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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT

In re the Conservatorship of the Person and
Estate of BRITNEY JEAN SPEARS

Case No. BP108870

Hon. Brenda J. Penny, Dept. 4

**BRITNEY JEAN SPEARS'S SEPARATE
STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUESTED IN NOTICE OF DEPOSITION**

[Filed concurrently with Notice of Motion and
Motion to Compel; Declaration of Lisa C. McCurdy;
and Proposed Order]

Date: July 13, 2022 (Date approved by Court Clerk)
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Dept: 4

1 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
2 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.
3 Jamie objects on the grounds that this Document Request presents an incomplete hypothetical and
4 assumes facts.

5 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

6 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
7 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
8 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
9 for Production Nos. 12-21).

10 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
11 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
12 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
13 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
14 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
15 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
16 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
17 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

18 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
19 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
20 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
21 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
22 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
23 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
24 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
25 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
26 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
27 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
28

1 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
2 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

3 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:**

4 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
5 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
6 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
7 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
8 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
9 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 [“As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
10 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”].) This fact is buttressed by his new
11 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
12 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
13 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes
14 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
15 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

16 As a matter of statutory law, Mr. Spears waived any and all objections to the document requests
17 in the Deposition Notice that was served on October 1, 2021, and Amended Notice that was served on
18 November 3, 2021. (See McCurdy Decl., Exs. B, E.) By failing to object, Mr. Spears now has no choice
19 but to produce documents responsive to this request. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.410(a); see also Weil
20 & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 8:483 [Deponent
21 “must timely serve written objections before the deposition. If [deponent] waits until the deposition to
22 raise the objection, it is waived; and [deponent] cannot refuse to produce the documents at the deposition
23”] [emphasis in original].)

24 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
25 cooperation in producing “**all**” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
26 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
27 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
28 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of

1 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
2 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 3 • That Mr. Spears would “**unconditionally**] *cooperate* with a complete and total
4 transfer of **all files** regarding the conservatorship”
- 5 • That Ms. Spears was “**welcome to everything – complete transparency without**
6 **conditions.**”
- 7 • That he would “**do everything [he] [could]** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
8 files] from prior counsel”
- 9 • “Again, **complete transparency without conditions.**”

10 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

11 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 12 • “Jamie has **nothing to hide** [and] **will therefore hide nothing.**”
- 13 • “Jamie affirms that he will **unconditionally cooperate** in transferring **all** [emphasis in
14 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 15 • “Jamie recognizes his **ongoing and transparent participation is paramount**”
- 16 • “Jamie will **unconditionally cooperate** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 17 • “Jamie is committed to **complete transparency without conditions.**”

18 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

19 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
20 “committed to **complete transparency,**” that they had “**withheld nothing,**” and that he “provided **explicit**
21 **instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.**” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
22 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
23 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

24 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
25 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
26 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
27 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
28 contained in the applicable requests.

1 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
2 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
3 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
4 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
5 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
6 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
7 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
8 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)¹ Thus, consistent with the
9 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
10 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
11 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 [“[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
12 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party.]”.)

13 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
14 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
15 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
16 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
17 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
18 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
19 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
20 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
21 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
22 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
23 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
24 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

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¹ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
2 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
3 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
4 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
5 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
6 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
7 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
8 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
9 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
10 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
11 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
12 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

13 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
14 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
15 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
16 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
17 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
18 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
19 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
20 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, ***not one***. (See
21 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
22 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)²

23 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
24 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
25 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
26 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
27 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.

28 ² As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 Spears's role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
2 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only "reasonably calculated" to
3 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
4 including Mr. Spears's fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
5 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

6 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears's objection that the requests are somehow "not reasonably
7 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
8 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
9 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

10 Mr. Spears's objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
11 "YOU" and "YOUR," are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
12 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
13 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 ["[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
14 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response."].) Mr. Spears
15 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
16 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) "The objection
17 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
18 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
19 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought."
20 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
21 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 ["The objection of burden is valid only when that
22 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice."]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
23 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears's objection that the documents "may be obtained
24 from other sources or through other means of discovery" (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
25 burden and expense would "outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery" (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
26 is also completely meritless.

27 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are "oppressive"
28 because they "do not contain any temporal limitations" (an objection repeated in every response) this

1 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
2 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
3 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
4 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
5 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
6 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
7 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
8 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

9 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
10 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
11 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
12 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
13 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
14 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
15 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
16 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

17 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
18 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
19 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
20 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
21 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
22 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
23 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
24 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

25 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
26 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
27 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
28 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**

1 ***produce everything without exception.***” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
2 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
3 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
4 such objections.

5 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
6 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
7 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
8 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
9 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
10 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
11 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
12 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

13 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
14 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
15 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
16 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
17 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
18 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
19 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

20 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
21 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
22 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
23 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
24 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
25 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
26 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
27 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
28 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and

1 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears's desperation and lack of any factual basis for
2 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
3 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

4 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:**

5 All DOCUMENTS and COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO any recording or listening device
6 in the home or bedroom of Britney Jean Spears, including all DOCUMENTS and COMMUNICATIONS
7 relating to the decision to place any such recording or listening device and the records of any such audio
8 recordings.

9 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:**

10 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
11 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
12 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
13 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
14 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
15 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.
16 Jamie objects on the grounds that this Document Request presents an incomplete hypothetical and
17 assumes facts.

18 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

19 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
20 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
21 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
22 for Production Nos. 10-11).

23 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
24 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
25 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
26 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
27 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
28 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of

1 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
2 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

3 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
4 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
5 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
6 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
7 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
8 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
9 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
10 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
11 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
12 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
13 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
14 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

15 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:**

16 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
17 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
18 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
19 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
20 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
21 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
22 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."]) This fact is buttressed by his new
23 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
24 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
25 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes
26 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
27 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

1 As a matter of statutory law, Mr. Spears waived any and all objections to the document requests
2 in the Deposition Notice that was served on October 1, 2021, and Amended Notice that was served on
3 November 3, 2021. (See McCurdy Decl., Exs. B, E.) By failing to object, Mr. Spears now has no choice
4 but to produce documents responsive to this request. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.410(a); see also Weil
5 & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 8:483 [Deponent
6 “must timely serve written objections before the deposition. If [deponent] waits until the deposition to
7 raise the objection, it is waived; and [deponent] cannot refuse to produce the documents at the deposition
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10 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
11 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
12 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
13 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
14 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
15 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

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17 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
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19 ***conditions.***”
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21 files] from prior counsel”
- 22 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

23 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

24 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 25 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 26 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
27 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
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- 1 • “Jamie will *unconditionally cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
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7 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
8 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

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10 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
11 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
12 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
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20 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
21 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)³ Thus, consistent with the
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1 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
2 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
3 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
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14 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
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17 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
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19 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
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26 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
27 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
28 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely

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10 is also completely meritless.

11 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
12 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
13 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
14 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
15 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
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21 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
22 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
23 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
24 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
25 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
26 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
27 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
28 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

1 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
2 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
3 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
4 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
5 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
6 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
7 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
8 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

9 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
10 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
11 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
12 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
13 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
14 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
15 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
16 such objections.

17 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
18 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
19 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
20 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
21 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
22 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
23 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
24 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

25 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
26 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
27 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
28 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115

1 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
2 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
3 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

4 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
5 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
6 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
7 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
8 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
9 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
10 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
11 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
12 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
13 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
14 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
15 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

16 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:**

17 All DOCUMENTS and COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO any and all loans you received
18 from Tri Star Sports & Entertainment or Lou Taylor.

19 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:**

20 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
21 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
22 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
23 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
24 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie also objects to the Document Request to the
25 extent it seeks documents or information not relevant or related to Britney or the Conservatorship.

26 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

27 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
28 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by

1 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
2 Production No. 9) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
3 Request for Production No. 5).

4 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
5 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
6 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
7 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
8 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
9 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
10 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
11 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

12 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
13 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
14 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
15 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
16 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
17 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
18 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
19 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
20 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
21 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
22 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
23 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

24 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:**

25 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
26 his boilerplate objections are proper. (*See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
27 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
28 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn

1 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
2 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 [“As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
3 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”].) This fact is buttressed by his new
4 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
5 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
6 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
7 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
8 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

9 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
10 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
11 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
12 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
13 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
14 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
15 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 16 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
17 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 18 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
19 ***conditions.***”
- 20 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
21 files] from prior counsel”
- 22 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

23 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

24 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 25 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 26 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
27 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 28 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”

- 1 • “Jamie will *unconditionally cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 2 • “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions*.”

3 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

4 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
5 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
6 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
7 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
8 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

9 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
10 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
11 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
12 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
13 contained in the applicable requests.

14 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
15 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
16 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
17 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
18 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
19 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
20 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
21 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁵ Thus, consistent with the
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23 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
24 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
25 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
26 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
27 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
28 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

1 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
2 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
3 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
4 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
5 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
6 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
7 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
8 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

9 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
10 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
11 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
12 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
13 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
14 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
15 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
16 such objections.

17 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
18 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
19 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
20 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
21 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
22 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
23 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
24 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

25 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
26 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
27 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
28 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115

1 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
2 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
3 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

4 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
5 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
6 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
7 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
8 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
9 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
10 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
11 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
12 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
13 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
14 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
15 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

16 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:**

17 All agreements contracting for personal services of Britney Jean Spears.

18 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:**

19 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
20 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
21 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
22 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
23 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
24 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

25 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

26 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
27 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
28 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for

1 Production No. 3) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
2 Request for Production No. 3). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.

3 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
4 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
5 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
6 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
7 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
8 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
9 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
10 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

11 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
12 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
13 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
14 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
15 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
16 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
17 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
18 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
19 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
20 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
21 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
22 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

23 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:**

24 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
25 his boilerplate objections are proper. (*See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
26 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
27 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
28 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery

1 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 [“As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
2 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”].) This fact is buttressed by his new
3 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
4 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
5 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
6 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
7 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

8 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
9 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
10 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
11 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
12 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
13 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
14 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 15 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
16 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 17 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
18 ***conditions.***”
- 19 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
20 files] from prior counsel”
- 21 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

22 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

23 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 24 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 25 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
26 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 27 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”
- 28 • “Jamie will ***unconditionally cooperate*** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”

- 1 • “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions.*”

2 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

3 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
4 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
5 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.*” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
6 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
7 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

8 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
9 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
10 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
11 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
12 contained in the applicable requests.

13 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
14 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
15 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
16 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
17 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
18 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
19 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
20 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁷ Thus, consistent with the
21 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
22 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
23 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
24 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

25
26 _____
27 ⁷ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
28 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
2 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
3 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
4 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
5 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
6 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services
7 Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
8 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
9 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
10 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
11 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
12 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

13 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
14 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
15 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
16 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
17 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
18 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
19 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
20 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
21 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
22 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
23 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
24 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

25 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
26 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
27 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller
28 and Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely

1 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR**,” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
2 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
3 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
4 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, *not one*. (See
5 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
6 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)⁸

7 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
8 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
9 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
10 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
11 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
12 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
13 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
14 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
15 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
16 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

17 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
18 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
19 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
20 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

21 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
22 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
23 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
24 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
25 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
26 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
27 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection

28 ⁸ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
2 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
3 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”
4 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
5 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
6 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
7 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
8 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
9 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
10 is also completely meritless.

11 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
12 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
13 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
14 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
15 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
16 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
17 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
18 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
19 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
20 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

21 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
22 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
23 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
24 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
25 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
26 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
27 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
28 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

1 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
2 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
3 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
4 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
5 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
6 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
7 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
8 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

9 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
10 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
11 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
12 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
13 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
14 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
15 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
16 such objections.

17 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
18 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
19 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
20 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
21 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
22 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
23 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
24 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

25 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
26 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
27 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
28 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115

1 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
2 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
3 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

4 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
5 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
6 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
7 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
8 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
9 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
10 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
11 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
12 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
13 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
14 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
15 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

16 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:**

17 All DOCUMENTS that refer, reflect, or RELATE TO any communications between YOU and
18 any representative of Tri Star Sports & Entertainment Group, including Lou Taylor and Robin Greenhill.

19 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:**

20 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
21 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
22 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie objects on the grounds that this
23 Document Request seeks confidential or private financial information, confidential business or
24 commercial information, trade secrets, proprietary information, or otherwise calls for information
25 protected by the right of privacy. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to the extent it
26 impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product
27 doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie objects to this Document Request to the extent it
28 calls for documents and information irrelevant and unrelated to Britney or the Conservatorship. Jamie

1 further objects to the Document Request to the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's
2 possession or equally available to her.

3 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

4 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
5 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
6 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
7 Production No. 4) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
8 Request for Production No. 4). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.

9 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
10 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
11 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
12 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
13 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
14 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
15 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
16 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

17 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
18 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
19 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
20 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
21 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
22 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
23 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
24 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
25 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
26 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
27 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
28 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

1 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:**

2 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
3 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
4 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
5 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
6 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
7 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 [“As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
8 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”].) This fact is buttressed by his new
9 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
10 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
11 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
12 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
13 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

14 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
15 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
16 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
17 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
18 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
19 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
20 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 21 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
22 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
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24 ***conditions.***”
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26 files] from prior counsel”
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28 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

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- 2 • “Jamie has *nothing to hide* [and] *will therefore hide nothing*.”
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- 4 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
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9 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
10 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
11 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
12 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
13 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

14 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
15 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
16 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
17 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
18 contained in the applicable requests.

19 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
20 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
21 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
22 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
23 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
24 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
25 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
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3 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 ["[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
4 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party.]")

5 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are "duplicative, unduly burdensome,
6 oppressive, and harassing" because Mr. Spears already "voluntarily" produced some of the same
7 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
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18 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
19 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be "unjust and inequitable." But he
20 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his "Big Lie" defense: that he has cooperated and
21 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that "there
22 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
23 and definitions" because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
24 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
25 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
26 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why

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28 the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts' construction of that statute." (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
2 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

3 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
4 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
5 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
6 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
7 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
8 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
9 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
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11 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
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13 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
14 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
15 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
16 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
17 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
18 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
19 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
20 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
21 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
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23 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
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26 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

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28 ¹⁰ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
2 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
3 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
4 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
5 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
6 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
7 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
8 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
9 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
10 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”
11 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
12 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
13 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
14 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
15 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
16 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
17 is also completely meritless.

18 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
19 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
20 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
21 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
22 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
23 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
24 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
25 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
26 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
27 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

1 Mr. Spears's objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
2 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with "sufficient factual
3 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim," such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
4 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 ["if an
5 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
6 request 'shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
7 claim'"]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 ["[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
8 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise".]) He failed to do so.

9 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
10 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell'Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
11 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
12 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
13 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
14 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
15 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
16 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

17 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
18 timely object, his counsel promised "***unconditional[] cooperat[ion]***," "***complete transparency without***
19 ***conditions***," and that Britney Spears was "***welcome to everything***." (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
20 Even further, Mr. Spears's counsel stated that he had "provided ***explicit instructions to prior counsel to***
21 ***produce everything without exception***." (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
22 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
23 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
24 such objections.

25 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
26 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears's burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
27 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
28 255.) Mr. Spears's position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter's* privacy.

1 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
2 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
3 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
4 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

5 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
6 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
7 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
8 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
9 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
10 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
11 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

12 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
13 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
14 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
15 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
16 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
17 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
18 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
19 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
20 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
21 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
22 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
23 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

24 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:**

25 All communications, including agreements, with Tri Star Sports & Entertainment Group or any of
26 its principals or employees.

1 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:**

2 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
3 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
4 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie objects on the grounds that this
5 Document Request seeks confidential or private financial information, confidential business or
6 commercial information, trade secrets, proprietary information, or otherwise calls for information
7 protected by the right of privacy. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to the extent it
8 impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product
9 doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie objects to this Document Request to the extent it
10 calls for documents and information irrelevant and unrelated to Britney or the Conservatorship. Jamie
11 further objects to the Document Request to the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's
12 possession or equally available to her.

13 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

- 14 ● Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
15 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
16 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
17 Production No. 9) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
18 Request for Production No. 5). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.
- 19 ● The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
20 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
21 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
22 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
23 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
24 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
25 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
26 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.
- 27 ● There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
28 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this

1 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
2 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
3 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
4 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
5 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
6 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
7 information." See Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
8 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jarnie's possession, custody, or
9 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
10 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

11 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:**

12 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
13 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
14 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
15 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
16 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
17 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
18 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."] .) This fact is buttressed by his new
19 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
20 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
21 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes
22 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
23 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

24 Mr. Spears's counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client's unconditional, transparent
25 cooperation in producing "**all**" documents to Ms. Spears's counsel. Although these representations have,
26 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
27 become a "Big Lie" of Mr. Spears's defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
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10 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

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10 Mr. Spears's objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
11 "YOU" and "YOUR," are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
12 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
13 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 ["[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
14 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response."] Mr. Spears
15 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
16 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) "The objection
17 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
18 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
19 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought."
20 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
21 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 ["The objection of burden is valid only when that
22 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice."]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
23 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears's objection that the documents "may be obtained
24 from other sources or through other means of discovery" (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
25 burden and expense would "outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery" (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
26 is also completely meritless.

27 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are "oppressive"
28 because they "do not contain any temporal limitations" (an objection repeated in every response) this

1 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
2 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
3 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
4 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
5 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
6 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
7 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
8 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

9 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
10 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
11 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
12 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
13 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
14 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
15 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
16 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

17 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
18 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
19 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
20 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
21 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
22 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
23 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
24 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

25 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
26 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
27 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
28 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**

1 ***produce everything without exception.***” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
2 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
3 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
4 such objections.

5 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
6 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
7 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
8 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
9 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
10 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
11 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
12 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

13 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
14 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
15 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
16 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
17 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
18 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
19 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

20 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
21 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
22 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
23 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
24 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
25 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
26 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
27 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
28 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and

1 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears's desperation and lack of any factual basis for
2 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
3 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

4 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:**

5 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO any agreements with Tri Star Sports & Entertainment Group.

6 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:**

7 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
8 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
9 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie objects to this Document Request to the
10 extent it calls for documents and information irrelevant and unrelated to Britney or the Conservatorship.
11 Jamie further objects to the Document Request to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by
12 the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine.
13 Jamie further objects to the Document Request to the extent that it seeks information that is already in
14 Britney's possession or equally available to her.

15 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

- 16 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
17 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
18 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
19 Production No. 6) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
20 Request for Production No. 6). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.
- 21 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
22 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
23 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
24 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
25 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
26 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
27 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
28 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

1 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
2 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
3 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
4 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
5 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
6 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
7 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
8 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
9 information." *See* Jan, 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
10 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
11 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
12 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

13 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:**

14 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
15 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
16 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
17 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
18 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
19 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
20 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."].) This fact is buttressed by his new
21 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
22 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
23 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes
24 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
25 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

26 Mr. Spears's counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client's unconditional, transparent
27 cooperation in producing "**all**" documents to Ms. Spears's counsel. Although these representations have,
28 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has

1 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
2 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
3 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
4 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 5 • That Mr. Spears would “**unconditionally] cooperate** with a complete and total
6 transfer of **all files** regarding the conservatorship”
- 7 • That Ms. Spears was “**welcome to everything – complete transparency without**
8 **conditions.**”
- 9 • That he would “**do everything [he] [could]** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
10 files] from prior counsel”
- 11 • “Again, **complete transparency without conditions.**”

12 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

13 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 14 • “Jamie has **nothing to hide** [and] **will therefore hide nothing.**”
- 15 • “Jamie affirms that he will **unconditionally cooperate** in transferring **all** [emphasis in
16 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 17 • “Jamie recognizes his **ongoing and transparent participation is paramount**”
- 18 • “Jamie will **unconditionally cooperate** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 19 • “Jamie is committed to **complete transparency without conditions.**”

20 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

21 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
22 “committed to **complete transparency,**” that they had “**withheld nothing,**” and that he “provided **explicit**
23 **instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.**” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
24 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
25 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

26 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
27 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
28 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and

1 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
2 contained in the applicable requests.

3 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
4 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
5 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
6 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
7 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
8 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
9 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
10 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)¹³ Thus, consistent with the
11 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
12 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
13 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
14 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

15 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
16 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
17 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
18 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
19 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
20 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
21 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
22 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
23 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
24 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
25

26 _____
27 ¹³ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
28 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
2 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

3 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
4 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
5 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
6 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
7 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
8 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
9 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
10 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
11 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
12 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
13 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
14 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

15 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
16 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
17 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
18 and *Stine*, *infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
19 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR**,” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
20 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
21 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
22 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, ***not one***. (See
23 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
24 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)¹⁴

25 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
26 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
27 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.

28 ¹⁴ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
2 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
3 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
4 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
5 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
6 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
7 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

8 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
9 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
10 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
11 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

12 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
13 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
14 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
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16 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
17 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
18 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
19 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
20 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
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22 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
23 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
24 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
25 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
26 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
27 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
28 is also completely meritless.

1 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
2 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
3 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
4 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
5 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
6 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
7 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
8 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
9 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
10 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

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13 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
14 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
15 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
16 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
17 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
18 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

19 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
20 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
21 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
22 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
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24 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
25 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
26 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

27 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
28 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional]] cooperat[ion],**” “**complete transparency without**

1 **conditions,”** and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything.**” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
2 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
3 **produce everything without exception.**” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
4 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
5 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
6 such objections.

7 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
8 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
9 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
10 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
11 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
12 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
13 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
14 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

15 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
16 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
17 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
18 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
19 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
20 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
21 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

22 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
23 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
24 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
25 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
26 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
27 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
28 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests

1 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
2 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
3 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears's desperation and lack of any factual basis for
4 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
5 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

6 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:**

7 All correspondence (whether on paper, electronically, or by text or instant message) with Tri Star
8 Sports & Entertainment Group RELATING TO Tri Star Sports & Entertainment Group's compensation.

9 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:**

10 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
11 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
12 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
13 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
14 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
15 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

16 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

- 17 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
18 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
19 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
20 Production No. 8) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
21 Request for Production No. 8). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.
- 22 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
23 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
24 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
25 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
26 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
27 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
28

1 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
2 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

3 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
4 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
5 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
6 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
7 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
8 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
9 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
10 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
11 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
12 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
13 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
14 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

15 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:**

16 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
17 his boilerplate objections are proper. (*See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
18 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
19 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
20 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
21 sought. (*See Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
22 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."].) This fact is buttressed by his new
23 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
24 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
25 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes
26 objections on the basis of privilege. (*See generally*, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
27 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

1 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
2 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
3 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
4 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
5 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
6 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
7 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 8 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally*** cooperate with a complete and total
9 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 10 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
11 ***conditions.***”
- 12 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
13 files] from prior counsel”
- 14 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

15 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

16 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 17 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 18 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
19 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 20 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”
- 21 • “Jamie will ***unconditionally cooperate*** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 22 • “Jamie is committed to ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

23 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

24 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
25 “committed to ***complete transparency,***” that they had “***withheld nothing,***” and that he “provided ***explicit***
26 ***instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.***” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
27 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
28 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

1 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
2 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
3 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
4 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
5 contained in the applicable requests.

6 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
7 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
8 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
9 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
10 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
11 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
12 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
13 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)¹⁵ Thus, consistent with the
14 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
15 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
16 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
17 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

18 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
19 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
20 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
21 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
22 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
23 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
24 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
25 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under

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27 ¹⁵ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
28 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
2 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
3 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
4 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

5 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
6 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
7 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
8 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
9 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
10 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
11 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
12 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
13 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
14 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
15 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
16 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

17 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
18 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
19 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
20 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
21 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
22 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
23 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
24 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, ***not one***. (See
25 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
26 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)¹⁶

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¹⁶ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
2 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
3 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
4 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
5 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
6 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
7 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
8 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
9 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
10 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

11 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
12 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
13 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
14 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

15 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
16 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
17 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
18 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
19 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
20 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
21 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
22 based upon burden must be sustained by **evidence showing** the quantum of work required, while to
23 support an objection of oppression there must be **some showing** either of an intent to create an
24 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”
25 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
26 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
27 burden is **demonstrated** to result in injustice.”]; cf. *Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
28 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained

1 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
2 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
3 is also completely meritless.

4 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
5 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
6 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
7 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
8 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
9 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
10 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
11 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
12 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
13 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

14 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
15 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
16 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
17 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
18 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
19 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
20 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
21 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

22 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
23 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
24 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
25 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
26 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
27 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
28

1 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
2 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

3 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
4 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
5 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
6 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
7 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
8 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
9 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
10 such objections.

11 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
12 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
13 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
14 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
15 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
16 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
17 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
18 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

19 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
20 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
21 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
22 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
23 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
24 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
25 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

26 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
27 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
28 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting

1 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
2 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
3 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
4 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
5 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
6 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
7 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears's desperation and lack of any factual basis for
8 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
9 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

10 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9:**

11 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO a listening or recording device placed in Britney Jean
12 Spears's home or bedroom.

13 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9:**

14 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
15 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
16 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
17 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
18 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
19 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.
20 Jamie objects on the grounds that this

21 Document Request presents an incomplete hypothetical and assumes facts.

22 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

23 ● Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
24 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
25 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
26 for Production No. 10). This is now the second time Britney served the exact same request.

27 ● The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
28 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California

1 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
2 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
3 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
4 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
5 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
6 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

7 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
8 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
9 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
10 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
11 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
12 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
13 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
14 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
15 information." See Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
16 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
17 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
18 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

19 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9:**

20 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
21 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
22 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
23 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
24 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
25 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
26 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."].) This fact is buttressed by his new
27 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
28 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold

1 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to every single request for production includes
2 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
3 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

4 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
5 cooperation in producing “all” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
6 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
7 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
8 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
9 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
10 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 11 • That Mr. Spears would “**unconditionally] cooperate** with a complete and total
12 transfer of **all files** regarding the conservatorship”
- 13 • That Ms. Spears was “**welcome to everything – complete transparency without**
14 **conditions.**”
- 15 • That he would “**do everything [he] [could]** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
16 files] from prior counsel”
- 17 • “Again, **complete transparency without conditions.**”

18 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

19 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 20 • “Jamie has **nothing to hide** [and] **will therefore hide nothing.**”
- 21 • “Jamie affirms that he will **unconditionally cooperate** in transferring **all** [emphasis in
22 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 23 • “Jamie recognizes his **ongoing and transparent participation is paramount**”
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27 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
28 “committed to **complete transparency,**” that they had “**withheld nothing,**” and that he “provided **explicit**

1 ***instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.***” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
2 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
3 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

4 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
5 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
6 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
7 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
8 contained in the applicable requests.

9 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
10 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
11 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
12 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
13 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
14 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
15 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
16 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)¹⁷ Thus, consistent with the
17 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
18 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
19 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
20 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

21 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
22 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
23 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
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27 ¹⁷ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
28 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
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1 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
2 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
3 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
4 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
5 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
6 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
7 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

8 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
9 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
10 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
11 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
12 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
13 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
14 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
15 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
16 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
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26 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
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6 is also completely meritless.

7 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
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25 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
26 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
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4 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

5 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
6 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
7 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
8 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
9 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
10 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
11 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
12 such objections.

13 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
14 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
15 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
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21 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
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26 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
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1 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
2 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
3 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
4 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
5 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
6 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
7 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
8 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
9 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
10 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
11 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
12 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10:**

14 All correspondence (whether on paper, electronically, or by text or instant message) RELATING
15 TO a listening or recording device placed in Britney Jean Spears’s home or bedroom.

16 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10:**

17 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
18 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
19 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
20 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
21 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
22 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.
23 Jamie objects on the grounds that this Document Request presents an incomplete hypothetical and
24 assumes facts.

25 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

26 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
27 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
28

1 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
2 for Production No. 11). This is now the second time Britney served the exact same request.

3 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
4 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
5 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
6 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
7 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
8 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
9 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
10 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

11 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
12 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
13 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
14 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
15 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
16 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
17 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
18 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
19 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
20 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
21 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
22 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

23 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10:**

24 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
25 his boilerplate objections are proper. (*See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
26 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
27 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
28 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery

1 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 [“As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
2 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”].) This fact is buttressed by his new
3 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
4 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
5 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
6 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
7 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

8 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
9 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
10 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
11 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
12 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
13 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
14 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 15 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
16 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 17 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
18 ***conditions.***”
- 19 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
20 files] from prior counsel”
- 21 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

22 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

23 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 24 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 25 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
26 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 27 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”
- 28 • “Jamie will ***unconditionally cooperate*** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”

- “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions.*”

(McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.*” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents contained in the applicable requests.

Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)¹⁹ Thus, consistent with the Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

¹⁹ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
2 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
3 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
4 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
5 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
6 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
7 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
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9 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
10 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
11 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
12 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

13 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
14 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
15 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
16 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
17 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
18 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
19 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
20 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
21 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
22 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
23 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
24 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

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7 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
8 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
9 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
10 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
11 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
12 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
13 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
14 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
15 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

16 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11:**

17 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO mirroring of Britney Jean Spears’s mobile telephone on
18 another device or mirroring any telephone or device utilized by Ms. Spears.

19 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11:**

20 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
21 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
22 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
23 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
24 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
25 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.
26 Jamie objects on the grounds that this Document Request presents an incomplete hypothetical and
27 assumes facts.

28 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

1 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
2 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
3 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
4 for Production No. 12). This is now the second time Britney served the exact same request.

5 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
6 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
7 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
8 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
9 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
10 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
11 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
12 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

13 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
14 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
15 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
16 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
17 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
18 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
19 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
20 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
21 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
22 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
23 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
24 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

25 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11:**

26 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
27 his boilerplate objections are proper. (*See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
28 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important

1 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
2 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
3 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 [“As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
4 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”].) This fact is buttressed by his new
5 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
6 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
7 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
8 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
9 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

10 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
11 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
12 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
13 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
14 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
15 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
16 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 17 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
18 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 19 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
20 ***conditions.***”
- 21 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
22 files] from prior counsel”
- 23 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

24 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

25 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 26 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 27 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
28 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”

- 1 • “Jamie recognizes his *ongoing and transparent participation is paramount . . .*”
- 2 • “Jamie will *unconditionally cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 3 • “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions.*”

4 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

5 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
6 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
7 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.*” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
8 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
9 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

10 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
11 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
12 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
13 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
14 contained in the applicable requests.

15 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
16 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
17 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
18 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
19 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
20 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
21 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
22 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)²¹ Thus, consistent with the
23 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
24 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14

25
26 _____
27 ²¹ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
28 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 [“[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
2 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party.”.]

3 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
4 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
5 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
6 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
7 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
8 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
9 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
10 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
11 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
12 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
13 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
14 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

15 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
16 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
17 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
18 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
19 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
20 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
21 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
22 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
23 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
24 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
25 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
26 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

27 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
28 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or

1 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
2 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
3 claims it “***DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,***” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
4 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
5 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
6 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, *not one*. (See
7 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
8 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)²²

9 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
10 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
11 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
12 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
13 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
14 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
15 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
16 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
17 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
18 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

19 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
20 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
21 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
22 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

23 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
24 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
25 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
26 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
27 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears

28 ²² As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
2 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
3 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
4 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
5 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”
6 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
7 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
8 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
9 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
10 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
11 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
12 is also completely meritless.

13 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
14 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
15 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
16 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
17 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
18 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
19 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
20 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
21 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
22 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

23 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
24 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
25 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
26 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
27 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
28 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that

1 claim”)]; (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
2 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

3 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
4 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
5 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
6 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
7 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
8 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
9 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
10 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

11 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
12 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
13 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
14 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
15 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
16 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
17 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
18 such objections.

19 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
20 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
21 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
22 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
23 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
24 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
25 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
26 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

27 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
28 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the

1 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
2 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
3 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
4 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
5 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

6 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
7 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
8 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
9 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
10 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
11 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
12 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
13 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
14 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
15 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
16 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
17 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

18 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12:**

19 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO monitoring of Britney Jean Spears’s personal computer, iPad
20 or a computer used by Ms. Spears.

21 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12:**

22 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
23 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
24 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
25 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
26 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
27 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

1 Jamie objects on the grounds that this Document Request presents an incomplete hypothetical and
2 assumes facts.

3 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

4 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
5 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
6 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
7 for Production No. 17).

8 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
9 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
10 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
11 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
12 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
13 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
14 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
15 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

16 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
17 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
18 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
19 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
20 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
21 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
22 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
23 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
24 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
25 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
26 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
27 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

28 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12:**

1 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
2 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
3 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
4 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
5 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
6 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 [“As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
7 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”].) This fact is buttressed by his new
8 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
9 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
10 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
11 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
12 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

13 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
14 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
15 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
16 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
17 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
18 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
19 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 20 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
21 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 22 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
23 ***conditions.***”
- 24 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
25 files] from prior counsel”
- 26 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

27 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

28 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 1 • “Jamie has *nothing to hide* [and] *will therefore hide nothing*.”
- 2 • “Jamie affirms that he will *unconditionally cooperate* in transferring *all* [emphasis in
- 3 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 4 • “Jamie recognizes his *ongoing and transparent participation is paramount . . .*”
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7 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

8 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
9 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
10 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
11 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
12 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

13 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
14 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
15 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
16 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
17 contained in the applicable requests.

18 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
19 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
20 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
21 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
22 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
23 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
24 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
25 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)²³ Thus, consistent with the

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27 ²³ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
28 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 Court's reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
2 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
3 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 ["[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
4 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party.]")

5 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are "duplicative, unduly burdensome,
6 oppressive, and harassing" because Mr. Spears already "voluntarily" produced some of the same
7 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
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18 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
19 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be "unjust and inequitable." But he
20 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his "Big Lie" defense: that he has cooperated and
21 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that "there
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25 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
26 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
27 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
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3 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
4 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
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13 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
14 is also completely meritless.

15 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
16 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
17 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
18 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
19 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
20 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
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25 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
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27 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
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1 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
2 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
3 claim’’’); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
4 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise’’’].) He failed to do so.

5 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
6 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
7 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
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10 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
11 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
12 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

13 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
14 timely object, his counsel promised “***unconditional[] cooperat[ion],***” “***complete transparency without***
15 ***conditions,***” and that Britney Spears was “***welcome to everything.***” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
16 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided ***explicit instructions to prior counsel to***
17 ***produce everything without exception.***” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
18 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
19 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
20 such objections.

21 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
22 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
23 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
24 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
25 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
26 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
27 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
28 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

1 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
2 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
3 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
4 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
5 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
6 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
7 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

8 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
9 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
10 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
11 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
12 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
13 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
14 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
15 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
16 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
17 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
18 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
19 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

20 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13:**

21 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO monitoring of Britney Jean Spears’s iCloud account or an
22 iCloud account used by Britney Spears.

23 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13:**

24 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
25 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
26 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
27 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
28 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to

1 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.
2 Jamie objects on the grounds that this Document Request presents an incomplete hypothetical and
3 assumes facts.

4 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

5 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
6 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
7 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
8 for Production No. 20).

9 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
10 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
11 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
12 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
13 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
14 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
15 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
16 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

17 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
18 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
19 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
20 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
21 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
22 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
23 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
24 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
25 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
26 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
27 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
28 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

1 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13:**

2 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
3 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
4 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
5 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
6 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
7 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 [“As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
8 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”].) This fact is buttressed by his new
9 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
10 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
11 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
12 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
13 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

14 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
15 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
16 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
17 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
18 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
19 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
20 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 21 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
22 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 23 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
24 ***conditions.***”
- 25 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
26 files] from prior counsel”
- 27 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

28 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

1 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 2 • “Jamie has *nothing to hide* [and] *will therefore hide nothing*.”
- 3 • “Jamie affirms that he will *unconditionally cooperate* in transferring *all* [emphasis in
- 4 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 5 • “Jamie recognizes his *ongoing and transparent participation is paramount . . .*”
- 6 • “Jamie will *unconditionally cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 7 • “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions*.”

8 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

9 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
10 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
11 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
12 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
13 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

14 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
15 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
16 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
17 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
18 contained in the applicable requests.

19 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
20 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
21 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
22 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
23 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
24 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
25 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
26 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)²⁵ Thus, consistent with the

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28 ²⁵ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing

1 Court's reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
2 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
3 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 ["[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
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28 the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
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17 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
18 timely object, his counsel promised "***unconditional[] cooperat[ion]***," "***complete transparency without***
19 ***conditions***," and that Britney Spears was "***welcome to everything***." (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
20 Even further, Mr. Spears's counsel stated that he had "provided ***explicit instructions to prior counsel to***
21 ***produce everything without exception***." (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
22 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
23 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
24 such objections.

25 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
26 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears's burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
27 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
28 255.) Mr. Spears's position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter's* privacy.

1 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
2 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
3 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
4 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

5 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
6 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
7 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
8 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
9 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
10 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
11 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

12 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
13 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
14 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
15 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
16 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
17 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
18 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
19 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
20 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
21 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
22 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
23 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

24 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:**

25 All correspondence (whether on paper, electronically, or by text or instant message) RELATING
26 TO monitoring of Britney Jean Spears’s iCloud account.
27
28

1 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:**

2 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
3 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
4 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
5 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
6 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
7 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.
8 Jamie objects on the grounds that this Document Request presents an incomplete hypothetical and
9 assumes facts.

10 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

- 11 ● Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
12 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
13 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
14 for Production No. 21). This is now the second time Britney served the exact same request.
- 15 ● The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
16 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
17 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
18 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
19 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
20 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
21 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
22 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.
- 23 ● There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
24 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
25 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
26 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
27 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
28 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy

1 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
2 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
3 information." See Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
4 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
5 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
6 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

7 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:**

8 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
9 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
10 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
11 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
12 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
13 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
14 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."]) This fact is buttressed by his new
15 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
16 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
17 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to every single request for production includes
18 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
19 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

20 Mr. Spears's counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client's unconditional, transparent
21 cooperation in producing "all" documents to Ms. Spears's counsel. Although these representations have,
22 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
23 become a "Big Lie" of Mr. Spears's defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
24 Spears's statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
25 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
26 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears's counsel professed the following:

- 27
- That Mr. Spears would "unconditionally] cooperate with a complete and total
28 transfer of all files regarding the conservatorship"

- That Ms. Spears was “*welcome to everything – complete transparency without conditions.*”
- That he would “*do everything [he] [could]* to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all files] from prior counsel”
- “Again, *complete transparency without conditions.*”

(McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- “Jamie has *nothing to hide* [and] *will therefore hide nothing.*”
- “Jamie affirms that he will *unconditionally cooperate* in transferring *all* [emphasis in original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- “Jamie recognizes his *ongoing and transparent participation is paramount*”
- “Jamie will *unconditionally cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions.*”

(McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly “committed to *complete transparency,*” that they had “*withheld nothing,*” and that he “provided *explicit instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.*” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents contained in the applicable requests.

Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods

1 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
2 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
3 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
4 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)²⁷ Thus, consistent with the
5 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
6 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
7 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 [“[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
8 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party.”].)

9 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
10 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
11 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
12 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
13 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
14 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
15 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
16 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
17 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
18 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
19 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
20 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

21 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
22 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
23 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
24 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
25 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there

26 _____
27 ²⁷ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
28 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
2 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
3 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
4 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
5 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
6 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
7 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

8 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
9 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
10 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
11 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
12 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
13 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
14 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
15 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, ***not one***. (See
16 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
17 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)²⁸

18 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
19 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
20 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
21 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
22 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
23 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
24 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
25 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
26 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
27 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

28 ²⁸ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
2 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
3 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
4 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

5 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
6 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
7 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
8 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
9 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
10 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
11 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
12 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
13 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
14 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”
15 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
16 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
17 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
18 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
19 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
20 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
21 is also completely meritless.

22 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
23 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
24 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
25 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
26 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
27 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
28 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring

1 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
2 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
3 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

4 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
5 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
6 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
7 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
8 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
9 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
10 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
11 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

12 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
13 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
14 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
15 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
16 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
17 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
18 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
19 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

20 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
21 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
22 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
23 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
24 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
25 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
26 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
27 such objections.

1 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
2 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
3 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
4 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
5 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
6 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
7 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
8 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

9 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
10 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
11 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
12 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
13 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
14 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
15 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

16 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
17 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
18 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
19 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
20 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
21 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
22 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
23 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
24 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
25 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
26 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
27 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

1 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15:**

2 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO payments or approvals for payments made for legal
3 representation of Lou Taylor or Robin Greenhill.

4 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15:**

5 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
6 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
7 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
8 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
9 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
10 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

11 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

- 12 ● Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
13 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
14 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
15 Production No. 10) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
16 Request for Production No. 22). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.
- 17 ● The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
18 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
19 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
20 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
21 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
22 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
23 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
24 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.
- 25 ● There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
26 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
27 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
28 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents

1 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
2 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
3 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
4 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
5 information." See Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
6 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
7 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
8 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

9 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15:**

10 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
11 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
12 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
13 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
14 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
15 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
16 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."].) This fact is buttressed by his new
17 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
18 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
19 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to every single request for production includes
20 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
21 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

22 Mr. Spears's counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client's unconditional, transparent
23 cooperation in producing "all" documents to Ms. Spears's counsel. Although these representations have,
24 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
25 become a "Big Lie" of Mr. Spears's defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
26 Spears's statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
27 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
28 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears's counsel professed the following:

- That Mr. Spears would “**unconditionally] cooperate** with a complete and total transfer of **all files** regarding the conservatorship”
- That Ms. Spears was “**welcome to everything – complete transparency without conditions.**”
- That he would “**do everything [he] [could]** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all files] from prior counsel”
- “Again, **complete transparency without conditions.**”

(McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- “Jamie has **nothing to hide** [and] **will therefore hide nothing.**”
- “Jamie affirms that he will **unconditionally cooperate** in transferring **all** [emphasis in original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- “Jamie recognizes his **ongoing and transparent participation is paramount**”
- “Jamie will **unconditionally cooperate** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
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(McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly “committed to **complete transparency,**” that they had “**withheld nothing,**” and that he “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.**” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents contained in the applicable requests.

Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production

1 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
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5 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
6 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)²⁹ Thus, consistent with the
7 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
8 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
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11 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
12 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
13 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
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15 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
16 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
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4 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
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12 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
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25 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
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3 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
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7 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
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22 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
23 is also completely meritless.

24 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
25 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
26 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
27 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
28 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the

1 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
2 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
3 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
4 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
5 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

6 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
7 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
8 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
9 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
10 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
11 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
12 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
13 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

14 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
15 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
16 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
17 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
18 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
19 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
20 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
21 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

22 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
23 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional]] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
24 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
25 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
26 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
27 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
28

1 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
2 such objections.

3 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
4 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears's burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
5 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
6 255.) Mr. Spears's position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter's* privacy.
7 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the "historically important state interest
8 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings." (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
9 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
10 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears's evasive and fabricated "privacy rights."

11 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the "common
12 interest doctrine." Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
13 "common interest doctrine" is a "nonwaiver doctrine," and does not separately act as a privilege
14 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
15 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 ["party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
16 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
17 privilege"].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

18 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
19 "speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
20 or unknown to Jamie" and "call for a legal conclusion." (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
21 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
22 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
23 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
24 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
25 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
26 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
27 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears's desperation and lack of any factual basis for
28

1 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
2 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

3 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16:**

4 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO tax or “accounting services” rendered by Tri Star Sports &
5 Entertainment Group.

6 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16:**

7 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
8 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
9 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
10 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
11 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
12 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

13 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

- 14 ● Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
15 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
16 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
17 Production No. 11) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
18 Request for Production No. 24). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.
- 19 ● The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
20 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
21 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
22 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
23 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
24 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
25 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
26 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.
- 27 ● There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
28 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this

1 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
2 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
3 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
4 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
5 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
6 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
7 information." See Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
8 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
9 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
10 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

11 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16:**

12 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
13 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
14 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
15 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
16 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
17 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
18 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."] .) This fact is buttressed by his new
19 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
20 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
21 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes
22 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
23 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

24 Mr. Spears's counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client's unconditional, transparent
25 cooperation in producing "**all**" documents to Ms. Spears's counsel. Although these representations have,
26 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
27 become a "Big Lie" of Mr. Spears's defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
28 Spears's statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of

1 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
2 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 3 • That Mr. Spears would “**unconditionally]] cooperate** with a complete and total
4 transfer of **all files** regarding the conservatorship”
- 5 • That Ms. Spears was “**welcome to everything – complete transparency without**
6 **conditions.**”
- 7 • That he would “**do everything [he] [could]** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
8 files] from prior counsel”
- 9 • “Again, **complete transparency without conditions.**”

10 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

11 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 12 • “Jamie has **nothing to hide** [and] **will therefore hide nothing.**”
- 13 • “Jamie affirms that he will **unconditionally cooperate** in transferring **all** [emphasis in
14 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 15 • “Jamie recognizes his **ongoing and transparent participation is paramount**”
- 16 • “Jamie will **unconditionally cooperate** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 17 • “Jamie is committed to **complete transparency without conditions.**”

18 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

19 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
20 “committed to **complete transparency,**” that they had “**withheld nothing,**” and that he “provided **explicit**
21 **instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.**” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
22 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
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24 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
25 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
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3 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
4 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
5 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
6 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
7 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
8 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

9 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
10 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
11 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
12 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
13 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
14 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
15 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
16 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

17 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
18 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
19 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
20 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
21 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
22 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
23 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
24 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

25 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
26 timely object, his counsel promised “***unconditional[] cooperat[ion]***,” “***complete transparency without***
27 ***conditions***,” and that Britney Spears was “***welcome to everything***.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
28 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided ***explicit instructions to prior counsel to***

1 ***produce everything without exception.***” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
2 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
3 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
4 such objections.

5 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
6 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
7 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
8 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
9 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
10 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
11 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
12 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

13 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
14 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
15 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
16 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
17 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
18 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
19 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

20 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
21 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
22 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
23 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
24 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
25 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
26 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
27 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
28 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and

1 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears's desperation and lack of any factual basis for
2 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
3 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

4 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17:**

5 All correspondence (whether on paper, electronically, or by text or instant message) with security
6 services and/or guards at Black Box Security, Inc. or otherwise, who have worked at the residence of
7 Britney Jean Spears concerning electronic surveillance.

8 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17:**

9 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
10 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
11 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
12 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
13 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
14 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

15 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

16 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
17 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
18 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
19 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
20 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
21 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
22 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
23 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

24 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
25 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
26 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
27 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
28 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has

1 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
2 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
3 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
4 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
5 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
6 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
7 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

8 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17:**

9 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
10 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
11 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
12 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
13 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
14 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
15 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."]) This fact is buttressed by his new
16 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
17 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
18 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes
19 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
20 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

21 Mr. Spears's counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client's unconditional, transparent
22 cooperation in producing "**all**" documents to Ms. Spears's counsel. Although these representations have,
23 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
24 become a "Big Lie" of Mr. Spears's defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
25 Spears's statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
26 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
27 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears's counsel professed the following:

- That Mr. Spears would “**unconditionally**] *cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of *all files* regarding the conservatorship”
- That Ms. Spears was “*welcome to everything – complete transparency without conditions.*”
- That he would “**do everything [he] [could]** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all files] from prior counsel”
- “Again, *complete transparency without conditions.*”

(McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- “Jamie has *nothing to hide* [and] *will therefore hide nothing.*”
- “Jamie affirms that he will *unconditionally cooperate* in transferring *all* [emphasis in original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- “Jamie recognizes his *ongoing and transparent participation is paramount*”
- “Jamie will *unconditionally cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions.*”

(McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly “committed to *complete transparency,*” that they had “*withheld nothing,*” and that he “provided *explicit instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.*” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents contained in the applicable requests.

Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production

1 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
2 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
3 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
4 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
5 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
6 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)³³ Thus, consistent with the
7 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
8 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
9 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
10 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

11 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
12 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
13 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
14 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
15 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
16 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
17 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
18 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
19 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
20 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
21 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
22 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

23 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
24 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
25 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he

26 ³³ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
27 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
28 Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
2 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
3 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
4 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
5 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
6 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
7 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
8 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
9 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

10 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
11 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
12 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
13 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
14 claims it “***DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,***” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
15 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
16 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
17 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, ***not one***. (See
18 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
19 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)³⁴

20 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
21 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
22 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
23 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
24 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
25 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
26 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
27 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters

28 ³⁴ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
2 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

3 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
4 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
5 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
6 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

7 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
8 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
9 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
10 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
11 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
12 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
13 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
14 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
15 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
16 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”
17 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
18 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
19 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
20 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
21 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
22 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
23 is also completely meritless.

24 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
25 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
26 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
27 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
28 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the

1 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
2 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
3 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
4 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
5 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

6 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
7 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
8 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
9 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
10 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
11 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
12 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
13 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

14 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
15 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
16 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
17 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
18 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
19 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
20 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
21 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

22 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
23 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional]] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
24 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
25 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
26 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
27 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
28

1 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
2 such objections.

3 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
4 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears's burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
5 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
6 255.) Mr. Spears's position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter's* privacy.
7 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the "historically important state interest
8 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings." (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
9 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
10 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears's evasive and fabricated "privacy rights."

11 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the "common
12 interest doctrine." Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
13 "common interest doctrine" is a "nonwaiver doctrine," and does not separately act as a privilege
14 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
15 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 ["party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
16 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
17 privilege"].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

18 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
19 "speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
20 or unknown to Jamie" and "call for a legal conclusion." (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
21 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
22 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
23 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
24 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
25 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
26 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
27 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears's desperation and lack of any factual basis for
28

1 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
2 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

3 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18:**

4 All lease or other rental agreements paid for out of the Conservatorship Estate of Britney Jean
5 Spears.

6 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18:**

7 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
8 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
9 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
10 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
11 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
12 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

13 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

- 14 ● Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
15 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
16 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
17 Production No. 18) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
18 Request for Production No. 27). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.
- 19 ● The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
20 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
21 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
22 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
23 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
24 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
25 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
26 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.
- 27 ● There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
28 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this

1 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
2 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
3 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
4 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
5 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
6 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
7 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
8 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
9 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
10 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

11 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18:**

12 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
13 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
14 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
15 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
16 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
17 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
18 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."] .) This fact is buttressed by his new
19 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
20 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
21 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes
22 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
23 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

24 Mr. Spears's counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client's unconditional, transparent
25 cooperation in producing "**all**" documents to Ms. Spears's counsel. Although these representations have,
26 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
27 become a "Big Lie" of Mr. Spears's defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
28 Spears's statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of

1 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
2 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 3 • That Mr. Spears would “**unconditionally]] cooperate** with a complete and total
4 transfer of **all files** regarding the conservatorship”
- 5 • That Ms. Spears was “**welcome to everything – complete transparency without**
6 **conditions.**”
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8 files] from prior counsel”
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10 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

11 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 12 • “Jamie has **nothing to hide** [and] **will therefore hide nothing.**”
- 13 • “Jamie affirms that he will **unconditionally cooperate** in transferring **all** [emphasis in
14 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 15 • “Jamie recognizes his **ongoing and transparent participation is paramount**”
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19 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
20 “committed to **complete transparency,**” that they had “**withheld nothing,**” and that he “provided **explicit**
21 **instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.**” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
22 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
23 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

24 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
25 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
26 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
27 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
28 contained in the applicable requests.

1 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
2 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
3 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
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7 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
8 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)³⁵ Thus, consistent with the
9 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
10 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
11 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 [“[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
12 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party.]”.)

13 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
14 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
15 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
16 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
17 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
18 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
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³⁵ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
2 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
3 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
4 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
5 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
6 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
7 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
8 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
9 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
10 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
11 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
12 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

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14 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
15 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
16 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
17 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
18 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
19 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
20 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, ***not one***. (See
21 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
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23 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
24 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
25 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
26 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
27 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.

28 ³⁶ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 Spears's role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
2 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only "reasonably calculated" to
3 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
4 including Mr. Spears's fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
5 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

6 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears's objection that the requests are somehow "not reasonably
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9 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

10 Mr. Spears's objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
11 "YOU" and "YOUR," are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
12 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
13 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 ["[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
14 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response."].) Mr. Spears
15 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
16 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) "The objection
17 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
18 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
19 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought."
20 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
21 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 ["The objection of burden is valid only when that
22 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice."]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
23 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears's objection that the documents "may be obtained
24 from other sources or through other means of discovery" (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
25 burden and expense would "outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery" (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
26 is also completely meritless.

27 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are "oppressive"
28 because they "do not contain any temporal limitations" (an objection repeated in every response) this

1 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
2 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
3 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
4 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
5 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
6 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
7 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
8 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

9 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
10 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
11 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
12 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
13 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
14 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
15 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
16 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

17 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
18 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
19 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
20 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
21 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
22 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
23 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
24 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

25 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
26 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
27 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
28 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**

1 ***produce everything without exception.***” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
2 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
3 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
4 such objections.

5 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
6 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
7 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
8 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
9 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
10 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
11 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
12 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

13 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
14 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
15 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
16 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
17 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
18 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
19 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

20 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
21 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
22 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
23 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
24 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
25 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
26 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
27 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
28 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and

1 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears's desperation and lack of any factual basis for
2 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
3 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

4 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19:**

5 All correspondence (whether on paper, electronically, or by text or instant message) RELATING
6 TO the monthly allowance that you allowed to Britney Jean Spears out of her Conservatorship Estate.

7 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19:**

8 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
9 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
10 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
11 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
12 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
13 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

14 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

- 15 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
16 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
17 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
18 Production No. 19) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
19 Request for Production No. 28). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.
- 20 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
21 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
22 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
23 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
24 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
25 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
26 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
27 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

1 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
2 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
3 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
4 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
5 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
6 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
7 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
8 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
9 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
10 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
11 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
12 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

13 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19:**

14 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
15 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
16 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
17 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
18 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
19 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
20 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."].) This fact is buttressed by his new
21 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
22 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
23 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes
24 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
25 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

26 Mr. Spears's counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client's unconditional, transparent
27 cooperation in producing "**all**" documents to Ms. Spears's counsel. Although these representations have,
28 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has

1 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
2 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
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25 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

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14 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
15 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
16 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
17 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
18 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
19 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
20 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
21 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”
22 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
23 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
24 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
25 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
26 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
27 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
28 is also completely meritless.

1 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
2 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
3 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
4 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
5 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
6 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
7 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
8 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
9 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
10 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

11 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
12 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
13 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
14 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
15 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
16 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
17 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
18 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

19 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
20 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
21 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
22 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
23 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
24 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
25 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
26 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

27 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
28 timely object, his counsel promised “***unconditional]] cooperat[ion],***” “***complete transparency without***

1 **conditions,**” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything.**” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
2 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
3 **produce everything without exception.**” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
4 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
5 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
6 such objections.

7 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
8 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
9 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
10 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
11 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
12 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
13 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
14 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

15 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
16 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
17 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
18 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
19 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
20 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
21 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

22 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
23 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
24 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
25 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
26 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
27 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
28 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests

1 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
2 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
3 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears's desperation and lack of any factual basis for
4 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
5 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

6 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20:**

7 All DOCUMENTS evidencing any analysis performed RELATING TO the monthly allowance
8 that you permitted to Britney Jean Spears out of her Conservatorship Estate.

9 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20:**

10 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
11 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
12 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
13 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
14 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
15 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

16 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

- 17 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
18 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
19 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
20 Production No. 20) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
21 Request for Production No. 29). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.
- 22 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
23 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
24 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
25 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
26 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
27 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
28

1 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
2 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

3 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
4 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
5 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
6 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
7 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
8 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
9 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
10 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
11 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
12 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
13 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
14 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

15 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20:**

16 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
17 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
18 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
19 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
20 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
21 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
22 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."]) This fact is buttressed by his new
23 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
24 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
25 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes
26 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
27 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

1 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
2 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
3 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
4 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
5 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
6 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
7 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 8 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally*** cooperate with a complete and total
9 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 10 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
11 ***conditions.***”
- 12 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
13 files] from prior counsel”
- 14 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

15 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

16 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 17 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 18 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
19 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 20 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”
- 21 • “Jamie will ***unconditionally cooperate*** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 22 • “Jamie is committed to ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

23 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

24 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
25 “committed to ***complete transparency,***” that they had “***withheld nothing,***” and that he “provided ***explicit***
26 ***instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.***” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
27 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
28 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

1 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
2 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
3 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
4 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
5 contained in the applicable requests.

6 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
7 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
8 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
9 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
10 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
11 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
12 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
13 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)³⁹ Thus, consistent with the
14 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
15 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
16 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
17 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

18 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
19 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
20 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
21 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
22 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
23 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
24 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
25 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under

26 _____
27 ³⁹ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
28 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
2 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
3 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
4 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

5 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
6 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
7 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
8 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
9 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
10 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
11 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
12 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
13 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
14 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
15 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
16 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

17 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
18 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
19 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
20 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
21 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
22 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
23 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
24 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, ***not one***. (See
25 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
26 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)⁴⁰

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28

⁴⁰ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
2 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
3 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
4 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
5 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
6 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
7 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
8 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
9 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
10 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

11 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
12 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
13 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
14 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

15 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
16 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
17 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
18 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
19 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
20 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
21 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
22 based upon burden must be sustained by **evidence showing** the quantum of work required, while to
23 support an objection of oppression there must be **some showing** either of an intent to create an
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26 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
27 burden is **demonstrated** to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
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2 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
3 is also completely meritless.

4 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
5 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
6 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
7 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
8 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
9 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
10 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
11 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
12 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
13 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

14 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
15 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
16 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
17 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
18 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
19 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
20 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
21 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

22 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
23 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
24 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
25 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
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1 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
2 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

3 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
4 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
5 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
6 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
7 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
8 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
9 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
10 such objections.

11 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
12 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
13 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
14 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
15 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
16 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
17 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
18 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

19 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
20 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
21 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
22 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
23 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
24 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
25 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

26 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
27 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
28 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting

1 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
2 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
3 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
4 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
5 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
6 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
7 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears's desperation and lack of any factual basis for
8 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
9 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

10 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 21:**

11 All DOCUMENTS evidencing your ascertainment, if any, of the goals, needs and preferences of
12 Britney Jean Spears while you were the Conservator of the Person.

13 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 21:**

14 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
15 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
16 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
17 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
18 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
19 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

20 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

21 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
22 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
23 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
24 Production No. 22) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
25 Request for Production No. 31). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.

26 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
27 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
28 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject

1 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
2 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
3 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
4 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
5 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

6 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
7 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
8 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
9 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
10 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
11 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
12 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
13 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
14 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
15 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
16 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
17 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

18 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 21:**

19 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
20 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
21 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
22 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
23 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
24 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
25 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."].) This fact is buttressed by his new
26 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
27 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
28 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes

1 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
2 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

3 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
4 cooperation in producing “all” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
5 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
6 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
7 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
8 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
9 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 10 • That Mr. Spears would “*unconditionally*] cooperate with a complete and total
11 transfer of *all files* regarding the conservatorship”
- 12 • That Ms. Spears was “*welcome to everything – complete transparency without*
13 *conditions.*”
- 14 • That he would “*do everything [he] [could]* to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
15 files] from prior counsel”
- 16 • “Again, *complete transparency without conditions.*”

17 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

18 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 19 • “Jamie has *nothing to hide* [and] *will therefore hide nothing.*”
- 20 • “Jamie affirms that he will *unconditionally cooperate* in transferring *all* [emphasis in
21 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 22 • “Jamie recognizes his *ongoing and transparent participation is paramount*”
- 23 • “Jamie will *unconditionally cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 24 • “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions.*”

25 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

26 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
27 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
28 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.*” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even

1 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
2 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

3 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
4 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
5 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
6 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
7 contained in the applicable requests.

8 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
9 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
10 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
11 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
12 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
13 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
14 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
15 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁴¹ Thus, consistent with the
16 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
17 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
18 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 [“[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
19 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party.]”)

20 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
21 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
22 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
23 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
24 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
25 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*

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27 ⁴¹ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
28 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
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the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
2 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
3 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
4 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
5 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
6 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

7 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
8 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
9 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
10 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
11 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
12 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
13 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
14 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
15 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
16 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
17 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
18 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

19 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
20 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
21 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
22 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
23 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
24 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
25 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
26 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, *not one*. (See
27
28

1 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
2 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)⁴²

3 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
4 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
5 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
6 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
7 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
8 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
9 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
10 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
11 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
12 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

13 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
14 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
15 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
16 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

17 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
18 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
19 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
20 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
21 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
22 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
23 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
24 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
25 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
26 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”
27 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any

28 ⁴² As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
2 burden is **demonstrated** to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
3 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
4 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
5 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
6 is also completely meritless.

7 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
8 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
9 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
10 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
11 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
12 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
13 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
14 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
15 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
16 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

17 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
18 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
19 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
20 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
21 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
22 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
23 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
24 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

25 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
26 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
27 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
28 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th

1 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
2 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
3 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
4 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

5 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
6 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
7 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
8 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
9 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
10 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
11 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
12 such objections.

13 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
14 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
15 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
16 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
17 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
18 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
19 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
20 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

21 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
22 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
23 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
24 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
25 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
26 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
27 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

1 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
2 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
3 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
4 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
5 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
6 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
7 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
8 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
9 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
10 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
11 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
12 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 22:**

14 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO any discussion or negotiation for your resignation from the
15 position of Conservator.

16 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 22:**

17 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
18 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
19 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
20 to the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.
21 Jamie further objects to the Document Request to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by
22 the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine.

23 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

24 ● Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
25 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
26 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
27 Production No. 24) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
28 Request for Production No. 33). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.

1 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
2 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
3 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
4 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
5 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
6 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
7 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
8 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

9 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
10 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
11 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
12 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
13 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
14 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
15 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
16 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
17 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
18 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
19 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
20 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

21 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 22:**

22 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
23 his boilerplate objections are proper. (*See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
24 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
25 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
26 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
27 sought. (*See Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
28 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."]) This fact is buttressed by his new

1 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
2 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
3 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
4 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
5 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

6 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
7 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
8 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
9 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
10 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
11 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
12 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 13 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
14 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 15 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
16 ***conditions.***”
- 17 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
18 files] from prior counsel”
- 19 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

20 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

21 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 22 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 23 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
24 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 25 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”
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1 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
2 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
3 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
4 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
5 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

6 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
7 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
8 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
9 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
10 contained in the applicable requests.

11 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
12 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
13 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
14 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
15 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
16 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
17 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
18 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁴³ Thus, consistent with the
19 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
20 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
21 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
22 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

23 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
24 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
25 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,

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4 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
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6 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
7 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
8 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
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11 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
12 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
13 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
14 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
15 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
16 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
17 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
18 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
19 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
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21 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

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23 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
24 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
25 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
26 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
27 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
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6 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
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8 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
9 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
10 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
11 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
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14 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
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7 is also completely meritless.

8 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
9 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
10 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
11 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
12 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
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16 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
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18 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
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24 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
25 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

26 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
27 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
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3 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
4 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
5 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

6 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
7 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
8 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
9 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
10 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
11 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
12 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
13 such objections.

14 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
15 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
16 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
17 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
18 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
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21 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

22 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
23 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
24 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
25 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
26 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
27 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
28 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

1 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
2 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
3 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
4 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
5 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
6 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
7 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
8 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
9 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
10 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
11 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
12 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23:**

14 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO any payments to third parties that you sought as part of any
15 discussion or negotiation for your resignation from the position of Conservator.

16 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23:**

17 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
18 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
19 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
20 to the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.
21 Jamie further objects to the Document Request to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by
22 the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine.

23 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

24 ● Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
25 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
26 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
27 Production No. 25) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
28 Request for Production No. 34). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.

1 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
2 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
3 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
4 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
5 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
6 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
7 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
8 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

9 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
10 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
11 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
12 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
13 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
14 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
15 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
16 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
17 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
18 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
19 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
20 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

21 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23:**

22 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
23 his boilerplate objections are proper. (*See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
24 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
25 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
26 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
27 sought. (*See Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
28 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."]) This fact is buttressed by his new

1 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
2 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
3 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
4 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
5 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

6 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
7 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
8 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
9 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
10 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
11 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
12 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 13 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
14 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 15 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
16 ***conditions.***”
- 17 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
18 files] from prior counsel”
- 19 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

20 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

21 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 22 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 23 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
24 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 25 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”
- 26 • “Jamie will ***unconditionally cooperate*** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 27 • “Jamie is committed to ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

28 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

1 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
2 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
3 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
4 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
5 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

6 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
7 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
8 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
9 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
10 contained in the applicable requests.

11 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
12 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
13 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
14 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
15 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
16 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
17 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
18 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁴⁵ Thus, consistent with the
19 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
20 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
21 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
22 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

23 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
24 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
25 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,

26 ⁴⁵ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
27 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
28 Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
2 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
3 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
4 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
5 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
6 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
7 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
8 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
9 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

10 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
11 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
12 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
13 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
14 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
15 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
16 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
17 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
18 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
19 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
20 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
21 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

22 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
23 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
24 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
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2 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
3 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
4 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
5 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
6 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
7 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
8 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
9 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
10 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
11 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
12 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 24:**

14 All correspondence (whether on paper, electronically, or by text or instant message) RELATING
15 TO any payments to third parties that you sought as part of any discussion or negotiation for your
16 resignation from the position of Conservator.

17 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 24:**

18 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
19 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
20 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
21 to the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.
22 Jamie further objects to the Document Request to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by
23 the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine.

24 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

25 ● Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
26 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
27 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
28

1 Production No. 26) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
2 Request for Production No. 35). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.

3 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
4 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
5 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
6 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
7 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
8 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
9 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
10 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

11 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
12 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
13 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
14 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
15 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
16 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
17 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
18 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
19 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
20 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
21 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
22 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

23 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 24:**

24 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
25 his boilerplate objections are proper. (*See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
26 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
27 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
28 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery

1 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 [“As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
2 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”].) This fact is buttressed by his new
3 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
4 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
5 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
6 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
7 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

8 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
9 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
10 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
11 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
12 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
13 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
14 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 15 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
16 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 17 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
18 ***conditions.***”
- 19 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
20 files] from prior counsel”
- 21 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

22 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

23 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 24 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 25 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
26 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 27 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”
- 28 • “Jamie will ***unconditionally cooperate*** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”

- “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions.*”

(McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.*” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents contained in the applicable requests.

Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁴⁷ Thus, consistent with the Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

⁴⁷ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
2 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
3 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
4 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
5 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
6 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
7 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
8 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
9 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
10 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
11 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
12 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

13 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
14 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
15 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
16 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
17 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
18 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
19 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
20 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
21 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
22 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
23 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
24 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

25 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
26 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
27 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
28 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely

1 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR**,” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
2 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
3 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
4 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, *not one*. (See
5 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
6 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)⁴⁸

7 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
8 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
9 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
10 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
11 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
12 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
13 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
14 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
15 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
16 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

17 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
18 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
19 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
20 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

21 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
22 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
23 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
24 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
25 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
26 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
27 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection

28 ⁴⁸ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
2 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
3 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”
4 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
5 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
6 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
7 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
8 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
9 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
10 is also completely meritless.

11 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
12 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
13 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
14 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
15 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
16 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
17 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
18 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
19 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
20 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

21 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
22 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
23 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
24 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
25 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
26 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
27 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
28 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

1 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
2 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
3 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
4 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
5 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
6 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
7 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
8 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

9 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
10 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
11 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
12 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
13 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
14 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
15 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
16 such objections.

17 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
18 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
19 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
20 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
21 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
22 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
23 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
24 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

25 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
26 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
27 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
28 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115

1 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
2 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
3 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

4 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
5 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
6 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
7 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
8 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
9 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
10 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
11 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
12 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
13 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
14 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
15 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

16 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 25:**

17 All DOCUMENTS evidencing any training, schooling, or education you received RELATING
18 TO how to be a fiduciary or manage the financial affairs of a third party.

19 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 25:**

20 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
21 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
22 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
23 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
24 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
25 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

26 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

27 ● Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
28 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by

1 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
2 Production No. 27) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
3 Request for Production No. 36). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.

4 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
5 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
6 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
7 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
8 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
9 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
10 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
11 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment

12 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
13 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
14 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
15 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
16 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
17 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
18 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
19 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
20 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
21 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
22 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
23 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

24 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 25:**

25 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
26 his boilerplate objections are proper. (*See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
27 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
28 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn

1 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
2 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 [“As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
3 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”].) This fact is buttressed by his new
4 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
5 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
6 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
7 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
8 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

9 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
10 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
11 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
12 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
13 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
14 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
15 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 16 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
17 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 18 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
19 ***conditions.***”
- 20 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
21 files] from prior counsel”
- 22 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

23 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

24 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 25 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 26 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
27 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 28 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”

- 1 • “Jamie will *unconditionally cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 2 • “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions*.”

3 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

4 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
5 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
6 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
7 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
8 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

9 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
10 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
11 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
12 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
13 contained in the applicable requests.

14 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
15 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
16 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
17 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
18 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
19 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
20 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
21 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁴⁹ Thus, consistent with the
22 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
23 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
24 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
25 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

26 _____
27 ⁴⁹ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
28 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
2 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
3 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
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12 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

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14 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
15 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
16 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
17 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
18 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
19 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
20 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
21 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
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24 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

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27 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
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10 is also completely meritless.

11 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
12 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
13 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
14 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
15 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
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27 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
28 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

1 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
2 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
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6 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
7 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
8 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

9 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
10 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
11 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
12 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
13 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
14 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
15 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
16 such objections.

17 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
18 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
19 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
20 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
21 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
22 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
23 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
24 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

25 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
26 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
27 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
28 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115

1 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
2 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
3 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

4 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
5 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
6 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
7 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
8 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
9 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
10 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
11 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
12 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
13 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
14 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
15 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

16 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 26:**

17 All organizational and corporate formation documents for all entities that have received or held
18 Conservatorship Estate assets and in which you held or hold an officer, director, managing member,
19 general partner, or managing agent position.

20 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 26:**

21 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
22 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
23 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
24 to the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.
25 Jamie objects on the grounds that this Document Request seeks confidential or private financial
26 information, confidential business or commercial information, trade secrets, proprietary information, or
27 otherwise calls for information protected by the right of privacy. Jamie further objects to the Document
28

1 Request to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the
2 attorney work-product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine.

3 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

4 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
5 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
6 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
7 Production No. 30) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
8 Request for Production No. 39). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.

9 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
10 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
11 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
12 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
13 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
14 in an order. This Document Request is relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to
15 the extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

16 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
17 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
18 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
19 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
20 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
21 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
22 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
23 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
24 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
25 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
26 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
27 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

28 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 26:**

1 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
2 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
3 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
4 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
5 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
6 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 [“As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
7 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”].) This fact is buttressed by his new
8 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
9 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
10 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to every single request for production includes
11 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
12 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

13 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
14 cooperation in producing “all” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
15 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
16 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
17 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
18 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
19 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 20 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
21 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 22 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
23 ***conditions.***”
- 24 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
25 files] from prior counsel”
- 26 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

27 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

28 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 1 • “Jamie has *nothing to hide* [and] *will therefore hide nothing*.”
- 2 • “Jamie affirms that he will *unconditionally cooperate* in transferring *all* [emphasis in
- 3 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 4 • “Jamie recognizes his *ongoing and transparent participation is paramount . . .*”
- 5 • “Jamie will *unconditionally cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 6 • “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions*.”

7 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

8 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
9 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
10 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
11 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
12 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

13 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
14 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
15 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
16 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
17 contained in the applicable requests.

18 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
19 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
20 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
21 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
22 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
23 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
24 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
25 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁵¹ Thus, consistent with the

26 _____
27 ⁵¹ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
28 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 Court's reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
2 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
3 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 ["[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
4 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party.]")

5 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are "duplicative, unduly burdensome,
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12 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

13 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
14 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion],**” “**complete transparency without**
15 **conditions,**” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything.**” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
16 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
17 **produce everything without exception.**” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
18 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
19 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
20 such objections.

21 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
22 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
23 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
24 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
25 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
26 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
27 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
28 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

1 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
2 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
3 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
4 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
5 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
6 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
7 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

8 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
9 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
10 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
11 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
12 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
13 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
14 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
15 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
16 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
17 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
18 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
19 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

20 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 27:**

21 All correspondence (whether on paper, electronically, or by text or instant message) RELATING
22 TO whether Britney Jean Spears wanted or did not wish to work a second residency in Las Vegas.

23 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 27:**

24 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
25 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
26 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
27 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
28

1 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
2 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

3 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

4 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
5 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
6 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
7 Production No. 31) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
8 Request for Production No. 40). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.

9 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
10 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
11 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
12 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
13 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
14 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
15 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
16 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

17 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
18 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
19 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
20 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
21 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
22 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
23 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
24 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
25 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
26 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
27 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
28 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

1 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 27:**

2 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
3 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
4 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
5 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
6 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
7 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 [“As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
8 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”].) This fact is buttressed by his new
9 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
10 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
11 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
12 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
13 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

14 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
15 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
16 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
17 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
18 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
19 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
20 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 21 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
22 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 23 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
24 ***conditions.***”
- 25 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
26 files] from prior counsel”
- 27 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

28 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

1 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 2 • “Jamie has *nothing to hide* [and] *will therefore hide nothing*.”
- 3 • “Jamie affirms that he will *unconditionally cooperate* in transferring *all* [emphasis in
- 4 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 5 • “Jamie recognizes his *ongoing and transparent participation is paramount . . .*”
- 6 • “Jamie will *unconditionally cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 7 • “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions*.”

8 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

9 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
10 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
11 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
12 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
13 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

14 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
15 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
16 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
17 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
18 contained in the applicable requests.

19 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
20 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
21 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
22 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
23 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
24 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
25 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
26 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁵³ Thus, consistent with the

27 _____
28 ⁵³ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing

1 Court's reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
2 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
3 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 ["[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
4 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party.]")

5 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are "duplicative, unduly burdensome,
6 oppressive, and harassing" because Mr. Spears already "voluntarily" produced some of the same
7 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
8 "[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
9 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
10 another method." (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services
11 Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
12 "a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
13 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method"]; see,
14 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 ["the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
15 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
16 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable"].)

17 Mr. Spears's objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
18 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
19 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be "unjust and inequitable." But he
20 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his "Big Lie" defense: that he has cooperated and
21 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that "there
22 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
23 and definitions" because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
24 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
25 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
26 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why

27 _____
28 the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts' construction of that statute." (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
2 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

3 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
4 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
5 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
6 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
7 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
8 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
9 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
10 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, ***not one***. (See
11 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
12 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)⁵⁴

13 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
14 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
15 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
16 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
17 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
18 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
19 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
20 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
21 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
22 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

23 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
24 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
25 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
26 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

27
28 ⁵⁴ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 Mr. Spears's objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
2 "YOU" and "YOUR," are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
3 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
4 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 ["[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
5 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response."].) Mr. Spears
6 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
7 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) "The objection
8 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
9 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
10 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought."
11 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
12 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 ["The objection of burden is valid only when that
13 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice."]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
14 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears's objection that the documents "may be obtained
15 from other sources or through other means of discovery" (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
16 burden and expense would "outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery" (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
17 is also completely meritless.

18 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are "oppressive"
19 because they "do not contain any temporal limitations" (an objection repeated in every response) this
20 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
21 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
22 because Britney Spears was under her father's infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
23 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
24 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
25 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
26 "oppression" such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
27 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

1 Mr. Spears's objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
2 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with "sufficient factual
3 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim," such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
4 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 ["if an
5 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
6 request 'shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
7 claim'"]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 ["[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
8 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise".]) He failed to do so.

9 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
10 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell'Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
11 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
12 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
13 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
14 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
15 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
16 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

17 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
18 timely object, his counsel promised "***unconditional[] cooperat[ion]***," "***complete transparency without***
19 ***conditions***," and that Britney Spears was "***welcome to everything***." (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
20 Even further, Mr. Spears's counsel stated that he had "provided ***explicit instructions to prior counsel to***
21 ***produce everything without exception***." (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
22 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
23 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
24 such objections.

25 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
26 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears's burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
27 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
28 255.) Mr. Spears's position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter's* privacy.

1 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
2 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
3 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
4 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

5 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
6 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
7 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
8 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
9 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
10 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
11 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

12 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
13 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
14 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
15 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
16 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
17 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
18 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
19 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
20 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
21 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
22 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
23 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

24 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 28:**

25 All correspondence (whether on paper, electronically, or by text or instant message) RELATING
26 TO whether Britney Jean Spears wanted to work again for so long as you were her Conservator.
27
28

1 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 28:**

2 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
3 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
4 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
5 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
6 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
7 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

8 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

9 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
10 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
11 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
12 Production No. 32) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
13 Request for Production No. 41). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.

14 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
15 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
16 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
17 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
18 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
19 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
20 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
21 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

22 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
23 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
24 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
25 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
26 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
27 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
28 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).

1 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
2 information." See Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
3 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
4 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
5 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

6 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 28:**

7 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
8 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
9 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
10 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
11 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
12 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
13 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."]) This fact is buttressed by his new
14 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
15 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
16 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes
17 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
18 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

19 Mr. Spears's counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client's unconditional, transparent
20 cooperation in producing "**all**" documents to Ms. Spears's counsel. Although these representations have,
21 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
22 become a "Big Lie" of Mr. Spears's defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
23 Spears's statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
24 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
25 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears's counsel professed the following:

- 26
- That Mr. Spears would "**unconditionally**] cooperate with a complete and total
27 transfer of **all files** regarding the conservatorship"
- 28

- 1 • That Ms. Spears was “*welcome to everything – complete transparency without*
- 2 *conditions.*”
- 3 • That he would “*do everything [he] [could]* to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
- 4 files] from prior counsel”
- 5 • “Again, *complete transparency without conditions.*”

6 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

7 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 8 • “Jamie has *nothing to hide* [and] *will therefore hide nothing.*”
- 9 • “Jamie affirms that he will *unconditionally cooperate* in transferring *all* [emphasis in
- 10 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 11 • “Jamie recognizes his *ongoing and transparent participation is paramount*”
- 12 • “Jamie will *unconditionally cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 13 • “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions.*”

14 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

15 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
16 “committed to *complete transparency,*” that they had “*withheld nothing,*” and that he “provided *explicit*
17 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.*” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
18 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
19 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

20 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
21 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
22 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
23 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
24 contained in the applicable requests.

25 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
26 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
27 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
28 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods

1 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
2 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
3 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
4 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁵⁵ Thus, consistent with the
5 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
6 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
7 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 [“[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
8 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party.”].)

9 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
10 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
11 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
12 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
13 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
14 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
15 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
16 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
17 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
18 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
19 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
20 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

21 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
22 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
23 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
24 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
25 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there

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27 ⁵⁵ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
28 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
2 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
3 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
4 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
5 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
6 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
7 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

8 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
9 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
10 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
11 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
12 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
13 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
14 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
15 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, ***not one***. (See
16 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
17 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)⁵⁶

18 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
19 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
20 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
21 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
22 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
23 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
24 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
25 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
26 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
27 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

28 ⁵⁶ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
2 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
3 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
4 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

5 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
6 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
7 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
8 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
9 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
10 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
11 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
12 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
13 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
14 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”
15 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
16 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
17 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
18 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
19 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
20 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
21 is also completely meritless.

22 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
23 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
24 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
25 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
26 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
27 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
28 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring

1 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
2 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
3 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

4 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
5 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
6 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
7 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
8 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
9 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
10 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
11 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

12 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
13 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
14 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
15 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
16 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
17 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
18 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
19 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

20 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
21 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
22 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
23 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
24 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
25 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
26 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
27 such objections.

1 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
2 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
3 do so. (See *Coy*, *supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
4 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
5 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
6 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
7 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
8 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

9 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
10 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
11 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
12 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
13 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
14 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
15 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

16 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
17 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
18 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
19 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
20 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
21 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
22 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
23 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
24 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
25 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
26 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
27 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

1 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 29:**

2 If you contend that your Twelfth Accounting should be approved, all DOCUMENTS supporting
3 that contention.

4 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 29:**

5 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
6 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
7 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
8 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
9 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
10 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

11 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

12 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
13 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
14 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
15 for Production No. 42). This is now the second time Britney served the exact same request.

16 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
17 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
18 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
19 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
20 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
21 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
22 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
23 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

24 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
25 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
26 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
27 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
28 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has

1 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
2 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
3 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
4 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
5 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
6 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
7 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

8 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 29:**

9 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
10 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
11 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
12 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
13 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
14 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
15 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."].) This fact is buttressed by his new
16 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
17 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
18 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes
19 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
20 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

21 Mr. Spears's counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client's unconditional, transparent
22 cooperation in producing "**all**" documents to Ms. Spears's counsel. Although these representations
23 regrettably have proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
24 become a "Big Lie" of their defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr. Spears's
25 statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of equity and
26 fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email dated
27 October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears's counsel professed the following:

- That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally***] *cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without conditions.***”
- That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all files] from prior counsel”
- “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

(McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”
- “Jamie will ***unconditionally cooperate*** with a complete and total transfer of all files”
- “Jamie is committed to ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

(McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

In a November 5, 2021 email to the undersigned, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly “committed to ***complete transparency,***” that they had “***withheld nothing,***” and that he “provided ***explicit instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.***”

(McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what was promised. Mr. Spears’s Big Lie-tactics to create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents contained in the applicable requests.

1 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
2 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
3 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
4 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
5 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
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7 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
8 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁵⁷ Thus, consistent with the
9 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
10 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
11 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 [“[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
12 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party.].) This is particularly true here
13 because, as Mr. Spears admits, he is a fiduciary and he has a fiduciary obligation to comply.

14 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
15 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
16 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially, “A
17 party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
18 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
19 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
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2 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
3 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
4 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on what has become a “Big Lie” of his defense: that he
5 has cooperated and transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on
6 the basis that “there are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice,
7 Document Requests, and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl.,
8 Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response,
9 instead of making countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so
10 state on the record, under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by
11 Bates number? Why does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue?

12 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
13 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce his text or
14 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
15 and *Stine*) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely claims it “**DIDN’T**
16 **HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” supra at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall and hide the truth,
17 Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps” rather than a
18 professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. (See *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.*
19 (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where party refused to produce documents
20 in an organized and labelled manner].) For these reasons, Mr. Spears must be compelled to produce the
21 documents at issue.

22 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
23 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
24 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
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26 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
27 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
28 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to

1 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go to the heart of numerous pending matters including
2 Mr. Spears's fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540; *Hudson,*
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4 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears's objection that the requests are "not relevant and not
5 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" and are "overly broad" (McCurdy
6 Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact, legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970)
7 2 Cal.3d 161, 173 [observing California's "liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures"].) Thus,
8 any "doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery." (*Id.*; see also
9 *Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.

10 Mr. Spears's objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
11 "YOU" and "YOUR," are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
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15 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
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23 Cal.App.3d 313, 321 [requisite burden showing was made when the objecting party showed it would
24 require the review of over 13,000 claim files, requiring five claim adjusters working full time for six
25 weeks].) For this reason, Mr. Spears's objection that the documents "may be obtained from other sources
26 or through other means of discovery" (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the burden and expense
27 would "outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery" (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17) is also meritless.

1 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
2 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
3 argument is also without merit. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an
4 unreasonable burden and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are
5 only here today because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a
6 decade. Further, the evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when,
7 among other things, Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a loan from Tri Star and then
8 hiring Tri Star (a fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
9 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
10 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

11 Mr. Spears’s objections on these grounds are meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived.
12 *First*, to the extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with
13 “sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege
14 log. (See, e.g. Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755,
15 772 [“if an objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the
16 response to the request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits
17 of that claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the
18 burden of establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

19 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
20 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
21 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
22 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
23 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
24 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
25 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
26 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

27 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
28 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**

1 *conditions*,” and that Britney Spears was “welcome to everything.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
2 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided *explicit instructions to prior counsel to*
3 *produce everything without exception*.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Under *Moeller and Stine*, Mr.
4 Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were privileged (and
5 they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any such objections.

6 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
7 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
8 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
9 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
10 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
11 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
12 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) The mission is to ascertain the truth, which necessarily
13 trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

14 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
15 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
16 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
17 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
18 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
19 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
20 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

21 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
22 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
23 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
24 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
25 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
26 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
27 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
28 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use

1 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
2 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears's desperation and lack of any factual basis for
3 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
4 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

5 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 30:**

6 If you contend that your Petition for Order Allowing and Approving Payment of Compensation to
7 Conservator and Attorneys for Conservator and for Reimbursement of Costs should be granted, all
8 DOCUMENTS supporting that contention.

9 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 30:**

10 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
11 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
12 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
13 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
14 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
15 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

16 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

- 17 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
18 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
19 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
20 for Production No. 43). This is now the second time Britney served the exact same request.
- 21 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
22 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
23 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
24 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
25 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
26 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
27 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
28 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

1 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
2 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
3 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
4 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
5 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
6 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
7 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
8 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
9 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
10 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
11 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
12 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

13 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 30:**

14 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
15 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
16 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
17 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
18 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
19 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
20 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."].) This fact is buttressed by his new
21 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
22 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
23 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes
24 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
25 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

26 Mr. Spears's counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client's unconditional, transparent
27 cooperation in producing "**all**" documents to Ms. Spears's counsel. Although these representations have,
28 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has

1 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
2 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
3 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
4 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 5 • That Mr. Spears would “**unconditionally] cooperate** with a complete and total
6 transfer of **all files** regarding the conservatorship”
- 7 • That Ms. Spears was “**welcome to everything – complete transparency without**
8 **conditions.**”
- 9 • That he would “**do everything [he] [could]** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
10 files] from prior counsel”
- 11 • “Again, **complete transparency without conditions.**”

12 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

13 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 14 • “Jamie has **nothing to hide** [and] **will therefore hide nothing.**”
- 15 • “Jamie affirms that he will **unconditionally cooperate** in transferring **all** [emphasis in
16 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 17 • “Jamie recognizes his **ongoing and transparent participation is paramount**”
- 18 • “Jamie will **unconditionally cooperate** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 19 • “Jamie is committed to **complete transparency without conditions.**”

20 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

21 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
22 “committed to **complete transparency,**” that they had “**withheld nothing,**” and that he “provided **explicit**
23 **instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.**” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
24 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
25 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

26 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
27 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
28 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and

1 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
2 contained in the applicable requests.

3 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
4 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
5 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
6 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
7 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
8 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
9 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
10 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁵⁸ Thus, consistent with the
11 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
12 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
13 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
14 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

15 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
16 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
17 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
18 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
19 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
20 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
21 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
22 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
23 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
24 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
25

26 _____
27 ⁵⁸ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
28 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
2 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

3 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
4 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
5 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
6 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
7 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
8 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
9 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
10 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
11 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
12 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
13 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
14 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

15 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
16 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
17 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
18 and *Stine*, *infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
19 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR**,” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
20 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
21 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
22 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, ***not one***. (See
23 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
24 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)⁵⁹

25 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
26 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
27 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.

28 ⁵⁹ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
2 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
3 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
4 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
5 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
6 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
7 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

8 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
9 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
10 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
11 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

12 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
13 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
14 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
15 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
16 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
17 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
18 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
19 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
20 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
21 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”
22 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
23 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
24 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
25 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
26 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
27 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
28 is also completely meritless.

1 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
2 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
3 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
4 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
5 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
6 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
7 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
8 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
9 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
10 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

11 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
12 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
13 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
14 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
15 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
16 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
17 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
18 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

19 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
20 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
21 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
22 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
23 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
24 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
25 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
26 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

27 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
28 timely object, his counsel promised “***unconditional]] cooperat[ion],***” “***complete transparency without***

1 **conditions,**” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything.**” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
2 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
3 **produce everything without exception.**” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
4 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
5 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
6 such objections.

7 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
8 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
9 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
10 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
11 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
12 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
13 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
14 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

15 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
16 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
17 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
18 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
19 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
20 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
21 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

22 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
23 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
24 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
25 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
26 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
27 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
28 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests

1 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
2 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
3 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears's desperation and lack of any factual basis for
4 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
5 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

6 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 31:**

7 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO monies you, or any entity with whom you are affiliated as an
8 officer, director, employee, or in any capacity are affiliated, received between 2008 and the termination
9 of the Conservatorship.

10 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 31:**

11 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
12 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
13 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
14 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
15 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
16 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

17 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

18 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
19 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
20 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
21 Production No. 36) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
22 Request for Production No. 45). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.

23 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
24 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
25 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
26 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
27 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
28 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of

1 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
2 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

3 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
4 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
5 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
6 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
7 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
8 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
9 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
10 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
11 information." See Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
12 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
13 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
14 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

15 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 31:**

16 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
17 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
18 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
19 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
20 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
21 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
22 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."]) This fact is buttressed by his new
23 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
24 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
25 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes
26 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
27 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

1 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
2 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
3 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
4 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
5 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
6 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
7 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 8 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally*** cooperate with a complete and total
9 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 10 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
11 ***conditions.***”
- 12 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
13 files] from prior counsel”
- 14 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

15 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

16 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 17 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 18 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
19 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 20 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”
- 21 • “Jamie will ***unconditionally cooperate*** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 22 • “Jamie is committed to ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

23 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

24 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
25 “committed to ***complete transparency,***” that they had “***withheld nothing,***” and that he “provided ***explicit***
26 ***instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.***” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
27 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
28 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

1 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
2 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
3 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
4 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
5 contained in the applicable requests.

6 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
7 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
8 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
9 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
10 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
11 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
12 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
13 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁶⁰ Thus, consistent with the
14 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
15 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
16 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
17 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

18 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
19 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
20 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
21 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
22 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
23 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
24 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
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27 ⁶⁰ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
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2 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
3 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
4 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

5 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
6 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
7 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
8 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
9 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
10 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
11 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
12 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
13 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
14 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
15 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
16 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

17 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
18 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
19 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
20 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
21 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
22 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
23 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
24 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, ***not one***. (See
25 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
26 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)⁶¹

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⁶¹ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
2 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
3 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
4 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
5 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
6 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
7 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
8 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
9 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
10 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

11 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
12 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
13 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
14 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

15 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
16 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
17 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
18 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
19 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
20 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
21 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
22 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
23 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
24 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”
25 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
26 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
27 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
28 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained

1 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
2 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
3 is also completely meritless.

4 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
5 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
6 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
7 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
8 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
9 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
10 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
11 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
12 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
13 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

14 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
15 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
16 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
17 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
18 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
19 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
20 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
21 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

22 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
23 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
24 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
25 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
26 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
27 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
28

1 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
2 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

3 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
4 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
5 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
6 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
7 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
8 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
9 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
10 such objections.

11 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
12 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
13 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
14 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
15 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
16 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
17 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
18 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

19 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
20 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
21 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
22 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
23 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
24 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
25 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

26 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
27 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
28 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting

1 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
2 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
3 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
4 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
5 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
6 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
7 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears's desperation and lack of any factual basis for
8 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
9 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

10 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 32:**

11 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO the media work invoiced by law firms for which you seek
12 approval to pay their invoiced fees out of the Conservatorship Estate.

13 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 32:**

14 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
15 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
16 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
17 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
18 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
19 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

20 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

- 21 ● Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
22 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
23 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
24 for Production No. 46). This is now the second time Britney served the exact same request.
- 25 ● The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
26 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
27 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
28 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and

1 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
2 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
3 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
4 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

5 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
6 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
7 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
8 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
9 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
10 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
11 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
12 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
13 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
14 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
15 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
16 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

17 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 32:**

18 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
19 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
20 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
21 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
22 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
23 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
24 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."].) This fact is buttressed by his new
25 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
26 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
27 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to every single request for production includes
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1 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
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5 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
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7 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
8 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
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11 transfer of *all files* regarding the conservatorship”
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13 *conditions.*”
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15 files] from prior counsel”
- 16 • “Again, *complete transparency without conditions.*”

17 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

18 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 19 • “Jamie has *nothing to hide* [and] *will therefore hide nothing.*”
- 20 • “Jamie affirms that he will *unconditionally cooperate* in transferring *all* [emphasis in
21 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
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27 “committed to *complete transparency,*” that they had “*withheld nothing,*” and that he “provided *explicit*
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1 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
2 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

3 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
4 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
5 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
6 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
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14 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
15 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁶² Thus, consistent with the
16 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
17 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
18 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 [“[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
19 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party.]”)

20 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
21 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
22 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
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10 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
11 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
12 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
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14 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
15 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
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13 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
14 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
15 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
16 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

17 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
18 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
19 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
20 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
21 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
22 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
23 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
24 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
25 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
26 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”
27 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any

28 ⁶³ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
2 burden is **demonstrated** to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
3 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
4 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
5 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
6 is also completely meritless.

7 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
8 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
9 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
10 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
11 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
12 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
13 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
14 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
15 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
16 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

17 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
18 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
19 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
20 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
21 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
22 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
23 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
24 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

25 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
26 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
27 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
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2 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
3 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
4 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

5 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
6 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
7 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
8 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
9 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
10 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
11 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
12 such objections.

13 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
14 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
15 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
16 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
17 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
18 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
19 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
20 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

21 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
22 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
23 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
24 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
25 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
26 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
27 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

1 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
2 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
3 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
4 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
5 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
6 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
7 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
8 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
9 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
10 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
11 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
12 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33:**

14 All correspondence (whether on paper, electronically, or by text or instant message) RELATING
15 TO the media work invoiced by law firms for which you seek approval to pay their invoiced fees out of
16 the Conservatorship Estate.

17 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33:**

18 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
19 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
20 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
21 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
22 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
23 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

24 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

25 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
26 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
27 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (see, e.g, Request
28 for Production No. 47). This is now the second time Britney served the exact same request.

1 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
2 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
3 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
4 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
5 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
6 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
7 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
8 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

9 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
10 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
11 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
12 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
13 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
14 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
15 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
16 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
17 information." See Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
18 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
19 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
20 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

21 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33:**

22 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
23 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
24 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
25 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
26 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
27 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
28 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."]) This fact is buttressed by his new

1 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
2 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
3 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
4 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
5 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

6 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
7 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
8 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
9 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
10 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
11 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
12 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 13 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
14 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 15 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
16 ***conditions.***”
- 17 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
18 files] from prior counsel”
- 19 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

20 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

21 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 22 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 23 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
24 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 25 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”
- 26 • “Jamie will ***unconditionally cooperate*** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 27 • “Jamie is committed to ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

28 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

1 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
2 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
3 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
4 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
5 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

6 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
7 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
8 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
9 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
10 contained in the applicable requests.

11 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
12 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
13 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
14 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
15 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
16 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
17 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
18 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁶⁴ Thus, consistent with the
19 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
20 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
21 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
22 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

23 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
24 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
25 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,

26 _____
27 ⁶⁴ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
28 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
2 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
3 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
4 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
5 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
6 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
7 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
8 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
9 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

10 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
11 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
12 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
13 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
14 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
15 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
16 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
17 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
18 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
19 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
20 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
21 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

22 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
23 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
24 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
25 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
26 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
27 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
28 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has

1 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, **not one**. (See
2 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
3 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)⁶⁵

4 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
5 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
6 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
7 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
8 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
9 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
10 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
11 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
12 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
13 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

14 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
15 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
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11 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
12 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
13 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
14 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
15 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
16 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
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9 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
10 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
11 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
12 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 34:**

14 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO the business manager matters invoiced by law firms for
15 which you seek approval to pay their invoiced fees out of the Conservatorship Estate.

16 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 34:**

17 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
18 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
19 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
20 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
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24 ● Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
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27 for Production No. 48). This is now the second time Britney served the exact same request.

1 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
2 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
3 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
4 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
5 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
6 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
7 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
8 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

9 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
10 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
11 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
12 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
13 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
14 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
15 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
16 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
17 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
18 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
19 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
20 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

21 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 34:**

22 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
23 his boilerplate objections are proper. (*See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
24 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
25 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
26 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
27 sought. (*See Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
28 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."]) This fact is buttressed by his new

1 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
2 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
3 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
4 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
5 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

6 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
7 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
8 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
9 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
10 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
11 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
12 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 13 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
14 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 15 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
16 ***conditions.***”
- 17 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
18 files] from prior counsel”
- 19 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

20 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

21 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 22 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 23 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
24 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
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28 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

1 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
2 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
3 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
4 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
5 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

6 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
7 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
8 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
9 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
10 contained in the applicable requests.

11 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
12 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
13 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
14 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
15 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
16 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
17 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
18 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁶⁶ Thus, consistent with the
19 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
20 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
21 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
22 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

23 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
24 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
25 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,

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27 ⁶⁶ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
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1 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
2 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
3 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
4 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
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6 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
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9 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

10 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
11 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
12 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
13 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
14 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
15 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
16 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
17 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
18 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
19 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
20 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
21 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

22 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
23 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
24 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
25 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
26 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
27 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
28 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has

1 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, **not one**. (See
2 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
3 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)⁶⁷

4 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
5 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
6 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
7 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
8 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
9 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
10 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
11 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
12 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
13 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

14 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
15 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
16 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
17 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

18 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
19 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
20 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
21 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
22 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
23 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
24 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
25 based upon burden must be sustained by **evidence showing** the quantum of work required, while to
26 support an objection of oppression there must be **some showing** either of an intent to create an
27 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”

28 ⁶⁷ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
2 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
3 burden is **demonstrated** to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
4 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
5 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
6 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
7 is also completely meritless.

8 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
9 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
10 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
11 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
12 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
13 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
14 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
15 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
16 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
17 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

18 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
19 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
20 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
21 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
22 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
23 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
24 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
25 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

26 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
27 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
28 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel

1 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
2 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
3 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
4 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
5 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

6 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
7 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
8 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
9 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
10 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
11 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
12 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
13 such objections.

14 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
15 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
16 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
17 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
18 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
19 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
20 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
21 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

22 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
23 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
24 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
25 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
26 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
27 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
28 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

1 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
2 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
3 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
4 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
5 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
6 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
7 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
8 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
9 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
10 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
11 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
12 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 35:**

14 All correspondence (whether on paper, electronically, or by text or instant message) RELATING
15 TO the business manager matters invoiced by law firms for which you seek approval to pay their
16 invoiced fees out of the Conservatorship Estate.

17 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 35:**

18 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
19 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
20 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
21 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
22 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
23 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

24 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

25 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
26 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
27 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
28 for Production No. 49). This is now the second time Britney served the exact same request.

1 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
2 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
3 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
4 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
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9 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
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13 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
14 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
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16 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
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19 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
20 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

21 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 35:**

22 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
23 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
24 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
25 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
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11 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
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24 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
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19 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
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23 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
24 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
25 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
26 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
27 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
28 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has

1 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, **not one**. (See
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5 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
6 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
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9 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
10 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
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14 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
15 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
16 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
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18 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
19 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
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23 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
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27 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”

28 ⁶⁹ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

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5 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
6 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
7 is also completely meritless.

8 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
9 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
10 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
11 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
12 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
13 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
14 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
15 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
16 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
17 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

18 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
19 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
20 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
21 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
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24 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
25 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

26 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
27 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
28 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel

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3 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
4 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
5 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

6 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
7 timely object, his counsel promised “***unconditional[] cooperat[ion]***,” “***complete transparency without***
8 ***conditions***,” and that Britney Spears was “***welcome to everything***.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
9 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided ***explicit instructions to prior counsel to***
10 ***produce everything without exception***.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
11 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
12 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
13 such objections.

14 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
15 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
16 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
17 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
18 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
19 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
20 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
21 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

22 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
23 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
24 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
25 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
26 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
27 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
28 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

1 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
2 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
3 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
4 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
5 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
6 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
7 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
8 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
9 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
10 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
11 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
12 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 36:**

14 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO the travel planning invoiced by law firms for which you seek
15 approval to pay their invoiced fees out of the Conservatorship Estate.

16 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 36:**

17 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
18 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
19 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
20 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
21 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
22 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

23 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

24 ● Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
25 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
26 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.,* Request
27 for Production No. 50). This is now the second time Britney served the exact same request.

1 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
2 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
3 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
4 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
5 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
6 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
7 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
8 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

9 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
10 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
11 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
12 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
13 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
14 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
15 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
16 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
17 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
18 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
19 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
20 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

21 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 36:**

22 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
23 his boilerplate objections are proper. (*See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
24 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
25 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
26 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
27 sought. (*See Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
28

1 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”.) This fact is buttressed by his new
2 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation.

3 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
4 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
5 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
6 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
7 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
8 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
9 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 10 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
11 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 12 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
13 ***conditions.***”
- 14 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
15 files] from prior counsel”
- 16 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

17 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

18 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 19 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 20 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
21 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 22 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”
- 23 • “Jamie will ***unconditionally cooperate*** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 24 • “Jamie is committed to ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

25 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

26 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
27 “committed to ***complete transparency,***” that they had “***withheld nothing,***” and that he “provided ***explicit***
28 ***instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.***” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even

1 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
2 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

3 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
4 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
5 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
6 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
7 contained in the applicable requests.

8 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
9 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
10 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
11 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
12 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
13 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
14 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
15 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁷⁰ Thus, consistent with the
16 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
17 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
18 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 [“[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
19 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party.]”)

20 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
21 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
22 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
23 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
24 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
25 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*

26 ⁷⁰ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
27 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
28 Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
2 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
3 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
4 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
5 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
6 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

7 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
8 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
9 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
10 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
11 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
12 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
13 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
14 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
15 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
16 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
17 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
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21 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
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9 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
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3 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
4 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
5 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
6 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
7 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
8 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
9 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
10 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
11 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
12 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37:**

14 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO the invoiced legal fees incurred by Atlanta law firms in
15 connection with the *Bryan Kuchar litigation* (Northern District of Georgia Case No. 1:19-cv-03028).

16 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37:**

17 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
18 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
19 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
20 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
21 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
22 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

23 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

24 ● The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
25 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
26 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
27 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
28 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action

1 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
2 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
3 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

4 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
5 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
6 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
7 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
8 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
9 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
10 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
11 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
12 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
13 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
14 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
15 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

16 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37:**

17 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
18 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
19 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
20 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
21 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
22 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
23 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."]) This fact is buttressed by his new
24 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
25 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
26 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to **every single request** for production includes
27 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
28 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

1 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
2 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
3 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
4 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
5 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
6 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
7 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 8 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally*** cooperate with a complete and total
9 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 10 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
11 ***conditions.***”
- 12 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
13 files] from prior counsel”
- 14 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

15 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

16 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 17 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 18 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
19 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 20 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”
- 21 • “Jamie will ***unconditionally cooperate*** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 22 • “Jamie is committed to ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

23 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

24 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
25 “committed to ***complete transparency,***” that they had “***withheld nothing,***” and that he “provided ***explicit***
26 ***instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.***” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
27 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
28 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

1 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
2 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
3 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
4 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
5 contained in the applicable requests.

6 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
7 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
8 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
9 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
10 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
11 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
12 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
13 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁷² Thus, consistent with the
14 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
15 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
16 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
17 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

18 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
19 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
20 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
21 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
22 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
23 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
24 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
25 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under

26 _____
27 ⁷² See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
28 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
2 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
3 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
4 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

5 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
6 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
7 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
8 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
9 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
10 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
11 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
12 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
13 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
14 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
15 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
16 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

17 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
18 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
19 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
20 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
21 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
22 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
23 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
24 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, ***not one***. (See
25 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
26 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)⁷³

27
28

⁷³ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
2 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
3 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
4 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
5 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
6 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
7 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
8 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
9 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
10 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

11 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
12 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
13 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
14 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

15 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
16 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
17 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
18 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
19 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
20 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
21 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
22 based upon burden must be sustained by **evidence showing** the quantum of work required, while to
23 support an objection of oppression there must be **some showing** either of an intent to create an
24 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”
25 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
26 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
27 burden is **demonstrated** to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
28 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained

1 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
2 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
3 is also completely meritless.

4 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
5 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
6 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
7 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
8 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
9 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
10 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
11 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
12 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
13 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

14 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
15 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
16 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
17 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
18 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
19 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
20 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
21 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

22 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
23 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
24 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
25 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
26 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
27 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
28

1 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
2 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

3 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
4 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
5 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
6 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
7 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
8 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
9 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
10 such objections.

11 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
12 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
13 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
14 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
15 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
16 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
17 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
18 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

19 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
20 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
21 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
22 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
23 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
24 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
25 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

26 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
27 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
28 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting

1 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
2 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
3 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
4 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
5 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
6 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
7 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears's desperation and lack of any factual basis for
8 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
9 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

10 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 38:**

11 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO the invoiced legal fees relating to litigation pursued against
12 one of the leaders of the “#FreeBritney” movement or any participants in that movement.

13 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 38:**

14 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
15 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
16 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
17 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
18 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
19 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

20 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

- 21 ● Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
22 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
23 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
24 for Production No. 54). This is now the second time Britney served the exact same request.
- 25 ● The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
26 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
27 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
28 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and

1 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
2 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
3 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
4 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

5 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
6 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
7 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
8 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
9 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
10 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
11 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
12 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
13 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
14 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
15 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
16 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

17 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 38:**

18 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
19 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
20 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
21 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
22 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
23 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
24 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."].) This fact is buttressed by his new
25 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
26 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
27 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to every single request for production includes
28

1 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
2 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

3 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
4 cooperation in producing “all” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
5 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
6 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
7 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
8 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
9 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 10 • That Mr. Spears would “*unconditionally*] cooperate with a complete and total
- 11 transfer of *all files* regarding the conservatorship”
- 12 • That Ms. Spears was “*welcome to everything – complete transparency without*
- 13 *conditions.*”
- 14 • That he would “*do everything [he] [could]* to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
- 15 files] from prior counsel”
- 16 • “Again, *complete transparency without conditions.*”

17 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

18 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 19 • “Jamie has *nothing to hide* [and] *will therefore hide nothing.*”
- 20 • “Jamie affirms that he will *unconditionally cooperate* in transferring *all* [emphasis in
- 21 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 22 • “Jamie recognizes his *ongoing and transparent participation is paramount*”
- 23 • “Jamie will *unconditionally cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 24 • “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions.*”

25 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

26 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
27 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
28 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.*” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even

1 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
2 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

3 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
4 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
5 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
6 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
7 contained in the applicable requests.

8 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
9 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
10 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
11 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
12 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
13 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
14 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
15 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁷⁴ Thus, consistent with the
16 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
17 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
18 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 [“[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
19 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party.]”)

20 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
21 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
22 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
23 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
24 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
25 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*

26 ⁷⁴ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
27 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
28 Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
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11 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
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13 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
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24 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
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6 is also completely meritless.

7 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
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9 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
10 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
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24 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

25 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
26 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
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2 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
3 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
4 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

5 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
6 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
7 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
8 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
9 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
10 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
11 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
12 such objections.

13 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
14 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
15 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
16 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
17 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
18 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
19 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
20 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

21 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
22 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
23 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
24 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
25 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
26 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
27 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

1 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
2 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
3 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
4 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
5 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
6 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
7 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
8 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
9 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
10 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
11 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
12 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 39:**

14 All correspondence (whether on paper, electronically, or by text or instant message) RELATING
15 TO the invoiced legal fees relating to litigation pursued against one of the leaders of the “#FreeBritney”
16 movement or any members of that movement.

17 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 39:**

18 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
19 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
20 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
21 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
22 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
23 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

24 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

25 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
26 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
27 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
28 for Production No. 55). This is now the second time Britney served the exact same request.

1 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
2 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
3 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
4 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
5 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
6 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
7 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
8 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

9 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
10 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
11 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
12 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
13 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
14 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
15 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
16 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
17 information." See Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
18 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
19 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
20 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

21 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 39:**

22 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
23 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
24 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
25 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
26 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
27 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
28 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."]) This fact is buttressed by his new

1 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
2 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
3 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to every single request for production includes
4 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
5 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

6 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
7 cooperation in producing “all” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
8 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
9 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
10 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
11 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
12 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 13 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally***] *cooperate* with a complete and total
14 transfer of *all files* regarding the conservatorship”
- 15 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
16 ***conditions.***”
- 17 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
18 files] from prior counsel”
- 19 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

20 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

21 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 22 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 23 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring *all* [emphasis in
24 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 25 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”
- 26 • “Jamie will ***unconditionally cooperate*** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 27 • “Jamie is committed to ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

28 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

1 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
2 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
3 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
4 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
5 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

6 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
7 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
8 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
9 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
10 contained in the applicable requests.

11 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
12 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
13 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
14 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
15 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
16 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
17 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
18 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁷⁶ Thus, consistent with the
19 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
20 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
21 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
22 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

23 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
24 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
25 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,

26 ⁷⁶ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
27 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
28 Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
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9 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
10 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
11 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
12 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
13 such objections.

14 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
15 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
16 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
17 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
18 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
19 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
20 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
21 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

22 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
23 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
24 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
25 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
26 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
27 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
28 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

1 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
2 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
3 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
4 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
5 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
6 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
7 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
8 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
9 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
10 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
11 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
12 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 40:**

14 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO the stipulated judgment and settlement in the litigation
15 pursued by the Conservatorship Estate – regardless of which entity initiated the action – against one of
16 the leaders of the “#FreeBritney” movement or any members of the movement.

17 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 40:**

18 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
19 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
20 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
21 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
22 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
23 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

24 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

25 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
26 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
27 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
28 for Production No. 56). This is now the second time Britney served the exact same request.

1 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
2 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
3 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
4 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
5 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
6 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
7 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
8 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

9 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
10 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
11 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
12 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
13 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
14 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
15 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
16 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
17 information." See Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
18 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
19 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
20 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

21 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 40:**

22 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
23 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
24 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
25 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
26 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
27 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
28 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."]) This fact is buttressed by his new

1 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
2 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
3 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
4 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
5 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

6 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
7 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
8 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
9 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
10 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
11 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
12 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 13 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
14 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 15 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
16 ***conditions.***”
- 17 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
18 files] from prior counsel”
- 19 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

20 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

21 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 22 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 23 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
24 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 25 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”
- 26 • “Jamie will ***unconditionally cooperate*** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 27 • “Jamie is committed to ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

28 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

1 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
2 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
3 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
4 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
5 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

6 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
7 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
8 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
9 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
10 contained in the applicable requests.

11 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
12 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
13 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
14 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
15 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
16 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
17 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
18 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁷⁸ Thus, consistent with the
19 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
20 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
21 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
22 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

23 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
24 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
25 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,

26 ⁷⁸ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
27 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
28 Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
2 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
3 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
4 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
5 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
6 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
7 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
8 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
9 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

10 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
11 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
12 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
13 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
14 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
15 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
16 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
17 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
18 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
19 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
20 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
21 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

22 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
23 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
24 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
25 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
26 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
27 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
28 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has

1 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, **not one**. (See
2 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
3 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)⁷⁹

4 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
5 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
6 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
7 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
8 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
9 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
10 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
11 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
12 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
13 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

14 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
15 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
16 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
17 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

18 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
19 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
20 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
21 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
22 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
23 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
24 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
25 based upon burden must be sustained by **evidence showing** the quantum of work required, while to
26 support an objection of oppression there must be **some showing** either of an intent to create an
27 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”

28 ⁷⁹ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
2 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
3 burden is **demonstrated** to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
4 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
5 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
6 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
7 is also completely meritless.

8 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
9 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
10 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
11 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
12 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
13 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
14 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
15 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
16 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
17 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

18 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
19 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
20 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
21 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
22 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
23 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
24 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
25 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

26 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
27 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
28 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel

1 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
2 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
3 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
4 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
5 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

6 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
7 timely object, his counsel promised “***unconditional[] cooperat[ion]***,” “***complete transparency without***
8 ***conditions***,” and that Britney Spears was “***welcome to everything***.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
9 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided ***explicit instructions to prior counsel to***
10 ***produce everything without exception***.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
11 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
12 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
13 such objections.

14 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
15 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
16 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
17 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
18 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
19 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
20 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
21 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

22 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
23 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
24 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
25 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
26 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
27 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
28 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

1 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
2 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
3 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
4 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
5 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
6 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
7 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
8 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
9 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
10 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
11 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
12 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 41:**

14 All correspondence (whether on paper, electronically, or by text or instant message) RELATING
15 TO the stipulated judgment and settlement in the litigation pursued by the Conservatorship Estate –
16 regardless of which entity initiated the action – against one of the leaders of the “#FreeBritney”
17 movement or any members of the movement.

18 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 41:**

19 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
20 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
21 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
22 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
23 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
24 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

25 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

- 26 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
27 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by
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1 Britney from Jamie in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request
2 for Production No. 57). This is now the second time Britney served the exact same request.

3 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
4 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
5 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
6 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
7 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
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9 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
10 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

11 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
12 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
13 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
14 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
15 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
16 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
17 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
18 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
19 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
20 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
21 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
22 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

23 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 41:**

24 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
25 his boilerplate objections are proper. (*See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
26 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
27 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
28 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery

1 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 [“As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
2 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”].) This fact is buttressed by his new
3 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
4 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
5 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
6 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
7 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

8 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
9 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
10 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
11 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
12 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
13 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
14 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 15 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
16 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 17 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
18 ***conditions.***”
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20 files] from prior counsel”
- 21 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

22 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

23 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 24 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 25 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
26 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 27 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”
- 28 • “Jamie will ***unconditionally cooperate*** with a complete and total transfer of all files.”

- 1 • “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions.*”

2 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

3 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
4 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
5 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.*” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
6 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
7 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

8 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
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17 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
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10 is also completely meritless.

11 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
12 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
13 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
14 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
15 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
16 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
17 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
18 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
19 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
20 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

21 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
22 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
23 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
24 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
25 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
26 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
27 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
28 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

1 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
2 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
3 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
4 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
5 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
6 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
7 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
8 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

9 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
10 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
11 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
12 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
13 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
14 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
15 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
16 such objections.

17 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
18 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
19 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
20 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
21 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
22 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
23 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
24 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

25 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
26 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
27 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
28 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115

1 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
2 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
3 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

4 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
5 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
6 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
7 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
8 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
9 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
10 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
11 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
12 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
13 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
14 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
15 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

16 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 42:**

17 A copy of your bond posted for the Conservatorship and all DOCUMENTS RELATING TO the
18 bond.

19 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 42:**

20 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
21 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
22 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
23 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
24 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
25 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

26 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

27 • Jamie objects on the grounds that the Document Request is unduly burdensome and
28 unreasonably duplicative and cumulative because it seeks the same information that was requested by

1 Britney from Jamie in her August 25, 2021 First Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*, Request for
2 Production No. 1) and in her December 17, 2021 Second Set of Requests for Production (*see, e.g.*,
3 Request for Production No. 58). This is now the third time Britney served the exact same request.

4 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
5 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
6 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
7 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
8 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
9 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
10 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
11 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

12 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
13 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
14 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
15 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
16 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
17 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
18 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
19 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
20 information." See Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
21 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
22 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
23 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

24 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 42:**

25 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
26 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
27 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
28 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn

1 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
2 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 [“As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
3 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”].) This fact is buttressed by his new
4 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
5 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
6 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
7 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
8 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

9 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
10 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
11 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
12 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
13 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
14 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
15 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 16 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
17 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 18 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
19 ***conditions.***”
- 20 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
21 files] from prior counsel”
- 22 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

23 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

24 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 25 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 26 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
27 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 28 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”

- 1 • “Jamie will *unconditionally cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 2 • “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions*.”

3 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

4 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
5 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
6 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
7 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
8 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

9 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
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17 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
18 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
19 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
20 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

21 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
22 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
23 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
24 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
25 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
26 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
27 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
28 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

1 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
2 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
3 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
4 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
5 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
6 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
7 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
8 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

9 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
10 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
11 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
12 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
13 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
14 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
15 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
16 such objections.

17 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
18 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
19 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
20 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
21 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
22 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
23 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
24 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

25 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
26 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
27 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
28 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115

1 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
2 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
3 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

4 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
5 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
6 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
7 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
8 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
9 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
10 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
11 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
12 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
13 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
14 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
15 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

16 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 43:**

17 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO “Cookin’ Cruzin’ and Chaos with Jamie Spears” Motor
18 Home or putative pilot television show.

19 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 43:**

20 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
21 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
22 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
23 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
24 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie objects to the Document Request to the
25 extent it calls for documents and information irrelevant and unrelated to Britney or the Conservatorship.
26 Jamie further objects to the Document Request to the extent that it seeks information that is already in
27 Britney's possession or equally available to her. Jamie objects on the grounds that this Document Request
28

1 seeks confidential or private financial information, confidential business or commercial information,
2 trade secrets, proprietary information, or otherwise calls for information protected by the right of privacy.

3 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

4 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
5 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
6 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
7 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
8 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
9 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
10 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
11 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

12 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
13 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
14 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
15 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
16 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
17 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
18 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
19 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
20 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
21 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
22 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
23 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

24 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 43:**

25 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
26 his boilerplate objections are proper. (*See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
27 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
28 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn

1 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
2 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 [“As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
3 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith.”].) This fact is buttressed by his new
4 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
5 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
6 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
7 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
8 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

9 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
10 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
11 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
12 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
13 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
14 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
15 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 16 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally]] cooperate*** with a complete and total
17 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
- 18 • That Ms. Spears was “***welcome to everything – complete transparency without***
19 ***conditions.***”
- 20 • That he would “***do everything [he] [could]*** to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
21 files] from prior counsel”
- 22 • “Again, ***complete transparency without conditions.***”

23 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

24 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 25 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
- 26 • “Jamie affirms that he will ***unconditionally cooperate*** in transferring ***all*** [emphasis in
27 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 28 • “Jamie recognizes his ***ongoing and transparent participation is paramount***”

- 1 • “Jamie will *unconditionally cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 2 • “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions*.”

3 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

4 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
5 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
6 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
7 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
8 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

9 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
10 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
11 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
12 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
13 contained in the applicable requests.

14 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
15 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
16 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
17 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
18 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
19 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
20 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
21 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁸⁴ Thus, consistent with the
22 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
23 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
24 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 “[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
25 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

26 ⁸⁴ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
27 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
28 Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
2 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
3 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
4 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
5 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
6 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*
7 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
8 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
9 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
10 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
11 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
12 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

13 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
14 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
15 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
16 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
17 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
18 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
19 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
20 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
21 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
22 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
23 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
24 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

25 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
26 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
27 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
28 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely

1 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR**,” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
2 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
3 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
4 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, *not one*. (See
5 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
6 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)⁸⁵

7 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
8 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
9 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
10 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
11 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
12 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
13 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
14 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
15 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
16 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

17 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
18 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
19 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
20 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

21 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
22 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
23 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
24 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
25 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
26 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
27 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection

28 ⁸⁵ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 based upon burden must be sustained by *evidence showing* the quantum of work required, while to
2 support an objection of oppression there must be *some showing* either of an intent to create an
3 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”
4 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
5 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
6 burden is *demonstrated* to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
7 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
8 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
9 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
10 is also completely meritless.

11 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
12 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
13 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
14 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
15 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
16 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
17 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
18 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
19 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
20 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

21 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
22 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
23 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
24 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
25 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
26 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
27 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
28 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

1 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
2 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
3 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel
4 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
5 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
6 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
7 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
8 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

9 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
10 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
11 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
12 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
13 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
14 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
15 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
16 such objections.

17 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
18 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
19 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
20 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
21 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
22 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
23 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
24 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

25 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
26 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
27 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
28 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115

1 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
2 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
3 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

4 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
5 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
6 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
7 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
8 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
9 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
10 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
11 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
12 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
13 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
14 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
15 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

16 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 44:**

17 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO Marc Delcore.

18 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 44:**

19 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
20 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
21 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
22 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
23 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie objects to the Document Request to the
24 extent it calls for documents and information irrelevant and unrelated to Britney or the Conservatorship.
25 Jamie further objects to the Document Request to the extent that it seeks information that is already in
26 Britney's possession or equally available to her.

27 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:
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1 • The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
2 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
3 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
4 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
5 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
6 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
7 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
8 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

9 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
10 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
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12 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
13 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
14 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
15 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
16 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
17 information." See Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
18 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
19 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
20 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

21 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 44:**

22 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
23 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
24 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
25 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
26 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
27 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
28 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."]) This fact is buttressed by his new

1 lawyer’s own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
2 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears’s counsel claims he “instructed” prior counsel to “withhold
3 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
4 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
5 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

6 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
7 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
8 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
9 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
10 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
11 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
12 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 13 • That Mr. Spears would “***unconditionally*** cooperate with a complete and total
14 transfer of ***all files*** regarding the conservatorship”
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16 ***conditions.***”
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18 files] from prior counsel”
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20 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

21 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 22 • “Jamie has ***nothing to hide*** [and] ***will therefore hide nothing.***”
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24 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
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28 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

1 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
2 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
3 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception*.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even
4 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
5 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

6 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
7 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
8 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
9 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
10 contained in the applicable requests.

11 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
12 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
13 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
14 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
15 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
16 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
17 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
18 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁸⁶ Thus, consistent with the
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22 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party[.]”)

23 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
24 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
25 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,

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11 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
12 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
13 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
14 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
15 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
16 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
17 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
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21 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

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23 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
24 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
25 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
26 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
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28 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has

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4 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
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14 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
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18 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
19 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
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21 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
22 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
23 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
24 any actual factual support whatsoever. (See McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16, 17.) “The objection
25 based upon burden must be sustained by **evidence showing** the quantum of work required, while to
26 support an objection of oppression there must be **some showing** either of an intent to create an
27 unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”

28 ⁸⁷ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

1 (*W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417, 418.) Mr. Spears fails to make any
2 showing as to burden or oppression. (See *id.* at p. 418 [“The objection of burden is valid only when that
3 burden is **demonstrated** to result in injustice.”]; *cf. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Ct.* (1986) 188
4 Cal.App.3d 313, 321. For these reasons, Mr. Spears’s objection that the documents “may be obtained
5 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
6 burden and expense would “outweigh the likely benefit of this discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 17)
7 is also completely meritless.

8 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
9 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
10 argument is also meritless. Again, no showing has been made of any intent to create an unreasonable
11 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
12 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
13 evidence shows that the conservatorship was conflicted from the very outset, when, among other things,
14 Mr. Spears violated Rule of Court 7.1059 by obtaining a substantial loan from Tri Star and then hiring
15 Tri Star (a then fledgling company) as her business manager. And any claim that *Mr. Spears* faces
16 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
17 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

18 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
19 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
20 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
21 Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c); *Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 755, 772 [“if an
22 objection to a document request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the response to the
23 request ‘shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that
24 claim’”]); (See *Costco, supra*, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“[t]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
25 establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”].) He failed to do so.

26 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
27 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
28 fiduciary became holder of the privilege of all communications between fiduciary and his counsel

1 regarding the estate, whenever they occurred]; see also *Moeller v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th
2 1124, 1129-1135 [because fiduciary is holder of the attorney-client privilege in his or her capacity as
3 such, successor fiduciary becomes the holder as to confidential communications between the predecessor
4 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
5 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

6 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
7 timely object, his counsel promised “***unconditional[] cooperat[ion]***,” “***complete transparency without***
8 ***conditions***,” and that Britney Spears was “***welcome to everything***.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
9 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided ***explicit instructions to prior counsel to***
10 ***produce everything without exception***.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
11 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
12 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
13 such objections.

14 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
15 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
16 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
17 255.) Mr. Spears’s position also reeks of hypocrisy given his gross violations of *his daughter’s* privacy.
18 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
19 of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (See *Gregori v. Bank of*
20 *America* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 312.) Even as Mr. Spears hides it, the mission remains to ascertain
21 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

22 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
23 interest doctrine.” Not only does Mr. Spears once again fail to support this objection with any facts, the
24 “common interest doctrine” is a “nonwaiver doctrine,” and does not separately act as a privilege
25 shielding documents from discovery. (See *OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court* (2004) 115
26 Cal.App.4th 874, 889-90 [“party seeking to invoke the [common interest] doctrine must first establish
27 that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from a disclosure by a claim of
28 privilege”].) No privilege exists here to protect the disclosure of the requested documents.

1 Finally, Mr. Spears purports to assert hodgepodge objections that the document requests are
2 “speculative, lack foundation, or improperly assume the existence of hypothetical facts that are incorrect
3 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
4 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
5 objections; he fails to incorporate them anywhere else, and he fails to justify how the document requests
6 are so formed. This is because he is, once again, wrong and he is once again seeking to evade the truth
7 and its consequences. As demonstrated above and as the requests themselves demonstrate, the requests
8 are narrowly tailored to pending issues, which were put front and center by Mr. Spears himself. The use
9 of such general objections, as applied here, is improper under the California Civil Discovery Act, and
10 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
11 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
12 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 45:**

14 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO the Domestic Violence Restraining order entered against you
15 in 2019.

16 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 45:**

17 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
18 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
19 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie objects to the Document Request to the
20 extent it calls for documents and information irrelevant and unrelated to Britney or the Conservatorship.
21 Jamie further objects to the Document Request to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by
22 the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine.
23 Jamie also objects to this Document Request to the extent it seeks documents or information about
24 Britney's minor children. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to the extent that it seeks
25 information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

26 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

27 ● The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
28 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California

1 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
2 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and
3 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
4 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
5 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
6 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

7 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
8 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
9 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
10 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
11 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
12 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
13 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
14 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
15 information." See Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
16 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
17 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
18 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

19 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 45:**

20 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
21 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
22 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
23 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
24 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
25 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
26 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."].) This fact is buttressed by his new
27 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
28 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold

1 nothing” on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to ***every single request*** for production includes
2 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
3 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

4 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
5 cooperation in producing “***all***” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
6 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
7 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
8 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
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18 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

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28 ⁸⁹ As a matter of restraint, we refrain herein from moving for sanctions but reserve all rights in that regard.

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4 from other sources or through other means of discovery” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 15), and that the
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6 is also completely meritless.

7 Additionally, to the extent Mr. Spears objects that the document requests are “oppressive”
8 because they “do not contain any temporal limitations” (an objection repeated in every response) this
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10 burden, and any objection based on a lack of temporal definition is hypocritical. We are only here today
11 because Britney Spears was under her father’s infantilizing control for more than a decade. Further, the
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15 “oppression” such that he cannot respond to discovery relating to *his own* oppression of Britney Spears
16 is, to say the least, rich. Mr. Spears put his conduct at issue and he must face the consequences.

17 Mr. Spears’s objections on privileged meritless, inapplicable, and have been waived. *First*, to the
18 extent any privilege was claimed, Mr. Spears should have supported the claim with “sufficient factual
19 information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim,” such as a privilege log. (See, e.g. Code
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25 *Second*, now that Mr. Spears has been suspended as conservator of the estate, he no longer holds
26 any attorney-client privilege. (See *Stine v. Dell’Osso* (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 834, 843 [successor
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3 fiduciary and attorney concerning trust administration]; Cal. Probate Code, § 8524, subd. (c). Because he
4 was suspended, Mr. Spears quite simply has no privilege to claim.

5 *Third*, as noted above, Mr. Spears also waived any privilege claims. In addition to failing to
6 timely object, his counsel promised “**unconditional[] cooperat[ion]**,” “**complete transparency without**
7 **conditions**,” and that Britney Spears was “**welcome to everything**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. D.)
8 Even further, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he had “provided **explicit instructions to prior counsel to**
9 **produce everything without exception**.” (See McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11; see also *infra*, n.4.) Under *Moeller*
10 and *Stine*, Mr. Spears does not hold the privilege. And in any event, even if the documents at issue were
11 privileged (and they are not) he has waived any such privilege and should be estopped from asserted any
12 such objections.

13 Mr. Spears also objects that the requests somehow violate his right to privacy. (McCurdy Decl.,
14 Ex. G, ¶ 10.) This makes no sense. It is Mr. Spears’s burden to justify the objection, and he has failed to
15 do so. (See *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221; *Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
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17 Finally, any claimed right to privacy must be considered against the “historically important state interest
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20 the truth, which necessarily trumps Mr. Spears’s evasive and fabricated “privacy rights.”

21 Mr. Spears additionally claims each document request violates confidentiality or the “common
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3 or unknown to Jamie” and “call for a legal conclusion.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 13, 14.) In asserting
4 this boilerplate objection, Mr., Spears does nothing more than cite boilerplate buzz words into his general
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10 their bald assertion in this context demonstrates Mr. Spears’s desperation and lack of any factual basis for
11 them. (See generally *Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 [use of
12 boilerplate objections is improper and sanctionable].)

13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 46:**

14 All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO payments made to Advanced Multimedia Partners from
15 Britney Spears or her Estate including but not limited to all payments made to that entity or James P.
16 Watson, III.

17 **RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 46:**

18 Jamie incorporates by reference his General Objections. Jamie further objects to the Document
19 Request to the extent it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive
20 especially as it does not contain any temporal limitations. Jamie further objects to the Document Request
21 to the extent it impermissibly seeks material protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-
22 product doctrine, and/or the common interest doctrine. Jamie further objects to the Document Request to
23 the extent that it seeks information that is already in Britney's possession or equally available to her.

24 Jamie further objects to the Document Request as follows:

25 ● The Document Request extends beyond the proper scope of discovery and improperly
26 attempts to re-litigate the thirteen-year Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders. California
27 Civil Procedure Code Section 2017.010 limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the subject
28 matter involved in the pending action. California Probate Code Section 2103 releases a conservator and

1 the sureties from all the conservatee's claims when the court authorizes, approves, or confirms the action
2 in an order. This Document Request is therefore overbroad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of
3 discovery to the extent it is not relevant to the limited matters remaining before the Court and to the
4 extent the Court already approved any action in an order or judgment.

5 • There is no legitimate reason for requiring Jamie to undertake the burden of sifting
6 through documents he already produced and reproducing those documents that are responsive to this
7 Document Request. Jamie objects to these Document Requests as duplicative, unduly burdensome,
8 oppressive, and harassing to the extent the Document Requests seek some or all of the same documents
9 and information that Jamie already voluntarily produced. Since October 2021, Jamie's counsel has
10 arranged for nearly 600,000 pages of documents (consisting of more than 58 boxes of hard copy
11 documents and more than 22 drives of electronic documents and spanning over 13 years of documents).
12 Britney's own counsel admitted at the January 19, 2022 hearing that Jamie "produced voluminous
13 information." *See* Jan. 19 Tr. 17:3-4. The nearly 600,000 pages of documents represent more than
14 124,500 electronic documents. Any responsive documents that are in Jamie's possession, custody, or
15 control already are in Britney's possession, custody, or control or are otherwise equally available to her
16 given Jamie's prior voluminous production of documents and information.

17 **REASON TO COMPEL PRODUCTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 46:**

18 As an initial matter, Mr. Spears fails to justify any of his objections with any facts, and none of
19 his boilerplate objections are proper. (See *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court* (2009) 47 Cal.4th
20 725, 733; *Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-221.) It is important
21 to bear in mind, too, that Mr. Spears has an obligation as a suspended conservator and fiduciary to turn
22 over all relevant and responsive documents without any condition, regardless of the method of discovery
23 sought. (See *Poag v. Winston* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1176 ["As a fiduciary, a conservator owes a
24 duty of loyalty which requires that he act in the highest good faith."].) This fact is buttressed by his new
25 lawyer's own repeated claims of cooperation. Further, demonstrating regrettable gamesmanship and
26 completely contradicting himself, Ms. Spears's counsel claims he "instructed" prior counsel to "withhold
27 nothing" on the basis of privilege. Yet, his response to every single request for production includes
28

1 objections on the basis of privilege. (See generally, McCurdy Decl., Ex. G.) This type of Alice-in-
2 Wonderland dissembling is unacceptable.

3 Mr. Spears’s counsel repeatedly and profusely promised his client’s unconditional, transparent
4 cooperation in producing “all” documents to Ms. Spears’s counsel. Although these representations have,
5 regrettably, proven to be false, made in an effort to create a false narrative and record—and what has
6 become a “Big Lie” of Mr. Spears’s defense—they are nevertheless relevant; thus, in addition to Mr.
7 Spears’s statutory waiver, his boilerplate objections should also be considered waived as a matter of
8 equity and fairness and he should be estopped from asserting them. By way of illustration only, by email
9 dated October 22, 2021, Mr. Spears’s counsel professed the following:

- 10 • That Mr. Spears would “*unconditionally*] cooperate with a complete and total
- 11 transfer of *all files* regarding the conservatorship”
- 12 • That Ms. Spears was “*welcome to everything – complete transparency without*
- 13 *conditions.*”
- 14 • That he would “*do everything [he] [could]* to help facilitate the direct transfer [of all
- 15 files] from prior counsel”
- 16 • “Again, *complete transparency without conditions.*”

17 (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.)

18 In the November 1, 2021 Status Report, Mr. Spears’s counsel represented the following:

- 19 • “Jamie has *nothing to hide* [and] *will therefore hide nothing.*”
- 20 • “Jamie affirms that he will *unconditionally cooperate* in transferring *all* [emphasis in
- 21 original] files regarding the estate to Britney’s counsel without delay.”
- 22 • “Jamie recognizes his *ongoing and transparent participation is paramount*”
- 23 • “Jamie will *unconditionally cooperate* with a complete and total transfer of all files.”
- 24 • “Jamie is committed to *complete transparency without conditions.*”

25 (McCurdy Decl., Ex. D.)

26 In a November 5, 2021 email, Mr. Spears’s counsel stated that he and his client were supposedly
27 “committed to *complete transparency*,” that they had “*withheld nothing*,” and that he “provided *explicit*
28 *instructions to prior counsel to produce everything without exception.*” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 11.) Even

1 more, Mr. Spears’s counsel claimed that “whatever documents exist regarding electronic surveillance, to
2 the extent that any, would part [*sic*] of the production being made by prior counsel.” (*Id.*)

3 These promises are tantamount to a “Big Lie.” By objecting to every single one of Ms. Spears’s
4 document requests, Mr. Spears has done the exact opposite of what he promised. Mr. Spears’s tactics to
5 create a false record and narrative should not be countenanced. Even putting aside his statutory and
6 fiduciary obligations, he has waived any objections and he should be ordered to produce all documents
7 contained in the applicable requests.

8 Mr. Spears objects to the document requests as “unduly burdensome and unreasonable duplicative
9 and cumulative” because he claims Ms. Spears requested similar information in requests for production
10 propounded on him. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 5.) The objection is contrary to law. California’s Code
11 of Civil Procedure does not preclude a party from seeking similar documents through different methods
12 of discovery. “[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a
13 party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that
14 seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under
15 the other.” (*Carter v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.)⁹⁰ Thus, consistent with the
16 Court’s reasoning in *Carter*, Mr. Spears must bring the requested documents to his deposition pursuant to
17 this different method of discovery. (See also *Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1993) 14
18 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 [“[T]he selection of the method of discovery is to be utilized is to be made by the
19 party seeking discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party.]”)

20 Relatedly, Mr. Spears claims the document requests are “duplicative, unduly burdensome,
21 oppressive, and harassing” because Mr. Spears already “voluntarily” produced some of the same
22 documents and information. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 7.) He is wrong, on multiple levels. Initially,
23 “[a] party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
24 disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under
25 another method.” (*Irvington-Moore, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; see also *TBG Ins. Services*

26 ⁹⁰ See also 10 Witkin, Cal. Evid. Discovery § 143 [discussing *Carter*]. Notably, the Legislature has amended the Civil
27 Discovery Act several times since *Carter*, and it has done so without overruling or modifying *Carter*’s interpretation of the
28 Act. “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing
the interpretation put on that statute by the court, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the
courts’ construction of that statute.” (*People v. Ledesma* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-01.)

1 *Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [citing *Irvington-Moore* for the proposition that
2 “a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under
3 one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method”]; see,
4 e.g. *Coy, supra*, 58 Cal.2d at p. 218 [“the bare claim of previous deposition is insufficient as an objection
5 to an interrogatory . . . To suffice as a valid objection such claim must be supported by some showing (or,
6 as a minimum, some claim) that the requirement of a reply would be unjust and inequitable”].)

7 Mr. Spears’s objection that he has already produced some of the requested documents, even if
8 true, is not a defense. To the extent he intended to actually rely on this objection, Mr. Spears needed to
9 demonstrate that production of the requested documents now would be “unjust and inequitable.” But he
10 grossly fails to so demonstrate; instead, he relies on his “Big Lie” defense: that he has cooperated and
11 transferred all of the documents requested. Mr. Spears also astonishingly objects on the basis that “there
12 are no further documents [he] could provide to respond to the Deposition Notice, Document Requests,
13 and definitions” because he supposedly has produced them all. (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, at p. 3:22-23.) If
14 this were true (and it is false), then why does he not so state in a single response, instead of making
15 countless boilerplate objections? Why does he not appear at his deposition, and so state on the record,
16 under penalty of perjury? Why does he not identify the requested documents—by Bates number? Why
17 does he not correlate them to the document requests at issue? And why does he not simply provide
18 answers to the following questions and requests that have been posed to him repeatedly?

19 As referenced above, despite our repeated and ongoing requests, while relying on the facile and
20 false claim that he has produced “everything” requested, Mr. Spears has also failed to produce all text or
21 email communications between and amongst Tri Star, Black Box, himself, and his counsel (see *Moeller*
22 and *Stine, infra* at pp. 19-20) concerning the illicit surveillance operation at issue. Indeed, he falsely
23 claims it “**DIDN’T HAPPEN, YOUR HONOR,**” *supra* at 9. In short, as part of their efforts to stonewall
24 and hide the truth, Mr. Spears has engaged in improper disjointed and incomplete “document dumps”
25 rather than a professional, organized, and labelled production of documents. More pointedly, he has
26 failed to produce *any* documents pursuant to and correlated to the deposition notices, *not one*. (See
27
28

1 *Kayne v. Grande Holdings Ltd.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-76 [sanctions appropriate where
2 party refused to produce documents in an organized and labelled manner].)⁹¹

3 Mr. Spears also objects that the document requests “attempt to relitigate the entire thirteen-year
4 Conservatorship and innumerable final court orders,” and “are not relevant and not reasonably calculated
5 to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 6, 8.) Nonsense.
6 “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the
7 action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) In this case, the document requests directly relate to Mr.
8 Spears’s role and conduct as former conservator of the estate, which are also directly at issue under
9 *Shine, Kasperbauer, and Hudson*. The requested documents are thus not only “reasonably calculated” to
10 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, they go directly to the heart of numerous pending matters
11 including Mr. Spears’s fee petition and accountings, see, e.g., *Shine, supra*, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 540;
12 *Hudson, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.

13 Under the circumstances, Mr. Spears’s objection that the requests are somehow “not reasonably
14 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” (McCurdy Decl., Ex. G, ¶¶ 8, 9) are, in fact,
15 legally frivolous. (See *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173; *Garamendi v.*
16 *Golden Eagle Ins. Co.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712 fn. 8.)

17 Mr. Spears’s objections on grounds of purportedly vague and ambiguous requests, or the terms
18 “YOU” and “YOUR,” are all baseless. (McCurdy Decl. G, ¶¶ 9, 11.) He has not and cannot explain in
19 any manner what he claims not to understand about the document requests. (See *Deyo v. Kilbourne*
20 (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 [“[W]here the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the
21 information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”].) Mr. Spears
22 also fails to support his baseless burdensome and oppressive objections and asserts all of them without
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13 DATED: May 31, 2022

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

14
15 By /s/ Mathew S. Rosengart

MATHEW S. ROSENGART

Attorneys for Conservatee Britney Jean Spears

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17 **LAWYERS**
18 **FOR BRITNEY**
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