Bill Chen | Managing Partner
230 Park Ave, 10th Floor | New York, NY 10169
PH: (347) 688-8056 | www.rhizomepartners.com

Dear Partners,

During Q1 2018, Class B investors of Rhizome Partners experienced a 3.5% net gain versus -0.8% for the S&P 500. At the five year anniversary mark, Class B investors have experienced a 10.4% annualized net return and 63.7% cumulative net return while the fund held 40% cash and cash-like instruments on average.

	S&P 500[1]	10% Absolute Return Hurdle	FTSE NAREIT All Equity REIT Total Return	Rhizome Partners Class B Net Return[2,3]
April 10th thru Dec 31, 2013	18.2%	7.2%	-4.9%	19.50%
Full Year 2014	13.7%	10.0%	28.0%	19.2%
Full Year 2015	1.4%	10.0%	2.8%	-5.8%
Full Year 2016	12.0%	10.0%	8.6%	11.5%
Full Year 2017	21.8%	10.0%	8.7%	5.6%
Q1 2018	-0.8%	2.4%	-6.7%	3.5%
Cumulative Return Since Inception	84.4%	60.7%	38.0%	63.7%
Annualized Return Since Inception	**13.1%**	**10.0%**	**6.7%**	**10.4%**

1. S&P 500 returns include dividend reinvestments

2. Net return is net of operating expenses and incentive allocation for Class B. Individual partners may experience returns that are different than the Class B return.

3. Rhizome Partners Class B Net Return is accomplished while holding 40% cash and cash-like instruments

We believe results should be measured across a full market cycle. In an environment where valuations are generally fair or even rich, we are very comfortable with the results that we generated on a net basis. We believe our net returns reflect appropriate IRR on capital deployed while also preserving optionality for greater opportunity set. When we believe conditions are right, we will be 100% invested. At times when patience and protection are prudent, we will hold large cash balances while still investing in a manner that will propel us forward. The consequence of holding a large cash balance is that our results are throttled down. For example, assuming we doubled our invested capital net of fees and expenses while holding 40% cash, the reported net returns to our partners would be roughly 60%. In the short term, the cash holdings will have the impact of reducing our net returns. In the long run, this approach towards cash management will likely position us very well to thrive during moments of market uncertainty.

General Portfolio Update for Q1 2018

At year end 2017, we wrote that we allocated 48% of the fund's capital towards our top four real estate positions. These real estate positions accounted for roughly 6% gross returns during the quarter. Our non-real estate investment accounted for a 2% gross loss spread across a dozen names. During the quarter, FRP Holdings in particular appreciated 27% and generated a 3.5% gross return for the fund. The Company sold their industrial portfolio to a Blackstone fund for $358 million. Shares have nearly doubled since October 2016 and generated a 32% IRR in roughly two and a half years. FRP Holdings is one of our most successful investments in the fund's history and has contributed the largest profit in total dollars to date. A few existing and prospective investors have asked for opportunities to make co-investment allocations to ideas like FRP Holdings in the future. Please see our real estate performance review later in this document for a discussion on this topic. Subsequent to quarter end, we have sold our entire position in FRP Holdings.

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Key Takeaways from the Five Year Review

We have stayed true to our stated objective of engaging in value investing and we have adhered to the core value of Rhizome Partners. Our investments have demonstrated a large margin of safety component coupled with shareholder-friendly management teams and/or engaged activists. We conducted a thorough review of our investments and observed the following key takeaways:

1) We have successfully concentrated on our best ideas as our largest positions tend to perform better.
2) Our real estate investments have outperformed the typical 15-20% IRR profile of most real estate private equity investments.
3) The companies that we invested in generally have better fundamentals today than at the time of our investment. They also tend to trade at higher prices and some were even taken private; this is a mark of quality.
4) We have been successful in risk management. Our worst loss tied to a single position was less than 3% of partners' capital.

Performance Review - Real Estate Investments

Real Estate Performances Since Inceptions	Status	IRR	Average P&L[1]	Max % of Portfolio At Cost	Estimated Gross Portfolio Contribution	Holding Period	Commentary
J.W. Mays	Closed	68%	97%	13%	13%	Mid 2013- Mid 2016	Sold most of position within 12 months as the shares doubled rapidly. In 2018, private market value is roughly 3x of share price and over 4x of our original cost.
CareTrust REIT[2]	Closed	83%	36%	10%	4%	Late 2014 - Early 2016	Event driven thesis worked out quickly in H2 2014 and sold the bulk of our position within months
FRP Holdings[2]	Closed Q2 2018	32%	72%	22%	14%	Mid 2015 - Early 2018	Gradually reduced position size as share prices climbed over the course of 2.5 years. Company sold 1/2 of real estate asset for $20mm more than the Enterprise Value of our cost basis
Macy's[2]	Closed	-16%	-17%	8%	-1%	Late 2015- Late 2017	Use of put protection mitigated further losses. This is our lone real estate mistake.
Griffin Industrial (East Coast Industrial)	Ongoing	11%	5%	10%	0.5%	Early 2017 - Current	We believe the current price is severely undervalued and the position will drive meaningful returns for Rhizome in the future
LAACO, LTC (West Coast Self Storage)	Ongoing	15%	9%	11%	1%	H2 2017 - Current	We believe the current price is severely undervalued and the position will drive meaningful returns for Rhizome in the future
Long Term Real Estate Compounder (LTREC)[2]	Ongoing	22%	12%	11%	1%	Mid 2017 - Current	We believe the current price is severely undervalued and the position will drive meaningful returns for Rhizome in the future

1) Average P&L is calculated as the average prices realized after we reached our maximum position size divided by the average cost incurred immediately before reaching maxiumum position size
2) CTRE, FRP Holdings, Macy's, LTREC have net hedging cost (dividend less hedging cost) that range from -1% to +1% P&L. These are in addition to the figures above.

Given our track record, we have received organic inbound inquiries from both existing and prospective investors about opportunities to allocate additional capital towards individual high conviction real estate ideas. Many of these investors have historically invested in single asset real estate private equity deals targeting a 15-20% IRR while employing a substantial amount of leverage. Per our conversation, they have noticed that Rhizome's real estate investments have significantly outperformed their real estate private equity investments despite our typical low leverage profiles. We believe that such allocation strategies make sense and we look forward to collaborating with our partners in the future. We believe that co-investment opportunities are a differentiated way that Rhizome can add value to our partners. Due to our goal of maintaining personal relationships with our partners, co-investments will only be available to existing partners. Please see page 4 for additional details on Rhizome's 30/30 Initiative.

Five years ago, we wrote about the difficulties of assessing skill versus luck in an investment manager's track record. To understand Rhizome Partners' core competence in real estate, we encourage you to examine our theses for JW Mays, CareTrust REITs, FRP Holdings, LAACO, and Griffin Industrial Realty. You can compare the fundamental developments of our companies against our many detailed investment presentations. By analyzing our investment presentations, you will also gain a deeper understanding of our lengthy research process that often involves physically visiting the hard assets.

We can easily see a direct correlation between the size of a position and its subsequent performance. It is also important to point out that our real estate investments typically carry much less debt on a look-through basis than private equity investments. The other key takeaway from the table above is that great real estate opportunities are rare. In five years, we were only able to comfortably allocate to seven such investments. It is interesting to note that our real estate investments did not benefit from a rising market. The NAREIT All Equity REIT Index experienced annualized returns and cumulative returns of 6.7% and 38.0% respectively during the last five years. Our investments significantly outperformed the index over this time period, suggesting a different ingredient for success than a mere rising tide.

Performance Review - Market Neutrals and Event Driven Investments

In the first five years of our fund's history, we generated sizable returns from market neutral and event-driven investments. We enjoyed successful investments in tenders, merger arbitrage, strategic alternatives, spinoffs, dividend suspensions/re-instatement, corporate turnarounds, industry consolidation, etc. Our returns on these investments are quite satisfactory. We believe our results here illustrate that skill rather than luck contributed to our returns. For tenders and liquidation investments, we successfully predicted that the companies will pay us cash proceeds that are significantly higher than our cost. For merger arbitrage situations, we successfully predicted deal closing. For certain strategic alternatives, the companies were sold at higher premiums. These investments benefitted from specific catalysts rather than general market conditions. We have highlighted many of these investments in our previous investor letters and we encourage you to review them.

Performance Review – General Non-Real Estate Investments

This category includes companies trading at low multiples of revenue, EBITDA, or free cashflow, 52 week-lows, and the occasional net-net. We have periodically mentioned many of these investments in our investor letters. Some of the named investments include StraightPath Communication, Awilco Drilling, a basket of high yield MLPs following the 2016 energy crisis, AEP Industries/Berry Global etc. Our performance in the general category is also satisfactory. Since inception, about 69% of our general investment ideas result in profits for us and about 31% results in losses. Our winning ideas contributed about 74% of the gross P&L dollars in this category and the losing ideas contributed about 26% of gross P&L dollars. In summary, our winners tend to win more and our losers tend to lose less. It is also important to note that these results are statistically important in that they amount to dozens of individual positions.

Our five year review was also helpful in identifying areas of weakness and the resultant efforts we made to improve our investment process. Due to our smaller circle of competence at the fund's launch, we were very conscious of where this boundary laid. When we found promising ideas in the past, we took our time to understand the company and the industry it participated in. This was naturally a time consuming process that was further hindered by the lack of fund resources for travel and research prior to 2016. Thus we allocated smaller position sizes to these investments. Despite mostly positive fundamental developments, these ideas tended to contribute to a small percentage of the fund's profit.

With the addition of five years of knowledge and increased financial resources, we are now able to understand companies faster and deeper. We have also enlarged our network of industry contacts and fund managers. Our goal is to leverage the expansion of our circle of competence to improve our performance in this category going forward. In short, we want to utilize the same deep dive research process of our real estate investments and apply it here. We expect to make larger, more concentrated allocations in this category in the future. It should also be noted that we have increased our focus on higher quality companies while we have historically focused on the cheapest valuation. Going forward, we will increasingly look for companies with pricing power, moats, and long runway.

Organizational Objectives – Rhizome's 30/30 Initiative

After five years of managing the Rhizome organization, we have a better understanding of our organizational and operational objectives as well. Every year, we spend some quality time thinking deeply about the best structural setup for the Rhizome organization. We would like to share some of our key organizational observations with you:

1) We take greater pride in generating excellent risk-adjusted returns, than in managing a larger pile of assets.
2) We have great relationships with our partners and we want to preserve this experience.
3) Idea generation and research inevitably compete for our limited time with capital raising and administrative functions.
4) Our partners will be better served, our performance should improve, and we will personally be happier if we focus as much of our time on idea generation and research.

In response, we will broadly outline our new 30/30 Initiative:

1) Our goal in the next 1-3 years is to reach 30 relationships and $30-$50 millions of assets under management from our current base of roughly $14 million of assets and 15 distinct relationships.
2) We intend to increase our minimum investment from $250,000 to $500,000 and subsequently to $1,000,000.
3) Each admission of roughly five incremental partners will result in a step up in the minimum.
4) Upon fulfilling the parameters of our 30/30 Initiative, we will likely close our fund to additional partners.
5) We will allow existing partners to add additional capital to both Rhizome Partners and potential co-investment opportunities.

6) Co-investment opportunities will only be available to existing partners.

Our motivation for the 30/30 Initiative is deeply rooted in our desire to create win/wins for both Rhizome and our partners. So why did we choose 30 partners and the step up in minimums to invest in Rhizome Partners? We carefully chose these figures in order to preserve our unique relationships with our partners. One of the biggest surprises over the last five years is how rewarding our relationships with our partners have been. Our family office and high net worth partners are deeply appreciative of our efforts and results. Some of them view Rhizome as a solution provider in their efforts to diversify their wealth away from concentrated family businesses. Some of them view Rhizome as a lower risk alternative to real estate private equity deals with greater than 15-20% IRR while employing much less leverage. Some of them view Rhizome as a way to compound their wealth in a risk adverse way in order to combat the erosion of purchasing power due to inflation. Some of them view Rhizome as a solution to grow their wealth in a risk adverse way during a bull market and yet retain the dry powder to pounce during periods of market turmoil. This dynamic is one of the most rewarding aspects of managing the Rhizome organization.

These unique relationships made it much easier for me to cap our total relationships at roughly 30 despite foregoing potentially large personal financial upside. We want relationships that are personal and direct. We do not wish to update our partners on massive conference calls where our partners have to enter into a queue to ask questions. We believe that our partners should be able to call us directly to chat about our investments and the process behind it. We believe that we can be most helpful during times of market distress. It is during these episodes that we can potentially help our partners generate 5-10 years of returns in 1-2 years. But we are cognizant of the upper thresholds of how many relationships are truly personal. We believe 30 relationships offer enough diversification of the investor base while also allowing us to have genuinely personal relationships with our partners.

A revisit of our recent organizational history will help our partners understand how we intend to use organizational resources under the 30/30 Initiative. We achieved an important milestone in late 2016 when we increased our assets under management by $10 million. That made the Rhizome organization sustainable in the long term. Since then, we have utilized the additional resources to hire a part time research analyst and dramatically increased our budget on travel, site tours, and research subscriptions. We believe that these initiatives allowed us to discover many new ideas that were added to the fund since late 2016.

One of our current organizational goals is to offer a full time position to our part time analyst. Our part time research analyst has demonstrated very satisfactory skills in helping us with our field research process. A key part of field research is getting strangers to talk; this is something at which he excels. We would like to offer him a full time position so that we can fully utilize this skill and further develop his idea generation and research skills. In addition, we would like to hire an operations/administrative team member. In addition to taking away research time from me, these responsibilities tend to inflict distracting “brain damage” for me. I will re-allocate the time saved toward road trips to see real estate assets, industry research, financial modeling, reading, and talking with management teams. By delegating these responsibilities, we believe our investment process will dramatically improve.

General Observation That You May Find Interesting

Bill Chen | Managing Partner
230 Park Ave, 10th Floor | New York, NY 10169
PH: (347) 688-8056 | www.rhizomepartners.com

Tax Attributes of Our Returns

We estimate that 70% of our returns are long term capital gains or qualified dividends. Short term capital gains are typically the result of price appreciation that happens rapidly forcing us to trim our positions for risk control reasons. Event driven-investing is the other source of short term capital gains. We expect the long term taxable return profile of our investments to trend higher in the future as our portfolio becomes less event driven than in the past.

Portfolio Composition

Historically, we have concentrated our partners' capital in our top 10 ideas. Real estate investments accounted for roughly half of our partners' invested capital. Going forward, we expect to obtain a similar portfolio allocation.

An Unintended Byproduct – Low Volatility

We do not believe that price volatility is risk, but rather because of our large cash holdings and long-term time horizon it represents a unique strategic opportunity for us. At times, we wish our portfolio companies would be more volatile which would allow us to take advantage of large price swings. Because we hold a large amount of cash, the unintended consequence is that our monthly swings tend to be smaller. Our largest monthly drawdown is 4% and the largest peak to trough drawdown is about 8%. Both events occurred during the summer of 2015. We warn that we do not actively try to manage volatility; this is merely a byproduct of our adherence to a value-oriented investing strategy and large cash holdings. We will maintain our focus on having enough dry powder to take advantage of future market selloffs.

Redemption Statistics

In the last five years, no partner has redeemed from Rhizome Partners except me. My personal redemption was for working capital reasons. All partners elected the Class B share class with a two year lock-up. We are very lucky to have a long-term focused shareholder base.

Capacity to Manage Additional Capital

We believe that we can manage several hundred million dollars of capital in the Rhizome organization and via co-investment opportunities. Instead of raising capital up to this limit, we strongly believe in preserving the long runway for our partners. We expect to achieve our strategic asset cap primarily through organic growth of the partners' capital over time.

Investment Updates

New Investment - Orphaned/Mischaracterized/Public LBO/Broken Distribution/Turnaround Compounder

Well, that is a mouthful! We recently allocated roughly 8% of partners' capital into a unique turnaround investment that could turn into a long term compounder with up to 4-5x return in five years. Despite being in year three of an incredible turnaround, it still has all the superficial elements that can cause a company to be severely mispriced. However, we believe it also has all the right ingredients to become a long-term compounder. Because of the fluid nature of the investment, we will not delve into the details for now because we want to reserve the flexibility to adapt to the fast-evolving facts. But rest assured, we have purchased enough Aug 2018 and Jan 2019 puts to hedge our downside while the transformational turnaround continues in 2018. We estimate that the maximum potential loss of partners' capital will be about 2% while the five year upside could be over 30% of partners' capital.

FRP Holdings

Overview – FRP Holdings owns a collection of income producing real estate assets, royalty streams, and valuable land parcels. The land parcels provide an organic growth pathway in the next 5-10 years. We believe that we originally purchased the security at less than 60 cents on the dollar. Due to a low debt-to-capital ratio, we believe downside risks due to interest rate movements or error in our analysis will be dampened. We believe that management is conservative and shareholder-friendly. This is evidenced by our phone conversations as well as their historical capital allocation decisions. Prior to building our sizable position, we conducted a 3,000-mile road trip up and down the East Coast to visit buildings and sites of the company. Rhizome Partners has created an investment presentation detailing our analysis. If you would like a copy, please e-mail bill@rhizomepartners.com.

Q1 2018 Updates – During the quarter, FRP Holdings sold their warehouse portfolio to Blackstone for $358mm. When we allocated over 22% of our partners' capital to FRP Holdings in November of 2016, the enterprise value was roughly $20mm less than the sales price of the warehouse portfolio. We believe the remaining assets are worth roughly $400mm. We think very highly of management. However, the surging stock price created a high class problem for us. In the $57-$59 range, it is about 90% higher than our cost in late 2016. By selling the warehouse, the company significantly lowered the rate of compounding of their NAV as $23mm of cashflow gets taken away and is now in the form of cash. At recent prices, the discount to our estimated NAV has narrowed while the future growth rate of the NAV has also declined. Following the sale of the warehouse portfolio we have decided to fully exit our position. This is a symptom of having an investment reach fair value in a relatively short period of time. It forces us to sell our position in order to lower downside risk. FRP Holdings has generated one of the largest single idea returns for the fund since inception. We encourage the reader to compare the fundamental developments against our original investment thesis.

LAACO Ltd – Previously Described As West Coast Self-Storage

Overview – Roughly 11% of Rhizome Partners' capital is invested in LAACO, which we bought at a roughly 13x FFO and an 8% cap rate. We believe we are invested in an undervalued, under-levered and growing self-storage company with an owner-operator at the helm. In short, we paid $100 per share for a collection of assets that is worth roughly $150 per share and growing over time. The entire portfolio trades at roughly $80 per sqft while public comparable companies trade at 2-3 times that amount while holding inferior assets. We will also receive a 4% cash distribution per year and we may re-invest in the company if prices remain low.

Bill Chen | Managing Partner
230 Park Ave, 10th Floor | New York, NY 10169
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When we allocate capital, we like to stress test our investments by analyzing how the companies performed during the Great Recession of 2008/2009. Our self-storage company's revenue and FFO decreased by less than 7% during that time period. Like many of our portfolio companies, there is minimal debt on the balance sheet.

Q1 2018 Updates – All operating metrics, including revenue and occupancy, improved on existing facilities. In our previous letter, we predicted that the occupancy level in hurricane ravaged-Houston would increase dramatically. The company recently disclosed that occupancy doubled from 26% to 49% in Houston and they are now past the break-even point. Operating income and cashflow for 2017 were negatively affected by ramp up costs of four new facilities added to the base of 56 facilities. The company's new self storage facilities have now passed the break-even occupancy level. We believe most of the incremental occupancy related revenue will fall to the bottom line. The company even bought back 1.5% of the float at an attractive price.

We recently visited management and took a tour of the company's club operation. The building is strategically located in the rapidly gentrifying Downtown LA area. A new Apple store will open about a block away. The company expects membership to grow and the current membership fees are very reasonably priced. We believe that in time, the cashflow from the club operation will improve and our P/FFO will shrink further. It is very satisfying to invest alongside a shareholder friendly management team who executes on the necessary blocking and tackling. The company will be worth more if sold or run by a large self-storage like Public Storage. But we more than make up some of the operational and capital inefficiencies by paying about 60% of fair market value for the assets. We also continue to receive a 1% quarterly dividend.

Griffin Industrial Realty – Previously Known As East Coast Industrial

Overview – Roughly 11% of Rhizome Partners' capital is invested in Griffin Industrial Realty, a fast growing industrial company currently trading at less than 70% of asset value on an unlevered basis. The company is benefiting from tail winds due to a structural shift that created high demand for its properties. We expect this structural shift to continue for the next three to five years. It also has opportunities to reinvest capital in its own development pipeline at an attractive rate of return. We believe the 2018 year end NAV will be worth 80% more than our average cost. The company's portfolio currently generates roughly $22mm of net operating income and we believe that this figure will increase by another $3-5mm in the next 12-18 months due to 700k sqft of new development. The Company also owns over $90mm of land parcels which includes some parcels suitable for development into industrial buildings. We have met the management team and believe that they have a sensible three to five year plan to build shareholder value and convert the company into an attractive REIT vehicle in the long run.

Q1 2018 Updates – We recently took a tour of Griffin's industrial buildings and came away with a more positive view of the company's assets. Some of the company's tenants have invested heavily in their buildings which will incentivize them to extend their leases upon maturity. In addition, many of the company's tenants strategically place their regional hub in the company's Northeast location. We are more confident that a 7.0% cap rate is conservative especially given FRPH's recent warehouse sale to Blackstone at a 5.9% cap rate with similar portfolio characteristics. We will continue to monitor the company's development pipeline in the next 12-18 months. We will also attend the annual shareholder meeting in coming months.

Bill Chen | Managing Partner
230 Park Ave, 10th Floor | New York, NY 10169
PH: (347) 688-8056 | www.rhizomepartners.com

Long Term RE Compounder (LTREC)

Overview – Roughly 11% of Rhizome Partner's capital is allocated towards LTREC. LTREC is a real estate development company with a 20 year pipeline that earns high teens to low 20s IRRs on their projects. The benefit of investing in this company is that there is no need to constantly look for new projects and potentially invest in ever riskier deals as the cost of land and building inevitably trends upward. LTREC owns an income producing segment which consist of retail, hospitality, multi-family and trophy assets. In 2-3 years, investors can easily put the appropriate cap rates on this group of asset and value it at over $6 billion. The company also owns 8.4mm sqft of condo and retail development in a land constrained tropical paradise location that has similar selling price and land constraint and regulatory characteristics as New York City. We believe that the net present value (NPV) of this development pipeline to be almost $2 billion. The company also owns master planned communities in Texas and Nevada. We think that the NPV of these assets are another $2 billion. Since we have visited all the assets, we feel comfortable with the asset quality and asset value. We think that the investment is very valuable in that it will allow us to hold onto an investment that could generate greater than 20% in the next 2-3 years and greater than 10% CAGR for over a decade. This frees up time and energy for us to pursue other opportunities.

Q1 2018 Updates – During the quarter the company purchased roughly 1% of the shares outstanding at prices that are about 14% below quarter end prices. Q1 Annualized net operating income of income properties increased to $187mm. The company's forecasted stabilized NOI has now been increased to $340 to $350mm in the next 2-3 years. The increases in current and forecasted stabilized NOI is a recurring theme each quarter as development projects are built, leased, and stabilized. Leasing progression of one of their largest projects continues apace. We will personally visit this project in the next couple of weeks via our attendance of a live sporting event. Residential lot sales in the master planned communities are healthy. The company also sold some non-core legacy assets which generated tax losses that they can net against taxable gains. Patience is a virtue when you own a collection of high quality assets and can focus on other things while competent management executes its long-term plan.

TerraForm Power

Overview – TerraForm Power (TERP) is a renewable energy yieldco that is similar in structure to REITs and MLPs in that it is meant for investors who seek growing distributions over time. SunEdison is the sponsor of TERP and its bankruptcy filing has forced TERP to suspend its dividend and delayed the filing of its financials as SunEdison and TERP both share the same financial reporting system. We believe that TERP sold off because 1) the natural shareholder base of TERP demands consistent and growing distributions and 2) the market was afraid that the SunEdison bankruptcy will drag TERP into a messy restructuring.

Q1 2018 updates – Brookfield continues to execute on cost cuts and the acquisition of Saeta Yield. During the quarter, a single faulty blade reduced the CAFD by about $6 million as the company decided to shut down the operations for 70 turbines. The key financial development during the quarter is that TERP decided to increase the equity financing of the Saeta Yield deal from $400 million to $650 million. This will de-leverage the balance sheet sooner but will also lead to additional dilution.

Bill Chen | Managing Partner
230 Park Ave, 10th Floor | New York, NY 10169
PH: (347) 688-8056 | www.rhizomepartners.com

Please feel free to contact me anytime, by phone at (347) 688-8056 or by email at bill@rhizomepartners.com.

Regards,

Chong Tong "Bill" Chen

RHIZOME PARTNERS

Bill Chen | Managing Partner
230 Park Ave, 10th Floor | New York, NY 10169
PH: (347) 688-8056 | www.rhizomepartners.com

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The Fund commenced operations in April 2013 and has limited performance history. All performance of the Fund shown is from inception, net of applicable fees and expenses, presumes reinvestment of income and reflects the performance of the Class B Interests with a 1% Management Fee and a 15% Performance Allocation. The performance of Class A, which is also currently being offered and charges a 2% Management Fee and a 20% Performance Allocation, is not shown but is available upon request. Past performance is not indicative of future results. No representation is made that the Fund will or is likely to achieve its objectives, that the Investment Manager's investment process or risk management will be successful, or that any investor will make any profit or will not sustain losses.

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Targeted returns are used for measurement or comparison purposes and only as a guideline for prospective investors to evaluate the Fund's investment strategy and performance. Target returns shown reflect the Investment Manager's subjective view based on a variety of factors including, among others, investment strategy and prior performance of products pursuing similar strategies and market conditions. Targeted returns should be evaluated over the time period indicated and not over shorter periods.

Any statements regarding market events, future events or other similar statements constitute only subjective views, are based upon expectations or beliefs, should not be relied on, are subject to change due to a variety of factors, including fluctuating market conditions, and involve inherent risks and uncertainties, both general and specific, many of which cannot be predicted or quantified and are the beyond the Fund's or the Investment Manager's control. Future evidence and actual results could differ materially from those set forth in, contemplated by, or underlying these statements. In light of these risks and uncertainties, there can be no assurance that these statements are now or will prove to be accurate or complete in any way. The Investment Manager undertakes no responsibility or obligation to revise or update such statements.

Any financial indices shown are unmanaged, assume reinvestment of income and do not reflect the impact of any management or performance fees. There are limitations in using financial indices for comparison purposes because such indices may have different volatility, credit and other material characteristics. The S&P 500 is an unmanaged, capital-weighted index representing the aggregate market value of the common equity of 500 companies primarily traded on the NYSE.

This information is as of the date indicated, reflects present intention, is not complete, is subject to change, and does not contain material information regarding the Fund, including important risk disclosures. The Fund is a private investment fund that is NOT subject to the same regulatory requirements as mutual funds, including mutual fund requirements to provide certain periodic and standardized pricing and valuation information to investors. Investment in the Fund may involve a high degree of risk and its performance may be volatile. Such risks may include, without limitation, risk of adverse or unanticipated market developments and risk of illiquidity.

Bill Chen | Managing Partner
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PH: (347) 688-8056 | www.rhizomepartners.com

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