

In the modern world the intellectual elite is committed to empiricism. If you aim to get by by being smart you're supposed to think that moral values are objective or that they don't exist. This is because the empiricist always looks into the past first and only after that into the future. The past has already been judged so its moral value seems quite objective. Furthermore, the past is no longer here so judgments about the past are less likely to change than judgments about the present moment.

Clinging to judgments about the past made by others allows an individual to erect a facade of independence without needing to know much about the past. He doesn't even need to cling to actual judgments about the past if he can cling to the possibility of obtaining objectively verified information from trusted sources. It can be bothersome to have a metaphysical discussion with a young man who has this mindset because he doesn't really state much else than his own independence and vigour.

On the other hand, a businessman might say that moral values are subjective. He might want to say that because it's quite easy to argue that objectively, humanity hasn't invented any economic system that has turned out to distribute wealth completely fairly. If moral values were subjective a wealthy businessman could enjoy his life without feeling too bad about that.

Unfortunately for him, it's problematic to declare moral values subjective. If we are to be objective about anthropology then subjectivity of moral values belongs on the turf of spirituality and mysticism.

Throughout the ages, mystics have been committed to finding subjective ways of improving subjective well-being. If a businessman says moral value is subjective for him it's like he's stealing from mystics. He might be working on his own subjective well-being but the way in which he does that – market economy – is far less subjective than the mystic's way.

This isn't obvious because mystics themselves rarely explicate the idea that moral values are subjective. They don't do that because it's anti-subjective to mention the metaphysical concept of subjectivity. People who truly believe in the subjectivity of moral value don't mention it because they want to keep it.

Subjective quality is absolute in the here and now. To mention subjectivity itself would turn the context relative. Introducing other contexts would decrease the significance of any subjective value that already exists in the present moment.

To put it in the simplest of wordings, no man talks about subjectivity while having sex with his wife even though the situation is highly subjective. And to speak of subjective value when none is present amounts to speaking of nothing at all.

Subjectivity isn't subjective. To be sure, "subjectivity" could be subjective for a dog who's been rewarded while saying this word, but any other word could've been used for that as well. If a person understands subjectivity for what it really is then he knows some things aren't subjective. If he knows that much he should also know moral value isn't subjective, because why would he have ever paid attention to any of those things if they weren't moral values?

Those who believe in the subjectivity of moral values shouldn't say that they do, and those who say that they do can't be entirely truthful even if they have good intentions.

In the context of empiricism we may of course postulate that the statement "moral values are subjective" is just an instrument for accomplishing a certain goal. It obviously isn't causally inert. If it truly didn't mean anything it would be difficult to figure out how can I be writing an article about it.

I'm writing about it because I'd prefer not to hear that statement again. Instead of saying "moral values are subjective" why don't people say "I have nothing to say"? We could become more civilized by adopting some procedure for dealing with the problem that it's possible say: "moral values are subjective".

In order to establish a procedure for this, the intellectual elite should show an example. Since the intellectual elite doesn't show such an example we need to turn elsewhere.

Islam is known as a religion that appreciates practical things and discourages abstract thinking. So it might seem counterintuitive that a metaphysician would appreciate Islam. Indeed, before the second world war a Western person could become esteemed by having educated and consistent opinions about metaphysics. He could have gained membership of the intellectual elite by voicing these opinions. He wouldn't have been required to provide empirical proof about the merits of his thoughts. What would he have needed Islam for?

Before the second world war Islamic culture seemed intellectually degenerate. But if we consider all appearances that can be observed then Muslims sport intellectual qualities that Western people no longer have. Muslims process their faith by way of deductive thinking just like a metaphysical system builder would research metaphysics.

Deduction preserves certainty. Without certainty, a metaphysician is like the old Wittgenstein who unconsciously imitates Buddhism yet fails to become an embodiment of compassion because of his ambitious and hence competitive past. The Buddha was not encumbered by an ambitious past.

Having an ambitious past can be a handicap in practicing Buddhism because there is no notion of "returning to Buddhism". According to Islam, being a Muslim is the original state

of the human. Buddhism doesn't emphasise a similar idea as central to Buddhism. Therefore, having an ambitious past can make a Buddhist feel like a quitter.

Pirsig wrote that from a mystical point of view, metaphysics is a degenerate activity. This is because the mystical aesthetic ideal is harmonious and the use of willpower is minimised. In order to contribute as a metaphysician one will almost certainly need to resort to willpower like Pirsig did when he studied the origins of arete. He overworked himself on that one. I don't suggest he had another option should he have produced a result in his inquiry, but considering his health he did too much work to stay healthy.

If the Buddha had lived in a different environment he, too, might have needed to risk his health in order to be productive. From a mystical viewpoint it's just a coincidence that when Pirsig risked his health for metaphysics he was also being productive.

How could I be a Buddhist embodiment of compassion if I have a true nature? I have an essence, which is my sociotype. "The Fundamentals of the Middle Way" denies my essence because it denies all essences, that is, gender-neutral dharmas.

How could I be a Christian when Christianity doesn't do anything about misuse of metaphysics? At least Buddhist teachers had some standards about that. People from cultures influenced by Christianity tend to use metaphysics to deconstruct metaphysics without paying any attention to the fact that they're doing something else than a metaphysician does. Why shouldn't they have the humility to admit they have nothing to say about metaphysics?

Do they expect their audience to be impressed by the fact that they play with abstract concepts? It's not impressive because the audience will be confused about whether they need help or not. If they're just defending themselves from their audience then obviously they aren't ready to let the audience help them at that.

I considered numerous reasons for this strange behaviour before finding a satisfactory answer. The first answers I found were rather unsatisfying.

The first reason for such behavior that I thought of was a practical one. I began from the worst case scenario which is that they're doing it to evade blame. That would be psychopathical and it's obvious to me why a psychopath might do that.

The best case scenario is that they do it out of ignorance and would understand why it's wrong if someone told them.

Then there's the average case scenario. Maybe they've gotten so accustomed to thinking that way that they can't learn what's wrong about using metaphysics to deconstruct metaphysics.

So their belief about subjectivity of moral values is grounded on ignorance but they still can't learn anything else.

At this point I felt sad for how Western civil liberties about freedom of speech protect such ignorance and let people pass it on to the next generation. But soon I finally found a way to move this issue to a different, less practical context: the context of essence.

Every person has a sociotype and every sociotype is an essence. The sociotype of a person refers to his temperament as described by a model of psychology. Judging from its popularity the context of essence is less general than the context of metaphysics, which is quite unpopular and highly general. So we might prefer reasoning metaphysically about essences over reasoning essentially about metaphysics.

From a metaphysical viewpoint, it will always remain possible to consider it a logical problem if someone speaks for himself when he says moral values are subjective. However, this could be said about another person with no problem if it's true. If people nevertheless say this about themselves then shouldn't that be considered similar to worshipping the demiurge?

If I consider how it affects my opinion of another person that they say such a thing then I guess it's similar to idolatry. I wouldn't give them another opportunity to have me take them seriously as metaphysicians unless they did something that would show they really care about that. They've never cared to do so. Why haven't they?

The reason why they don't care could boil down to this: people who value model M introverted intuition retain some innocence even if they do say that moral values are subjective. Because they are speaking of themselves instead of metaphysics. However, I know by experience that also introverts can understand it's a mistake to declare moral values subjective. I know more than one introvert who doesn't make this mistake and it was an introvert who originally taught me not to make this kind of a mistake.

Philosophers before me seem to never have seriously considered the effect temperament has on metaphysics. Reality truly does appear different for different kind of people.

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