

Zhugé Liang and the Northern Campaign of 228–234

John Killigrew

To cite this article: John Killigrew (1999) Zhugé Liang and the Northern Campaign of 228–234, *Early Medieval China*, 1999:1, 55-91, DOI: [10.1179/152991099788199472](https://doi.org/10.1179/152991099788199472)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/152991099788199472>



Published online: 18 Jul 2013.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 37



View related articles [↗](#)

Zhugue Liang and the Northern Campaign of 228–234

John Killigrew
SUNY at Brockport

Among the many individuals who appear in the legends, myths, and reality of Chinese military history, one of the most enigmatic is Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮 (A.D. 180–234). In his introductory essay to *Chinese Ways of Warfare*, the late John K. Fairbank contrasts the West, which he claims stresses the glory of warfare and the admiration and emulation of figures such as Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon, to an anti-militarist China, where the most one can find is a “Robin Hood figure” like Zhuge Liang. The main thrust of the essay is to emphasize the alleged disesteem of violence in traditional Chinese strategic culture: the classic concept of *wen* 文 (non-military strategies) being more efficacious than *wu* 武 (military strategies).¹ Ignoring the question as to whether this thesis corresponds to the reality of Chinese history, such a terse dismissal of Zhuge Liang is misleading because the hagiographical folk cult that developed soon after his death, which has continued throughout the centuries, is related precisely to his purported military accomplishments as well as his exemplification of the virtues of loyalty and steadfastness. While recent English language scholarship meets much of the lacunae of ignorance that surrounds his career, his military exploits await an analytical assessment.² At the same time among many Chinese his folk cult has been enhanced by the immense popularity of the famous novel by Luo Guanzhong 羅貫中 (1330–1400), *Sanguo yanyi* 三國演義 (*The Three Kingdoms*).³ Here he is portrayed as the personification of military deception; a stalwart hero who overcame his adversaries through strategic and psychological ruses. Obviously his military career, particularly the ill-fated Northern Campaign, which this article will narrate and critique, needs to be brought into sharper focus in order to provide the student of Chinese military history with a more comprehensive understanding and appreciation of the reality of his achievements and failures.

¹ Fairbank 1974:7, 25–27.

² Henry 1992:589–612; Wills 1994:110–20.

³ Roberts 1991.

The reconstruction of his early life and youthful years as outlined below is taken from several sources.⁴ Born in Shandong Province in A.D. 180 to a literati family, he was orphaned at the age of four when his parents perished in the Yellow Turban Rebellion. Subsequently, he was raised by an uncle and in the year 194 accompanied the latter to Nanchang 南昌, in present-day Jiangxi Province, where the uncle received an appointment as a district magistrate under Yuan Shu 袁術, the local regional warlord. Soon thereafter the uncle was dismissed and along with his young ward traveled to Jingzhou 荊州 in search of an appointment from Liu Biao 劉表, the commissioner of Jingzhou. The *zhou* 州 (prefecture) was an administrative subdivision of the Eastern Han dynasty, which in turn was subdivided into a number of commanderies (*jun* 郡).

Jingzhou was a relatively calm area amidst the turmoil that plagued the last years of the Later Han dynasty and was famous as a refuge for scholars and Confucian literati from North China. Situated astride the middle Yangzi River it embraced parts of the present-day provinces of Hunan and Hubei. Because of its geopolitical importance it became the focus of attention during the Three Kingdoms period: Whoever controlled Jingzhou controlled the middle Yangzi and had easy access to the lower reaches of the river. Upon the death of his uncle in 197, the seventeen-year-old Zhuge Liang struck out on his own to take up a career as a farmer-scholar in the area of Longzhong 隆中, southwest of the prefectural seat of Xiangyang 襄陽, an important commercial, political, and intellectual center on the Han River 漢水, some 200 kilometers north of its juncture with the Yangzi.

Here tilling the soil amid fields and dikes as a means of livelihood, he simultaneously pursued a life of study pertaining to the classics of ancient literature, history, and military affairs. Having an active and inquisitive mind he made the acquaintance of many of the refugee-scholars from North China, familiarizing himself with their views and opinions on events of the day and benefiting from their guidance as to the meaning and spirit of the classics. Many of these scholars were affiliated with the Jingzhou school, which stressed literary and scholastic culture,

⁴ SGZ 35; Fang Beichen 1995:1651–95; Zheng Xiaoshi 1985; Liu Chunfan 1962.

and, reflecting an obvious Daoist trend, disdained politics and public life.⁵

However, if such was the intellectual trend in Jingzhou at that time, it did not attract the youthful and ambitious Zhuge Liang, who in contrast to arid scholasticism found stimulation and nourishment in the Legalist tradition of analyzing the situation and integrating knowledge with the practical struggle for power. In particular he came to admire the career and achievements of Guan Zhong 管仲 (-645 B.C.), and the military exploits of Yue Yi 樂毅. The former, famed in Chinese history as an advisor to the ruler of the state of Qi 齊, was responsible for various political, economic, and military policies that transformed Qi from a weak and vulnerable position during the late Spring and Autumn period (770–476 B.C.) to dominance within the decentralized structure of the Zhou dynasty. Yue Yi was a renowned military commander of the state of Yan 燕 who defeated the army of Qi in 284 B.C.

The most direct influence on Zhuge Liang's intellectual development during his youthful years in Longzhong came from a certain Pang Degong 龐德公. An eremitic scholar with a reputation for scholarship and learning, he was respected for his knowledge of and insight into contemporary politics. His refusal to participate in public affairs was due less to his distaste of active politics than to his contempt for the policies and personality of the Jingzhou commissioner, Liu Biao. Impressed with the youthful Zhuge Liang's understanding of the political and strategic issues shaping events in the last phase of the Later Han dynasty, Pang gave his protégé the nickname "sleeping dragon" (*wolong* 臥龍). According to ancient Chinese mythology a hibernating dragon waits for a propitious opportunity and then enters the clouds to control the cosmic forces of the universe and grasp political hegemony.⁶

There was another important strain in Zhuge Liang's intellectual and political background, one that, at the core of his controversial Northern Campaign of 228–34, shaped his politico-military strategy. While it was quite common at this time to hold that the "mandate of heaven" was moving away from the Han court, others such as Zhuge Liang upheld the Han not only as politically legitimate but reflective of the cosmic order of the universe. The manipulation and domination of the court in

⁵ Twitchett 1986:792–93; Chen Chi-yun 1975:64–65.

⁶ SGZ 37:953, note 1.

Luoyang 洛陽 by Cao Cao 曹操 (155–220) was viewed by Zhuge Liang as immoral and illegal. Cao Cao, after obtaining control of North China by the last decade of the 2nd century, secured effective control over the court without deposing the emperor and proclaiming a new mandate. It was Zhuge Liang's ideological commitment to the Han court and his animosity to the manipulative Cao Cao that shaped his strategic-political goal: He sought not a balance of power between regional hegemony but the restoration of a more pristine Han court purged of the noxious influence of Cao Cao. His willingness and eagerness to end his seclusion and join the entourage of Liu Bei 劉備 (161–223) was based on this political and ideological commitment. In Liu Bei, a distant relative of the ruling Liu family of the Han court, Zhuge Liang saw not only a legitimate patron to support and serve but a competent military commander who could accomplish his ideological and political goals.⁷

In 201, the fourth year of Zhuge Liang's recluse life as a farmer-scholar, Liu Bei, after involvement in a "dynastic restoration" against the wily Cao Cao, escaped from the latter's clutches and with his rag-tag army fled south from Luoyang to the sanctuary of Jingzhou where he received patronage from Liu Biao 劉表, who like Liu Bei, claimed to be a distant relative of the ruling family. Arriving in Jingzhou with some 10,000 dispirited troops, Liu Bei was assigned to garrison and guard the northern approaches to Jingzhou against the expected southward advance of Cao Cao. The area included Xinye 新野, near Xiangyang and Zhuge Liang's residence in Longzhong. While undertaking his new military duties, Liu Bei became increasingly drawn into discussions pertaining to strategic and political issues of the day with local elites and consequently became aware of the reputation of the "sleeping dragon." Liu Bei's military career up to this time had been one of an undistinguished minor warlord in the ebb and flow of military machinations that erupted to shake the Later Han dynasty following the Yellow Turban Rebellion of 184. For some twenty years he had shifted alliances back and forth. When the recent affiliation with Cao Cao had ended in disaster, he found himself in Jingzhou isolated and vulnerable.⁸

It was at this juncture that Liu Bei sought out the highly respected and ambitious Zhuge Liang for advice and recruited him

⁷ SGZ 32; Feng Wenguang 1994; Tan Liangxiao and Zhang Dake 1987.

⁸ Fang Beichen 1991:61–103

to serve as a *moushi* 謀士, an advisor on geopolitical and strategic matters. According to tradition, in the year 207 (Jian'an 建安 12), Liu Bei made three calls on the “sleeping dragon” before he agreed to join the former’s entourage. It was at this time that Zhuge outlined to Liu Bei the famous “Longzhong dui” 隆中對 (Longzhong Plan; LZD).⁹ It not only envisaged Liu Bei succeeding in establishing a regional base of power, but most significantly detailed a grand strategy for Liu Bei to achieve hegemony (*baye kecheng* 霸業可成) and resuscitate the morbid Han court. Because the LZD is closely related to the strategy and conduct of the Northern Campaign a brief description of its contents is appropriate.¹⁰

Before Liu Bei could even contemplate unifying China and liberating the Han court from the “national bandit” Cao Cao, it was imperative for him to establish a viable geographic base from which he could derive manpower and other resources necessary for the grand enterprise of unification. The LZD proposed that Liu Bei focus on the middle Yangzi area of Jingzhou and Yizhou 益州 (present-day Sichuan). The LZD noted that Cao Cao controlled the North China plain (*zhongyuan* 中原), famous in Chinese military history as the key to mastery over all the country, as well as the Yellow River basin from Shandong to Chang’an; at the same time Sun Quan 孫權 (181–252) effectively controlled the lower Yangzi region, known as Jiangnan 江南. In view of this, the LZD recommended that Liu Bei seize Jingzhou and Yizhou—both areas ruled by incompetents who could easily be toppled—thereby establishing a triangular geographic political structure in which Liu Bei could compete for hegemony with the other two protagonists.

Another crucial aspect of the LZD was the proposal for forming an alliance with Sun Quan in order to deter and resist the more powerful and intimidating Cao Cao. Other aspects of the LZD involved instituting economic, legal, and administrative reforms in Jingzhou and Yizhou as well as developing good relations with the non-Han people located in the west and south, the present-day provinces of Gansu, Yunnan, and Guizhou. Such a policy would reduce animosity of the local people toward Han officials and might provide a source of needed manpower and valuable economic resources.

⁹ *SGZ* 35:912–13; *MSA* 1986:26.

¹⁰ *MSA* 1983:26, 1986:406–408.

The LZD had a final culminating clause: a two-pronged northern campaign which would be consummated by the seizure of the Central Plain and the liberation of the Han court by Liu Bei. The LZD was silent as to when and under what circumstances the Northern Campaign would take place, presumably when the political and military situation was favorable and an extraordinary opportunity presented itself, such as the destabilization of Cao Cao's power. The two-pronged campaign specified that one advance would be from Yizhou in the west, north through the Qinling 秦嶺, debouching into the Wei River 渭水 valley and achieving a strategic position in the west from which to dominate the great bend of the Yellow River and Guanzhong 關中; the second prong from the east would drive north from Jingzhou toward the political center of Luoyang 洛陽 and the surrounding Central Plain and the Yellow River basin. The LZD disregarded the role that Sun Quan as an ally would play in the culminating Northern Campaign. Presumably at the least he was expected to tie down some of Cao Cao's forces.¹¹

Liu Bei acceded to the LZD. The alliance between the two weaker protagonists, himself and Sun Quan, was arranged and shortly thereafter was instrumental in bringing about the dramatic and crucial victory for the allied forces over Cao Cao's army at the battle of Chibi 赤壁 in 208. Hoping to advance into the middle Yangzi valley and seize Jingzhou prior to sweeping down the river east toward Jiangnan, Cao Cao's plans were smashed by the allied army at Chibi, some 40 kilometers upstream from present-day Wuhan. This battle is important in the history of the Three Kingdoms period for it provided the basis upon which the tripolar military balance of power was built. For his part Liu Bei moved swiftly to seize the adjacent prefectures of Jingzhou south of the Yangzi by dispatching Zhuge Liang to consolidate control over these areas, consisting of parts of present-day Hunan and Guizhou, while with the remainder of the army he sat astride the middle Yangzi area near present-day Wuhan. The subsequent military campaigns which established the tripartite division of China prior to the Northern Campaign are instructive for the interplay of strategy and personalities.¹²

¹¹ MSA 1986:406–408.

¹² Wu Guoqing 1992:1–250; Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:54–175; MSA 1983:1–61, 1986: 367–486.

Less sanguine about future campaigning south toward the Yangzi delta, Cao Cao in 211 launched a military campaign west toward Chang'an and the northwest. Concerned that this was prelude to an encroachment south through the Qinling 秦嶺 into his domain, Liu Zhang 劉璋, commissioner of Yizhou, was persuaded by his staff to invite Liu Bei to enter the area and provide military assistance against the threat of Cao Cao. During the late summer of 211, precisely at the time when Cao Cao was consolidating control over the Guanzhong area and the Wei River valley, Liu Bei with an army of 30,000 entered Yizhou. Two of his most famous commanders, Guan Yu 關羽 and Zhang Fei 張飛, along with Zhuge Liang, remained behind in Jingzhou. As administrator of the three southern prefectures of Jingzhou, Zhuge Liang was given the opportunity to use his talents to develop a sound political, economic, and military base. Through treachery and duplicity, Liu Bei finally gained control in Yizhou, although not before summoning Zhuge Liang in 214 to lead a force of some 40,000 up the Yangzi to the present-day Chongqing area and then north to assist in the capture of Chengdu 成都, the capital of Yizhou.¹³

Following the capture of Chengdu in 214, Liu Bei moved north to confront Cao Cao for control of Hanzhong 漢中. Situated on the upper reaches of the Han River south of the dominating Qinling, Hanzhong was strategically important for access to the east and west, and was considered crucial for the safety of the Chengdu plain. It had been seized by Cao Cao in 215, but in 217, while he was campaigning in the east against Sun Quan in the Huai River 淮水 area, Liu Bei sought to wrest this strategic center from his hands. The subsequent campaign was a protracted affair and Zhuge Liang, based in Chengdu, was responsible for the mobilization and transfer of reinforcements. In the spring of 219, faced with the difficulty of ration transport through the Qinling, Cao Cao withdrew his forces from Hanzhong and returned to Chang'an. Thus, either by design in consciously following the LZD of Zhuge Liang, or by seizing unique opportunities, Liu Bei had achieved the necessary territorial base needed for unifying China proper: Liu Bei was master of Yizhou and his subordinate Guan Yu stood preeminent in Jingzhou. This situation, as it unfolded in the spring of 219, proved to be the zenith of Zhuge Liang's strategic design.¹⁴

¹³ Wu Guoqing 1992:176–82.

¹⁴ Wu Guoqing 1992:195–200.

From 219 until the death of Liu Bei in 223 there were successive defeats, the consequences of which seriously compromised the LZD. First, Guan Yu advancing north against Cao Cao's forces in the Xiangyang region on the Han River was attacked from the rear by the treacherous Sun Quan. Guan Yu perished and his entire army was destroyed. Jingzhou came under Sun Quan's control, thereby inflicting a fatal blow to the LZD's design of a two-pronged northern campaign. This military disaster was followed by significant political moves among the several protagonists of the Three Kingdoms period: the abdication of the last Han emperor in 220 and the enthronement of Cao Pi 曹丕, the son of Cao Cao, as the first emperor of the Wei 魏 dynasty; Liu Bei assuming the title of emperor of Shu-Han with his capital at Chengdu; and Sun Quan proclaiming himself king of Wu 吳.¹⁵

The second military disaster that would challenge the viability of the LZD was the tragic defeat of Liu Bei's waterborne campaign down the Yangzi to recapture Jingzhou and avenge the death of Guan Yu. Zhuge Liang was not involved in planning this expedition, which began in 221 and culminated in 222 with the defeat of Liu Bei's army and his fleeing to Baidicheng 白帝城, west of the Sanmen gorges. In 223, Liu became seriously ill. On his deathbed, he summoned Zhuge Liang and gave him the responsibility for the political guidance of his seventeen-year-old son and heir to the Shu-Han throne, Liu Chan 劉禪. At the same time he named Zhuge Liang prime-minister (*chengxiang* 丞相) in charge of all aspects of the Shu-Han government, including military affairs.¹⁶

Facing daunting problems that were the direct consequence of Liu Bei's military disaster and untimely death, Zhuge Liang initially moved to restore the alliance with the Wu under Sun Quan. Then, following the pacification of a rebellion in the southern areas of Yizhou in present-day Yunnan Province, he began to rebuild and revive the economic base and military structure of the state that had been shattered by Liu Bei's debacle through "closing the pass (Ling Pass 靈關) and resting the people" (*biguan ximin* 閉關息民).¹⁷

The rebuilding of the Shu-Han military in preparation for the Northern Campaign in 228 requires a brief comment on the

¹⁵ Fang Beichen 1989:108–109; MSA 1983:50.

¹⁶ Wu Guoqing 1992:243.

¹⁷ ZZTJ 70:2216.

military administration of Shu-Han under the new prime minister. In 211, when Liu Bei first entered Yizhou his army consisted of two types of professional long-term soldiers: those who enlisted while he was still a “guest” of Liu Biao in Jingzhou, and those remnants of Liu Biao’s forces which were incorporated into his army after the battle of Chibi in 208. In 214, when he arrived in Yizhou, Zhuge Liang introduced a policy similar to the Han dynasty’s population registration and military conscription, called *geng* 更 (literally, to change or replace).¹⁸

Attention was also focused on training and drill in tactical formations: In ancient Chinese military history there is considerable discussion given to battlefield tactical formations including the *bazhen* 八陣 “the eight row formation.”¹⁹ During the wars of the Three Kingdoms period the *bazhen* referred to a specific tactical formation introduced by Zhuge Liang as a defense against the striking power of the Cao-Wei cavalry. Accounts of the nature of this battlefield formation during Zhuge Liang’s Northern Campaign are scarce, but in view of the deadly nature of the crossbow barrage we can surmise that he sought to develop a formation which would give full play to the firepower of the crossbows in an ambush situation and neutralize the cavalry superiority of his enemy.²⁰

During the years 223–25, while Zhuge Liang was “closing the pass and resting the people,” Cao Pi 曹丕, the emperor of Wei, launched three unsuccessful military campaigns against Sun Quan in the east seeking to break into the Yangzi valley by way of the Hefei 合肥 region. In 226 he died, and his successor Cao Rui 曹叡 decided to forego his predecessor’s offensive strategy in favor of a defensive posture, at least for the time being, both in the east and west. It was at this juncture that Zhuge Liang decided that the political and military situation was propitious for launching his Northern Campaign. There was the ongoing rebellion of the non-Han peoples in the northwest—Hu 胡 and Qiang 羌—against the Cao-Wei regime, which had the potential of benefiting Zhuge Liang should he strike north toward this region. And the succession of Cao Rui was not without some dissension among the Cao-Wei elite. Although the regime was not seriously weakened internally as a result of these developments, Zhuge Liang, in the year 227,

¹⁸ Xu Rongsheng 1988:126–37.

¹⁹ *JS* 98:2569.

²⁰ Li Boxun 1998:51–54.

determined that his adversary's political situation was indeed tenuous. With this development and confident that his own preparations were complete, he issued his famous memorial to Liu Chan proclaiming his commitment to the restoration of the Han court, the destruction of the "national bandits," and the liberation of the old capital at Luoyang. After making suitable arrangements to consolidate affairs in Chengdu during his absence at the front commanding the army, he mobilized his expeditionary force of about 100,000 at Hanzhong and outlined plans for the Northern Campaign to his subordinate officers.²¹

In one of the most famous war councils in Chinese military history, he proposed a wide left hook to seize the upper Wei River 渭水 valley including the high terrain on both sides of the river called Longyou 隴右, thereby outflanking Chang'an 長安 and the Guanzhong 關中 area from the west. One of Zhuge Liang's subordinate officers, Wei Yan 魏延, objected to this plan and urged instead a swift strike directly north from Hanzhong through a convenient pass in the Qinling with the goal of seizing Chang'an. He argued that the Cao-Wei commander at Chang'an, being timid and irresolute, would flee at the appearance of the enemy. Wei Yan requested that he be given command of a force of 10,000 which he would drive through the pass and within ten days capture the historical city. He was confident that after dispersing the Cao-Wei garrison he could hold Chang'an until Zhuge Liang and the main force arrived after advancing through the mountain passes. This bold plan, which was turned down by Zhuge Liang, was in stark contrast to his own more cautious proposal of a wide sweeping left-hook advance to seize the Longyou area before any advance on Chang'an. The contrast between the two proposals has remained the focus of controversy and criticism among historians in judging Zhuge Liang's Northern Campaign and his overall strategic competency. He did order two small forces to march through the Ye Valley 斜谷 to serve as a decoy by threatening Mei 郿 on the Wei River. Although diluted from the original two-pronged advance as outlined in the LZD, the Northern Campaign began in the early spring of 228 with the wide left hook aiming to seize the Longyou area, Tianshui 天水 in the Wei River valley some 300 kilometers west of Chang'an, and Qishan 祁山, a defensive

²¹ Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:1211–55; Wu Guoqing 1992:251–87; MSA 1983:1–61.

bastion that screened the southern approaches to Tianshui (see Map).²²

The advance guard under Ma Su 馬謖 was given the mission of securing the strategic post of Jieting 街亭, approximately 75 kilometers northeast of Tianshui on a mountain pass road between the Liupan Mountains 六盤山 on the north and the Long Mountains 隴山 on the south, and well over 250 kilometers northwest of Chang'an. Here Ma Su arranged his defensive position on the higher elevation of a nearby mountain, forfeiting access to a water source that was available on the lower slopes in violation of tactical regulations. Although initially surprised by Zhuge Liang's offensive, Cao Zhen 曹真, the Cao-Wei commander in Chang'an, dispatched a combined infantry-cavalry force of 50,000 under Zhang He 張郃 to block Zhuge Liang's advance at Jieting. By the time he arrived Ma Su already was ensconced in his vulnerable position. Cut off from needed water, he was easily defeated. Remnants of his ill-fated force were rallied and extricated by a subordinate officer and escaped annihilation because Zhang He, fearing an ambush, did not pursue. Besides the defeat at Jieting the decoy force that had pushed through the Ye Valley was roughly handled by other Cao-Wei forces, and fearing that the enemy was in a position to threaten his flank and rear, Zhuge retreated with the main force back to Hanzhong 漢中.²³

The debacle of Zhuge Liang's first campaign in the spring of 228 has received much criticism and comment by Chinese historians throughout the centuries. Nevertheless from a study of various accounts of the Jieting episode it is surprising that comment fails to analyze the fact that Ma Su's advance guard was not reinforced in a timely fashion by the main force. Much is made of the incompetency which Ma Su demonstrated in his defensive deployment. But the advance guard was separated from the main force by some 75 kilometers, the distance between Tianshui and Jieting, which precluded alacritous reinforcement. This fact receives little analysis.²⁴ Following the retreat back to Hanzhong, Zhuge Liang published his controversial memorial to his sovereign in which he struck a pessimistic note and chastised himself for the defeat and retreat. Nevertheless, Ma Su was executed for his failure to comply with regulations. The failure of the first campaign was

²² Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:Map 159; Wu Guoqing 1992:269.

²³ *SGZ* 35:922; *ZZTJ* 71:2240-42.

²⁴ Wang Rutao 1997:61-63.

also a political disaster because many of the people adjacent to the line of advance in the Tianshui region, who had earlier defected from the Cao-Wei, now joined the retreat to Hanzhong. This displacement of several thousand residents was involuntary and presumably was related to the need to enhance agricultural productivity in the Hanzhong plain.²⁵

Zhuge Liang's second campaign came about as a result of his reaction to events in eastern China. Not long after the disappointing retreat back to Hanzhong in the summer of 228, a Wu army under Lu Xun 陸遜 defeated a Cao-Wei force at Shiting 石亭, 35 kilometers northeast of Hefei in present-day Anhui Province. To meet this possible threat of a breakthrough into the Huai River 淮水 valley, the Cao-Wei court reinforced the eastern front by shifting troops from the west. Believing that the enemy he faced in western China was severely weakened by this transfer, late in the same year Zhuge Liang struck through the Qinling with the objective of seizing the walled city of Chencang 陳倉, near present-day Baoji 寶雞 on the north bank of the Wei River. At the time of the first campaign, Cao Zhen, the Cao-Wei commander in Chang'an, fortuitously had garrisoned Chencang, approximately 175 kilometers west of his headquarters, with a small force of 5000 under Hao Zhao 郝昭. Chencang, a transportation hub on the old Silk Road, and Tianshui were the keys to controlling communication in the Wei valley to the west. Although outnumbered by Zhuge Liang, who brought some 20,000 to 30,000 troops into the fray, Hao Zhao was prepared to endure a siege, confident he could hold out until reinforcements arrived from headquarters. After several appeals to surrender were dismissed by Hao, Zhuge Liang brought into action such classic siege equipment as scaling ladders and mobile battering rams which proved ineffective when countered by various incendiary devices. Heavy stones attached to thick ropes were swung from the walls by the defenders to smash the mobile battering rams. A tower built to overlook the walls in order to provide a downward angle for bowmen was met by counter tower building. A tunnel built to penetrate beneath the walls was parried by the defenders digging a bisecting tunnel. After three weeks of stalemate, reinforcements arrived under Zhang He, the victor of Jieting. With food rations depleted, Zhuge Liang lifted the siege and withdrew to Hanzhong. One of Zhang He's subordinate officers, Wang Shuang 王雙,

²⁵ SGZ 35:922, note 2.

ordered to pursue the retreating foe through the Qinling, was killed and his force decimated by an ambush that Zhuge Liang had arranged. This incident was the beginning of his reputation as a skillful tactician and master of ambushes, a reputation that would influence his adversaries even after his death.²⁶

In the spring of 229 the third campaign was launched with the same goal as the earlier campaigns—to gain control over the Longyou area—with the immediate objective being the prefectural seats of Wudu 武都 and Yinping 陰平. These areas, in the western foothills of the Qinling, some 175 kilometers northwest of Hanzhong, were in the general locality through which Zhuge Liang had campaigned a year earlier. The campaign began with the vanguard moving through the valleys west of Hanzhong and gaining control over the two prefectural seats in rapid succession. In a counter move, Zhang He, the Cao-Wei commander in Tianshui, sent a force under Guo Huai 郭淮 from Tianshui to march south and challenge this threat. Zhuge Liang, with timely information concerning this move by Guo Huai, moved swiftly to reinforce his vanguard and defeated Guo Huai in a “meeting engagement” (*yingzhan* 迎戰) at Jianwei 建威. A meeting engagement in ancient Chinese military history is when two military forces meet in open battle without any defensive structure or barrier. Located some 30 kilometers northwest of Wudu on the West Han River as it winds its way through the foothills of the Qinling, Jianwei was in close proximity to Qishan, the defensive bastion screening any advance from the south to Tianshui. Here Guo Huai, after the defeat at Jianwei, prepared a defensive position and effectively checkmated any plans Zhuge Liang had of a quick advance to Tianshui and Longyou.

Frustrated that the tactical victory at Jianwei did not reap significant strategic benefits, and fearing that a stalemate against a well-defended enemy would be a drain on manpower and rations, Zhuge Liang retreated back to Hanzhong. The withdrawal to Hanzhong also meant that political control over the two prefectures of Wudu and Yinping was once again abandoned, a development that must have taxed the credibility of Zhuge Liang and his Shu-Han state among the residents of these areas. In analyzing the third campaign it is interesting to note that Zhuge Liang was alacritous in reinforcing his advance guard and achieving a tactical success in a meeting engagement, in contrast to the disastrous first campaign,

²⁶ SGZ 35:924; ZZTJ 71:2247–50.

but failed to sustain the tactical victory and achieve any dramatic results. Furthermore, it gives evidence of the tactical advantage a defender could have if given time and favorable terrain.²⁷

Beginning in the winter of 229–30, and into the spring of 230, Hanzhong was the scene of a remarkable new military development. Rather than prepare for another offensive through or around the Qinling, Zhuge Liang initiated extensive defensive preparations in anticipation of a Cao-Wei offensive. It consisted of constructing two defensive barriers on the Hanzhong plain, a total distance of some 200 kilometers: In the west a walled city was built on the north bank of the Mian River 沔水, near present-day Mianxian 沔縣 and the locale of Zhuge Liang's tomb. In the east a walled city of approximately 7 kilometers in diameter was built adjacent to the side of a mountain upon which were located signal towers. What ensued seems to suggest that either Zhuge Liang was the recipient of reliable information or possessed an uncanny insight into the mentality of his adversary. The Cao-Wei court had decided to abandon its cautious, defensive strategy and launch a large-scale offensive south through the Qinling. The plan adopted called for a complicated and simultaneous three-pronged attack spread out over a considerable width with the initial goal of seizing Hanzhong. The eastern column under Sima Yi 司馬懿 would advance south from Chang'an to the vicinity of Xicheng 西城, 200 kilometers east of Hanzhong on the Han River, from where he would move upstream toward Hanzhong. The central column under Cao Zhen was to strike south through the mountain roads and egress in the vicinity of the eastern edge of the Hanzhong plain. The western column under Zhang He, a veteran of previous engagements with Zhuge Liang, consisted of a cavalry force which would move from the Tianshui-Qishan area east toward Hanzhong.²⁸

While these preparations for the campaign were being undertaken by both sides a political development occurred that must have been of little solace to Zhuge Liang, particularly in view of the limited political benefit that he had gained from his three military campaigns. Sun Quan, perhaps sensing that the situation was opportune and that the mandate of the Han court was irrevocably shattered, proclaimed himself emperor of Wu in 229. This move must have provoked the Cao-Wei court which had

²⁷ *SGZ* 35:924; *ZZTJ* 71:2251–52.

²⁸ *SGZ* 33: 896, 9:282; *ZZTJ* 71:2261.

come to believe that Sun Quan was a pliable although unreliable vassal. At the same time by presenting himself as a possible successor to the Han mandate, Sun directly challenged Zhuge Liang's goal of restoring the Han court. Among some of the Shu-Han elite in Chengdu there was anger and dismay at Sun Quan's proclamation but Zhuge Liang urged restraint. He cautioned his colleagues to ignore the proclamation and continue to maintain the alliance in order to tie down important Cao-Wei forces in eastern China. By having Wu as a nominal ally, Shu-Han would be relieved of the burden of maintaining a large force on its eastern boundary to watch and observe the unreliable Sun Quan.²⁹

By the fall of 230, when the Cao-Wei southern offensive began, Zhuge Liang had completed defensive arrangements and awaited the enemy onslaught. Ever the cagey adversary, he ordered the dashing Wei Yan 魏延, with a mixed cavalry-infantry force, to make a deep penetration behind Cao-Wei lines toward the northwest by going around the Qishan-Tianshui area, bypass Zhang He's force, advance up the Gansu corridor with the goal of contacting various non-Han peoples, and sow dissension among them toward the Cao-Wei regime, while at the same time sell the famous Chengdu silk brocades in return for horses and weapons.³⁰ From the start the Cao-Wei offensive in the year 230 was plagued with difficulties: Extraordinarily heavy and continuous rains inundated the Han River and precluded a swift advance upstream by Sima Yi once he had reached Xicheng, and Cao Zhen, for the identical reason, found passage through the narrow valleys impossible, while Zhang He in the west had to deal with the threat to his rear. By the fall of 230, after a month and half of little or no progress, the campaign was terminated.³¹

It was Wei Yan's deep penetration of the Gansu corridor that prevented Zhang He from moving toward Hanzhong as part of his role in the ill-fated summer Cao-Wei offensive. Instead of moving on Hanzhong he prepared to block Wei Yan's return by moving his force to Shanggui 上邽 in the vicinity of Tianshui. He divided his force: He remained at Shanggui while Guo Huai marched west to meet the returning Wei Yan. The latter after spending several months buying horses and establishing ties with the local people began his return late in the year 230. At Shouyang 首陽, on the

²⁹ ZYTJ 71:2252–54; SGZ 47:1134–35.

³⁰ SGZ 40:1003, 33:896; Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:226.

³¹ Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:226.

upper reaches of the Wei River and some 120 kilometers west of Tianshui and Shanggui, Guo Huai succeeded in surrounding and besieging Wei Yan's encampment. Once again in timely fashion, as he did at Jianwei in the spring of 229 against the same Guo Huai, Zhuge Liang, obviously confident of the security of Hanzhong as well as Zhang He's reluctance to leave his defensive position at Shanggui, made a daring march west to meet Wei Yan and to reinforce him in case of difficulty. Fortuitously for the latter, Zhuge arrived unexpectedly on the battlefield and surprised the besieging Guo Huai who fled for the safety of Zhang He's prepared defense at Shanggui. After this tactical victory Zhuge Liang did not pursue his defeated opponent but once again left the battlefield and returned to Hanzhong. Ever so cautious, he must have concluded that an attack against Zhang He's defense, lacking any element of surprise and located at a considerable distance from his base at Hanzhong, would at best lead to a stalemate and only deplete and exhaust manpower and rations. But, not surprisingly, it was the impetuous Wei Yan who urged Zhuge Liang to continue the momentum of victory by bypassing Zhang He and isolate the defensive bastions around Tianshui and boldly move on Chang'an. To the cautious Zhuge Liang, Wei Yan's successful expedition to the west and the resulting defeat of Guo Huai at Shouyang was due to the fact that the Shu-Han army had achieved surprise and such a situation could not be duplicated by advancing on Chang'an. Prudence dictated a return to Hanzhong.³²

The fourth campaign was launched early in 231 with the goal once again of seizing Longyou, with the initial phase being the capture of Wudu and Yinping to serve as a forward base. Disregarding the possibility of retaliation by Cao-Wei officials, Zhuge Liang again sent envoys to the border regions in the west to contact the Xianbei and the Qiang, urging them to create a disturbance in the Cao-Wei rear while the Shu-Han army advanced toward Longyou. Furthermore, in order to improve the transportation of supplies and rations he appointed Li Yan 李嚴, an old colleague and friend of Liu Bei, to be responsible for the ration transportation supply line: Chengdu-Hanzhong frontline. In addition he introduced a new vehicle that he hoped would increase the amount of rations that could be transported to the frontline. It consisted of a centered positioned one-wheel cart with four men on each corner for guidance. By setting the goal of seizing Longyou in

³² Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:228.

the fourth campaign, Zhuge Liang might be judged as being overly optimistic because the Cao-Wei defensive posture at this time was indeed formidable: Qishan and Shanggui were garrisoned, thus providing a defensive screen to Tianshui; the battle-tested Guo Huai and Dai Ling 戴陵 commanded forces guarding Tianshui from the northwest; finally, Zhang He stood ready with a cavalry force at Chang'an. The offensive began when Zhuge Liang divided his force by using part of the army to besiege the defensive bastion of Qishan, while the main force was kept nearby in reserve, perhaps hoping to ambush any Cao-Wei relief force coming south from Tianshui, or preparing to take advantage of any opportunity that the battlefield presented.³³

When news of Zhuge Liang's thrust toward Qishan and Tianshui reached Cao Zhen at Chang'an, he was immediately concerned that the advance was a ploy and that his adversary intended to strike directly at his headquarters through the Qinling passes: "Make a sound in the west but attack in the east." Shortly after making this assessment of the situation in the early summer of 231, Cao Zhen took ill and was replaced by Sima Yi as the overall Cao-Wei political-military commander in the west. One of the least known of the protagonists of the three Kingdoms period he was to succeed in having a most illustrious political and military career.³⁴ Many Cao-Wei staff officers at headquarters were of the opinion that Zhuge Liang had moved toward the west only to seize the early wheat harvest near Shanggui and did not present any serious threat to Longyou. But, acting on orders from the Cao-Wei court, Sima led the entire force out of Chang'an with the objective of relieving Qishan. Zhuge Liang on his part, aware of the advance of Sima Yi but wishing to maintain the initiative, kept part of his 30,000 man army besieging Qishan and set out with the remainder to seize the various Cao-Wei garrisons isolated and dispersed around Tianshui. Fortunately for Zhuge Liang his opponents played into his hands. Guo Huai, who had been garrisoning Didao 狄道, some 75 kilometers south of present-day Lanzhou and around 200 kilometers west and north of Tianshui, had been ordered to join Sima Yi at Qishan. While on the march he became aware of Zhuge Liang's advance on Shanggui. Thereupon, he took the initiative and suggested to Fei Yao 費瑤, the garrison commander at Shanggui, that they attempt to strike Zhuge Liang's

³³ Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:229.

³⁴ Fang Beichen 1990:81–82; Zheng Xin and Yang Xizhen 1981:16–23.

army while on the march. Fei agreed and left his defensive position and along with Guo Huai sought to catch the elusive enemy on the march in a front-rear pincer attack. Always eager for a “meeting engagement” Zhuge Liang defeated Fei and Guo and succeeded in uncovering the approaches to Tianshui and Longyou. However, he failed to gain any substantive benefit from this victory, and even though Tianshui was devoid of its defensive screen, he made no move to seize this important site.

When Sima Yi, accompanied by Zhang He, arrived at Qishan he was informed about the debacle to Guo and Fei and immediately marched off to Shanggui leaving the Shu-Han army besieging Qishan. Instead of seeking out Zhuge Liang in a “meeting engagement” he occupied a strong defensive position on the mountains east of Shanggui. Zhuge Liang, reluctant to attack a defensive barrier, set his army to work harvesting the early spring wheat that was available in the vicinity—perhaps access to the wheat was the purpose of the fourth campaign after all— all the while under the scrutiny of his enemy. Upon completing the harvest the Shu-Han army marched south toward Qishan hoping to entice Sima to follow and create an opportunity for a meeting engagement or an ambush. Sima did pursue but avoided being drawn into battle. Subsequently, at Lucheng 鹵城 some 30 kilometers east of Qishan, Zhuge Liang halted his march and prepared for battle.

His adversary declined the challenge, preferring to take up a defensive position on nearby high ground. Several of Sima’s subordinate officers in ridiculing their commander’s timidity coined one of the most famous aphorisms in Chinese military history: “To fear the Shu army as if it were a tiger.” Faced with such criticism their commander relented and launched a frontal assault, while assigning the cavalry force under Zhang He the mission of striking the Shu-Han force besieging Qishan. Zhuge Liang’s army prevailed at the battle of Lucheng, but Sima was able to extricate his force and retreat north to take up a defensive position at Shanggui. The retreat must have been in considerable disarray as accounts of the battle note that the Shu-Han forces captured 3000 sets of armor, 5000 swords, and 3100 crossbows. Zhang He’s attack of the besieging Shu-Han army at Qishan was unsuccessful and when he heard of the defeat of his commander at Lucheng he returned to Shanggui. Given the significant dimensions of equipment loss on the part of Sima Yi’s army, Zhuge Liang’s inability or unwillingness to capitalize on the victory at Lucheng is

perplexing: Was it the lack of a strong cavalry army coupled with concern over an ambush that made him reluctant to seek out more decisive victory? The stalemate at Shanggui between the two armies continued for several months during the summer of 231. From time to time Zhuge Liang sought to entice Sima into attacking, but the latter, having experienced his adversary's tactical virtuosity, demurred.³⁵

It was at this juncture that one of the most bizarre incidents in Zhuge Liang's career occurred. Li Yan, who had the responsibility for maintaining the supply of rations to the frontlines, realizing that because of heavy rains transport had broken down, sent an officer to Zhuge Liang's camp near Shanggui, informing him of the decision of the Shu-Han emperor in Chengdu to withdraw the army to Hanzhong. The emperor feared that a shortage of rations caused the transport breakdown. Unaware of Li Yan's mendacity in forging this false order, Zhuge Liang retreated once again to Hanzhong.

If he was frustrated by the limited strategic results of his campaigns so far, there must have been some consolation in the ambush of Zhang He at Mumen 木門. In contrast to his usual cautious approach in pursuing a retreating Zhuge Liang, Sima Yi ordered Zhang He to pursue and attack, confident that the demoralized and tired Shu-Han army would be an easy prey for the cavalry. The ambush succeeded in killing Zhang He and decimating his cavalry force by using massed crossbowmen firing from cover and striking the enemy as they entered a narrow defile. In this incident Zhuge Liang proved himself a worthy disciple of Sun Bin 孫臏, who ambushed and defeated Pang Juan 龐涓, at the famous battle of Maling 馬陵 in 341 B.C. by using massed crossbowmen.

But any comfort that Zhuge could take over the Mumen ambush must have been short-lived because upon return to Hanzhong he became aware of Li Yan's treachery. The latter after forging the retreat order compounded his perfidy by informing the emperor that the retreat of the army was a ploy to entice the enemy to pursue. After an investigation, Zhuge exposed evidence of Li Yan's duplicity. This ugly affair ended with the latter's dismissal. However, he was able to maintain his family property and his son, who was not involved in the matter, continued in office. The Li Yan incident has been explained as a struggle for power at the

³⁵ Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:230.

court in Chengdu with the culprit seeking to disgrace and subvert Zhuge Liang. As an old friend of Liu Bei he was never reconciled to the restoration of the alliance with Sun Quan, nor was he favorably inclined toward and supportive of the campaign to destroy the Cao-Wei regime and restore the Han dynasty. In contrast to Zhuge Liang's ambition to destroy the Cao-Wei regime and restore the Han dynasty, he wished to maintain a cozy defensive posture in Yizhou and continue the triangular division of the *tianxia* 天下 (China proper).³⁶

That Zhuge Liang intended to persist in seizing the Wei valley and the Longyou area was clear to Sima Yi. Although tactically defeated in battle several times, he had been successful in parrying any effort of Zhuge Liang to nibble away at the Longyou area. Indeed, he was proving to be a most competent adversary: He still occupied and began to reinforce the territory that Zhuge sought to seize; and soon after his appointment in 231 as the overall political and military official in the west he began to initiate policies in preparation for a protracted war against the Shu-Han state. Among these policies was the transfer of people from eastern China to farm abandoned land in the vicinity of Tianshui and Shanggui on the south bank of the Wei River, and on the north bank opposite Chang'an. Some units of his army were assigned to *tuntian* 屯田 duty, a famous arrangement in Chinese military history whereby a certain number of troops were engaged in farming while others were on active duty. Earlier Cao Cao had extensively developed the *tuntian* system on the eastern front in order to reinforce defenses against Sun Quan.

To enhance the productivity of the Wei valley, Sima began to rehabilitate and restore an irrigation canal that ran parallel to the river on the north bank from a point near Chencang east to where the Jing River 涇水 joins the Wei, some 175 kilometers in length. Work on repairing the canal began in the winter of 231 and the canal was ready for use within a year. It had been originally built under the supervision of Zheng Guo 鄭國, a famous hydraulic engineer in 234 B.C. After its rehabilitation in A.D. 232, it provided water for 1,000 *qing* (1 *qing* in Three Kingdoms times was approximately 8.5 acres) of land, increasing dramatically the potential of Sima Yi to withstand a protracted war in the Longyou area.³⁷

³⁶ Liu Jinghua 1993:53–62.

³⁷ Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:232.

On his part Zhuge Liang likewise encouraged agricultural production in the Hanzhong plain, but nothing on the scale of Sima Yi's canal project or population displacement. In addition he developed a new piece of equipment to expedite the transportation of rations called the *liuma* 流馬, literally "floating horse." It was a raft-type vessel which could be used to transport grain on water and could be pulled on suitable shoreline or overland from one body of water to another, indicating that the next campaign would be through mountain passes where there was swift flowing rivers and streams. If the advance was successful it would be useful in crossing the Wei River. In addition, workers were sent to repair the plank road which egresses from the Qinling at a point where access is convenient to Chencang, the city Zhuge Liang unsuccessfully besieged in the winter of 228. Along with planning and preparation, arrangements were made that in conjunction with Zhuge Liang's advance north from Hanzhong Sun Quan would launch an offensive in the east. This had been discussed earlier between the two allies, and when it finally occurred in the summer of 234, the results were dismal and did little to assist Zhuge Liang in forcing the enemy to withdraw forces in the west to meet a threat in the east.³⁸

Because both Chencang on the north bank of the Wei River, and Qishan, the screen for Tianshui, were defended by Cao-Wei forces, Zhuge Liang selected to strike through the Qinling by way of Baoye 褒斜 and arrive at the south bank of the Wei River at Wuzhangyuan 五丈原, a broad plain generally opposite the north bank location of Meixian. The launching of the fifth campaign in the spring of 234 did not in the least take Sima by surprise. Upon learning that Zhuge's army was moving through the Qinling, he made a pre-emptive move by crossing the river and proceeded to build a fortified position on the south bank in an area which would inhibit any descent east along south bank toward Chang'an on the part of the Shu-Han army once it had debouched from the mountain pass. After completing this move to the south bank, Guo Huai, a trusted subordinate of Sima and a veteran of the various campaigns against Zhuge Liang, suggested to his commander that their wily adversary might have plans other than seeking a decisive battle and gaining access to Chang'an. He cautioned Sima that Zhuge's goal remained the seizure of Longyou, but instead of the previous wide left-hook offensives, the Shu-Han leader might be

³⁸ Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:236–38.

planning to develop the Wei valley as a forward base and then proceed to gain control of the area and outflank the Cao-Wei position in the Guanzhong area from the west. Already, he reported, there was information that Shu-Han forces besides egressing at Wuzhangyuan had crossed the river upstream and built a line of communications leading from Gudao 故道 bypassing Chencang, and that ration supplies were being ferried across the river. Concerned over a potential threat of being cut off on the south bank, Sima reinforced the communication center of Beiyuan 北原, situated on the main east-west road on the north bank. This tactical move was none too soon because Zhuge Liang, perhaps foiled by the Sima's defensive position on the south bank, or indeed seeking to establish a position north of the Wei river as a preliminary step to control Longyou, crossed the river above Beiyuan with a portion of his army. Faced by a strong defensive deployment by Guo Huai at Beiyuan, which precluded an easy access east and to Sima's line of communication, Zhuge Liang sought to entice Guo Huai into battle by marching his force west and north, in the vicinity of the ill-fated battlefield of Jieting. After two months of desultory and ineffective maneuvering north of the Wei river, and perhaps concerned over the safety of his own line of communications, he recrossed the river to the base at Wuzhangyuan. When it became apparent in the summer of 234 that the stalemate would continue until he would be forced to retreat because of the endemic problem of ration supply, Zhuge Liang ordered his army to carry out the *tuntian* system, perhaps indicative of his intention to establish his staying power in the Wei valley as the first step in the long-range goal of seizing Longyou. Within two months during the summer of 234, about 1,000 *qing* of abandoned or open land were under cultivation; furthermore, the army also began assisting local farmers with irrigation projects and other agricultural tasks, thereby increasing its popularity among the people, an important factor in anticipation of a long protracted struggle for control of the region.³⁹

If Zhuge Liang envisaged that the fifth campaign would be assisted by Sun Quan launching a grand offensive into the Huai River valley, he was probably disappointed but not surprised by the tardiness and ineffectiveness of military events in the east. There had been sporadic campaigns and battles between Sun Quan's army and various Cao-Wei forces since 226: an overseas campaign

³⁹ Wu Guoqing 1992:283; Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:236.

by Sun Quan to present-day Liaoning 遼寧 Province to obtain horses, followed by the ambush and defeat of a water-borne campaign launched by Sun Quan toward Hefei, and further military action in this area as late as 232. Only after Zhuge Liang and Sima were stalemated along the Wei River did Sun Quan's force of 100,000 begin its ponderous advance north from the Yangzi and present-day Nanjing. The force was divided into three columns: a move on the eastern flank toward Huaiyin 淮陰 on the lower Huai River, a central column to advance toward the old battleground around Hefei, and a western column to advance toward Xiangyang on the Han River. Once the offensive began the poorly coordinated and widely dispersed columns were defeated piecemeal, void of any value to Zhuge Liang in forcing the Cao-Wei army to withdraw forces and breaking the stalemate.⁴⁰

Any optimism that the *tuntian* system would provide a long range solution to the endemic problem of ration supply and strengthen the resolve of Zhuge Liang concerning the viability of the Northern Campaign turned to pessimism in the late summer of 234 with the deterioration of his health brought on by both mental and physical exhaustion. The frustrating stalemate was the origin of several stories concerning his effort to entice Sima into a "meeting engagement." Finally, an envoy was sent to Sima's camp with the mission of challenging battle, but the Cao-Wei commander took the opportunity of the visit to interrogate the envoy about Zhuge's health, avoiding any mention of military affairs. The envoy informed Sima that because of the failure to take proper nourishment and adequate rest his adversary was in failing health and that this situation was compounded by his persistence to micromanage the administration of the army and oversee minor and petty disciplinary and procedural details. Sima correctly surmised that Zhuge's health was a serious matter which could affect the battlefield situation. The court at Chengdu also was concerned over this issue and sent an envoy to the camp at Wuzhangyuan to inquire as to the prime minister's health and discuss national affairs. After several days of interviews the envoy departed for Chengdu but after a short time on the road returned to Wuzhangyuan. Zhuge realized that the quick return of the envoy had to do with the seriousness of his illness and in succeeding consultations they discussed the issue of a suitable successor and replacement. The rapid deterioration of his health and depressed

⁴⁰ Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:237–38.

mental condition is reflected in the dramatic instruction that he gave to his subordinate officers: After his death the army under the overall command of Yang Yi 楊儀 was to return to Hanzhong with Wei Yan covering the retreat. By instructing his subordinates to abandon the idea of a protracted stay in the Wei valley, he in effect admitted the failure of his goal to seize the Longyou area and accepted the fact that a failed Northern Campaign would be his legacy. Several days after the consultation with his officers Zhuge Liang died in the early autumn of 234 at the age of 54.⁴¹

Two developments took place after his death that had the potential to seriously endanger the safe extrication of the army from the Wei valley. News of the death of Zhuge Liang was withheld from public announcement until the army had reached the safety of the Baoye Valley.

The first development was the pursuit by Sima's army after the retreat started. When Sima was informed by local people that the Shu-Han army was withdrawing from Wuzhangyuan and heading for the pass, he did not immediately pursue. Fearing a ruse, he preferred to send an officer to make a reconnaissance of the situation. Upon learning that the Shu-Han army had indeed withdrawn the pursuit was ordered, but a vigorous counterattack by Yang Yi prompted Sima to retreat back to his defensive position. With his retreat secure and after reaching the further safety of the pass, Yang Yi made a public announcement of the death of the prime minister. The announcement caused a discussion among Sima's entourage as to its veracity: Perhaps the pronouncement was false and merely an effort to entice Sima to pursue through the mountain pass and provide the wily Zhuge Liang with another opportunity to demonstrate his talent for ambushade. Upon a personal inspection of the abandoned Shu-Han encampment Sima determined that Zhuge was indeed deceased and that a pursuit through the Baoye Valley was appropriate. He marched his army through the pass as far as the southernmost egress without any difficulty, but concerned over the lack of supplies to support any further advance, he returned his army to the Wei River.⁴²

The second development that endangered the safety of Zhuge Liang's army was the personal feud between Yang Yi and Wei Yan. The latter was a bold and daring commander, while Yang Yi was more conservative and cautious. Upon the death of Zhuge,

⁴¹ Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:239–40.

⁴² Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:240.

Yang Yi, consistent with the death-bed instructions, initiated the retreat with the body of the revered leader. Wei Yan vigorously protested such a move as well as his role as the commander of the rear guard. He urged that various government officials attend to escorting the body back to Hanzhong, while he would lead the army in an attack against Sima. Realizing that Yang Yi was indeed initiating the retreat, he quickly extricated his force and raced to the Baoye Valley and proceeded to a position within the pass to block Yang Yi and the rest of the Shu-Han army. Wei Yan's jealousy of Yang Yi was such that he was prepared to initiate a civil war and threaten the viability not only of the army but the Shu-Han state. When news of this development reached the court in Chengdu, partisans of Yang Yi denounced Wei Yan's treachery. Meanwhile an ominous situation in the Baoye Valley was avoided when Yang Yi bypassed Wei Yan's blocking position. Furthermore, Yang used a psychological ploy of having a subordinate officer proceed to Wei Yan's position and make an oral appeal to his officers and men reproaching them for supporting such an egregious and insensitive act while the body of the revered leader was being returned to Hanzhong. Consequently, Wei Yan's mutinous force dispersed and its leader, accompanied by a small entourage, fled to Hanzhong, whereupon he was seized and executed along with his son and grandson.

If Yang Yi was confident that his position to succeed to political and military power was now guaranteed he was in for a disappointment, because, although the title of prime minister was discontinued, Jiang Wan 蔣琬 was named president of the Department of State Affairs (*shangshu ling* 尚書令), a position with considerable military and political authority. His accession to power was in accord with Zhuge Liang's death-bed instruction. Given a nominal position with no military command, Yang Yi began to foment dissension and subversion and when threatened with arrest committed suicide. After this brief period of internecine rivalry and disunity among the leadership elite, Jiang Wan consolidated power and the Shu-Han court would maintain its tenuous existence in Chengdu until 263 when Liu Chan surrendered to a Cao-Wei army.⁴³

The death of Zhuge Liang had noticeable impact on the other two states. Sun Quan initially reinforced his army on the Yangzi at the Sanmen gorges apparently in order to assist his ally. But it was

⁴³ Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:240–42.

more likely to participate in carving up Shu-Han should Cao-Wei forces under Sima Yi move aggressively south through the Qinling. Suspecting Sun Quan's motives, Jiang Wan moved with alacrity to counter Sun Quan and stabilize the situation by reinforcing the Shu-Han Yangzi River garrison at Baidicheng.

At the Cao-Wei court there was relief that Zhuge's death marked the passing of a strategic threat, and the emperor began an extensive program of public works, including a new palace at Xuchang 許昌. While construction on these projects was proceeding, the area around Luoyang suffered a devastating drought. A potential disaster was avoided when Sima Yi transported food to the capital from the Wei valley. Already recognized for his success in defeating Zhuge Liang's Northern Campaign, Sima's popularity and prestige among the people was further enhanced by this act. Before his death in 251 he succeeded in solidifying his personal and family power in the Cao-Wei state, a preliminary step leading to the usurpation of the throne by his grandson Sima Yan 司馬炎 in 265, and the establishment of the Jin Dynasty.⁴⁴

The critique of Zhuge Liang's Northern Campaign and the assessment of his overall strategic competency began soon after his death. Chen Shou 陳壽 (223–97) concluded his biography of Zhuge Liang with the famous comment that while he was an outstanding political and military administrator he was unable to make appropriate changes in strategy (*yingbian jianglue fei qi suochang* 應變將略非其所長).⁴⁵ In this succinct phrase he implies that Zhuge Liang throughout the Northern Campaign persisted in a flawed strategy: The continuous unsuccessful efforts to seize Longyou reflected his strategic inflexibility. However, an accurate and complete rendition of Chen Shou's assessment must take note of the fact that while he scored Zhuge's strategic inflexibility he recognized his outstanding ability as a military administrator and competency in public and civilian affairs. Notwithstanding his political competency it is his failure to adhere to "absolute flexibility" (*quanbian* 權變) that appears to dismay Chen Shou.

Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–92), a famous Qing scholar, is critical of the strategic goal of the LZD because the two-pronged offensive that was intrinsic to the plan did not make a distinction as

⁴⁴ Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:242–43.

⁴⁵ SGZ 35:934.

to which prong was the decoy and which was the main force. He alludes to the plan as being without any subtlety: such as using the stratagem “make a sound in the east but strike in the west” (*shengdong jixi* 聲東擊西). Nor did it incorporate any hint of the interplay between *zheng* 正 and *qi* 奇—the orthodox, apparent and overt military operation, and its opposite, a surprise, covert, or unexpected military action which brings about victory for a weaker force. The term *zhengqi*, which dates from the *Sunzi* 孫子,⁴⁶ is widely used by various scholars in their critique of Zhuge Liang. Wang Fuzhi notes that the person who seeks to seize the *tianxia* from a comparatively weak position must be flexible in strategic planning in order to grasp the opportunity to use *qi* to obtain victory (*zhuqi zhisheng* 出奇制勝). Concerning the Northern Campaign of 228–234, Wang makes a significant contribution to the historical debate. He notes that the initial mobilization and advance from Hanzhong in 228 created a perilous situation for the Cao-Wei court because it was unexpected and came as a surprise. However, it was not followed through to success by the seizure of Chang’an and the Guanzhong area because Zhuge had a more limited strategic goal. Knowing that the Cao-Wei state could not be toppled in one decisive campaign, and that the weak Liu Chan was not a credible candidate to rule a restored Han court, Zhuge Liang, contrary to his announced policy, sought to use the Northern Campaign to enhance the defensive position of the Shu-Han state: “Use attack for defense” (*yigong weishou* 以攻爲守). Wang argues that the Longyou area, the goal of the Northern Campaign, was not important for the seizure of Chang’an and Guanzhong, but was critical as the back door for access to the Chengdu plain and the heart of the Shu-Han state. Furthermore, the various campaigns between 228 and 234 were not related to the LZD or the pacification of the Central Plain because an offensive in the east toward the strategic centers of Luoyang and Wancheng 宛城, as envisaged by the LZD, could only be coordinated with a direct advance toward Chang’an, not by a wide left hook to seize Longyou. Therefore, in the opinion of this famous Qing scholar, the Northern Campaign was a limited war for a limited strategic goal: the enhancement of the defensive posture of the Shu-Han state.⁴⁷ Wang’s analysis is congruent with the modern strategic

⁴⁶ Su Ruozhou and Ke Li 1983:172–75.

⁴⁷ *Du tongjian lun* 9:311–15; 10:384–85, 401.

concept of maximizing one's security by the preventive use of force against presumed or real threats.

Contemporary critique and analysis of Zhuge Liang and the Northern Campaign generally echo these earlier commentaries but with interesting embellishments. The two military histories, which are the basis for the above account of the campaign, make significant criticisms. One charges that the political goal of the LZD was flawed because the restoration of the Han court was unrealistic. The Cao-Wei government, considered by Zhuge to be illegal, had effectively dealt with economic and political issues and had gained the support of the people. It is admitted that Zhuge Liang's boldness in selecting an offensive strategy from a position of weakness was daring and imaginative and had several worthwhile results: The superior Cao-Wei army would be compelled to be more circumspect in dealing with Shu-Han and not slight its military strength; by holding the initiative he could decide when to attack and when to retreat. In attacking, the enemy dare not accept the challenge of a "meeting engagement," and in retreating, the enemy dare not make a vigorous pursuit. Except for the opening battle of Jieting in 228, his army always left the battlefield intact.⁴⁸

The second source acknowledges the value of the LZD in establishing the tripartite power structure that evolved into the Three Kingdoms period. Not only was the plan valuable in this regard, but by envisaging the tripartite arrangement as the prelude to the ultimate unity of the Chinese polity and the restoration of the Han court by Liu Bei, the plan is deemed practical and realistic. While Zhuge is lauded for developing the small and weak Shu-Han state into a credible competitor for the mandate of heaven, he is censured for the Northern Campaign: His battlefield victories are judged as hollow and without any strategic substance, and his failure to accept the necessity of using stratagems throughout the campaign is cited as evidence that his military achievements left much to be desired.⁴⁹

To the military historians at the Military Science Academy in Beijing, Zhuge Liang and the Shu-Han state had two alternatives in 223, the date of Liu Bei's death following his disastrous eastern campaign: Either sit passively on the defensive and rely on its formidable geographic position in splendid isolation, or follow the

⁴⁸ Wu Guoqing 1992:287–90.

⁴⁹ Chen Tingyuan and Li Zhen 1976:243–47.

plan that was adopted to build up internal economic and military strength as well as restoring diplomatic ties with Sun Quan as a prelude to a northern campaign. These scholars cite the preparation and implementation of the Northern Campaign as embodying a policy of self-strengthening through struggle. It is judged a reasonable policy for Shu-Han to pursue, particularly if it was correctly implemented, because it had the distinct possibility of seizure of the Longyou area. Zhuge Liang, in the judgment of these scholars, was too cautious: the failure to exploit the initial surprise in 228 by either a bold move on Chang'an through the Qinling, or a more vigorous move to seize the Longyou area by having the decoy force advance through the mountains and go directly to the Wei River in the vicinity of Chencang, thereby drawing the enemy away from Longyou and providing Zhuge with the opportunity to seize this prized area. The failure of the first campaign in 228 set the stage for a protracted war which resulted in weakening the Shu-Han army, exhausting its population, and depleting its economic resources. These scholars view Zhuge Liang's political goal of restoring the Han dynasty as inappropriate and unrealistic even as early as 208 when the LZD was formulated, and, by the time of the Northern Campaign in 228, totally irrelevant. The diplomatic success in restoring the alliance with Sun Quan prior to the Northern Campaign is dismissed as useless because it brought little strategic dividend: Each side had different political agendas which precluded close military coordination. Once the first campaign in 228 was turned back, the Cao-Wei state was capable of handling the two-front threat presented by the alliance with ease.⁵⁰

The ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s and his policy of "seek the truth from the facts" marked a vigorous revival of Chinese scholarship concerning Zhuge Liang's military career and the military history of the Three Kingdoms period. Periodic conferences have been held by the Zhuge Liang Research Society resulting in a plethora of publications. At Sichuan University a research center specializing in the Three Kingdoms period has been established. In the fall of 1994, the famous Wuhouci 武侯祠 Museum in Chengdu opened a new exhibition hall with extensive documents, illustrations, and artifacts pertaining to the military history and general culture of Three Kingdoms period. Furthermore, there are two other museums in China with emphasis on Zhuge Liang and the Three Kingdoms period and staffed by

⁵⁰ MSA 1983:79–84; MSA 1986:367–438.

professional curators: Longzhong in Hubei, where he lived before affiliating with Liu Bei, and the site of his tomb outside of Mianxian in Shaanxi. Not surprisingly, Zhuge Liang's military career, including the LZD and the Northern Campaign, has been the focus of considerable recent scholarship in China.⁵¹

A review of this material indicates that to a great degree it has developed and embellished Chen Shou and Wang Fuzhi's analyses, although some of the new assessments merit attention. One variation notes that Zhuge Liang's Northern Campaign had no fixed strategic goal: The maximum, of course, was to restore the Han court, but the minimum, which he achieved to some degree, was to keep the initiative and manipulate the enemy by using the offensive to enhance the security of Shu-Han. Such a strategy, it is claimed, was consistent with the fact that except for the first and fifth campaigns, Zhuge Liang's army never exceeded 50,000, a comparatively small force. The Northern Campaign is seen as an exploratory expedition, which, by means of harassing offensives and using flexible tactics of advance-retreat, kept the enemy off balance. Since his limited manpower was inconsistent with the goal of capturing Longyou, seizing territory was not his goal. Therefore, he always changed direction of his offensives: once to Tianshui, then to Chencang, then to Wudu, then back toward Qishan and Tianshui; He was flexible and responded to the situation by quick attack-retreat tactics, seeking at the same time to "avoid the hard and strike the soft" (*bishi jixu* 避實擊虛).⁵²

Other scholars fault the LZD on two counts: The political goal of restoring the Han court was unrealistic, and the idea of seizing Jingzhou as a base for one of the prongs for a northern campaign was a flawed concept because Sun Quan would never accept Liu Bei in control of this critical area, the "lips and teeth" for the security of his Jiangnan base. In essence, Zhuge Liang is charged with failing to make an objective analysis of the political situation at the time he drew up the LZD.⁵³

Another contemporary analysis is critical of the plan to rely on Sun Quan as an ally to assist in the offensive against Cao-Wei, although the LZD is seen more favorably as an incisive analysis of the situation in 208: Its objective, the seizure of Jingzhou and Yizhou and the defensive alliance with Sun Quan, is seen as a

⁵¹ Tan Liangxiao 1993:240–52; Zhang Dake 1989:379–404.

⁵² Lu Huayu 1991:30–34, 1992:19–22.

⁵³ Zhang Yunbo 1989:75–78; Chen Kehua 1982:96–102.

reasonable proposal in the year 208. Zhuge is complimented for his battlefield innovations: the anti-cavalry tactics and artifacts he introduced, and the development of the multiple bolt firing crossbow, the famous *liannu* 連弩. But it is in assessing the failure of Zhuge Liang to use any stratagems during the Northern Campaign that an interesting analysis is attempted: (a) Prior to taking command of the army Zhuge Liang had little experience in commanding armies—he was basically a *muliao* 幕僚 or a *moushi* 謀士, a staff officer or strategic planner without any battlefield experience and did not appreciate the need nor significance of surprise and stratagem in achieving victory. (b) At the time of the stalemate on the Wei River in the summer of 234, the situation precluded any use of stratagem. Having met his match, he dare not take any risk. (c) Zhuge Liang had trained his army in battlefield formations and combat drills based on deliberation, mechanical precision, steadiness and security, a concept that reflected his own personality and strategic style. (d) In a sense his flexible battlefield tactics and ability to control the initiative was in itself a brilliant stratagem. Concerning Zhuge Liang's unwillingness to consider a surprise attack on Chang'an to initiate the campaign in 228, as proposed by Wei Yan, this decision is supported as correct in view of the fact that the goal was not Chang'an but the seizure of Longyou and the upper Wei River Valley in order to enhance the defensive posture of the Shu-Han state. This analysis is a variation of the Wang Fuzhi thesis.⁵⁴

Concerning Zhuge Liang's cautious approach in making the wide left hook to secure the Longyou instead of a bold strike through the mountains to seize Chang'an, one scholar notes that the dismissal of Wei Yan's proposal reflected concern over the rear area security of the Shu-Han state should the surprise attack be successful and Zhuge Liang gain control over this critical area. Sun Quan, reluctant to accept Shu-Han control over such a strategic area, would attack Zhuge's rear as he did against an unsuspecting Guan Yu in 219. Although he was a nominal ally of Shu-Han, the possibility of a reprise of 219 scenario, "a tiger at the front door and a wolf at the back," prompted Zhuge Liang to favor a cautious advance to Longyou.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Chen Yuping 1992:7–12.

⁵⁵ Li Xingwu 1995:15–19.

The thesis of Wang Fuzhi that the purpose of the Northern Campaign was to “attack in order to defend” is dismissed by a contemporary scholar as unrealistic and improbable. Furthermore, such a strategy is deemed impractical in the case of a weak state, such as Shu-Han, with limited resources and manpower, in confronting a stronger foe. If the national policy was defense then it would have behooved Zhuge Liang to foster preparation behind the natural defensive barrier already in existence: Wait for the enemy to advance and then attack, rather than squander resources by exhaustive and continuous offensives to secure a more advantageous defensive position. Indeed, the purpose of the Northern Campaign was consistent with the LZD long-term goal of conquering the Central Plain, while the immediate goal was to seize the valuable resources of the Longyou area as well as its geopolitical location thereby securing access to Chang’an and the Guanzhong area. Success in this endeavor, followed by the capture of the latter two locations, would set the stage for an ultimate advance east to the Central Plain. Concluding a lengthy and detailed critique of the Northern Campaign, a modern scholar claims that Cao-Wei superiority could only be reversed by using some sort of a stratagem at the outset of the campaign “to change weakness into strength by using stratagem to secure victory.”⁵⁶ Furthermore, Wei Yan’s proposal for a surprise attack on Chang’an through the Qinling was feasible because such a maneuver had been used successfully during the wars that established the Han dynasty by Han Xin 韓信 in 206 B.C. Given the disparity in power and resources, a bold stratagem at the outset was the *sine qua non* of success. Zhuge Liang’s later tactical virtuosity notwithstanding, his initial caution doomed the Northern Campaign.⁵⁷

While Zhuge Liang might be faulted by Chinese scholars for his military incompetency, he is fulsomely praised for his “subjective effort” to unite the nation, an effort, it is claimed, that is congruent with the historical trend toward the national unity of China.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Zhang Dake 1989:341.

⁵⁷ Zhang Dake 1989:326–45; Shi Nianhai 1978:295–301.

⁵⁸ Jian Xiuwei and Ge Zhuang 1986:1–6; Chen Kewei 1982:38–45.

A study of the Chinese language literature pertaining to the military career of Zhuge Liang and his Northern Campaign indicates that the persistent and exhaustive critique that he has received from scholars from the late third century to the late 20th century is testimony to the continuing and compelling fascination that he inspires. His military career results in a contrasting assessment: On the battlefield he demonstrated tactical skill and flexibility, yet the ambiguity surrounding the purpose and strategic goal of the campaign is perplexing. While his bold and incisive geopolitical and grand strategic analysis in the LZD is admirable, his cautious approach in achieving the fruits of such analysis is dismaying. While he has gained the reputation as a master of military organization and administration, the conspicuous and consistent logistical bottlenecks that frustrated his battlefield successes tarnishes this estimation. While it is claimed that he was a student of the pre-Qin military classics and an author of a military treatise himself, he seems to have disregarded the admonition in the *Sunzi* to avoid weakening the nation by constant and fruitless campaigns. It is this dichotomous judgment of his performance, some positive some negative, that provides a realistic understanding and appreciation of his military career.

Finally, there is an interesting paradox: Although the Northern Campaign resulted in no significant political or strategic successes, its mastermind has been mythologized throughout the centuries as the ill-fated hero who struggled unsuccessfully against formidable odds for an ideological and political goal, the unity of the *tianxia* 天下. Indeed, it is ironic that his single-minded tenacity and commitment to this goal was criticized by Chen Shou in the late third century as a flaw: the inability to revise strategy to correspond to the reality of the situation. Apropos to Chen Shou's assessment, a recent scholarly analysis seeking to identify the presence of a strategic culture in Chinese military history concludes that the one central, constant, and pervasive element is the concept of "absolute flexibility" *quanbian* 權變.⁵⁹ If that is the case then one can make the assessment that Zhuge Liang and his Northern Campaign were an aberration from the dominant and normative strategic culture of China.

⁵⁹ Johnston 1995:148–54.


List of References

- Chen Chi-yun. 1975. *Hsün Yüeh (A.D. 148-209): The Life and Reflections of an Early Medieval Confucian*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chen Kehua 陳克華. 1982. "Zhuge Liang beifa xiyi" 諸葛亮北伐析疑. *Zhengming* 爭鳴 1982.2:96-102.
- Chen Kewei 陳可畏. 1982. "Lun Zhuge Liang chu Qishan zhi zhan" 論諸葛亮出祁山之戰. In *Zhongguo gudaishi luncong* 中國古代史論叢. Fuzhou: Fujian chubanshe.
- Chen Tingyuan 陳廷元 and Li Zhen 李震, eds. 1976. *Zhongguo lidai zhanzheng shi* 中國歷代戰爭史, vol. 4. Taipei: Liming wenhua gongsi.
- Chen Yuping 陳玉屏. 1992. "Lun Zhuge Liang de zhanlue" 論諸葛亮的戰略. *Guizhou shifan daxue xuebao* 貴州師範大學學報 1992.2:7-12.
- Du tongjian lun* 讀通鑑論. By Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (Qing dynasty). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976.
- Fairbank, John K. 1974. "Introduction: Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience." In Frank A. Kierman, and John K. Fairbank, eds., *Chinese Ways in Warfare*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press:1-26.
- Fang Beichen 方北辰. 1989. *Sun Quan xinzhuan* 孫權新傳. Taipei: Shijie wenwu chubanshe.
- Fang Beichen. 1990. *Sima Yi zhuan* 司馬懿傳. Taipei: Guoji wenhua shiye youxian gongsi.
- Fang Beichen. 1991. *Liu Bei xinzhuan* 劉備新傳. Taipei: Qunyutang chuban gongsi.
- Fang Beichen. 1995. *Sanguo zhi zhuyi* 三國志注譯, vol. 2. Xi'an: Shaanxi renmin chubanshe.
- Feng Wenguang 馮文廣. 1994. "Liu Bei Zhuge Liang guanxi kao" 劉備諸葛亮關係考. *Sichuan shifan xueyuan xuebao* 四川師範學院學報 1994.1:17-22.

- Henry, Eric. 1992. "Chu-ko Liang in the Eyes of his Contemporaries." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 52:589–612.
- Jian Xiuwei 簡修煒 and Ge Zhuang 葛狀. 1986. "Zhuge Liang beifa luexi" 諸葛亮北伐略析. *Lishi jiaoxue* 歷史教學 1986.6:1–6.
- Johnston, Alastair I. 1995. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1995.
- Li Boxun 李伯勳. 1998. "Gudai bazhen yuanliu ji Zhuge Liang bazhen kaolue" 古代八陣淵流及諸葛亮八陣考略. *Chengdu daxue xuebao* 成都大學學報 1998.1:51–57.
- Li Xingwu 李興武. 1995. "Zhuge Liang beifa heyi buyong Wei Yan de qimou" 諸葛亮北伐何以不用魏延的奇謀? *Lishi jiaoxue* 歷史教學 1995.8:15–19.
- Liu Chunfan 劉春藩. 1962. *Zhuge Liang* 諸葛亮. Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe.
- Liu Jinghua 劉京華. 1993. "Zhuge Liang de zhongjun yu shiwu" 諸葛亮的忠君與失誤. In Tan Liangxiao 1993:52–62.
- Lu Huayu 盧華語. 1991. "Shu-Han bingli yu Zhuge Liang beifa yongbing kao" 蜀漢兵力與諸葛亮北伐用兵考. *Beijing shifan xueyuan xuebao* 北京師範學院學報 1991.2:30–34.
- Lu Huayu. 1992. "Lun Zhuge Liang beifa de mudì" 論諸葛亮北伐的目的. *Shixue xuekan* 史學學刊 1992.5:19–23
- MSA. Chinese Military Science Academy (Zhongguo Junshi Kexueyuan 中國軍事科學院). 1983. *Zhongguo gudai zhanzheng zhanli xuanbian* 中國古代戰爭戰例選編, vol. 2. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.
- MSA. 1986. *Zhongguo junshishi* 中國軍事史, vol. 2, part 1: *Binglue* 兵略. Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe.
- Roberts, Moss, trans. 1991. *The Three Kingdoms: A Historical Novel*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- SGZ. *Sanguo zhi* 三國志. By Chen Shou 陳壽 (Jin dynasty). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1991.

- Shi Nianhai 史念海. 1978. "Lun Zhuge Liang de gongshou celue" 論諸葛亮的攻守策略. In idem, *Heshan ji* 河山集. Beijing: Sanlian shudian.
- Su Ruozhou 蘇若舟 and Ke Li 柯理. 1983. *Junshi chengyu* 軍事成語. Taiyuan: Shanxi renmin chubanshe.
- Tan Liangxiao 譚良嘯, ed. 1993. *Zhuce Liang yu Sanguo wenhua* 諸葛亮與三國文化. Chengdu: Zhuge Liang yanjiuhui.
- Tan Liangxiao 譚良嘯 and Zhang Dake 張大可. 1987. *Sanguo renwu pingzhuan* 三國人物評傳. Xi'an: Sanqin chubanshe.
- Tan Qixiang 譚其驤, ed. 1982. *Zhongguo lishi dituji* 中國歷史地圖集, vol. 3. Beijing: Ditu chubanshe.
- Twitchett, Denis, and Michael Loewe, eds. 1986. *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 1: *The Ch'in and Han Empires*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wang Rutao 王汝濤. 1997. "Kou zhi shi xiaolu" 扣(志)識小錄. *Liaoning shifan daxue xuebao* 遼寧師範大學學報 1997.4:32–36.
- Wills, John, Jr. 1994. *Mountain of Fame: Portraits in Chinese History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wu Guoqing 武國卿. 1992. *Zhongguo zhanzheng shi* 中國戰爭史, vol. 4. Beijing: Jincheng chubanshe.
- Xu Rongsheng 許蓉生. 1988. "Shu-Han bingzhi chutan" 蜀漢兵制初探. In Wang Rutao 王汝濤, ed., *Zhuce Liang yanjiu sanbian* 諸葛亮研究三編. Jinan: Shandong wenyi chubanshe:126–37.
- Zhang Dake 張大可. 1989. *Sanguo shi yanjiu* 三國史研究. Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe.
- Zhang Yunbo 張雲波. 1989. "Bijiao Lu Su yu Zhuge Liang de zhanlue sixiang" 比較魯肅與諸葛亮的戰略思想. *Qilu xuekan* 齊魯學刊 1989.1:75–79.
- Zheng Xiaoshi 鄭孝時. 1985. *Zhuce Liang zhuan* 諸葛亮傳. Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe.
- Zheng Xin 鄭欣 and Yang Xizhen 楊希珍. 1981. "Lun Sima Yi" 論司馬懿. *Shixue yuekan* 史學月刊 1981.6:16–24.

ZZTJ. *Zizhi tongjian* 資治通鑑. By Sima Guang 司馬光 et al.
(Northern Song dynasty) Zhonghua shuju edition.



Based on Tan Qixiang 1982, vol. 3:15–16.