed that the Soviet regime would "evolve" into something less radical. In essence this was a political perspective that counted on the Russian Revolution's evolving along similar lines to the French Revolution. Ustrialov saw in Stalin the "new Napoleon," or "Caesarism," as he put it.

Harbin, the city in Heilongjiang Province occupied by the Japanese from February 1932 was the largest settlement of White Russians in the world and teemed with agents and spies from all over the world.¹⁰ Ustrialov lived there between 1920, when it was still an outpost of the White Russian military resistance to the Bolshevik Revolution, and 1935, when Russian employees of the railroad were permitted to repatriate to the USSR if they wished, as Ustrialov chose to do.

In the course of this second part of his interrogation Ustrialov admitted that he had been contacted by Tanaka, whom Bystriantseva identifies as a member of the Upper House of the Japanese Diet (Parliament), an expert on Russian affairs, and as such, an agent of

¹⁰ "Harbin was a nest of the world's intelligence services and secret operations of the 1930s." («Харбин — это гнездо мировых разведок и тайных операций 30-х годов.») Mikhail Vishliakov, "Faces of the Transbaikal." Михаил Вишняков, «Лики Забайкалья». *Сибирские Огни: Литературно-Художественный Журнал*. № 2 (2004). http://www.hrono.ru/text/2004/vish_0204.html

the Japanese government. Ustrialov had met Tanaka as early as 1926.

Tanaka had told Ustrialov in 1934 in Harbin that the Japanese government would try to reestablish contact with him in Moscow in order to ask his advice "on the so-called Russian problem." Nakamura, the Japanese correspondent and, obviously, intelligence agent who contacted Ustrialov and met with him in late December 1936, gave an introduction – "greetings" – from "Harbin friends" and, when they met in person, from Tanaka. "Harbin friends" would have either been anti-Soviet Russian émigrés who had refused to repatriate or the Japanese themselves.

Ustrialov agreed to meet him in a clandestine manner. Ustrialov also did not volunteer this information, but only divulged it when his interrogator suggested that he knew this already. In the eyes of the NKVD and prosecution this would have been another mark against him. Citizens were supposed to report to the proper authorities any attempts by suspected agents of foreign powers to meet with them. The ninety-minute talk also took place in Tanaka's automobile. This was obviously an attempt at secrecy too.

Failure to contact the Soviet government at this point to inform them of the attempt by an obvious Japanese agent to contact him would certainly have put Ustrialov outside the law. The Soviet government would have regarded this as an agreement by Ustrialov to be a Japanese spy. Ustrialov did not notify the government, but was evidently found out anyway. He was in fact convicted and executed in September 1937 for espionage for Japan.

Nakamura asked about Bukharin "and his friends," showed much interest in them, and called them "realist politicians, much more far-sighted and having more social support than the Zinoviev-Kamenev group that had recently failed." He called them "not at all as weak as it seemed" and said they had much open and secret support within different areas of the Soviet Party and apparatus.

Nakamura then revealed that support for the Right opposition existed in the highest echelons of the Red Army, saying that the Jap-

Japanese knew this not only from their own information but from "another anti-Comintern ally." This was certainly Germany. The "anti-Comintern pact" between Germany and Japan had been formed in November 1936 and no other countries had joined it by July 1937 (Mussolini's Italy did not join it until November 1937). We have a great deal of evidence of collaboration of Tukhachevsky et al. with Germany. One small bit of it, the Mastny-Benes note, is discussed briefly earlier in the present volume.

Nakamura named Tukhachevsky as one of those who were very sympathetic to the Rights. He outlined the political program of the Rights in the same way Tanaka had done in 1934. According to Nakamura the Bukharin-Rykov group would, if they came to power, sharply change Soviet policy in the following ways.

- * Halt Comintern work in China. That would mean stopping all support for the Chinese Communist Party of Mao Tse-tung.
- * Let Japan have "a free hand" in China, to make it a Japanese colony.
- * Give Japan "significant concessions" in the Soviet Far East, including perhaps selling back to Japan the northern part of Sakhalin island.
- * Effect a sharp improvement in Soviet-German relations.
- * Expand trade with Germany and German markets in the USSR.
- * Stop supporting the Comintern. This presumably meant in Axis and pro-German countries at least, unless it meant "shutting it down entirely."
- * Enter into some kind of alliance with Germany against Poland.

This outline of the program of the Rights corresponds closely to that given briefly by Bukharin in his first confession of June 2, 1937, and that emerges from the testimony of Bukharin, Rykov, and the other defendants at the March 1938 Moscow Trial. It would mean that the USSR would then, in Ustrialov's words, "enter the society of 'normal' states," promoting national, rather than internationalist and class, interests.

Nakamura expressed the wish that Ustrialov should meet with Bukharin or other Rightists and hopefully, with their help, with Tukhachevsky again. This confirms that the Japanese government believed the possibilities for a Rightist – Military seizure of power was still very much alive in December 1936. And this is consistent with the information surrounding the Trauttmansdorff-Mastny talks only a few weeks later in early 1937. We have much evidence that at this time Hitler was still hoping the Rights and military could still take power.¹¹

Bystriantseva's Analysis

In her introduction to the text of this interrogation Bystriantseva, an expert on Ustrialov's life and works, admits that she is unable to establish that the remarks in it were forced upon Ustrialov by the interrogators. Despite whatever doubts she has, she goes on to take the interview seriously anyway and, in her other remarks, assumes it does indeed express Ustrialov's own views.

She states:

Хочется подчеркнуть, казалось бы, общеизвестное, но слишком часто нарушаемое правило: анализ документа предполагает обязательное знание не только всей деятельности Н.В.Устрялова, но и его целостного мировоззрения. (246 col. 2)

...

¹¹ See, for example, our discussion of the Mastny-Benes note in a previous chapter.

Можно сказать, что данный протокол является последним разговором, беседой Устрялова с будущим поколением. (248 col. 2)

Translated:

I wish to emphasize a rule that it seems, should be generally understood but is frequently broken: the analysis of this document presupposes the obligatory knowledge not only of all of the activity of N.V. Ustrialov but also of his world-view as a whole.

...

It can be said that his transcript represents the final conversation, by Ustrialov with the generation of the future.

This argues strongly for the genuineness of Ustrialov's confessions in two ways. For one thing, how would an NKVD interrogator know Ustrialov's views so well that he could forge or "script" the transcript of an interrogation to sound genuine to an expert like Bystriantseva? For another, Bystriantseva herself is expert in Ustrialov's works and worldview. Yet she admits that she is unable to conclude the transcript of the interview with Tukhachevsky was faked.

Bystriantseva herself obviously believes that the interrogation was not falsified. She writes that she considers this interrogation Ustrialov's "last thoughts, his hopes, his words to the future." Her words are further evidence that the interrogation is genuine, and that the remarks attributed to Ustrialov in it were, in fact, his own.

But if the interrogation was not falsified in those parts of it where Ustrialov expresses his political and philosophical views, then this is additional strong evidence that the rest of the interrogation is genuine as well, including the sections that interest us.

Elsewhere in the article Bystriantseva notes that in the transcript Ustrialov's friend, the jurist Nikolai Pavlovich Sheremet'evskii, is called Nikolai Borisovich – an error that the real Ustrialov could not possibly make in the case of a friend. She is undoubtedly right that Ustrialov would not have made such a mistake. But this is an error that a typist working from a shorthand transcript could easily make. It proves nothing in itself.

Ustrialov's cousin Ekaterina Grigor'evna Shaposhnikova did in fact tutor Tukhachevsky's daughter in the Russian language, as Ustrialov states elsewhere in the transcript. Bystriantseva notes that Shaposhnikova's son's denial that the meeting took place has no significance.

Ustrialov states that his cousin Shaposhnikova was "an elderly woman of about fifty" and completely apolitical. As Bystriantseva suggests, Ustrialov undoubtedly said this to keep suspicion away from her. In fact Shaposhnikova was born in 1896 and would have been no more than forty-one at the time of the meeting with Tukhachevsky. She did in fact escape arrest and lived until 1983. In any event, this detail seems to be genuine.

Bystriantseva also published notes on the "rehabilitation hearings" held in Ustrialov's case in 1988. This was a time when rehabilitations of the "victims of Stalinism" were proceeding at a high rate and in large numbers. But the military prosecutor failed to recommend Ustrialov's rehabilitation based on the evidence he had. The documents reveal that a previous rehabilitation investigation in 1955-56 also failed to reach any conclusive results, and left a number of unanswered questions. This earlier study confirmed that Ustrialov had been a leading member of the Kadet Party and had been personally singled out by Lenin as an enemy of the Soviet regime. Ustrialov had certainly been an outspoken opponent of the Soviet regime in this period.

Ustrialov confessed as well to long contact with Japanese intelligence. In effect this made him a Japanese agent. The Khrushchev- and early Gorbachev-era rehabilitation commissions must have considered this in their decisions not to rehabilitate him. Although

Ustrialov was at length rehabilitated on October 17, 1989, the materials Bystriantseva cites suggest that these points were not cleared up even at that time. By the late Gorbachev period almost every application for rehabilitation was being accepted.

The earlier rehabilitation study of Ustrialov's criminal case file reveals that Ustrialov confirmed his guilt at his trial, while it states that no other inculpatory materials were presented at the trial other than his own confessions in the preliminary investigation and again at his trial on September 14, 1937.¹² We would expect that the indictment would state the grounds on which the suspicion of "counterrevolutionary activity" was based - that is, what circumstances had excited the interest of the NKVD and led to Ustrialov's arrest.

Ustrialov named a number of his friends among whom, he said, he had "set forth his counterrevolutionary views." Some of them were repressed between 1937 and 1940. But others were evidently not repressed in any way and lived into the '50s, '60s, '70s and even '80s.

Названные Устряловым (Устряловым ли?) фамилии не были тайной для органов (и мы считаем необходимым особо подчеркнуть, что большая часть из этих лиц не только не пострадала, но и продолжала работать, получая награды от советского правительства). (248 col. 1-2)

Translated:

The names named by Ustrialov - if it was he - were no secret to the "organs" (and we consider it essential to specially emphasize the fact that most of these persons not only were not repressed, but even continued

¹² We discuss this issue of convictions based only upon the defendant's confession in a short appendix to this chapter.

to work and received awards from the Soviet government.)

This suggests that the names were not suggested by the interrogators in order to find a pretext to arrest and repress these people. The only logical conclusion that remains is that Ustrialov did in fact name them himself.

Ustrialov's statement is consistent with Tukhachevsky's confessions; with the pre-trial confessions we have from Bukharin and Krestinsky; and with the testimony at the March 1938 Moscow trial. Both Tukhachevsky and Nakamura referred to the Rights, or Bukharin-Rykov group, as the "realist politicians." Radek said that he used the same term for the bloc of Rights and Trotskyists in his discussions with the German military attaché General K. (evidently German military attaché General Ernst Köstring).

In this context there seems little reason to doubt the genuineness of the Arao document, since it is obviously compatible with Nakamura's knowledge of Tukhachevsky's political orientation against the Soviet government and towards the Axis.¹³ Ustrialov's confession also argues in favor of its being genuine.

The Ustrialov Evidence and The Moscow Trials

The relevance of Ustrialov's confession to our evaluation of the Moscow Trials, including the accusations made there of Trotsky's collaboration with the Germans and Japanese, are very clear. The bloc of Rights and Trotskyites was accused of working with Tukhachevsky and his military co-conspirators and confessed to doing that.

¹³ We discuss the Arao document in an earlier chapter of this work.

In a previous chapter we have reproduced passages from the testimony of Rozengol'ts, Rykov, Grinko, Krestinsky, and Bukharin concerning the Tukhachevsky conspiracy. In them the defendants at the Third Moscow Trial admit collaboration with Tukhachevsky and his group of military men, and indicate that Trotsky was involved in this collaboration also.

Ustrialov's confession is thus strong evidence in support of the essentially reliable nature of Moscow Trials confessions as evidence, as well as of Trotsky's involvement in the conspiracy of the bloc - something we know from the Trotsky Archive is true in any case.

* * *

During the Khrushchev and Gorbachev years "rehabilitations" were often justified by the statement that the only evidence against the defendant presented at trial was the defendant's own confessions. Works by anticommunist scholars repeat this charge as though it represented some kind of tyrannical practice.

This is deliberately misleading. In the American criminal justice system and, perhaps, others as well, the prosecution does not go to the expense and trouble of presenting a case, calling witnesses, and presenting evidence, if the defendant has pled guilty. A defendant's guilty plea does not imply that the prosecution did not have evidence and witnesses in case the defendant pled innocent. In the Soviet criminal justice system in the 1930s a defendant had to confirm his confessions of guilt (if he had made any) at trial. Many defendants confessed before trial, confirmed their confessions to the investigation before trial, and then refused to confirm them at trial. In those cases the prosecution presented the evidence it had. This happened in the case of Nikolai Ezhov in February 1940. Despite the fact that he refused to confirm his many confessions at trial Ezhov was convicted on the testimony of others who testified against him.

Chapter 12. Conclusion – The Moscow Trials As Evidence

Moscow Trial Defendants Who Lied

We can establish that some of the Moscow Trial defendants lied deliberately to the court.

A few words of caution are needed lest the reader mistakenly conclude: "If a witness tells a lie once, he must be lying all the time." Of course this is not so. The fact that someone has made *one* verifiably false statement does not in the least mean that *all* his or her statements must be false. Likewise, someone who had made a verifiably *true* statement does not necessarily tell the truth all the time. Each statement must be checked. Historians should verify, not "believe."

The fact that in example after example we have shown that Trotsky lied while defendants at the first two Moscow Trials told the truth does not mean that *all* the testimony and accusations in the Moscow Trials were true. Verifiable falsehoods can be found in them – but not, as is commonly believed, in the form of false accusations by the prosecution or false confessions of guilt by innocent defendants. Rather the falsehoods we can now demonstrate were told by guilty defendants who continued to deceive the prosecution and court.

Sokol'nikov

For example, we can now confirm that the following statement made by Sokol'nikov in his final statement at trial, is false:

I can add nothing to the information and the evaluations which were here given by the members of the centre – Pyatakov and Radek. I think that these evaluations have been sufficiently frank, and I fully

share them. But I cannot add anything of my own, because **I was not in direct communication with Trotsky, I was not directly connected with him**, and received information through third persons. (1937 Trial 555)

Getty found a certified mail receipt of a letter to Sokol'nikov in London that Trotsky mailed sometime during 1932. The receipt is strong evidence that Sokol'nikov did receive the letter. Assuming the letter reached him - a similar letter did reach Radek - it follows that Sokol'nikov falsely denied having been in contact with Trotsky in 1932 although Radek admitted he had received Trotsky's letter in the same year.

We don't know why Sokol'nikov did this. Possibly Sokol'nikov believed that direct contact with Trotsky would be considered a more serious crime.

Radek

Some Moscow Trial defendants withheld more substantive matters from the prosecution. During the first part of his testimony Radek mentioned the name of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky (105). Later Vyshinsky asked Radek why he had done so. Radek replied "Of course, Tukhachevsky had no idea either of Putna's role or of my criminal role," adding

I say that I never had and could not have had any dealings with Tukhachevsky connected with counter-revolutionary activities, because I knew Tukhachevsky's attitude to the Party and the government to be that of an absolutely devoted man. (146)

These passages in which Tukhachevsky's name is mentioned are omitted from the published Russian-language transcript, which is less than half the length of the English transcript. We don't know why. It is possible that the much shorter Russian transcript was published soon after the trial while the fuller English version was

published later in the year after Tukhachevsky and other top military leaders had been arrested, tried, and convicted of espionage and treason in May-June 1937.

Radek must have known about Tukhachevsky's conspiracy. Bukharin knew about it, and he was closely in touch with Radek. Maybe Radek was still hoping in January 1937 that Tukhachevsky and the other military men would be successful in overthrowing the Stalin regime. Even Bukharin waited to mention Tukhachevsky's participation in the conspiracy until June 2, 1937, a week after Tukhachevsky had been arrested and had begun to confess.

Similarly, Bukharin concealed the involvement of Commissar of the NKVD Nikolai Ezhov with the conspiracy. We know that Bukharin knew of Ezhov's role by 1935 at the latest. In his first pretrial confession, again at his trial, and finally in his two appeals to the Soviet Supreme Court Bukharin claimed that he had completely "disarmed," confessed everything he knew. He said the same thing in his letter of December 10, 1937, to Stalin in which he retracted all his previous confessions, and whose content he then later retracted in turn. Perhaps Bukharin too was still hoping that Ezhov would be successful where Tukhachevsky and his own bloc of Rights and Trotskyists had failed.

If Bukharin had named Ezhov as a co-conspirator the Soviet government could have dismissed him from his post as Commissar of Internal Affairs – head of the NKVD – as much as 18 months before he was finally induced to resign in November 1938. The hundreds of thousands of murders of innocent Soviet citizens carried out under Ezhov's leadership in 1937-1938, often called the *Ezhovshchina* or "Great Terror," could have been greatly reduced in number and perhaps prevented altogether.¹

¹ Grover Furr and Vladimir L. Bobrov, "Verdikt: Vinioven" [Verdict: Guilty]. In *1937. Pravo-sudie Stalina. Obzhalovaniu ne podlezhit!* Moscow: Eksmo-Algoritm, 2010, 13-63.

Zinoviev and Kamenev

Zinoviev and Kamenev knew about NKVD Commissar Iagoda's involvement in the conspiracy of Rightists but did not reveal that fact before or at their August 1936 trial. We know this now because in 1997 eight pretrial interrogations of Iagoda were published in Russia in the provincial city of Kazan' in a tiny press run of only 200 copies. In 2004 a semi-official volume of documents published by the right-wing anticommunist "Memorial" organization also published one of these interrogations, making it clear that they are genuine.

Iagoda testified as follows:

По отношению к Зиновьеву и Каменеву у меня была двойственная политика.

Я не мог допустить, чтобы следствие по их делу далеко зашло. Я боялся их откровенных показаний. Они могли бы выдать весь заговор....

Наряду с этим положение Зиновьева и Каменева, осужденных и находящихся в изоляторе, все время меня беспокоило. А вдруг они там что-либо надумают, надоест им сидеть и они разразятся полными и откровенными показаниями о заговоре, о центре, о моей роли (Каменев, как участник общего центра заговора, несомненно знал обо мне и о том, что я являюсь участником заговора). Я говорю, что это обстоятельство все время меня тревожило. Правда, я принял все меры к тому, чтобы создать Зиновьеву и Каменеву наиболее благоприятные условия в тюрьме: книги, бумагу, питание, прогулки - все это они получали без ограничения. Но чем черт не шутит? Они были опасными свидетелями.

Поэтому, докладывая дело в ЦК, я, чтобы покончить с ними, предлагал Зиновьева и Каменева расстрелять.

Это не прошло потому, что данных для расстрела действительно не было.

... Летом 1936 г. из политизоляторов в Москву для привлечения к следствию по делу центра троцкистско-зиновьевского блока были доставлены Зиновьев и Каменев. Мне, как я уже говорил, нужно было с ними покончить: они все равно были уже провалены, третий раз привлекались, и я очень беспокоился, чтобы они где-нибудь на следствии не болтнули лишнего. Поэтому я считал необходимым поговорить с ними. Ясно, что ни на допросах, ни вызывать их в кабинет для разговора я не мог. Поэтому я стал практиковать обход некоторых камер арестованных во внутренней тюрьме. Почти во все камеры я заходил вместе с начальником тюрьмы Поповым. К <с. 199:> Зиновьеву и Каменеву (в отдельности к каждому) я тоже зашел, предупредив Попова, чтобы он остался за дверью.

За время 5-10 минут я успел предупредить Зиновьева и Каменева о том, кто арестован, какие имеются показания. Заявил им, что никаких данных о других центрах, принимавших участие в заговоре, тем более об общем центре, следствие не знает.

"Не все еще потеряно, ничего не выдавайте сами. Центр заговора действует. Вне зависимости от приговора суда вы вернетесь ко мне," - говорил я им. И Зиновьев и Каменев на следствии и на суде, как вы знаете, выполнили мои указания. А после приговора они были расстреляны. Это было в августе 1936 г.

Translated:

In relation to Zinoviev and Kamenev my policy was twofold. I could not permit the investigation of their case to go too far. **I was afraid of any frank confessions from them. They could give up the whole conspiracy. ...**

At the same time I was still troubled by the situation of Zinoviev and Kamenev who had been convicted and were in prison. Lest, suddenly, they get to thinking too much, get tired of sitting in prison, and suddenly burst out with full and frank confessions about the conspir-

acy, about the center, about my role (**Kamenev, as a participant in the general center of the conspiracy, unquestionably knew about me and about the fact that I was a participant in the conspiracy**). I say that this situation was troubling me all the time. True, I took all means to obtain for Zinoviev and Kamenev the most agreeable conditions in prison: books, paper, food, walks - all this they received without limit. But what the devil! They were dangerous witnesses. Therefore when I reported on this case to the Central Committee, in order to be finished with them, I proposed that Zinoviev and Kamenev be shot. This was not accepted because the facts necessary for their execution [to convict them of a capital crime - GF] really did not exist.

... In the summer of 1936 Zinoviev and Kamenev were sent from the political prisons to Moscow in order to be brought to trial in the case of the Trotskyist-Zinovievite bloc. As I have already said, I needed to finish them. They were already doomed, about to be tried for the third time; and I was very worried lest at some point in the investigation they let drop something they should not. Therefore I began to make rounds of some of the cells of arrested suspects in the inner prison. I dropped in to almost all the cells together with Popov, the chief of the prison. I also dropped in on Zinoviev and Kamenev (separately on each of them), after telling Popov to remain outside.

In the space of 5 - 10 minutes I succeeded in informing Zinoviev and Kamenev about who had been arrested and what kind of confessions they had made. I told them that the investigation did not know any facts about the other centers that were taking part in the conspiracy, much less about the general center. **"Everything is not lost, do not give up anything**

yourselves. The conspiratorial center is still functioning. No matter what sentence the court hands down you will return to me," I told them. And Zinoviev and Kamenev, as you know, carried out my instructions during the investigation and at the trial. And after their sentencing they were shot. This was in August 1936. (Genrikh Iagoda 192; 198-9)

Iagoda rushed Kamenev and Zinoviev to execution before they could expose yet more of the conspiracy.

It appears that Nikolai Bukharin felt the same way:

We now have some of the letters that Bukharin wrote to Party leaders after the Zinov'ev-Kamenev trial. In his letter of August 27, 1936 to Stalin, Bukharin wrote:

Excellent that these scoundrels have been executed; the air became immediately cleaner.

In a letter to Voroshilov of a few days later, September 1, 1936, Bukharin calls Kamenev "cynic and murderer," "most loathsome of men," "human carrion." It had been Kamenev who at the August 1936 Moscow Trial implicated Bukharin as one of the leaders of the Rights as late as 1934, something Bukharin loudly denied. Bukharin added that he was "fearfully glad" (*strashno rad*) that "the dogs" - he means Zinov'ev and Kamenev - "have been shot."

Bukharin's words have the sound of someone who "doth protest too much." Sure enough, in these letters Bukharin is trying hard to convince Stalin and others

that what Zinov'ev and Kamenev said about him at their 1936 Trial was false. In fact, it was anything but!²

From other similar events Stalin concluded that the Oppositionists had an agreement to kill any of their number who named names. In reply to a remark by Bukharin, Stalin explained this at the December 1936 Central Committee Plenum.

А что же теперь оказалось, вы поглядите! После этого мы человек 50, по крайней мере, опросили. Ведь они все нутро Пятакова выворотили. Это же чудовищный человек оказался! Почему он шел на то, чтобы выступить общественным обвинителем? Почему он шел на то, чтобы самому расстреливать своих товарищей? Оказывается, у них правило такое: ежели твой единомышленник-троцкист арестован и стал выдавать людей, его надо уничтожить. Вы видите, какая адская штука получается. Верь после этого в искренность бывших оппозиционеров! Нельзя верить на слово бывшим оппозиционерам даже тогда, когда они берутся собственноручно расстрелять своих друзей.

Translated:

But as for how things have turned out, you can see yourself! After that we questioned about 50 people, at least. They really turned Piatakov inside out. It turns out that he's a monster of a person! So why did he agree to be the public prosecutor? Why did he agree to shoot his comrades himself? It turns out that they have a rule like this: If your fellow Trotskyist is arrested and has begun to give up the names of others, he must be destroyed. You can see what kind of hellish joke this comes to. Believe after this in the sincerity of

² Furr, Grover and Vladimir L. Bobrov. "Stephen Cohen's Biography of Bukharin: A Study in the Falsehood of Khrushchev-Era 'Revelations.'" In *Cultural Logic* 2010. At <http://clogic.eserver.org/2010/Furr.pdf>

former oppositionists! We can't take former oppositionists at their word even when they volunteer to shoot their friends with their own hands. (*Voprosy Istorii* 1, 1995, pp. 9-10.)³

Bukharin, Iagoda and others

Like Bukharin, Iagoda certainly knew about Ezhov's participation in the conspiracy as well, and like Bukharin he did not tell "the whole truth" at his trial.⁴ In another chapter we have quoted the remarks by Mikhail Frinovsky in which he states that Bukharin, Iagoda, Bulanov, and perhaps others knew about Ezhov's conspiracy and did not reveal it.

In the "mercury affair" (*rtutnoe delo*), which we mentioned in Chapter 1, Ezhov told Bulanov to lie in order to build up his own, Ezhov's, credibility. It was discovered after Ezhov's arrest.

Results Beyond Trotsky: The Moscow Trial Testimony

The conclusion of our verification of the Moscow Trials testimony is this:

* Whenever we can check independent evidence concerning a contradiction between Moscow Trial testimony and Trotsky's responses, it is the Moscow Trial testimony, not Trotsky's denial, that proves to have been truthful.

³ For Stalin's whole remarks see <http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrgr/research/stalinonoppsvi11995.html>

⁴ This is confirmed both in Iagoda's confessions in the 1997 volume *Genrikh Iagoda. Narkom vnutrennikhdel SSSR, General'niy komissar gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti. Sbornik dokumentov*. Kazan', 1997, and in the April 11, 1939 confession-statement by Ezhov's right-hand man Mikhail Frinovskii, a translation of which may be consulted at <http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrgr/research/frinovskyeng.html>

* As far as we can now determine, on the basis of the evidence we now possess, none of the Moscow Trial defendants gave false testimony that was wrung from them by the NKVD, the Prosecution, or anyone else, including Stalin.

The present study too adds credibility to the Moscow Trials themselves, while casting doubt on Trotsky's denials and on the Khrushchev-era and Gorbachev-era "Rehabilitation" reports.

In the second part of this book and in volume two we examine further evidence that Trotsky did urge "terror" against the Soviet leadership and did collaborate with Germany and Japan. These were among the most important and most dramatic charges made at the trials. The evidence that Trotsky was guilty of spurring his Soviet followers to the use of "terror" or assassination against the Stalin leadership goes a step farther towards confirming the basic trustworthiness of the testimony given at the Moscow trials.

As far as we can now determine, on the evidence now available the Moscow Trial defendants:

- (a) were guilty of at least those crimes to which they confessed;
- (b) said what they themselves chose to say in their trial testimony.

This conclusion will be ideologically unacceptable to those who cut their historical conclusions to fit their political prejudices. There is no lack of such persons in and around the field of Soviet history and in politics. In the present case neither ideological anticommunists nor, of course, Trotskyists will be persuaded by this or any conceivable evidence. "Political correctness" – ideological acceptability to influential forces motivated not by the search for historical truth but by political agendas is, of course, not a category of historical evidence and has no place in the struggle to discover the truth.

In the eyes of many persons the evidence that Trotsky really did urge his followers in the USSR to employ "terror" would appear to

justify the Moscow Trials. By the same token the evidence that the defendants in the Moscow Trials were guilty will appear to justify the actions of Stalin and the Soviet government of the day. After all, no country would fail to pursue and deal harshly with persons and groups who were guilty of the crimes to which the Moscow Trials defendants confessed.

Powerful forces both within the field of Soviet studies and beyond it will find this conclusion to be intolerable on political grounds. The Cold War in historical studies against communism continues with a vengeance. The histories of most if not all of the new post-Soviet states are constructed upon a demonization of communism, especially of Stalin and the USSR during his time. The academic study and teaching of Soviet history is dominated by a tacit requirement that Stalin and the USSR during his day be condemned.

Meanwhile Trotskyism is not just tolerated but accorded an honored place in the field of Soviet history. Two avowedly Trotskyist journals, *Revolutionary History* and *Critique*, publish articles in the field of Soviet history. The latter is published by Taylor and Francis Ltd., a major publisher of mainstream academic journals in the U.K. Pierre Broué was eulogized by Bernhard Bayerlein, editor of the anticommunist *Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismusforschung*. Broué worked with Bayerlein on a number of anti-communist research projects. Broué was a member of the board of Bayerlein's "International Newsletter of Communist Studies."⁵

Knowledge that the Moscow Trials were honest and the defendants guilty will do much to debunk other harmful "cults" that are still thriving. In some countries the "cult" around Trotsky remains influential on the anti-imperialist and pro-working class Left. The "cult" of the demonization of Stalin is even more widespread, not only geographically but ideologically, its adherents raging from

⁵ See details at <http://www.dr-bayerlein.eu/books.html>

anarchists and Trotskyists, to liberals, to conservatives and fascists.

These "cults" are nourished by the myth that Trotsky and the Moscow Trials defendants were "framed" in the Moscow Trials. They persist only through ignoring the evidence that we have and through misinterpretation, often flagrant, of the evidence that is not ignored.

The Moscow Trials Testimony as Evidence

Whenever we can check a fact-claim made by a defendant in the Moscow Trials against independent evidence we have found that the defendant was telling the truth, in that the fact-claim in question can be verified independently.

In a few cases a defendant chose to deceive the prosecution, apparently with a view to concealing his responsibility for acts of which, he hoped, the prosecution was unaware, or of preserving what remained of the conspiracy, or both.

Since the defendants' fact-claims that we can check have turned out to be truthful, we have no basis to dismiss other fact-claims whose truthfulness we cannot check. The success of this verification process means that researchers may properly use the fact-claims made by Moscow Trial defendants as evidence.

The importance of this result for our further investigation of Leon Trotsky's conspiratorial activities during the 1930s should be obvious. We now have no reason to reject the statements made by defendants concerning Trotsky's conspiratorial activities.

However, we now possess much more evidence of Trotsky's conspiratorial activities than that contained in statements by Moscow Trials defendants. In the second part of this book we examine other evidence of Trotsky's conspiracies. Much of this evidence comes from Trotsky's own false statements, through which he carelessly or unconsciously revealed, in part, that which he wished to conceal.

The second volume of this work will examine more evidence concerning Trotsky's collaboration with Germany and Japan.

Part Two. Trotsky's Lies and
The Murder of Sergei Kirov

Chapter 13. Trotsky on the Kirov Assassination

On December 1, 1934 Sergei M. Kirov, First Secretary of the Bolshevik party in Leningrad, Politburo member, and close associate of Joseph Stalin, was murdered outside his office by Leonid Nikolaev, an unemployed party member. Nikolaev tried to commit suicide but failed and was captured. Within a few days he had named as his accomplices a number of members of an underground group of Party members loyal to Grigory Zinoviev, whom Kirov had replaced as Leningrad party chief.

Our study of the discoveries made during the past several decades in the Harvard Trotsky Archive and of documents from former Soviet archives published since the end of the USSR permits us to read Trotsky's writings on the Kirov assassination in a new light. Trotsky's article purports to be an attempt to understand the Kirov assassination by scrutinizing the Soviet government's reporting about it. But we can now see that it is not this at all. Rather, Trotsky's article is a coverup, an attempt to use lies and misdirection to keep hidden Trotsky's and his followers' involvement in a bloc with the clandestine Zinovievist group that did carry out Kirov's murder.

The *Biulleten' Oppozitsii* – in English, the Bulletin of the [Russian] Opposition (henceforth B.O.) – was Leon Trotsky's periodical journal during the years between his expulsion from the Soviet Union 1929 and his assassination in August 1940. Written and published in Russian, it has never been translated in its entirety. But many of Trotsky's individual articles, published first in the B.O., have been translated and published separately. In the case of B.O. #41 of January 1935, a single article of Trotsky's occupied an entire issue. We have verified that the English version, titled "The Stalinist Bureaucracy and the Assassination of Kirov," is a faithful translation

of the entire issue #41 of the B.O., and will use the English translation here.¹

"Amalgam"

We need to say something about Trotsky's frequent use of the word "amalgam." In Russian *amal'gama* can be used to mean any kind of mixture or combination. Trotsky uses it very frequently in Russian to mean something like "false account of events." Following Trotsky's practice his English translators employ the word "amalgam." Trotsky uses the word "amalgam" two dozen times in this one article alone. He defines it in the following way:

It was clear, however, that this information relating to the "Zinoviev group" was not issued by accident; it could imply nothing else but the preparation of a jural "amalgam," that is to say, a consciously false attempt to implicate in the assassination of Kirov **individuals and groups who did not and could not have anything in common with the terrorist act.**

One interesting result of our research is the discovery that it was not Stalin but Trotsky himself, who composed "amalgams" the "consciously false" accounts of events surrounding the Kirov murder.

Trotsky's "amalgams" – one of which was the charge that it was Stalin who was composing "amalgams" – served Trotsky's aims in two ways. They were an attempt to discredit accusations made by the Soviet prosecution against the various oppositionists. All of these men had been followers of Trotsky's, had worked closely with Trotsky, or were themselves followers of one or more of the

¹ "Leon Trotsky: On the Kirov Assassination (December 1934)." At <http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1934/12/kirov.htm> Unless otherwise identified all quotations attributed to Trotsky here are to this two-part article. The Russian original of *Biulleten' Oppozitsii* is at <http://www.mit.edu/people/fjk/BO/BO-41.html> and at http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/BO/BO_No_41/Main.html

oppositionists who had, such as Zinoviev. Also, by accusing Stalin of composing "amalgams," i.e. of lying, Trotsky deflected attention away from his own falsehoods. Since many of these could have easily been discovered if anyone had checked, perhaps the only effective "smokescreen" or cover-up at Trotsky's disposal was to call Stalin the liar first.

Trotsky listed the fifteen Moscow-based Zinovievists whose arrests had been announced in *Pravda*. Two of those arrested were Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, who we know were part of the bloc of Trotskyists and Zinovievists formed with Trotsky's permission in 1932. A third was Safarov, a Zinoviev follower whom Leon Sedov, Trotsky's son and his main political aide, had identified in 1932 as one who would shortly join the bloc.² We have reproduced the texts of Sedov's and Trotsky's letters about the bloc at the end of the present volume.

We have independent evidence from Soviet archives that Safarov was recruiting others to this same bloc in August 1932. According to this testimony Safarov was telling others that the bloc had regular contact with Trotsky,³ a fact confirmed by materials in the Harvard Trotsky Archive.

В августе 1932 г. я был у него в Москве на улице Грановского, 5 в Доме советов. САФАРОВ, убедившись в неизменности моих антисоветских убеждений, сообщил мне, что зиновьевцы имеют свой конспиративный центр и в блоке с троцкистами продолжают борьбу против ЦК ВКП(б). Видя, что в лице САФАРОВА я могу найти возможного союзника нашей антисоветской организации, я в свою очередь

² Letters by Trotsky and his son Leon Sedov discussing the formation of the bloc in 1932 and its composition were discovered in 1980 in the Harvard Trotsky Archive by Pierre Broué, at the time the most prominent Trotskyist historian in the world. Broué reported these findings, including a letter naming Zinoviev, Kamenev, Safarov and others in Pierre Broué, "Trotsky et le bloc des oppositions de 1932." *CahLT* 5 (1980) 5-37. The discovery of the bloc is discussed and the relevant part of Sedov's letter quoted in English translation in Furr Kirov 131-133.

³ Interrogation of S. Kh. Khodzhanov, July 31, 1937. In *Lubianka. 1937-1938 Document No. 155* p. 290.

рассказал ему, что вхожу в нелегальную националистическую антисоветскую организацию, борющуюся против ВКП(б) и советской власти. САФАРОВ выдвинул передо мной вопрос о блоке троцкистско-зиновьевского центра с нашей организацией для совместной борьбы против ВКП(б). Он также информировал меня, что у них имеется регулярная связь с ТРОЦКИМ, и они считают необходимым действовать в союзе с агрессивными странами.

Translated:

In August 1932 I was with him in Moscow at 5 Granovsky Street, in the Palace of Soviets. SAFAROV, convinced that my anti-Soviet convictions had not changed, informed me that the Zinovievists had their conspiratorial center and in a bloc with the Trotskyists were continuing the struggle against the CC of the VKP(b). Seeing that in SAFAROV I could find a possible ally for our anti-Soviet organization, I told him in turn that I had joined an illegal nationalist anti-soviet organization that was struggling against the VKP(b) and against Soviet authority. SAFAROV posed the question of a bloc between the Trotskyist-Zinovievist center and our organization for mutual struggle against the VKP(b). He also informed me that they had regular contact with TROTSKY, and that they considered it essential to act in concert with aggressor countries.

The fact that we know from the Trotsky Archive that the bloc existed and included both Trotskyists and Zinovievists, as Khodzhanov testifies here, is further evidence that the NKVD was *not* falsifying interrogation-confessions. In Part One of the present volume we set forth a great deal of evidence that the Moscow Trials testimony is genuine – represents what the defendants chose to say.

Trotsky did his best to distance himself from Zinoviev and Kamenev by attacking them:

There is not the slightest reason or motive for us to defend the policies or personal reputations of Zinoviev, Kamenev and their friends. They were at the head of that faction which inaugurated the struggle against Marxist internationalism under the name of "Trotskyism"; they were subsequently driven against the bureaucratic wall raised with their own efforts and under their own leadership; having taken fright at their own handiwork, they joined the Left Opposition for a brief period and revealed the frauds and falsehoods utilized in the struggle against "Trotskyism"; frightened by the difficulties of the struggle against the usurping bureaucracy, they capitulated; reinstated to the party, they substituted for principled opposition, sniping, secret machinations; they were again expelled – they capitulated for the second time.

They disavowed the banner of Marxism and camouflaged themselves, hoping to gain a place in the party which had been corrupted and strangled by the apparatus. Having generally lost esteem and confidence, and even the possibility of waging a struggle, they found themselves, in the end, cruelly punished. It is not our task to defend them!

These paragraphs are a lie. We know now that Trotsky and his Soviet-based followers really were in a bloc with Zinoviev, Kamenev, Safarov, and others. That means that this verbal assault by Trotsky on Zinoviev, Kamenev "and their friends" was a coverup intended to mask Trotsky's real relations with these men through the bloc. It was a part of Trotsky's "amalgam." Likewise, Trotsky often wrote sharp attacks on Karl Radek claiming that, on principle, he had not been in any contact, direct or indirect, with Radek, when in fact we know that he had indeed written Radek at exactly the time

Radek disclosed during his testimony at the January 1937 Moscow Trial.⁴

Documents from Trotsky's own archive now permit us to see that in the cases of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Radek Trotsky's attacks were a cover for conspiratorial ties. Therefore we cannot take any of Trotsky's attacks on any opposition figures at face value.

Trotsky argued that Zinoviev and Kamenev "could not" have been involved in Kirov's assassination on two grounds. First, because these "old Bolsheviks, the most intimate collaborators of Lenin, those who shared power with Stalin, members of the 'Old Guard,'" could not possibly "have posed for their task the *restoration of capitalism*." Second, because Bolshevism and Marxism-Leninism firmly prohibit "individual terror" (assassination).⁵

"Terror"

Trotsky insisted that the Zinovievists could not be involved in the assassination of Kirov because terrorism is incompatible with Marxism.

The negative attitude of Marxism towards the tactic of individual terror is known to every worker able to read and write. A great deal has been written on this question.

Therefore, Trotsky asserted, Zinoviev and Kamenev could not have been involved in Kirov's murder.

⁴ Evidence of this letter was discovered in the Harvard Trotsky Archive by American historian J. Arch Getty. See Getty TIE 24-35. For the evidence that this letter was the one Radek mentioned in his testimony at the January 1937 Moscow Trial (sometimes called the "Radek-Piatakov Trial" or "Second Moscow Trial") see Furr, Kirov, 321. We discuss this matter in detail in another chapter of the present book.

⁵ A careful reading of all the Soviet materials related to the Kirov murder and published during December 1934 reveals that Zinoviev and Kamenev were not, in fact, accused of plotting "the restoration of capitalism." We explore this apparently unaccountable remark of Trotsky's in a later chapter.

Zinoviev and Kamenev were lacking in character; but no one considered them fools or ignorant buffoons. The other thirteen above named Bolsheviks lived through the experiences of the Bolshevik party for 25-30 and more years. They could not suddenly turn to a belief in the utility of individual terror for changing the social régime...

Nor, says Trotsky, could he himself be suspected of stooping to terror. Quoting from an article of his own published in 1911 he continued:

To this article which counterposed to terrorist adventurism the method of preparing the proletariat for the socialist revolution, I can add nothing today, twenty-three years later.

Trotsky theorized that terrorists were guilty of the same kind of cult-of-great-man thinking as he discerned in the Soviet party.

Individual terrorism is in its very essence bureaucratism turned inside out. For Marxists this law was not discovered yesterday. Bureaucratism has no confidence in the masses, and endeavors to substitute itself for the masses. Terrorism works in the same manner; it seeks to make the masses happy without asking their participation. The Stalinist bureaucracy has created a vile leader-cult, attributing to leaders divine qualities. "Hero" worship is also the religion of terrorism, only with a minus sign.

Then he uses language similar to that used by his son Leon Sedov when talking to Mark Zborowski in January 1937.

Trotsky, December - January 1934-1935: "The Nikolaievs imagine that all that is necessary is to remove a few leaders by means of a revolver in order for history to take another course."

Sedov, January 1937: "While he was reading newspapers 'Sonny' said that since the whole regime in the USSR is held up by Stalin, it would be enough to kill Stalin for it all to fall apart."

Trotsky and Terror

Mark Zborowski was an NKVD agent who managed to gain Sedov's confidence. Zborowski wrote reports to his handlers while acting as one of Sedov's closest collaborators. In a report dated February 8, 1937, Zborowski wrote that on January 22, 1937, the eve of the Piatakov-Radek trial, Sedov suddenly began speaking to him of "terror":

February 8, 1937

On January 22 L. Sedov in our conversation at his apartment about the question of the second Moscow trial and the role in it of some of the accused (Radek, Piatakov and others) stated: "Now there is no reason to hesitate. Stalin must be killed."

For me this statement was so unexpected that I did not manage to react to it in any way. L. Sedov immediately redirected the conversation onto other questions.

On January 23 L. Sedov, in my presence and also that of L. Estrina, uttered a sentence with the same content as that of the 22nd. In answer to this statement of his L. Estrina said "Keep your mouth shut." They did not return to this question again.⁶

Trotsky claimed that terrorism was in violation of Marxism:

⁶ Zborowski archive, F.31660 d. 9067 Papka No. 28. In Volkogonov Archive, Library of Congress. Online at http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrgr/research/zbor_sedov_stalin0238.pdf Some of these same documents are confirmed by John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, *Deadly Illusions* (New York: Crown, 1993), 283; 469 n.44. Tsarev, a former KGB man, had privileged access to KGB files for a time in the early 1990s. The same texts are quoted in Tsarev & Kostello, *Rokovye Illuzii*, 322-3, and n. 44 p.531 (Russian original). These and other texts of Zborowski's reports are in facsimile in the Volkogonov Archive, LOC. This archive also contains facsimiles of the reports published by Costello and Tsarev, thus verifying that they are the same ones.

But if Marxists categorically condemned individual terrorism, obviously for political and not mystical reasons, even when the shots were directed against the agents of the Czarist government and of capitalist exploitation, they will even more relentlessly condemn and reject the criminal adventurism of terrorist acts directed against the bureaucratic representatives of the first workers' state in history.

But in 1937 Sedov justified terrorism to Zborowski in language similar to what I.I. Reingol'd, a codefendant in the 1936 Moscow Trial, attributed to Zinoviev and Kamenev, and that another codefendant, K.B. Berman-Yurin attributed directly to Trotsky.

Reingol'd:

VYSHINSKY: How did Zinoviev and Kamenev reconcile terroristic activities with Marxism?

REINGOLD: In 1932, Zinoviev, at Kamenev's apartment, in the presence of a number of members of the united Trotskyist-Zinovievite centre argued in favor of resorting to terror as follows: although terror is incompatible with Marxism, at the present moment these considerations must be abandoned. There are no other methods available of fighting the leaders of the Party and the Government at the present time. Stalin combines in himself all the strength and firmness of the present Party leadership. Therefore Stalin must be put out of the way in the first place. (1936 Trial 55)

Berman-Yurin:

In the evening we continued our conversation. I asked him how individual terrorism could be reconciled with Marxism. To this Trotsky replied: problems cannot be treated in a dogmatic way. He said that a situation had arisen in the

Soviet Union which Marx could not have foreseen. (1936 Trial 95)

Zborowski:

С 1936 г. «сын» не вел со мной разговоров о терроре. Лишь недели две-три тому назад, после собрания группы «сын» снова заговорил на эту тему. В первый раз он только старался «теоретически» доказать, что терроризм не противоречит марксизму. «Марксизм» — по словам сына — «отрицает терроризм постолько, поскольку условия классовой борьбы не благоприятствуют терроризму, но бывают такие положения, в которых терроризм необходим.» В следующий раз «сын» заговорил о терроризме, когда я пришел к нему на квартиру работать. Во время читки газет «Сын» сказал, что так как весь режим в СССР держится на Сталине, то достаточно убить Сталина, чтобы все развалилась. Эту мысль он высказывал и раньше, но до последнего раза он никогда ее так четко не формулировал. В этот последний раз он неоднократно возвращался к этому, и особенно тщательно подчеркивал необходимость убийства тов. Сталина.

Translated:

Since 1936 "Sonny"⁷ had not talked with me about terror. Only about two or three weeks ago, after a meeting of the group, "Sonny" again began to speak on this subject. At first he only tried to "theoretically" prove that terrorism does not contradict Marxism. "Marxism" — in Sonny's words — "rejects terrorism only insofar as the conditions of the class struggle are not suit-

⁷ "Sonny" (Russian *synok*) was the NKVD code name for Sedov. Pierre Broué rendered *synok* in French as "le fiston."

able for terrorism, but there are situations in which terrorism is essential.”

The next time “Sonny” began to speak about terrorism when I arrived at his apartment to work. While reading newspapers “Sonny” said that since the whole regime of the USSR is held up by Stalin, it would be enough to kill Stalin for everything to fall apart. He had stated this thought earlier too, but until this time he had never formulated it this sharply. This last time he repeatedly returned to it, and underscored with special care the necessity to kill com. Stalin.

Sedov tried to recruit Zborowski as a terrorist to kill Stalin:

В связи с этим разговором «сын» спросил меня боюсь ли я смерти вообще и способен ли я был совершить террористический акт.

Translated:

In connection with this talk “Sonny” asked me whether I feared death in general, and whether I would be capable of committing a terrorist act.

When Zborowski temporized without giving a definite answer Sedov outlined his own conception of what a terrorist must be like:

На мой ответ что все это зависит от необходимости и целесообразности, сын сказал, что я не совсем верно понимаю, что такое «настоящий» террорист и начал мне объяснять какими должны быть люди подходящие для исполнения терактов.

Переходя к тактике террора он остановился на кадрах, считая, что это основное. Террорист – по словам сына – должен всегда быть готовым к смерти, смерть должна быть для террориста ежедневной реальностью, причем эту тезу он иллюстрировал примером психологии народовольцев. Причем при этом он бросил реплику,

что я – по его мнению – человек слишком мягкий для такого рода дел.

Translated:

To my answer that everything would depend on the necessity and the expediency, Sonny said that I did not understand accurately at all what a "real" terrorist was and began to explain to me just what persons who were suitable for carrying out terrorist acts must be like.

Speaking of the tactic of terror he paused on the subject of cadres, saying that this was basic. A terrorist – in Sonny's words – must always be prepared for death, death must be for the terrorist a daily reality. Here he illustrated this thesis with the example of the psychology of the Narodovol'tsy.⁸ At this point he tossed out the remark that I, in his opinion, was too soft a person for this kind of affair.

According to Mark Zborowski, Sedov told him on January 22, the day *before* the Second Moscow Trial began, that Stalin should be killed:

22 января Л. Седов во время нашей беседы, у него на квартире, по вопросу о 2-м московском процессе и роли в нем отдельных подсудимых (Радека, Пятакова и др.) заявил: "Теперь колебаться нечего. Сталина нужно убить."

Translated:

On January 22 L. Sedov, during our conversation in his apartment about the question of the Second Moscow

⁸ Members of the terrorist "Narodnaia Vol'ya" or "People's Will," who carried out numerous assassinations of Tsarist officials, including that of Tsar Alexander II in 1881.

Trial and the roles in it of certain defendants (Radek, Piatakov, and others) declared: "Now there is no reason to hesitate. Stalin must be killed." (Emphasis in original)

On October 28, 1936, a little less than three months earlier, Sedov had signed the introduction to the *Livre rouge sur le procès de Moscou* (*The Red Book on the Moscow Trial*). The *Livre rouge* repeats Trotsky's insistent claim that Marxists generally, and Trotsky himself specifically, completely eschew "terror" - individual assassination.⁹ The *Bulletin of the Opposition*, Trotsky's Russian-language periodical, ##52-53 also dated October 1936 says exactly the same thing.

The Second Moscow Trial began on January 23, 1937. Zborowski reported:

23 января Л. Седов, в присутствии моем а также Л. Эстриной, бросил фразу такого же содержания как и 22-го. В ответ на это его заявление, Л. Эстрина сказала «Держи язык за зубами». Больше к этому вопросу не возвращались.

Translated:

On January 23 L. Sedov in my presence and that of L. Estrina¹⁰ repeated what he had said on the 22nd. In answer to this declaration L. Estrina said: "Keep your mouth shut." They did not return to this question again.

It is legitimate to assume that Sedov's views on terror were also those of his father. Sedov was Trotsky's main political representative. He had no political positions of his own.

⁹ Livre rouge pp. 68-71, "Marxisme et terreur individuelle." The *Livre rouge* and B.O. ##52-53 are the same work. This work was translated into English as *The Red Book on the Moscow Trials*. It is online at <http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/sedov/works/red/>

¹⁰ Lola or Lilia Estrina was a supporter of Trotsky's movement and secretary to Sedov.

We know from the memoir of Jules Humbert-Droz that by 1928 at the latest Bukharin was advocating the murder of Stalin.¹¹ The Rightist group led by Bukharin was again discussing the need to kill Stalin in 1932, the same year they united with the Trotskyists, Zinovievists, and others in the bloc.¹² If Trotsky had really opposed terror in principle, as he repeatedly proclaimed, he would not have joined a bloc with those who championed it.

Both Pierre Broué and Arch Getty have pointed out that Trotsky lied when he believed it was expedient to do so. For example, Trotsky denied the existence of the bloc, and also denied that he had written to Radek, as Getty discovered. Sven-Eric Holmström showed that Trotsky lied repeatedly concerning the "Hotel Bristol" matter.¹³ Broué discovered a number of other issues Trotsky lied about.¹⁴

All the evidence we now have supports the hypothesis that Trotsky advocated assassination. There is no evidence to impugn this hypothesis except for Trotsky's and Sedov's public denials. We are compelled to discount their denials since we know they both lied when they thought it to their advantage to do so in the interests of their conspiratorial work.

Even Pierre Broué, in his day the most prominent Trotskyist historian and researcher in the world, accepted Zborowski's reports as genuine.

Le general [Volkogonov - GF] est capable de passer des documents sous silence, mais je ne le crois pas ca-

¹¹ See Part One, Chapter 8 of the present book. See also the discussion of Jules Humbert-Droz's revelation in his 1971 memoir in Grover Furr and Vladimir L. Bobrov. "Stephen Cohen's Biography of Bukharin: A Study in the Falsehood of Khrushchev-Era 'Revelations.'" *Cultural Logic* 2010 (published January 1, 2012) 1-5.

¹² Furr and Bobrov, 64-67.

¹³ Holmström, *New Evidence*.

¹⁴ Broué summarizes some of them in *POS*.

pable de falsifier un document. (Broué Léon Sedov 210-211)

Translated:

The general is capable of remaining silent about documents but I do not believe that he is capable of falsifying a document.

In another chapter of the present book we discuss Zborowski's remarks at greater length and note that John Costello and Oleg Tsarev have verified that they come from Zborowski's NKVD file, to which they gained access in the early 1990s.

Therefore we have good evidence that Trotsky was indeed advocating "terror" despite his vehement professions that he would never do so.

The Name of Trotsky

The first of Trotsky's two essays in issue #41 of the B.O. (also in the translation), dated December 28, 1934, does not cite any Soviet source that mentions Trotsky's name. Nevertheless, Trotsky stated he has deduced that he himself was the real target:

By dealing this blow to the Zinoviev group Stalin, as we said, aimed at consolidating the ranks of the bureaucracy. But that is only one aspect of the matter. There is another, and no less important, side: *Using the Zinovievist group as a footstool, Stalin is aiming to strike a blow at Trotskyism.* And cost what it may, he must strike that blow. In order to understand the goal and the direction of this new stage of the struggle against "Trotskyism," it is necessary to consider – even though briefly – the international work of the Stalinist faction.

As Trotsky knew then and we know today, he and his followers in the USSR were in a bloc with the Zinovievists. Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others had been arrested. Therefore it was obvious that the Zinovievists had already named their own leaders. Having done

that they would have no reason not to also name those with whom they had long been in a bloc: the Trotskyists. And the Trotskyists would not ally with persons who planned "terror" unless Trotsky had declared that terror was necessary. We know that the bloc was in touch with Trotsky. So Trotsky had good reason to think that his name would be mentioned by the Zinovievists.

Trotsky claimed that he had predicted this new "amalgam:"

When the first dispatch appeared in which Nikolaiev was said to have been a member of the Leningrad Opposition in 1926, there was no further room for doubt. The new campaign against Zinoviev and Kamenev was not long in following. **At that moment, in a conversation with a friend (I apologize for these personal details, but they are necessary for the understanding of the psychological undercurrents in the case), I said, "The matter will not rest long on this plane; tomorrow they will bring Trotskyism to the fore." To be able to make such a prediction, it was really not necessary to be a prophet.** The December 25 issue of the *Temps* which I received two or three days later contained in a telegraphic dispatch from Moscow the following item: "We must point out ... that as the days go by, Trotsky's name is being mentioned more and more often alongside Zinoviev's." [3] Kirov's corpse and the Zinoviev group thus become preparatory steps for a much wider and bolder scheme: to deal a blow at international Leninism.

Trotsky's name was indeed mentioned, but only because the French newspaper had misidentified as a Trotskyist Grigori Evdokimov, a Zinovievist arrested on December 9 in connection with the Kirov investigation. This was an easy error to make because Evdokimov had been identified as a Trotskyist when, along

with many others, he had been expelled from the Party in 1927. Trotsky would of course have known this.¹⁵

“Expose the Scheme In Advance”

Trotsky claimed that he had deduced that his name would be mentioned and publicized this in order to “expose the scheme in advance.”

There is only one way to forestall en route the amalgams that are in preparation: *Expose the scheme in advance*. The Stalinists are trying to mold the public opinion of the world police towards expulsions, extraditions, arrests and other more decisive measures. The Leninists must prepare the public opinion of the world proletariat for these possible events. In this case, as in others, it is necessary to speak out openly about what is; that is also the aim of the present article.

We know today that the NKVD’s connecting Trotsky with the Zinovievists was not a “scheme” but the truth. Evidently Trotsky hoped to make what was true appear so patently false as to be predictable in advance and so to dissipate any suspicion about his activities. It was Trotsky’s story that was the real “amalgam.”

“The Indictment”

In the same issue #41 of B.O. (and in the same English translation) Trotsky published an article titled “The Indictment” and dated it December 30, 1934, two days after the first. In it Trotsky claimed

¹⁵ Page 2 of the December 25, 1934, issue of the Paris newspaper *Le Temps* did carry an article that contained these words - but only because of the arrest on December 10 (he was actually arrested on December 9) of Grigori Evdokimov. Evdokimov had been expelled from the Party at the XV Party Congress in 1927 as “an active member of the Trotskyist opposition.” Evdokimov is listed in *XV S’ezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii - (b). Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1928), p. 1247, No. 17 and page 1318 No. 18. Evdokimov was No. 31 of 121 persons who signed a letter dated December 3, 1927, agreeing to the Party’s line and requesting reinstatement; see *ibid.*, p. 1334.

that he was examining the summary of the indictment of the Kirov defendants that was published in the French Communist Party's newspaper *Humanité* of December 28, 1934, along with a short introductory front-page article by future French CP leader Jacques Duclos.

This article by Trotsky contains a number of revealing remarks that we need to examine carefully. We have obtained a copy of this issue of *Humanité* so we can compare Trotsky's remarks against the text of the articles upon which he is commenting.¹⁶

Trotsky begins:

Just as one could have expected, **the indictment doesn't mention the Zinoviev-Kamenev group by so much as a word.** In other words: the initial amalgam fell apart into dust.

Anyone who reads the *Humanité* article in question can see that Trotsky is lying here. The indictment mentions the Zinoviev-Kamenev group repeatedly. Here are the relevant passages from the article in *Humanité*:

"...des participants de l'ancien **groupe antisoviétique Zinoviev**" (col. 1);

"...par les chefs de **notre organization: Zinoviev, Kamenev et autres...**" (col. 1);

"...pour cacher la participation du **groupe Zinoviev**" (col. 3)

¹⁶ Short front-page article: "L'acte d'accusation de Nikolaïev montre la complicité de Trotski dans l'assassinat de Kirov" par Jacques Duclos. Summary and discussion of the indictment: "La Révolution se défend. L'acte d'accusation contre Nikolaïev et ses complices terroristes révèle l'activité contre-révolutionnaire du groupe zinovieviste," page 3.

“... les anciens members du **groupe antisoviétique Zinoviev...**” (col. 4);

Therefore, Trotsky's claim that “the initial amalgam fell apart into dust” is false as well. On the contrary: once more the “amalgam” or “consciously false” story is by Trotsky.

Immediately after the words quoted above Trotsky wrote the following:

However, concurrently it has fulfilled its task by psychologically preparing for another amalgam: in the indictment there emerges suddenly – suddenly for naive people – the name of Trotsky. Nikolaiev, the murderer of Kirov, was – according to his confession – in contact with a consul of a foreign power. During one of Nikolaiev's visits to the consulate, the consul gave him 5,000 roubles for expenses. Nikolaiev adds, “He told me that he can establish contact with Trotsky, if I give him a letter to Trotsky from the group.” And that is all. Period! The indictment does not subsequently return to this episode. ... But how and why does my name suddenly appear here? **Is it, perhaps, because the terrorist group was seeking contact with Trotsky? No, even the GPU does not dare to assert this.** Perhaps Trotsky was seeking contact with the terrorist group? No, the indictment does not dare say this either. **The consul himself was the one to assume the initiative** and, while giving Nikolaiev 5,000 roubles on the eve of the terrorist act that was being prepared, he requested a letter addressed to Trotsky.

This statement of Trotsky's is also untrue. The text of the *Humanité* article reads as follows:

J'ai ensuite demandé au consul de nous prêter une aide matérielle, lui disant que nous lui rendrions l'argent prêté aussitôt que notre situation financière changerait.

À l'entrevue suivante, la troisième ou la quatrième au consulat, le consul m'informa qu'il était prêt à satisfaire à ma demande et me remit 5.000 roubles.

Il dit qu'il pouvait établir **la liaison** avec Trotsky si je lui remettais une lettre du groupe à Trotsky.

Translated:

Then I asked the consul to lend us material help and told him that we would return the money borrowed as soon as our financial situation changed.

At the following interview, the third or fourth at the consulate, the consul informed me that he was ready to satisfy my request and gave me 5,000 rubles.

He said that he could establish **the contact** with Trotsky if I gave him a letter from the group to Trotsky.

The first mention in this text of contact with Trotsky is by the consul. Neither the Russian text nor the abbreviated French translation explicitly specifies which party first suggested contact with Trotsky. However, the French text in *Humanité* says "la liaison" - "the contact" - meaning a contact previously mentioned. Since the consul then asks Nikolaev for a letter "from the group to Trotsky" the most obvious interpretation would be that Nikolaev, on behalf of "the group," had asked for the contact with Trotsky.

This passage is identified as an extract from a confession of Nikolaev's of December 20. We know now that it was indeed Nikolaev who, in a part of his December 20 statement not quoted in the indictment, "asked the consul to connect our group with Trotsky."¹⁷

A little further on Trotsky wrote:

¹⁷ See Lenoë Document 69 pp. 341-2. Osmund (Åsmund) Egge, *Zagadka Kirova* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2011), 175 quotes these passages in the Russian original.

The version we have adduced, which unfailingly flows from the indictment itself, if one is able to read it, presupposes consequently that the GPU itself, through the medium of an actual or fake consul, was financing Nikolaiev and was attempting to link him up with Trotsky. This version finds its indirect but very actual confirmation in the fact that all the responsible representatives of the GPU in Leningrad were kicked out immediately after the assassination.

This statement too is false. It is also inconsistent with any logical interpretation of the text of the indictment. In reality the Leningrad NKVD men who were dismissed and later brought to trial were charged with criminal dereliction of duty for failing to protect Kirov. This became known only at the end of January 1935.¹⁸

Trotsky continued:

The consul himself was the one to assume the initiative and, while giving Nikolaiev 5,000 roubles on the eve of the terrorist act that was being prepared, he requested a letter addressed to Trotsky.

The dismissals of the Leningrad NKVD men in early December do not at all support Trotsky's "theory" that "the GPU itself... was financing Nikolaiev." It is clear from the text of the indictment in *Humanité* that it was Nikolaev who asked the consul for money, not the consul who offered it first: "*J'ai ensuite demandé au consul de nous prêter une aide matérielle...*"

Trotsky was evidently betting that his readers would not compare his own article with the text in *Humanité*, much less with the original Russian text of the indictment published in *Pravda* and in newspapers all over the Soviet Union. Trotsky knew what his readers did not: that through his clandestine supporters within the USSR he really was in contact with the Zinovievite group that had

¹⁸ See Lenoë 436-445.

murdered Kirov. Therefore this is yet another "amalgam" of Trotsky's - a version of events he knew to be false. The NKVD (Trotsky calls it by its former name, the GPU) was not financing Nikolaev nor trying to "link him up with Trotsky."

Trotsky's Silence about the Bloc

Towards the conclusion of his second article Trotsky makes the following statement:

The Soviet authorities were compelled to admit openly that the participation of Zinoviev, Kamenev and others "was not proved": **The official dispatches generally made no mention of me at all.** The indictment refers only to the anxiety of the "consul" to obtain a letter to Trotsky - without drawing any conclusions.

Then Trotsky comments on "the unbelievable tone of *Humanité*."

The lackeys of *Humanité* write that Trotsky's participation in the murder of Kirov was "proved."

The tone of Duclos' article in *Humanité* might indeed be considered "unbelievable" if, as Trotsky claimed in this article, the only mention of his name was in the passage concerning the unidentified consul.

But Trotsky has concealed from his readers something that anyone who reads the actual article in *Humanité* can see for themselves: numerous references to the bloc of Trotskyists and Zinovievists. The bloc and Trotsky's name is mentioned four times in *Humanité's* summary article about the indictment:

"Ce groupe se forma sur la base d'un ancien **bloc trotskiste-zinovieviste.**" (col. 1)

"Nikolaiev, au cours de ses dépositions, le 13 septembre, confirma qu'il appartenait au groupe d'anciens oppositionnels qui faisait un travail contre-

révolutionnaire, ajoutant que «*les membres de ce groupe ralliaient la plate-forme du bloc trotskiste-zinovieviste.*» (col. 1)

“L’inculpé Khanik, un des membres actifs de ce groupe, caractérisant ses conceptions «idéologiques et politiques» reconnut que «ces conceptions avaient pour point de départ **la plate-forme du bloc Trotsky-Zinoviev** cherchant de miner l’autorité de la direction actuelle du Parti et à remplacer cette direction par des chefs de notre organisation: Zinoviev, Kamenev et autres qui sont partisans du changement de l’orientation actuelle du Parti.» (col. 1)

“Durant la période 1933-1934 les anciens membres du groupe antisoviétique Zinoviev s’organisèrent à Leningrad en groupe terroriste contre-révolutionnaire illégal, agissant comme tel et se posant comme but de désorganiser la direction du gouvernement soviétique au moyen d’actes terroristes dirigés contre les chefs du pouvoir soviétique et changer ainsi la politique actuelle dans l’esprit de **la plate-forme Zinoviev-Trotsky...**” (col. 4)

In its summary *Humanité* actually *reduced* the number of such references. The original published Russian text of the indictment contains not four but *six* references to the “Zinoviev-Trotsky” or “Trotsky-Zinoviev” bloc or platform. The term “Trotskyist-Zinovievist bloc” occurs *four* times in the Russian original but only three times in the French version.¹⁹

Thanks to the materials Broué discovered in the Harvard Trotsky Archive we know that the Soviet-based clandestine Trotskyists

¹⁹ *Obvinitelnye materialy po delu podpol'noi kontrrevolutsionnoi gruppy zinov'evtsev*. Moscow: Partizdat TsK VKP(b), 1935. This text was published in *Pravda* on December 27, 1934, just before the December trial. We have put this version online in Russian at https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrgr/research/obvin_zak_dec34.html

asked Trotsky's permission to form a bloc with the Zinovievists, the Sten-Lominadze group, Safarov, and other oppositionists.

At the present stage of our discussion we can conclude that it is unlikely that the Zinovievists would have murdered Kirov without the agreement of the Trotskyists in the bloc. The Trotskyists would at the very least have obtained their leader's, Trotsky's, blessing to collaborate with those who were planning the murder.

This conclusion finds confirmation in a pretrial confession of Genrikh Iagoda, NKVD chief during the Kirov investigation and defendant in the March 1938 Moscow Trial, who confessed to being one of the "Right" conspirators in the bloc with the Trotskyists, Zinovievists, and others.

Он сообщил мне о том, что блок между троцкистами и зиновьевцами окончательно оформлен организацией общего центра, что правые также входят в этот блок, но сохраняют свою самостоятельную организацию и свою особую линию.

Вопрос. Какую свою особую линию?

Ответ. По этому вопросу мы с Енукидзе беседовали довольно долго. Я не могу, конечно, сейчас передать в деталях весь наш разговор, но общий смысл его сводится к следующему.

Троцкисты и зиновьевцы, говорил Енукидзе, слились теперь в одну организацию с единым центром и единой программой. С точки зрения конечных целей, мы, правые, ничего своего, что отделяло нас от троцкистов и зиновьевцев, не имеем. Мы так же, как и они, против генеральной линии партии. Против Сталина.

В борьбе за наши конечные цели, за их осуществление, за приход наш к власти мы признаем все средства борьбы, в том числе и террор против руководства партии и Советского правительства. На этой основе и достигнуто было соглашение правых с центром троцкистско-зиновьевского блока.

Но что отделяет нас от этого блока? В чем особенность нашей линии? Дело в том, что троцкисты и зиновьевцы, подстегиваемые находившимся в изгнании Троцким, торопят с совершением террористических актов. Троцкому за границей, наверное, несладко приходится, и он исходит злобой, брызжет слюной и жаждет крови. Он не дает опомниться своему центру в Союзе, он требует террористических актов против членов ЦК, не считаясь с общей ситуацией в стране и вне ее, не считаясь с тем, что такой оторванный от плана заговора террористический акт ничего конкретного нам не даст, а может стоить нам десятка голов наших людей.

Мы же, правые, говорил Енукидзе, не можем и не хотим пускаться на авантюрные акты, продиктованные больше жаждой мести и злобой, нежели рассудком и расчетом. Это не значит, конечно, что мы против террористических актов, что мы питаем какие-либо симпатии к Сталину и его Политбюро. Нет! Мы, как и троцкисты, полны ненависти и негодования, мы, как и они, готовы к террористическим актам, но на такие акты мы пойдем тогда, когда это совпадет с общим нашим планом. «Над нами не капает, мы не в эмиграции. Все наши люди находятся в Союзе, нас особенно не били. Мы можем хладнокровнее готовиться, готовиться всерьез к захвату власти и имеем свои планы,» — закончил Енукидзе.

Translated:

He [Avel' Enukidze] informed me that the bloc between the Trotskyists and the Zinovievists was conclusively formed by the organization of a general center, that the Rights also enter into this bloc but have kept their own independent organization and their own special line.

QUESTION: What was their own special line?

ANSWER: Enukidze and I discussed this question for quite a long time. Of course, I cannot now relate our

whole conversation in detail but its general sense comes down to the following:

The Trotskyists and Zinovievists, said Enukidze, have now entered into one organization with a single center and a single program. From the viewpoint of our final aims we Rights have nothing special that divides us from the Trotskyists and Zinovievists. Like them, we are also against the general line of the Party. Against Stalin.

In the struggle for our final aims, for bringing them into being, for our attaining power, we recognized all means of struggle, including also terror against the Party leadership and the soviet government. On this basis the agreement of the Rights was reached with the center of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist bloc.

But what separates us from this bloc? In what does the special nature of our line consist? The fact is this: the Trotskyists and Zinovievists are spurred on by Trotsky who finds himself in exile and so they are in a hurry to accomplish terrorist acts. No doubt it is not easy for Trotsky abroad and he expresses malice, foams at the mouth, and thirsts for blood. He does not permit his center in the Soviet Union to think it over, he demands terrorist acts against members of the CC and does not consider the general situation inside and outside the country, does not consider the fact that such a terrorist act, in isolation from the plan of the conspiracy, will not yield us any concrete result, and might cost us a dozen of our people's heads.

But we, the Rights, said Enukidze, cannot permit and do not wish to permit adventurist acts dictated more by a thirst for revenge and malice than by sound judgment and reason. Of course that does not mean that we are against terrorist acts, that we harbor any

sympathy towards Stalin and his Politburo. No! We, like the Trotskyists, are full of hatred and indignation, we, like they, are prepared for terrorist acts, but we will have recourse to such acts when they suit our general plan. "We are not in danger, we are not in emigration. All of our people are inside the Soviet Union, we have not taken any serious blows. We can prepare ourselves more calmly, seriously prepare for the seizure of power and have our own plans," – said Enukidze. (Genrikh Iagoda 169-171)

What Iagoda states here is consistent with everything else we know about the bloc and about Trotsky's support for terror. In other passages Iagoda discusses the bloc's involvement in the Kirov murder in a manner that is consistent with the confessions and indictment in the Kirov murder case of December 1934 and with the confessions, both pretrial and during the trial, of Kamenev and Zinoviev.

We do not know why Trotsky did not wish to acknowledge that there really was a Trotskyist-Zinovievite bloc or that the bloc included other opposition groups. Pierre Broué and Vadim Rogovin, skilled researchers but devoted Trotskyists, suggested that Trotsky told his lies in order to save his followers inside the USSR. But this apologetic explanation makes no sense. If Trotsky had admitted only what the Soviets had already made public he would have put no one in danger who was not already known to the Soviets. Therefore Trotsky could not have been trying to defend his Soviet-based followers or to fool "Stalin" and the NKVD.

Trotsky may have believed that he had to preserve "plausible deniability" in order to fight attempts by the Soviet government to deny him any place of exile. Trotsky may also have believed that denying only *some* Soviet charges – for instance, involvement in terror – while admitting to others like the bloc, would not be credible. Perhaps Trotsky feared that he would lose many of his followers if he were to concede that the Soviet NKVD was telling the truth *some* of the time.

Whatever his reasoning, Trotsky decided to deny everything the Soviets charged him and his followers with, including charges that we now know to be true. Given that the bloc was mentioned prominently in the Kirov indictment and that he had decided to deny everything the Soviet prosecution said, Trotsky could do one of two things. He could quote those parts of the indictment that mentioned the "Trotskyist-Zinovievite bloc" and then deny the existence of such a bloc. Or he could ignore those passages – in effect, act as though there were no such passages in the indictment.

Trotsky chose the latter course of action. In doing so he ran a considerable risk. Anyone who read the article in *Humanité* – let alone the original article in *Pravda* – and compared it with what Trotsky had written would immediately notice Trotsky's failure to even mention, much less to deny, the repeated allegations in the indictment that the Zinovievite terrorists were in a bloc with the Trotskyists.

Any such reader would ask: "Why does Trotsky remain silent about these, the most striking allegations in the indictment?" Once noticed, Trotsky's failure not only to deny the charge of a bloc with the Zinovievite terrorists, but even to mention it – if only to call it "yet another amalgam," etc. – would strike any reader as suspicious. Failure to deny a serious charge is often interpreted as a tacit admission.

Trotsky must have believed that the risk of openly discussing and denying the Trotskyist-Zinovievite bloc was greater than that of simply passing over it in silence. This suggests that he was writing with a sympathetic, even credulous, readership in mind, or at least one favorably predisposed towards anti-Stalin propaganda, one that would be unlikely to compare the *Humanité* or *Pravda* articles with Trotsky's account. Trotsky's lies were aimed above all at duping his own followers.

This is also suggested by his habit of inserting into his writings attacks on Stalin in the form of gratuitous and unverified remarks.

Two examples occur in the first of his two essays here. Towards the end of this essay Trotsky makes the following claim:

В 1926 году Н. К. Крупская, примкнувшая тогда, вместе с Зиновьевым и Каменевым, к левой оппозиции, говорила: “еслиб жив был Ленин, он сейчас, наверное, сидел бы у ГПУ в тюрьме.”

Translated:

In 1926, N.K. Krupskaya, who along with Zinoviev and Kamenev then adhered to the Left Opposition, said, “Were Lenin alive, he would most assuredly be in a GPU prison.”

It would be difficult to prove that Krupskaya did not make this statement. The burden of proof is on Trotsky to prove she did. Besides, it is more than unlikely. In 1926 not a single Oppositionist had been imprisoned – not Zinoviev, not Kamenev, not Trotsky, nor any of their supporters. No matter how opposed Krupskaya was to Stalin’s political line in 1926, the idea that she could have said that Lenin would have been in prison is not credible.

Moreover, no one else had any independent knowledge of this purported remark. Boris Bazhanov, who worked from 1923 as Stalin’s secretary until he fled the USSR in 1928, published the first volume of his strongly anti-Stalin memoirs, *I Was Stalin’s Secretary*, in Paris in 1930. Bazhanov recorded many insulting rumors about Stalin. But this one only gets into his book in editions published after the French edition of Trotsky’s biography *Staline*, which Bazhanov credits as his source, therefore after 1948:

В своем секретариате Сталин не стеснялся, и из отдельных его фраз, словечек и интонаций я ясно видел, как он на самом деле относится к Ленину. Впрочем, это понимали и другие, например, Крупская, которая немного спустя (в 1926 году) говорила: “Если бы Володя жил, то он теперь сидел бы в тюрьме” (свидетельство Троцкого, его книга о Сталине, франц. текст, стр. 523).

Translated:

In his Secretariat Stalin did not hold back and from some of his phrases, remarks, and intonations I saw clearly what he really thought of Lenin. Moreover, others understood this too, for example, Krupskaja, who said a little later (in 1926): "If Volodia were alive he would now be in prison" (according to Trotsky in his book about Stalin, French edition, p. 523).²⁰

An otherwise unattested anecdote such as this one would be credited only by persons who were accustomed to accepting Trotsky's unsupported statements at face value – that is, by Trotskyists.

Trotsky also stated the following as fact:

During the last two years of his life, Lenin saw in the bureaucracy the principal danger to the revolution and in Stalin the most consummate representative of this danger. Lenin fell ill and died during a feverish preparation of the struggle against the Stalinist apparatus.

This is not true either. There is no evidence of any struggle by Lenin "against the Stalinist apparatus." That was true at the time, and we can confirm it today, since the publication of the relevant documents of Lenin's last year of life since 1989. Unlike the previous remark which, in theory at least, *might* have been uttered by Lenin privately to Trotsky alone, no "feverish preparation" of struggle "against the Stalinist apparatus" could have been kept secret.

²⁰ See Bazhanov, *Vospominaniia byvshego sekretaria Stalina* ("Memoirs of Stalin's former secretary"), Moscow 1990, Chapter 7; online at http://www.hrono.ru/libris/lib_b/bazhan07.php The French edition of Trotsky's biography of Stalin was published by Grasset (Paris) in 1948.

This is part of Trotsky's attempt to portray himself as Lenin's rightful successor, to counter Stalin's similar claim that *he* was Lenin's rightful successor.²¹ The genuineness of the documents called "Lenin's Testament" has been called into serious question by research based upon the originals.²² But even if they are genuine, as they were believed genuine at the time, Lenin trusted Stalin – and, apparently, only him – enough to ask Stalin alone to give him poison if he, Lenin, should find the pain of his illness unbearable.

Conclusion

The major finding of our study is dramatic. Trotsky did not only deny the bloc of Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Rightists, and other oppositionists, the very evidence of whose real existence was discovered by Pierre Broué in the Harvard Trotsky Archive. He denied his contacts with Zinoviev, Kamenev, Piatakov, and Radek. He also denied accusations made at the Moscow Trials that he had had contact with still other oppositionists, contacts that Broué has verified.

These accusations were central to all three Moscow trials. This means *that not just Trotsky's essays and other discussions of the Kirov murder but all of Trotsky's essays about the Moscow Trials contain deliberate falsifications.*

Once Trotsky had embarked on the practice of declaring that all the evidence in the Kirov assassination, and then in all the future prosecutions of former oppositionists, was faked from beginning to end, there was no turning back. To admit that he had lied would

²¹ For a brief discussion of these issues, translations of some of the relevant documents, and references to others, see Furr, *Khrushchev Lied* pp. 11-19 and 232-239.

²² The main study of this question is the monumental work by V.A. Sakharov, "Politicheskoe zaveshchanie" Lenina. *Real'nost' istorii i mify politiki*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 2003. A very short summary by the author is *Podlog zaveshchania vozhdia. Kto avtor?* Available at a number of internet sites including <http://stalinism.narod.ru/vieux/saharov.htm>

have done more damage to his movement and his credibility than admitting even a part of the truth from the beginning. Unwilling to risk the consequences, it is only logical that Trotsky would stick to this story - that it was Stalin who had fabricated everything.

This means that Trotsky spent the rest of his life repeating and elaborating a picture of the Moscow Trials and of Stalin that he knew to be, at least in significant part, a lie of his own making. Beginning no later than his essay on the Kirov assassination in late December 1934 Trotsky concocted a series of "amalgams" to the effect that the trials were nothing more than frame-ups by Stalin, the NKVD, and the Prosecutor. Trotsky knew what he wrote was not the truth but his own fabrication. His followers and the broader readership of his articles in the mainstream press did *not* know this.

A devoted Trotskyist all his life, Pierre Broué shrank from drawing the obvious conclusions from his own discovery that Trotsky had lied about the bloc and other contacts with oppositionists. For example, Broué did not reconsider the two volumes that the Dewey Commission published. How likely is it that the commission would have found Trotsky "Not Guilty"²³ if its members had known that Trotsky really had been in a bloc with the Zinovievists and Rightists; that he really had been in secret contact with Zinoviev, Kame-nev, Radek, and Piatakov, whom he had publicly excoriated, and with others whom he had denied contacting? But Broué continued to defend the Commission and its findings as though the documents he himself had discovered in the Trotsky Archives did not exist. We discuss the Dewey Commission in other chapters of the present study.²⁴

²³ The title of the Dewey Commission's report is *Not Guilty. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made Against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials*, John Dewey, chairman. New York, London, Harper & Brothers, 1938.

²⁴ See Broué, "L'historien devant la vie. Charles A. Beard et les procès de Moscou." *CahLT* 19 (1984), 68-77. B

Broué did realize that these discoveries would necessitate a complete revision of the conventional anticommunist and Trotskyist view of the Moscow Trials:

I think that the new data concerning the "Opposition bloc," the organization of two Communist blocs of Oppositions, the attempt to unify the Communist Opposition, definitively destroys all the legends and preconceived ideas about an all-mighty, blood-thirsty, machiavelian Stalin. (Broué POS 110.)

But even this very cautious statement, in which Broué carefully limits the implications of Trotsky's lying, is ignored by anticommunists and Trotskyists generally. It appears that, like Trotsky himself, they are afraid to concede that *any* part of the Moscow Trials testimony was true. As we have shown in Part One, to do so would be to open a "Pandora's box," a cascade of other discoveries that destroys what we have called the "anti-Stalin paradigm," an essential part of which is that the Moscow Trials were frame-ups of innocent defendants.

Trotsky and Anticommunism

Trotsky has sometimes been called an anticommunist. It is worth recalling this epithet in light of the facts uncovered in this essay.

On the one hand, Trotsky considered himself to be a true communist and his movement the true communist movement. In that sense he was not an anticommunist as that term is normally understood.

However, one understanding of "anticommunist" is someone who deliberately fabricates false tales of terrible crimes which he then blames on communists. This is the sense in which it is logical to call Nikita Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" "anticommunist." It was filled with deliberate falsehoods. It provided ammunition, grist for the mills, of pro-capitalist anticommunists.

In the long run Trotsky's "amalgams," like those of Khrushchev, were more effective than similar lies invented or spread abroad by

opponents of communism.²⁵ Trotsky and Khrushchev had spent decades as leading communists themselves. Their "revelations" - for such they claimed their deliberate lies to be - had far more credibility than those of overtly pro-capitalist propagandists.

As far as I can tell, Trotsky was the very first writer to characterize the Soviet Union as "totalitarian." Certainly it was Trotsky who put this term in use on the Left. Prior to Trotsky's use of the word in his "amalgams" about the Moscow Trials the word "totalitarian" simply meant a one-party state - something that Trotsky himself had advocated. Trotsky extended the use of the word "totalitarian" to accommodate his "amalgam" that Stalin had fabricated all the charges against the former oppositionists in all the trials, as well as all of the confessions. Trotsky knew that this was not so. He knew that a number, perhaps many, perhaps even all - the charges against and statements of the defendants, including those against and by his own followers, were true. But he pretended that they were all grotesque fabrications, and shouted that falsehood to all the world.

Trotsky's term "amalgam" has become common usage in anti-communist Soviet historiography, a term regularly employed by historians as though it described an established practice on Stalin's part. Witness the following quotation from Oleg Khlevniuk, one of the leading anticommunist historians of the Stalin period:

As in other political affairs of the Stalinist era, the Syrtsov-Lominadze case was, to use Trotsky's apt characterization of the 1936-38 show trials, "an amalgam," a peculiar combination of real facts and falsifications.²⁶

²⁵ For a sample of Khrushchev's lies about Stalin see Furr Khrushchev Lied.

²⁶ Oleg V. Khlevniuk, "Stalin, Syrtsov, Lominadze: Preparations for the 'Second Great Break-through.'" *The Lost Politburo Transcripts. From Collective Rule to Stalin's Dictatorship*. Ed. Paul R. Gregory and Norman Naimark. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution (2008), 79.

In reality, it does describe an established practice - but by Trotsky rather than by Stalin.

Not the least of the conclusions we may draw from the discovery of Trotsky's "amalgams" is this: that there is no obvious limit to them. We have established that Trotsky's essay on the Kirov assassination was full of lies, one after the other. Some were obvious, if anyone had bothered to check them. Others, involving the truth about Trotsky's bloc with the Zinovievists, Rights, and others, were closely guarded secrets, known only to Trotsky, his son, and one of his most loyal secretaries, Jean van Heijenoort.

This means that we should take a fresh look at the allegation that Trotsky collaborated with the Germans and Japanese. We know that Trotsky lied when he claimed that he would never form a bloc with Zinoviev and Kamenev, and also lied when he ridiculed the idea that he could ever have recourse to "terror," i.e. assassination. Yet we know that he did both of these things.

We have previously attempted to gather and study the Soviet evidence that Trotsky collaborated with Germany and Japan. Now we have even less reason to question that Soviet evidence than we had before. In the present chapter we have suggested that the fact that Trotsky falsely claimed that Zinoviev and Kamenev were falsely charged with plotting the restoration of capitalism is consistent with the hypothesis that Trotsky really did collaborate with the Germans and Japanese. We will explore this point in more detail in volume two of this study.

Just as we have discovered that Trotsky was lying, it turns out that, in each case where we can check, Soviet prosecutor Vyshinsky and the Moscow Trial defendants were telling the truth. In another chapter of the present book we examine other Moscow Trial allegations that Trotsky denied. Likewise, now that we know Trotsky attacked Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Radek to cover up his continuing contacts with them it would be worthwhile to examine whether Trotsky also remained in contact with others with whom he had

once been in open alliance but later supposedly broke with, like
POUM²⁷ leader Andrés Nin.

²⁷ This is the common acronym for Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista - Spain.

Chapter 14. Trotsky and the Charge of “Armed Intervention”

Introduction

On December 1, 1934, Sergei M. Kirov, First Secretary of the Bolshevik Party in Leningrad, was assassinated outside his office in the Smolny Institute by Leonid Nikolaev, an unemployed Party member. Within a few days Nikolaev was naming men whom he claimed were his associates in a clandestine oppositional group who supported Grigory Zinoviev, Leningrad Party leader before Kirov.

Living in France at the time Leon Trotsky followed these events in *Humanité*.¹ *Humanité* covered the Kirov murder case closely, often summarizing articles in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* supplemented by summary and analysis written by their own staff. Sometimes *Humanité* printed translations of important documents verbatim or in long excerpts.

By consulting the pages of *Humanité* and supplementing them with copies of the two Moscow papers we have read the same articles that Trotsky read and have compared his coverage of the Kirov case with that of his sources. In doing this we have discovered a number of instances where Trotsky falsified the contents of the articles on the Kirov murder and investigation. One of these instances of falsification concerns the allegation that Zinoviev and his close associate Lev Kamenev had been charged with planning “armed intervention.”

¹ Trotsky's writings on the Kirov murder cite *Humanité* and, once, *Le Temps*, as does Sedov in the *Livre rouge* (Red Book). Trotsky occasionally quotes *Pravda* and *Izvestia* in a manner that suggests he had quick access to them.

Trotsky's allegations

Trotsky wrote about the supposed accusation of "armed intervention" in two issues of his publication, *Biulleten' Oppozitsii* (in English, "Bulletin of the Russian Opposition," henceforth B.O.) We reproduce Trotsky's words below:

B.O. #42 February 1935:

Первые правительственные сообщения и официальные статьи после ареста московской группы старых большевиков гласили, что Зиновьев-Каменев и их друзья поставили себе целью «восстановление капиталистического строя» и стремились вызвать иностранную «военную интервенцию» (через посредство... латышского консула!). Ни один серьезный человек не поверил этому, разумеется.

Лакеи Сталина, выступающие под именем «вождей» Коминтерна, не устают, однако, твердить, что Зиновьев, Каменев и др. «сами признали свои преступления.» Какие? Подготовку реставрации капитализма? подготовку военной интервенции?

Допустим, что критика Зиновьева неправильна. Признаем даже за лакеями право считать направленную против них критику «преступной.» Но причем же тут все-таки «реставрация капитализма» и «военная интервенция»? Какая связь между требованием более революционной политики против буржуазии и программой восстановления буржуазного режима? Где тут здравый смысл? Он полностью погребен под чудовищными извержениями подлости!

Translated:

The first government communique and official articles after the arrest of the Moscow group of Old Bolsheviks said that Zinoviev-Kamenev and their friends had taken as their aim "the restoration of the capitalist system" and they were trying to provoke "armed in-

tervention" from abroad (by the intermediacy of a consul- from Latvia!). No serious person could believe it; that is understood.

...

Stalin's lackeys, who cover themselves with the name of "leaders" of the Communist International, don't, however, recoil at the assertion that Zinoviev, Kamenev and the others "have themselves admitted their crimes. "Which ones? Preparation of the restoration of capitalism? Preparation of armed intervention?

...

Let us admit that Zinoviev's criticism was false. Let us even grant that the lackeys were right to judge criticism directed against them "criminal. " But are we to see in that the "restoration of capitalism" and "armed intervention"? What connection is there between the demand for a more revolutionary policy against the bourgeoisie and a program for "the restoration of a bourgeois regime"? Where has common sense gone? It is completely buried beneath a monstrous defecation of infamy.²

B.O. #43 April 1935:

В правительственном сообщении, как и в бесчисленных статьях «Правды» заключалось, как известно, прямое и категорическое утверждение, что Зиновьев и Каменев ставили себе целью реставрацию капитализма и военную интервенцию.

² "Письмо американским друзьям." <http://web.mit.edu/fjk/www/FI/BO/BO-42.shtml> ; Trotsky, "Everything Gradually Falls Into Place." WLT 1934-1935 223-228. (WLT). Originally in B.O. #42.

- «Заметки журналиста. Как сталинцы подрывают мораль Красной армии.»

Сейчас Майский, в сане посла, обвиняет «зиновьевцев» и «троцкистов» в **стремлении вызвать военную интервенцию** для реставрации капитализма...

- «Рабочее государство, термидор и бонапартизм (Историко-теоретическая справка)»

Так скажут, вероятно, сталинцы и прибавят на всякий случай, что мы переменили позицию, дабы легче **вызвать военную интервенцию.**

- <http://web.mit.edu/fjk/www/FI/BO/BO-43.shtml>

Translated:

In the government communique as well as in numerous articles in *Pravda* there was, as is well known, the direct and categorical assertion that Zinoviev and Kamenev *had as their goal the restoration of capitalism and military intervention...*³

Today Maisky, in the rank of ambassador, accuses "Zinovievists" and "Trotskyists" of striving to **provoke military intervention** in order to restore capitalism...⁴

...

This will probably be said by Stalinists, who will add for good measure that we have changed our position

³ "Notes of a Journalist." WLT 1934-1935 323-238, at 327. Originally in B.O. #43. Italics in original.

⁴ "The Workers' State, Thermidor and Bonapartism." WLT 1934-1935 240-261, at 251. Originally in B.O. #43.

in order the more easily to **provoke military intervention.**

Trotsky's "Amalgam"

Trotsky did not give any specific references to the "first government communiqué" – in Russian the word is in the plural, *soobshcheniia*, "communiqués" – or "numerous" "official" articles "in *Pravda*" or anywhere else. This is understandable, for there were none to give. These statements of Trotsky's are false. Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others in the "Moscow Center" who were to be tried in mid-January 1935 were not charged with planning "armed intervention" any more than they were with the "restoration of capitalism."⁵ Trotsky was lying.

We have searched all the issues of *Humanité*, the newspaper of the French Communist Party that was Trotsky's source of information about what the Russian press was publishing. We have reproduced below all the passages where "armed" or "foreign intervention," or language to that effect, are cited in any articles dealing with the Kirov Assassination or its aftermath, including the arrests of Zinoviev, Kamenev and others. Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others in the "Moscow Center" are not accused in any of them.

Humanité Dec. 28 p. 1 col. 6 bottom:

EN 3e PAGE

A Leningrad, les adhérents du groupe étaient en liaison avec le consul d'une puissance capitaliste et escomptaient que l'assassinat de Kîrov provoquerait une intervention étrangère.

André Marty article, p. 2 col. 1:

⁵ See the separate chapter in this book on the "restoration of capitalism" charge.

« L'instruction a établi que le groupe n'espérant pas que le meurtre de Kirov servirait de signal à un mouvement intérieur, du pays contre le Parti communiste de l'U. R. S. S. et contre le pouvoir soviétique, comptait sur l'aide directe du dehors, sur **l'intervention de l'armée** et sur l'appui de certains Etats étrangers »

Article on Kirov indictment p. 3 col. 3

Aidés par l'étranger!

Cependant, ne comptant pas sur la réalisation de telles actions à « l'intérieur du pays », le groupe **TABLAIT DIRECTEMENT SUR;v L'AIDE « DU DEHORS ,» SUR L'INTERVENTION ARMEE ET L'AIDE DE CERTAINS ETATS ETRANGERS.**

L'espoir de **l'intervention** comme moyen unique de renverser le pouvoir soviétique caractérise nettement le point de vue de l'inculpé Nikolaïev qui ne le cachait pas à ses amis intimes.

L'instruction a établi que Nikolaïev, conformément à un accord préalable avec Kotolynov, a rendu visite à plusieurs reprises à un certain consul de Leningrad...

Humanité Dec. 29 p. 3 col. 2:

« Détail caractéristique les anciens partisans de Zinoviev, qui basaient tous leurs plans antisoviétiques sur le secours de la bourgeoisie internationale par la voie de « **l'intervention ,** » après avoir noué des relations avec le consul étranger, essayent maintenant, par son intermédiaire de se lier avec la contrerévolution.

Humanité Dec. 31 1934 p. 3 col. 5

Les *Isvestia* écrivent dans un éditorial « La sentence qui a frappé les assassins de Kirov est l'expression di-

recte (le la volonté de millions de travailleurs remplis d'indignation et d'une haine profonde envers les terroristes fascistes, restes de l'opposition de Zinoviev, qui, s'étant assuré que leur activité antisoviétique ne peut pas trouver de sympathie dans les masses, sont entrés; non seulement dans la voie de la terreur, mais ont misé sur **l'intervention de l'étranger**. Rien ne peut désorganiser le pouvoir soviétique ni arrêter la marche triomphale du socialisme. »

Humanité Jan. 8 1935 p. 2 col. 1:

C'est Nikolaïev qui parle. « Le groupe tablait directement sur l'aide dit dehors, sur **l'intervention armée** et l'aide de certains États étrangers. »

Humanité Jan. 8 1935 p. 3 col. 7:

Les terroristes et leurs liaisons LE CONSUL COMPLICE DES ASSASSINS DE KIROV FUT L'ALLIE DES BLANCS ET L'HOMME DE HITLER

Moscou (Du notre correspondant particulier).

- On sait que le consul de Lettonie, qui eut contact avec les terroristes révolutionnaires et qui est considéré comme complice des assassins de Kirov, a été rappelé par son gouvernement, et l'ambassadeur de ce pays en U.R.S.S. a pris connaissance des pièces de l'instruction. L'activité du consul en question ne fut nullement une activité diplomatique: elle comprenait une aide pécuniaire aux terroristes contre-révolutionnaires, la participation à la préparation de leur fuite à l'étranger, le concours à l'introduction d'autres terroristes en U.R.S.S. et la préparation d'une situation facilitant **une intervention antisoviétique armée**.

Or, chacun comprend qu'une intervention ne se fait pas par de petits États: même dans le cas où les forces

armées de pareils Etats envahissent le territoire d'un grand Etat, elles jouent seulement le rôle d'éclaireurs pour les armées de puissances beaucoup plus importantes, dont elles remplissent la mission militaire, politique et sociale.

Il n'est donc pas difficile de supposer que les derniers actes du diplomate si étrange de ce petit Etat cachaient des forces de beaucoup plus d'envergure pour le compte desquelles il travaillait en réalité.

The Charge of "Armed Intervention"

The accusation of attempting to provoke, counting upon, or hoping for "armed" or "foreign" "intervention" was not applied to Zinoviev, Kamenev, or others of the "Moscow Center" at all. No Soviet documents charge Zinoviev, Kamenev, and the other Old Bolsheviks arrested and tried together with them with planning, counting on, etc., "armed intervention." It was applied in newspaper articles and by the Soviet courts *only* to the members of the Leningrad Center of Zinovievists who had conspired successfully to murder Sergei Kirov. But even against them it was not applied "officially" in any "government communiqué." It was not mentioned either in the indictment, or in the sentence.

Trotsky fabricated this false story. He must have had some reason for doing so. To discover that reason is the goal of the present chapter.

Beginning with the January 1937 Moscow trial this same accusation was leveled at Trotsky himself, by his own followers and then by the Soviet court. Thereafter the accusation of plotting "armed intervention" was repeated and elaborated. This cannot be mere coincidence. There must be some relationship between Trotsky's false claim in 1934 and 1935 that Zinoviev and Kamenev had been accused of plotting "armed intervention" and the public accusations beginning in January, 1937 by the Soviet prosecutor and by

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Trotsky's followers charging that it was Trotsky himself who was plotting "armed intervention."

In the present chapter we investigate that connection. Our hypothesis is as follows: Trotsky suspected that, at some point in the near future, members of the bloc would testify that one aspect of the bloc's activities had been the plotting of an armed intervention. (This is in fact what happened, only much later, in 1936-1937).

The only way Trotsky could successfully "predict" that such an accusation would be forthcoming is if he knew that it was true and therefore that one or more of the defendants who were members of the bloc was likely to reveal it.

Why Did Trotsky Run the Risk of Discovery?

This threat accounts for Trotsky's lying about the "armed intervention" charge. Trotsky took a considerable risk in telling this lie. It would have been easy for anyone who checked either the Russian newspapers or *Humanité* to see that Trotsky was lying about the accusations against Zinoviev and Kamenev. It is logical to think that he only assumed this risk out of some powerful motive.

Trotsky was once again composing a false story or "amalgam" of which the essential part is that it was Stalin who is guilty of an "amalgam." Trotsky continued to derisively repeat the falsehood that Zinoviev and Kamenev were accused of planning "armed intervention" until the April 1935 issue of the B.O. After that he abandoned it. Unlike the "restoration of capitalism" story, which Trotsky was still repeating at the Dewey Commission testimony in April 1937, his false claim that Zinoviev and Kamenev were charged with plotting "armed insurrection" disappears from his writing after April 1935. (We discuss Trotsky's "restoration of capitalism" 'amalgam' in the next chapter.)

In the case of the "Zinovievite-Trotskyite bloc" story we know why Trotsky repeated his falsehood. Such a bloc did exist and Trotsky decided to deny it completely. This decision forced Trotsky to con-

coct a different version of the Kirov murder - one he knew to be false - and foist it on the world in order to conceal the existence of the bloc. Trotsky argued tirelessly that the story of the bloc was an invention, an "amalgam" of Stalin's, when he knew that in reality it was he himself who was composing an "amalgam." It was Trotsky, not "Stalin," i.e. the Soviet prosecution, who was lying.

The clandestine Zinovievists who had been arrested for the Kirov murder had started to confess and had named their leader, Zinoviev. It was a safe guess that soon they would also name Trotsky, whose followers were in the bloc with the Zinovievists. We know from the Harvard Trotsky Archive that Trotsky had given his approval for the formation of this bloc. So Trotsky "predicted" that his name would come up in connection with the Kirov investigation. Sure enough, it did. Trotsky was able to "predict" that his name would become implicated in the Kirov murder story while claiming that this was yet another of Stalin's "amalgams."

In the next chapter we suggest that the same logic holds in the case of the "restoration of capitalism" "amalgam." There we show that the "restoration of capitalism" story more or less accurately reflected the economic plan that Trotsky had been proposing since 1930. It also reflected the "Riutin Platform," which was really the platform of the whole bloc of Zinovievists, Trotskyists, and Rightists. In addition we have evidence from the January 1937 and March 1938 Moscow Trials testimony that Trotsky was instructing the leaders of the clandestine Trotskyist group in the Soviet Union that a reversion towards capitalism would be the price of cooperation of the capitalist powers, especially Germany and Japan, in connection with the overthrow of the Stalin regime.

As in the case of the "Zinovievite-Trotskyite bloc," "name of Trotsky" and "restoration of capitalism" "amalgams," once we realize that this "armed intervention" story is false we are left to wonder why Trotsky chose to tell this lie and to tell it repeatedly. Why did

he fabricate false accusations instead of simply dealing with the real ones? Trotsky must have thought that he had much to lose if he did not tell this lie.⁶

Trotsky's strategy: "Expose the scheme in advance."

In previous chapter we examined Trotsky's reactions to the Kirov murder and discussed his strategy of pretending to "predict" that which he knew or could reasonably expect would follow:

There is only one way to forestall en route the amalgams that are in preparation: *Expose the scheme in advance*. The Stalinists are trying to mold the public opinion of the world police towards expulsions, extraditions, arrests and other more decisive measures. The Leninists must prepare the public opinion of the world proletariat for these possible events. In this case, as in others, it is necessary to speak out openly about what is; that is also the aim of the present article.

Trotsky restated this strategy in his final speech to the Dewey Commission in April 1937:

The author of these lines and his closest co-thinkers followed attentively the intrigues and provocations of the GPU, and **in advance**, on the basis of particular facts and symptoms, **warned time and again**, in letters as well as in the press, **against Stalin's provocative plans and against amalgams in preparation**.
(CLT 486)

⁶ I use the word "lie" because Trotsky deliberately misled his followers, the principal readers of the B.O. and of his other essays.

We propose that the only way Trotsky could have thought that his mention of the accusation in a newspaper article presaged an "official" accusation to come was if that accusation were true.

This time Trotsky's attempt "to expose the scheme in advance" misfired somewhat. No accusation that Zinoviev and Kamenev had been relying upon "armed intervention" surfaced during the Kirov murder investigation, indictment, trial, and sentencing, nor in the articles or indictment concerning the arrests and trial of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and their followers in the "Moscow Center."

Still, Trotsky must have calculated that the "armed intervention" allegation might come to the fore sooner or later. Trotsky could not prevent this from happening. The only thing he could do was to "get out in front of" the accusation by claiming that he had already "exposed the scheme in advance." We know that this was his strategy in "predicting" that his own name would surface during the investigation of the Kirov murder by Zinovievist members of the bloc.

In the present case our hypothesis is as follows: Trotsky calculated that future confessions would include the charge of "armed insurrection." This is what led Trotsky to anticipate this accusation by "predicting" it.

There are a number of reasons Trotsky could have believed that the "armed intervention" accusation would be forthcoming:

* Trotsky could have known that Zinoviev and Kamenev had been planning for "armed intervention," and therefore that their followers would probably expose this fact.

* Trotsky could have known that the Rights, who were also a part of the bloc, were planning for "armed intervention," and therefore their followers too would probably expose the fact.

If any of the Zinovievists or Rights confessed they would certainly inculcate the Trotskyists and Trotsky himself. In either of these cases the Trotskyists, as a constituent part of the bloc, would have

known about and agreed to this tactic. That means that Trotsky himself must have at least approved it.

In fact we have good evidence from the Moscow Trials transcripts, from Budyonny's letter to Voroshilov, and from Piatakov's recently-declassified NKVD file, that Trotsky actively promoted armed intervention against the USSR. We discuss the first two sources in the present volume and will examine Piatakov's NKVD file in the next volume.

* Trotsky himself had been advocating "armed intervention" to his supporters in the USSR. The Zinovievists and Rights would have known about this. Even if they did not know about it, the Zinovievists had named Trotsky. So the arrests of yet more Trotskyists would have been imminent and they might well reveal that Trotsky was relying on "armed intervention."

The evidence now available supports this last scenario. We will present the evidence that supports this as a hypothesis.

But in any case Trotsky's "amalgam," or lie, about "armed intervention" must be accounted for. In the rest of this essay we will give:

- * the evidence that Trotsky was planning "armed intervention" as a means to gain power in the USSR;
- * evidence that corroborates or confirms this evidence;
- * a consideration of other possible hypotheses that might be cited to explain Trotsky's repeated lie that Zinoviev and Kamenev were accused of plotting armed intervention.

Evidence: The January 1937 Moscow Trial

We have evidence from the January 1937 and March 1938 Moscow Trials testimony that Trotsky was instructing the leaders of the clandestine Trotskyist group in the Soviet Union that a reversion to capitalism might well be the price of cooperation of the capital-

ist powers, especially Germany and Japan. The Trotskyist leaders on trial also testified that they might have to rely on the military might of capitalist powers in order to seize power.

In his opening statement at the 1937 Trial Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, the Soviet prosecutor, summarized pretrial testimony by Karl Radek:

The main task which the parallel centre set itself was **the forcible overthrow of the Soviet government** with the object of changing the social and state system existing in the U.S.S.R. L.D. Trotsky, and on his instructions the parallel Trotskyite centre, aimed at **seizing power with the aid of foreign states** with the object of restoring capitalist social relations in the U.S.S.R (5)

Proceeding from this program, L. D. Trotsky and his accomplices in the parallel centre entered into negotiations with agents of foreign states with the object of overthrowing the Soviet government with the aid of **armed intervention.** (6)

The investigation has established that L.D. Trotsky entered into negotiations with one of the leaders of the German National-Socialist Party with a view to **waging a joint struggle against the Soviet Union.**

L.D. Trotsky and his accomplices in the U.S.S.R. considered it necessary, during the forthcoming war, to adopt an active defeatist position and to do all they could to **assist the foreign interventionists in their fight against the U.S.S.R.**

For example, the accused Pyatakov, relating the conversation he had with L. Trotsky in December 1935 near Oslo, testified:

As regards the war, L.D. Trotsky spoke of this very explicitly. From his point of view, war is inevitable in the near future.

He, Trotsky, considers it absolutely necessary to adopt a distinctly defeatist attitude in this war. He considers that the bloc's coming into power can certainly be hastened by **the defeat of the U.S.S.R. in war.** (Vol. I, p. 258.) (10)

Piatakov's testimony

I recall that Trotsky said in this directive that without the necessary support from foreign states, a government of the bloc could neither come to power nor hold power. It was therefore a question of arriving at the necessary preliminary agreement with the most aggressive foreign states, like Germany and Japan, and that **he, Trotsky, on his part had already taken the necessary steps in establishing contacts both with the Japanese and the German governments.** (53)

...later, in the middle of 1935, Sokolnikov himself told me of this step and recounted the conversation in which he had sanctioned **Trotsky's negotiations with the Japanese government.** (53-4)

About the end of 1935 Radek received a long letter—instructions from Trotsky. In this directive Trotsky advanced two possible variants of our coming into power. The first variant was the possibility of our coming into power before a war, and the second variant, during a war. Trotsky visualized the first variant resulting from a concentrated terrorist blow, as he said....**The second variant, which in Trotsky's opinion was the more probable, was a military defeat.** (55)

In this connection Trotsky again said that in his opinion war was imminent, that he knew for a fact that it was a question not of, say, a five-year period, but of a short time....The other task was a more practical one: to train cadres for the event of war, that is to say, to

train diversionists and those who would engage in destruction, helpers for the fascist attack on the Soviet Union. (62)

In connection with the international question Trotsky very emphatically insisted on the necessity of **preparing diversionist cadres**. He rebuked us for not engaging energetically enough in diversive, wrecking and terrorist activities. He told me that he had come to an absolutely definite agreement with the fascist German government and with the Japanese government that they would adopt a favourable attitude in the event of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc coming to power. (64)

First, the German fascists promise to adopt a favourable attitude towards the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and to support it if it comes to power, either in time of war,... (64)

...since Hess and Trotsky had discussed the question of war and a military *coup d'état*, accession to power, that is to say, the defeat of the U.S.S.R.—Hess, of course, quite naturally raised the point: Well, you are fighting over there; while in this case we are a much better organized and a better armed force. It is clear once we negotiate you must go the whole length. **In the event of military attack the destructive forces of the Trotskyite organizations which would act within the country must be co-ordinated with the forces from without acting under the guidance of German fascism.** The diversive and wrecking activity which is being conducted by the Trotskyite-Zinovievite organization within the Soviet Union must be carried out under the instructions of Trotsky, which are to be agreed upon with the German General Staff.

Towards the end there was talk to the effect that, say, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc comes into power with the aid of certain external forces, they put us into power. (65)

The testimony of Trotskyist defendant G.Y. Sokol'nikov addresses the question of "armed intervention" most directly:

VYSHINSKY: And what about the aggressors?

SOKOLNIKOV: We were prepared to come to an agreement with them, the result of which would be that in the course of war and as a result of the defeat of the Soviet Union, the government of the bloc would come to power.

VYSHINSKY: It would therefore be correct to say that you were banking on **help from foreign interventionists?**

SOKOLNIKOV: You see ... perhaps it is something worse ...

VYSHINSKY: I am not speaking of what is worse or of what is better. I am not passing moral judgment. I am establishing facts. I, as the representative of the State prosecution, assert that you were directly staking on **the assistance of foreign aggressors, on the assistance of foreign interventionists.** Is my assertion correct?

SOKOLNIKOV: It is correct that we calculated on the help of foreign aggressors. Interventionists—I would not say. (156)

The Rights Also Confessed To Plotting "Armed Intervention"

Genrikh Iagoda was head of the OGPU and, between 1934 and October 1936, Commissar of Internal Affairs and head of the police

force known as the NKVD.⁷ Iagoda himself was arrested at the beginning of March 1937 and began to confess to being an important participant in the conspiracy of the Right oppositionists. In 1997 pretrial confessions of Iagoda were published in a small academic edition in Russia. These confessions are routinely cited as genuine by mainstream scholars of the Soviet period.

Iagoda testifies about the bloc's relations with Germany:

Помню, что Карахан говорил о двух вариантах соглашения: один, если центр заговора приходит к власти самостоятельно без помощи немцев; второй, если заговорщикам в их приходе к власти помогут немецкие штыки во время войны.

При первом варианте речь шла о следующих условиях:

1. Разрыв СССР договоров о союзе с Францией и Чехословакией.
2. Заключение военного и экономического союзов с Германией.
3. Ликвидация Коминтерна.
4. Предоставление Германии [права] на долголетние концессии источников химического сырья СССР (Кольского полуострова, нефтяных источников и прочее).
5. Установление в СССР такого политического и экономического строя, который гарантирует германским фирмам полную возможность развития своей частной инициативы на территории СССР.

⁷ The initials NKVD indicate the name of the Commissariat (= ministry) itself, "People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs" but are commonly used to refer to the police and investigative section of this large organization. The OGPU became a part of the NKVD in July 1934.

При втором варианте, т. е. при приходе к власти в военное время при помощи немцев, оставались в силе те же условия, плюс какие-то территориальные уступки, но какие именно я не помню. Об этом должен полнее и точнее показать сам Карахан.

...

Вопрос: А как мыслился приход к власти на случай войны?

Ответ: Речь шла о восстании наших партий в тылу, аресте членов правительства при одновременном открытии фронта неприятелю заговорщиками из военного блока. (198)

Translated:

I recall that Karakhan talks about two variants of the agreement: one, if the center of the conspiracy should come to power independently, without the Germans' help; the second, **if German bayonets were to help the conspirators to take power during wartime.**

In the first variant the following conditions would apply:

1. The cancellation by the USSR of agreements about alliance with France and Czechoslovakia.
2. The conclusion of military and economic agreements with Germany.
3. The liquidation of the Comintern.
4. The presentation to Germany of [rights to] long-term concessions of sources of chemical resources in the USSR (the Kola peninsula, petroleum sources, and so on).
5. The establishment in the USSR of a political and economic system that would guarantee to German

companies the full possibility of development of their private initiative on the territory of the USSR.

In the case of the second variant, i.e. **in the event [the bloc] came to power during wartime with German help**, these same conditions would hold, plus some territorial concessions, but I do not remember exactly what they were. Karakhkan himself should confess about this more fully and accurately.

...

QUESTION: And how was the coming to power in the case of war imagined?

ANSWER: Through an uprising of our parties in the rear, the arrest of members of the government while at the same time opening the front to the enemy by the conspirators of the military bloc.

Nikolai Bukharin, along with Aleksei Rykov, was arrested and imprisoned at the close of the discussion of their cases at the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central Committee. It has long been known that Bukharin made his first confession on June 2, 1937. A copy of that confession, which is still secret in Russia today, is in the Volkogonov Archive in the National Archives, Washington, DC. We have published it, together with a commentary.⁸

In that first confession Bukharin testifies about the bloc's, and specifically Trotsky's, reliance upon armed intervention:

In the summer of 1934 I was at RADEK'S apartment when RADEK informed me about TROTSKY'S external

⁸ Furr and Bobrov, "Nikolai Bukharin's First Statement of Confession in the Lubyanka." *Cultural Logic* 2007. At http://clogic.eserver.org/2007/Furr_Bobrov.pdf The Russian original, published in 2007 in the Russian historical journal *Klio* (St Petersburg) is at https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrgr/research/furrnbobrov_bukharin_klio07.pdf

political arrangements. RADEK said that **Trotsky, stressing terror, all the same considered the main chance for the arrival in power of the bloc to be the defeat of the USSR in war with Germany and Japan**, and in connection to this was promoting the idea of an agreement with Germany and Japan at the cost of territorial concessions (Ukraine to the Germans, the Far East to the Japanese). (17)

Evidence: Tukhachevsky's confessions

Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky was arrested in the fourth week of May 1937. Within two days he began to make detailed confessions about his conspiracy against the Stalin leadership. Among other matters he discussed the plans for intervention by foreign powers.

...Romm also passed on that it was Trotsky's hope that Hitler would come to power and would support him, Trotsky, in his struggle against Soviet power.⁹ (Main 159)

Round about this time, 1933/1934, Romm visited me in Moscow and told me that he had to pass on Trotsky's new instructions. Trotsky pointed out that it was no longer feasible to restrict our activities to simply recruiting and organizing cadres, that it was necessary to adopt a more concrete programme, that German Fascism would render the Trotskyists assistance in their struggle with Stalin's leadership and that the military conspiracy must supply the German General Staff with intelligence data, as well as working hand in

⁹ Translation by Steven J. Main, "The Arrest and 'Testimony' of Marshal of the Soviet Union M.N. Tukhachevsky (May-June 1937)." *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 10, 1 (1997), 151-195. Main puts scare quotes around the word "testimony" to show that he doubts that Tukhachevsky made the confession willingly. This is a requirement of those who wish to show their loyalty to the "anti-Stalin paradigm," *de rigueur* in mainstream Soviet history. Main has no evidence whatsoever that the confession is other than it purports to be. The dishonest tactic of "Argument by Scare Quotes" is discussed in Furr Kirov Chapter 4 87ff.

glove with the Japanese General Staff, carrying out disruptive activities in the army, prepare diversions and terrorist acts against members of the government. These instructions of Trotsky I communicated to the center of our conspiracy. (Main 160-161)

During the winter of 1935/1936, Pyatakov told me that Trotsky had now asked us to ensure the [future] defeat of the USSR in war, even if this meant giving the Ukraine to the Germans and the Primor'ye to the Japanese. In order to prepare the USSR's defeat, all forces, both within the USSR and out with [should be "-side" - GF] the USSR would have to be made ready; in particular, Pyatakov stated that Trotsky would carry out a decisive struggle to plant his people in the Comintern. Pyatakov stated that such conditions would mean the restoration of capitalism in the country... (Main 163)

Thus, developing our platform based on supporting the Rightists in their struggle against the general line of the Party, adding to it, subsequently, Trotskyite slogans, the end result was that the anti-Soviet military Trotskyite conspiracy had embarked on the path of overthrowing Soviet power through a counter-revolution by terror, espionage, diversionary activities, sabotage, defeatist activity [leading to] the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. (Main 163)

In the autumn of 1935, Putna came to my office and handed over a note from Sedov, in Trotsky's name, insisting that I more energetically attract Trotskyite cadres to the military conspiracy and more actively use them. I told Putna to say that this would be done. In addition, Putna told me that Trotsky had established direct links with Hitler's government and the General Staff, and that the center of the anti-Soviet military Trotskyite conspiracy should task itself to prepare de-

feats on those fronts where the German Army would operate. (Main 166)

As I have already pointed out in the first section, during the strategic military exercises carried out in April 1936, on the question of the operational position of our armies, I exchanged opinions with Yakir and Ubovich. Taking into account Trotsky's directive to prepare for defeat on that front where the Germans would attack, as well as General Rundstedt's instruction to prepare for defeat on the Ukrainian Front, ... (Main 185)

Primakov, as quoted in Budyonny's letter to Voroshilov:

Отрицал он это на том основании, что, якобы, ему, ПРИМАКОВУ, ТРОЦКИМ была поставлена более серьезная задача - **поднять в Ленинграде вооруженное восстание**, для чего он ПРИМАКОВ, должен был строго законспирироваться от всех террористических групп, порвать свои связи со всеми троцкистами и правыми и тем самым завоевать авторитет и абсолютное доверие со стороны партии и армейского командования.... В связи с **этим специальным заданием ТРОЦКОГО**, ПРИМАКОВ обрабатывал 25 кавдивизию во главе с командиром дивизии ЗЫБИНЫМ. По его словам, ЗЫБИН должен был **встретить на границе ТРОЦКОГО при овладении повстанцами Ленинградом.**¹⁰

Translated:

He denied that on the basis that supposedly he, Primakov, had been entrusted by Trotsky with a

¹⁰ "Narodnomu kommissaru Oborony Soiuza SSR Marshalu Sovjetskogo Soiuzu tov. K.E. Voroshilovu." *Klio* (St Petersburg) No. 2 (2012), 21.

more serious task - to raise an armed insurrection in Leningrad, for which he Primakov must keep himself strictly apart from any terrorist groups, break his ties with all Trotskyites and Rights, and at the same time win for himself authority and absolute trust from the party and the army command.... **In connection with this special assignment of Trotsky's**, Primakov had worked on the 25th cavalry division headed by the commander of the division. Zybin. According to his words **Zybin had been supposed to meet Trotsky at the border once the rebels had taken over Leningrad.**

Liushkov

The testimony of Genrikh Samoilovich Liushkov, NKVD General and defector in June 1938 to the Japanese, is some of the strong evidence we presently have from outside of the USSR and beyond the reach of the NKVD, that confirms the truthfulness of some of the testimony and charges at the Moscow Trials. Liushkov's remarks to his Japanese handlers confirm key elements of Tukhachevsky's confessions. It also confirms the charges at the March 1938 Moscow Trial including, explicitly, Rykov's involvement in the anti-government conspiracy and the conspiracy of some leading military officers.¹¹

Concerning the issue of "armed intervention" Alvin Coox summarized what Liushkov told his Japanese handlers as follows:

According to Lyushkov, the interrogations of Deribas, Zapadni, and Barminski established that in the NKVD and the border guard forces, a plot centering on Garmarnik had been fomented. For a long time Deribas had been in contact with Rykov and was the latter's

¹¹ Furr Kirov Chapter 17: "Liushkov's Essay," 336-358.

'hidden conspirator'. In concert with Lavrenty Lavrentiev (former First Secretary of the Regional Committee of the Party until January 1937), with Grigory Krutov (shot in April 1938), and with the army plotters Sangurski, Aronshtam, and others, Deribas supposedly intended to conduct a putsch in the Far East and **to reach agreement with the Japanese for help and for combined operations against the Soviet Union.** (Coox 1, 156)

We also examine Liushkov's disclosures to his Japanese handlers in another chapter of the present study.

Evidence: the March 1938 Moscow Trial

Prosecutor Vyshinskii:

The extensive application of wrecking measures in Uzbekistan was also fully corroborated by the accused IKRAMOV, who testified that the "bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" had set him the following tasks:

...a) to make extensive preparations in Uzbekistan for armed insurrection, to be started simultaneously with the beginning of intervention;... (17)

GRINKO: ... At the beginning of 1935 I heard from Lyubchenko about the creation in the Ukraine of a national-fascist organization, the object of which was to sever the Ukraine from the U.S.S.R., and which **counted on receiving assistance in the shape of military intervention** on the part of those forces and elements with whom I had already established personal contact at that time. The national-fascist organization also set itself the aim of uniting with the "bloc of Rights and Trotskyites," which had established contact with the military conspirators. (70)

IVANOV: We assembled insurrectionary groups, chiefly around Archangel, so as, **at the moment of intervention**, to cut off communication between Archangel and the central arteries of our country, and thus make it easier for the British to seize this timber region and most valuable port. (124)

IVANOV:... During this conversation in particular, I asked: where is the intervention, where is the attack on the Soviet Union? Bukharin told me that measures were being taken to induce the fascist countries Japan and Germany to take action without fail in 1937, and the chances of this were good. (127)

KRESTINSKY: This was the question which confronted us, and in our brief conversations with Pyatakov we were thinking, we were saying that without help from the outside, that is to say, **without intervention, without armed assistance from outside, we could not manage**, and when I went abroad ...

IKRAMOV: ... Antipov informed me about the German-Japanese orientation and about the connections with the Germans and Japanese. He also told me that there was a military group, and that in the event of war they would act by **opening the front to the attacking forces of the interventionists**. (360)

IKRAMOV: It was during the Congress of Soviets in November or the beginning of December 1936. During the Congress of Soviets I met Bukharin on the staircase; nobody was about, and I asked him about this. He answered in the affirmative, and formulated it as follows: **if there will not be a war just now, if there will not be intervention soon, it is all over with our business**. (361)

BUKHARIN: Tomsy considered it permissible to take advantage of war and preliminary agreements with Germany. This I opposed by the following arguments, I said that in the first place **if Germany were to intervene in one way or another during the war to help the counter-revolutionary coup**, then, as it always happens, Germany, being rather a strong military and technical factor, would inevitably put her feet on the table and tear up any preliminary agreement which had been concluded. (431)

BUKHARIN: When I asked Tomsy how he conceived the mechanics of the coup he said this was **the business of the military organization, which was to open the front.**

VYSHINSKY: So Tomsy was preparing to open the front?

BUKHARIN: He did not say that.

VYSHINSKY: Yes or no?

BUKHARIN: I asked how he visualized **the mechanism of this intervention.**

VYSHINSKY: Whose intervention?

BUKHARIN: Of certain foreign states. (433)

BUKHARIN: I said that I asked Tomsy: "**How is the mechanism of this intervention visualized?**" He answered: "This is the business of the military organization, which is **to open the front to the Germans.**" (434)

Corroborating evidence

The evidence cited above is direct evidence that not only Trotsky but the "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" itself, including the Rights, advocated "armed intervention" as a part of a plan for seizing

power in the USSR. There is also a good deal of corroborating evidence—evidence tending to strengthen or confirm the direct evidence in some way. The subject of the present article – Trotsky's lie that Zinoviev and Kamenev were accused of planning "armed intervention" – can itself be considered as corroborating evidence that confirms or strengthens the case that Trotsky conspired with Germany and Japan.

Piatakov's Face-To-Face Confrontation with Bukharin December 7, 1936

In 2002 the transcript of Iurii Piatakov's "face-to-face" confrontation with Nikolai Bukharin was published in a leading Russian history journal. In it Piatakov confirms all his previous confessions. He does not specifically mention his charge that Trotsky was conspiring with Germany. If he had done so it would be direct, not corroborating, evidence.

Its significance is that not only Nikolai Ezhov, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs (head of the NKVD), but Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, Commissar for Heavy Industry Sergo Ordzhonikidze, and Stalin himself were present. It was never intended for publication.

There is no reason to think Piatakov's statements were "forced" and there is no evidence they were. Bukharin privately told his wife, Anna Larina, about this meeting, as Larina recounted in her memoirs. Bukharin told her that Ordzhonikidze had asked Piatakov repeatedly whether his testimony were "voluntary." Piatakov assured him that it was entirely voluntary.¹²

In his confrontation with Bukharin Piatakov did confirm that at their meeting in 1931 Leon Sedov gave him Trotsky's instructions about the formation of a Trotskyist bloc with the Rightists within

¹² Anna Larina. *This I Cannot Forget. The Memoirs of Nikolai Bukharin's Widow*. New York: Norton, 1993, p. 312.

the USSR, one that was already in the process of formation. We know this independently from Trotsky's and Sedov's own documents in the Harvard Trotsky Archive. Therefore, in this one rare instance where we can check Piatakov's confession against information we know to be true from another source, Piatakov was telling the truth. This lends credibility to the rest of Piatakov's statements.¹³

Sokol'nikov and Radek

Just before the end of the USSR a short excerpt from pretrial confessions by Sokol'nikov and Radek were published. In the course of the pretrial investigation in December 12, 1936, Sokol'nikov testified that Tamekiti Ota, Japanese ambassador to the USSR, asked him, Sokol'nikov, on April 13, 1935, whether he was aware that "Mr. Trotsky has made certain proposals to my government." In the trial transcript the identity of the country and the ambassador were omitted. In volume two of the present study we will present evidence that corroborates the validity of Sokol'nikov's testimony that he was approached by the Japanese concerning Trotsky's collaboration with them.¹⁴

It is not likely that this testimony was "fabricated" – faked – and then the details omitted at the trial itself and in the transcript. Such a charade would have been pointless. Moreover, as we point out elsewhere in the present volume in more detail, there never has been any evidence that the defendants' testimony at the Moscow Trials was "compelled" in any way. All the evidence we have is that the Moscow Trials defendants said *what they wanted to say*.

On December 16, 1936, just four days after this testimony by Sokol'nikov, Georgi Dimitrov wrote about it in his private diary.

¹³ "Stenogramma ochnykh stavok v TsK VKP(b). Dekabr' 1936 goda. No. 3. Stenogramma ochnoi stavki mezhdru Piatakovym i Bukharinym v Ts.K VKP(b) ot 7 dekabria 1936 goda." *Voprosy Istorii* 4 (2003) 3-12. The "face-to-face confrontation" is on pp. 3-7; the rest of the article is a letter of Bukharin's to Stalin.

¹⁴ See also Furr Evidence.

Dimitrov copied or summarized a passage that must be at the conclusion of the transcript of this interrogation of Sokol'nikov:

QUESTION: Thus, the investigation concludes that Trotsky abroad and the center of the bloc within the USSR entered into negotiations with the Hitlerite and Japanese governments with the following terms:

First, to provoke a war by Germany and Japan against the USSR;

Second, to promote the defeat of the USSR in that war and to take advantage of that defeat to achieve the transfer of power in the USSR or [their] government bloc;

Third, on behalf of the future bloc government to guarantee territorial and economic concessions to the Hitlerite and Japanese governments.

Do you confirm this?

REPLY: Yes, I confirm it.¹⁵

Some pretrial testimony of Radek's likewise confirms his testimony at trial, where crucial details were omitted. We refer the reader to our longer discussion elsewhere.¹⁶

Conclusion

Trotsky lied in stating that Zinoviev and Kamenev had been charged with "provoking" or otherwise counting on "armed intervention." in order to oust Stalin et al. and bring themselves to power. The question is: Why did he fabricate this particular lie?

¹⁵ *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov*, ed. Ivo Banac (Yale U.P., 2003), 43.

¹⁶ Furr Evidence. 66-73.

Why did he take such a clear risk of exposure? Why did Trotsky repeatedly make statements that anyone who took the trouble to verify them could readily see were false?

Our hypothesis is that Trotsky told this lie in order to anticipate an accusation that he could reasonably expect to emerge at some point: that he, Leon Trotsky, had been urging his followers to count on the intervention of hostile powers to bring him and the bloc to power. He could reasonably expect this accusation would be made because (a) he had indeed been doing this, and his followers in the bloc knew it and, (b) because others in the bloc - Zinovievists and Rights - not only knew that Trotsky advocated "armed intervention" but were doing so themselves. Hence if they were caught - say, through the confession of one or more of their members - they would have no reason not to inculpate Trotsky too. Since the NKVD had arrested many members of the bloc and on the basis of their confessions was continuing the investigation and arresting more of them, it was likely that, sooner or later, one or more of these men would reveal what Trotsky had been doing. This is in fact what happened.

Other possible hypotheses

No single piece or unit of evidence is unequivocal. When viewed individually, in isolation from the whole concatenation of evidence, any piece of evidence can be accounted for in multiple ways. The explanatory power of circumstantial evidence is revealed when multiple pieces of evidence can all be accounted for by only one hypothesis, one single explanatory narrative.¹⁷ In this essay we have outlined that hypothesis.

It is important to inquire what other hypotheses might be able to account for Trotsky's deliberate lies that Zinoviev, Kamenev, and

¹⁷ "In practice, circumstantial evidence can have an advantage over direct evidence in that it can come from multiple sources that check and reinforce each other." "Circumstantial Evidence," Wikipedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circumstantial_evidence#Validity_of_circumstantial_evidence

their followers were planning to "provoke armed intervention" by a hostile state. Any alternate hypothesis would have to satisfy the same requirements:

* It would have to account for the obvious "coincidence" that, although Trotsky's claim that Zinoviev and Kamenev had been charged with desiring "armed intervention" was false, he himself and other members of the bloc were to be accused of exactly this almost exactly two years later.

* It would also have to set forth a different yet equally persuasive reason for Trotsky's lie. Trotsky took a considerable risk of being exposed as a liar. If Trotsky had simply criticized and/or ridiculed the real accusations against Zinoviev and Kamenev, without lying about the charges against them, he would have run no such risk. Indeed, he would have been expressing the doubts many people had about who the real murderers of Kirov were. Therefore we must assume that Trotsky had a very compelling reason to lie in precisely this way.

The hypothesis set forth in the present essay satisfies both of these requirements: it accounts for both the apparent "coincidence" and Trotsky's motive for telling such a blatant lie.

Our hypothesis is strengthened because it suggests that Trotsky was once again relying on his strategy of "exposing the scheme in advance": of feigning to predict an accusation that he knew was likely to be made in the future since he knew it to be true and also knew that at least one of those in the bloc who knew about it too would be likely to reveal it when arrested and questioned. We have shown that Trotsky employed this tactic on other occasions.

The fact that Trotsky denied the accusations that he was relying on "armed intervention" is not significant. Trotsky would have denied this accusation whether it were true or false. We know the bloc of Trotskyists, Zinovievists, and Rights did exist despite the fact that Trotsky repeatedly and strenuously denied it. Thanks to Broué,

Getty, and Holmström we know that Trotsky lied about other matters as well. Thanks to Getty we also know that Trotsky's Archive has been "purged," no doubt of incriminating materials.

We do not know of any other hypothesis that can account for Trotsky's false claim that Zinoviev and Kamenev had been accused of planning on "armed intervention." Moreover, our hypothesis is the most obvious one, the one that would immediately present itself to any objective researcher.

Despite this fact, we predict that our hypothesis will be rejected by some people on political, not evidentiary, grounds. Contemporary historiography of the Soviet Union is dominated by ideological anticommunism. Under the sway of this anticommunism many people refuse to accept any historical explanation, no matter how well it accounts for the evidence, if it tends to make the Moscow Trials testimony appear basically accurate, or if it fails to reinforce the dominant paradigm of Joseph Stalin as bloodthirsty dictator and falsifier.

This is true of Trotskyist historians as well, who are accepted at the margins of mainstream anticommunist historiography. Typically, Trotskyists are unwilling to consider the possibility that Trotsky lied other than in order to save his followers in the Soviet Union. They are ideologically unwilling to countenance the possibility that Soviet accusations of Trotsky's involvement with German and/or Japan might be accurate despite all the evidence now available to support that conclusion.

We believe that political bias accounts for the fact that the research reported in this paper was not done before this. In another, less politicized, field of historical study some scholar or student would have long ago done what we did: obtain the articles from *Humanité*, *Pravda*, and *Izvestia*, and compared them to what Trotsky wrote. The fact that this has not occurred speaks to the strong political biases that dominate the field of Soviet studies.

The phenomenon of Trotsky's "amalgam" about "armed intervention" should not be ignored, no matter how inconvenient it may be for politically-motivated persons. It has to be accounted for.

It may be that there is another hypothesis that better explains Trotsky's taking the risk he did in lying about Zinoviev and Kamenev being accused of supporting "armed intervention." But until such an alternative hypothesis is shown to account for the evidence better than the one we have proposed here, we must consider our hypothesis as proven by the available evidence - not proven "beyond any doubt," but proven "beyond reasonable doubt."

Chapter 15. Trotsky's Kirov Assassination article – "The Restoration of Capitalism"

"The Restoration of Capitalism"

In his article "On the Kirov Assassination" dated December 30, 1934, which comprises the entire issue #41 of the *Biulleten' Opozitsii*, Trotsky listed the men arrested in the fourth week of December and charged with being the "Moscow Center" of the clandestine Zinovievist organization whose Leningrad Center had carried out Kirov's murder. Trotsky wrote:

... these fifteen individuals are implicated, no more, no less, in the assassination of Kirov and, according to explanations given by Pravda, **they had as their aim the seizure of power, beginning with Leningrad, "with the secret intention of reestablishing the capitalist régime."**

Trotsky thought that this charge was important enough to devote two paragraphs to denouncing it:

3. Was the Purpose to Restore Capitalism?

The first question which must inevitably arise in the minds of all thinking workers is the following: How could it come to pass that at a time like this, after all the economic successes, after the "abolition" – according to official assurances – of classes in the USSR, and the "construction" of the socialist society – **how could it come to pass that old Bolsheviks, the most intimate collaborators of Lenin, those who shared power with Stalin, members of the "Old Guard," could have posed for their task the restoration of capitalism?** Do Zinoviev, Kamenev and the others consider that the socialist régime is no boon to the

masses? Or, on the contrary, do they expect from capitalism personal advantages both for themselves and their descendants? And what sort of advantages?

Only utter imbeciles would be capable of thinking that capitalist relations, that is to say, the private ownership of the means of production, including the land, can be reestablished in the USSR by peaceful methods and lead to the régime of bourgeois democracy. As a matter of fact, even if it were possible in general, capitalism could not be regenerated in Russia except as the result of a savage counter-revolutionary coup d'état which would cost ten times as many victims as the October Revolution and the civil war. In the event of the overthrow of the Soviets, their place could only be taken by a distinctly Russian Fascism, so ferocious that in comparison to it the ferocity of the Mussolini régime and that of Hitler would appear like philanthropic institutions. Zinoviev and Kamenev are no fools. They cannot but understand that the restoration of capitalism would first of all signify the total extermination of the revolutionary generation, themselves, of course, included. Consequently, there cannot be the slightest doubt here that **the accusation concocted by Stalin against the Zinoviev group is fraudulent from top to bottom, both as regards the goal specified - restoration of capitalism; and as regards the means - terrorist acts.**

Trotsky repeated this accusation in an article dated January 26, 1935, published in the February 1935 issue number 42 of the B.O.:

The first government communique and official articles after the arrest of the Moscow group of Old Bolsheviks said that Zinoviev-Kamenev and their friends had taken as their aim "**the restoration of the capitalist system**" and they were trying to provoke "armed intervention" from abroad (by the intermediacy of a

consul- from Latvia!). No serious person could believe it; that is understood.

Stalin's lackeys, who cover themselves with the name of "leaders" of the Communist International, don't, however, recoil at the assertion that Zinoviev, Kamenev and the others "have themselves admitted their crimes." Which ones? Preparation of **the restoration of capitalism**? Preparation of armed intervention?

...

Let us admit that Zinoviev's criticism was false. Let us even grant that the lackeys were right to judge criticism directed against them "criminal." But are we to see in that the "**restoration of capitalism**" and "armed intervention"? What connection is there between the demand for a more revolutionary policy against the bourgeoisie and a program for "the restoration of a bourgeois regime"? Where has common sense gone? It is completely buried beneath a monstrous defecation of infamy.¹

Trotsky continued to repeat this charge in B.O. #43, of April 1935:

Today Maisky, in the rank of ambassador, accuses "Zinovievists" and "Trotskyists" of striving to **provoke military intervention in order to restore capitalism**...²

...

¹ Trotsky, "Everything Gradually Falls Into Place." WLT 1934-1935 223-228. Originally in B.O. #42.

² "The Workers' State, Thermidor and Bonapartism." WLT 1934-1935 240-261, at 251. Originally in B.O. #43.

In the government communique as well as in numerous articles in *Pravda* there was, as is well known, the direct and categorical assertion that Zinoviev and Kamenev *had as their goal the restoration of capitalism and military intervention...*³

And in B.O. #44 of July 1935:

Of the six congresses in the history of the Comintern to date, Zinoviev was president of five. Now he is in prison, ostensibly for **having wanted to restore capitalism by a terrorist act...**⁴

Trotsky and his son Leon Sedov repeated this charge yet again in their attack on the August 1936 Moscow Trial of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others in B.O. #52-53, republished in French as Leon Sedov, *Livre rouge sur le procès de Moscou / Red Book on the Moscow Trial* (October 1937).

16-го января 1935 года в советских газетах появился обвинительный акт по делу, так называемого, Московского центра, с Зиновьевым, Каменевым, Евдокимовым и др. во главе.... 15-16 января состоялся суд над Зиновьевым, Каменевым и др. всего 19 подсудимыми. **Они обвинялись в стремлении к "реставрации капитализма" и в контр-революционной деятельности вообще. Ни одного конкретного факта или доказательства обвинения не привело.** (B.O. #52)

Translated:

³ "Notes of a Journalist." WLT 1934-1935 323-238, at 327. Originally in B.O. #43. Italics in original, boldface mine, GF.

⁴ "The Seventh Congress of the Comintern." (June 7, 1935). WLT 1934-1935, 406-406, at 405. Originally in B.O. #44.

Le 16 janvier 1935, les journaux soviétiques publièrent l'acte d'accusation de l'affaire du prétendu Centre de Moscou, avec Zinoviev, Kaménev, Evdokimov et autres en tête. ... Les 15 et 16 janvier, le tribunal statuait sur le sort de Zinoviev, de Kamenev, etc., 19 inculpés en tout. **Ils étaient accusés d'aspirer au «rétablissement du capitalisme»** et de mener une activité contrerévolutionnaire *en général*. Aucun fait concret, aucune preuve ne furent apportés par accusation. (*Livre rouge*, pp. 23-24)

Translated:

On January 16, 1935, the Soviet newspapers published the formal indictment in the case of the so-called Moscow Center, with Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov and the others at its head. ... On January 15 and 16 the court pronounced judgment on the fate of Zinoviev, Kamenev, et al., 19 defendants in all. **They were accused of striving for the "restoration of capitalism"** and of counterrevolutionary activity in general. Not a single concrete fact, no proof, was introduced by the prosecution.⁵

This charge is again repeated in the following section (called "chapters" in the French and English books):

"Реставрация капитализма" или "жажда личной власти"?

В связи с первым процессом, Зиновьева и Каменева обвинили в том, что они за возврат к капитализму, "за капиталистическую реставрацию." Под этим припевом шла в

⁵ Leon Sedov, *The Red Book on the Moscow Trials* (1936), Chapter 3. At <http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/sedov/works/red/ch03.htm> (Red Book)

советских газетах того времени (начало 1935 года) травля Зиновьева -- Каменева.

Если не удалось -- тогда -- установить характера деятельности Зиновьева -- Каменева (террор), то по крайней мере твердо была установлена их цель: восстановление капитализма.

На втором процессе "капиталистическая реставрация" была совершенно забыта. Дана была новая версия: ...«с несомненностью установлено, что единственным мотивом организации троцкистско-зиновьевского блока стремление во что бы то ни стало захватить власть» (обвинительный акт). (В.О. #52)

From the Livre rouge:

Le «rétablissement du capitalisme» ou la «soif du pouvoir personnel»?

En liaison avec le premier procès, Zinoviev et Kaménev avaient été accusés d'être pour le retour au capitalisme, pour la «*restauration capitaliste*». C'est avec ce refrain que les journaux soviétiques de l'époque (début 1935) ont poursuivi Zinoviev et Kaménev.

Si l'on ne pouvait alors établir le caractère de l'activité de Zinoviev et de Kaménev (la terreur), on avait du moins nettement établi leur but: *le rétablissement du capitalisme*.

Au second procès, le «rétablissement du capitalisme» est tout a fait oublié. On apporte une nouvelle version: "...Il est établi d'une façon irréfutable que le seul motif de l'organisation du bloc trotskiste-zinoviéviste fut la tendance à s'emparer coûte que coûte du pouvoir" (1). (Livre rouge, p. 34)

Translated:

The "Restoration of Capitalism" or the "Thirst for Personal Power"?

In connection with the first trial⁶, Zinoviev and Kamenev had been accused of supporting the return to capitalism, "capitalist restoration." It is with this refrain that the Soviet newspapers of that period (the beginning of 1935) persecuted Zinoviev and Kamenev.

If one could not – then – establish the nature of the activity of Zinoviev and Kamenev (terror), **at least their purpose had been clearly established: the re-establishment of capitalism.**

At the second trial, the "restoration of capitalism" was completely forgotten. A new version was given: "... It is irrefutably established that the only motive for the organization of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist block was the attempt to seize power at any cost." (The Indictment). (Red Book, Chapter 4)

Trotsky continued to repeat this charge long after the First Moscow Trial of August 1936. In the middle of his lengthy final statement at the Dewey Commission hearings in April, 1937 – a statement that occupies 171 pages of print in the published transcript – Trotsky made the following statement:

In January, 1935 Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others were sentenced, in connection with the Kirov assassination, to some years of imprisonment. **During the trial they confessed a desire "to restore capitalism."** (CLT 533.)

⁶Trotsky is referring to the Moscow Center trial of January 1935.

In another undated article of about this time Trotsky again repeats the same charge:

These questions relate above all to Zinoviev and Kamenev. Just what were their motives – and these motives must have been exceptionally forceful – that guided them in their purported terror? **At the first trial in January 1935**, Zinoviev and Kamenev, while denying their participation in the assassination of Kirov, did acknowledge, by way of compensation, their “moral responsibility” for the terrorist tendencies, and in doing so **they cited** as the incentive for their oppositional activity **their urge “to restore capitalism.”** If we had nothing else to go by except this inhuman political “confession,” it would be sufficient to expose the lie of Stalinist justice.⁷

Trotsky's “Amalgam”

All these statements of Trotsky's are false. No such charge or anything like it figures in either the December 28, 1934, indictment of the Leningrad Zinovievist group charged with the assassination of Sergei Kirov or the January 1935 trial indictment (*obvinitel'noe zakliuchenie*) published in *Pravda*, January 16, 1935, on page 6. Nothing at all about restoring capitalism, or even the word “capitalism” itself, can be found among the charges as listed in the “rehabilitation” document published in the official Gorbachev-era Party journal *Izvestia Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS* in 1989.⁸ The archival copy of the court's sentence against the defendants in this case does not mention anything about reestablishing capitalism.⁹

⁷ Trotsky, “Zinoviev And Kamenev” (1937). At <http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1937/xx/kamzinov.htm>

⁸ “O dele tak nazivaemogo «moskovskogo tsentra,»” *Izvestia TsK KPSS* 7 (1989), p. 65. Reprinted in book form in R-PP 149.

⁹ Volkogonov Papers (LOC) Reel 3 Container 4 Folder 16.

Indeed, the word "capitalism" does not occur in any of these documents at all.¹⁰

The transcript of this January 1935 trial has never been published, so we have not seen it and Trotsky did not read it either. However, some quotations from the words of a few of the defendants were reproduced in a newspaper article which we discuss below. Trotsky quoted from it in 1936, as we shall see. But in it none of the accused confessed to desiring "to restore capitalism."

The passage from Chapter 3 of the *Red Book* quoted above correctly identifies the date, January 16, 1935, that the indictment (*obvinitel'nyi akt*) against Zinoviev, Kamenev, and their Moscow-based supporters was published in Soviet newspapers, including *Pravda*. But nothing about this charge or anything like it can be found there.

There is no question about the use of different texts. In the paragraphs immediately before the section subtitled "The 'Restoration of Capitalism' or the 'Thirst for Personal Power'" (quoted above) Trotsky/Sedov quote from the statements of four of the January 1935 defendants: Kamenev, Bakaev, Zinoviev, and Evdokimov. The quotations from the first three are taken directly from the text of the indictment which, as Trotsky/Sedov correctly noted, was published in *Pravda* and other Soviet newspapers on January 16, 1935 (in *Pravda* on page 6).

18. Каменев Л.Б....Признал, что «недостаточно активно и энергично боролся с тем разложением, которое было последствием борьбы с партией и на почве которого могла возникнуть и осуществить своё преступление

¹⁰ Trotsky does not identify the passage from *Pravda* where he supposedly found the phrase "with the secret intention of reestablishing the capitalist régime." I have not been able to find it anywhere in the December 1934 pages of that newspaper. Of course, even if it should be found there somewhere it would not change matters. This, by the way, is a legitimate example of "absence of evidence" constituting "evidence of absence," because *Pravda* of December 1934 to January 1935 is a finite search field.

шайка бандитов из подонков антипартийной оппозиции.»

Translated:

Kamenev acknowledged that he "did not fight actively or energetically enough against the demoralization which was the consequence of the struggle against the party and upon which ground a band of brigands (Nikolaev and others) could spring up and carry out their crime."

...не порвал окончательно с Зиновьевым своих связей...
(col. 3)

Translated:

"[acknowledged] ...that he did not break all ties with Zinoviev."

Здесь была только злобная враждебная критика важнейших мероприятий партии... (col. 1, bottom)

Translated:

[Bakaev declares that] "here [among the Zinovievists] there was only malevolent and hostile criticism of the most important measures taken by the party."

...партия совершенно права в том, что она говорит по вопросу о политической ответственности бывшей антипартийной «зиновьевской» группы за совершившееся убийство. (col. 3)

Translated:

[Zinoviev says that] "...the party is absolutely correct when it speaks of the political responsibility of the old

'Zinovievist' anti-party group for the assassination which has just been accomplished."¹¹

The quotation from Evdokimov is taken directly from the separate article published on the same page opposite the text of the indictment and titled "From the Hall of the Supreme Court of the USSR. Declaration of the defendant Evdokimov to the court of January 15 of this year."¹²

«...мы должны нести ответственности, ибо тот яд, которым мы отравили окружающим нас в течение десятка лет, способствовал совершению преступления - убийству Кирова.» (col. 6, top)

Translated:

"We must bear the responsibility [for Kirov's murder], because it is the venom with which we poisoned those around us during a 10-year period which made possible the realization of this crime."¹³

The article quoting Evdokimov is summarized in *Humanité* of January 18, 1935.¹⁴ Trotsky and Sedov had read either the Russian original in *Pravda* or the briefer French summary. In *Pravda* the Evdokimov article and the text of the Indictment are on the same page.

¹¹ See *Livre rouge*, 33.

¹² "Iz zala verkhovnogo suda SSSR. Zaiavlenie podsudimogo Evdokimova na sude 15 ianvaria sego goda." *Pravda* January 16, 1935, page 6, cols 5-6.

¹³ See *Livre rouge*, 34.

¹⁴ "Les contre-révolutionnaires devant le tribunal supreme." *Humanité* January 18, 1935, p. 3 cols. 6-7. More quotations from Evdokimov are translated in an article the following day: "Ennemis dangereux le Tribunal les met sous les verrous," *Humanité* Jan. 19, 1935, p. 2 col. 1.

Therefore Trotsky and Sedov knew that Zinoviev, Kamenev and the other defendants, arrested in December 1934 and put on trial in mid-January 1935, were not charged with conspiring to "restore capitalism" or "provoking armed intervention," nor did they confess to it, nor did the issue arise in any way.

Rogovin's "Amalgam"

Vadim Z. Rogovin was a historian whose works constitute the most sustained Trotskyist interpretation of Soviet history of the Stalin period. In his books Rogovin always cited Trotsky prominently and positively. But Rogovin could not find any evidence of the "restoration of capitalism" charge that Trotsky claimed was in newspaper accounts. Rather than acknowledge this fact, however, Rogovin just repeated Trotsky's claim without any footnote or citation.

In the newspaper commentaries accompanying the trial transcript, the desire to restore capitalist society in the USSR was given as the incentive for these terrorist moods and for oppositional inclinations in general.¹⁵

Rogovin realized that the "restoration of capitalism" charge was not mentioned in the August 1936 trial. But instead of noting the fact that Trotsky (and Sedov) lied about this Rogovin concocted what we may call "Rogovin's amalgam" — a story according to which Zinoviev and Kamenev made a deal with Stalin to withdraw this charge, in return for which they would plead guilty to terrorist activity. He then refers to "the shift from the version about wanting to restore capitalism to the one about the naked thirst for power" (28).

¹⁵ Rogovin, 1937. *Stalin's Year of Terror*. Oak Park, IL: Mehring Books, 1998, p. 26.

In this way Rogovin avoided exposing Trotsky's lie. Perhaps he believed he was saving Trotsky's reputation. After all, how many people would scour the Soviet press to see whether the "restoration of capitalism" charge was actually raised in it?

Even nineteen months later, at the First Moscow Trial of August 1936, this charge was not part of the indictment, or charges against the defendants, including Zinoviev and Kamenev. In fact, nothing about the "restoration of capitalism" was mentioned in any way during that trial. Zinoviev, Kamenev, et al. did *not* confess to anything even remotely resembling this. They were *not* charged with supporting any "return to capitalism," "restoration of capitalism," etc..

This charge is a fabrication by Trotsky. To use Trotsky's own term, this story is an "amalgam." It is not true that, as Trotsky/Sedov claimed, "the restoration of capitalism' was completely forgotten" at the First Moscow Trial of August 1936. There was nothing to "forget." This accusation had never been made in the first place.

Why Did Trotsky Lie About This?

Pierre Broué and Vadim Rogovin wrote that Trotsky and Sedov lied about the bloc with the Zinovievists, Rights, and other oppositionists, and about Trotsky's contacts with some of the other people with whom he publicly and repeatedly denied having had any contact because they did not want to endanger supporters in the Soviet Union whom the NKVD had not yet identified. We have argued elsewhere that this cannot be the correct explanation because it would not have endangered anyone whom the NKVD and Soviet prosecution did not already know about.

Moreover, this explanation does not apply to Trotsky's claim that Zinoviev, Kamenev, et al. were accused of, and confessed to, plotting to restore capitalism. Anyone who bothered to obtain and read the issues of *Pravda* could have discovered that Trotsky was lying. Therefore, Trotsky had to know that by making this claim he was taking a serious risk of being exposed as a liar.

Trotsky must have had some very compelling reason for taking such a risk. A statement attributed to psychoanalyst Alfred Adler runs: "A lie would have no sense unless the truth were felt to be dangerous." Trotsky would not have lied if the truth had been on his side. It follows that he was hiding something. But what?

"Expose The Scheme In Advance"

Towards the end of his December 30, 1934, article on the Kirov Assassination Trotsky inserted a section titled "The Inevitability of New Amalgams Had Been Foretold." In it he claimed to have "predicted" that his own name would soon be raised "alongside Zinoviev's."

When the first dispatch appeared in which Nikolaiev was said to have been a member of the Leningrad Opposition in 1926, there was no further room for doubt. The new campaign against Zinoviev and Kamenev was not long in following. At that moment, in a conversation with a friend (I apologize for these personal details, but they are necessary for the understanding of the psychological undercurrents in the case), I said, "The matter will not rest long on this plane. Tomorrow they will bring Trotskyism to the fore." To be able to make such a prediction, it was really not necessary to be a prophet. The December 25 issue of the *Temps* which I received two or three days later contained in a telegraphic dispatch from Moscow the following item: "We must point out ... that as the days go by, Trotsky's name is being mentioned more and more often alongside Zinoviev's." Kirov's corpse and the Zinoviev group thus become preparatory steps for a much wider and

bolder scheme: to deal a blow at international Leninism.¹⁶

We know now how Trotsky was able to "predict" this. In 1980 Pierre Broué found proof in the newly-opened Harvard Trotsky Archive that Trotsky and his Soviet-based followers really were in a bloc with the Zinovievists. Once the Zinovievists had inculcated their own leaders by name there was no reason for them not to also name Trotsky. Therefore it was "predictable" that they would do so.

Trotsky chose not to reveal that he and his followers in the USSR were in a bloc with the Zinovievists, the Rights, and some other oppositionists. That meant he had to account for the progressive revelations by the NKVD and Soviet prosecution in some other way.

So he created an "amalgam." According to this false story the "campaign" against the Zinovievists was a "preparatory step" to "a much wider and bolder scheme": namely, an attack on Trotsky himself and his new movement. Trotsky claimed that his name was brought up because of Soviet alarm at "the growth of international Leninism," as he called the Trotskyist movement. Of course Trotsky knew better. Since Broué's 1980 article we have know better too.

Then Trotsky wrote:

There is only one way to forestall en route the amalgams that are in preparation: *Expose the scheme in advance*. The Stalinists are trying to mold the public opinion of the world police towards expulsions, extraditions, arrests and other more decisive measures. The Leninists must prepare the public opinion of the

¹⁶ "The Stalinist Bureaucracy and the Kirov assassination." December 28, 1934. WLT 1934-1935 175-197, at 194.

world proletariat for these possible events. (195; italics in the original.)

Here Trotsky explicitly claims that he "predicted" his name would come up so that he could "forestall" future fabrications - show them to be false because "predictable." In reality, the truth appears to be that Trotsky was able to "predict" things that he knew would come to light because they were true.

Hypothesis

This suggests an explanation for Trotsky's claim that Zinoviev, Kamenev, and the rest were charged "with the secret intention of reestablishing the capitalist régime," and his persistence in repeating it over and over again. Our hypothesis is that he did so because the charge was true - not only about Zinoviev and Kamenev but, more importantly, about Trotsky himself. According to testimony in the 1937 and 1938 Moscow Trials Trotsky really had instructed his followers that re-establishing capitalism would be necessary in order to placate the Germans and Japanese.

Trotsky may have been prompted to anticipate this charge by a press release printed in *Humanité* of December 23, 1934 (p. 5 col. 7) which states that the restoration of capitalism was the goal of the Kirov assassins, the Leningrad Center: "la préoccupation secrète de restaurer le régime capitaliste." This accusation is *not* leveled at Zinoviev, Kamenev, et al., whose arrests are signaled in a brief article immediately below the former.

An article in *Humanité* the following day (Dec. 24, p.3) titled "Le groupe terroriste zinovévist-trotskiste est le résultat de la persistance dans l'opposition à la ligne du parti" quotes *Izvestia* of December 22 or 23 as follows:

Le sens entier de leur activité et de leurs aspirations était la restauration du régime capitaliste.

Translated:

The whole sense of their activity and hopes was the restoration of the capitalist regime.

This too is stated of the Kirov assassins, not of Zinoviev and Kamenev. Trotsky cited *Humanité* as a source for his early article on the Kirov murder.

These articles concern only the Leningrad-based Zinovievists who were charged with murdering Kirov. Moreover, it only claims that the "sense" of their program would be a reversion to capitalist forms of production and distribution characteristic of the New Economic Policy – which, of course, they were.¹⁷ There is no indication in this article or any other that Zinoviev, Kamenev, and the Moscow-based Zinovievists, under arrest by December 22, were to be charged with plotting to restore capitalism.

Trotsky must have assumed this charge would be brought forth quickly, just as he assumed his name would be mentioned very soon. In the latter case he was correct – Trotsky's name came up almost immediately. In the former case, though, Trotsky miscalculated. In 1935 Zinoviev and Kamenev did not expose the bloc and the "parallel," or secret, leadership. The charge of "plotting to restore capitalism" was not brought up against Trotsky until sometime after the First Moscow Trial of August 1936.

However, Trotsky could reasonably have anticipated that this charge against him might be still brought up at some future time. Once Zinoviev and Kamenev had been arrested it was possible that they would name Radek, Piatakov, and Sokol'nikov. But Trotsky could not have known in advance when this might happen or when the charge against him would be made public.

If this was Trotsky's plan it made a good deal of sense. If the names of the leaders of the "parallel center" Radek, Piatakov, and

¹⁷ The *Humanité* article makes it clear that the Soviets knew that the economic programs of the Zinovievists was close to that of Trotsky. Trotsky's 1929 economic critique of the collectivization-industrialization campaign and that of the Right's Riutin Program of 1932 are similar, and Trotsky's came first.

Sokol'nikov did not come up or if, when interrogated, these men did not reveal Trotsky's plans, Trotsky could simply continue to claim that Stalin had made the "restoration of capitalism" charge and then abandoned it. Trotsky could then cite this as further "proof" of Stalin's duplicity. In fact Trotsky and Sedov did make this claim, as we have seen:

At the second trial, the "restoration of capitalism" was completely forgotten.

But if, as eventually did happen, the charge of plotting "the restoration of capitalism" was raised against him Trotsky would have the option of claiming that he had once again refuted an "amalgam in preparation" by "exposing the scheme in advance." So Trotsky continued to repeat the baseless charge that Zinoviev and Kamenev had been accused of plotting to "restore capitalism."

According to this hypothesis, therefore, Trotsky was able to make this assumption with some confidence because he had indeed instructed his followers in exactly this way - to restore capitalism. Trotsky's repeated claim in December-January 1934-5 that the Soviet government had charged Zinoviev, Kamenev, et al. with plotting to "reestablish the capitalist regime" can be explained as Trotsky's attempt to anticipate accusations that he assumed would probably be made against himself sometime in the future.

Under this hypothesis Trotsky's "prediction" that the defendants would be charged with reestablishing capitalism is like his "prediction" that his own name would soon be raised in the Kirov assassination case. In both instances Trotsky knew the charge against him was true and would almost certainly be made sooner or later. By anticipating this charge - by "exposing the scheme in advance" - Trotsky hoped to prepare public opinion - or, at any rate, his own supporters, the people who read his Bulletin - for the time when the Soviets really did make it, and so to "refute" it in advance by making it look all too "predictable" and therefore false.

Radek's and Piatakov's Testimony

This accusation that Trotsky was overtly proposing the "restoration of capitalism" did finally surface during the Second Moscow Trial in January 1937. It was a major, and shocking, feature of the trial. Trotsky, widely considered a fiery revolutionary more "left" than Stalin, was accused of promoting the re-establishment of capitalism, or at least many aspects of it, since that seemed to be the only way to get the help of the capitalist powers to overthrow Stalin.

Iurii Piatakov, one of the chief defendants (the trial is often called "the Radek-Piatakov trial") testified:

As for the **retreat**, Trotsky wrote that Radek and I were mistaken in thinking that the **retreat** would be inconsiderable -- we would have to **retreat** very far, and on this was based the bloc, not only with the Zinovievites, but also with the Rights. (1937 Trial 38-39)

... In this connection also it would be necessary, for considerations of home policy, to effect a fairly big **retreat**, in addition to concessions to foreigners. Radek quite justly mentioned this **retreat** in town and country, such as permitting capitalist trade and so forth. To put it simply, Trotsky explained that it would be a very serious **retreat**. This is exactly what he said: you and Radek are still under the sway of the old ideas of 1925-26 and you are unable to see that in essence our coming to power will mean that we will have to **retreat very far in the direction of capitalism**. (1937 Trial 65)

Karl Radek outlined how Trotsky's views changed between 1934 and 1935:

VYSHINSKY: Three facts: the April letter of 1934, the December letter of 1935 and Pyatakov's meeting with

Trotsky in December 1935. How was the question put in Trotsky's letter in 1934? War, working for defeat?

RADEK: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: A return to capitalism in substance?

RADEK: No, a return to capitalism is not raised in the letter

VYSHINSKY: No? What then?

RADEK: A **retreat** which we then thought. . . .

VYSHINSKY: To where?

RADEK: To the positions of the NEP, with industry strengthened in comparison with what it had been before 1928.

VYSHINSKY: A **retreat** towards strengthening what elements?

RADEK: A **retreat** which was to restore a part of the capitalist elements as well, but this **retreat**, if compared with the state of things in 1927 - there would be a possibility during this **retreat**, on the one hand, of admitting capitalist restoration, but at the same time of strengthening industry, thanks to the First Five-Year Plan, the state farms and part of the collective farms - that is to say, we would have an economic base on which in my opinion a proletarian government could have maintained itself.

VYSHINSKY: So a proletarian government could still have maintained itself? But the tendency was to go backward?

RADEK: The tendency was to go backward.

VYSHINSKY: In 1935 this stood out more clearly in comparison with 1934?

RADEK: In 1935 the question was raised **of going back to capitalism.**

VYSHINSKY: To what limits?

RADEK: What Trotsky proposed was without any limits. To such limits as the enemy might require. (122)

According to Sokol'nikov the Trotskyists understood that they had no choice; it was retreat or be crushed:

SOKOLNIKOV: ... We considered that fascism was the most organized form of capitalism, that it would triumph, would seize Europe and stifle us. It was therefore better to come to terms with it, it was better to consent to a compromise in the sense of **retreating from socialism to capitalism.** (151)

The hypothesis that Trotsky did advocate the "restoration of capitalism" as Radek, Piatakov, and others asserted, is consistent with much other evidence we now possess.

Radek, Piatakov and Sokol'nikov also testified that Trotsky was directly conspiring with the Germans and Japanese. Such negotiation is a logical corollary to the assumption that the USSR would be defeated in a war and the Stalin leadership overthrown. The Germans and Japanese would have to be persuaded to allow the opposition to take power rather than simply to dismember the USSR by themselves. Trotsky allegedly either assumed or knew for a fact that Germany and Japan would demand considerable territorial concessions - the Ukraine and the Pacific Coast region - as well as economic concessions, as their price.

Thanks to the partial opening of some former Soviet archives we possess a great deal of Soviet evidence to corroborate the Moscow Trial testimony that Trotsky was conspiring with the Germans and Japanese. There is no indication that this evidence was faked.

Moreover, there appears to be no reason to suspect it was faked since it was all secret until the partial opening of Soviet archives after the end of the USSR.¹⁸ This evidence is consistent with the testimony that Trotsky was planning to "restore capitalism" in the sense of making serious economic (as well as territorial) concessions to the fascist powers.

Trotsky's 1930 Program

The program of "restoring capitalism" that, according to Radek and Piatakov, Trotsky outlined to them, is closely similar to what Trotsky had openly advocated when the collectivization-industrialization campaign was under way. Here are some of Trotsky's programmatic proposals from issue #10 of the *Bulletin of the Russian Opposition*¹⁹ dated March 23, 1930, in the article titled "Open Letter to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The State of the Party and the Tasks of the Left Opposition":

A **retreat** is inevitable in any case. It must be carried out as soon as possible and as orderly as possible.

Put an end to "complete" collectivization, replacing it with a careful selection based on a real freedom of choice. ... Put an end to the policy of administrative abolition of the kulak. Curbing the exploiting tendencies of the kulak will remain a necessary policy for many years.

Put an end to the "racetrack-gallop" pace of industrialization. Re-evaluate the question of the tempos of development in the light of experience, taking into account the necessity of raising the standard of living of

¹⁸ We examine this evidence in volume two of the present study.

¹⁹ This is the title Trotsky used in translation. In Russian it is just "Bulletin of the Opposition."

the masses. Pose point-blank the question of the quality of production, as vital for the consumer as it is for the producer.

Give up the "ideal" of a closed economy. Work out a new variant of the plans based on as much interaction as possible with the world market.

To make the necessary **retreat**, to renew its [the USSR's] strategic arsenal without too much damage and without losing its sense of perspective...²⁰

The abandonment of collectivization, of the destruction of the kulaks as a class, and of crash industrialization; a greatly increased role for foreign trade, and what Trotsky termed the "necessity" of raising the standard of living – these policies (if they were possible at all) would have meant a greater reliance on markets and a smaller role for the state. Trotsky was advocating a form of state-regulated capitalist commodity production similar to that of the New Economic Policy. Trotsky justified this as an "inevitable" and a "necessary retreat."

This 1929 program of Trotsky's is similar to the Rights' "Riutin Platform" of 1932.²¹ Arch Getty noted that Trotsky's program in the 1930s was not essentially different from that of the Rights.

... Trotsky's spirited defence of the *smychka* and rural market relations, his criticism of the ultra-leftist campaign against the kulaks, and his advocacy of planning on the basis of "real potentials" were similar to the strictures of Bukharin's "Notes of an Economist." (Getty TIE 34 note 21)

²⁰ WLT 1930 135-150, at 147, 150.

²¹ We now know this was composed not by Riutin but by Bukharin, Tomsky, and other leaders of the Rights.

Although the Riutin Platform originated in the right wing of the Bolshevik Party, its specific criticisms of the Stalinist regime were in the early 1930s shared by the more leftist Leon Trotsky, ... Like the Riutin group, Trotsky believed that the Soviet Union in 1932 was in a period of extreme crisis provoked by Stalin's policies. Like them, he believed that the rapid pace of forced collectivization was a disaster and that the hurried and voluntarist nature of industrial policy made rational planning impossible, resulting in a disastrous series of economic "imbalances." Along with the Riutinists, Trotsky called for a drastic change in economic course and democratization of the dictatorial regime within a party that suppressed all dissent. According to Trotsky, Stalin had brought the country to ruin.²²

The economic section²³ of the "Riutin Platform" shows clear similarities to Trotsky's proposals:

III. In the field of industrialization.

1. The immediate cessation of anti-Leninist methods of industrialization and growth in the game by robbing the working class, civil servants and village through direct and indirect, overt and concealed unbearable taxes and inflation. Industrialization on the basis of the actual and the steady growth of the welfare of the masses.

²² Getty and Naumov Road 61.

²³ The full title of the document known as the "Riutin Platform" is "Stalin and the Crisis of the Proletarian Dictatorship. Platform of the 'Union of Marxist-Leninists' (the 'Riutin Group')." It was first published in R-PP 334-443. The economic section of the Riutin Platform is extremely skimpy. It takes up fewer than two pages in a document 112 pages long in the printed edition.

2. Reduction of investment in capital construction in accordance with the general condition of all the available resources of the country.

IV. In the field of agriculture.

1. Immediate dissolution of all the inflated collective farms (kolkhozy) formed by force. Truly voluntary collectivization on the basis of machine technology and all possible assistance to collective farms.

2. Immediate creation of all necessary conditions and real support for the development of individual poor and middle peasant farming.

3. Elimination of all unprofitable collective farms. Retention in our hands only of that number of the best collective farms that we are actually able to make truly exemplary socialist enterprises.

4. Transmission of large-scale machine inventory of liquidated state and collective farms into the hands of local agricultural machinery associations.

...

6. The immediate cessation of grain, and harvesting seizure campaigns and seizures of other agricultural products, [which are] modern methods of robbing the village.

Land development and consolidation of individual farmers and confirming their long-term use of the allocated land.

V. In the area of trade.

1. Cessation of exports of agricultural products at very low prices.

2. Cessation of exports of consumer goods at very low prices.

3. Return to the Leninist policy of prices. A decisive decline in prices. Restoration of cooperation and its rights.

VI. In the field of finance and tax.

1. The termination of inflation, heavy tax burden on the proletariat and all workers.

2. Termination of the endless exactions of every kind in the form of loans placed by virtually mandatory continuing increase in pay differentials in cooperation, etc.

3. A maximum and effective reduction of taxes on workers, employees and workers of the village.

VII. In the field of legal material living conditions of workers and peasants.

1. Restore all of the rights of workers to clothing, marriage payment, etc., of which they have been deprived during the past 4 years.

2. Restore the old rules of layoffs that existed 4 years ago.

3. Restore the old rules and a Leninist policy in the work of the trade unions.

4. Immediately stop the adventurist policy of dekulakization in the countryside, which is in fact aimed against the entire basic population of the village. (R-PP 441-3.)

The similarities between the Riutin Platform and Trotsky's "Open Letter" of 1930 are obvious. At the Second Moscow Trial in January 1937 Sokol'nikov stated:

As regards the principles of the program, as early as 1932 the Trotskyites, the Zinovievites, and the Rights had all come to agree in the main on the program which previously had been described as the program of the Rights.

This was the so-called Ryutin platform. As early as 1932 it expressed to a large extent just these principles of program which were common to all three groups. (1937 Trial 150-1)

The similarities between the "Riutin Platform" and Trotsky's proposals cannot be a coincidence. In 2004 an interrogation-confession of Valentin Astrov was published. Astrov was a student of Bukharin's and a member of his underground group of Rights. He revealed that the so-called "Riutin Platform" was not really written by Martemian Riutin at all, but by the leaders of the Rights, Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky, and Uglanov.

Рютинская платформа по существу явилась документом не РЮТИНА, а центра правых... СЛЕПКОВ далее сообщил, что главными авторами рютинской платформы были РЫКОВ, БУХАРИН, ТОМСКИЙ и УГЛАНОВ и что было обусловлено в случае провала изобразить этот документ как документ только РЮТИНА, дабы не поставить под удар руководящую верхушку правых.

Translated:

The Riutin Platform was in essence not RIUTIN'S document but that of the center of the Rights. ... SLEPKOV even stated that the main authors of the Riutin platform were RYKOV, BUKHARIN, TOMSKY, and UGLANOV and that it had been agreed, in the event of our failure [i.e. exposure, arrest] to depict this document

as a document of RIUTIN alone, so as not to endanger the top leadership of the rights. (Lubianka 1937-1938 86.)

During the March 1938 Moscow Trial Rykov confirmed what Astrov had stated in January 1937, that the Riutin Platform was composed by the leadership of the Rights: himself, Bukharin, Tomsky, Uglanov, and Vasili Shmidt. Rykov also confirmed that it had been named after Riutin in order to provide cover for the leadership of the Rights.

The platform was called after Ryutin, because it was published by supporters of the Rights, the Ryutin group, from Uglanov's Moscow organization. During the investigation instituted in connection with this platform, this group took the whole responsibility upon itself. This had been decided on beforehand, so that we ourselves should not be called to account for the platform... And to make it easier to do this, the program itself contained a phrase which expressed a certain sense of aloofness from Bukharin, Tomsky and myself; it said something to the effect that these three were waste steam. This was done from motives of double-dealing.

(1938 Trial 163)

Bukharin confirmed what Astrov had testified:

BUKHARIN: The Ryutin platform was adopted at the notorious conference held in the autumn of 1932, or in the summer, and it was approved at the meeting of which Alexei Ivanovich Rykov spoke.

VYSHINSKY: That means 1932?

BUKHARIN: The autumn of 1932. (1938 Trial 168)

Rykov's and Bukharin's testimony here is important to us since we know that Astrov was not subject to any kind of compulsion at his January 1937 interrogation. We also know that he testified truthfully since he had the chance to withdraw his testimony in 1989 and 1993 but instead he confirmed it. This constitutes further evidence that the confessions in the Moscow Trials are not fabrications forced upon innocent, unwilling defendants by the investigators or the prosecution but genuine confessions that represent what the defendants wished to say. We studied this question in detail in the first section of the present book.

Astrov testified that the Rights considered that the Trotskyists had adopted the economic program of the Rights:

At the beginning of 1932 in a meeting of the activists of our organization in his apartment SLEPKOV justified the necessity of concluding a bloc with the Trotskyists. He said that "the Trotskyists have accepted the economic platform of the Rights, and the Rights — the internal party program of the Trotskyists. The tactic of terror unites us. The disagreements between ourselves and the Trotskyists are insignificant. (32)

Bukharin confirmed this too in his testimony at the March 1938 trial:

Much has been said here about the Ryutin platform, and perhaps there is no need to dwell upon it. It was called the Ryutin platform for reasons of secrecy, as an insurance against exposure; it was called the Ryutin platform in order to conceal the Right centre and its top leadership. Furthermore, I must say in addition: I think that the Ryutin platform—that is why I permit myself to hold your attention for a few minutes longer—the Ryutin platform, as far as I can remember during the trial, **the platform of the Right counter revolutionary organization, was perhaps already actually a common platform of the other group-**

ings, including the Kamenev-Zinoviev and Trotskyite groupings.

It was just at this very moment that the situation became such that Trotsky had to throw off his Leftist uniform. When it came to exact formulations of what had to be done after all, his Right platform came into evidence at once, that is, he had to speak of decollectivization, etc.

VYSHINSKY: That is, you equipped Trotskyism ideologically too?

BUKHARIN: Quite true. (1938 Trial, 388-389)

Pierre Broué agreed that the Rights were part of the bloc.²⁴ Writing in 1980 Broué did not know that behind Riutin and Slepkov, whom he named, were Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsky.

La lettre à l'encre sympathique de Léon Sedov fait apparaître l'existence des groupes suivants : le groupe trotskyste d'U.R.S.S. (« notre fraction »), les « zino-viévistes ,” le groupe d'I. N. Smirnov, le groupe Sten-Lominadzé, le groupe « Safar(ov)-Tarkhan(ov),” « les droitiers » et « les libéraux .” Bien entendu, tous ne participent pas au « bloc ,” mais tous en connaissent l'existence et, selon Sedov, ont des contacts avec lui.
(7)

Le groupe appelé par Sedov « les droitiers » pose en revanche plus de problèmes. Le terme désigne habituellement, on le sait, les éléments du parti qui ont, depuis l'époque de la Nep jusqu'à l'autocritique de leurs chefs de file, suivi le trio Boukharine, Rykov, Tomsky (26). ... les comptes rendus de réunions du

²⁴ Broué, Trotsky et le bloc CahLT 5 (Jan-Mar 1980), 7, 12, 14-16, 18, 20, 28.

secrétariat international de l'Opposition de gauche et quelques lettres de Léon Sedov font apparaître qu'il désigne systématiquement à l'époque par le terme de « droitiers » ce que les historiens désignent par « groupe Rioutine ,” un groupe original apparu précisément en 1932. (12-13)

Translated:

The letter from Leon Sedov in invisible ink reveals the existence of the following groups: the Trotskyist group in the USSR (“our fraction”), the “Zinovievists,” the group of I.N. Smirnov, the Sten-Lominadze group, the “Safar(ov)-Tarkhan(ov)” group, “the Rights” and “the liberals.” Of course not all took part in the bloc but all of them knew of its existence and, according to Sedov, were in contact with him (7)

The group Sedov called “the Rights,” by contrast, poses more problems. We know that the term usually means those elements of the Party who, since the NEP period until the self-criticisms of their leaders, had followed the troika of Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy (26). ... The accounts of the meetings of the international secretariat of the Left Opposition and a few letters from Leon Sedov reveal that at that time what the historians call the “Riutin group,” an original group that appeared precisely in 1932, was systematically designated by the term “the Rights.”

Broué goes on to name Galkin, Maretsky, Uglanov, and Kaiurov. The real history of the “Riutin group” was unknown to Broué, writing in 1980.

It is noteworthy that Broué recalls that Ante Ciliga, a dissident who was released and left the USSR, stated the relationship between the Rights and the Trotskyists in virtually the same words as Astrov:

Ante Ciliga dit qu'il y affirmait : « Les droites ont eu raison dans le domaine économique et Trotsky dans la critique du régime du parti (31). »²⁵

Translated:

Ante Ciliga said that said it was affirmed: "The Rights were correct in the economic arena, and Trotsky in the criticism of the regime of the Party."

Ciliga had this information at first hand, for he was imprisoned for a time in the political "isolator" at Verkhneuralsk where a number of Rights and Trotskyites, including both Astrov and I.N. Smirnov, were also imprisoned and where the opposition conspiracy of the bloc continued.²⁶

Evidence and Proof

We have proposed the hypothesis that Trotsky did in fact advocate as a "retreat" the restoration of many or most aspects of capitalism, as Radek, Piatakov, and Sokol'nikov testified at the January 1937 Moscow Trial. We believe this hypothesis is the only one that can satisfy the following conditions:

* It explains why Trotsky again and again took the risk of exposure as a liar by falsely claiming that Zinoviev and Kamenev had been accused of, charged with, confessed to, and been convicted of, "plotting to restore capitalism" and that this could be verified through articles in *Pravda*.

²⁵ Broué 14. Broué's reference is to A. Ciliga, *Au pays du grand mensonge*. Paris: Gallimard, 1938. Published in English as *The Russian Enigma*. London: Ink Links Ltd., 1979.

²⁶ "Arrested (in Russia) in 1930, he was imprisoned in the isolator at Verkhneuralsk where he participated in the life of the 'Bolshevik-Leninist collective' of which he offered a caricatural description after he was freed." Stephen Schwartz, "Ante Ciliga (1898-1992): A Life at History's Crossroads." *Revolutionary History: Unpublished Articles*, 34, at <https://web.archive.org/web/20010411013259/http://www.revolutionary-history.co.uk/supplem.htm>

* It is consistent with the Riutin Platform of the Rights. We know that Trotsky approved the bloc with the Rights and other oppositionists in 1932, which was also the year that the Riutin Platform was adopted.

* It is consistent with the other evidence we now possess about the deliberate falsehoods Trotsky invented and repeated throughout the period under question. We examine them elsewhere in the present work.

* It is also consistent with the evidence we have collected from Soviet sources that Trotsky was indeed conspiring with Germany and Japan.

* We have shown in Part One that Moscow Trials testimony is valid as evidence in that, whenever we can check it from independent sources, it turns out to reflect what the defendants chose to say rather than fabrications forced upon innocent defendants.

The defendants in the January 1937 Moscow Trial made it clear that Trotsky's plan to "retreat" to capitalism was motivated by his belief that the opposition could only come to power in one of two ways: either through a war with the fascist powers - which they assumed the USSR would lose - or through a *coup* against the Stalin leadership, which would only succeed in establishing itself with cooperation from other imperialist countries. In either case German and Japanese cooperation would only be purchased at a very stiff price. According to them, Trotsky realized this and drew the necessary conclusions.

Considered dispassionately, the views these three defendants attributed to Trotsky make sense. Whether by assassination or by defeat in war at the hands of invaders the removal by force of Stalin would certainly evoke a violent reaction, probably leading to rebellion and serious social instability. The Soviet Union's major capitalist enemies would likely try to take advantage of this situation, possibly by invading and attempting to dismember the enormous country and by setting up one or more capitalist regimes

with political and social policies approved by them. To any Opposition that hoped to take the reins of power during such a crisis it was obvious that some kind of agreement would have to be arranged, in advance, with these aggressive imperialist capitalist powers.

A Hypothesis Must Account for the Evidence

We have a lot of evidence, in the form of testimony at the 1937 and 1938 Moscow Trials, that Trotsky did advocate the "restoration of capitalism." His denial can be dismissed because he would deny the charge whether he had advocated it or not, and because we know Trotsky lied when he thought it expedient. Trotsky's archive has been "purged" so the absence in it of evidence there of this or other conspiratorial aims can bear no weight.

Therefore two hypotheses are possible:

1. That Trotsky did advocate "restoration of capitalism." This is the hypothesis that represents the most straightforward explanation in that it accounts for all the evidence.
2. That some other hypothesis can account for Trotsky's "amalgam" under consideration here: that Zinoviev and Kamenev were charged with, and confessed to, plotting "the restoration of capitalism."

This essay has laid out the evidence in support of hypothesis #1. As far as we can determine, there is no evidence to support any other hypothesis.

This leads us to an important conclusion. On the evidence, Trotsky did advocate the "restoration of capitalism" as Radek, Piatakov, and Sokol'nikov testified. No other hypothesis explains the evidence before us.

What does this mean for the further hypothesis that Trotsky conspired with Germany and Japan?

Evidence Internal to Trotsky's Writings

Trotsky was highly intelligent, a prolific writer, a skilled theorist, and a dedicated revolutionary activist. How then is it possible that Trotsky was an incompetent liar? Yet again and again he composed falsehoods that anyone could have discovered and exposed simply by checking the sources Trotsky himself cited.

The "restoration of capitalism" claim is one of these lies. During the period from December-January 1935 to January 1937 Trotsky made it repeatedly. It was a lie that could easily be exposed by anyone who took the trouble, as we have done here, to compare what Trotsky claimed was in the articles in *Humanité* and Soviet newspapers with what Trotsky claimed was in them. Therefore Trotsky took a significant risk in telling this "amalgam." Moreover, he told it repeatedly. It follows that this "amalgam" had to be very important to him for some reason.

The only explanation we can find that would account for his repeating this lie over and over again is Trotsky's stated tactic to "expose the scheme in advance." Trotsky must have raised this issue as a pre-emptive strike to ward off the charge that he believed would come sooner or later by making it appear "predictable" and therefore "obviously" false. At length Trotsky was indeed charged with it by Radek, Piatakov, and Sokol'nikov. Radek, Piatakov, and Sokol'nikov linked Trotsky's advocacy of "restoring capitalism" to his view that the opposition would have to make serious concessions to aggressive capitalist states in order to be able to take and hold power.

Trotsky vehemently denied having been in touch with Radek, Piatakov, and Sokol'nikov. But we know that here too Trotsky was lying - he had indeed been in touch with them. We know that Radek was telling the precise truth when he described receiving a letter from Trotsky at the end of February or beginning of March, 1932. There is no reason to think that Radek did not tell the truth in the rest of his testimony as well.

Radek, Piatakov and Sokol'nikov linked Trotsky's alleged statements that they would have to "restore capitalism" to the need to collaborate with Germany and Japan. And it stands to reason that no plans to replace the Stalin leadership would make any sense without making some kind of advance agreement with Germany and Japan. These were the policies that were described in the January 1937 Trial as constituting a "restoration of capitalism."

We have a good deal of other evidence that Trotsky conspired with Germany and Japan.²⁷ We will identify and discuss yet more evidence in volume two. Trotsky's "restoration of capitalism amalgam" is consistent with such a conspiracy. We conclude that this "amalgam" of Trotsky's *corroborates* the other evidence we have that Trotsky conspired with the Germans and Japanese.

Conclusion

In raising time after time the false claim that Zinoviev and Kame-
nev had been accused of, confessed to, and been convicted of "plot-
ting the restoration of capitalism" Trotsky was doing his best to
defuse, through anticipation, the accusation he knew would sooner
or later be leveled at himself. He knew it would be leveled against
himself because he himself had been advocating exactly the "resto-
ration of capitalism" to the leadership of his Soviet-based follow-
ers for some time - at least since 1935, according to Radek, per-
haps as early as 1933, according to Piatakov and Krestinsky. This
hypothesis is consistent with a great deal of other evidence we
now possess.

We have no reason to doubt the Soviet evidence that Trotsky col-
laborated with Germany and Japan. Trotsky's denials cannot be
taken seriously. Thanks to the research of Broué, Getty, and Holm-
ström we now know that Trotsky routinely lied whenever he

²⁷ See the evidence laid out in Furr, *Evidence*. We have also discussed this question in Part One of the present book.

thought it expedient to do so. Trotsky's lies went far beyond denying the involvement in his conspiracy of individuals. He also lied about important issues of principle such as his willingness to enter a bloc with other oppositionists and his willingness to employ "individual terror," or assassination against Stalin and others.

We cannot expect to find *conclusive* evidence - whatever that might be - of Trotsky's collaboration with Germany and Japan. Any demand that "conclusive evidence," a "smoking gun," be produced is simply a form of denial. In the case of a deeply conspiratorial organization as the opposition underground in the USSR necessarily had to be, one whose goal was to leave *no* evidence behind, we are forced to be content with composing a mosaic of *circumstantial* evidence. We possess even this circumstantial evidence only because (a) the Soviet Union came to an end and some documents from Soviet archives have become public, and (b) the "purging" of incriminating documents from the Harvard Trotsky archive was done imperfectly.

Absent these archival materials Trotsky would still have formed a bloc with the Zinovievists and other opposition groups, would still have written Radek, Sokol'nikov, and others, and - we argue - would still have conspired with Germany and Japan. The defendants in the Moscow Trials would still have been telling the truth, and Trotsky would still have been lying, in those cases we can now verify. But we would not have had the evidence that this was so. We would have only the testimony from the Moscow Trials.

This is yet more evidence that the Moscow Trial testimony should be taken far more seriously when we cannot check it, since it turns out to be truthful in those few examples where, by accident of history, we can check it. It also means that nothing Trotsky wrote during the 1930s about his own activities or the USSR should be accepted as true unless it can be independently verified.

Chapter 16 . Trotsky in *Biulleten' Oppozitsii*

Trotsky dated issue #42 of the *Biulleten' Oppozitsii* February 1935, a month after the Kirov assassination issue #41 of January 1935. After the first few years of publication it had become unusual for Trotsky to publish back-to-back issues of the B.O. For example, there had been only two issues during the whole of 1934. So why did Trotsky do so this time?

Three articles, comprising about two-thirds of this issue, were devoted to the Kirov murder and related matters, especially the January 1935 indictment and trial of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Safarov, and the rest of the men whose arrests Trotsky had mentioned in the previous issue. These three articles have been published in English translation in the volume *Writings of Leon Trotsky [1934-1935]*. We will analyze them here. They are:

- * "Some Results of the Stalin Amalgam." (January 12, 1935)¹
- * "The Case of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Others." (January 16-18, 1935)
- * "Everything Gradually Falls Into Place." (January 26, 1935)

Like the whole of the Kirov murder issue #41, these articles set forth Trotsky's "amalgam," what he claimed was his theory about what was really going on. In reality they represent Trotsky's coverup, his "smokescreen." At the very least, Trotsky and his Soviet-based supporters were in alliance with the Zinovievists who murdered Kirov. In fact we now have evidence that they were much more deeply involved in the murder than that and Trotsky

¹ This article is also online at <https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1935/01/amalgam.htm> where it is titled "A Trial Balance of the Stalin Amalgam."

knew almost everything about the Kirov murder. We will explore this question further in volume two of this work.

Trotsky had decided not to reveal his ties to the Zinovievists, and through them to the Leningrad-based Zinovievist group that had murdered Kirov or to the bloc of Rights and Trotskyists, and Zinovievists. So he had to invent a fictitious version of events. While claiming that he was trying to deduce the truth of what was happening inside the USSR around the Kirov murder, in reality Trotsky was creating a false – fictional – story that might accomplish several aims.

First, it would stand as his claim that he and his Soviet-based followers were innocent of Kirov's murder and of any thought of resorting to "terror." Second, it would demonize Stalin and his colleagues as bloodthirsty thugs who not only were using Kirov's murder to suppress anyone they considered a threat to their power but who also may even have killed Kirov themselves.

Trotsky's alternative narrative would also serve to misdirect readers, get them to begin asking not, "Why is the Opposition using 'terror'?" but "Why is *Stalin* using 'terror'?" Therefore it would serve as Trotsky's "cover" for the real conspiratorial activities of his Soviet-based followers.

It is worth noting that Trotsky never refers to anything his Soviet-based adherents really were doing. After all, if the "Left Opposition," the "Bolshevik-Leninists" (as Trotsky referred to his followers) were viewed by Stalin as such a threat, then they must have been doing something! But Trotsky never mentions any activity at all by Soviet-based Trotskyists. A discerning reader at the time would have wondered whether Trotsky's silence about his followers' activities might not suggest that those activities were indeed what the Soviet prosecution alleged.

Ironically, therefore, it was not Stalin and the NKVD but Trotsky himself who had to fabricate what Trotsky liked to call "amalgams" – deliberately false and misleading accounts of what was happening. Trotsky's "amalgams" are composed of a number of elements:

* He severely distorted what he has found in the Soviet or other communist press accounts.

* Some of his falsehoods serve as "straw men" – statements he falsely attributes to Soviet sources and which he can easily claim to "refute."

* Sometimes these falsehoods serve as "red herrings," permitting Trotsky to deflect his readers' attention from the real developments in the USSR and to fabricate imaginary "amalgams," fictions in which Stalin and his men are the villains while the Opposition are innocent of any unprincipled acts and are in fact doing nothing at all.

* Sometimes Trotsky simply lied outright about what these accounts say.

Trotsky also lied about his own activities and principles.

* He claimed that he always broke completely with "capitulators." We know today, from materials in the Harvard Trotsky Archive, that this was a lie: he did not break off with them.

* He pretended to attack these same "capitulators" in print in what we now know was an attempt at a "cover" to disguise continued secret collaboration with them.

* He suppressed the truth about his real ties to the Zinovievists who were the subjects of the arrests and trials.

* He salted his presentation with anti-Stalin rumors and lies which he reported as fact.

"Some Results of the Stalin Amalgam" (January 12, 1935)

It is in this issue that Trotsky begins to set forth an "amalgam" that was destined to become for many years the "mainstream," or stan-

standard version of the Kirov assassination: that it was Stalin who had had Kirov killed.

1. Таинственный консул оказался латышским консулом: наше предположение, что для амальгамы выбран маленький консул маленькой страны подтвердилось полностью. Но необходимость назвать консула – очевидно, под дипломатическим давлением – грозила опрокинуть амальгаму: кто же поверит, что консул Латвии организует мировую интервенцию против СССР?

Translated:

1. The mysterious consul has now turned out to be a Latvian consul; our supposition that a petty consul of a tiny nation would be chosen for the amalgam has been fully confirmed. However, it became necessary to name the consul – obviously because of diplomatic pressure – and this necessity threatened to blast the amalgam, for who would believe that a consul of Latvia is **the organizer of world intervention against the USSR?** (208)

In an essay titled “The Indictment” («Обвинительный акт») in B.O. #41 Trotsky had indeed said:

... консул представлял, надо думать, какое-нибудь совсем маленькое и захолустное государство: это безопаснее).

Translated:

... the consul represented, I suppose, some very small and provincial state: that would be safer).

The fact that even before the Latvian consult had been publicly identified Trotsky had “predicted” the consul would be from a very small country suggests that Trotsky knew this in advance. Trotsky’s words “that would be safer” do not explain his remark. After all, the consul could easily have been Polish or German. We know

today that Nikolaev, Kirov's assassin, had the address and phone number of the German consulate in his notebook. (Lenoe 258) Aside from the Baltics there were simply no other "very small and provincial states" anywhere near the USSR. Indeed, the Latvian consul may have already initiated contact with Trotsky.

Then comes a "straw man." The *Humanité* text of the indictment mentions the word "consul" nine times, but never accuses him of being "the organizer of world intervention against the USSR." It is easy for Trotsky to ridicule this allegation as though the Soviet indictment had stupidly made it – unless some reader bothered to check the text of the indictment.

But any reader who did so would immediately see that Trotsky was lying. And that implies that Trotsky believed he had something important enough to hide to be worth the risk of exposure.

2. Группа Зиновьева была арестована по делу об убийстве Кирова. Обвинительный акт не заикается, между тем, ни об одном из арестованных в Москве зиновьевцев. Почему же все-таки они были арестованы?

Translated:

2. The Zinoviev group was arrested in connection with the Kirov assassination. Yet the indictment does not so much as let out a peep concerning a single one of the Zinovievists arrested in Moscow. But why then are they arrested? (208-209)

This too is a straw man. The indictment Trotsky mentions is that of the Leningrad group of Zinovievists who were tried for murdering Kirov. The Moscow Zinovievist group, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others, had been arrested because the Leningrad group of Zinovievist that had planned and carried out Kirov's murder was in touch with them. The Moscow-based Zinovievists were not indicted for the murder because the NKVD had found no evidence they were aware of it. (Such evidence was eventually found, but not until much later.)

3. В чем можно обвинить Зиновьева, Каменева и их друзей политически? В том, что они капитулировали.

Translated:

3. What charge, politically, may be brought against Zinoviev, Kamenev, and their friends? Their capitulation.

This is a "red herring." Trotsky is discussing the indictment of the Leningrad Zinovievist group for the Kirov murder. Then he asks this rhetorical question about the Moscow-based Zinovievist group who were not indicted and so, logically, were not mentioned in the indictment.

Trotsky of course knew that Zinoviev, Kamenev, Safarov, and other leading members of the bloc that he himself, Trotsky, had approved in 1932, had "capitulated" dishonestly. Their "capitulations" - renunciation of oppositional views and oaths to follow the Party line - were false. In the language of the Soviet investigators they were guilty of "two-facedness" or "double-dealing" (*dvulichie, dvurushnichestvo*). Pierre Broué firmly stated that this was a common practice and that "everybody had known" that Smirnov and his group had been lying in their "capitulation" and that Safarov had been the first one to suggest this as a necessary tactic. (Broué POS 104) Naturally, Trotsky hid this fact from his readers.

Попытка связать большевиков-ленинцев с идеей интервенции имеет очень определенный исторический запах.

Translated:

There is a specific historical stench to this attempt at connecting the Left Opposition with the idea of intervention.²

² At this point two paragraphs concerning the 1926 Opposition platform have been inserted into the English version. They are absent from the Russian original in B.O. #42.

Trotsky's accusation is a "straw man." The Leningrad Zinovievist group was indeed accused in the Soviet press (but not by the Prosecution) of trying to provoke foreign intervention:

Cependant, ne comptant pas sur la réalisation de telles actions à « l'intérieur du pays », le groupe TABLAIT DIRECTEMENT SUR L'AIDE « DU DEHORS », SUR L'INTERVENTION ARMEE ET L'AIDE DE CERTAINS ETATS ETRANGERS.

Translated:

However, not counting on the realization of such actions "inside the country" the group WAS COUNTING DIRECTLY ON AID "FROM OUTSIDE," ON ARMED INTERVENTION AND THE HELP OF CERTAIN FOREIGN STATES.

But Trotsky cannot point to any claims in the Soviet press linking the Left Opposition – Trotsky and his followers – to "intervention." In a previous chapter we examined in more detail Trotsky's "amalgam" or false allegation that the Soviet investigators and prosecution – "Stalin" – were trying to connect him, Trotsky, with "foreign intervention."

The events of 1926 and 1917 consume all of points 4 and 5 of this article while saying nothing about the matter at hand. Perhaps Trotsky preferred to turn his readers' attention to these years, when he himself played an important role.

Все 14 обвиняемых по делу об убийстве Кирова оказались расстреляны. Все ли они участвовали в террористическом акте? Обвинительный акт отвечает на этот вопрос утвердительно, но не приводит и тени доказательства.

Translated:

The fourteen who were accused in connection with the Kirov assassination were all shot. Did they all par-

ticipate in the terrorist act? The indictment answers this question in the affirmative, but it does not adduce even the semblance of proof.

This is a lie. Both the original indictment in the Kirov murder case, which had been published in *Pravda* on December 27, 1934, and even the abbreviated version in *Humanité* of December 28 which Trotsky explicitly cited, summarized a lot of evidence, as anyone who read them would know. This evidence is the confessions of several of the defendants, partial confessions of others, and mutual accusations by some defendants of others. We have put both the Russian text of the Indictment and the abbreviated French text from *Humanité* on line. Matthew Lenoe has translated most of it into English; and we have published a criticism of Lenoe's omissions.³

As in the previous issue of B.O. Trotsky is taking a risk – namely, that his readers will not think to compare what he is writing with the text of the indictment.

Мы видели, с какой наглой и вместе трусливой тенденциозностью он впутывает в свой текст имя Троцкого, сознательно умалчивая о том, какие последствия имела провокация консула насчет "письма."

Translated:

We have seen with what brazen and cowardly tendentiousness it has injected the name of Trotsky into its text and how deliberately it passes over in silence what happened to the consul's provocation regarding the "letter." (210)

³ Russian text of the Indictment: https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furr/research/obvin_zak_dec34.html; Lenoe's partial text of the Indictment, in English translation, is in Lenoe, *The Kirov Murder and Soviet History*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010, 345-352. Our critique of Lenoe's omissions is in *Furr Kirov* 210-217. For a hyperlink to the French text see note 7, below.

There are two falsehoods in this sentence:

* As in the previous issue of B.O., Trotsky says nothing about the "Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc," although it is mentioned three times in the abbreviated indictment. This is a transparent, even an incriminating omission. Anyone who read both texts would notice it and might wonder what the reason for this omission could be. Trotsky must have felt that remaining silent about the bloc was worth this risk. So the claim that "the name of Trotsky" was mentioned "with brazen and cowardly tendentiousness" is designed only to confuse the reader.

* The Indictment does not "deliberately pass over in silence" the issue of the consul and letter to Trotsky at all. On the contrary, they are mentioned prominently:

«Il dit qu'il pouvait établir **la liaison** avec Trotsky si je lui remettais une lettre du groupe à Trotsky.»

Translated:

He said that he could establish **the contact** with Trotsky if I gave him a letter from the group to Trotsky.⁴

The French text clearly implies that the consul was not the first one to mention contact with Trotsky. The consul does not say "liaison" (contact) but "**la liaison**" – "**the contact**," a contact previously mentioned. The original Russian text of the indictment contains the same implication:

При этом сказал, что установить связь с Троцким он может, если я вручу какое-либо письмо от группы к Троцкому.

⁴ "La Révolution Se Défend. L'acte d'accusation contre Nikolaïev..." *Humanité* December 28, 1934, p. 3 col. 2.

Translated:

He [the consul] also said that, as for establishing contact with Trotsky, he could do so if I should give him some kind of letter from the group to Trotsky.

The indictment never states that Nikolaev actually gave the consul such a letter. If the investigators had known that he did, the indictment would certainly have mentioned it. And the investigators could not interrogate or search the consul of a foreign country, as Trotsky knew. Here as elsewhere Trotsky was hoping that no one would bother to check what he wrote against the text of the indictment available in *Humanité*.

Дело идет не о борьбе советской бюрократии против Троцкого и "троцкистов." Дело идет о моральной атмосфере мирового рабочего движения. Гнусная амальгама вокруг "консула," служившего, видимо, одновременно трем правительствам, принадлежит ныне к числу обычных, нормальных приемов сталинской бюрократии в борьбе за ее кастовые позиции.

Translated:

What is here involved is not so much the struggle of the Soviet bureaucracy against Trotsky and the "Trotskyists" but the question of the moral atmosphere of the world working class movement. The vile amalgam constructed around the "consul," who apparently was in the simultaneous employ of three governments, stands today as one of a number of ordinary and normal measures utilized by the Stalinist bureaucracy in the struggle for its caste positions.

Understandably Trotsky wanted to direct his readers' attention away from discussion of his and his followers' involvements with the Leningrad Zinovievist terrorists. This is the most likely explanation for his silence about the "Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc."

The sentence about the consul is another "straw man." Trotsky later claimed that the Latvian consul had "given 5000 rubles for the organization of Kirov's murder." (227) This is a lie. What the indictment really stated was something quite different: that it was Nikolaev who asked the consul for money for the Leningrad Zinovievist group:

«J'ai ensuite demandé au consul de nous prêter une aide matérielle, lui disant que nous lui rendrions l'argent prêté aussitôt que notre situation financière changerait.

«A l'entrevue suivante, la troisième ou la quatrième au consulat, le consul m'informa qu'il était prêt à satisfaire à ma demande et me remit 5.000 roubles.

Translated:

I then asked the consul to lend us material help and told him that we would return the money loaned to us as soon as our financial situation changed.

At the next interview, the third or fourth at the consulate, the consul told me that he was ready to satisfy my request and handed me 5,000 rubles.

Nor does the indictment say anything at all about the consul being aware of an attempt to kill Kirov.

The "three governments" alleged by Trotsky would have been, besides Latvia, Hitler's Germany and the USSR, since Trotsky proposed that Kirov's murder was organization by the NKVD:

Понадобилась новая версия: консул Латвии являлся на самом деле агентом Гитлера.

- "Некоторые итоги сталинской амальгамы,"

Translated:

A new version was necessary: the consul of Latvia was at the same time an agent of Hitler.

- "Some Results of the Stalin Amalgam," B.O. #42

Anyone who read the Indictment or the abbreviated French version in *Humanité* would know that neither the Soviet press nor the Indictment against the Kirov defendants accused the Latvian consul of working with or for Germany.

Meanwhile the notion that Stalin was involved in Kirov's murder was another "red herring." Blaming Stalin for killing Kirov was yet another example of "exposing the scheme in advance," of "getting out in front" of the accusation that Trotsky could be reasonably certain would be aimed before long at himself.

Trotsky includes his "peppery dishes" tale here:

В 1921 г., предупреждая ближайших товарищей против избрания Сталина генеральным секретарем, Ленин говорил: "этот повар будет готовить только острые блюда."

Translated:

In 1921, warning his most intimate comrades against electing Stalin as general secretary, Lenin said, "This cook will prepare only peppery dishes."

In the Introduction we showed that this story too is a lie.

"The Case of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Others."
(January 16 – 18, 1935)

Trotsky continues constructing his own "amalgam," or deliberately false account, of the events in the USSR.

Их арестовали для амальгамы, т.-е. для установления связи между террористическим убийством и оппозицией, всякой вообще оппозицией, всякой вообще критикой, прошлой, настоящей и будущей. Их

решились арестовать, потому что все казалось заранее рассчитано.

Translated:

They [Zinoviev, Kamenev and 14 of their associates] were arrested with a view to an amalgam, that is to say, in order to establish a connection between the terrorist assassination and the Opposition, all opposition, all criticism in general, past, present or future. It was decided to arrest them when everything seemed to have been already settled. (213)

Trotsky knew from reading the abbreviated indictment as published in *Humanité* that the Kirov murder defendants had revealed the existence of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist bloc.⁵ Therefore the connection between the terrorist murder and both the Zinovievist and the Trotskyist oppositions had already been established. But although he had personally approved its formation Trotsky had decided to deny that the bloc existed. Consequently we are dealing with Trotsky's own "amalgam," or false story, here.

Trotsky continues by elaborating his own "amalgam" of Stalin's involvement, via the GPU (NKVD), with Kirov's murder:

ГПУ было в курсе подготовлений террористического акта в Ленинграде. "Консул" выполнял данное ему поручение: он представлял соединительное звено амальгамы. Но действительный террорист, Николаев, в последний момент -- по соображениям конспирации -- оторвался, видимо, от своей собственной группы, в том числе и от входивших в нее агентов ГПУ. Раздался роковой выстрел. Он не входил в программу Сталина. Но это был риск предприятия. Киров пал жертвой.

⁵ We have put the text of the abbreviated Kirov indictment, from *Humanité*, December 28, 1934, p.3, online here:
http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrgr/research/kirov_indict_humanite1228.pdf

Агенты ГПУ пострадали: старших сместили, младших расстреляли вместе с террористами.

Translated:

The NKVD was conversant with the preparations for the Leningrad terrorist act. The "consul" had carried out the task assigned to him; he was the link in the amalgam. The real terrorist, Nikolaev, however, it appears, at the last moment for conspiratorial reasons — detached himself from his own group, including the agents of the NKVD who were playing a part in it. The fatal shot rang out. It wasn't in Stalin's program. But that was the risk in the enterprise. Kirov fell victim. The NKVD agents paid for it: the higher officials were dismissed, the lower ones were shot together with the terrorists. ("The Case of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Others," WLT 1934-35, 213)

This is all invention, more "smokescreen" and "red herrings." No lower-ranking NKVD workers were shot together with Nikolaev's group ("the terrorists"). There was never any evidence of contact between the NKVD and the Latvian consul. There was never any evidence of Stalin's involvement in Kirov's murder. Trotsky, of course, knew that it was not Stalin but the bloc that had been planning the assassinations of Kirov, Stalin, and others.

It is tempting to hypothesize that Trotsky may have known about Iagoda's indirect involvement with the Kirov murder, of which we know from Iagoda's pretrial confessions of 1937 as well as from his testimony at the March 1938 Moscow Trial.⁶ Iagoda discussed with Radek his attempts to stop or at least minimize the repression of the underground Trotskyists in the aftermath of the Kirov murder. It is possible that Radek conveyed to Trotsky whatever he knew himself.

⁶Iagoda's important pretrial and trial confessions are fully discussed in Furr Kirov Chapters 14 and 15.

Trotsky repeats a falsehood from his article in B.O. #41:

Пришлось Зиновьева-Каменева и их друзей выделить из процесса. Обвинительный акт по делу Николаева не упоминал о них ни словом;...

Translated:

It was necessary to leave out from the trial the case of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and their friends. The indictment in the Nikolaev case said not one word about them... (214)

This is a lie. The Kirov indictment, including the abbreviated version in *Humanité*, did indeed mention Zinoviev, Kamenev, and the "groupe antisoviétique Zinoviev" numerous times. We have studied this lie of Trotsky's in a previous chapter..

Under the heading "17 January" Trotsky asserts that Bakaev, one of the defendants, "must have" testified under threat of being tried as one of Kirov's assassins. (217) This is an interesting statement by Trotsky.

Bakaev was indeed involved in Kirov's murder, as were Zinoviev and Kamenev. But Trotsky does not claim that Zinoviev and Kamenev had testified out of a threat of being tried as among Kirov's killers. Bakaev was in Moscow, as were Zinoviev and Kamenev. Along with Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others Bakaev was to be a defendant in the First Moscow Trial of August 1936. There Bakaev, like Zinoviev and Kamenev, admitted to involvement in the plan to kill Kirov. All three had been named by so many of their accomplices that further denial was pointless.

In the present book we demonstrate that Trotsky, whose strategy was to deny all accusations, sometimes made a statement that did not fit his fictive narration and thus was a "tell" that revealed more than he intended. In the light of what we know now about Trotsky's strategy of falsification we can see that this remark of Trotsky's about Bakaev is such a "tell."

Under "18 January" Trotsky discusses the abbreviated text of the indictment against Zinoviev, Kamenev, Safarov et al. published the previous day, January 17, in *Humanité*.⁷ Safarov began to testify, albeit in a veiled manner, about the formation of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist bloc in 1932, while not calling it a bloc. This was a threat to Trotsky and he describes Safarov's quoted testimony as follows:

Главный свидетель обвинения, Сафаров, почему то выделенный из процесса (роль этого субъекта в деле представляется крайне загадочной) показывает, что "контр-революционная" деятельность Зиновьева-Каменева и других была особенно активной в 1932 году! Но ведь за эту именно деятельность они и были исключены в 1932 году из партии и сосланы.

Translated:

The chief witness for the prosecution, Safarov, whose case - we don't know why - was examined separately (the role of this individual in the affair appears most enigmatic), shows that the "counterrevolutionary" activity of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and the others was particularly intense in 1932! Yet it was precisely for this activity that in 1932 they were expelled from the party and deported. (218)

Trotsky's "deductions" here are pure misdirection. The fact that Safarov named the year 1932 must have been especially alarming to Trotsky. Sedov's 1932 letter to Trotsky explicitly identifies Safarov as someone who has not yet joined the bloc as it was being formed in 1932 but whose joining is expected shortly. But Safarov was not a Trotskyist. Perhaps Trotsky thought that Safarov might be more likely to identify Trotsky, Zinoviev, and others in order to save himself.

⁷ We have put the text of this abbreviated indictment, from *Humanité* January 17, 1935, p. 3 online at http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furg/research/zin-kam_indict_humanite011735.pdf

Обвинительный акт ни словом не упоминает о связи этих обвиняемых с Николаевым.

Translated:

The indictment does not mention by a single word the connection of the accused with Nikolaev. (220)

Another false statement. The abbreviated indictment in *Humanité* cites the contact between the Moscow group of Zinovievists and the Leningrad group that killed Kirov and of which Nikolaev was a part, as illustrated by this passage (more could be cited):

L'instruction préliminaire établit que Zinoviev, Evdokimov, Guertik, Bakaev, Koukline, Kamenev, Charaov, Fedorov et Garchenine adhéraient au «Centre de Moscou», réunissant autour d'eux nombre des membres les plus actifs de l'ancien groupement antisoviétique Zinoviev et **entretenant des rapports réguliers avec les membres du groupe de Leningrad**, condamnés par le Collège militaire du Tribunal suprême de l'U.R.S.S. (affaire de l'assassinat de Kirov).

Le « Centre de Moscou » ne se bornait pas seulement à l'entretien de rapports avec le groupe illégal de Leningrad et de certains de ses partisans dans 'd'autres villes, mais jouait un rôle de *centre politique dirigeant systématiquement*, au cours d'un certain nombre d'années, l'activité contre-révolutionnaire secrète, **tant du groupe de Moscou que de celui de Leningrad.**

Translated:

The preliminary instruction has established that Zinoviev . and Gorshenin belonged to the "Moscow Center" and brought together under them a number of the most active members of the old Zinoviev anti-Soviet grouping and **maintained regular contact with the**

members of the Leningrad group condemned by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR (the Kirov assassination case).

The "Moscow Center" did not limit itself only to the maintenance of contact with the illegal Leningrad group and with certain of its members in other towns, but played the role of the *political center that systematically directed*, for a number of years, the secret counterrevolutionary activity of **both the Moscow group and of that of Leningrad**.

Once again, it appears that Trotsky was so intent upon constructing an "amalgam" that would direct attention away from the accusations of the Soviet court that he did not worry about the reactions of any reader who might compare what he wrote with the texts themselves.

Trotsky mentioned that the Kirov murder indictment cited the "platform" of 1926:

Обвинительный акт по делу Николаева пытался, как мы помним, связать террористов с оппозиционной "платформой" 1926 года.

Translated:

The indictment in the Nikolaev case tried, as we recall, to connect the terrorists with the "platform" of the 1926 Opposition. (150)

So it did - but, as we have shown in an earlier chapter, it also mentioned the "Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc" four times (three in the French abbreviation). Trotsky remained silent about that.

Once again Trotsky falsely claimed that he has always broken with "capitulators":

Пробовал ли Сталин при помощи военного суда дополнить работу консула и вырвать показания против Троцкого? Я не сомневаюсь в этом. Успеха он во всяком

случае не имел. Принципом фракции большевиков-ленинцев всегда было рвать непримиримо с капитулянтами. Двойной бухгалтерии мы не допускаем.... Мы порвали в свое время с зиновьевцами так же решительно, как в прошлом году - с Раковским.

Translated:

Did Stalin try to complete the consul's work by means of the military tribunal in order to extract declarations against Trotsky? I don't doubt it. In any case, he didn't succeed. The constant principle of the Bolshevik-Leninist faction is: break irreconcilably with capitulators. We do not allow double bookkeeping... We broke in the past with the Zinovievists as resolutely as last year we broke with Rakovsky. (221)

Thanks to Broué's and Getty's discoveries in the Harvard Trotsky Archive we know that this is a lie. Trotsky did not "break irreconcilably with capitulators." On the contrary: some, perhaps most, perhaps even all, such cases were a deception, designed to facilitate the continuation of clandestine opposition work inside the Party. Therefore in his own words Trotsky did indeed "allow double bookkeeping." His claim of principled oppositionism was a pose, undoubtedly essential for him to retain his non-Soviet followers and those Soviet followers who were not "in the know.."

The following paragraph raises an interesting example: that of Khristian Rakovsky. At the March 1938 Moscow Trial Rakovsky testified that he too had remained with Trotsky after making a false "capitulation":

This took place in July or August 1932. One and a half years later, in February 1934, I sent a telegram to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., saying that I had completely disarmed myself both ideologically and organizationally and asked to be reinstated in the Party. This telegram was insincere, I was lying. It was my deliberate intention to hide from the Party and the government my association with

the Intelligence Service ever since 1924, and Trotsky's association with the Intelligence Service ever since 1926. (1938 Trial 288-289)

Broué has admitted that "everybody" understood these "capitulations" to be a smokescreen. (POS 104) Trotsky's mentioning Rakovsky in the same breath as Zinoviev and Kamenev strongly suggests that Trotsky's supposed "break" with Rakovsky in 1934 was also a "cover" for the latter's continued secret Trotskyist work. Trotsky confirms that his phony "break" with the false "capitulators" is his best defense:

Этот полный разрыв связей, политических и личных, сделал невозможным – несмотря на помощь консула и военного суда – успешное развитие амальгамы в сторону большевиков-ленинцев.

Translated:

This complete rupture in personal and political relations has made impossible – despite the help of a consul and a military tribunal – future success in developing amalgams from the side of the Bolshevik-Leninists. (221)

This, of course, is another lie. Thanks to the research of Pierre Broué and others we know that there was no "break" with Zinoviev, Kamenev, and the others in the bloc formed in 1932, or with Radek and others to whom Trotsky wrote the same year. This confirms Rakovsky's testimony that his "break" too was a smokescreen.

"Everything Gradually Falls Into Place." (January 28, 1935)

Here Trotsky continues his misdirection, or "amalgam," of his own. He writes:

30-го декабря 1934 года я высказывал твердую уверенность в том, что ГПУ было с самого начала в

курсе подготовлявшегося террористического акта. Об этом неопровержимо свидетельствовало участие "консула," который мог быть только агентом ГПУ. Теперь мы имеем проверку. 23 января военный трибунал приговорил 12 ответственных ленинградских представителей ГПУ, во главе с их шефом Медведем к суровым карам: заключение от 2 до 10 лет! Приговор вменяет им в вину не более не менее, как тот факт, что "они были осведомлены о подготовлявшемся покушении на Кирова но обнаружили преступную небрежность (!) и, не приняв необходимых мер охраны."

Translated:

On December 30, 1934, I expressed the firm conviction that the GPU from the outset knew about the terrorist act that was being prepared. The participation of the "consul" who could only be an agent of the GPU, was the irrefutable evidence. Now we have the proof. On January 23, a military tribunal condemned twelve responsible representatives of the GPU in Leningrad, with, at their head, their chief, Medved, to hard labor: two to ten years' imprisonment! The sentence on them was for the charge that, no more, no less, "they were aware of the attempt being prepared against Kirov but showed criminal negligence (!) in not taking the necessary security measures." (223)

Trotsky's text is so close to the text in *Pravda* that Trotsky must have had access to the Soviet paper. We have reproduced below the words in *Pravda* of January 23, 1935, concerning the sentencing of the NKVD men with Trotsky's words in his article dated January 26. Trotsky wrote:

...они были осведомлены о подготовлявшемся покушении на Кирова...

The text in *Pravda* of January 23, 1935 reads thus:

...располагая сведениями о готовящихся покушениях на тов. Сергея Мироновича Кирова...

Trotsky's language:

...но обнаружили преступную небрежность...

The text in *Pravda*:

...проявили ... преступную халатность...

Trotsky's language:

...не приняв необходимых мер охраны.

The text in *Pravda*:

...не приняли необходимых мер охраны.

These passages prove that Trotsky had access to *Pravda* within a day or two of its publication in the USSR. Trotsky's words either echo those of the *Pravda* article precisely or are a very close paraphrase. Trotsky must have read the *Pravda* article himself or had someone read it to him while he made notes.

Here Trotsky was continuing his attempt to deflect attention away from the involvement of the "Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc" onto another - any other - target, by falsely asserting that NKVD men were among the 14 executed for the Kirov murder; that Stalin was involved in the Kirov murder.

Trotsky concludes with phrases that are full of irony for us today:

Революционный террор не нуждается в маскировке, ибо он находит непосредственное оправдание в сознании народных масс.

Translated:

Revolutionary terrorism does not need a mask because it finds its immediate justification in the consciousness of the popular masses. (228)

We know from sources outside the USSR that Trotsky did indeed sanction the use of "terror," both from Sedov's words to Zborowski and from Trotsky's bloc with the Rights, who according to Jules Humbert-Droz were already planning Stalin's assassination in 1928. Like his declarations of permanent "break" with "capitulators" Trotsky's insistence in denouncing "terror" is more "cover" for his machinations.

Concerning Stalin's "amalgams" Trotsky wrote:

Потребность в амальгамах возникает с того момента, когда бюрократия поднимается над революционным классом, как правящая каста, со своими особыми интересами, тайнами и махинациями.

Translated:

The need for amalgams emerges when a bureaucracy rises above the revolutionary class as a privileged caste, with its special interests, secrets, and machinations. Fearing for its power and its privileges, the bureaucracy is compelled to deceive the people. (228)

What becomes of this analysis when we realize that it was not Stalin who was forging "amalgams" – false stories – but Trotsky himself? Moreover, on the evidence we now have, Stalin and the Soviet prosecutors had not fabricated anything. They were really trying to find out what was going on, trying to solve the crime.

Posing as a champion of the truth Trotsky denounces Stalin's "amalgams," or deliberate falsifications. Meanwhile it was Trotsky who was creating "amalgams" to disguise his real activities. Ironically it was not Stalin but Trotsky himself who felt "compelled to deceive the people."

On the evidence we have today it is clear that the Stalin-era Soviet investigators did solve the Kirov murder.⁸ Further investigation into the murder eventually led the NKVD to discover the bloc of Oppositionists – Zinovievists, Trotskyists, Rightists, and others – who were the defendants in all three of the public Moscow Trials of 1936, 1937, and 1938.

With the following words Trotsky was also positioning himself to declare any future revelations by the NKVD and Soviet prosecutors as even larger fabrications:

Сталину необходимо прикрыть сорвавшиеся амальгамы новыми, более широкого масштаба и более успешными. Нужно встретить их во всеоружии! Борьба против диких расправ над марксистской оппозицией в СССР неотделима от борьбы за освобождение мирового пролетарского авангарда от растлевающего влияния сталинских агентов и сталинских методов. Ни один честный пролетарский революционер не смеет молчать. Из всех политических фигур самой презренной является фигура Понтия Пилата.

Translated:

Stalin is forced to cover up the unsuccessful amalgams with new, broader and more successful ones. We must meet them well armed. The struggle against the ferocious repressions against the Marxist opposition in the USSR is inseparable from the struggle for the liberation of the world proletarian vanguard from the influence of Stalinist agents and Stalinist methods. Not one honest revolutionary proletarian ought to be silent. Of all political figures, the most despicable is Pontius Pilate. (228; Emphasis in the original.)

At this point we should recall that Trotsky's principal tactic in covering up the bloc and his own activities was to "expose the scheme

⁸ See Furr Kirov.

in advance." In his first article on the Kirov murder in B.O. #41 Trotsky had written:

There is only one way to forestall en route the amalgams that are in preparation: *Expose the scheme in advance*. The Stalinists are trying to mold the public opinion of the world police towards expulsions, extraditions, arrests, and other more decisive measures. The Leninists must prepare the public opinion of the world proletariat for these possible events. In this case, as in others, it is necessary to speak out openly about what is; that is also the aim of the present article. ("The Stalinist Bureaucracy and the Assassination of Kirov")

Trotsky knew then - and we know now - that it was he himself, not the Soviet prosecution ("Stalin"), that was cooking up a false story or "amalgam" concerning Kirov's murder. Trotsky also suspected that the NKVD investigation would uncover more details of his own followers' activities, and therefore that more accusations against him would be forthcoming in the future.

Once he had begun to deny that the bloc with Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others existed Trotsky had no choice but to compose a false account of the Kirov murder while pretending to be deducing what had really happened. The obvious tactic was to turn the tables and blame Stalin for Kirov's murder, and then blame Stalin again for trying to pin Kirov's murder on the real culprits, the bloc, including himself, Trotsky.

For the rest of his life Trotsky continued to falsely claim that the Moscow Trials were a frameup and that all the defendants including himself were its innocent victims. In a great historical irony, Trotsky's "amalgam" was to become the most influential account of Kirov's murder. Of course, Trotsky's followers accepted it. But the central event in its further development was Nikita Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" of February 25, 1956, when Khrushchev said:

It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances surrounding Kirov's murder hide many things which are inexplicable and mysterious and demand a most careful examination.

In 1964 the Shvernik Commission appointed by Khrushchev to find evident for the "rehabilitations" of the Moscow Trials victims and many others, suggested that Stalin was behind Kirov's murder. In conformity with Khrushchev's goals the Commission concluded:

Никакого «Антисоветского право-троцкистского блока» в действительности не существовало ...

Translated:

No "Anti-Soviet Right-Trotskyist bloc" existed in reality...

This report was not published until 1994, after the end of the Soviet Union. But in the late 1980s it was studied and used by Gorbachev's men. Aleksandr Iakovlev, a Politburo member and Gorbachev's chief for ideology, ordered an attempt to find evidence that Stalin was behind Kirov's murder. Iakovlev's high-level commission reluctantly concluded that there was no such evidence. So they settled for a compromise solution: they claimed that Nikolaev had been a "lone gunman," that there had never been a bloc, and that Stalin had used Nikolaev's crime to "frame" innocent people whom he thought were against him.

Thanks to the Harvard Trotsky Archive we know today that the bloc did exist. The Shvernik Commission's, and Iakovlev's, reports are as phony as the version by Trotsky on which, through Khrushchev, they were ultimately based. This story, which originated in Trotsky's need to deny and conceal his conspiracy, has become the canonical version of the Kirov murder.

*Part Three. Trotsky's Lies and
The Dewey Commission*

Chapter 17. The Dewey Commission I – The Testimony

The “Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trial,” called the Dewey Commission (D.C.) after its chairman, John Dewey, was formed in 1937 ostensibly to investigate the charges made against Trotsky in the first two Moscow Trials.

The objectivity of the D.C. and its intention to conduct an impartial hearing was sharply questioned from the outset.

Columnist and Editor of the Baltimore Sun Mauritz Hallgren, one of the original Commission members, resigned at the beginning of February 1937 in protest against what he felt was an attempt by Trotsky and his followers to use the Committee as a tool in Trotsky’s struggle against the Soviet government.¹

One of the initial members, Carleton Beals, dropped off the Commission when he became convinced that it was pro-Trotsky and not objective. Beals called the D.C. hearings “a joke.” Beals’ full statement was printed in *The New York Times* of April 19, 1937.

¹ Holmström, New Evidence 42. Hallgren explained his reasons for his resignation in a letter to *The New York Times* of February 5, 1937, p. 20. Hallgren’s letter of resignation to Felix Morrow of the American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky, dated January 27, 1937, may be read at <http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrgr/research/hallgrentomorrow.pdf> Hallgren’s letter to *The New York Times* may be read at http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrgr/research/hallgren_nyt020537.pdf

Beals published a second explanation for his resignation in the *Saturday Evening Post* of June 12, 1937.²

Nevertheless its hearings, held in Mexico in April 1937, and its report made later that year, have often been said to have disproved some at least of the accusations made against Trotsky at these two Moscow Trials.³ The D.C. is often cited as a definitive refutation of the charges leveled at Trotsky in the first two Moscow Trials. It is even referred to as a successful debunking of the trials testimony as a whole.

In fact, it appears as though the D.C. has never been carefully studied. For no one who carefully examines the text of the two volumes of the D.C. proceedings with any attempt at objectivity could reach such a conclusion. We will demonstrate that fact in the following chapters.

It has always been possible to assess the statements and claims made by Trotsky, his advocate, and his witnesses on the basis of their logic. We can now also evaluate the conclusions reached by the D.C. in the light of the greater knowledge afforded to us by archival materials. These materials are: the Trotsky archive at Houghton Library, Harvard University; the Trotsky archive that forms part of the Nicolaevsky papers at the Hoover Institution; and certain materials from Soviet archives that have been published since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.

² The *New York Times* article about Beals' resignation may be read at http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrgr/research/beals_nyt041937.pdf Beals' SEP article may be read at http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrgr/research/beals_sep061937.pdf

³ We have used, among other accounts, the unpublished Masters degree dissertation of the late John M. Belton, *The Commission of Inquiry Into Charges Made Against Leon Trotsky in the Great Purge Trials in Moscow*. Emory University, 1966, and Thomas Ray Poole, "Counter-Trial." *Leon Trotsky on the Soviet Purge Trials*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1974; Alan Wald, "Memories of the Dewey Commission: forty years later." *Antioch Review* 35 (Fall 1977) 438-451.

The D.C. published two volumes. In this chapter we will examine the first volume, *The Case of Leon Trotsky*. It is a transcript of the hearings held by the D.C. in Coyoacán, Mexico, between April 10 and April 17, 1937, plus some additional supplementary materials related to them. The following chapter is devoted to a study of the second volume, *Not Guilty*. It contains the D.C.'s consideration of the testimony and its conclusions.

Earlier in this book we have listed a number of Trotsky's proven lies. Trotsky repeated most of them in his testimony to the D.C. This and the following chapter are organized around an examination of those of Trotsky's demonstrable falsehoods that he employed in his testimony to the D.C. Thanks to the archival discoveries we can now prove that Trotsky deliberately lied in much of his most important testimony to the D.C.

Trotsky's falsehoods dealt with elsewhere in this study

When issues arise in the D.C. transcript that are considered in other parts of the present book we will refer to those discussions. We want to mention two of them at the outset:

* The Kirov Murder. Trotsky refers extensively to the Kirov murder and his own writings about it. We examine these writings of Trotsky's in other chapters of the present work.

* The question of the "Hotel Bristol" and whether Gol'tsman (called "Holtzman" in the English translation of the 1936 Trial transcript and in the D.C. hearings), a defendant in the First Moscow Trial of August 1936 (the "Zinoviev-Kamenev trial"), met Sedov, and then Trotsky, in Copenhagen in November 1932, is examined in Sven-Eric Holmström's article of 2009. We refer to that excellent study, and only add a few additional points that Holmström did not address there.

Trotsky's principal lies to the Dewey Commission "Capitulators"⁴

Trotsky lied to the D.C. when he stated:

We do not discuss with the capitulators. We merely exclude them from our ranks and keep them out of the argument. (CLT 119)

Pierre Broué insisted that this was not true.

Lev Sedov called the Smirnov group either the "former capitulators" or the "Trotskiite capitulators." Everybody had known, from 1929 on, that people in the Smirnov group had not really capitulated but were trying to fool the apparatus, and were capable of organizing themselves as an Opposition within the party: the fact was so universally known that Andres Nin, the Spaniard deported from the Soviet Union in August 1930, explained it openly to his German comrades of *Die permanente Revolution* who printed his declaration without apparent problem. (POS 104)

According to Broué, by 1929 at the latest none of the "capitulations" were genuine. All the "capitulators" were "two-faced," hypocritical, and "capitulated" in order to gain reinstatement in the Party where they could continue their conspiracy. The Moscow Trials testimony and other evidence now available suggests that dishonest "capitulations" began far earlier than 1929.

⁴ "Capitulators" is the name given to Bolshevik Party members who were loyal to an Opposition group within the Party, were expelled for violating the 1921 resolution forbidding Party factions, and who then "capitulated" to the Party leadership - Stalin - by signing a statement in which they renounced their dissident views and swore to uphold the Party's line in future.

By 1932 Trotsky had reached out to them and some of them had responded. That means that by 1932 at the latest Trotsky's public rejection of "capitulators" was a smokescreen behind which to hide their dealings with each other.

The Bloc with other Oppositionists

In his D.C. testimony Trotsky denied the possibility of a bloc with Zinoviev and Kamenev because they were "capitulators."

GOLDMAN: Did you ever discuss with anyone the possibility of organizing a united center between your political followers and the followers of Zinoviev and Kamenev in the Soviet Union, after the break-up of your bloc with Zinoviev and Kamenev?

TROTSKY: Never. My articles show that it is absolutely impossible. My appreciation of them, my total contempt after the capitulation, my hostility to them and their hostility to me, excluded that absolutely.

GOLDMAN: Have you read the testimony of Zinoviev and Kamenev and the other defendants in the first Moscow trial?

TROTSKY: Yes.

GOLDMAN: Wherein these defendants claimed that you instructed several of them to establish a united center between your political followers and their political followers? Have you read such testimonies?

TROTSKY: Yes.

GOLDMAN: What have you to say about that?

TROTSKY: It is a falsehood organized by the G.P.U. and supported by Stalin. (CLT 87-88)

Trotsky's explanation for the testimony concerning the bloc at the 1936 Moscow Trial was that the bloc did not exist, was a fabrica-

tion of the G.P.U. (the name for the NKVD until 1934) at Stalin's order. Trotsky was lying. To use one of Trotsky's favorite words, this was an "amalgam" - of his own. We have known since 1980 that Trotsky was lying here thanks to Broué's discovery of Sedov's bloc letter and of Trotsky's reply.

Trotsky repeated this "amalgam," or falsehood, throughout the D.C. hearings. In his long closing statement Trotsky said:

3. The testimony of the defendants - at least those whose political physiognomy is well known - is, however, false also in those sections where they expose their own criminal activity. We are not dealing with bandits, or with criminal perverts, or with moral degenerates, but with the unfortunate victims of the most horrible inquisitorial system of all time. (CLT 488)

The Zinoviev-Kamenev trial (August 1936) was constructed entirely on the basis of terror. (CLT 498)

Trotsky knew that this was not true. The Prosecutor's charge that Zinoviev and Kamenev were in a bloc with Trotsky and the Soviet Trotskyists was not false, not "constructed ... on the basis of terror." It was, in fact, true.

Trotsky knew much more than this. He certainly knew, for example, that the Zinoviev-Kamenev underground planned and carried out the December 1, 1934, murder of Sergei Kirov in Leningrad. We have discussed this in more detail in another chapter. We now have good evidence that Trotsky and his supporters in the USSR were more directly involved in Kirov's murder. We will discuss this in the second volume of this study.

In his essays on the Kirov murder and on the January 1935 trial of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and their Moscow-based co-conspirators Trotsky claimed repeatedly that he despised Zinoviev and Kamenev and that he had had no contact with them. This was all deliberate falsehood, a smokescreen to camouflage the bloc and its activities.

I.N. Smirnov

Trotsky lied to the D.C. when he denied any contact with Smirnov:

GOLDMAN: After his capitulation in November, 1929, did you have any connection with Smirnov?

TROTSKY: I, directly, not. My son met him in Berlin in 1931, in the street.

GOLDMAN: Did your son give you any information?

TROTSKY: Yes, he told us that the man is absolutely unhappy and disoriented, without any political orientation, that he gave him some information about old friends, capitulators and non-capitulators, and that he was very friendly in conversations with him - he knew my son as a boy, and then as a young lad - contrary to Pyatakov, who met my son also on the street, but turned his head away. My son called him traitor. That was on Unter den Linden. (CLT 89)

Trotsky was lying here as well. In reality Smirnov was one of the members of the bloc named in Sedov's letter to Trotsky. Sedov had been in touch with him and communicated this to Trotsky.

Gaven

Trotsky lied to the D.C. when he denied having any contact with Gaven:

GOLDMAN: Did you ever hear of a man by the name of Gaven?

TROTSKY: Yes.

GOLDMAN: Who is he?

TROTSKY: He is a Latvian Bolshevik. He, if I remember, gave all his sympathies at a certain time to the Opposition. As Holtzman, for example. In 1926 or

1927, he was connected for a time with Smilga, a member of the Central Committee. But he disappeared from my eyes absolutely after 1926.

GOLDMAN: In the testimony of Mrachkovsky, and also Smirnov, there is a reference that you sent communications through Gaven to Smirnov about the necessity of killing Stalin.

TROTSKY: I don't know anything about it. No, it is an absolute falsehood. He is not among the defendants.

GOLDMAN: No, he is not. He is a witness.

TROTSKY: Not even a witness.

GOLDMAN: That's right.

TROTSKY: He disappeared. (CLT 225-6)

Pierre Broué discovered that Trotsky had indeed met with Gaven and given him a message for Smirnov.

Some documents found in Sedov's Papers in Hoover cast useful supplementary light on the case. For the first time, we learn something about the man who was depicted by procurator Vyshinskii and some of the defendants as the one who brought the terrorist directives from Trotskii to the USSR, that is Iuri Petrovich Gavenis (sometimes Gaven), and Old Bolshevik working in Gosplan.... In 1936 Trotskii and Sedov denied having had any contact with him. In fact, they had. Allowed to go to Germany in order to receive medical care, Gavenis wrote to Trotskii and got an interview with Lev Sedov who wrote an account of it. Gavenis gave information about the bloc, supplementing Holzman's. He also gave information about his own "O"-group (probably Osinskii) and seems to have agreed to bring back to the Soviet

Union a message to the Trotskiite group itself - in spite of his worry about the latter having been infiltrated by OGPU. (POS 99)

Elsewhere in the present volume we discuss Trotsky's contact with Gaven. We will return to this contact in volume two.

Preobrazhensky

Trotsky mentions Preobrazhensky's "capitulation" a number of times. Though he never states outright whether he had subsequently been in contact with Preobrazhensky, Trotsky did say he never again contacted the "capitulators," of which Preobrazhensky was one. He wrote about Preobrazhensky as he did about Radek.

The discussion revolving around Radek took on an international character. Thus, the German oppositional organization, the Leninbund, published the declaration of Radek, Smilga and Preobrazhensky, and offered to print my declaration. In October, 1929, I answered the leadership of the Leninbund: "Isn't it monstrous? In my brochure I defend the point of view of the Russian Opposition. Radek, Smilga and Preobrazhensky are renegades, bitter enemies of the Russian Opposition, and furthermore Radek does not stop at any calumny." In the publications of the Left Opposition during those years one can find, in several languages, not a few scornful articles and comments flaying Radek. (CLT 531)

Trotsky implied that he was not collaborating with Preobrazhensky. But he was. In January 1932 Preobrazhensky was one of the persons to whom Trotsky wrote a letter, of which only the certified mail receipt remains in the Harvard Trotsky Archive. In the same year Preobrazhensky is named in Sedov's 1932 "bloc letter" to Trotsky.

Radek

Trotsky and his lawyer Goldman insisted that Trotsky had had no contact with Radek since his exile from the USSR in 1929.

GOLDMAN:.. The testimony will show that Trotsky has had no connection either direct or indirect with Radek since the time of his expulsion from the U.S.S.R., and that he has neither received from Radek nor written to him a single letter. (CLT 10)

GOLDMAN: Now, were you in communication with Radek, either directly or indirectly, since you left the Soviet Union, Mr. Trotsky?

TROTSKY: The only communications are represented by the quotations; no other communication.

GOLDMAN: You mean that you wrote about him, but you did not write to him?

TROTSKY: Never.

GOLDMAN: Did you receive any letters from him?

TROTSKY: Never.

GOLDMAN: Did you send letters to him through an intermediary?

TROTSKY: No. (CLT 116)

Trotsky was lying again. In reality Trotsky did write Radek. Moreover, he did so at exactly the time Radek specified in his testimony at the Second Moscow Trial of January 1937. We discuss this in another chapter of the present volume.

Trotsky repeated this lie in his long closing statement:

The year 1929 was the breaking-point in his political life as in his attitude towards me, the story of our relations before and after 1929 can be followed without difficulty from year to year through articles and letters. In this question, as in others, to reestablish the basic facts is to refute the accusation. (CLT 524)

During the trial, Radek testified: ". . . in February, 1932, I received a letter from Trotsky . . . Trotsky further wrote that since he knew me to be an active person he was convinced that I would return to the struggle." Three months after this alleged letter, on May 14th, 1932, I wrote to Albert Weisbord in New York... (CLT 532)

I have declared more than once, and I declare again, that Pyatakov, like Radek, for the past nine years was not my friend but one of my bitterest and most treacherous enemies, and that there could have been no question of negotiations and meetings between us. (CLT 554)

Sokol'nikov

Trotsky testified to the D.C. that he had not contacted Sokol'nikov:

GOLDMAN: December, 1927. Was Sokolnikov ever in disfavor with the ruling, bureaucratic apparatus, as far as you know—before the trials, I mean?

TROTSKY: Sokolnikov has original ideas. He has a very inventive mind, and that is the reason why he is not fit, he does not fit into the bureaucratic régime.

GOLDMAN: Did you ever have any communication from him when you left Russia?

TROTSKY: Never.

GOLDMAN: Did you in any way communicate with him since you left Russia?

TROTSKY: No.

GOLDMAN: Either directly or indirectly?

TROTSKY: No. (CLT 123)

Trotsky was lying. Getty discovered in the Harvard Trotsky Archive the certified mail receipt of a letter from Trotsky to Sokol'nikov of January 12, 1932.

It is interesting to note that at the Second Moscow Trial of January 1937 Sokol'nikov also denied having been in touch with Trotsky. This shows that witnesses at the Moscow Trials did not either lie or tell the truth consistently. Therefore, the discovery of a single lie by a witness is not grounds to dismiss all his testimony as false. The D.C. frequently committed this error, as we shall see.

Piatakov

As with Radek, Preobrazhensky, and Sokol'nikov Trotsky claimed that he had had no contact with Piatakov since leaving the USSR.

GOLDMAN: When did he [Piatakov] capitulate?

TROTSKY: He capitulated openly, publicly; he capitulated in February, 1928. He was the first "Trotskyite" who capitulated publicly.

GOLDMAN: And after that did you have any correspondence with him at all?

TROTSKY: None.

GOLDMAN: Either when you were in the Soviet Union or outside of the Soviet Union?

TROTSKY: Exactly. (CLT 117)

GOLDMAN: So, you state you never saw Pyatakov in Oslo in December of 1935, or at any other place, and that you never saw him since 1927 or thereabouts?

TROTSKY: **Never.**

GOLDMAN: Never had any communication with him?

TROTSKY: **Never.**

GOLDMAN: Either with him directly or through some intermediary?

TROTSKY: **Never. (CLT 210-211)**

No evidence remains in the Trotsky Archives of Trotsky's having been personally in contact with Piatakov. However, Piatakov was in touch with Radek, with whom Trotsky was in contact. This is certainly "communication ... through an intermediary." So Trotsky was lying here too.

We also have Piatakov's own testimony at the Second Moscow Trial of January 1937, and his statement to Ezhov of December 19-20, 1936. In both documents Piatakov discussed in detail his clandestine contacts with Trotsky and Trotsky's demands for terror and sabotage. We have submitted the Moscow Trials testimony to a rigorous process of verification and have established that it is valid as evidence. We will return to Piatakov in volume two where we will present a detailed study of Piatakov's very important statement to Ezhov.

Piatakov and the Flight to Norway Question

Trotsky concentrated on trying to prove that Piatakov could not have landed at Kjeller, at that time the main Oslo airport, during December 1935.

GOLDMAN: There is an article in the *Arbeiderbladet* of Oslo of January 29, 1937, where the director of the

Trotsky's "Amalgams"

airport, Director Gulliksen, says: "No foreign aeroplane at Kjeller." (CLT, Sixth Session, 214)

But Piatakov had explicitly never claimed to have used that airport.

VYSHINSKY: I have a question to put to Pyatakov. Accused Pyatakov, please tell me, you travelled in an airplane to Norway to meet Trotsky. Do you know in which airdrome you landed?

PYATAKOV: Near Oslo.

... VYSHINSKY: Have you heard of a place called Kjeller or Kjellere?

PYATAKOV: No.

VYSHINSKY: You confirm that you landed in an airdrome near Oslo?

PYATAKOV: Near Oslo, that I remember. (1937 Trial 442-443)

In his testimony at trial Piatakov had claimed that he and Bukhartsev had met in the Tiergarten in Berlin with an emissary of Trotsky's who provided him with a German passport and took care of all the customs formalities. A person who could do such things obviously had to have some kind of German official status. Piatakov could have flown on a non-commercial airplane, a military or diplomatic plane. He could have arrived at a different airport. Sven-Eric Holmström has already identified other airfields at which Piatakov could have landed.

Radek had claimed that Trotsky was collaborating with the German government. If that were so the German government could have arranged matters with Norwegian officials so that the flight

was not recorded. Or, Piatakov could have taken a Norwegian rather than a “foreign” airplane in the first place.⁵

As of 2015 we have much more evidence from NKVD files to supplement Piatakov’s statements at the Second Moscow Trial. It is clear that Trotsky had been personally in contact not just with Radek but with Piatakov too, and that the latter really did make a secret visit to Trotsky in Norway in December, 1935. We will discuss this material and provide the documentation, including translations into English, in volume two of the present work.

A more important consideration is Trotsky’s credibility in general. Trotsky lied many times in instances where we can now prove that he lied. But Getty showed that Trotsky’s archives were purged of incriminating documents. Moreover, Trotsky himself conceded that he would have purged his own archives if they had contained anything incriminating. Since Radek told the truth in the only instance which we can independently verify it is likely that others, including Piatakov, did as well. The fact that we cannot prove that through independent evidence does not imply that Trotsky did not contact Piatakov individually. It only means that we can’t prove it.

Elsewhere in this book we examine Sedov’s “slip of the tongue” to a reporter from a Dutch Social-Democratic newspaper in which Sedov admitted that Trotsky had had contact both with Zinoviev and Kamenev and with Radek and Piatakov.

Gol’tsman

During the First Moscow Trial (August 1936) Gol’tsman (Holtzman) had admitted having had six or eight meetings with Trotsky’s son Sedov in Berlin in 1932. During the D.C. hearings Trotsky denied both direct and indirect contact with Gol’tsman.

⁵ Sven-Eric Holmström is presently studying the “Piatakov flight to Norway” question.

On June 29, 1937, two months after the D.C. hearings, Trotsky wrote the Commission to inform them that Gol'tsman had indeed met Sedov:

1. To a question regarding Holtzman I replied that after my departure from Russia I had neither "directly or indirectly" any communication with him (see session 3). In fact, Holtzman met my son, Sedov, in Berlin in 1932 and communicated to him, as I **subsequently learned**, some factual reports about the situation in the USSR. These reports were published in the Russian Bulletin of the Opposition (No.31, November 1932). This fact can be interpreted as an "indirect" communication between Holtzman and myself. (CLT 592)

Trotsky was lying. He had not learned "subsequently" - after his D.C. testimony - about Sedov's meetings with Gol'tsman. In his *Li-vre rouge* published in October 1936 Sedov had admitted to one meeting with Gol'tsman. This same claim was made in the Russian edition of the *Bulletin of the Opposition* Nos. 52-53, also dated October 1936.⁶ Trotsky certainly reviewed both texts before publication. He may well have coauthored one or both with Sedov.

But on May 31, 1937, Sedov testified at the Paris session of the D.C. that he had met with Gol'tsman "several times" (*plusieurs fois*), as Gol'tsman had testified. Trotsky had no choice but to correct his statement to the D.C.

The question arises: Why did Sedov and Trotsky lie about the number of meetings with Gol'tsman? What really went on during those meetings? We have discussed this interesting issue in another chapter of the present work.

⁶ "Smirnov i Gol'tsman," *Biulleten' Oppozitsii* Nos. 52-53. At <http://web.mit.edu/fjk/www/FI/BO/BO-52.shtml>

"Terror"

During the D.C. sessions more time and attention was paid to the question of "terror" - the Russian term for mass killing or individual assassination - than to any other. Sessions Seven, Eight, Ten, and Eleven were given over mainly to discussion of this issue. Trotsky and his attorney Goldman devoted a lot of effort to arguing that Trotsky had always and consistently opposed the use of violence in political struggle ("terror"). Here are a few of many citations from the testimonial section of the D.C. hearings.

GOLDMAN:... The accusation of individual terror, as will be shown on the basis of Trotsky's numerous articles, beginning in 1902, is in direct contradiction with the whole bent of his thought, with his political education, with the lessons of his revolutionary experience, and finally, with the entire tradition of Russian Marxism. (CLT 11)

TROTSKY: This was the sense of our fight. During my first exile, from 1902 to 1905, I held dozens and dozens of lectures, wrote dozens of articles against individual terrorism in favor of mass action. During my second exile, which was after 1907 - after the defeat of the first revolution of 1905, and when the wave of terrorism became very important because the reaction was terrible; after the defeat of the revolution the desire of revenge became imperative with the youth - my second exile was filled with lectures and written articles against individual terrorism. (CLT 45-46)

During the Seventh session of the hearings Goldman read into the record many quotations from Trotsky's writings in which Trotsky condemned individual terror (assassination). During the Eighth and Tenth sessions Trotsky discussed terror and his opposition to it at great length. Trotsky claimed to oppose terror on practical political grounds even while conceding that it could sometimes be justified on moral grounds:

FINERTY: Your opposition to individual terror, while it may be morally justified, is that it is not an effective political movement?

TROTSKY: Absolutely so.

FINERTY: I understood you, on direct examination, to testify that your opposition to individual terror as a political means was that it was an ineffective political means, while it might be morally justified under certain conditions.

TROTSKY: Totally right.

FINERTY: It was not suitable as a political measure?

TROTSKY: Totally right. (CLT 368)

During the Eleventh session John Dewey pointed out that Trotsky had signed a statement by the Opposition in which the use of terror was justified under certain circumstances.

DEWEY: Can I ask you a question on terrorism? In the appeal of the Russian Opposition to the Communist International, made after your expulsion from the Party, you state that it is still possible without new revolutionary disturbances to put in order and reinforce the system of the proletarian dictatorship. When I say you, I mean the leaders of the Opposition. Before that it says:

Terror can play a great affirmative role if it is based on a correct political line and promotes the dissolution of reactionary groups. As Bolsheviks we fully understand the rôle of the revolutionary terror. We applied it to the bourgeoisie and their agents, the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and not for one moment do we intend in the future to renounce the revolutionary terror as against

enemies of the proletariat. We well remember, however, that the terror of the parties hostile to the Bolsheviks was powerless.

That is on page 356 of the English *The Real Situation in Russia*. Part of it runs over on the top of 357. I am merely asking you whether there is anything inconsistent in that with what you stated this morning, whether it is in the same line with the remarks you made this morning? (CLT 385)

Trotsky seems to have been caught off guard by this quotation, and replied:

TROTSKY: I don't remember all this document, but it was not signed by me. It was after my expulsion.

Thereupon Dewey pointed out that Trotsky had indeed signed the statement.

DEWEY: Yours is the first name there.

TROTSKY: Oh, yes, it is signed. My exposition in the first session today was in a larger historical line. I say if the society becomes genuinely Socialist, if solidarity is the cement of the society, then terroristic methods would be dying out, and the line of dictatorship, and that the status of terrorism must be declining.

Trotsky's reply is doubletalk. The quotation read out by Dewey is a forceful affirmation of the use of terror in certain circumstances. It says nothing about terrorism "dying out" or "declining." An honest investigation would have followed up vigorously on this evasion by Trotsky. But the D.C. let it pass.

Trotsky devoted the whole of Part IX of his long closing statement (Session 13) to repeating his renunciation of individual terror. (CLT 488-494).

We know now, and not only from Moscow Trials testimony, that Trotsky was lying. Leon Sedov had tried to recruit his own chief

assistant, Mark Zborowski, to go to the Soviet Union as an assassin, or "terrorist." Zborowski was a secret NKVD agent. On two occasions that we know of – not all of his reports to his NKVD handlers have been made public – Zborowski stated that Sedov had, in private conversation with him, justified the use of terror in general and the murder of Stalin specifically. We have discussed these reports in detail elsewhere in the present book.

"Get Rid of Stalin"

Trotsky never denied using the term "ubrat' Stalina" – roughly, "get rid of Stalin" – in his "Open Letter to the Central Executive Council of the U.S.S.R." of March 1932. The English translation says: "to remove Stalin."⁷ The Russian original, published in *Biulleten' Oppozitsii* No. 27 of March 1932 uses the Russian term "ubrat' Stalina."

Trotsky's defense attorney Goldman quoted an article of March 1933 in which Trotsky called for Stalin's removal but rejected the slogan "Down with Stalin."

GOLDMAN: "Syndicalist" in English means something altogether different from "trade unionist." Then in the article published in *The Militant* on March 25th, 1933, by Trotsky, this is continued:

As far back as 1926 Stalin was told that he was clearly grooming himself as a candidate for the post of undertaker to the Party and the Revolution. For the past six years, Stalin has come very close to the fulfillment of this role. Throughout the Party, and outside of it, there is spreading ever wider the slogan, "Down with Stalin!" The causes for the origin and the growing popularity of this "proverb" require no

⁷ At <http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1932/03/cec2.htm>

explanations. But, nevertheless, we consider this slogan incorrect. The question touches not Stalin personally, but his faction. It is true that for the last two years it has become extremely constricted in its scope. But it still includes many thousands of apparatus functionaries. Other thousands and tens of thousands, whose eyes have been opened as regards Stalin, continue to support him, nevertheless, from fear of the unknown. The slogan "Down with Stalin!" may be understood, and could inevitably be understood, as the slogan for the overthrow of the faction now in power, and even more - the overthrow of the apparatus. But we do not want to overthrow the system, but to reform it by the efforts of the best proletarian elements.

It is self-evident that an end must and will be put to the Bonapartist régime of a single leader and of the pack compelled to revere him, because that is the most shameful perversion of the idea of the revolutionary Party. But the matter touches not the expulsion of individuals, but the changing of a System.

It is precisely the Stalinist clique that indefatigably circulates rumors to the effect that the Left Opposition will return to the Party not otherwise than with a sword in its hand, and that it will immediately begin merciless reprisals against its factional opponents. This poisonous lie must be refuted, repudiated, and exposed. There is no feeling for revenge in politics. Bolshevik-Leninists

-
By that is meant the Left Oppositionist faction...

- never were motivated by it in the past, and least of all do they intend to be motivated by it in the

future ... We are ready to work hand in hand with every one who seeks to prevent catastrophe through the restoration of the Party. (CLT 268)

About his use of this term Trotsky testified as follows:

FINERTY: Mr. Trotsky, when you say "eliminate," do you mean "exterminate"?

TROTSKY: No.

FINERTY: In other words, when you say "eliminate," you mean to eliminate politically?

TROTSKY: Yes, to deprive them of the apparatus of the dictatorship and replace them by democracy.

FINERTY: When you said "Remove Stalin," you used it in the same political sense?

TROTSKY: Not only that; I am astonished to what degree I was cautious in my article. I wrote a second time to the Central Committee: "You must remove Stalin." But as a slogan, "Down with Stalin!" I repudiated it in my article. Because in the Central Committee everybody understands that it is in a legal way I proposed to remove him; to change the secretary. When it becomes a slogan of the masses, it cannot mean assassination. I repudiate it. (CLT 277)

Trotsky did indeed repudiate the slogan "Down with Stalin" in his article "Alarm Signal" published in *The Militant* of March 25, 1933 (p. 3 col. 6, bottom). However, this article was written before Trotsky began to call for a revolution in the USSR. As late as March 1933, in his letter to the Soviet Politburo of March 15, 1933 Trotsky was offering concessions in hopes of being allowed to return to the Soviet Union. As Getty pointed out in 1986, Trotsky kept this letter secret and never informed his followers about it. Trotsky had not yet decided that no return to the Soviet leadership was

possible for him. According to Getty, Trotsky made this decision later, announcing it in his July 15, 1933, article on the Comintern. (Getty TIE 29-31)

By the time of the D.C. hearings in early 1937 Trotsky had changed his attitude towards the Stalin regime and was calling for its overthrow. His "repudiation" of the slogan "Down with Stalin" belonged to an earlier period, now long in the past.

"Ubrat" is an ambiguous term, like "get rid of" in English. Depending upon the context it might, or might not, imply violence. But what it does *not* mean is "remove from office." Trotsky could have just said that - "remove Stalin from office" - but chose not to.

Elsewhere in this book we have outlined how the term "ubrat' Stalina" was a loaded term among the Oppositionists in the early 1930s. We have good evidence that by 1932 at the latest it was interpreted by Right Oppositionists to mean assassination. As Radek noted in his testimony, it could not mean anything else in the context of the time.

In 1937 Trotsky secretary Jean van Heijenoort prepared excerpts from Trotsky's and Sedov's 1932 correspondence with each other on this subject. In those excerpts Trotsky argues that the slogan "ubrat' Stalina" should not be understood as advocating his assassination, while Sedov was less categorical.

In the end Trotsky did not use these excerpts at the Dewey Commission, for example as exhibits. We can't be sure why he did not. It may be that Trotsky feared that the Commission would have asked for the originals. Those originals are not in the Trotsky Archive today. They were among the materials "purged" for some reason, probably because they contained incriminating information. Getty suggested this in 1986 and it is hard to account for the disappearance of these letters on any other grounds.

The underground Oppositionists in the USSR understood "ubrat'" to mean "get rid of by assassination." They were discussing this very term at the same time as Trotsky used it in his open letter to the C.E.C. and in discussions with Sedov. It seems likely that at the

very least the missing letters between Trotsky and Sedov did not firmly oppose "terror."

No experienced conspirator would unambiguously advocate murder in a written communication. It is easy to see how Radek, or anyone else, could have interpreted the term "ubrat" as a call to violence. Thanks to Zborowski's reports about Sedov, we know that Trotsky meant it as a term that would be understood as a call to violence while perhaps retaining some slight degree of "plausible deniability."⁸

Other Lies and Evasions by Trotsky

"Evidence"

At several points in his testimony to the D.C. Trotsky claims that the Soviet prosecution has no evidence of his guilt while he, Trotsky, has evidence of his own innocence.

These two fundamental features of the Moscow trials – the absence of evidence and the epidemic character of the confessions – can but arouse suspicion in every thinking man. (CLT 481)

Trotsky accuses the Soviet prosecution of lacking "material proof" (evidence) of his guilt.

1. Despite long years of struggle against the Opposition, despite tens of thousands of raids, arrests, banishments, imprisonments, and hundreds of executions, the Soviet judicial authorities do not have

⁸ Context is everthing. In 1984 the present author interviewed a retired contractor who in the 1940s had disobeyed an order by North Jersey mob boss Abner "Longy" Zwillman. Zwillman accepted the contractor's explanation. Then he told a number of his thugs to take the contractor out for a meal. Zwillman added, "And I don't mean his last meal!" The contractor told me that if Zwillman had not added that statement the thugs might have murdered him, since "take him out for a meal" was one underworld euphemism for "kill him."

at their disposal even a single substantial fact, not a shred of material proof to confirm the truth of the accusations. This fact constitutes the most damning evidence against Stalin. (CLT 487)

Trotsky knew this statement was false and the D.C. members ought to have known as well.

In the First Moscow Trial of August 1936 Moisei Ol'berg's Honduran passport was submitted as a prosecution exhibit.

VYSHINSKY:... It was Paul Olberg who put his brother V. Olberg, as both of them testify, in touch with the Gestapo and helped V. Olberg to obtain from the Gestapo the passport of a citizen of the Republic of Honduras, which figures as an exhibit in the present case. (1936 Trial 25)

This passport was shown to the court as an exhibit on page 89.

At the Second Moscow Trial of January 1937 Vyshinsky produced the diary of Stroilov, one of the defendants, as evidence and interrogated Stroilov about it.

VYSHINSKY: Next, please hand to the accused Stroilov this black book. (Stroilov is handed a book of an office journal type in a black binding.) What is that black book?

STROILOV: It is my diary.

VYSHINSKY: Where did you keep it?

STROILOV: I kept it while I was abroad.

VYSHINSKY: In what year?

STROILOV: All the time I lived there.

VYSHINSKY: Is it in your handwriting?

STROILOV: Everything here. . . .

VYSHINSKY: Please look first, do not take it for granted.

STROILOV: Everything here is mine.

VYSHINSKY: Yours?

STROILOV: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: And is the meeting with Wüster and Berg recorded in your handwriting?

STROILOV: All this was written when I was in Germany, and when I returned to the Soviet Union I continued it probably for about two months. That was already here in the Soviet Union.

VYSHINSKY: When did all this happen?

STROILOV: In 1930-31.

VYSHINSKY: And it was then that you wrote it?

STROILOV: Immediately.

VYSHINSKY: Very well. Let me have that book back again. This book has been attached to the files as material evidence. I request the Court to look at page 23, which contains a reference to the meeting with Berg; page 27, which contains a reference to a conversation with Berg; page 37, which contains a reference to a letter from Wüster; page 33, which also contains a reference to Wüster; page 35, which contains a reference to Wüster; page 43, which contains a reference to Sommeregger. The character of these meetings and conversations was explained to you by the accused Stroilov yesterday. I want to draw your attention to the fact that these meetings are confirmed in the diary of 1931.

STROILOV: Of 1930 and 1931. (1937 Trial 272-3)

During the 1938 Moscow Trial Nikolai Bukharin, the most famous of the defendants, said that incriminating evidence (*uliki*) was important in convincing him to stop denying all the charges against him and begin to confess.

BUKHARIN: I shall now speak of myself, of the reasons for my repentance. Of course, it must be admitted that incriminating evidence plays a very important part. (1938 Trial 777)

This evidence itself was not presented at trial. We know that the same thing is true about at least some of the other defendants, since some of the incriminating evidence against them has been published in Russia in recent years.

Vyshinsky also addressed the issue of material evidence in his summary statement to the January 1937 trial:

VYSHINSKY: But what proof have we in our arsenal from the point of view of juridical procedure?

It must be said that the nature of the present case is such that it predetermines the peculiar nature of the proof possible in the case. We have a conspiracy, we have before us a group of people who conspired to bring about a coup d'état, who organized themselves and for a number of years carried on, or secured the carrying on, of activities directed towards ensuring the success of this conspiracy, a conspiracy with fairly wide ramifications, a conspiracy which connected the conspirators with foreign fascist forces. How can the question of proof be presented under these circumstances? The question can be put this way: a conspiracy, you say, but where are the documents? YOU say there is a program, but where is the program? Have these people a written program anywhere? They only talk about it.

You say there is an organization, that there is some sort of a gang (they call themselves a party), but where are their decisions, where is the material evidence of their conspiratorial activities - rules, minutes, a seal, and so on and so forth?

I am bold enough to assert, in keeping with the fundamental requirements of the science of criminal procedure, that **in cases of conspiracy such demands cannot be put.** You cannot demand that cases of conspiracy, of coup d'état, be approached from the standpoint: give us minutes, decisions, membership cards, the numbers of your membership cards; you cannot demand that conspirators have their conspiratorial activities certified by a notary. No sensible man can put the question in this way in cases of state conspiracy. In fact we have a number of documents to prove our case. But even if these documents were not available, we would still consider it right to submit our indictment on the basis of the testimony and evidence of the accused and witnesses and, if you will, circumstantial evidence. **In the present case I can quote a brilliant authority on the law of evidence such as the old, well-known English jurist, William Wills, who in his book on circumstantial evidence shows how strong circumstantial evidence can be, and how, not infrequently, circumstantial evidence can be much more convincing than direct evidence.**⁹ (1937 Trial 512-513)

Elsewhere we have quoted the Russian historian Yurii Zhukov, an article in the Comintern magazine, and a C.I.A. source to the effect

⁹ Vyshinskii is referring to William Wills, *An essay on the principles of circumstantial evidence: illustrated by numerous cases* (1862; many times reprinted).

that no documentary evidence should be expected in any competent conspiracy of this kind. (Furr Evidence)

An experienced revolutionary conspirator like Trotsky would have known not to entrust much to writing. Broué reported that Lilia Estrina (Dallin), one of Sedov's secretaries, told him as much. Dallin said that only Sedov and Trotsky himself knew the most important secrets of Trotsky's conspiracy. (Broué Léon Sedov 210)

Trotsky, however, claimed in his closing statement that by contrast he had presented "documentary proof" of his innocence.

The very expression, "Stalinist amalgam," was given currency by us almost eight years before the Kirov assassination and the spectacular trials which followed it. **The relevant documentary proofs have been placed at the disposal of the Commission of Inquiry. They show with absolute incontestability that what is involved is not an underground Trotskyite conspiracy first unearthed in some startling manner in 1936, but a systematic conspiracy of the GPU against the Opposition, with the aim of imputing to it sabotage, espionage, assassinations and the preparation of insurrections.** (CLT 486)

This statement is both a lie and a bluff. It is a lie because we have the evidence that the bloc - the "underground Trotskyite conspiracy" - did exist. It is a bluff because Trotsky presented no such evidence. Nor could he have done so. No such evidence existed then, and none exists today. But as with so many other statements of Trotsky's the D.C. members did not challenge it - did not ask him for clarification ("What 'relevant documentary proofs' that prove there was no 'underground Trotskyite conspiracy' are you referring to, Mr. Trotsky?")

Doubletalk About Trotsky's Archive

A little further on Trotsky stated:

The Commission is in a position to compare my private correspondence with my articles and books, and in this way determine whether my activity bears the slightest tinge of double-dealing. (CLT 486-487)

Here Trotsky was again lying, as anyone who reads the D.C. transcript can instantly see. For earlier in the same closing statement he had already made the following admission:

Furthermore, it is absolutely indisputable that I would not preserve in my archives records of my crimes had I committed any. (CLT 467)

Early in the D.C. sessions Carleton Beals questioned Trotsky on this same point:

BEALS: ...For the purpose of this line of questioning, I am considering you guilty, and therefore I would like to ask you what assurance the Commission would have in examining your archives that you have not destroyed that which was unfavorable to yourself.

After first agreeing with Beals that the question was "absolutely natural" Trotsky evaded it completely:

TROTSKY: That is an absolutely natural question. But my aim is not to convince the Commission by the documents which I have allegedly destroyed, but by the documents which remain in my archives.

He then proceeded to make an argument based on consistency:

I will prove to the Commission that the man who wrote from year to year those thousands of letters, those hundreds of articles, and those dozens of books and had those friends and those enemies, that this man could not commit the crimes of the indictment. It is the most genuine evidence I have.

Noticing this evasion, Beals tried to ask it again:

BEALS: Answering the question I have —

Trotsky again dodged the question with what can only be described as doubletalk:

TROTSKY: If you will permit me a supplement. It is impossible to introduce allegedly destroyed documents. They could not find place in these archives.

Whereupon he reiterated what amounts to an argument to consistency:

If you suppose, if you have the hypothesis of criminal documents to the German Minister Hess, to Hitler or the military of the Mikado, then you must find in my archives a place for them. Such a duplicity of character is impossible. (CLT 52)

First, Trotsky admits that he would have destroyed any incriminating documents in his archive. Then Trotsky says that he could not introduce documents that he would have destroyed had they existed, which therefore could not be in his archives. Then he concludes by saying that if he had composed criminal documents they must be in his archive: "then you must find in my archive a place for them."

The result of this smokescreen of confusing doubletalk is that Trotsky never answered Beals' question and the Commission never followed up on it. No wonder Beals resigned! What point would there be in the Commission's examining his archive unless Trotsky told them that he had not removed incriminating documents? The Commission allowed Trotsky to evade this question completely. As we know today, there were indeed incriminating documents in Trotsky's archive - at least those identified by Getty and Broué, but undoubtedly more, perhaps many more since, as Getty was the first to note, the archive has been "purged," though imperfectly.

Trotsky affirmed a logical absurdity. He agreed that he would have removed any incriminating documents from his archive. Yet at the same time he asserted that the same archive – the letters, articles, and books that remained after anything incriminating had been removed from it – would prove his innocence!

Once again Trotsky's bluff worked on the Commissioners – either that, or they never intended to do the necessary work to verify Trotsky's statement in the first place.

"Torture" at the Moscow Trial

In his concluding statement Trotsky claimed that the defendants at the 1936 and 1937 Moscow Trials were tortured and threatened with the torture of their families.

Read Pyatakov's, and especially Radek's, last pleas, and between the lines you will read as follows: "You demanded that we degrade and stultify ourselves in order to expose Trotsky and Trotskyism. Because we are broken and demoralized individuals, because of the mental torture we have suffered, because we fear that you will torture our loved ones as you are torturing us, we have agreed to say everything that you dictated to us. Now grant us our lives, and, if not, then shoot us and save our fathers, mothers, wives and children." (CLT 453)

4. Although Nikolayev and the thirteen other executed men said everything that was asked of them (and I assume that Nikolayev and his companions were subjected to physical torture), **they did not have a word to say about the participation of Zinoviev, Bakayev, Kamenev, or any other "Trotskyite" in the assassination.** The GPU, obviously, never once questioned them along these lines. (CLT 496, italics in original)

Trotsky's "torture" talk was a smokescreen. In his testimony at the January 1937 Moscow Trial Karl Radek had referred explicitly to the issue of torture and ridiculed it:

RADEK: When I found myself in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the chief examining official realized at once why I would not talk. He said to me: "You are not a baby. Here you have fifteen people testifying against you. You cannot get out of it, and as a sensible man you cannot think of doing so. If you do not want to testify it can only be because you want to gain time and look it over more closely. Very well, study it." For two and a half months I tormented the examining official. **The question has been raised here whether we were tormented while under investigation. I must say that it was not I who was tormented, but I who tormented the examining officials and compelled them to perform a lot of useless work.** For two and a half months I cornpelled the examining official, by interrogating me and by confronting me with the testimony of other accused, to open up all the cards to me, so that I could see who had confessed, who had not confessed, and what each had confessed.

This lasted for two and a half months. And one day the chief examining official came to me and said: "You are now the last. Why are you wasting time and temporizing? Why don't you say what you have to say?" And I answered: "Yes, tomorrow I shall begin my testimony." And the testimony I gave contains not a single correction from first to last. I unfolded the whole picture as I knew it, and the investigation may have corrected one or another personal mistake about the connections of some person with another, but I affirm that not a single thing I told the examining officials has been refuted and that nothing has been added.

I have to admit one other guilt. Having already confessed my guilt and having disclosed the organization, I stubbornly refused to testify with regard to Bukharin. I knew that Bukharin's position was just as hopeless as my own, because our guilt was the same, if not juridically, then in essence. But we are close friends, and intellectual friendship is stronger than any other kind of friendship. (1937 Trial 549).

Anyone who reads the transcript of the Radek-Piatakov trial can see that it would be hard to imagine a cooler customer than Radek. But Trotsky could count on the fact that very few people would read this long, 580-page transcript with both care and objectivity.

Trotsky's statement about Nikolaev (the assassin of Sergei Kirov) is interesting in a somewhat different way. We know today that neither Nikolaev nor any of the defendants were "tortured." This might, or might not, count as a lie. After all, Trotsky assumed, but did not assert, that these men were "tortured."

But Trotsky's following statement - in boldface above - is a deliberate lie, for the Kirov Trial defendants did indeed implicate Zinoviev, Bakaev, Kamenev, and other Zinovievists. The names of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others were mentioned in the press, and Trotsky read it. We have examined Trotsky's lying about the Kirov murder in earlier chapters.

Concerning Holtzman (Gol'tsman) Trotsky stated:

Suffice it to say that, despite the insistence of the Prosecutor, Holtzman denied any participation whatever in the terrorist activity. (CLT 516)

This is a veiled reference to page 158 of the 1936 Trial transcript, where Vyshinsky says:

Holtzman adopted the same position as Smirnov - I admit everything except terrorism - because he

knows that for terrorism he may have to pay with his head.

Trotsky does not seem to realize that this is evidence that Gol'tsman was **not** tortured since, presumably, enough torture would have forced him to admit to anything the Prosecution charged him with. Or perhaps he just did not expect the D.C., or anyone who might read the 603-page transcript of its hearings, to realize it. Sure enough, the D.C. did not realize that Gol'tsman's refusal here contradicted Trotsky's claim that the defendants were tortured.

Trotsky does not mention the fact that Smirnov also denied terrorist activity but was exposed by the testimony of a number of others, including Gaven, Mrachkovsky, Safonova, Dreitser, and Gol'tsman. In the case of a conspiracy, where documentary evidence is not to be expected, the mutual accusations by other members of the conspiracy are considered to be strong evidence of guilt in any judicial system.

Could Trotsky Speak Norwegian?

During the discussion about Piatakov's putative secret trip to Norway to see Trotsky the following exchange took place:

GOLDMAN: Did you ever take any trips without anybody at all?

TROTSKY: Never.

GOLDMAN: All alone?

TROTSKY: Never. It is impossible, Mr. Attorney, because if I am on the street and recognized by the people I am absolutely helpless. I am surrounded by people, and especially in Norway - **I don't speak Norwegian** - I must have some Norwegian people who can defend me.

GOLDMAN: Didn't you learn Norwegian while you were there?

TROTSKY: Not sufficiently to speak. (CLT 209)

Now it seems that Trotsky was lying even in this apparently small matter! Sven-Eric Holmström has amassed contemporary testimony from Norwegians who conversed in that language with Trotsky.

This may not be so unimportant after all. Holmström has been researching the possibility that Piatakov did in fact fly to Norway to talk with Trotsky. Trotsky made the claim that he could not speak Norwegian as evidence that he could not have met with Piatakov unless accompanied by a Norwegian speaker, and Konrad Knudsen's family was prepared to swear that they did not accompany him on any such trip. Holmström has identified a person who spoke both Norwegian and Russian, who may have accompanied Piatakov to a meeting with Trotsky, and who had the authority to make such a meeting secret.

Chapter 18. The Dewey Commission II – The Report

Charles Beard's First Letter

In Part III of his lengthy closing statement during the Dewey Commission (D.C.) hearings Leon Trotsky discusses a letter of March 19, 1937 from Charles Beard, addressed to George Novack. In it the renowned American historian gives his reasons for refusing the invitation to become a member of the Commission.

Trotsky reproduced, with comments, two direct quotations from the letter and one paraphrase. We'll examine each of them here. The letter itself was not included in the Appendix-Correspondence section of the Hearings volume. No one could check its text to verify whether Trotsky were quoting it accurately or honestly describing its contents.¹

Trotsky's first description of Beard's letter includes a direct quote from it:

First of all, he says, the accusation against Trotsky rests *exclusively* on the confessions. "From a long study of historical problems, I know that confessions, even when voluntarily made, are not positive proof."

Trotsky's paraphrase:

Furthermore, Professor Beard deems it proper to apply a rule which governs American jurisprudence, namely: The accused must be considered innocent if

¹ Beard's letter is published in Harold Kirker and Burleigh Taylor Wilkins. "Beard, Becker and the Trotsky Inquiry." *American Quarterly* 13, No. 4 Winter 1961 pp. 516-525, at page 519.

there have not been brought against him objective proofs which leave no room for reasonable doubt.

Trotsky's second description of Beard's letter contains a quotation from it:

Finally, the historian writes that "it is almost, if not entirely, impossible to prove a negative in such a case; namely, that Mr, Trotsky did not enter into the relations of conspiracy charged against him. Naturally, as an old revolutionist, experienced in the art, he would not keep incriminating records of the operations, if he did engage in them. Furthermore, no person in the world could prove that he has not engaged in a conspiracy, unless he had a guard set over him every moment of the time covered by the charges. In my opinion it is not incumbent upon Mr. Trotsky to do the impossible - that is, prove a negative by positive evidence. It is incumbent upon his accusers to produce more than confessions, to produce corroborating evidence to specific and overt acts." (CLT 464-465)

On the first quotation concerning confessions not being "positive proof" Trotsky made the following comment:

The word "even" indicates clearly enough that the question of the voluntary character of the Moscow confessions is for this scholar, at the very least, open. As an example of false self-accusations, Professor Beard cites the classic cases of the trials of the Inquisition, along with instances of the darkest superstition. That single comparison, which coincides with the development of the thought of Friedrich Adler, secretary of the Second International, speaks for itself. (CLT 464)

Trotsky's remarks here are not accurate. Beard did not refer to the Inquisition at all. The passage in question reads as follows:

Accused persons have confessed to personal communications with the devil, to riding broomsticks in the sky, to witchcraft, to sorcery, and to causing death and destruction by resort to evil spirits.

Beard was referring to confessions "even when **voluntarily made.**" He did not refer to the Inquisition, which would raise the question of torture and compulsion. It is Trotsky who raises the question of "the trials of the Inquisition." Trotsky states that Beard was comparing the Moscow Trials to the Inquisition, as Trotsky himself did. But Beard did no such thing.

Beard said that even voluntary confessions "are not positive proof." That is, they are not conclusive. He did not deny that they are "proof," that is, important evidence.

Beard continued:

Confession unsupported by other evidence is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As far as I am able to ascertain the confessions made in the Russian trial court were not supported by any corroborating evidence which has been made available to us. Hence I do not regard the charges that Mr. Trotsky entered into a conspiracy against the Russian government as proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

The issue here is: What constitutes "other evidence," "corroborating evidence"? Competent criminal conspirators do not leave written evidence of the conspiracy lying about to be found by the police.

In Trotsky's first quotation above he claims to be paraphrasing a passage in Beard's letter. But Trotsky's paraphrase is inaccurate. Here is what Beard actually wrote:

In the second place, I apply to Mr. Trotsky the rule applied in American jurisprudence, namely, that he is to be deemed innocent of the charges until they are proved beyond all reasonable doubt. He may be distressed by charges but he is entitled to be deemed innocent of these charges until corroborating evidence has been produced.

Trotsky's statement is false. Beard did not mention "objective proofs which leave no room for reasonable doubt." Beard wrote "...until corroborating evidence has been produced." It is easy to see why Trotsky preferred to put words into Beard's mouth instead of quoting him directly. Mutual confirmation by defendants of each other's confessions is indeed "corroborating evidence."

Evidently Trotsky would have preferred that Beard had commented on a situation where corroborating evidence to confessions does exist but in which all the corroborating evidence has been deliberately faked by the police, the false mutually corroborating confessions obtained by torture, threats, or some other form of compulsion. That is what Trotsky contended was the case in the first two Moscow Trials. But Beard did not make any such reference.

Trotsky agreed with the substance of his second quotation from Beard's letter. He stated:

... it is absolutely indisputable that I would not preserve in my archive records of my crimes had I committed any. (CLT 467)

But then he continues with an absurdity and a false conclusion.

But my archives are important for the investigation, not for what they lack, but for what they contain. Positive acquaintance with the daily development of my thought and acts over a period of nine years (one year of banishment and eight of exile) is entirely sufficient to demonstrate a "negative fact" - namely,

that I could not have committed acts contrary to my convictions, to my interests, to my whole character.

This is doubletalk coupled with false logic. The doubletalk is the first sentence, in which Trotsky claims that his archives would provide proof of his innocence even if he had removed all the incriminating materials.

The false logic is that what was left in his archive could "prove a negative"—that his archives would be fully consistent with his public writings and statements. Not only is this nonsense - Trotsky has just admitted that he would have removed anything incriminating beforehand - but we know it is false. Evidence of the bloc, of correspondence with Radek, Sokol'nikov et al., and of other matters Trotsky stoutly and dishonestly denied to the D.C. have indeed been found in his archive. Trotsky's discussion of Beard's letter to Novack is dishonest - a bluff.

Beard's Second Letter

On March 22, 1937, Beard wrote another letter² concerning the D.C.. This letter was in reply to a letter by John Dewey in which Dewey evidently urged Beard to join the D.C.. Dewey's letter has not been located.

Neither Trotsky nor the members of the D.C. made any reference to Beard's letter replying to Dewey. It is not hard to imagine why Trotsky didn't mention it. It was not in Trotsky's interest to refer to it. Beard made it clear that there was nothing Trotsky could do to demonstrate his innocence. It was clearly against Trotsky's interest that this opinion by so prominent a historian be made known.

But the D.C. ought to have found some way to make its contents public. The fact that it did not do so argues that the D.C. was not

² Harvard Trotsky Archive, bms Russ 13.1 13783.

objective but, on the contrary, suppressed documents that contradicted its professed mission.

Beard wrote:

If Trotsky is guilty, he would not, as an experienced revolutionist, keep incriminating records in his files and papers; nor, if he even had them, would he keep them in his files to be examined by any commission of inquiry. On the other hand, if he is not guilty, he certainly could not demonstrate the fact by an absence of records—i.e. prove his innocence. It requires no trip to Trotsky to know that the Commission of Inquiry would have to report "no evidence" of guilt in Trotsky's papers.

Beard was correct. Trotsky could not prove his innocence "by an absence of record." Trotsky would have to "prove a negative" - that he did not do some things. As Beard had pointed out in his letter to Novack of March 19, 1937, that would be impossible "unless he had a guard set over him every moment of the time covered by the charges." Moreover, as we know now, Trotsky was *not* in fact innocent of at least some of the charges against him. Indeed, on the evidence we now have - including the Moscow Trials testimony, which we have verified in the first part of this book - Trotsky was guilty of *all* of those charges.

What Beard wrote next cut the ground out from under the entire D.C. enterprise:

Well, that would be seized upon by ignorant partisans as evidence that he is not guilty, and encourage them to declare the claim of innocence proved. Now I cannot be a party to an enterprise that can have only one outcome which is fully known in advance.

This is exactly what happened: the D.C. "declared Trotsky's claim of innocence proved." What's more, the Commission itself pro-

moted this falsehood - that they had proved Trotsky "Not Guilty," the title of the concluding D.C. volume.

Beard continued:

So my judgment stands in my mind: (1) a confession is not proof; (2) Trotsky is innocent until proved guilty; (3) no matter what papers Trotsky may have, he cannot prove his innocence by anything he can show; (4) only a court with power to summon the principals and compel them to give testimony could come anywhere near the truth.

We've examined Beard's statement that "a confession is not proof" above. Point 3 here is the central issue. Beard recognized that it was impossible for Trotsky, as it would be for anyone, to "prove his innocence" by anything he could show.

Beard also wrote that "Trotsky is innocent until proven guilty." However, in Beard's point (2) "innocent" means something different from what "innocence" in point (3). In point (2) "innocent" means "in a juridical sense" - that the burden of proof is on the accuser. The fact that a defendant in a trial may be found "not guilty" does not mean that s/he is, in fact, innocent of the charge, that s/he did not commit the crime in question. It is not a statement about the defendant at all but about the evidence (as assessed by the judge or jury). In a judicial sense, "not guilty" does not mean "innocent"; it means guilt is "not proven." This is the most that the D.C. could do - find Trotsky's guilt "not proven."

But the D.C. went far beyond that. The Commission claimed that they had "found" - that is, proven - that Trotsky was in fact "innocent."

(22) We therefore find the Moscow trials to be frame-ups.

(23) We therefore find Trotsky and Sedov not guilty.
(NG xxiii)

In Beard's terms, Dewey and the rest of the Commission members were the "ignorant partisans" who "declare[d] the claim of innocence proved." Beard recognized that the D.C. was "an enterprise that can have only one outcome which is fully known in advance" and did not want to be associated with it. Beard was correct. What's more, Beard did not know what we know today: he did not know about Trotsky's lying to the Commission and withholding of evidence.

Nor did Beard know that the Commission would not even bother to examine Trotsky's archives. Perhaps the Commission members did not do this because they recognized the truth of what Beard said and to which Trotsky agreed - that anything incriminating would have been removed in advance, and so it would be fruitless to search Trotsky's archive. It is ironic that materials incriminating Trotsky and proving his duplicity did remain in Trotsky's archive despite an attempt at some time to "purge" it.

Whatever their reasons for not examining Trotsky's archives at his invitation, the Commission should have stated them in order to avoid the impression that they simply "believed" whatever Trotsky told them. But this was the fundamental problem with the D.C.: it did, in fact, "believe Trotsky."

Beard continued:

... let Trotsky publish everything he thinks will clear him of the charges, for the capitalist press is eager to have everything that will discredit Soviet Russia.

In a letter to his fellow Trotsky supporters Bernard Wolfe and Herbert Solow, Felix Morrow wrote the following:

Beard absolutely won't talk to us. His second letter (to Dewey who wrote him after his first letter) indicates that he will not be gotten now or ever. There is a sentence in the second letter, stating that anything Trotsky offers the capitalist press is eagerly printed, because the cap press desires to discredit Soviet

Russia — this is revealing and a warning to us not to press him.³

Morrow saw this statement of Beard's as reason that Trotsky supporters should stop urging Beard to participate in the Commission. But who could deny the truth of what Beard had written? Surely it was obvious that the capitalist press did not print Trotsky's articles out of sympathy for the anti-capitalist, revolutionary aims that Trotsky professed, but out of sympathy for his anti-Soviet views.

Pierre Broué waxed indignant over Beard's statement:

C'est avec un véritable chagrin que l'on prend conscience que des hommes dont les qualités d'esprit, l'honnêteté intellectuelle — oui -- et le dévouement au travail ont permis d'ouvrir à leurs contemporains la perspective d'une meilleure compréhension de leur passé comme de leur avenir, se soient révélés aussi médiocres au moment où ils auraient dû savoir, comme John Dewey, prendre leur temps pour une bonne cause et justifier leur combat d'historien par un combat dans le présent pour l'avenir. Ce n'est pourtant pas en eux qu'il faut chercher la clé de leur comportement mais dans la campagne forcenée menée au cours des semaines précédentes par les staliniens américains et leurs agents en milieu littéraire, contre le comité et ses membres, contre Trotsky, contre Dewey, contre le droit d'exprimer et de critiquer l'Union soviétique et son chef "genial." La malheureuse phrase de Charles Beard sur l'empressement de la presse capitaliste à imprimer Trotsky porte la marque de sa fabrique.⁴

Translated:

³Harvard Trotsky Archive, bms Russ 13.1 6898, Houghton Library.

⁴Pierre Broué, "L'historien devant la vie.: Charles A. Beard et le procès de Moscou." CahLT 19 (Sept. 1984) 68-77, at 73.

It is with a real sense of sadness that we realize that men whose qualities of mind, intellectual honesty - yes - and dedication to work have opened for their contemporaries the prospect of a better understanding of their past and their future, have proven as mediocre at the moment that they should have known how, like John Dewey, to devote some time to a good cause and justify their struggle as a historian by a struggle in the present for the future. It is, however, not in them that we must look for the key to their behavior, but in the frenzied campaign conducted during the preceding weeks by American Stalinists and their agents in literary circles, against the committee and its members, against Trotsky, against Dewey, against the right to express [oneself] and to criticize the Soviet Union and its "genius" leader." Charles Beard's unfortunate phrase about the willingness of capitalist press to print what Trotsky writes bears the mark of this factory.

Broué called Beard's statement "the unfortunate phrase" and opined that Beard said it under the influence of "American Stalinists and their agents in the literary world." But Broué did not say it was untrue. The capitalist press was certainly printing Trotsky because he was attacking the Soviet Union, which the capitalists also hated.

A passionate Trotsky partisan, Broué believed that Dewey was correct in deciding that Trotsky was innocent and that Beard was wrong. Broué was unable to see that it was Beard, not Dewey, who was objective.

Et c'est là que se situe le véritable problème, esquivé par nos excellents collègues. Relisant aujourd'hui l'admirable rapport de la commission Dewey sur la falsification de l'histoire par les procureurs et les policiers de Staline, relisant sa déclaration d'innocence pour Trotsky et Sedov, morts de la façon qu'on sait moins de trois années après, on ne peut qu'éprouver un sentiment d'indignation pour des hommes, aussi éminents soient-ils, qui ont invoqué

"leur travail" et tant de mauvaises raisons pour éviter de se compromettre avec une cause qu'ils savaient juste, mais qu'ils croyaient perdue, en adorateurs du fait accompli qu'ils étaient peut-être, ou, tout au moins, en historiens plus soucieux de questions "académiques" que de problèmes relevant de la rue ou de la vie. (72-3)

Translated:

And this is where the real problem lies, dodged by our excellent colleagues. Rereading today the admirable report of the Dewey Commission on the falsification of history by Stalin's prosecutors and policemen, rereading its declaration of innocence for Trotsky and Sedov, dead less than three years later by the manner of which we know, one can only feel a sense of outrage for men, eminent though they are, who cited "their work" and so many bad reasons to avoid compromising themselves in a cause they knew to be just, but that they believed to be lost, worshipers of the accomplished fact which they perhaps were, or, at least, historians more concerned with issues "academic" than with problems from the street or in life.

How could Broué have written these words when he already knew that Trotsky had lied about the bloc with the Soviet Oppositionists, and therefore that Trotsky had lied repeatedly in his testimony? Evidently Broué was blinded by his loyalty to Trotsky to such a degree that he was incapable of recognizing the truth of what Beard had written: that it was impossible for the Commission to establish Trotsky's innocence or guilt.

Broué knew more about Trotsky's lies than anyone else at the time. But he never set what he knew about Trotsky's lies beside Trotsky's testimony, articles, and interviews. To do so would have required a degree of objectivity: the determination to concede that his hero might have been wrong. This fundamental precondition of historiography, objectivity - the determination to question one's own preconceived ideas and to take concrete steps so as not to be blinded by them - proved to be beyond Broué's ability. Broué ap-

pears to have been ignorant even of the fact that historians are supposed to struggle for objectivity.

Dewey and the Commission were wrong to conclude that the trials were a "frame-up" and Trotsky was innocent. As Beard realized, they could not reach such a conclusion with any validity. What they could do was to "declare [Trotsky's] claim of innocence proved" and to delude others to that effect. This is what the D.C.'s report has done since its volumes were published: they have deluded others.

"Not Guilty"?

In this chapter we will examine Volume 2 of the D.C.'s publications: the book *Not Guilty. Report of the Commission of Inquiry Into The Charges Made Against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials*. We will point out a few of the many errors in logic and reasoning that the Commission members made in reaching their conclusions. We will also indicate where we now know Trotsky lied.

We know today that the Commission could have discovered that Trotsky was lying if they had accepted Trotsky's offer and assigned a team to study his archive. Trotsky would no doubt have "purged" his archive of whatever he could, as quickly as possible. But it is doubtful whether he could have done a thorough job. There must have been much more compromising material in the archive in 1937 than what remained in it in 1980, when it had been gone over numerous times by Trotsky's secretary Jean van Heijenoort, almost certainly the person who imperfectly "sanitized" the archive.

The D.C. elected not to study Trotsky's archive. But they should have known that he *might* be lying. It was an error on their part, born of bias, of ignorance, or both, not to recognize this possibility. After all, they certainly recognized that the defendants in the Moscow Trials might be lying.

The Commission made error after error of logic and deduction. It failed to check up on statements Trotsky made - and, in the case of the Paris hearings, that Sedov made. They failed to verify facts even when, as in the "Hotel Bristol - Bristol Konditori" matter, it was completely in their power to check them.

The D.C. may have been reasoning from a bias against Stalin and Soviet communism, or a bias in favor of Trotsky, or both. But it was also reasoning from a position of naiveté about their own abilities. Non-historians often believe that no special training is needed in order to assess historical evidence. Many people, especially those with some education, commonly believe that they are good judges of historical evidence even though they have never had the training, or trained themselves, to learn how to analyze historical evidence objectively; even though they have never given the question of how to interpret historical evidence any serious thought, or even any thought at all. This was clearly the case with the D.C. members and of John Dewey himself.

* * * * *

I.N. Smirnov

In its "Summary of Findings" the Commission wrote the following about I.N. Smirnov:

(3) On the basis of all the evidence, we find that Trotsky never gave Smirnov any terrorist instructions through Sedov or anybody else. (xxi)

This is a fault in logic. There are no grounds for this conclusion. It was impossible for the D.C. or anyone else to reach this conclusion validly on the basis of the evidence and testimony before it.

Moreover, we know the D.C. was factually wrong. Pierre Broué showed that Gol'tsman did carry messages between Trotsky and Smirnov. The D.C. had no way of knowing what those messages were. We know that Sedov, and therefore Trotsky, did advocate "terror," i.e. assassination. We know that Trotsky was in a bloc with Rightists whose leader, Bukharin, had been plotting to assas-

sinate Stalin since at least 1928. Therefore, these messages could have been "terrorist" messages, as they were asserted to be in testimony at the Moscow Trial. In volume two of this study we will examine much more evidence about Smirnov's role in planning "terror."

Gol'tsman

(5) On the basis of all the evidence, we find that Holtzman never acted as go-between for Smirnov on the one hand and Sedov on the other for the purposes of any terrorist conspiracy. (xxi)

This is a fault in logic. Again, there are no grounds for this conclusion. It was impossible to validly reach it on the basis of the evidence and testimony the D.C. had.

Moreover, we know that Gol'tsman did indeed act as go-between between Sedov (Trotsky) and Smirnov. Broué admitted that Gol'tsman carried at least one message to Smirnov. But Gol'tsman met with Sedov perhaps as many as eight times. He could have carried "terrorist" instructions, as testified at the 1936 Moscow Trial. But the D.C. never asked Sedov anything about these meetings.

Piatakov

(12) We find that Pyatakov did not fly to Oslo in December, 1935; he did not, as charged, see Trotsky; he did not receive from Trotsky any instructions of any kind. (xxii)

This is another fault in logic. The D.C. goes on to talk about "the disproof of the testimony of the defendant Pyatakov" and how that "completely invalidates the testimony" of others. But the D.C. did not disprove Piatakov's testimony at all. They could not do so, with the evidence and testimony they had.

Furthermore, it is invalid to reason that if *any* part of a defendant's testimony is untruthful, then *everything* is untruthful. It is simply not the case that either everything a defendant said is true, or everything is false. Human beings, including defendants at trials, do not either tell the truth all the time or lie all the time. The fact that a person tells a lie does not in the least mean that person always lies. In fact, no human being always lies or always tells the truth. For the D.C. to be ignorant of this elementary issue is a strong sign of bias and incompetence, or of dishonesty.

But in fact the D.C. did not prove that *any* part of Piatakov's testimony was untruthful. They simply *asserted* that it was. The Commission "believed Trotsky."

In his "slip of the tongue" interview with the Dutch Social-Democratic newspaper *Het Volk* Sedov revealed that Trotsky had been in touch with Radek and Piatakov. We know today that this was true. We know that Trotsky was in contact with Radek, though Trotsky lied repeatedly about this. Logically, it is possible that Trotsky was also in direct contact with Piatakov. And we have demonstrated in Part One that there is no reason not to accept the Moscow Trials testimony as valid, including Piatakov's here.

As for the flight to Norway, it is, perhaps, conceivable that Piatakov made it all up. But there is a great deal of testimony from various trial defendants that Piatakov did fly to Norway and met with Trotsky either at the time he testified or at another time and in another manner. The D.C. did not investigate the issues surrounding Piatakov's alleged flight. We have examined Trotsky's evasions about this issue in Part One. We will have more to say about Piatakov's flight in volume two.

We now have the transcript of the face-to-face interrogation with Bukharin, Stalin, Ezhov, and Ordzhonikidze of December 7, 1936. This transcript was published in 2002. Piatakov confesses privately to being involved in the Trotskyist reserve leadership, though he says nothing about the flight to Norway.

ЕЖОВ — В своих показаниях, данных вами в течение трех допросов, вы показали относительно состава так называемого запасного троцкистского центра, куда вы входили, и относительно блока с правыми. Вы это подтверждаете?

ПЯТАКОВ — Подтверждаю.

...

ПЯТАКОВ — ... В 1931 г. у меня состоялась встреча с Седовым, о которой я показывал наряду с другими вещами. Седов говорил относительно того, что ему <с.4> известно об активизации работы правых, что троцкистский центр, который к тому времени образовался в Союзе, связан с правыми и что, с его точки зрения, речь идет о возобновлении крупной борьбы, причем всякие средства должны быть пущены в ход. Вопрос блока с правыми или, как тогда Седов передал, контактирование с правыми, является неизбежным.

Так как Седов, как я уже показал, был для меня не партнером в обсуждении политических вопросов, я выслушал от него только то, что он передал со слов Троцкого, и не ставил перед ним вопроса, на какой основе создается блок и т.д. Тем более что он мне передал, что в Союзе троцкистский центр установил эти связи.

Троцкий знал мои отношения с Бухариным; он предлагал мне возобновить связь с Бухариным, так как с Рыковым у меня никогда личных отношений не было...

...

Я не могу припомнить сейчас, было ли это в начале или в середине 1932 года. Точной даты я не могу припомнить. Но я рассказал Бухарину относительно своей встречи с Седовым, относительно террористических установок Троцкого,

относительно блока с правыми. Бухарин не выразил никакого особенного удивления, из чего я сделал вывод, что из других источников это ему более или менее известно.

...

На одном из заседаний Политбюро в течение 10—15 минут мы с Томским имели разговор, причем из этого разговора явствовало, что с Сокольниковым он виделся, разговаривал и одобряет блок с нами, троцкистами.

...

ПЯТАКОВ — Конкретно шел разговор о директивах Троцкого, переданных мне Седовым.⁵

Translated:

EZHOV: In your confessions given during the course of three interrogations you confessed concerning the membership of the so-called **reserve Trotskyist center** in which you were a member, and concerning the **bloc with the Rights**. Do you confirm this?

PIATAKOV: I confirm it.

...

PIATAKOV: In 1931 I had a **meeting with Sedov**, concerning which I have confessed together with other things. Sedov said that he knew about the activization of the work of the Rights, that the **Trotskyist center** which at that time was being formed in the USSR was **in contact with the Rights**, and that from his standpoint, this was a question of

⁵"Stenogramma ochnykh stavok v TsK VKP(b). Dekabr' 1936 goda." *Voprosy Istorii* No. 3, 2002, 3-4.

the **renewal of a serious struggle, in which all means should be utilized.** The question of the bloc with the Rights or, as Sedov informed me at that time, contacting the Rights, was essential.

Since Sedov, as I have already confessed, was no equal for me in the matter of discussion of political questions, I listened **only to that which he transmitted from the words of Trotsky,** and did not ask him on what basis the bloc was being formed, etc. All the more so since he informed me that **the Trotskyist center in the USSR had established these contacts.**

Trotsky knew my relationship with Bukharin and he proposed that I should renew my **contact with Bukharin,** since I had never had personal relations with Rykov...

...

I can't remember now whether this was at the beginning or in the middle of 1932. I can't recall the exact date. But I told Bukharin about **my meeting with Sedov, about Trotsky's terrorist instructions, about the bloc with the Rights.** Bukharin showed no special surprise, from which fact I concluded that he was more or less aware of these matters from other sources.

...

At one of the Politburo sessions Tomsy and I had a 10 or 15 minute conversation and from that conversation it became clear that **he was seeing Sokol'nikov** and was discussing and approved a bloc **with us Trotskyists.**

...

PIATAKOV: In concrete terms we have a conversation about the directives of Trotsky which were given to me by Sedov.

Here Piatakov outlines his contacts with Sedov and the Trotskyist group with the Rights and Bukharin. We know that the bloc of which Piatakov speaks did exist. We simply have no evidence that Piatakov was lying, and therefore no reason to think that he was - for example, that he had been "forced" to make false statements here.

In Part Two, Chapter Two we cited Anna Larina's account of what Bukharin told her when he returned from this face-to-face confrontation. Bukharin confirmed that Piatakov had confessed his guilt to Ordzhonikidze. Bukharin did not tell Larina that he thought Piatakov was lying - if he had done so, Larina would have said that. But she does not.

We also have Sergo Ordzhonikidze's speech of February 5, 1937, to leading members of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, where Piatakov had been his assistant. It is clear from this speech that Ordzhonikidze believed Piatakov guilty. (Getty & Naumov 292-294)

You think that if I had as my first deputy a man like Piatakov, who had worked in industry for the past 15 years, who had tremendous connections with all sorts of people, you think that this person couldn't possibly sneak one or two of his people in. But sneak them he did! Some of them were found out, others were not. You have, after all, heard of their tactics. Who among you has raised the question of finding out how things are going on in your chief directorate?

You think that a wrecker [*vreditel'*] is someone who walks around with a revolver in his pocket, someone who hides in some dark corner somewhere, waiting for his victim? Who could imagine that Piatakov could

be a saboteur, and yet he turned out to be a saboteur, and, more still, a fine talker. He told how he did it.

Ordzhonikidze went on to explain how he had had Todorskii, someone whom Piatakov had named, expelled from the Party.⁶ Ordzhonikidze further explained how the Party had reprimanded him for expelling Todorskii on these grounds – presumably, without a Party hearing or trial.

We also have an extract from Stalin's presentation at the December 1936 Central Committee Plenum, from which we have quoted in Part One, Chapter 12. Rather than quote this statement at length here, we refer the reader to our translation of it, which is online.⁷

In short, we have a great deal of testimony to Piatakov's guilt, and no evidence to the contrary. Meanwhile, we know that Trotsky lied about all this to the D.C. The evidence shows that Trotsky was in touch not only with Radek but with Piatakov as well. There is no reason to doubt Piatakov's confession that Trotsky had given him "terrorist directives" since we know Trotsky supported the use of terror.

Romm

(14) We find that the disproof of Vladimir Romm's testimony and that of Pyatakov completely invalidates the testimony of the defendant Radek. (Not Guilty xxii)

This is a fallacy. The D.C. could not have proven that Romm had not met Trotsky at the end of July 1933, as Romm had testified.

⁶ In the public transcript of the January 1937 Moscow Trial Todorskii is named by Rataichak another of the defendants, not by Piatakov. (1937 Trial 420) Piatakov must have named him in an interrogation not made public.

⁷ See note 3 of Part One, Chapter Seven, and note 3 of Part One, Chapter Twelve, above.

Trotsky *asserted* that he had not visited Paris at that time. (CLT 181) But the D.C. could not *prove* that he had not done so. Trotsky's biographers agree that he arrived in St. Palais-sur-Mer, near Royan, France, on July 25, 1933, and resided there until October of that year. This is about eight hours by car from Paris. On November 1, 1933, Trotsky moved to Barbizon, a town less than two hours from Paris by car.

We know that Trotsky travelled incognito from Barbizon to Paris multiple times. We know that he visited Simone Weil in Paris at the end of December. Here is how Weil's biographer, basing his account on Weil's own, describes Trotsky at that time:

Trotsky arrived on the twenty-ninth or thirtieth, with his wife Natalia Sedova and two bodyguards. He had shaved off his goatee and mustache and had used pomade to flatten his thick mane of hair. Thus transformed and dressed like a bourgeois, he was quite well disguised. ...⁸

Trotsky and "his family, his guards, and some friends" went to see an Eisenstein film showing in the neighborhood. Despite what Pétrement describes as their furtive behavior no one recognized them.

We know about this visit because Simone Weil wrote about it. Could Trotsky not have made other visits to Paris in disguise, about which no one wrote? Of course he could have. According to leading Trotskyist historian and biographer Jean-Jacques Marie, Trotsky visited Paris in disguise about once a week after November 1933. (Marie, Trotsky 423) It is possible that Trotsky did so before November 1933 as well - from St. Palais to Paris, for example.

⁸ Simone Pétrement. *Simone Weil. A Life*. Translated from the French by Raymond Rosenthal. New York: Pantheon Books, 1976, 188.

Also, Romm might have misremembered the date he met with Trotsky, or lied about it for some reason. So the D.C. could never "disprove" Romm's statement in general.

In any case it is invalid to conclude that if any part of a defendant's testimony is untruthful, all of it is untruthful. Charles Beard, in his letter to Dewey, wrote:

Even if he could prove the falsity of the charge that he did not meet Romm in Paris,⁹ that would be only a detail, though presumptive evidence against the general charge. It would not settle the issue.

Beard is correct. The fact that an accused makes a false statement does not prove that all the accused's statements are false - it does not "completely invalidate" Romm's testimony. In fact we know

* that Trotsky was in contact with Radek;

* that Trotsky lied about this, and about many other matters, to the D.C.

We cannot establish even today that Romm's testimony was false, even as to the month he named. Trotsky travelled about *in disguise, secretly*. It is simply not possible to "prove" that he did *not* go to Paris to meet Romm. Neither could the D.C. The Commission could of course take Trotsky's, and his friends', word for it. In the end, that is basically what the D.C. did do. But then, why bother with a commission of inquiry at all - unless it was intended to be a "whitewash" from the beginning?

Conspiracy

(16) We are convinced that the alleged letters in which Trotsky conveyed alleged conspiratorial instructions to the various defendants in the Moscow

⁹ Beard clearly intended to write "...that he met Romm in Paris..."

trials never existed; and that the testimony concerning them is sheer fabrication. (xxii)

This is another fault in logic. The D.C. had no basis in evidence for its "conviction" that the letters "never existed" or for its conclusion.

What's more, we can be certain that the Commission was wrong. Trotsky did write Radek a letter at exactly the same time that Radek testified at the January 1937 Trial. Radek also testified that Trotsky's letter was "conspiratorial."

There is no reason to believe that Radek was lying here. Trotsky would scarcely have written to him for any other than a conspiratorial purpose. But we know that Trotsky lied to the D.C. on this point as on many others.

Terror

(17) We find that Trotsky throughout his whole career has always been a consistent opponent of individual terror. The Commission further finds that Trotsky never instructed any of the defendants or witnesses in the Moscow trials to assassinate any political opponent. (xxii)

This is patently groundless. The fact that Trotsky has never *publicly* supported "individual terror" and therefore could not have *privately* done so is absurd. The D.C. had no way of determining that Trotsky never contacted any of the Moscow Trial defendants, much less what he might have told them.

Moreover, Dewey himself had caught Trotsky out on this very question. Trotsky had advocated "terror," without specifying "individual" or some other form of "terror." As we have seen, Trotsky was flustered by Dewey's question, at first denying that he had signed the document in question and then claiming that it said something other than what, in fact, it did say. We discussed this in the previous chapter. So the D.C. *knew* that Trotsky had indeed

advocated "terror" and that he had lied about this to the D.C. until the evidence was put in front of him. (CLT 385-6)

Today we know that Trotsky did send a letter to Radek at exactly the same time Radek testified he received a letter from Trotsky, and that he also wrote to other Oppositionists. We also have Zborowski's testimony that Sedov tried to recruit him to be an assassin in the USSR, and advocated assassination of Stalin.

None of this documentary material is worth anything so far as concerns the existence of a "Trotskyite" conspiracy, or the alleged connections of these accused with such a conspiracy. **And indeed no documentation supporting the charge of conspiracy** was either shown to any accused for identification or attached to the records. Yet the accused, according to testimony, had not hesitated to write and send at considerable risk of exposure letters concerning the most compromising of their alleged criminal activities. (NG 29)

This is a failure of logic. We know that Trotsky did send such letters. The D.C. did not know this. But it should have been obvious to them, as it was to Charles Beard, that they could not know whether Trotsky had sent any or not.

Nothing can be concluded from the *lack* of documentary evidence of conspiracy. In this case as in many others the D.C. was guilty of committing a logical fallacy - here, the "argument from ignorance." It's an error to expect "documentation" supporting the charge of conspiracy. Conspirators try to leave *no* evidence of their conspiracy.

Even the presence of documentation could not by itself prove or disprove the charge of conspiracy. Such documentation could be forged, no doubt even more easily than testimony can be compelled. We have already noted that *if such documentation existed, its existence would itself be suspect.* Experienced conspirators

would never have committed their conspiracy to writing in the first place.

As Charles Beard noted in his letter to Novack,

Naturally, as an old revolutionist, experienced in the art, he would not keep incriminating records of the operations, if he did engage in them.

The D.C. should have recognized this elementary fact as well.

Chapter VII. The "Capitulators," pp. 35-48.

On pages 38 and following of *Not Guilty* the D.C. accepts Trotsky's claim that he could not possibly have formed a bloc with "capitulators." This is an example of the "argument from incredulity," another logical fallacy.

On page 43 the D.C. raises the issue of "cloaking the conspiracy":

§ 28. The question arises, of course, whether all these expressions of mutual enmity might not have been published for the purpose of cloaking the alleged conspiracy.

The Commission goes on to dismiss this idea. They had no grounds to do so. And in fact we know that Trotsky did indeed "cloak the conspiracy." As we have noted, Pierre Broué wrote:

Lev Sedov called the Smirnov group either the "former capitulators" or the "Trotskiite capitulators." Everybody had known, from 1929 on, that people in the Smirnov group had not really capitulated but were trying to fool the apparatus, and were capable of organizing themselves as an Opposition within the party: the fact was so universally known that Andres Nin, the Spaniard deported from the Soviet Union in August 1930, explained it openly to his German comrades of *Die permanente Revolution* who printed his declaration without apparent problem. (POS 104)

The Commission continues:

And Trotsky, who had been fought by Zinoviev and Kamenev during the period of the Troika, and repudiated by them at the 15th Congress, would appear to have had very little reason to trust them in an alliance as dangerous as an underground conspiracy. (NG 47)

The Commission had no way of knowing whether Trotsky was dissembling, as indeed he was. Thanks to Broué's discovery of the proof that the bloc of Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Rights, and other Oppositionists really existed, we know Trotsky was lying here.

Then the Commission proceeds to compound their error as follows:

Thus the contention that those Trotskyists who returned to the Party did so in pursuance of a deliberate policy of duplicity inaugurated by Trotsky himself is borne out neither by the evidence nor by any tenable theory. (NG 47-8)

This is true nonsense. Apparently there is no theory that the D.C. would consider "tenable." Moreover, since in fact we do possess evidence of "a deliberate policy of duplicity... by Trotsky" - evidence that the D.C. refused to look for - no theory, "tenable" or otherwise, is required to fill in any gaps. Even Broué admitted that the "capitulationists" were duplicitous.

On the other hand, the evidence introduced in rebuttal indicates that capitulations were often due to repressions by the GPU; that "capitulators" were systematically pressed to become informers against the Opposition; and that Oppositionists were therefore obliged for the sake of their own safety to abstain from all relations with them and to regard them as enemies. It [the evidence - see above] also indicates that mutual distrust existed between the

Trotskyists and Zinovievists, even in exile and in political prisons, and constitutes a **legitimate basis for doubting the probability of a new "Trotskyist-Zinovievist" bloc for the purposes of a terrorist conspiracy.**" (NG 48)

This is yet another error of logic. There could not be any "legitimate basis" for "doubting the probability for a new 'Trotskyist-Zinovievist' bloc" - which we now know did in fact exist - or that it was "for the purposes of a terrorist conspiracy." Today we have a great deal of evidence of such a conspiracy.

We find that all this evidence warrants due consideration, in weighing the charges and confessions in the two Moscow trials, of Trotsky's contention that he had regarded the "capitulators" in those trials as his political enemies from the time of their capitulations.

In short, the D.C. chose to "believe" Trotsky and to "disbelieve" the Moscow Trial testimony. Beard had predicted as much. He had written Dewey:

... I cannot be a party to an enterprise that can have only one outcome which is fully known in advance.

No wonder Beard refused to join the Commission! And no wonder Felix Morrow expressed relief when Beard refused to join.

Dreitzer

The accused Dreitzer confessed that in the autumn of 1931 he had two conversations with Sedov in Berlin, having been instructed by Smirnov to ascertain Trotsky's attitude on the formation of a bloc with the Zinovievites (ZK¹⁰ 51-52); and that in October, 1934,

¹⁰ ZK is the D.C.'s abbreviation for the transcript of the 1936 Moscow Trial, the "Zinoviev-Kamenev" trial.

he received from Trotsky a letter in invisible ink, containing instructions on terrorism and defeatism (ZK 22, 52). (NG 51-2)

Today we know the following:

- * The bloc was indeed formed.
- * Gol'tsman did carry messages about the bloc back to Smirnov.
- * Sedov and Trotsky did write letters in invisible ink (an-tipirin).

Therefore there is nothing the least improbable about Dreitser's claim to have discussed this with Sedov the year beforehand.

The accused Holtzman testified that he delivered to Sedov in 1932 a report and a secret code from Smirnov; that he had several conversations with Sedov ... (NG 52)

We know that Gol'tsman did meet with Sedov and deliver a report. We also know that Sedov and Trotsky tried to cover up the fact that Sedov met with Gol'tsman multiple times.

...and at his suggestion went in November, 1932, to see Trotsky in Copenhagen where he received from him verbal instructions to the effect that Stalin must be killed, and that for this purpose it was necessary to choose cadres of responsible people fit for this task. (ZK 101.)

In view of the fact that the first statements are true there is nothing improbable about these second statements.

Gol'tsman may have met Sedov as he stated, or he may not have. But that does not mean he did not meet with Trotsky. Sven-Eric Holmström has shown, and the Gol'tsman NKVD file confirms, that Gol'tsman must have visited the hotel in Copenhagen where he

said he met Sedov (we will study the Gol'tsman NKVD file in volume two of this study). As we mentioned in a previous chapter, it is possible that Gol'tsman met in Copenhagen not with Sedov but with someone else whose identity he wanted to shield. But whether Gol'tsman met Sedov in Copenhagen or not, the real question is whether he met with Trotsky there.

Trotsky dodged this issue. That raises the question: Why did he dodge it? The D.C. should have pursued this question. It did not.

Gol'tsman is another example of a Moscow Trial defendant some of whose testimony can now be verified - his multiple meetings with Sedov, which Trotsky and Sedov tried to hide. Today we can verify part of Gol'tsman's testimony. We cannot disprove any of it. That does not mean that all of Gol'tsman testimony was true. It does mean that there are no grounds for dismissing *any* of it.

The Bloc

The D.C. stated:

Thus there is, as we have said, **no direct evidence** of the attitude of either Sedov or Trotsky toward the formation of the bloc, or concerning their role, if any, in its formation. (NG 53)

This statement makes no sense. What "direct evidence" could there have been, other than the testimony about it during the Moscow Trials? If there had been "direct evidence" - whatever that means - of a secret conspiratorial bloc, we ought to expect forgery. In fact we know that Trotsky and Sedov lied about the bloc, denying it many times when, in fact, they had formed it.

The D.C. never searched Trotsky's archive, as he repeatedly offered. Had they done so they might well have found what Broué and Getty found in 1980 and thereafter - direct evidence that Sedov and Trotsky had been trying to form the bloc and approved of it -- and maybe a lot more besides.

Trotsky testified as follows:

Furthermore, it is absolutely indisputable that I would not preserve in my archives records of my crimes had I committed any. (CLT 467)

Charles Beard said the same thing:

If Trotsky is guilty, he would not, as an experienced revolutionist, keep incriminating records in his files and papers; nor, if he even had them, would he keep them in his files to be examined by any commission of inquiry. (Letter to Dewey 03.22.37)

Therefore *the D.C. believed that it would not find any "direct evidence" and in fact did not look for any.* Then why did they even raise the question of "direct evidence"? The answer appears to be that the D.C. was strongly biased in Trotsky's favor.

During the hearings phase of the Commission Trotsky had asserted that he could prove his innocence with the aid of his Archive.

BEALS: ... For the purpose of this line of questioning, I am considering you guilty, and therefore I would like to ask you what assurance the Commission would have in examining your archives that you have not destroyed that which was unfavorable to yourself.

TROTSKY: That is an absolutely natural question. But my aim is not to convince the Commission by the documents which I have allegedly destroyed, but by the documents which remain in my archives. I will prove to the Commission that the man who wrote from year to year those thousands of letters, those hundreds of articles, and those dozens of books and had those friends and those enemies, that this man could not commit the crimes of the indictment. It is the most genuine evidence I have.

BEALS: Answering the question I have —

TROTSKY: If you will permit me a supplement. It is impossible to introduce allegedly destroyed documents. They could not find place in these archives. (CLT 52)

This is a bluff - in plain language, a lie. Moreover, it is doubletalk - it doesn't make any sense. But Trotsky persisted in this bluff:

TROTSKY: The Commission has at its disposal all my archives,... (CLT 486; 13th session, point 7)

Furthermore, it is absolutely indisputable that I would not preserve in my archives records of my crimes had I committed any. (CLT 467)

Trotsky admitted that he would have removed incriminating documents from his archives. So what good would the archives have been to the D.C.? He continued:

But my archives are important for the investigation, not for what they lack, but for what they contain. (CLT 467- 13th session, end of III)

This is doubletalk too. Everything Trotsky said about his archives was deliberate evasion. Trotsky admitted that he would have removed any incriminating documents from his archive.

Beard's letter to Dewey of March 22, 1937, is the only document that states the matter correctly. The fact that the D.C. did not publish it, or summarize it, or even reveal its existence, is not only further evidence of its incompetence and lack of objectivity - it is evidence of the Commission's dishonesty.

Bloc with Zinovievists

Zinoviev set the beginning of negotiations for the formation of the bloc, "on Trotsky's instruction," in the autumn of 1931 (ZK 72), and its actual formation in the summer of 1932 (ZK 44). Kamenev stated that at a meeting of the Zinovievite center in "our villa," in the

summer of 1932, Zinoviev reported that the union with the Trotskyites "was an accomplished fact" (ZK 66). (NG 54)

We know now that this was true. Sedov's letter to Trotsky of 1932 indicates that previous discussions had already taken place. But on pages 55 through 58 the D.C. tries to argue that contradictions among the various defendants about when the bloc was formed means that no bloc existed!

In the summer of 1932, at a meeting in Kamenev's villa, Zinoviev announced that the bloc was an accomplished fact (ZK 66). Yet in the second half of 1932, Smirnov posed to the leading trio of the Trotskyite organization the question of a bloc with the Zinovievites and Leftists, and sent a letter to Sedov through Holtzman, asking Trotsky's opinion on this question (ZK 21, 41-2). In the autumn of 1932, a letter was received from Trotsky approving the decision to unite, and at the same time Trotsky sent word through his emissary Gaven that the union must be on the basis of terrorism. After having received these instructions Smirnov instructed Ter-Vaganyan to bring about the formation of a bloc. (ZK 42.) The bloc was formed for the second time at the end of 1932 (ZK 11, 42). (NG 55)

We know that Sedov approved terrorism, so Trotsky did as well. Therefore there's nothing improbable in any of this.

Yet in his [Gol'tsman's] testimony there is nothing about Trotsky's attitude toward the proposed Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc, which, assuming that it was about to be formed at that time, must, one would think, have been uppermost in his own mind and that of Trotsky. (NG 56)

This too is faulty logic. Gol'tsman was a messenger between I.N. Smirnov and Trotsky. He was not a significant opposition figure in his own right. There was no testimony that he was part of the bloc himself. And we know that Trotsky did approve of the bloc.

This illustrates another common fallacy of the D.C.: the expectation that accounts from different individuals will not contradict each other in minor ways. In reality, the opposite is the case: *If all accounts by trial defendants were in agreement down to small details, that in itself would be grounds for suspecting that they were "scripted."*

Gaven

The D.C. stated:

Trotsky denied that he had communicated with Smirnov through Gaven, whom he had not seen since 1926 (PC 225-6). (NG 60)

Here, once again, is exactly what Trotsky testified:

GOLDMAN: Did you ever hear of a man by the name of Gaven?

TROTSKY: Yes.

GOLDMAN: Who is he?

TROTSKY: He is a Latvian Bolshevik. He, if I remember, gave all his sympathies at a certain time to the Opposition. As Holtzman, for example. In 1926 or 1927, he was connected for a time with Smilga, a member of the Central Committee. But he disappeared from my eyes absolutely after 1926.

GOLDMAN: In the testimony of Mrachkovsky, and also Smirnov, there is a reference that you sent communications through Gaven to Smirnov about the necessity of killing Stalin.

TROTSKY: I don't know anything about it. No, it is an absolute falsehood. He is not among the defendants.

GOLDMAN: No, he is not. He is a witness.

TROTSKY: Not even a witness.

GOLDMAN: That's right.

TROTSKY: He disappeared.

Thanks to Broué's research we know that Trotsky was lying here. Trotsky did meet with Gaven and send a message to Smirnov through Gaven. In 1980 Broué did not know about Sedov's meeting with Gaven. But by 1985 Broué had identified Gaven.¹¹

In view of the nature of Smirnov's testimony concerning this alleged communication, in view of the Prosecutor's failure to call the witness Yuri Gaven, and in view of his further failure to make any attempt to secure Trotsky's testimony, we consider that this testimony of the accused Smirnov as against Leon Trotsky is worthless. (NG 69)

This is all wrong, one more failure of reasoning. The D.C. had no grounds to draw this conclusion. It is invalid to dismiss evidence as "worthless" just because it is uncorroborated. The Commission should have just noted that Smirnov's testimony was uncorroborated and left the matter there.

Today we possess a lot of corroboration of Smirnov's testimony. We will discuss this question further in volume two.

Moreover, we know now that the D.C. was wrong: We now know that Smirnov was telling the truth when he stated that Gaven had brought him a message from Trotsky, and when he testified about

¹¹ Broué, "Compléments à un article...", CahLT 1985, p. 69; Broué, POS (1990) p. 99.

the bloc. Therefore the D.C.'s conclusion, "we consider that this testimony of the accused Smirnov as against Leon Trotsky is worthless," is not only illogical; it is also factually incorrect.

The D.C. was dishonest in claiming that the Soviet Prosecutor should have made attempts "to secure Trotsky's testimony" without explaining how he could have done that. Ask Trotsky to travel to the Soviet Union and appear at the trial? As for the Commission's "invitation" to the USSR to send a representative to their hearings: why would the Soviets have attended hearings that had no legal status and that, as Charles Beard pointed out, could never resolve the issue of Trotsky's guilt or innocence anyway?

The "Hotel Bristol" affair

The fullest and best discussion of the major issues in the "Hotel Bristol" question is Sven-Eric Holmström's article in *Cultural Logic* 2009. We will just add a few more considerations here.

Evidence that Gol'tsman did not meet with Sedov is not evidence that he did not meet with Trotsky. We know that Gol'tsman did meet with Sedov numerous times, as Gol'tsman testified at the 1936 Trial.

We know that Trotsky and Sedov needed to hide this fact for some reason. We don't know what that reason was. The most likely hypothesis is that during these additional meetings Sedov and Gol'tsman discussed Trotsky's new directive that "terror" must be used against the Stalin leadership. Trotsky, through Sedov, may have also given Gol'tsman other documents during their meetings, in addition to the document Gol'tsman gave to Sedov at their first meeting.

At any rate, it is clear that Trotsky and Sedov did not wish to be questioned about what happened during all these meetings. Sure enough, the D.C. did not ask Sedov any questions about what happened during those subsequent meetings, or about any other documents. The D.C. failed to follow up on this, just as they failed to follow up on the question of the relative positions of the hotel and the Bristol Konditori.

On page 91 Vikelsø Jensen claims the *Arbejderbladet* diagram of January 29, 1937, was wrong (in Part One Chapter Five above we have reproduced this diagram). But on page 92 the D.C. report admits that Jensen's two accounts are contradictory. In any case Holmström's photographs prove that Gol'tsman and *Arbejderbladet*, not Trotsky's witnesses, were correct.

Why didn't the D.C. take the trouble to obtain a contemporary photograph of the hotel and Bristol Konditori of 1932? Why didn't they just do what Holmström did more than 70 years later: check the street directory for Copenhagen, *Kraks Vejviser*, for the years in question and report what they found? Why didn't they just ask the proprietors of the two establishments, both of them still in business in 1937, what their relative situations had been in 1932?

The D.C. chose to devote a great deal of space and time to the "Hotel Bristol" question. It should obviously not have been relegated to contradictory testimony. It could easily have been verified. Any competent investigatory body would have done this. But the D.C. never made any effort to do so.

Sokol'nikov

§ 113. The accused Sokolnikov, fourth member of this alleged parallel or reserve center, not only claimed no direct contact with either Trotsky or Sedov, but expressly differentiated between himself and the members "of Trotskyite origin." (NG 143)

In his testimony at the January 1937 Moscow Trial Sokol'nikov denied any contact with Trotsky. On page 144 the D.C. points out that Sokol'nikov said in his final plea that he was not in direct communication with Trotsky.

But we know that Trotsky sent him a letter from Istanbul through Jan Frankel, his secretary, on January 12, 1932, because Getty discovered the certified mail receipt in the Harvard Trotsky Archive.

Unless he just forgot it - not impossible, perhaps, but unlikely - Sokol'nikov was deliberately lying to the Prosecution.

Assuming the latter, this seems to have been a smart move on Sokol'nikov's part. The Prosecution did not challenge Sokol'nikov on this point. Clearly it had no independent knowledge of this letter. This is a good example of how defendants sometimes tell falsehoods they themselves choose to tell for reasons of their own, *not* forced upon them by the Prosecution.

Both Sokol'nikov and Trotsky denied contact with each other. Yet we know, through independent documentation, that they were indeed in contact. That is, we know for certain that Trotsky was lying (the certified mail receipt) and can be reasonably certain Sokol'nikov was lying too.

Radek

We have already noted (§ 12 1) that Radek claimed to have received six letters from Trotsky. Radek twice stated (PR¹² 41, 543) that he burned these letters. (NG 192)

He testified that he first learned that preparations were being made for a united Trotskyite-Zinovievite center in a letter from Trotsky, which he received in February-March 1932. (NG 193-4)

Thus Trotsky, in February-March 1932, is alleged to have sent to a "capitulator" who had returned to the Party, with whom his own personal relations had been greatly strained, and with whom he is not alleged to have had any previous communication since the "split" in his faction which caused the strain, a letter which made it clear to that "capitulator" that Trotsky

¹² This is the abbreviation used in *Not Guilty* for the transcript of the January 1937 Moscow Trial, the "Pyatakov-Radek" trial.

had in mind terrorism against the leadership of the Soviet Union, and in which he definitely stated that a bloc was being formed between the Trotskyites and the Zinovievites. We have already remarked on the recklessness of Trotsky's conduct as represented in the records of these trials. This testimony of Radek offers a striking example. (NG 195-6)

In our opinion, therefore, neither Radek's testimony as to his motivation in joining the alleged conspiracy, nor his testimony that it was an unsolicited letter from Trotsky which informed him of it and urged him to join, is convincing. **It becomes incredible** when one considers Trotsky's own testimony and the materials he has submitted in its support. (NG 200-201)

This is another example of the logical fallacy of the "argument from incredulity."¹³ The D.C. actually claimed that the fact that they found a statement "incredible" meant that it could not be true or was unlikely to be true. The Commission members - Dewey included - did not realize that the statement "it is incredible" - in other words, "We don't believe it" - is a statement not about the matter at hand but about the person making the statement.

Moreover, we know for a fact that Radek was telling the truth in this case. Thanks to the certified mail receipt found by Getty in the Trotsky Archive in 1980 we can independently verify that Radek did receive a letter from Trotsky at exactly the time and place Radek named in his testimony at the January 1937 Moscow Trial. This makes the Commission's fallacy more obvious. But it would still be a fallacy even if we did not have the certified mail receipt.

Getty discovered that the Trotsky Archive had been purged, undoubtedly of incriminating materials. It is probable, therefore, that

¹³ For a definition see http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Argument_from_incredulity

the Archive originally contained other evidence of acts that the D.C. found "incredible."

We therefore hold that none of the letters allegedly exchanged between Trotsky and Radek, whether through Vladimir Romm or by unspecified means, ever existed, and that all testimony to the contents of these alleged letters is sheer fabrication. (NG 229)

This is yet another example of faulty reasoning. The D.C. had no grounds for concluding this. It is both illogical, and a further example of the D.C.'s bias in favor of Trotsky.

Furthermore, as we know now, the D.C. was factually wrong. Radek was telling the truth at least about the February-March 1932 letter. Based upon our verification of the Moscow Trials testimony, it is probable that other details about which Radek testified concerning the Trotskyist conspiracy were also true. There is no evidence to suggest otherwise.

Charge of Terrorism, pages 246 ff.

The D.C.'s error here is, once again, they chose to "believe" Trotsky's professions that he would never have recourse to "terror" (assassination, sabotage, etc.). They quote some of Trotsky's statements opposing "individual terror" (assassination) on page 250-251. During his testimony to the Commission Trotsky summarized a great many such passages from his various writings.

Once again, the D.C. committed the fallacy of incredulity:

§ 179. One may assume that if Trotsky anywhere at any time had come out for individual terror, the Prosecutor would have quoted him honestly. This he could not do because the fact is that all of Trotsky's writings on the problem reject individual terror and justify only revolutionary mass action. We therefore find that apart from the evidence in our possession which disproves the testimony connecting Leon Trotsky with the alleged terrorist conspiracy, the

charge of individual terrorism is not only not proved but **incredible**. (NG 255-6)

In addition to fallacious reasoning - here we see the "argument from incredulity" again - the D.C. was terribly naïve. Why would Trotsky ever have "come out for individual terror" at any time? Did the D.C. think that conspirators are in the habit of announcing, publicly in advance, their intention to conspire?

Moreover, assuming Trotsky did advocate terror - and we know, *thanks to Zborowski's reports, that he did* - he would, of course, have had to publicly deny it, just as he denied his bloc with the Zinovievists and the Rights. Trotsky's followers inside and outside the USSR believed him to be the model of a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary. Marx and, especially, Lenin always denounced terror. Therefore Trotsky's reputation depended upon his publicly denouncing it too.

We have already found, on the basis of the evidence, that the testimony of Radek and Pyatakov is worthless. (NG 315)

The D.C. had no grounds for this conclusion - which, as it turns out, was factually wrong. Today we know that much, at least, of what Radek and Piatakov testified was truthful. It is quite possible that *all* of their testimony concerning their Trotskyist conspiracy was truthful.

Natan Lur'e, p. 132

§ 103. In view of all these considerations, and the evidence in our possession concerning these defendants, we find no basis whatever for the attempt in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial to link Moissei Lurye and Nathan Lurye with Leon Trotsky or the **Trotskyist movement, or with an alleged "terrorist line."** (NG 132)

Once again the D.C. had no basis whatever to draw this conclusion. Moreover, we now have evidence that Lur'e was telling the truth.

In 1992 the post-conviction appeals of their sentences of death of ten of the Moscow Trial defendants were published.¹⁴ Natan Lur'e insisted on his guilt in his Appeal. In it he repeats that he was assigned by the leader of the Trotskyist organization.

I have committed a serious crime against the Soviet people. I wanted, in accordance with the assignment of the leader of Trotsky's terrorist center, to deprive the Soviet people and the entire world proletariat of our leader Stalin and of other leaders of the great Communist Party. I repeatedly prepared for terrorist acts against Voroshilov, Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Kaganovich, and Zhdanov, having been armed in order to carry out this plan.

I really did prepare to assassinate Voroshilov in accordance with the assignment of Franz Weitz, a representative of the Gestapo. I wanted to carry out these revolting murders because I had been poisoned by the poison of Trotskyism during my long residence in Germany....

Natan Lazarevich Lur'e, 24 August 1936.

Absent any evidence that Nathan Lur'e was lying even in this, his last appeal, it is futile to assert that he was. All the evidence we have is that Lur'e was truthful in incriminating himself. As always, we must be prepared to change our conclusions if new evidence, or compelling reinterpretation of existing evidence, should come to light. Unless and until that happens, the only conclusion consistent with the evidence available today is that Lur'e was telling the truth.

¹⁴ They are Kamenev; I.N. Smirnov, Zinoviev, Natan L. Lur'e, Piatakov, Muralov, Bukharin (2), Rykov (2), Krestinsky, Iagoda. *Izvestia* September 2, 1992, p. 3.

It is incorrect to say, as the D.C. repeatedly did: "This is incredible" - that is, "we don't believe it" - "and therefore it must be false." This is the "argument from incredulity" again. It is also incorrect to say, as the D.C. did, "We assume this testimony is false since it is not accompanied by any corroborating or documentary evidence." It could be true despite the absence of such evidence. And what kind of "corroborating evidence" could be expected in the case of a competent conspiracy?

Conclusion

Charles Beard was right. The D.C. was ill-conceived from the outset. It was impossible to prove Trotsky's innocence based on the testimony and documentation he presented, or could present. The fact that Trotsky claimed he could do so should have served as a warning to all concerned.

There was no way Trotsky could be proven guilty in the D.C. hearings. No way unless he told the truth - and he was not going to do that. But neither could Trotsky prove his innocence.

Had there been a trial, we do not know what the verdict might have been. Trotsky might have been found "not guilty" in the judicial sense, meaning "insufficient evidence to prove guilt." Or Trotsky might have been found guilty on the basis of the large number of his self-confessed co-conspirators who testified against him. The confession of the accused is not necessary for conviction - something that Bukharin pointed out during his own trial in March 1938.

But the D.C. was not a trial. There was no prosecution. The evidence that the Soviet prosecutors had - pretrial interrogations, documentation - was not available to the D.C.

Trotsky was free to lie to the Commission. We can show now that he did so many times. Given the fact that Trotsky's archive has been "purged" Trotsky may have lied many more times than we can now prove. There was no way the Commission could have

known whether he was telling the truth or not simply from his published works and the statements he chose to make. But the Commission made no serious attempt to verify what Trotsky told them.

The D.C. was shockingly incompetent. It committed error after error in reasoning. It repeatedly committed elementary logical fallacies. Above all the D.C. members were arrogant. None of its members possessed experience in evaluating historical evidence. None of them had any experience as investigators.

Yet the members of the Commission still believed that they could determine whether the Moscow Trials were honest or were frame-ups. In the end the D.C. deliberately confused the juridical finding of "not guilty," meaning "insufficient evidence to convict," with the concept of "innocence."

The D.C. was a travesty in every respect. However, in the long run it was a triumph for Trotsky. It was a public relations victory for him. It remains a basic document in the arsenal of Trotskyists and of Cold-War anticommunists to the present day.

Like the Moscow Trials transcripts the D.C.'s two volumes — 1012 pages of text — go largely unread and *a fortiori* unstudied. When I undertook to examine these volumes carefully I was genuinely shocked to find that there were so many logical fallacies and outright failures to check up on those fact-claims that could have been verified. Clearly, none of those persons who think the D.C. actually proved anything, or was ever more than a public relations stunt, has ever studied the Commission's two volumes with anything approaching a spirit of objectivity.

Today, thanks to revelations from the Trotsky and former Soviet archives, we know that Trotsky lied over and over again to the D.C. The Commission's members could not have known that. But they should have known that no defendant's word can be taken at face value. They should have known what Charles Beard knew — that their job was hopeless. The D.C. could only end as it did — as a public relations triumph for Trotsky and a swindle on the public.

By far the most famous, honored, and prominent of the Commission members, John Dewey was already a long-time anticommunist. Other Commission members had anti-Soviet and, some of them, pro-Trotsky backgrounds as well. They never acknowledged this history in the course of the Commission's sessions, thereby giving the public – whoever read the Commission's two volumes or read about it in newspaper or other accounts – the impression that they were unbiased, neutral, or objective.

The Dewey Commission's Verdict Set Aside

The report of the D.C. drew invalid conclusions from the evidence and testimony due to faulty logic and reasoning. It never had remotely enough evidence to justify its verdict that Trotsky and Sedov were "not guilty" and the Moscow Trials "frame-ups." But it was not due to faulty logic and reasoning alone that the D.C. reached its invalid conclusions.

Trotsky lied in his testimony to the Commission. He lied repeatedly, about very important matters that were central to the charges against him. In this essay we have outlined how Trotsky's provable lies made his testimony a travesty.

If Trotsky had told the truth, would the D.C. have found Trotsky "not guilty"? Certainly not. Had the Commission known then what we know today they would never have undertaken the inquiry in the first place.

It is impossible to imagine Trotsky admitting:

- * that he had formed a clandestine bloc with the Zinovievists, the Rights, and others;
- * that he had written Radek at exactly the time and place Radek testified at the January 1937 Moscow Trial;
- * that he had also written Sokol'nikov and Preobrazhensky;

- * that he had indeed communicated to Smirnov through Gol'tsman and Gaven;
- * that he had lied in all his writings about the Kirov murder;
- * that his archives did in fact contain evidence to incriminate him;
- * that his son, Leon Sedov, was advocating Stalin's murder.

- and yet think that the D.C. members would still have agreed to hold its hearings, much less that they would have found Trotsky "Not Guilty!"

Trotsky's archive has been "purged" of incriminating materials. We don't know of what, though at least of the letters to Radek and to other supporters, the exchange with Sedov about the slogan "remove Stalin," the letter to Gaven referred to during the 1936 Trial.

Had Trotsky told the truth, his credibility would have been destroyed. Many or most of his followers would have deserted him. It would have been a public relations triumph not for Trotsky but for the Stalin leadership and the Soviet Union.

We may never know about all of Trotsky's lies. However, given what we know today, we can state with confidence that the D.C. reached a foregone conclusion that they could just as easily have reached without going through this travesty of a hearing.

If the members of the Dewey Commission were alive today, there can be no doubt that, in light of all that we now know, they would have no recourse but to reverse their original decision. They are, of course, not alive.

Therefore it remains for us to draw the only possible conclusion about the D.C. and to "do the right thing.." We recognize that the Dewey Commission's verdict was unjust and invalid, and we declare it overturned.

Conclusion

Our research has produced two significant and complementary results:

* The defendants in the Moscow Trials were not innocent persons compelled to falsely testify by the investigation (NKVD) or prosecution. They said what they intended to say.

We have determined this by verifying, with independent primary source evidence, a number of the statements made in testimony by Moscow Trials defendants. In the few cases where we can prove a defendant lied, he did so to further the conspiracy of which he was a part and/or in an attempt to protect himself, not to incriminate himself or to placate the prosecution.

* Leon Trotsky lied a great deal during the 1930s. It is fair - accurate -- to say that, concerning the Soviet Union and the Stalin leadership, Trotsky did little except lie. Many of those lies are directly related to the accusations made against him by the defendants and the prosecution at the three Moscow Trials.

Other of Trotsky's lies concern the aftermath of the murder of Sergei Kirov in December 1934, an event which eventually led investigators to uncover the bloc of Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Rightists, and other Oppositionists, which Trotsky had approved and in which his secret Soviet-based supporters participated along with other oppositionists, including those who had killed Kirov.

We have determined that Trotsky lied so frequently and about so many things that nothing he wrote about the Soviet Union after the end of 1934 - the date of his first essays on the Kirov murder - represents what he himself really thought.

Trotsky lied in two basic ways. First, he denied any role in the conspiracies of which he was accused: with his own followers and other oppositionists within the Soviet Union; with foreign governments; with the German military; with the Red Army leaders. He denied the existence of the bloc of Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Rights, and other oppositionists. He denied having contact with a number of persons with whom we now know he did have contact.

Second, Trotsky chose the strategy of claiming that he would "expose the scheme in advance." It is asking too much of coincidence to think that Trotsky really did "predict" that the bloc members, including his own supporters and himself, would be accused of these things. The only explanation for these so-called predictions that is consistent with the evidence we now possess is that Trotsky knew that these accusations would eventually be forthcoming. Sooner or later, some of the bloc members would confess to them. So he anticipated them in order to make them seem so false they were "predictable."

Trotsky's declared strategy of "exposing the scheme in advance" is a "tell." His supposed "predictions" actually "telegraph" to us confirmation of some of the actions that Trotsky really had engaged in. Just as we know that the confessions of the Moscow Trials defendants are genuine, so we also know that Trotsky's denials are not reliable, because we can disprove many of his denials, and because Trotsky lied whenever he considered it expedient to do so.

During the investigation of the Kirov murder Trotsky claimed that he could "predict" that his name would be raised, when he knew that it would be because of his and his supporters' participation in the bloc with the Zinovievists.

Trotsky claimed that Zinoviev and Kamenev were charged with plotting "armed intervention" and the "restoration of capitalism." In reality, they were not charged with either. But Trotsky had advocated both. He could reasonably assume that he himself and his followers would be charged with these crimes sooner or later, as eventually happened.

In a conspiracy such as Trotsky's we can expect to find little or no *material* evidence. Conspirators do their best to leave no physical trace of their conspiracy. We have long had a great deal of *testimonial* evidence in the confessions of the Moscow Trials defendants. Having verified many details of the Moscow Trials confessions from independent sources, we can now accept the Moscow Trials testimony concerning Trotsky's conspiracies with a high degree of confidence. As additional confirmation we now have Trotsky's "predictions." They dovetail nicely with the later accusations against him.

It appears that in lying Trotsky acted from several motives:

- * to cover up the activities of his followers in the Soviet Union;
- * to preserve his image before his followers and on the world stage as a principled revolutionary and the true follower, by rights the heritor, of Lenin;
- * to maintain a posture of non-involvement in politics, necessary to preserve his ability to find countries which would let him live there as an exile;
- * above all, to maintain and continue his conspiracies against the Soviet leadership, in hopes of returning to power within the USSR.

The reality was very different from Trotsky's false accounts. His former followers testified at the Moscow Trials that Trotsky was

- * advocating the murder of Stalin and other Soviet leaders and the sabotage of Soviet industry and transportation;
- * conspiring with Germany and Japan either to support a coup d'état against the Stalin regime or to stimulate mutiny within the Soviet military in support of German and Japanese attacks, thereby facilitating the overthrow of the Stalin re-

gime and the assumption of power by the bloc and by Trotsky himself.

In the present volume we have cited good evidence of these activities by Trotsky, including evidence that corroborates the Moscow Trials testimony. We will examine yet more such evidence in volume two.

Denial

Soviet history is so politicized, and opinions about Soviet history so impassioned, that many readers will reject the results of this study not out of rational evaluation and criticism of the evidence, but out of simple denial thinly disguised by faulty reasoning.

For anticommunists and Trotskyists it is unthinkable that the Moscow Trials testimony should have turned out to be, on the whole, reliable. This fact invalidates what we have called the "anti-Stalin paradigm" of Soviet and world history. In the service of anticommunism, and of the cult around the figure of Trotsky, anticommunists and Trotskyists will continue to deny the truth as demonstrated by primary source evidence and sound analysis.

Nevertheless, we look forward to criticism from all quarters. Dishonest or incompetent criticism will expose the dishonesty and incompetence of those who employ it. Good, incisive, logical, and above all, *evidence-based* criticism will help to advance the cause of discovering the truth about Soviet history. Hopefully, such honest and competent criticism will also provide correctives that we can use to improve subsequent editions of this work.

Volume Two, the companion to the present work, will center on Trotsky's involvement in "terror" – the advocacy of violence and assassination. It will contain analysis of recently-released documents from the former Soviet archives that bear on Trotsky's conspiracies, including important confirmation of Trotsky's conspiracy with Japan; further details of Trotsky's promotion of "terror" and sabotage; details concerning Piatakov's secret flight to Norway in December 1935; and much else.

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Trotsky's "Amalgams"

Volume Two is scheduled to be published in late 2016.

Appendix: Documents

(Note: I had originally intended to put many of the important archival documents cited in this book into this Appendix. But doing so would make this book, already longer than I had planned, much longer still.

I plan to include more documents in Volume Two, to be published within a year.)

Document 1. Sedov to Trotsky 1932 Trotsky Arch.

4782

[Блок] организован. В него вошли зиновьевцы,

группа Стэн-Ломинадзе и троцкисты

(бывшие «_____»). Группа Сафар.

Тархан. формально еще не вошла – они стоят на слишком крайней позиции; войдут в ближайшее время. – Заявление З. и К. об их величайшей ошибке в 27 г. было сделано при переговорах с нашими о блоке, непосредственно перед высылкой З и К. –

Провал группы И.Н., Преобр. и Уф. (эти трое входили в центр) был сделан каким то полусумасшедшим, больным человеком. Его арестовали случайно, -- он начал выдавать. Вряд ли у ИН и др. нашли материалы («троцк. литература») за несколько дней до ареста ИН говорил нашему информатору: Х начал выдавать, я жду ареста со дня на день. Он был подготовлен благодаря наличию своего Морковкина, доставлявшего всю информац. К сожалению его ИН. не успел передать. –

Информатор сообщает, что никаких провалов

едущих из-заграниц., вообще связанных с заграницей не было.
Если есть очень важные вопросы – то телеграфно до четверга (то же указания).

Провал «бывших» большой удар, но заводские связи сохранялись.

Письмо № 2 получено по почте (хим).
2. Больш. информац. – лично. И та и друг.
от Веттера (помнишь). Молодец!

За последнее время в Р. уехало трое. Скоро жду 2х. Пересланы «маленькие.» Организац. этих поездок, их использован., передача и пр. требовало в каждом случае многих часов обсуждения и работы, иногда почта «ювелирной» (расскажу при случае). Часто надо не только «инструктировать», но и прежде всего убедить. Никто (за 1 исклю-

1 исключением) не шел сам, надо было найти припритянуть. Я имею сейчас постоянн. «агента» в Берлине, который иногда ездит. Отношусь к нему с абсолют. доверием.

Из всех поездок туда ни одна не совершилась «сама собою.» Я об этом всем пишу с единственной целью уточнить вопрос о моей судьбе под этим углом зрения.

Мой отъезд из Евр. будет фактически значать ликвидац. связей; максимум, что можно сохранить это часть односторонней переписки от туда. Это же мнение моск.

друзей, находящихся в уныние «. Они «считают», что мне необходимо оставаться в Е.

Создающееся положение ставит перед мною вопрос не попытаться ли мне нелегально остаться в Евр. (Brl или Париже наезшая в Brl), если не дадут визы? Мнение. Паспорт у меня есть.

Во всяком случае отсутствие как бы то ни было серьезных связей во Фр. и Вене, видимо поставит проблему так: Турц. или нелегалн.

Нелегалн. вопросы немецк. организации. 1) и важнейшее: создание

нелегальной типогр. в Берлине (в Лейнц. и Гамб. есть). купить пока не трудно: 400-600 (maxim) марок, - но нет денег.

Трудности

в установке, в помещании. Найти его наша главная забота.

Пото[му]

нужны деньги. (также стоит вопрос с конфер. немецк. - по[ка] нет денег; но Париж обещал). 2) Нелегалн. бюро (центр) [в Берлине удастся устроить хорошо. Мы имеем абсолютно чистого т-ща Kaufmann'a из R., который откроет комерч. бюро с представительством разных иностранн. фирм. Он собирает

сейчас эти представительства. Бюро, следов., не будет даже фиктивным. Один из членов центра будет работать в бюро, как служащ. Здесь будет явка, и пр. (для самого узко круга разумеется)

3) В смысле заграничной базы мы ориентируемся на R (Рейхенберг). 3 ½ - 4 часа езды от Brl, группа в 7-8 очень преданных людей, состоятельных. Легкая граница (автомобили у сочувствующих). Там можно скрыться, издавать газету для доставки в Герм. и пр.

Проявляйте химию утюгом - это скорее
Прошу подтвердить получение химии - письма.

English Translation:

[The bloc] has been organized. In it have entered the Zinovievists, the Sten-Lominadze group and the Trotskyists (former "capitulators"). The group of Safar. Tarkhan. has not formally entered yet - they stand on too extreme a position; they will enter in a very short time. - The declaration of Z. and K. concerning their enormous mistake in '27 was made during negotiations with our people concerning the bloc, immediately before the exile of Z and K. -

The downfall of the group of I.N., Preobr. and Uf. (these three were the center) was done by some half-insane, sick person. They arrested him by chance, - he began to name names. It is unlikely that they found materials ("Trotsk. literature") on IN and others. Several days before his arrest IN said to our informer: X has begun to name names, I await arrest any day. He was prepared thanks to the presence of his Morkovkin, who brought all the informat. Unfortunately IN did not have time to transfer it. -

Informer says that no downfalls of those who are going abroad, of those connected generally with abroad, have taken place. If there are very important questions - then by telegraph before Thursday (the same instructions).

The downfall of the "former" is a great blow, but factory contacts are being preserved.

Letter No. 2 received by mail (chem).
2. Big informat. - personally. Both from Vetter (remember). Great guy!

Recently three have departed for R. I await 2 soon. The "small ones" have been transferred. The organiz. of these trips, their use, transfer etc. demanded in each case many hours of discussion and work, sometimes the post of "the jewelry" (I'll tell you when I have a chance). Often I had not only to "instruct," but also above all to convince. No one (with one excep-)

1 exception) did not go alone, it was necessary to find and re-recruit. I now have a permanent "agent" in Berlin, who sometimes travels. I trust him absolutely.

Of all the trips there not one was completed "by itself." I write about all this for the sole purpose of defining the question of my own future from this point of view.

My departure from Eur. will in reality mean the liquidation of my contacts; the maximum that could be preserved is a part of the one-sided correspondence from there. That is the opinion of the Mosc. friends who are dejected. They "consider," that it is essential for me to stay in E.

The situation that is being created places before me the question of whether I need to try to remain illegally in Eur. (Brl or Paris with easy travel to Brl), if they do not grant me visas. Opinion. I do have a passport.

In any case the absence of any kind of serious connections in Fr. and Vienna, obviously poses the problem thus: Turk. or illegal.

The illeg. questions of the Germ. Organization. 1) the most important: creation of an illegal typogr. in Berlin (in Leipz. and Hamb. there are). To buy one is for the time being not hard: 400-600 (maxim) marks, - but there's no money. Difficulties in arrangement, in living quarters. To find it is our main concern. Theref. we need money. (same situation with question of Germ. Confer. - for now there's no money, but Paris has promised). 2) Illeg. buro (center) [in] Berlin has been successfully set up. We have an absolutely pure c-rad Kaufmann from R., who will open a commerc. buro with representation of various foreign firms. He is now preparing these representations. The buro, consequen., will not even be a fictional one. One of the members of the center will work in the buro as an employee. Here there'll be a hideout, etc. (for a very narrow circle, of course)

3) In the sense of a base abroad we are focusing our attention on R. (Reichenberg). 3 ½ -4 hours of travel from Brl, a group of 7-8 very devoted, well-off people. An easy border (sympathizers have autos). There people can be concealed, publish a newspaper for delivery to Germ. etc.

Bring out the chemical with an iron - it's faster
Please confirm receipt of the chemical - letter.

Document 2. Zborowski - Sedov on Killing Stalin, on Sedov's dissolution - Russian

Costello & Tsarev, *Deadly Illusions* p. 283 - Jan 22, 1937, & Feb 11, 1937, dispatches translated. Jan 23, 1937, remark translated in n. 44, p. 469.

Exactly the same texts, with Russian original, in Tsarev & Kostello, *Rokovye Illiuzii*, p. 169/322-3, and n. 44 p. 273/531

8 февраля 1937

22 января Л. Седов во время нашей беседы, у него на квартире, по вопросу о 2-м московском процессе и роли в нем отдельных подсудимых (Радека, Пятакова и др.) заявил: Теперь колебаться нечего. Сталина нужно убить"

Для меня это заявление было настолько неожиданным, что я не успел на него никак реагировать. Л. Седов тут же перевел разговор на другие вопросы.

23 января Л. Седов, в присутствии моем а также Л. Эстриной, бросил фразу такого же содержания как и 22-го. В ответ на это его заявление, Л. Эстрина сказала «Держи язык за зубами». Больше к этому вопросу не возвращались.

M Zborowski

С 1936 г. «сынок» не вел со мной разговоров о терроре. Лишь недели две-три тому назад, после собрания группы «сынок» снова заговорил на эту тему. В первый раз он только старался «теоретически» доказать, что терроризм не противоречит марксизму. «Марксизм - по словам сына - отрицает терроризм постолько, поскольку условия классовой борьбы не благоприятствует терроризму, но бывают такие положения, в которых терроризм необходим.» В следующий раз «сынок» заговорил о терроризме, когда я пришел к нему на квартиру

работать. Во время читки газет «Сынок» сказал, что так как весь режим в СССР держится на Сталине, то достаточно убить Сталина, чтобы все развалилась. Эту мысль он высказывал и раньше, но до последнего раза он никогда ее так четко не формулировал. В этот последний раз он неоднократно возвращался к этому, и особенно тщательно подчеркивал необходимость убийства тов. Сталина.

В связи с этим разговором «сынок» спросил меня боюсь ли я смерти вообще и способен ли я был совершить террористический акт. На мой ответ что все это зависит от необходимости и целесообразности, сынок сказал, что я не совсем верно понимаю, что такое «настоящий» террорист и начал мне объяснять какими должны быть люди подходящие для исполнения терактов.

Переходя к тактике террора он остановился на кадрах, считая, что это основное. Террорист – по словам сынка – должен всегда быть готовым к смерти, смерть должна быть для террориста ежедневной реальностью, причем эту тезу он иллюстрировал примером психологии народовольцев. Причем при этом он бросил реплику, что я – по его мнению – человек слишком мягкий для такого рода дел.

Разговор на этом внезапно был прекращен появлением соседки, и после он не возобновился.

М Зборовский

11.II. 1938

ВЫПИСКА ИЗ ПИСЬМА ГАММЫ

От 23-го июля 1937 года.

Мак и Сынок. По случаю рождения своего сына, Мак пригласил Сынка к себе на обед. Сынок просидел весь день за бутылкой у Мака, и крепко выпил. В этот вечер Соседка ждала Сынка для работы у него на дом. После Мака, с 6-ти и до 11 часов вечера, Сынок таскал Мака по разным кабакам Монпарнасса, и когда Мак с ним попрощался, Сынок вместо того, чтобы поехать домой, крепко

выпивший пошел в публичный дом, прежде чем вернуться домой, где его ждала Соседка.

Сынок, выпив не терял сознания, но сильно расчувствовался. Он извинялся перед Маком и почти со слезами просил у него прощения за то, что в начале их знакомства он подозревал его в том, что он агент ГПУ. Эти свои подозрения он объяснял тем, что в прошлом, в свой берлинский период, к нему ГПУ неоднократно подсылало своих агентов и пр.

Под конец в процессе своих «откровений», Сынов говорил, что борьба оппозиции еще с самого начала в Союзе была безнадежна, и что в успех этой борьбы никто не верил. Что он еще в 1927 г. потерял всякую веру в революцию, и теперь он ни во что не верит вообще, что он вообще пессимист. Работа и борьба, которые ведутся теперь, являются простым механическим продолжением прошлого. В жизни для него основное – это женщины и вино. Он также любит игру на деньги.

Рассказывал, как находясь в Монтекарло Жанна не давала ему больше 50 франков в день, которые он сразу же проигрывал в рулетку. У него мечта поехать с деньгами в Монте-Карло

Накануне этого вечера Сынок жаловался Маку, что трудно с деньгами. Когда они пошли вечером в кабак, Сынок, уже сильно выпивший, расплачиваясь, вытащил бумажник, и Мак увидел, что в нем лежит солидная пачка тысячефранковых билетов – Сынок разменял тысячу франков, чтобы расплатиться.

После этого случая Сынок начал таскать почти ежедневно Мака выпивать. Каждый раз, как Мак встречался с Сынком, даже у него на дому, Сынок вытаскивал бутылку вина, не стесняясь; как это было раньше. Как видно он решил сделать Мака своим собутылником. Мак ведет себя осторожно в время этих выпивок, он вообще крепок в этом отношении, и кроме того – выпивая сам рюмку, наливает Сынку три.

Верно: (Алексеев)

English Translation:

February 8, 1937

On January 22 L. Sedov, in our conversation at his apartment on the question of the Second Moscow Trial and the role in it of individual defendants (Radek, Piatakov, et al.) stated: "Now there is no reason to hesitate. Stalin must be killed."

For me this statement was so unexpected that I did not manage to react to it in any way. L. Sedov immediately turned the conversation on to other questions.

On January 23 L. Sedov, in my presence and also that of L. Estrina, said something of the same content as that of the 22nd. In answer to his statement L. Estrina said: "Keep your mouth shut." We did not return to this question any more.

Since 1936 "Sonny" has not talked with me about terror. Only two or three weeks ago, after a meeting of the group, "Sonny" began to speak again on this theme. The first time he tried only to "theoretically" prove that terrorism does not contradict Marxism. "Marxism" - in "Sonny's" words - rejects terrorism only insofar as the conditions of the class struggle are unfavorable for terrorism, but there exist conditions under which terrorism is essential." The next time "Sonny" began to talk about terrorism when I arrived at his apartment to work. While he was reading newspapers "Sonny" said that since the whole regime in the USSR is held up by Stalin, it would be enough to kill Stalin for it all to fall apart. He had expressed this idea earlier as well but until this last time he had never formulated it so clearly. This last time he returned repeatedly to this subject, and emphasized the necessity of the murder of com[rade] Stalin with especial care.

In connection with this conversation "Sonny" asked me whether I feared death in general and whether I would be able to carry out an act of terror. At my answer that this all depends on whether it is essential and expedient, Sonny said that I did not understand correctly what a "real" terrorist is and began to explain to me what kind of qualities people suitable for carrying out terrorist acts should be.

As far as the tactics of terror he stopped at the question of cadre. He considered that the fundamental thing. A terrorist, in Sonny's words, must always be prepared for death, death must be a daily reality for a terrorist, and he then illustrated this thesis by the example of the psychology of the Narodovoltsy. Thereupon he threw out the remark that I, in his opinion, am too soft a person for this kind of business.

The conversation on this subject was suddenly cut short by the appearance of Neighbor, and it did not start up again afterwards.

M. Zborowski

II.II. 1938

Excerpt from Letter of Gamma of July 23, 1937

Mak and Sonny [= Zborowski and Sedov]. On the occasion of the birth of his son Mak invited Sonny to his place for dinner. Sedov sat the whole day drinking at Mak's and got seriously drunk. That evening Neighbor [= Estrine] was expecting Sonny at his home to do work. After Mak, from 6 till 11 in the evening, Sonny dragged Mak around to various bars in Montparnasse, and when Mak said goodnight to him Sonny, instead of going home and seriously drunk, went into a brothel rather than return home where Neighbor was waiting for him.

Sonny drank heavily without losing consciousness, but became very sentimental. He apologized to Mak, and almost in tears asked for forgiveness for the fact that at the beginning of their acquaintance he suspected him of being an agent of the GPU. He explained his suspicions by the fact that in the past, in his Berlin period, the GPU had repeatedly tried to send its agents to him, etc.

Towards the end in the process of his "revelations" Sonny said that the struggle of the opposition had been hopeless from the very beginning, and that no one believed that this struggle would succeed. That he had lost all belief in the revolution already in 1927, and that now he did not believe in anything at all, that he was a pessimist about everything. The work and the struggle that was going on now were a simple mechanical continuation of the past. The main thing in life for him was women and wine. He also liked to gamble for money.

He told a story about how, when they were in Monte Carlo Jeanne [Sedov's wife] would not give him more than 50 francs a day, which he would always lose immediately playing roulette. He dreamed of going to Monte Carlo with money.

The day before this particular evening Sonny complained to Mak that he was hard up for money. When they went in the evening to a bar Sonny, already seriously drunk, pay the tab and took out a wallet, and Mak saw in it a solid packet of thousand-frank notes. Sonny changed a thousand-frank note in order to pay the tab.

After that time Sonny began to drag Mak out to drink with him almost every evening. Every time Mak met with Sonny, even in his own house, Sonny would bring a bottle of wine without any hesitation, like before. He had obviously decided to make Mak his drinking partner. Mak behaves himself carefully during these drinking bouts, he is strong generally in relation to drink, and besides that he would drink one wine glass and pour Sonny three.

Copied accurately

(Alekseev)

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