


# Hitler-

ein deutsches  
Überhängnis




VON ERNST NLEKIGER  
Widerstandverlag \* Berlin 1932



# Hitler-

ein deutsches  
Derschänknis



VON ERNST NIEKISCH

Widerstandsverlag \* Berlin 1932

# Conversion of WMF images is not supported

Use Microsoft Word or OpenOffice to save this RTF file as HTML and convert that in calibre.



calibre 2.49.0

Hitler: A German Fate

# Ernst Nieksich

Translated by: Eugene Montsalvat from the French volume of Ernst Nieksich's "*Hitler – une fatalité allemande*" et autres écrits nationauxbolcheviks

At:

graph-definition>

<https://niekischtranslationproject.wordpress.com/>

## Contents

[Alain de Benoist's Preface 4](#)

graph-definition>

Preface 50

graph-definition>

Chapter 1 – The German Protest to Fascism 51

graph-definition>

Chapter 2 – The Fall in Legality 62

graph-definition>

Chapter 3 – The Way to Powerlessness 81

## Alain de Benoist's Preface

“There are two questions to which the Germans of 1945 would respond to in all likelihood with a distraught mimicry or a shrug of the shoulders. The first would be: who was the last great Prussian? The other: who was the real adversary of Hitler in Germany? One can hesitate a long time and propose, to see, various names that one will reject all the same. But to finish, one will find the only good response to these two questions.”

“Ernst Niekisch”

“Who was Ernst Niekisch? Out of a hundred Germans, it is not likely to find more than one who would say it. Born in Silesia in 1889, Ernst Niekisch died in Berlin in 1967; his enterprises having failed, he died in obscurity. But he was one of the great Germans of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and his failure is perhaps a part of and a reflection of the Germany's failure, the obscurity of his name a symptom of the loss, among the Germans, of a historical consciousness and of self awareness.”

These lines of Sebastian Haffner, will, without a doubt, surprise more than one reader. Niekisch is a mystery, maintained also in part by himself, and the work that he devoted himself to has not been entirely elucidated to date. Within the Conservative Revolution, Niekisch was without a doubt the most remarkable of those who are frequently called “the left men of the right.” He was also the major exponent of “National Bolshevism,” a problematic expression in many respects. How can we clarify this mystery of Niekisch, except by bringing his works to public knowledge and retracing the major stages of his biography?

Ernst Niekisch was born on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of May 1889 in Trebnitz, near Breslau in Silesia, where his father was an artisan. His mother, nee Schnell, also had five daughters. In 1891, his family moved to Nördlingen, in Bavarian Swabia. Here, in this atmosphere of Bavaria, which he later said was little suited for him, the young Ernst Niekisch would spend all his childhood. Intending to be an educator, he studied at the high school in

Altdorf, near Nuremberg, then served an internship year in Nördlingen. From 1908-1909 he performed his military service with the 15<sup>th</sup> Reserve Infantry Regiment of Bavaria, quartered in Neuburg an der Donau. In 1912, he was named teacher, at first in Ries, then in Augsburg. Volunteering in 1914, mobilized in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Reserve Infantry Regiment, vision problems prevented his departure for the front. Niekisch will serve during the war in an instruction center for young recruits, then, leaving in 1915, as Feldwebel in a prisoner of war camp for Russians near Munich. That same year 1915, he married Anna Kienzle, with whom he would have a son, Ernst, born in 1916, who became a physician.

Niekisch joined the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in October 1917, at the age of 28, and became in the following year the political editor at the *Schwäbische Volkszeitung* in Augsburg. It was the reading of Marx, he said in his memoirs, that led him to socialism. But Niekisch was equally influenced by contact with Kant, Schopenhauer, Ibsen, and Nietzsche. Outside of the 18<sup>th</sup> Brumaire of Marx, he was profoundly marked by Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, as by the works of Machiavelli, that made him discover the nature of politics. In his article "The Idealist Content of Socialism," published in 1918, he highlights the role of the French "utopian" socialists and emphasized next to the input of Marx and Engels, the importance of Weitling and of Lassalle. The 25<sup>th</sup> of May 1918, he notes in his books: "political action is now the center of my existence."

The 8<sup>th</sup> of November 1918, his school was closed because of the Influenza pandemic, Niekisch learned at the headquarters of the *Schwäbische Volkszeitung*, from a non-commissioned officer of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Regiment, that the Republic had been proclaimed the day before in Munich by Kurt Eisner, and the soldiers of Augsburg are already trying to elect their councils. The responsible socialists, who hesitated to engage, decided to go to the barracks. Some hours later he was elected the president of the council of workers and soldiers of the town! He joined the same strike with the central committee of workers, peasants, and soldiers councils of Bavaria, which sent him in the month of

December as the delegate to the national congress of councils in Berlin, where he took the directorship of the organ of the Bavarian movement, *Arbeit und Zukunft*, which he ran from January to March 1919. After the assassination of Kurt Eisner, chief of the Munich revolution, on the 21<sup>st</sup> of February, and the constitution of the 18<sup>th</sup> of March by the new government directed by the socialist Johannes Hoffmann, he was elected president of the Central Committee of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Councils of Bavaria. During the following weeks, he will be the strong man of the movement and exercise a sort of supreme magistracy, all the while continuing to hold his daily paper. Also, he made a visit to Walter Rathenau and tried to save the revolution by reaching an accord with the parliamentary government, while a refugee in Bamberg. But the negotiations failed.

During the nights of the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> of April, Niekisch opposed the anarchists Landauer and Mühsam who wanted to accomplish a “second revolution” and instate a communist republic in Bavaria. Believing that Bavaria, with a notably rural character, was not ready for an experience of the Soviet type, he resigned his offices. His successor would be Ernst Toller. The Second Republic of the councils, whose leaders were the communists Max Levin and Eugen Léviné, would be dismantled in the first days of May by government troops supported by Freikorps. White Terror succeeded Red Terror.

It did not spare Niekisch. The 23<sup>rd</sup> of June, he was condemned to two years in the fortress for “complicity in high treason.” He was also expelled from the teaching profession. The 5<sup>th</sup> of May, while he was conducted to prison, he sent his resignation from the SPD and the same day joined a socialist minority group, the USPD (Unabhängigen Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands), which, according to him, did not show the same weakness during the events as the SPD did.

Successively incarcerated in Ebrach and in Niederschönfeld, Niekisch used his time in prison to deepen his education. He mainly read Spengler, Leopold von Ranke, and Machiavelli. The first struck him with a primary idea of foreign policy: he deduced that social revolution implies



beforehand national liberation. The second convinced him of the value of the Prussian spirit. The third, whose influence would be the most lasting, taught him that politics implies realism and doesn't confound itself with morals. His ideas began to slowly evolve, while his sympathies continued to go to the USPD. In March of 1921, while still imprisoned, he was elected a member of the Landtag, the regional parliament, of Bavaria as an independent social democrat. Released on the 29th of August, he became president of the USPD group in the Landtag, at the same time operating one of the organs of the party, the weekly *Die Umschau*. The following year, he found himself once again a member of the SPD, following its reunification with the USPD and the socialist center.

In November 1922, Niekisch left Bavaria, which he decidedly felt little affinity with, and moved with his family to Berlin. Some months earlier, his wife had also received a menacing letter from an extreme right group "Das Schwarze Hundert."

In the capital of the Reich, Niekisch had difficulty earning a living as the secretary of the youth organization of the German Association of Textile Workers (Deutsche Textilarbeiterverband), an important syndicalist organization which counted no less than 750,000 members. But equally within this cadre he could develop the ideas that had matured at home during the preceding years. Niekisch expressed himself especially in the organ of the young socialists, the weekly *Der Firn. Sozialistische Rundschau*, where he was editor between October and December 1924, and where he could critique with virulence the "reformism" in the direction on the party. *Der Firn* would cease to appear in 1925, but Niekisch would find the time to found, in the margins of this publication, a collection of brochures whose declared objective was "to prepare a new intellectual orientation for the party." Besides these, he wrote elsewhere the first two parts.

The first of these brochures, *Der Weg der Deutschen Arbeiterschaft zum Staat* (Berlin 1925), is a violent critique of the "revisionist" current then embodied by German Social Democrats of Eduard Bernstein. With

touches sometimes evoking Georges Sorel, Niekisch pleaded for an identification of the working class in the state against the politics of capitulation in regard to France, against the Dawes Treaty, an expression of American financial meddling in German affairs. He affirmed that the working class would begin to open the way to the *Volksstaat* of all the Germans, while the Socialist Party would become the champion of the “spirit of resistance of the German people” against Western capitalist imperialism. “To have the moral right to manage the state”, he concluded, “we must first be its prime servant.” This importance accorded to the state betrays an evident Hegelian influence. Some years later, Niekisch would write, “Only the state is original, imperial, absolute, implacable, because it is a unity across the changing times, because it does not represent a single generation, but all the following generations, it is this precisely pure characterization of politics that the character of bourgeois liberal politics is incapable of comprehending.” In parallel, the notion of the “working class” was more Lassallian than Marxist: it tended to designate “all of those who work” and not only the proletariat. It was the immense majority of the nation, excluding the “thin layer” of bourgeois exploiters. Therefore, Niekisch could proclaim the quasi-identity of the people with the state. The working class “presents a natural disposition to support the state,” he will explain beforehand, “because they have always submitted to collective necessity and never possessed much, they escape egoistic motivations.” And yet: “It’s just because the working class doesn’t possess private property for their diversion that they are more suitable than the propertied classes to become a purer organ for the reasons of the state.”

Like its title indicates, the second brochure, *Grundfragen deutscher Aussenpolitik* (Berlin 1925), was devoted to the problems of foreign policy. There Niekisch defended the idea that class struggles, in the measure in which they were relevant to internal politics, are secondary compared to the domain of international relations, where the privileged actors are states. The “orientation towards the West”, he added, was a lure, for never had the West accepted the relevance of German power. Rather, Germany should draw all the possible advantages from the “median” position it occupied in Europe, and recognizing that the 1917

Revolution had at least the merit of cutting ties with the West. “One disregards the essential Russian development,” he then wrote, “as long as we consider it elusively as a revolutionary social event. We can only comprehend it from the point of view of foreign policy.” Certainly, in the era, it does not go away. “The salvation of Germany, “ he then said, “is not to be drawn from the Russian example and Bolshevize out of desperation, it is to be supple and flexible enough to give it a political constitution, a social order, an economic organization of a form that corresponds to the laws of the *Volkstum* and permit it to wield a maximum force of resistance on the outside.” This text attests that some of the kind of ideas he would develop were already present in him: the conviction that the German people must be moved before all by a spirit of resistance, the idea that foreign policy is the most decisive instance, the necessity of giving a content at once national and revolutionary to socialist aspirations, and finally the conviction that total “orientation towards the West” may contrary to the interests of the German people.

These positions led to lively discussions within the SPD. As might be expected, Eduard Bernstein accused Niekisch of adopting a “nationalist” point of view. The latter would reply to him: “Only by conquering and guarding the power of the state will class put itself in the most effective service of the state. Such is the origin of my enterprise: to bring the working class closer to the state... Bernstein is mistaken if he thinks that I want to amend social democracy to cope with the German nationalists... On the contrary it is social democracy that contributes to reinforce the German capitalist tendencies, by favoring an orientation towards the West.”

In contrast, the theses of Niekisch encountered a certain measure of success from the Hofgeismar Circle, which then represented the right wing of the Young Socialist Movement (Juso), itself semi-autonomous compared to the SPD. This circle, whose constituent meeting was held on Easter 1923 with the theme “Dienst an Volk und Staat”, which looked to link the ideas of nationalism and socialism, to react against the “summary internationalism” of orthodox Marxism. It was also interested in Mitteleuropa and proposed to create a European socialist federation

halfway between the capitalist West and the Bolshevik East. In its ranks, some convinced Lassallians rubbed shoulders with Conservative Revolutionaries, who were not prevented having support from a certain number of SPD directors like Gustav Dahrendorf, Hugo Sinzheimer, Gustav Radbruch, Eduard Heimann, and Herman Heller but also Theodor Haubach, Walther G. Oschilewski, Heinrich and Gustav Deist, and Otto Bach. It would constitute a sort of pool for the ideas of Niekisch.

But this support was not sufficient. At the beginning of 1926, Niekisch was forced to leave his post in the textile syndicate and expecting to be expelled from the Social Democratic Party, decided to take the lead and resign. The Hofgeismar Circle expressed solidarity with him and constituted itself as a “group with freedom of opinion.” It would break up shortly after, following divergences on the subject of the Locarno Treaties. Some months later, Niekisch left to live in Dresden, where he joined the “Old Socialist Party” (ASP), autonomously created in 1925 by 23 deputies of the Landtag of Saxony who became dissidents against the direction of the SPD. Very quickly he became the inspiration of the movement, in which he would direct for two years, starting on the 15<sup>th</sup> of July 1926, the daily journal, *Der Volksstaat*.

It was also in Dresden, on the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 1926, that Niekisch, created the journal that would make him the most well known, the monthly *Widerstand*, subtitled, *Blätter für sozialistische und nationalrevolutionäre Politik*, from 1928 *Zeitschrift für nationalrevolutionäre Politik*. In the first edition, he affirmed what the true German politics should be, the first political reality, and on the other hand the first German reality, to tend, before all, to national independence and the reestablishment of the sovereignty of Germany. But this goal, “to regain independence and reconquer a grand position of influence in the world”, implied the identification of the principal enemy which, after Niekisch, was none other than the ideology founded on “all this web of representations: humanity, peace, equal rights, self determination, that the Western democracies used to rock the exploited classes into the illusion that everything happened with their accord and that we can finish everything with a decision of the majority.”

At the beginning, *Widerstand* officially presented itself as the organ of the former members of the Hofgeismar Circle. Three of them, Otto Jacobsen, Walther G. Oschilewski, and mainly Benedikt Obermayr, would take an active, but short lived, part in the publication. In fact, from 1926 to 1927, *Widerstand* reached a larger audience than the old Socialist Democrat rallies with their proletarian “social nationalism.” At the turn of 1928, it would give itself a strictly national revolutionary coloration, already announcing a collaboration with August Winnig, who became coeditor starting in July of 1927.

Also a former Social Democrat, August Winnig, born in 1878, leader, from 1902, of *Grundstein*, the organ of the masons’ syndicate, he held in November 1918 the functions of high commissar of the Reich for the Baltic countries, commissar of the Reich for Eastern and Western Prussia, and finally Oberpräsident of East Prussia. The determining role he took during the epoch of the struggle against Bolshevism brought him to support the Kapp Putsch, which led to him being expelled from the SPD in 1920. In 1924, the date in which he met Niekisch through the journal *Der Firm*, he was already involved with the young conservative milieu and professed a socialism of vitalist and Nietzschean inspiration. In December 1924, he wrote in the celebrated new conservative journal, the *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, a text entitled “Der Glaube an das Proletariat,” first sketched out in a booklet under the same title in 1926, in which he redefined the proletariat in a typically idealist and Lassallian sense: “who is the proletariat? All who are salaried, says the economist. The oppressed and exploited classes, says the proletariat. The proletariat is a new state, I say. It is a new impulse of the *Volkstum*, which surges behind the old states, appearing at their sides, replacing them and completing them at the same time ... At present, the proletariat perceives itself as a class ... But it is more than a simple class. It is before all the party of the people, it is to be called the party of a historical and biological unity that the vital laws assert to designate the proletariat.”

To designate the universe carrying the essence of work, Winnig spoke of

*Arbeitertum*. In this universe forms a new type of human, capable of realizing that the same menace weighing on the social situation is also that weighing on the national being. In 1926, Winnig declared that the worker must have the courage to climb “the Calvary of national liberation,” to understand that his enemy henceforth was “no longer the boss, but the international capitalist financier” and to institute himself as the sole true representative of the nation. These ideas, then developed in the book entitled *Vom Proletariat zum Arbeitertum*, would exercise a certain influence on the Figure of the Worker that Ernst Jünger would present in *Der Arbeiter*.

Thanks to Winnig, the ideas expressed by Niekisch in *Widerstand* would rapidly touch the young conservative and new nationalist milieus, and thus also certain paramilitary groupings issuing from the Freikorps, like the League Oberland, then directed by the veterinarian Friedrich Weber, son in law of the völkisch editor J.F. Lehmann. But Winnig was also in close contact with the “*Bündisch*” milieu, which constituted a sort of core for the Youth Movement (*Jugend-bewegung*.) Towards 1925, the *Bündisch* youth organizations (the Eagles and the Falcons, the Artaman, the Beggars, Freischar Schill etc.) united close to 600,000 members, divided into many certain groups. Though a minority in the *Jugendbewegung*, which counted some four million youth, this current presented some original characteristics, which justified the importance observers accorded them. “This characteristic,” wrote Louis Depeux, “is precisely the *Bund*, the league as a type inspired by a very pure ideology of the right. The *Bund* has the vigor of a communitarian link, as opposed to the anarchic individualism of the old *Wandervogel*. It’s this emphasis that it puts on the group, and permits us to speak of a ‘*Bündisch* socialism,’ but also on hierarchy, the selection of members and the free designation of leaders: finally its the self-education of an elite destined to direct and serve Germany in a cultural revolution.” Moved by a *jugendbewegt* spirit very hostile to the world of adults, the *Bündische* outwardly manifested a bright spirit of independence, at the same time professing a demanding nationalism, affirming a communitarian socialism and a resolute anticapitalism. Many of them found themselves in the Resistance during the Third Reich. But also, their ranks provided

the leaders of most National Bolshevik groups, like Karl Otto Paetel, Werner Lass, Hans Ebeling, and Eberhard Koebel, called “tusk,” who joined the Communist Party in 1932.

At the same time, Niekisch also met Ernst Jünger, whose influence was also equally large on the Bündisch milieu. In 1930, Ernst Jünger would become the co-editor with Werner Lass of the “überbündisch” weekly, *Die Kommenden*, founded in 1925 and very quickly diffused through most Bündisch groups. It was in the autumn of 1927 that Niekisch and Jünger met for the first time. The contact was decisive, and the close links that were established between the two men were to quickly manifest themselves by active collaboration. Jünger would publish 18 articles in *Widerstand* between April 4th, 1927 and the 8<sup>th</sup> of September 1933. At the same time Niekisch became close to the brother of Ernst Jünger, Friedrich Georg, and with his circle: Richard Schapke, who was the future leader of *Die Kommenden*, the anti-Christian ideologue Friedrich Hielscher, and through contact with Jünger by the intermediary of Winnig, Franz Schauwecker, etc. Contrary to what is sometimes written, Jünger would never be a National Bolshevik, but he provided the National Bolsheviks with some of the essential elements of their conceptual cadre. And it was under the influence of Jünger, “the man of vision”, Niekisch said, that the editors of *Widerstand* would radicalize their ideas on the nation and extol a “new aristocracy” inspired by a Jüngerian “heroic realism.”

From 1928 to 1930, a period corresponding to what Uwe Saueremann called the *Widerstandsgesinnung*, Niekisch, converted to nationalism, expressed essentially in a cadre with a national-revolutionary orientation. In parallel, the team of the magazine expanded. Among the collaborators of *Widerstand* figured Joseph Drexel, Gustav Sondermann, Franz Schauwecker, then Alfred Baeumler, Hjalmar Kutzdermann and the Jünger brothers, Albrecht Erich Günther, Arnolt Bronnen, Otto Nickel and Hans Bäcker. In the circle of Niekisch, one could find the old pastor Otto Petras, the philosopher Hugo Fischer, and anthropologists like Karl Saller and Friedrich Merckenschlager. The magazine then benefited from the exceptional graphic talent of the designer A. Paul Weber, whose

incisive and mordant engravings appeared in *Widerstand* beginning in January 1929, who also made many portraits of Niekisch. Weber also illustrated most of the public offerings by the publishing house Niekisch created in January 1928, Widerstand-Verlag. He would become co-editor of *Widerstand* in January 1930.

The first of May 1929, Niekisch left Dresden and returned to live in Berlin, the city where he would spend the rest of his life, with the exception of his years in prison. One year earlier, in the legislative elections of May 1928, the ASP suffered a serious electoral defeat, and in November, their 3<sup>rd</sup> Congress rejected the project of the program presented by Niekisch. He departed from the “old socialists,” cutting the final link that attached him to the international left, and henceforth dedicated all his efforts to the magazine *Widerstand* and to the circles he had constituted around it.

National Bolshevism, which would progressively emerge from the positions taken by Niekisch in *Widerstand*, was first born from a reformulation of the theme of the “orientation towards the East” (*Ostorientierung*), a theme whose appearance directly took place, initially at least, in a given geographical (the “central” position of Germany in Europe) and historical (after Versailles) situation. For the National Revolutionaries, the Diktat of Versailles was firstly a weapon that permitted the Western bourgeoisie, with liberal capitalism and with the Western states, indivisible together, to pursue the war against Germany by new means. Thus Versailles represented the West of the time in its political, geographic, and ideological dimension. To fight for national independence and against the submission of Germany to foreign interests (*Verfremdung*) thus implied social revolution. Conversely, the struggle against capitalism required the reestablishment of German sovereignty. Relying on the “anti-capitalist nostalgia of the German people” (Gregor Strasser), the National Revolutionaries attacked capitalism, by the reason that its ideological inspiration was of “foreign” origin, that is to say Western: the capitalism of the time was a materialist system, the economic system of the victors and a system foreign to the German spirit.



So in perspective, the German people appeared doubly proletarianized. From one part, on the inside, they were majorly exploited by the propertied bourgeoisie: one finds here the Lassallian idea according to which the vast majority of the people are dominated by a “thin layer” of capitalists. From the other part, Germany was itself globally, a proletarian country, in the measure where it was alienated from its being by the Western bourgeois states. The two ideas then activated themselves mutually. The bourgeoisie could bluster against Versailles, it proved itself incapable of renouncing its privileges, because it remained attached to the same mode of life as the authors of the Diktat. Only a social revolution could revitalize Germany and constitute the people as a nation (*Nationwerdung*), and on the inverse, only national liberation could provide the energy and create the necessary conditions for a social revolution. A double consequence thus followed. Socialism whose central objective was to realize the nation, the cause of the people and the cause of the nation are one in the same cause: the divide between the right and the left was obsolete. For other part, against Versailles, all the means were good. Belittled by the West, Germany did not have another choice but to turn towards the East linking its fate to Soviet Russia, which was the center of global anti-Western feeling. Hence the belief in a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*, a communal Russo-German destiny.

Less surprising than it may seem on the first view, this analysis registered in a tradition of “pragmatic Russophilia” (Dupeux) that long marked German history. The National Revolutionaries were not deprived elsewhere of opportunities to evoke some historical precedents, in their eyes, rich in teachings. They cited the example of the alliance between Fredrick II and Tsar Peter III of Russia, made possible by the death of the Tsaritsa Elizabeth, which saved Prussia from defeat at the end of the Seven Years War (1762). They recalled the the aid brought by Russia to Prussia in the War of Liberation against the Napoleonic Occupation and the fashion in which the Baron Heinrich von Stein, expelled from Prussia in 1808 at the demand of Napoleon, could organize the resistance in St Petersburg. They argued, finally, that it was still the Russian alliance that would assure Bismarck of the security of the Eastern frontiers and would leave him free to carry on his policies in the West. Niekisch himself, in

his books, compared the 1917 Revolution with the death of Tsaritsa Elizabeth, and wrote, on the date of March 5<sup>th</sup> 1918, that the peace of Brest-Litovsk repeated the treaty of Tilsit.

One knows otherwise that during the First World War, the German Empire counted on the dissolving effect of Bolshevism to weaken the Russian pressure on the Eastern Front. In April 1917, the German authorities did not hesitate to authorize Lenin and his companions, who found themselves in Switzerland at the start of the war, to traverse Germany in a sealed car to rejoin Russia. Some months later, the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, which Trotsky would oppose in the name of intransigent internationalism, and Lenin would sign by realism, put an end to the hostilities between Germany and Russia, at the same time it would accord the Bolsheviks with a broad legitimization, because it was the first treaty concluded with the new revolutionary regime by a “bourgeois” country.

In following, the defeated Germany had to try to reduce the Allied stipulations arguing that its weakening would push the masses to despair and play into the hands of communist propaganda. In France, around 1918, *Action Française* spoke of “blackmail from Bolshevism.” It was not an empty threat. The following year, the 21<sup>st</sup> of March 1919, the Communists seized power because the Hungarian government, traumatized by the peace conditions imposed by the Allies, preferred to step down and let the soviets seize Budapest. In April of 1922, the Treaty of Rapallo made official the German-Soviet relations and even secretly provided for collaboration between the Reichswehr and the Red Army. Ambassador to Moscow from 1922 to 1928, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, charged with the application of the treaty and who would enjoy the great favor of the National Bolsheviks, would himself be the linchpin of many other Germano-Russian accords. By the Treaty of Rapallo, Germany would know that it was no longer alone and that it was in the interest of the Allies to release their pressure. London and Paris would manifest their anxiety, and it was likely that the fear of seeing a grand Russo-German alliance drawn up would very much play into the decision of Raymond Poincaré to occupy the Ruhr in 1923. All of this certainly had

nothing to do with National Bolshevism in the ideological sense of the term, neither with the first manifestations of this current such that we could record them between 1918 and 1923, but it constituted a historical-political cadre which we cannot ignore to comprehend the problem.

On the interior of the Conservative Revolution, the difficulty was evidently to reconcile an “orientation towards the East” with a critique of Marxism that appeared as founding a rapport between the principles. However this difficulty will be rapidly turned, at least in certain sectors of the movement. Two key ideas were going to aid them, the first part, the conviction that there existed a certain number of common points between Bolshevism and the Prussian style (a strong and hierarchical state, a will to suppress “bourgeois” parasitism, an appeal to the sense of sacrifice and of duty); the second part, the idea that Bolshevism is firstly a *Russian* movement, which the Marxist and internationalist ideology only represented a facade.

The analysis of the 1917 Revolution then operated on a double register. On one side, they stressed that Sovietism was only a radical and cosmopolitan form, of a poorly understood “Western-Social-Marxist idea,” as Arthur Moeller Van den Bruck said it. On the other, they affirmed that the 1917 Revolution constituted a sort of electroshock that permitted the Russian people to retake possession of themselves. Revealing this ambiguity was the attitude adopted by the directors of the Anti-Bolshevik League, a young conservative organization founded at the end of 1918 by Eduard Stadtler, who did not hesitate to declare that the Bolshevism they intended to fight was *also* the incarnation of a form of “an ethic of Service” of Prussian inspiration. Adolf Grabowsky, active member of the League, future collaborator of the magazine *Osteuropa*, organ of the German Society for the Study of Eastern Europe founded in 1925 by the new conservative Hoetzsch – that the National Socialists would accuse, in following, of having constituted a “collection of the all salon Bolsheviks and pro-Soviet Jewish Masonic liberals” – thus stressed the “absolutely authoritarian, activist, aristocratic” character of Russian Bolshevism, which Stadtler said himself “repressed by dictatorial force the anarcho-Bolshevik wave” and, at the same time, searched “in the

system” of ideas and forms which would permit the birth of a “Bolshevism or German socialism!”

The affirmation of the primacy of “life” and “spirit” supported, in parallel, the certainty that the national tradition and permanent traits of the *Volksgeist* would always end up winning with their political avatars. The general idea that, whatever revolutions produce on the interior of societies, the spirit of the people always reappears, marked invariably with footprint of ideologies with the most “universal” pretensions. “Each people has its own socialism,” repeated Moeller Van den Bruck, who would finish by writing, “Bolshevism is Russian and only Russian.” Thus, it imposes the idea that Russian Bolshevism is only superficially Marxist. Besides, added some, Marxism is incapable of effectively fighting against capitalism, because it is itself a byproduct of “bourgeois materialism.” As Marx formulated it, said Winnig, the class struggle only aimed to inculcate “bourgeois values to the worker,” in the measure where they did not leave the superficial terrain of strictly material interests. Niekisch would say, the same, the proletarian according to Marx only criticized the bourgeoisie because he did not belong to it, and that his critique betrays his desire to become bourgeois in turn: the proletarian is a bourgeois in power, a *Möchte-Gern Bürger*, which claims they rely uniquely on resentment and envy. For the National Revolutionaries, Russian Bolshevism made no attempt to turn the worker into a bourgeois. It was rather an idealist movement, founded on the ethic of work, selfless sacrifice, the primacy of the collective over the individual. And that also proved that the Russian spirit has already prevailed over the Marxist ideology that no longer serves as the screen of action for the Soviet leaders.

Around 1927, the Russian Revolution was presented in certain neonationalist organs, not necessarily as a model, but at least as an example

“of national restoration and authoritarian social restructuring” (Dupeux).

In December 1927, Hartmut Plaas, former naval lieutenant and future deportee to Ravensbrück, thus wrote in *Vormarsch* : “Lenin was Russian. We salute the ally. Even if he felt himself an international proletarian, he fought all his life for Russia. He conquered Russia, he accomplished a Russian mission ... Lenin was a socialist. That is why he is not our enemy. As Russia, it was its right to be socialist. Because socialism is the form of society that corresponds to the blood of Eastern men.” That point of view was systematized by the first National-Bolshevik journals. One could read for example in *Der Umsturz* that Marxism “is the ultimate consequence of liberalism”, while by Bolshevism, it means “All the Russian events, which are eminently nationalist events.” Niekisch would write himself: “Leninism is simply that which remains from Marxism when a great statesman utilizes it for the aims of national politics.” And in December 1928, *Widerstand* , salutes the elimination of Trotsky, rendering tribute to the fortitude of Stalin and his will to attack all the “forces of hostile decomposition to the national order in Russia.”

From one group to another, however, the points of view did not always overlap. Certain National-Bolsheviks admitted the idea of the class struggle, others didn't. Some of them employed it to give themselves a new political coloring. In August 1929, Karl Otto Paetel wrote: “All for the nation ... The word of August Winnig, after which the liberation struggle of the nation must be the struggle of the German worker, leads here to the only consequence possible, approve the class struggle as a fact, the push in the interest of the whole people ... imprinting it as a way to the victory of nationalism.” Hartmut Plaas, in the autumn of 1928, rallied himself forcefully to the notion of class struggle, without joining the National-Bolsheviks, who he would attack anyways in 1932, precisely he again

“changed his mind on the question.” However, all agreed to consider that Bolshevism, before all, was a Russian phenomenon; that this phenomenon exemplified, in that it brought together, under a revolutionary form, social and national aspirations; and mainly, that Germany and Russia had a common enemy, knowing it as the bourgeois

capitalism and liberal individualism of the West, that at least justifies a negative solidarity of the right and the left against the universe of the “center.” This conviction sometimes relied on the idea, advanced by Moeller Van den Bruck, that there existed a natural solidarity of “young peoples” (Germany and Russia) against the “old peoples” (France and Britain), an idea which had a geographic resonance besides, since Moeller added that “each country is old in the West, young in the East.” Finally, all saw in Bolshevism a force of radical change. “Bolshevism was presented as the quintessence of all of that which was destructive and decomposing”, one reads in *Der Umsturz* . “Then, it is true, we are National-Bolsheviks, because precisely, the way of the nation only proceeds through creative destruction.” Bolshevism would become the best means to collapse an order already shaken at its foundations, the best means to accelerate the movement and to hasten those things: a worsening political situation backed by a final optimism.

In 1929, Niekisch wrote in collaboration with Jünger an article entitled “Revolution um Karl Marx” in which he contrasted the synthesis of nationalism and socialism to Marxist internationalism, and advocates a “community of combat coming from very different camps.” This idea truly returns to speak as a leitmotiv. Jünger also declared that a tactical alliance with the communists was possible in the measure where they opposed the established order and the Weimar status quo, all in estimating that Marxism, to him, did not ultimately intend to “establish one of the most radical and the most boring forms of the petit-bourgeois rationalist order, in the style of a small allotment, a sort of proclamation of ration cards in perpetuity.” In the same spirit, Friedrich Hielscher published on the 16<sup>th</sup> of March 1927, in the *Neue Standarte (Arminius)* , an “appeal for oppressed peoples”, where one can read: “Firstly we must reject most clearly, the Third International and its ideology, because it is neither Russian nor German, but Western, and that it only represents a mask for Russia. Secondly, we must search for collaboration with Moscow despite the Communist ideology, because a large part of the consequences that Russia took from its ideology are not Marxist, but Russian.”

With the exception some of the cases of particular figures, and in a certain number of individual gatherings, this appeal for a “collaboration of fronts,” will hardly be followed by effects. The difficulty was astonishing. For the National-Bolsheviks the communists were on good path, but they were stopped en route, they could only seriously fight against capitalism when they would abandon the internationalism and materialism by which Marxism was akin to the bourgeois ideology it pretended to combat. The communists, from their side, held an identical reasoning, but on the inverse: if the National-Bolsheviks truly wanted to defend the people, they could begin by renouncing the nationalist aspirations which served as an alibi for the defense of capitalist interests. Passionate controversy, but deaf to dialogue.

On this backdrop, Ernst Niekisch would inscribe his proper trajectory. Determinant in this respect, was a lecture, that he seems to have made in the spring of 1929 (in the moment where all of the German right was mobilizing against the Young Plan), on an article published in May of 1877 by Dostoevsky in the *Journal of a Writer*. In this text, which *Widerstand* would reprint some months later, the author of *The Possessed* described Germany as a “protesting power.” “The most characteristic trait, the most essential of this great, proud, and particular people,” wrote Dostoevsky, “always was, since its entry into history, the refusal to unite, in its destiny and its principles, with the extreme Western European world, that is to say, with the inheritors of the old Roman destiny. It protested two thousand years, and even if it didn’t express it in proper words, even if it never expressed its proper ideal in a clear manner formulated to replace the Roman idea it destroyed, I believe yet, that it will always be intimately convinced that it can one day express these new words, which will allow it to lead humanity.”

This theme of the “eternally protesting German,” already evoked by Alfred Baeumler in the columns of *Widerstand* in December 1928 and which, previously, had already seduced Thomas Mann, permitted Niekisch to systematize his watchword of “resistance” (*Widerstand*) and to give to it a new context. Whereas previously, the West as always understood by the National-Revolutionaries and Young Conservatives was represented by

French universalism and English liberalism, the fight against Rome (“Los von Rom!”) being rather the fact of Völkisch milieu, Niekisch would henceforth declare with virulence that the “Western” world is ultimately the product of this “Roman spirit” to which the German people were constantly opposed throughout history, since Arminius and Widukind to Luther and Bismarck. He affirmed himself before all as a “protestant,” in all senses of the word, yet that would not prevent him from reproaching the official Protestant churches for failing the “Lutheran will to combat.” This anti-occidentalism reinforced the traditional opposition to “welsch” values, which then permitted him to divide the world into two antagonistic blocs: on one side, the West, Europe, Romanism, Catholicism, bourgeois imperialism, parliamentary decadence, and liberal capitalism; the other, Germany and Russia, and even Asia, Germanism and Slavism, Protestantism, the Prussian Style, and finally Bolshevism! In this lens, France was only “the contemporaneous armed form of Roman imperialism.” It is necessary, wrote Niekisch, to dismantle the edifice inherited from Charlemagne, this “father of the West,” this “patriarch of Pan-Europa,” indeed even treating the Romans as Charlemagne in his times treated the Saxons!

Faced with “Eternal Rome,” the old Prussian appeared more than ever as the counter-image, the counter-myth par excellence. Thomas Mann, Oswald Spengler, Arthur Moeller Van den Bruck and many others, had already celebrated the Prussian example, founded on the spirit of service, discipline and abnegation, even as the antithesis of the individualist, hedonistic, and liberal spirit of the bourgeois West. Niekisch, for himself, finally saw in the Prussian a model halfway between the Spartan spirit and Bolshevism. “The line of Prussian destiny,” he wrote, “is in a negative relation to the German bourgeoisie’s conception of the world: the more the bourgeois universe dries up and withers, the more the Prussian lives and flourishes.” In an article published in *Widerstand* in April 1928, Friedrich Hielscher, intimate friend of Jünger, also declared that the “nonWesternness of the German nature” rested on a “Prussian attitude,” on a Prussianism in the style of Frederick the Great. Some months later, Niekisch, who since 1924, claimed himself a “Prussian German, disciplined, and barbarous,” invited Germany to retrench, as



Prussia did formerly, in the shelter of “high walls” and “impassable trenches,” returning to its natural center of gravity: the space situated on either side of two ancient limits, the region covering North of the Main and East of the Elbe, which is sometimes called the “North German space”, sometimes “*Ostelbien*” (country to the East of the Elbe), or more simply, Prussia.

Yet, in this epoch, Niekisch stayed well within the consideration in a classical nationalist lens. In his articles of 1929, his critique of the West and his advocacy in favor of the Prussian ethic led him to violently reject modernity. His model man could then be a sort of Prussian Cincinnatus. He thus proclaimed that the “peasant property” is the “foundation of national life” and the peasant an “element of the conservation of the state.” “The earth is not a means,” he wrote, “the man-object relation is not without soul. ... The peasant is intimately bound to the soil, he belongs to it no more than it belongs to him ... Man lives with the earth, which transmits to him the spirit of his ancestors.” With the same spirit, he denounced unchecked urbanization, the way of life of the townsman, the technology “devouring men”, as aspects of the Western way of life. He stated tersely: “At the end of urbanization, of industrialization, of liberalization, of embourgeoisement, of the Europeanization of Germany, there is Versailles.” The “orientation towards the East” was then concluded as a “return to barbarity and peasant primitiveness.” He meant for Germany to rediscover its proper being in repudiating all the useless luxuries, by establishing an economy reduced to the strict level of elementary real needs (*Bedarfwirtschaft*), by adopting an ethic that was founded on the “will to austerity.” Niekisch also criticized discretionary property (*unbeschränkt*) and affirmed that it was fiefdom (*Lehenseigentum*) that responded best to the German life style. This orientation, which sometimes seemed to recapitulate certain völkisch themes, culminated in the “Program of German Resistance” published by Niekisch in April 1930, which extolled de-industrialization, the return to the earth, autarky, the adoption of a Spartan way of life, and the fusion of Germanic world and the Slavic world.

The decisive turn took place during this same year of 1930. In *Entscheidung* (Berlin 1930), Niekisch exhorted his compatriots to develop in themselves the “courage of the abyss” (*Mut zum Abgrund*). The Germans must recognize that Bolshevism, different from the bourgeois parties, is an “elementary movement” (a term directly borrowed from Jünger’s vocabulary) and that the class struggle, which finds its origin in materialist thinking, therefore bourgeoisie, determines the energies that can be put in the service of the nation. “It is thus,” wrote Niekisch, “that it is the attitude that one adopts regarding the communist movement that will decide the measure in which one counts for the future of Germany. He who behaves like a chirping woman belongs to Europe .... His true country is France, to the left of the Rhine. He has maladies that we cannot cure by inoculation like Malaria. Our enslavement is a malady of this sort. There needs to be a decision.” At the same moment, he declared in *Widerstand*: “The world cannot turn without things being shattered. It feels in this turn of the world, that Germany will receive the grace to restart from zero.” Then, “Germany can only reconquer its freedom by favoring Russo-Asiatic power against Europe.” The objective? To realize a grand Germanic-Slavic bloc, moved by the spirit of the Prussian ethic and extending “from Flessingue to Vladivostok.”

At the same time, Niekisch was convinced that Prussian history must be reinterpreted as the result of a mixture of Germanic and Slavic culture, and inversely, that Soviet Russia was finally a daughter of the Prussian spirit: “Such was the sense of the Bolshevik Revolution: Russian in peril of death took recourse to the idea of Potsdam, it took it to the extreme, almost to excess, and created that absolute state of warriors which submitted daily life to military discipline, that the citizen knew to endure hunger when he must face it, that all his life was charged with the explosion of a will to resistance.” He even would say: “Bolshevism, it’s

Luther in Russia.” About communism, he also wrote in *Entscheidung*: “In its harshness, there is something of the severity of the camp, there is more Prussian rigor there, than is known or even felt by the bourgeois Prussian.” Bolshevik Russia was thus “serving the idea of Potsdam.”

And Germany, which “sold its creation to Russia” could only “recover it by passing through Moscow.”

In 1928, Niekisch then declared that Germany should align with no one. “Bismarck,” he recalled, “said one day how much Russia treats brutally that states that depend exclusively on it. We should tuck with precaution between the East and the West and see far.” Three years later, then his evolution directed him to radicalize his positions, he then assured “by no means would Germany Bolshevize, Russify, or Asiaticize; but it is necessary that it orients itself towards the Eastern type.” It is evidently difficult to know if these reservations are pure, or solely aiming to reach agreement. In all fashion, as always with Niekisch, it was “realism” that commanded. In his “Program of German Resistance,” Niekisch explains the new reasons for not condemning the Soviet experience: “Russia is not individualist, it is not liberal. It places politics over the economy. It is not parliamentary, not democratic, and not “civilized.” Bolshevism refused humanism and “civilized” values.” Consequently, “if Washington is today the center of capitalist world, Moscow is its polar opposite.” In 1931, Niekisch repeated that “to be Bolshevik, signifies, after the nature of things, to have inflicted a defeat on the West.” “Russia,” he added, “is not a paradise, as the communist worker wants to believe it; it is a camp against the West. The social rank there depends on the fashion in which you pay with your person, as a worker or as a soldier; there wealth carries dishonor. That is what frightens the bourgeois. But that is a model for the German resistance.” And in concluding, “The position of resistance is not per-se communism or anti-communism, but capable of communism if another issue does not exist.”

Then there was no alternative: it was necessary to be “capable of communism.” Bolshevism is the antithesis of liberalism and the West, which are the true enemies of Germany. It is more Russian than Marxist, and maybe even more Prussian than Russian. At worst, it is a necessary evil, in the fashion of leveling the terrain to prepare for what is to come. The 15<sup>th</sup> of August 1931, Niekisch wrote to his friend Joseph Drexel: “The Communist Party prepares a step of necessary chaos. We think of that which is going to follow, when it sees an end. We can only rule and

mint the elementary force if we are in solidarity.” And returning to the same idea in his articles: “The German essence will finish by being strong enough to transform even the communist principle into an instrument of Germany’s future grandeur.”

At this stage, Niekisch then appeared to have totally rallied to NationalBolshevism. Contrary to other currents in this movement, he did not, however, use the term himself, and to qualify his positions, spoke rather, occasionally, of “German Bolshevism.” In fact, as Uwe Sauermann wrote it, the expression of “Prussian Bolshevism”, suggested by Erich Müller around 1932, would be without doubt the most appropriate to evoke this period, actually quite short, in the evolution of Niekisch, who affirmed it in 1930, culminating in 1931, and already beginning to finish by the end of 1932. Niekisch at that moment was incontestably Bolshevik. But he gave the term a particular significance: to be Bolshevik, for him, is to refuse, to the highest point, the orientation towards the West.

But Niekisch was not only a theoretician. He intended to be an organizer equally and, while his ideas underwent a rapid evolution, he hadn’t provided the efforts to put in place a true political organization. For the first time, in 1928, he searched before all to launch unitary initiatives in the direction of the nationalist camp. In May, the Reichstag elections revealed themselves to be very disappointing to the parties of the right, then the KPD and SPD largely reinforced their positions. In October,

Niekisch tried to constitute a “circle of chiefs” bringing together the Stahlhelm, the Jungdeutscher Orden (Jungdo) of Arthur Mahraun, the Wehrwolf of Fritz Kloppe, and the Oberland League. It would have no consequences. The following year, in the autumn of 1929, he attempted to regroup the youth leagues and student’s associations in a “youth action” (Aktion Jugend) against the Young plan. The results were a bit more favorable: the 28<sup>th</sup> of February 1930, the journal *Die Kommenden* published an appeal signed by some 32 different organizations, an appeal for which Niekisch was the inspiration, while several manifestations against the Young plan were conducted in Germany in association with

this publication, thus contributing to the extension of the right wing milieu whose word of order was “resistance.” In 1930-1931, Niekisch also had some contact with the Reichswehr, and it notably took the word before the officers of the Infantry School of Dresden.

It was even so in the Oberland League that his ideas were received with the most success. Created in Munich on October 31<sup>st</sup> 1921, it had taken over from a Freikorps of the same name, formed in April 1919, who notably fought the Polish Uprising in Silesia and acquired a national celebrity by the seizure of Annaberg (May 1921). Among them was found the Captain “Beppo” (Joseph) Römer, who was expelled in 1923 and would publicly join the Communist Party in 1932. The future writer Bodo Uhse, who would also end up joining the Communist Party, also figured among its adherents. The League recruited throughout the protestant milieu. Its journal, *Das Dritte Reich – Eckart-Briefe*, was lead by Gustav Sondermann, who was among the first collaborators of *Widerstand*. Friedrich Weber, chief of the movement, frequently invited Niekisch to speak before his followers, notably at the congress of the League in 1928. Two years later, dissent broke out among the Oberländer, having followed the decision of the Austrian sections to elect as Bundesführer the conservative Ernst Rüdiger. The 1<sup>st</sup> of February 1931, as the outcome of a reunion in Nuremberg in which Niekisch participated, the revolutionary elements of the movement decided to assert their autonomy and constituted themselves as the Oberland Comrades of the “Widerstand” Circles (Oberlandkameradschaft des Widerstandkreises). The review, *Das Dritte Reich*, which since April 1930, republished the content of *Widerstand*, but ceased to turn a profit from this.

The creation of the Widerstand Circles was anterior by some months to the schism of the Bund Oberland, but one cannot suppose that double membership was already frequent. It was in effect in 1930 that Niekisch decided to launch his proper movement. The first meeting days organized by the Circles were held in October 1930 at the castle of Lauenstein, near Probstzella (Thuringia), in the presence of about a hundred participants. An analogous meeting would take place in 1931 and 1932, with the participation of the Oberlandkameradschaft, whose center of gravity

rested in Franconia. Widerstand-Bewegung first published a *Rundbriefe*, to which was soon added a weekly, official organ of the movement, to which Niekisch gave the name *Entscheidung* and which would appear for the first time on October 9<sup>th</sup> 1932. Subtitled *Die Wochenzeitung für nationalrevolutionäre Politik*, it consisted of six large format pages and sold 8000 copies per week. A drawing by A. Paul Weber illustrated the first page of each issue. Besides the latter and the doctor Gustav Sondermann, the two principal facilitators of the movement were the editor Joseph Drexel and the governmental councilor Karl Tröger, who both came from the Oberland League. Treasurer of the Widerstand Circles, Joseph Drexel, born on the 6<sup>th</sup> of June 1896 in Munich, was a former student of Max Weber who had served as a volunteer in the air-force during the First World War. After a term in the Freikorps, he was responsible for the Oberland Bund in Franconia. Karl Tröger, the organizer of this movement, was born on the 21<sup>st</sup> of December 1900 in Hof an der Saale. As a former Freikorps member himself, a lawyer in Bayreuth starting from 1926, he was responsible for the Bund Oberland in Fichtelgebirge and the region of Regensburg, then High Franconia, and finally North Bavaria. He then worked with financial services in Breslau.

The Widerstand Circles formed from 1930-1931 in most of the major German cities. The effective numbers are difficult to decipher: Uwe Sauermann evaluated them at around 5,000 people, with an active core of five or six hundred adherents. The circulation of *Widerstand* oscillated, between 3,000 and 4,500 subscribers per month. On one side, Louis Depeux estimated that the cumulative total circulation of different publications of National-Bolshevik orientation was probably from 20,000 to 25,000 subscribers. He added that “all the indexes agree to show that the National-Bolsheviks were recruited from the Protestant Middle Class, in particular from the young intellectuals and the social and professional categories working in the service of the state.”

Niekisch, in either case, multiplied his travels and gave conferences from one side of Germany to the other. His influence for the youth was certain. It was explained without doubt by the extreme radicalism of his

positions, served by a formal meaning, an incisive tone, an oratory talent, which extended his reputation far beyond his immediate movement. Sebastian Haffner would not hesitate to add that “he wrote German in the style of Kleist, maybe the best German that was written in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.” However many, including his close associates, reproached him for his bad temper, his absence of flexibility, his tendency towards didacticism. His sententious spirit would follow his reputation as a “giver of lessons.” “Niekisch”, then wrote Sebastian Haffner, “was always a perspicacious and profound political thinker ... and in his life, a man of heroic courage. He was never a practical politician! He lacked almost everything for that: flexibility, adaptability, an indispensable minimum of opportunism, organizational faculties, a talent for demagogy, maybe even innate ambition, that element of power and success, in short, that which constituted the necessities of all politicians. In place of that, he had an exceeding amount of intellectual integrity, a touchy pride, an opinionated nature, even stubbornness. In his eyes, blue and hard, with which he saw the essence of things and people; the candor with which he spoke, and on all occasions, with which he thought, would acquire for him few friends, and certainly not partisan crowds, but at most, enthusiastic disciples.”

Although in 1931-1932, other National-Bolshevik groups, like those of Karl Otto Paetel or the Vorkämpfer group, which openly rallied to the idea of class struggle, then had the tendency to find Niekisch too lukewarm, whose virulence demonstrated that the latter had otherwise alienated certain sympathies in the young conservatives, and even national revolutionaries. In January 1930, August Winnig separated from *Widerstand*, after having published a cautionary note against NationalBolshevism. Franz Schauwecker and Alfred Baeumler equally ceased to collaborate with the magazine. Niekisch, in addition, was frequently attacked by movements like Stahlhelm or Jungdo, who professed an innate anticommunism and refused any global condemnation of the West, and by a rightist faction of the Youth Movement, who favored rather a “third front.”

Revelatory in this respect was the polemic that, in 1931, opposed Niekisch by Wilhelm Stapel, co-editor of the new conservative magazine

*Deutsches Volkstum*. This magazine, however, was not fundamentally hostile to him. It sometimes even published texts by him and his other co-editor, Albrecht Eric Günther, in which one could read the articles in *Widerstand*, which followed closely in 1919-1920 the experience of “Hamburg National Communism.” In 1931, listing *Entscheidung*, the book published by Niekisch in the preceding year, Stapel was nonetheless very worried about the emergence of a “German National Communism.” The book, he affirmed, belonged to the category of “either-or books,” that is to say, it merely, in Manichean fashion, addresses two brutal alternatives, as if there did not exist a third solution: “All of the German social universe, for example, is divided for Niekisch into “peasants” or “bourgeoisie.” The peasant is all that is pleasing to him (and pleasing to me), the bourgeois all that is displeasing to him (and displeasing to me). But this dichotomy is purely arbitrary. Reality is not like that.” Accused of multiplying the oppositions between “phantoms,” Niekisch also saw himself accused of “Romantic” Prussianism and opposition to the idea of Empire

(Reichsgedanke). To conclude, Stapel declared that if the ideas of Niekisch were to be realized politically, it would simply be “the end of the German people.” Niekisch would respond to him in *Widerstand* in July 1931.

With the National Socialists, the clash was more brutal. It would also be more determinant. Niekisch was, in effect, without contest, the one man in the Conservative Revolution who denounced, from very early on and with the most vigor, the Hitlerist movement. Around 1927, he accused Nazism of engaging itself in a dead end and only being motivated by “resentment” against the Jews and the November Revolution. Two years later, he systematized his critique in a new article dedicated to Hitlerism.

This would culminate in the celebrated booklet published in 1932: *Hitler – ein Deutsches Verhängnis*.

The opposition between Hitler and Niekisch evidently first holds from the rigorously opposed judgments that they both had on the Soviet Revolution and the nature of Bolshevism. Not only did the NSDAP



profess a fanatical anticommunism, but it inherited the Russophobia of Paul Lagarde, and in a very general fashion, the racial anti-Slavism then common in the Völkisch milieu – it only envisioned *Ostorientierung* in the expansionist and imperialist sense. For the National-Socialists, was neither “national,” and even less “Prussian,” since it was essentially internationalist and “Jewish.” Niekisch drew the conclusion that the “socialism” which Hitler claimed was a pure facade and that his irreducible anticommunism betrayed, despite all that he could say, his affinities with the Western, liberal, bourgeois universe. From 1929, this critique reinforced the theme of German protest against the “Roman” world. While in 1926, Niekisch then attributed Italian Fascism the merit of sharing “The intellectual structure of Bolshevism: autocracy, hatred of liberalism, use of force,” three years later, far from opposing the “modernist” ideology of Fascism to the “archaic” National-Socialism, as certain authors of the Conservative Revolution did, it is, on the contrary, primarily because the fascist movement was “Roman” and “Occidental” that he pronounced a condemnation of Hitler without appeal. In the same epoch, Ernst Jünger also affirmed: “Indubitably, Fascism is nothing other than the late form of liberalism ... a brutal shorthand of the liberal regime.” Niekisch therefore takes as his rival, not the name of liberal democracy, but on the contrary, the detested liberal and bourgeois universe. From there the arguments successively cascade. Niekisch recognized that at its beginning Hitlerism could have embodied the German protest against the Diktat of Versailles, but around 1923, he added that Hitler betrayed his mission and succumbed to the Roman and Catholic solicitations to which his Austrian origins predestined him: “He who is Nazi will soon be Catholic!” Hitler’s ideology, which made “race” the universal explicative factor and the “Jew” the scapegoat par excellence, was not German, but Bavarian, “Southern,” and reactionary. Like a Roman potentate, Hitler maintained around his personality an “oriental” cult, and, to do this, appealed to the masses, whom he basely flattered. He was the opposite of the Prussian *homo politicus*, inspired by Protestantism and Frederick the Great. His “Third Reich,” then, was less a political project than a “religious hope.” Not only was Hitler not a true revolutionary anti-capitalist, his “socialism” only being a lure to use radicalized petit-bourgeois, but in searching for the good grace of Italy,

England, and France – that Niekisch denounced under the name of “BritoGermania,” the Anglophilia of the “Hitler-Hess line” – it placed him “on the terrain of Versailles,” which showed that he had taken the role of “the gendarme of the West” by launching a “crusade” against Bolshevism. And Niekisch risked this prophecy: If Germany misguidedly gives itself to Hitler, it will surely go towards disaster. “It will remain an exhausted people ... without hope, and the order of Versailles will only be stronger than ever.”

Beginning in 1932, Niekisch made a new appeal to “the protesting Germans against fascism.” “The cohorts of Hitler,” he wrote, “find themselves on German soil as Southern European occupying troops!” To Goebbels, who he wanted to convince, he retorted one day, “You pretend to be National-Socialists, but is there anything national in your movement? Your salute is Roman, your flag equally so, the color of the uniforms of your troops makes one think of a Balkan occupation arm, your military parades of Catholic high masses! No, the German nation is another thing, it was not born in the fever of Bavarian beer halls! It was born in the protest against Rome, with the clear breeze of Protestantism and of the Prussian spirit.” Shortly after, Niekisch presented his proofs in his pamphlet, *Hitler – ein Deutsches Verhängnis*, to Ernst Jünger, who had returned to visit Berlin in the company of Carl Schmitt and Arnolt Bronnen. The text completes his premonition of a final catastrophe in the East. Jünger would say: “Niekisch gave me the effect of a man in the middle of making a leap; I could not dissuade him from publishing the book.” Illustrated with the striking drawings of A. Paul Weber, the pamphlet attained a circulation of 40,000 readers in that year. The NSDAP struck back by launching a press campaign against Niekisch. At that date, *Widerstand* was already regularly cited in the monthly press review (*Pressebericht*) of the Reichsführer SS as one of the “principal adversarial organs” (Hauptorgane der Gegner).

Around 1930, explained Sebastian Haffner, “Hitler and Niekisch were antipodal to each other, the two being the most irreconcilable you could find in Germany. The only thing they had in common, was their declared hate for the Weimar Republic, their firm will to make it fall such that it

would fall in every manner and to be the heir of the deceased. For the rest, their programs were opposed to each other, point by point: Hitler would want vengeance on the “criminals of November;” Niekisch would want the triumph of the November Revolution; Hitler would want a Fascist counter-revolution, Niekisch would want a socialist revolution; Hitler, the anti-bolshevik crusade and the colonization of Russia with the tacit complicity of the West, Niekisch, the alliance with Bolshevik Russia against the West. Hitler thought in the terms of “race” and “space,” Niekisch in terms of “class” and “state.” Hitler would want to win the crowds so he could lead them to capitalist and imperialist politics, Niekisch would want to win the crowds so he could lead them to Prussian socialism and ascetic politics.” Jünger would declare on his part: “Niekisch was then in a bit of a situation where we find the Greens today. He was quite on the right path, and if I could express myself thus, he would have been capable of influencing the evolution towards the left: and that would have gained him a stronger consensus, particularly in the East. Compared to him, Hitler did cheap work, and that bought him this monstrous popularity.”

In the Spring of 1932, on the occasion of the presidential elections, Niekisch tried to submit his candidacy, with the double title of the National-Revolutionary movement and of the Landvolkbewegung, whose leader, Claus Heim, of the Peasant revolt in Schleswig-Holstein, found himself imprisoned then. But, the other National-Bolshevik groups had already taken a position in favor of Thaelmann (the communist candidate), Claus Heim, who had already given his accord, reversed his support and the project failed. Some months later, Niekisch participated, beside twenty academics and researchers, in a voyage to the Soviet Union organized, from August 23<sup>rd</sup> to September 14<sup>th</sup>, by the Working Group for the Study of the Soviet Russian Planned Economy (Arplan). This group created on the margins of the activities of *Vörkämpfer* by the economist Friedrich Lenz, for the First Secretary Arvid Harnack, who served in the same Freikorps as Friedrich Hielscher and who was to later become famous within the celebrated “Red Orchestra” espionage network. The Arplan delegation was received in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov. Niekisch, whose sojourn would be cut short by illness,

encountered Karl Radek on this occasion. On his return, he published in *Widerstand* a resounding article, in which he gave tribute to the Soviet plan, as a means to surmount and instrumentalize modernity, affirming that the Russian people had adopted an attitude “heroism singular in the world,” forming a veritable “army of labor” and that “nothing would be easier than to transform it into a revolutionary army.” The Russians, added Niekisch, had even managed to dominate technology. It was not inevitable that it would “devour man” and that confronted Niekisch with an idea, which he had advanced a year earlier, that “collectivization is the form of social existence that the organic will must do if it wants to affirm itself in the face of the murderous effects of technology.” In this positive revaluation of technology, one notes the new influence of Jünger, who published *Der Arbeiter* in the course of the same year.

Like many of his compatriots, Niekisch was completely overtaken by the National-Socialist rise to power. In the first issue of *Widerstand* in January 1933, Hitler was then described as “the man without talent” (Talentlose) par excellence. In February, Niekisch published in his journal an article entitled: “The Epoch of Class Struggle.” There he declared: “Never has there been in Germany a cabinet so reactionary as that which we have now ... Does the event of January 30<sup>th</sup> represent a national revolution or not? ... Hitler is chancellor: that is for him without a doubt a personal success. He is the chancellor of a bourgeois reactionary cabinet: that is certainly not a success for nationalism.”

But the hour of repression was already at hand. The first organization forbidden by the new regime, on February 4<sup>th</sup> 1933, was the Black Front of Otto Strasser. On the night of 8<sup>th</sup> to 9<sup>th</sup> March, Niekisch was arrested with his wife by a group of SA, then released a few days later. His apartment was searched. Moreover, in March, the weekly *Entscheidung* was banned, after publishing 23 issues. *Widerstand*, in contrast, continued its publication for some time. In January 1934, the magazine adopted a new symbol on the first page, drawn by A. Paul Weber: on a black colored background, an eagle, in its claws a sword and a sickle, its chest bearing a hammer. At the end of July 1933, it published articles by the philosopher Hugo Fischer. Yet, in August 1933, it was still a question

among official milieus regarding a ban on *Widerstand*, which was finally pronounced on the 20<sup>th</sup> of December 1934. Niekisch would then accuse one of this former collaborators, the philosopher Alfred Baeumler, of having played a role in this ban.

Sebastian Haffner said that Niekisch “would spend four years in the Third Reich during which he was the last known and openly declared enemy of Hitler.” Pressured by his friends to leave Germany – Jünger, notably, advised him to seek refuge in Switzerland – Niekisch chose to make an “interior emigration.” Between 1933 and 1937, he would continue to write and tentatively constitute in secret his “Resistance Movement”, which henceforth merited this name more than ever. Though under constant surveillance by the police, he also made a number of trips abroad, thanks to the support of some patrons like Alfred Töpfer. Previously, he had almost never left Germany, now he traveled widely to Switzerland, Holland, France, Belgium, England, Scandinavia. In the summer of 1935 he even sojourned to Italy, where he met emigres ... and Mussolini.

In 1933, Niekisch worked on a project for a book which was titled, *Deutsche Mobilmachung*, echoing Jünger’s essay on “total mobilization.” There he repeated his critiques of National-Socialism and described Lenin as the all time heir of Luther, of Frederick II, of Fichte, of Hegel, of Nietzsche, and of Marx! The manuscript, sent to Joseph Drexel, would be seized by the Gestapo. But it was mainly in his two essays of 1934, *Die Dritte imperiale Figur* and *Im Dickicht der Pakte*, published in the following year, that begins a new turn, a turn then stillborn by the political conjuncture and the following events.

Distributed as Privatdruck, in a confidential fashion, *Die Dritte imperiale Figur*, a mythic work and virtually untraceable, is perhaps the most important of Niekisch’s books, at the same time the draft of an unfulfilled vision. Niekisch no longer reasoned in terms of immediate politics. Like Jünger, and without a doubt under his influence, he reformulated his ideas in an idealist language which gave the notion of *Figur*, Figure, (Gestalt in Jünger’s terms), a fundamental role. The history of Europe,

according to him, is before all the history of confrontation between grand Figures, each having a *ratio*, that is to say a spirit involved in a particular metapolitical project. The two great Figures of the past are the “Eternal Roman,” supporting the Western political project, at the same time Catholicism and Fascism, and the “Eternal Jew,” whose *ratio* was strictly economic and embodied in global liberalism. Faced with these two enemy Figures, both issuing from the Mediterranean and Roman space, Niekisch no longer believed in the “provincial” Figures of the Soldier, Peasant, the Germane, which he had previously praised and who risked being manipulated by the dominant Western *ratio*. He wish to greet the advent of another emblematic Figure, the Third Imperial Figure, that of the Worker, master of the “technical space,” who must establish on a global scale a new order, at the same time organic and technical, socialist, and proletarian. The technical *ratio* was then called to supplant the economic and metaphysical *ratio*. The Worker, “the New Barbarian,” engendered by the “new force” of the “Russo-Asiatic element” would liquidate the West, and its reign would permit the establishment of an Empire extending upon a world totally rid of bourgeois values, and at the same time it would correspond, Niekisch remaining in the Hegelian tradition, to the reign of the Spirit.

The kinship of the Third Imperial Figure and of Jünger’s Worker was obvious. They were not totally dependent on each other. For Niekisch, the old socialist, the collective worker is closer than the individual worker, in the strict sense, it is a less abstract Figure, resulting in the metamorphosis of the proletariat itself, redefined in an idealist manner. The Worker was also the embodiment of the “Bolshevik.” In 1935, Niekisch would then say he placed Jünger “between Spengler and Marx.” But the most important consequence of this new vision was the abandoning of the all reference to nationalism. Jünger, who, at that time, had already begun to distance himself from politics (in 1932-1933 he only published three articles in *Widerstand*), lead the way in this domain. Around 1929, Jünger would write: “The word nationalism is a flag, very useful to clearly fix the original combat position of a generation during the chaotic years of transition; it is by no means, as is believed by many of our friends and also our enemies, the expression of a superior value; it

designates a condition, but it is not our goal.” For Niekisch, the reference to the nation would become problematic since he would call for the formation of a Germano-Slavic “great space” – from Flessingue to Vladivostok! – and would multiply his acerbic criticism against Southern Germany and the “Bavarian miasma.” Contrary to other National-Bolshevik groups, who continued to see the nation as the absolute and final value for them, Niekisch, in the the *Die Dritte imperiale Figur* then perceived the nationstate as a bourgeois creation from the epoch of the French Revolution. “When the bourgeoisie celebrate the cult of the nation,” he wrote, “they secretly sacrifice to the their true idol, the god Mammon.” The nation was then no longer an unsurpassable reference. The state itself was no longer an absolute, but a simple means for the accession of the Figure. Niekisch rallied to the idea of imperial idea that he had condemned some years earlier, but he gave to it a somewhat planetary resonance. The unification of the “Russo-German great space” was only a prelude to the “ultimate empire” (Endimperium) that would extend across the entire earth. “If the nation is overtaken in the long term,” observed Louis Dupeux, “it is for reasons that hold neither for the economy, nor for any universalism, but to accomplish the accession of the Figure to the imperial rank.”

Niekisch also used the notion of empire to criticize anew Hitlerian racism: “No empire is a community of blood: it’s a community of faith and more generally a community of spirit.” He defended himself from falling into antisemitism. The Figure of the “Eternal Jew,” he said, belonged to the past. “To engage in antisemitism, it’s to revolve around the Jew.” Dignity required he challenge Nazi antisemitism, which was a “bourgeois German” antisemitism. Niekisch also gets to the Völkische and the “romantics,” who wanted to return to the past (“that is not the way back to the roots”) and he would propose that they “flee to countryside.” He finally renewed his attacks on National-Socialism, which he continued to consider as a bourgeois movement, even exclusively bourgeois, which he compared with insistence to Bonapartism: “Caesarist Democracy of the masses should become a major coup for the capitalist bourgeoisie.”

*Im Dickicht der Pakte* develops this critique with the angle of foreign policy. Niekisch contested that the world was divided into three camps: the communist camp, the capitalist camp, and the fascist camp. There were only two camp, he said, from the fact of “Hitlerian betrayal.” Germany found itself once again attached to the Western camp. It was the reason for which, he added, the game of the democracies consisted of dragging Hitler into a “thicket of pacts.” Niekisch then reproached the Third Reich for legitimizing the bourgeois order by making a defense of private property, and for the first time, “not wanting to go beyond the national state” and rejecting “imperial ambition.” But this book, for the first time also, put equally into doubt the revolutionary capability of Russia. Russia’s admission to the League of Nations in effect scandalized Niekisch, who spoke of a “voyage to Canossa” and demanded if the USSR, “by renouncing its savage mission of global revolution,” wouldn’t become one day “a Western European power with State capitalism.”

On the 22<sup>nd</sup> of March 1937, at seven in the morning, then preparing for a journey to Czechoslovakia, Niekisch was arrested by the Gestapo and then incarcerated. Simultaneously, a dragnet permitted the questioning of 70 other members of the Widerstand Circles, including Joseph Drexel and Karl Tröger. The archives of the movement and the correspondence of the publishing house, concealed by Drexel in a seat of an insurance company in Nuremberg, were also seized. No organ of the press would not be seized.

The proceedings only opened two years later. On January 3<sup>rd</sup> 1939, Ernst Niekisch, Joseph Drexel, and Karl Tröger appeared in secret before the Volksgerichtshof, presided over by Dr. Thierack. The clandestine activities of the Widerstand Circles, together with most of the texts published by Niekisch since 1933, were retained as evidence and figured in the accusation file. After a week of debate, on the 10<sup>th</sup> January, Niekisch was condemned for “preparations for high treason” and violation of the law banning political parties to life in prison, the confiscation of his property, and the forfeiture of all his civil rights. His companions were also condemned to prison time: three years and six months for Drexel, one year and nine months for Tröger. The integral



text of the judgment, discovered after the war at the American Documentation Center in Berlin-Dahlem, would only be published in 1978. In Switzerland, the trial was discussed at length by Adolf Grabowsky in the *Nationalzeitung* of Bâle. Fourteen authors were charged, including Niekisch's wife, who would be judged starting on the 17<sup>th</sup> of February and condemned to various penalties.

Ernst Jünger, who saw Niekisch for the last time at the start of 1937 in Goslar, would write in his notebooks on the date of September 1<sup>st</sup> 1945: "Ernst Niekisch is among these exceptional beings who, in the Civil War, had courage. I could not have imagined, before the events, that this courage would be astonishingly rare ... I saw how one man such as Niekisch stood in his refusal to capitulate. Dead silence all around." In prison, where he was incarcerated in particularly painful conditions, Niekisch developed a system of self discipline, that Sebastian Haffner described as "the last product, the supreme product, inspired by all of the Prussian spirit known to history." He held conferences before an imaginary public and imposed upon himself a rigorous use of his time. "I would invent a system of physical and intellectual hygiene that I would rigorously observe," he recounted in his memoirs, "I would stretch myself to use my time well. The first hour, I would work on philosophy, the second hour sociology, then I would reflect on a book I projected to write. After a meal, I would continue my intellectual exercise. History of literature, economic sciences, sometimes mathematics, aesthetic problems, those were the subjects on which I concentrated myself at present ..." His friends, they were trying to survive. Certain ones among them, during the war, found themselves in the service of counterespionage. Joseph Drexel, imprisoned in Amberg, then freed after having his sentence expunged, would be arrested again after the attempt of July 20<sup>th</sup> and sent to the camp in Mauthausen with the reference "R.U." ("Rückkehr unerwünscht", "no hope of return"). However, he would be liberated in January 1945. Karl Tröger, who enrolled in the Wehrmacht after his sentence, the penalty of prison having been converted to preventative detention, would die of a cerebral congestion due to overwork, on the 25<sup>th</sup> of March 1945 in Schmerz, in the environs of the

town of Brandenburg an der Oder where his friend Niekisch was then detained.

The 30<sup>th</sup> of September 1945, Jünger wrote in his notebooks: “Gerd also taught me that Niekisch had escaped alive from prison when they began to massacre the detainees. He had become blind and near paralyzed, and would try to reconstruct his publishing house in Berlin.” Ernst Niekisch was liberated by the Red Army on the 27<sup>th</sup> of April. He left the prison of Brandenburg-Görden near blind and incapable of walking. He had since returned home on the 5<sup>th</sup> of May.

\*\*\*

The political career of Niekisch did not end in 1945. But the man that the Russians had taken from his cell was evidently not the same man that, ten years earlier, announced the advent of the “Third Imperial Figure.” He affirmed democracy and “progressivism.” He stayed faithful to a number of his intuitions, and maybe the Soviet occupation of the Eastern part of Germany had also convinced him that the “Prussian-Bolshevik” synthesis which he had dreamed of, in part or less, had come to pass. Around August 1945, he joined the German Communist Party (KPD), and simultaneously took charge of the Volkshochschule Wilmersdorf, which found itself in the British sector where he continued to live. In Autumn he found himself in the director’s bureau of the Cultural League for the Democratic Renewal of Germany (Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands) and the Society of German-Soviet Friendship. We would become a member of the SED starting in April 1946. At the start of January 1946, Jünger wrote maliciously “It seems that Niekisch is completely oriented to the East right now.” The interested party responded to him not to simplify things... in 1947, thanks to the support of the historian Alfred Meusel, Niekisch became the professor charged with contemporary political and social problems at the Humboldt University of East Berlin. He would be tenured the following year. In 1949, member of the presidium of the national council of the National Front, director of the Research Institute on Imperialism, he also sat in the People’s Chamber (Volkskammer) and he found himself

closely associated with the creation of the GDR. But his independent spirit would rapidly earn him hostility, and near the end of 1949, he seemed to have encountered some difficulties expressing himself. In 1951, his Research Institute on Imperialism was brutally closed. The following year, the publication of his book entitled *Europäische Bilanz*, which he composed most of mentally in the course of his imprisonment and which he wrote immediately after his liberation (“I noted in four short months that which had slowly matured in eight years”), attracted violent attacks on him on the part of Wilhelm Girus, one of the party ideologues, who accused him of utilizing Marxist terminology to spread “nonscientific” ideas marked by idealism, irrationalism, and pessimism, and who designated his book as having everything of an “American edition of Spengler!” At the start of 1953, Niekisch publicly declared that the leadership of the GDR had lost all contact with the population. After an uprising on the 17<sup>th</sup> of June, he worked with the Soviets against Walter Ulbricht, resigned from the SED and definitively returned to the West. In his memoirs, he would say, “Liberty, which was opened to myself again, revealed an impenetrable thicket of new stifling subjugation.”

This same year of 1953, Niekisch published *Das Reich der niederen Dämonen*. There he underlined the bankruptcy of the middle classes and their lack of moral resistance in the face of Nazism: “The bourgeoisie had the government they deserved.” Put on sale in the GDR in 1958, the book would be withdrawn from libraries there after a few weeks. Yet, Niekisch had not converted to the West! In his articles, he denounced the young Federal Republic as a “plutocracy,” taking a position in favor of neutrality and considered Adenauer to have continued the “Western” ideas of Hitler. In 1956, his text on the Figure of the “Clerk” (der Clerk), which he described as a “modern fellah” – a term apparently borrowed from Spengler – in the service of the techno-bureaucracy, raised a certain disturbance. In parallel, in his works, since *Deutsche Daseinsverfehlung* (1946) until the first volume of his memoirs, Niekisch rewrote his personal history and assured that it was only for tactical reasons that he frequented nationalist milieus before the war. Finally, he began, against the authorities of the Federal Republic who, under the pretext of his

sympathies with the East, obstinately refused to pay the pension as a victim of Nazism as what his right, a judicial battle that would last no less than 13 years. In the judiciary proceedings, which would be obscured for some years after, Niekisch would be supported by jurists like Fabian von Schlabrendorff, and mainly by his friend Joseph Drexel, who managed after 1945 to become head of a veritable press empire in Franconia (he was notably the founder of *Nürnberger Nachrichten*). It was only in 1966, a few months before his death, and after the intervention of the European Commission on Human Rights, that Niekisch would finally obtain 30,000 marks of reparations and the promise of a monthly payment of 1,500 marks!

Ernst Niekisch died in Berlin, alone, the day of his 78 birthday, May 23<sup>rd</sup> 1967. His remains were cremated in the presence of Drexel, A. Paul Weber, Schlabrendorff, and Jünger, who would later say: “I assisted at his funeral. One saw the old militants there, who seemed to have all come right from the Joseph Conrad novel, *The Secret Agent*, some basket cases, and some old friends. It was a dismal funeral.”

Niekisch died apparently forgotten. The years following 1968, there appeared the first deep studies dedicated to him, a certain number of groups on the right and left would rediscover his thought and reclaim for themselves certain positions of his. Small journals like *Neue Zeit, Rebell, Ideologie und Strategie, Der Aufbruch, Wir selbst*, organizations like “Sache des Volkes” and the “Solidaristische Volksbewegung”, militants and young theoreticians like Alexander Epstein, Klaus Herrmann, Armin Krebs, Henning Eichberg, Siegfried Bublies, Wolfgang Strauss, Marcus Bauer, etc, who affirmed themselves under various titles as the representatives of a new “national-revolutionary” current. Certainly, times had changed. The national-revolutionaries of the “second generation” affirmed democracy and did not retain the apology for Bolshevism nor the project of an alliance with Soviet Russia from

Niekisch. But they did willingly support his advocacy of refusing the Western bloc, ethnopluralism, the defense of collective identities, the antiimperialist struggle, and the cause of peoples. They reclaimed

German reunification in the name of decolonization and the right of the people to guide themselves, and combated the liberal West on the basis of “national liberation” (Befreiungsnationalismus). One of their watchwords was “National identity and international solidarity.” In October 1976, young national-revolutionaries from the organization “Sache des Volkes” affixed to the house of Niekisch a commemorative plaque struck with this inscription: “We will be a revolutionary people, or we will no longer be a free people.” In 1977, *Rebell* and *Neue Zeit* gave Niekisch as an example to show that “nationalism consequently leads the antifascist struggle,” while Wolfgang Venohr declared in the magazine *Wir selbst*, “National liberation and anti-fascism cannot and should not be opposed.”

The influence of Niekisch was equally felt in certain tendencies of the “national left” (Bernt Engelmann, Peter Brandt, Herbert Ammon) who opposed themselves to Hans Matthias Kepplinger or Arno Klönne, and those who strove to unite nationalism, neutrality, ecology, and pacifism, and affirmed that the division of Germany was the principal factor of insecurity in Europe. The drawings of A. Paul Weber, who pursued, after the war, his career as a graphic designer in left wing milieus, were particularly popular among the Greens. And while many of the Niekisch’s books were reissued by the anarchist press ADHE, Helios publishing, of Mayence, lead by Karl-Heinz Pröhuber and Peter Bahn, published, starting in 1985, reprints of the great “classics” of NationalBolshevism. “Ernst Niekisch prepared his resurrection,” wrote Sebastian Haffner. “The historical and political works that he left had no equal in the Germany of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. For this moment, it’s something like a hidden treasure, jealously guarded by a handful of old comrades in struggle and grateful disciples. But when one opens his books ... one sees sparks flow as if they were electrified.”

“If on January 28<sup>th</sup> 1933,” wrote Walter Lacquer, “the president of the Reich Hindenburg had entrusted in Ernst Niekisch the responsibility to form a new cabinet, and if this cabinet was comprised of Friedrich Hielscher (Minister of Foreign Relations), Otto Strasser (Interior), Ernst Jünger (Culture Minister), Karl O. Paetel, Werner Lass, Hartmut Plaas,

and some others, the task of the historian who writes the history of German National-Bolshevism today, would have been simpler than it is in reality.” But the task of the historian is never simple, and on the subject of Niekisch the most opposed opinions abound today. For Sebastian Haffner, he was “first and foremost a revolutionary socialist”; for Armin Mohler, “the most radical nationalist of all times.” Hans Matthias Kepplinger treated him as a *Linkfascist*. Louis Dupeux, who did not hold him in esteem, considered him a “sonorous cretin,” and the liberal authors rested on his case to enunciate the “horseshoe theory”: the extremes touch. However, many saw in him as a premier author and thought, like Jünger, that he could have played “an important role in German history.”

These contrary opinions fed symmetric legends. The first of which was the “Niekisch-Orthodoxy” (Mohler). Maintained after 1945 in his self interest, with the support of Joseph Drexel, it formed the basis of the biography he dedicated to Friedrich Kalbermann. Niekisch was always a man of the left, who had only made tactical concessions with the terminology of nationalism to regroup the misguided youth. It was in this spirit that Schüdderkopf could write that Niekisch was “during all of his life a man of the left, who would think as a National-Communist, but never as a Nationalist.” The inverse thesis was supported by Louis Dupeux, among others: a man “of the right and even of the extreme right,” at least from 1926, Niekisch would be employed in shuffling the cards in giving into revolutionary pathos and his massive usage of the rhetoric of the extreme left was only a “reclamation.” The two theses actually appear to be unconvincing, one way or the other. Armin Mohler and Uwe Saueremann did not do justice to the first: it suffices, to refute it, by referring to his texts. About the second, one can oppose to it the itinerary of Niekisch – like the other National-Bolsheviks – after 1933: at the hour of decision, no longer intellectual but living, existential, the least we can say is that they did not pass to the side of “reaction.”

These two theses, equally suspicious, both rest on the theory of a “mask”: the mask of nationalism in the first, the mask of revolutionary Bolshevism in the second. The common presupposition is that he

couldn't have a socialism of the right or a nationalism of the left, and that one cannot be right and left at the same time. Such presupposition, which gives the leftright dichotomy a quasi-ontological bearing, has yet to be demonstrated. The history of ideas, in truth, rather seems to deny it. From one epoch to another, the "ideas of the right" and the "ideas of the left" are rarely the same. Is it truly impossible to use one as another to make, in the proper sense, their opposition insignificant? Niekisch appears to us, to have been a man of the right and of the left at the same time.

What no one disputes, however, is the extreme radicalism of his positions. While, if the evolution of Niekisch appears today so "aberrant" according to current political ideological categories, maybe it is because it obeys a logic which, for the most part, has become incomprehensible. "Those who don't want to think it through could never begin to do it," said Friedrich Lenz, while Louis Dupeux wrote: "Only the National-Bolsheviks went through with the discussion and they boldly dreamed of a truly "total" revolution for strictly national reasons." Niekisch strove to think "through", and it is in this by which his path exemplifies in the extreme, the greatest cross pollination of contemporary ideas. Also, with that, his thought, while bearing the imprint of many well known influences, stayed perfectly original. Niekisch, who had the nature of Cassandra, would want "realism" in a country where politics was frequently enmeshed with morality, and yet he was also unrealistic, maybe, precisely by an excess of logic and realism. He would want to give the right the ideas of the left, and the left the ideas of the right. Throughout his life, he navigated between the fronts; throughout his life, he scaled the heights. The result was a long series of setbacks, ruptures, failures, maybe even disillusionment. Niekisch was imprisoned under Weimar, imprisoned under Hitler, rejected by the authorities of the GDR, detested by those of the Federal Republic. That did not prevent him, with the social democrats, as with the councils, the "old socialists," with the nationalists and the communists, from always affirming himself as a revolutionary that nothing could ever break. Moreover, he was in revolt, a rebel, a resistant. The word *Widerstand*, chosen as the title of his

journal and his publishing house, has strong paradigmatic value: Niekisch was able to resist.

What remains today of the ideas of Niekisch? Maybe more than one believes, and not because here and there small groups occasionally reclaim them. Since it is significant that the majority of Communist Parties in the West have rallied today to an implicitly Lassallian conception, where the proletariat that was defined by Marx has been replaced by “the immense majority of the people.” The reinterpretation of the class struggle in national terms, which lead the National-Bolsheviks to qualify Germany as an oppressed nation compared to a “bourgeoisie” constituted globally by the Western countries, also knew new fortune with the diffusion of the term “proletarian nations.” Uwe Sauermann wrote that Niekisch could well have been the prophet of all the nationalism which expressed itself in this century under the red flag, indeed those who express themselves today under the green flag of Islam. Sebastian Haffner also saw him as a precursor of decolonization. “The fundamental political idea of Niekisch”, he wrote, “is that national liberation and socialist revolution are one in the same thing, that they are two sides of the same coin. This idea, is it another thing than the common maxim of the actions of Mao and of Ho Chi Minh, of Fidel Castro, of Che Guevara, and of Khomeini? The anti-bourgeois, anti-capitalist, anti-Western revolutionary parties of the Third World all bear the same name: National Liberation Front. The socialist revolution everywhere bears the nationalist flag. As implausible that this could appear, that true theoretician of universal revolution that is on the march today is not Marx, nor even Lenin. It’s Niekisch.”

Niekisch had without doubt many illusions about the nature of Russian communism, and his apology for “Bolshevism” could scandalize us today. Then it is necessarily to place it in context, to remember the immense hope which would sustain the Revolution of 1917 in the worker’s movement – and do not forget any more the Soviet delirium which seized, in the following decades, a large part of the global intelligentsia. The paradox is that Niekisch would admire the USSR for the same reasons that its adversaries would detest it and for the opposite



reasons of those who would admire it as its partisans! Yet, if we disregard value judgments, Niekisch in his analysis, is it so wrong? In seeing the Soviet Union as an authoritarian regime of “Prussian” inspiration, alternatively Spartan, in the fashion of Niekisch, or in imagining it as the draft of “society without classes” and as the “workers’ paradise”, in the fashion of so many intellectuals of the epoch, who was more in error? And the affirmation according to which Lenin and Stalin had practically “liquidated the old Marx,” the affirmation according to which Soviet Communism had always been, in part or less, a properly Russian phenomenon, hadn’t, in a certain measure, been confirmed? Many disappointed Marxists would probably be ready today to agree that Stalinist Russia was never anything other than “National Bolshevism.” The difference according to Niekisch, it is that they would derive from this finding, the opposite conclusions. They would also willingly distinguish “Russian” Bolshevism from “Occidental” Marxism, but they would then value the second to the detriment of the first. Nevertheless, the fact remains that it was in the ranks of the Conservative Revolution, and singularly in the National-Bolshevik milieu, that this distinction, received as banal today, was made for the first time.

As to the great book of the Germano-Russian alliance, who can say today, that he was not called, in the future, to add a few more chapters?

## Preface

“In general, it is not difficult to incite the German pharisees to manifest their nationalist excitement. In each assembly ... it suffices to have a sonorous voice and a flowery phrase.” – Bismarck to Gruner, 1859

It is not an irresistible need to critique that lead me to write this essay. I maturely reflected before taking this decision. It is difficult to remain objective when so many others are drunk. It is painful to not be able to believe and hope like so many people who do not pose these questions. But how to discharge this responsibility when my own conscience requires an account? When we see dangers, while the others are blind, we do not have the right to keep mum. A good number between them will be hurt, but they could be consoled by the permanent drunkenness in which they live. They do not look in the face the menace that is hanging over the future of our people. Whatever anxiety is not released, must be spoken.

# **Chapter 1 – The German Protest to Fascism**

## A Coil of Contradictions

The National Socialist movement has many meanings. It is ambiguous. Various currents, eruptions of sentiments, orientations and illusions reunite them like the bed of a river. It is this thing and, at the same time, it is another thing. It is polymorphous and full of antinomies. It contains almost as many contradictions as life itself. The voice of the blood is expressed by it, but also the thirst for social vengeance. The birth of the true nationalist sentiment provokes enthusiasm, but we abused it without shame with little personal vanities or calculated selfishness. The flame of a marvelous idealism is obscured by the smoke of a sickening corruption. The empty words cover, with an insupportable noise, an imperious need to act. The impression of a collected force is erased by eruptions of a repulsive brutality. A vile Latin complacency awakes doubts on the sincerity of the German protestation. The German will to freedom boldly breaks loose but later, it is insidiously betrayed by the petty craftiness of diplomacy. The good political instincts are silent before the liberal and bourgeois spirit that fear for their property.

Until the present, the National Socialist movement supported all these tensions because it had yet to orient itself towards a precise goal. Each of its elements could yet hope to dominate and leave their victorious imprint on the ensemble. No current had yet to feel provoked to the resistance and the necessity to affirm it. It seems that the decision to fix the limits and announce its color was not yet taken. The movement advances, but no one yet knows to what. All the ways remain open, no door is closed. Until the present, in the chaos of boiling oppositions, no precise form emerged, that could have opened the combat between the non organized forces and those that are structured. This indeterminacy of the program lends itself to all interpretations. We can find what we search for there. In good faith, this blurriness, that expresses nothing, is considered as a happy universality. This wave have an omnipotent effect giving access to a multitude of permitted possibilities.

As far as the National Socialist movement has various meanings, its functions are multiple. It is too vast to be able to deny its role in the organization of the nation. It could be the plowshare that splits the earth, as it could be the pain of childbirth, or the storm that clears the field and purifies the air, but it can equally be the hurricane that sweeps away cultures and villages, leaving nothing behind but ravages, rubble, and ruins.

## The Voice of German Protest

In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler described the impulses and motivations that had given birth to the movement. On the occasion of a conference with Gottfried Feder, he heard for the first time in life “an exposé of the operating principles of the stock market and international loans.” “After having followed the first conference of Feder, I had suddenly discovered one of the indispensable conditions for the foundation of a new party.” A bit later, he encountered, by chance, a little distraught group that was given the appellation of “Deutsche Arbeiterpartei” (“German Worker’s Party”). He obtained “a provisional membership card, number 7.”

It was these little people, the workers to which they joined themselves. The unvoiced feeling of the German debacle lived in them. They vaguely suspected the relation between the tasks of national and social liberation of the German people. Coming from their social milieu, they were in search of a form that corresponds to them in order to serve the national needs and their particularity in an effective fashion.

Gottfried Feder was never more than a mediocre fabricator of recipes. In general, moral precepts are the gospel of sects: we strive to cure all the sores of this world and the other equally by starting from this point. The strength of the recipe of Feder was to know to summarize, in a simple formula, the dependency of Germany by relation to the international powers that stood since 1918. Here, we show a visible enemy. No recipe could consider the whole of the phenomenon. Feder was not the best at that. He presented a method of national economy to an undemanding public and gave an explanation to the national and social catastrophe, that was given to modest people.

Hitler brought to the “Deutsche Arbeiterpartei” the recipe of Feder. He became the key with which he tried to interpret the “obscure desire” of this little group. He planted the idea of Feder in the social terrain where, generally, this type of “vegetation” develops very well. This idea was already mixed with its own psychic structure in such a fashion that it

could speak of good faith, sincerely and from the bottom of the heart. Consequently, he *had wanted to speak*. He possessed the pride of the born orator. His instinct pressed towards the element that suited him, that is to say *the public rally, the meeting*. A culminating point of his life was the first “popular assembly” crowned with success. The memory that he held was sacred. On a solemn tone, he recounted how he obtained it by force and how it would take place. “The opening was planned for 7:30. At 7:15, I entered into the hall of the Hofbräuhaus on the Platzel in Munich and my heart was filled with joy. The immense room – that is how it seemed to me then – was packed, heads pressed to each other, a crowd of near two thousand people.” From the public rally, it moved to the next and appeared to each of them as a victory. He counted the participants, like a general counts his divisions. By speaking, he accomplished his acts. The streets and the great rooms of the rally were his fields of battle. In 1918, the democratic spirit made an irruption in Germany. The demagogue became the hero of the day. By its essence, democracy is an alienation. It turns its point against the German personality. The true demagogue is always a Westerner, that is in the nature of things. As a clerk of the foreigner, Hitler’s invective is what is proper for Germany.

Mixing his very strong demagogic instincts with the German *values* was the first exploit of Hitler. He used his demagogic means against this spirit that was the origin of democracy. The democratic machinery had started on the Germany territory to annihilate the country. Hitler succeeded to reverse this march in the fashion that it began to function to the detriment of its creator, the Western spirit. The greatest demagogue that Germany had ever known, exceeded all his rivals by seizing the *German cause* which, according to its internal law, was at the antipodes of the forces of the democratic era. In place of reinforcing the alienation, he did the opposite and incited the *German people to protest against it*. The demagogue, who makes war on democracy, was a variety of “democratic man” in which democracy had attained its final limit. In this man, it *rages against itself, pushing to its own loss and preparing his suicide*.

Nevertheless, the profound contradiction between the democratic machinery and the anti-demagogic spirit of the form of life proper to Germany persists. That was the great danger. If the German cause had been taken into the wheels of democratic machinery, it would have been crushed.

It is true that during the first years, Hitler was undeniably one of the spokesmen of German protest. Given the enormous trickery that the German people was the victim of, no cry could be so piercing, no accusation could be so violent, no objection so strong. Hitler was certainly a demagogue, by covering the insolent noise made by the “victorious” Western democracies, but in the force of his voice resounded all the same the primitive sound of the German being, martyred and violent. The obstinate revolt of the German will to life recognized itself in Hitler’s loud harangues.

Nowhere is this will to life is more threatened than in Munich, the center of alienation, by separatist elements, Catholics, Romans, and French. That is where we weave the most perfidious plots, it is equally there where we entertain the most cordial relations with the corrupters of the German people. It was exactly beside this unstructured place, that the young “Nationalistische Arbeiterpartei” showed its elementary depth. In these times, *Ludendorff* had chosen to live in Munich. His pact with Hitler was a symbol and a promise. The demagogy of Hitler was submitted to Prussian discipline, that was the guarantee that he would remain only a *means*, only an *instrument*. Hitler accommodated himself to the role of “drummer.” While Ludendorff gave the order to the masses who ran, to line up and align themselves with the German cause, the necessary precautions were taken that the sterile resentments were not unleashed and that the troops marched. The setting in motion of the masses, which the zeal of the demagogue provoked, was a chance for Germany, from the moment where the general had prepared to put them in order and utilize them effectively.



## The Turnaround

The clerical particularist currents of Bavaria were dismayed when they saw the success of Hitler with officials. The elementary violence of the German protestation, unleashed by Hitler and directed by Ludendorff, could it undermine the position of Catholic domination? Already, they feared that the seizure of the German conscience would break out one day and could remove the “Roman crust.” They incited Hitler to his November Putsch. *The illegal and revolutionary, promising spirit of his group sank into ridicule of a folly packed with illegality.* Overnight, the charm of the movement was broken. The revolutionary heroes, who had sworn to conquer or die, paid for their defeat, not with their deaths, but with an agreeable retreat in an idyllic prison. The Catholic tendencies had regained the upper hand in Bavaria. The officials were immediately replaced on the spot according to the Constitution. The German protestation was lost in the void.

A year later, Hitler was already pardoned. The president of the Council of Ministers of Bavaria, one of the leaders of political Catholicism, received him to make him promise future good conduct. Hitler separated from Ludendorff and joined with General Epp, of the “Mary Mother of God” faction. He took as his model Mussolini and Italian Fascism. He confirmed the “brown shirt,” so foreign to the German atmosphere. *Since then, his hordes have camped like troops of Southern European occupation on German soil.* The Roman Fascist salute became obligatory. The German flags, flying magnificently in the wind, were replaced by standards with austere symbols of the past, standards which, until now, had preceded the Roman legionaries, the Italian Fascists, and Catholic processions. The movement that, until now, had tried to regain the territory, was no longer what it was before 1923. Right now, it is oriented under the Roman style.

For centuries, Munich had been the entry way for all the currents of Catholicism and the Counter-Reformation. That fact that nationalism arose there, was before 1923, a forecast of courage. The German protest

had dared to risk itself in the lion's den. If they succeeded in affirming themselves here, the greatest obstacle would have been cleared. Munich was the key to the enemy positions on German soil. Thus, National Socialism, at the beginning, threw its assault against this city. In November 1923, it laid for him ambushes and lead his defense. Ludendorff was in Munich as a Trojan Horse sowing German terror among the Roman cohorts.

After 1923, for Hitler, Munich became *his* city. He was conquered and he laid down before this decision. This submission did not pose him problems. Finally, it was only a *return to himself*. He is a German with a Latin sensibility, carrying in his instincts the tendencies of the CounterReformation, shared between the Wittelsbach and the Habsburg. Maybe his putsch of 1923 was only an act of despair to discharge a task that had fallen to him, that overwhelmed him because he did not feel up to it. As a Romanized German, he could not assume the mission of bearing the German revolt to victory. It was as if he had in his head, the secret law of his blood that told him to plot with Catholicism in order to block and divert the shock wave of the German revolt.

To be apparently linked to the Reich and take in secret the side of the Latin countries, that has always been the historical role of Munich. He who feels politically comfortable in this city, is suspect from the *German* point of view. In Munich, German affairs are seen as they appear to Latin countries. The fact that Hitler consented to definitively establish himself in Munich testifies to a non-negligible franchise. He who knows German history must understand that starting from this moment, a double game was under way for which Germany must pay the price. We cannot imagine a politics of the Reich programmed from Munich. It can only have there politics *against* the Reich. We cannot renew the Reich from the "Brown House." Given that it is in Munich, each enterprise that departs from that point will be harmful for the Reich.

Basically, the putsch of November 1923 had already anticipated the destiny of National Socialism in its entirety: *squandering the German energy, mobilizing for a lost cause so that the forces of Latin alienation could*

*have a free hand.* Certainly, in 1923, Hitler was still a pure fool, full of good intentions, but when he concluded his peace with Munich, he sacrificed his purity. In the measure where he remained a fool, he was all the same dangerous and malignant. National Socialism received a Fascist polish by reason of its concentration in Munich. The Fascist National Socialism is also honest and authentic in the faith of Bavaria – with the preservation of its sovereignty – in regard to the Reich. *Fascist* National Socialism is only a facade to hide the bent spine of Germany. It acts with a denatured nationalism for the German domesticated animals who want to keep a wild aspect.

## The Law of Rome

Starting from the feast room of the Hofbräuhaus, National Socialism began its victorious course across Germany. It was here that its mold was cast in order to, much later, develop freely. The ovations of the Bavarian petite-bourgeois encouraged Hitler. They anointed him “the man of the people. The popular man found the right words to express what moves the people. Because, this man is prey to a rhetorical agitation, he was not a true agitator. He is an interpreter and not an actor. He is the embodiment of a feeling. He is the representative of an idea and not a leader. He reveals that what happens in the people, but he does not march at its head.

From the start, National Socialism was marked by democratization. It already announced that it acted from a phenomenon which, after its internal mental structure was part of the sphere of influence of Latin civilization. National Socialism was understood there from the outset as materializing the *moral of the masses*. He knows to realize, reassemble it, and make a profit, as the Catholic Church has always known to do. Its manifestations produced the same effect as processions. Until the present, no political party offered its heart to the people with as much heat, solemnity, and exaltation. National Socialism, like the Catholic Church, had the sense of an artistic director. More than once, Hitler was allowed to stage political occasions which, like a business decorator, he was busy resolving the aesthetic details concerning propaganda. In Munich, we venerate the arts. National Socialism was received here, in its cradle, the gift of knowledge of profiting from the heritage of Schwabing. That is not the Protestant sobriety, reserve and austerity to whom *good countenance* is much more important than atmosphere. The Protestant is beware of letting go. He does not want drunkenness, he wants *discipline*. For National Socialism, which shares the conception of the Catholic Church, the fundamental fact of politics is the *people as naturally given*, while for the Protestant it is *the state as a moral work*. The German Protestant knows that politics does not happen by itself. As

a general rule, “the voice of the people” – the we recall in 1848 – is only words before the requirements of German politics.

The geographical situation of Germany, at the center of Europe, requires a maximum of constraints, “barracks”, “self renunciation”, “submission.” Politics must forcibly repel of natural instincts and the impulses of “the people.” A true German political man will never be popular as he does his work. In the best case, he can become it, once his mission is accomplished, when the people can rest on their successes. When we do German politics, the Latin regions, like Bavaria or the Rhineland, enter into a separatist ebullience. German politics does not affirm itself *with* them, but *against* them.

The National Socialist optimist betrays its origins: from the South of the Main and the Rhine as well, on the ancient soil of the legionnaires and the “Pfafengasse,” we refuse to see the gravity of the German situation. *For centuries, these regions, have utilized Roman loophole or that of the Confederation of the Rhine.* The state is not taken too seriously there. Rome is eternal, but the state is the work of man. For this reason, he is not justified by an absolute devotion, as *the Prussian* wants it.

National Socialism promises freedom. From where it will be in power, victory will be acquired. This optimism reveals it *apolitical* character. It is as little political and statist as Southern and Western Germany, which have never have founded the state. He does not see the horror of the situation in which Germany finds itself today and that seems without exit. He does not look the horrible political facts in the face. Instead he diverted his attention. It is a *movement of escape*, and it shudders before the magnitude of engagement that political misery requires of the Germans.

This engagement makes it tremble as all of bourgeois Germany trembles. He proposes an easy way of exit: believe in a miracle. The people do not want to sacrifice many things, which they hold and that are dear to them, to the Leviathan state, finding refuge in the womb of the Catholic Church. For National Socialism, it is easier to believe in a miracle than to

fashion a great political destiny. For those that are despairing, Hitler is a glow of hope. By the force of an act of faith, Germany, tributary state, will become the Third Reich. This Reich exists in us, that we will receive from the membership card of the National Socialist party. Those who do not join the party, slows their victory and earns, consequently, ruin and death.

National Socialist politics is a decision in favor of the just doctrine and its messiah. The Third Reich began by a *process*. We separate the sheet from the goats. Heresy is condemned by the Third Reich which more a religious hope than a political possibility. *It is not a state of this world, but a type of kingdom of God on earth*. Only a national messiah can bring it and this messiah is Hitler. National messianism is *Jewish* in origin. Its branches made magnificent flowerings in France, starting in 1789, and in the British Empire. In the Italy of Mussolini, it deployed itself anew with all its splendor. It is a product of the *Mediterranean coasts*. Where it takes root, it buries at the same time the spirit of Mediterranean culture into the soil. For the Germans, it is a sweet poison. Under its hold, they forget themselves and lose their personality. It is the price they must pay.

Democracy transforms itself into *despotism* when it takes the way of national messianism. The salvation of all the people would be put in question, if the messiah showed clemency towards those who doubted him. It is necessary to be a fervent adept of the doctrine of salvation, if we want to show this evil world the boot. Cromwell embodied the anger of

God and the Jacobins spread blood and fire. Fascism is the form today of the intolerance of national messianism. It engenders no new authority. It intimidates by terror.

The national messiah, who adapts his kingdom of God to human needs, becomes a Caesar. Caesar is a national messiah that takes the riches of the world and carries political success. Caesar was born in Rome. *Caesarism is always Roman*. Papism, fruit of Judeo-Christian crossing, reunites the elements of Caesarism and messianism. The Fascist leader is

a pope in the political plan – he is a “rival.” For this reason, Mussolini means evil to the pope – despite his spiritual paternity. For this same reason, Hitler means evil to Brüning. The pope has the power to make and break bonds in the name of the *celestial* kingdom. The Fascist leader has to decide who is worthy of the Third Reich and who is not. He does not have access to God outside of the office of the sacerdotal mediator. He does not have access to the Third Reich outside of the office of the Fascist leader, who is also a mediator. Fascism resembles Catholicism. It is not by chance that Hitler is Catholic. That is not equally by chance that the most important National Socialist directors are Catholic, while Reventlow, this Prussian Protestant, leads an obscure life, close to political insignificance. The fact that Hitler, the Fascist pope, was celibate like a true curate is maybe equally revelatory.

We feel the Catholic atmosphere that is mixed into the National Socialist manifestation. We do not throw political slogans and proclaim the verity of salvation. The orator does not give explanations, it does not reckon political possibilities. He preaches. Only the Fuhrer knows the secret of the Third Reich. He celebrates the miracle of the liberation and the deliverance of Germany. To participate in an assembly already creates a bond with the Third Reich – as the participation in a mass awakening the sentiment of a mystic union with the divine presence.

In Mayence, Hitler approached a little girl dressed in white, bowed and offered her flowers. He who gives life to National Socialism, he will not die as a soldier doing his duty. He will die as a martyr, testifying by his blood the truth of the faith.

Where National Socialism makes its irruption, Prussia and Protestantism no longer matter. When we are taken into this dizziness, we are no longer what we were before. The good Protestant countenance and the Prussian rigor are wasted and exceeded. He who is already National Socialist, will become Catholic later. The occasional imprecations of Catholic bishops against National Socialism are part of Roman diplomacy. It is necessary to take necessary dispositions to attract even the Lutheran pastors, in the ranks of National Socialism. This ideology habituates the North and

North East of Germany to the Roman mentality. Thanks to it, these regions become receptive to that coming from the other side of the Alps and the Rhine.



## **Chapter 2 – The Fall in Legality**

## On the Terrain of Versailles

The fate of weak states depends on the distribution of political weight in relations between the global powers. These states must undergo direct interventions from their neighbors. Without ceasing, they must watch for a shield that can protect them against the attempts of foreign interference. Since 1918, Germany has been part of the weak states. Its politics has further become a function of the powers of Versailles who consciously express a primitive force.

National Socialism searches for support against the regime of Versailles, from Mussolini. The respect for Rome is innate to Hitler, this Catholic of Southern Germany. The form of the Latin spirit attracts him. It is perfectly exalted and venerated by those for whom the Latin composition of their character has prepared.

The relation of Hitler with Italy is not political. It is romantic-religious. Italy is a blessed country, a holy land. It already knows the eternal luck that bears Fascism. It is a Palestine. In this regard Hitler bears across the Alps burning with an intense desire, a pious confidence. He does not reckon political value from Italy. He venerates this Fascist Italy as an absolute value. If he abandons it, it would be an apostasy and a profanation of holy places. The South Tyrol is, in some way, the human sacrifice that Hitler offers to his God. He has not yet been brought to power, and the question of knowing what price he must pay for services rendered in return by Italy has not yet been posed. Hitler pronounced the renunciation of South Tyrol well before having been called to political responsibility. The repercussions of this premature renunciation are more imaginary than those of Locarno. Hitler is the same type as Stesemann. What France was for him, Italy is for another. One abandoned AlsaceLorraine, the other South Tyrol. As the "realist" politics of Stresemann was unrealistic, the nationalist politics of Hitler is doubtful. Their result is the same: the lost of precious territories and noble German blood.

Italy was part of the beneficiaries of the order established by Versailles. Revision only interests it in the measure where it could reclaim a more important goal. It cannot hold the head of France. Yugoslavia paralyzes its forces. He only fights where it can be sure of the victory of its ally. On the field of battle, it hardly covers honor. It limits itself to robbing corpses. It should not be forgotten that this is fatherland of Machiavelli. Its political instincts, very sure, say to it in advance whose side has the greatest chance of victory. It has enough experience to realize that it cannot make a common politics with Germany against France. In the best case, it could bluff to serve Germany. It bluffs to obtain gratuities. France will put up the price to coax Italy. As a general rule, it will take from Germany the gratuity that it gives to Italy. Between Rome and Paris, there has always been a secret entente against Germany. Even if, occasionally, one tries to use one against the other to aid Germany, they never forget that, finally, they could agree on the back of Germany. For the latter, *strong in its arms*, Italy was not an ally by any proof. For a *powerless* Germany, it will be even less. It puts its existence in play, if it allows to incite a struggle, besides a disarmed Germany, into a bloody conflict with France. Its sacred selfishness protects it from such a folly.

For Italy the way passes through England. Those who want to agree with Italy must first arrive at an accord with London. The Tripartite Pact, Germany- Italy- England, is a fiction of Hitler's foreign policy. The British pathos contributed to the enterprise of Alfred Rosenberg who, chased from the Baltic countries, wants to come to accounts with Russia by delivering himself – and thus the party of Hitler – to England. The foreign policy of National Socialism is not based on cold calculations and purely practical considerations. On the contrary: it is an explosion of sentiments taking free course from the Roman stupefaction of Hitler and the thirst for vengeance on Russia of Rosenberg.

The force of England is broken. France would immediately respond to a Tripartite German-Italian-British pact by putting dynamite under the foundations of the British empire. It would provoke dangerous movements of revolt in the countries subjugated by England. It would have enough money and agents for this enterprise. Since 1918, the

English conservatives sails in the groove of France. To provoke France, such that it disposes especially with tactical means, it would be a folly. The English conservatives feel that this frivolous game could put in danger the existence of their country.

The foreign policy of National Socialism fails to initiate the processes unleashing the reversal of the relations of international forces. For this reason, the movement does not have a veritable global impact. It is incapable of becoming a determinant factor in international politics. Disarmed and embarrassed, it finds itself before the order of Versailles. The states that search for its support immediately defend this order, if someone tries to put it in question. If it does not happen to surmount this regime, it will be dominated by it and it is compelled to serve it. Versailles makes him understand that it will not have power in Germany, if he does not confirm it, if he does not recognize its legality – in brief if he does not continue in the tradition of Stresemann. Thus it is evident that for National Socialism internal power is more important than the liberation of Germany's foreign policy. The discourse of Hitler tries to prove to the foreigner that he is inoffensive, that he presents no danger for the world. France already examines in what measure it could engage with Hitler and what conditions it would pose to him. In Paris and among the experts in Germany, no one doubts that he will fulfill them.

The order of Versailles is the law that the Latin world imposed on central Europe. He who submits to the law of Latinity cannot revolt against Versailles. He finishes by being integrated into this institution of international right, created by Latin authority. He echoes it, because he has a spiritual affinity there. *Fascist National Socialism is not a revolt against*

*Versailles; it is the shadow that Latin supremacy projects on the German protest.*

## The Gendarme of the West

Bolshevism is a permanent revolt against the West. Bolshevik Russia is a concentration of revolutionary forces before which Versailles lamentably fails. It opposes it, by provoking a different order. Against Russia, Hitler has made a common front with all the Western powers. Given the global conjuncture, we must opt to be for the order of *Versailles*, or to be for the *Bolshevik* order. Those who combat the first take, from this fact, the defense of the second. He who is attached to the spiritual values, to the civilizing goods of the West, is a partisan of Versailles. He sacrifices Germany to prevent these goods and values from being put in danger. He is a defector, though he can immediately invoke in his favor a “conservative synthesis,” linking the West and National Socialism in a “superior union.”

The terrain of Hitler is the West. His foreign policy tries to obtain the support of the beneficiary states of Versailles. He can not leave this circle. For him, there is no position *outside* of Versailles. He wants to take some little advantages of the familial tensions that are here and there between France, England, and Italy. *His foreign policy is not a national strategy, but a family intrigue.* Hitler is only a Western quibbler who, at best, can annoy his companions. He is not this revolutionary that can reverse the global situation.

As always, the West suffers a grave sickness in regards to all that happens from the North of Danube and the East of the Elbe. Since the time of Charlemagne, it lead “crusades” against this “chaotic world.” The idea of the crusade is in origin, purely Latin. Unconsciously, the German felt it; and the German emperors tried, as a general rule, to honorably submit themselves to the execution of the crusader’s vow.

The World War was equally conceived as a crusade against Germany. This crusade was crowned with success. Germany must convert itself to the West. The conversion has truly succeeded until now, innumerable Germans want to make an appeal for a crusade against “the pagans of the

East.” Already, in the forest of Compiègne, *Erzberger* was close to pronouncing this “vow.” If Foch had wanted, he could have immediately sent the Western *Erzberger* on the way of the crusade.

Hitler is the successor of *Erzberger*. He does not realize that he exactly follows the same path. He puts the wind in German mercenaries as *Erzberger* had done and with the same lack of dignity. Catholic instinct and memories of the Habsburgs inflame the hate of Hitler towards Bolshevism. In Southern Germany, the Latinized region, we do not yet get the significance of Russia for the destiny of the German state. It is necessary to be near a King of Prussia or a Junker of the East Elbe in order to comprehend it. And even a King of Prussia should not allow himself to fret from Western liberalism. The liberal spirit is incompatible with the orders of reassurance.

*For Germany, Versailles is incomparably more dangerous than “Bolshevism.” Versailles caused the loss of the substance of the German people. Versailles signifies its true death. In the measure where Bolshevism is truly a poison, its toxic effect is lost before the force with which Germany reaffirms itself, Germany that, as always, better knows to resist the Slavic-Asiatic spirit than the Latin spirit. Ultimately, “German Bolshevism” would lead to a Machiavellian system, an effective instrument permitting Germany to wreck the West.*

Anti-Bolshevism, for it, is a *social* position and not *political*: *we fear for our wealth and not for our country.* Versailles, on the other hand, is a true political question. *Only those who oppose it, without making concessions, adopt an exclusively political position.* The exaggerated din against Bolshevism wants to hide that, at present, negotiations on a secret entente with Versailles have started. The vehement Anti-Bolshevism of Hitler indicates that he does not consider Versailles the true enemy. If he reclaims arms and uniforms, that is not to combat Versailles, but to become the gendarme of the West against Bolshevism. He does not want to reverse the order of Versailles, no, he wants to extend it until the Urals or even until the coasts of the Pacific. On this way, we can only win a balance of misery and not the liberty of Germany.

## “German” Socialism

Once Hitler gave hope to the little people withered from formulating, then realized their desires of deliverance and political liberation. The first thing he offered to them was *Die Brechung der Zinsknechtschaft*. This book by Feder only advanced a seductive idea but not too audacious, and not a vast plan of a revolutionary campaign. As always the disadvantaged classes placed their hope in “socialism.” Hitler proclaimed that this idea of Feder was “German” socialism. Bourgeois society had nothing to be afraid of and, at the same time, he could calm those who had many reasons to be discontent without attacking the propertied. To further reassure them, he now made the difference between “speculative” capital and “creative” capital. Thus all the “great fortunes” could, ultimately, be part of “creative capital.” The disadvantaged classes were gratified by the sweet consolation of a social remedy that, later, would ameliorate their situation and bring about the end of economic excess. In this fashion, this socialism spoiled nothing and cut no bridge. It was an absolutely *socialpacifist* element that had nothing combative, despite the frenetic applauding that he provoked in the attic meeting rooms. Although he was noisy, he was never aggressive. Conscious of the goal to attain, he repelled the class struggle. Visibly, he wanted to paralyze the combativeness of the lower classes. The true social aggression became consumed quite simply in the noise that “German” socialism had made in mass rallies. By his adjurations, Hitler unleashed waves of enthusiasm and absorbed the mental tensions that, otherwise, would be discharged in a tempest against the bastions of bourgeois society.

The working class, which had a political conscience and a union education, quickly understood the situation. They remained suspicious and held their reserve, They surmised that this pacifist socialism would take nothing from the wealthy and give nothing to the poor, outside of vain promises. It could predict that “German socialism” would lead, in the best case, to some technical social measures. That would change nothing in the status quo by putting it, artificially, in another light. “German

socialism” only announced singing tomorrows. It would content itself with paying the workers kind words.

Consequently, the propaganda of Hitler only obtained a very limited success among the working class. He could do nothing against the position of “Marxism” which remained impregnable.

It was especially the petite-bourgeois and the embourgeoisified people that Hitler could bewitch. Until the present, their happiness was to be capable of living in style and wearing a “white collar.” This happiness was put at risk or it had already disappeared. They were full of bitterness and didn’t know what to do. Enviously, they looked to the superior social classes that had not already succumbed to the situation. The fact that some part of them could exhibit material well being, when they had lost had little security they had, gnawed upon them. The workers excited their jealousy, these workers supported by social assurances, whose salary was protected by business conventions and who, even more, benefited from certain advantages, given their affinity with the state. As “German socialists,” they were operating on two fronts. With their socialism, they wanted to frighten those that life had favored. The idea that they could instill fear in the others assured them and reinforced the sentiment of their value. However, the “German” accentuation drew the trait of separation with the workers. This socialism was of a better and more noble type, it was a “*national* socialism.” The patriotism of the old combatants and the celebrations of the emperors birthday found a resonance there. Even as socialists, they insisted on a superior rank. Being a “nationalist” socialist, they were part of an elite, while the international socialist was a *subhuman*.

The strong times of National Socialism began after the years of inflation. A crowd of petite-bourgeois, having been shipwrecked, hastened to them. It bore poisonous sentiments and the thirst for vengeance: that which the state that had thus stolen from their citizens should paid to them. These petites-bourgeois opened the way of rebellion against the state and bourgeois society. They teamed up with Hitler because they considered



him as rebel. Until the present, they always remained inoffensive subjects.

The sole gesture of the revolutionary was imposed on them. They shirked from a true revolution. Their courage was lacking. Hitler, his attitude, his doctrine was cut in the measure for the petites-bourgeois. That means: clenching the fists and rolling eyes – of the rage contained without fear of being put to the test. Behind the explosion of sentiments hides the lack of decision to act. Without a clear goal, with precise shape, throwing a challenge, only that makes it understood that we have embarked upon a mortally dangerous enterprise. The nebulousness of future requirements did not prevent anyone from believing that the National Socialist movement would actually change the state of things, but it would do it without running risks. It has, to say so, a secret of obtaining the Third Reich by the ruse and without a big play.

*Thus Hitler became, in some sort, the ringing spokesman of a state with a petitebourgeois soul, all petite-bourgeois felt to understand it in the depths of their hearts.* The National Socialist movement became the refuge permitting the pusillanimous spirit of the petite-bourgeois to abandon itself to dreams born from their despair, at the same time, allowing itself to go to cowardice. Hitler *did not* cross the Rubicon on their behalf and he gave to his partisan the tranquil assurance that the pain of crossing would be spared.

Hitler represented a post detached from bourgeois society, but in fact he was part of it all the same. As with all the petite-bourgeois, he did not stay strictly for the good. Regardless of his anger against this society, he nevertheless remained secretly proud of being part of it. But he made it very difficult to affirm himself in the cadre of the bourgeoisie, and it was in that which resided the true reason for his irritation. Behind the hate for Marxism hides the fear of a fate from which he cannot escape. He detests the proletarian condition as a condemned man detests the prisoner for whom the doors have already opened. National Socialism is the branch from which the petite-bourgeois hangs on to in order to avoid being drowned in anti-bourgeois socialism. That is not an evasion of bourgeois

society, it's rather an extreme effort to remain there. In this last hour, it only acts to conserve the place of the petite-bourgeois. At the limit, it is a temptation of blackmail: it tempts the devil to incite the bourgeoisie to have indulgence for the petty bourgeoisie. It wants to preserve it in order to profit from them as well. It does not want to annihilate it. For this reason it ran immediately, from a true enemy appearing, to protect it. These are the social roots of its hate for Communism and Bolshevism.

Bourgeois society clearly sees this game and tries to count it in its calculations. It appreciates that Hitler maintains the bond between bourgeois values and the petite-bourgeois, yet the bourgeois bases of existence are already exposed under their feet. It considers the socialism of Hitler an inevitable compromise that it must accept in order to hold the confidence of the stalled petite-bourgeois. Hitler has a mission to prevent this social class from falling into the anti-bourgeois camp. As he fulfills this task, he will earn their esteem and other advantages.

National Socialism turned the petite-bourgeois from drifting into their revolt against the veritable authors of their misery. Those responsible for inflation and their resulting dispossession, were Stinnes, Luther, Stresemann, and Schacht. National Socialism taught these these injured people to uniquely condemn Marxism. Thus the victims were duped. Ultimately, there were made to prove themselves as protectors of those responsible for their misfortune. Hitler is at the origin of this absurd confusion: the blind petite-bourgeois, from which the political economy of the bourgeoisie took everything, desires to appease their thirst for vengeance on the blood of workers, shamefully exploited by the same society.

Modern bourgeois society is the final phenomenon of the West. Bourgeois civilization is full of the Latin radiance of spirit, of the sentiment of life, of the conception of the world, and Latin humanism.

His origins link Hitler to bourgeois society. Austria, like Bavaria, has always been a Roman shield against the Germans and the Slavs. The two both furnish German auxiliary legions that, in the service of the Romans,

become the watch guard against German uprisings. A leader who rallies the troops in these regions always obeys the secret order of Rome, arising from their instincts. To Hitler this order *comes to the aid of bourgeois society in Germany*. Hitler is the last hope of the bourgeois world. He recruits hordes by emotion who were in the middle of escaping bourgeois society. They become his partisans when he tries to make it seem as if he himself is nourishing projects of mutiny. In reality, he incites them to take out their furor on the innocents. He succeeded in portraying them as the *true* enemies of bourgeois society, enemies who could have been allies.

In the same fashion, ecclesiastics have always taken the head of movements that could harm the church. In the case of Luther, the Church lacked the necessary attention. The idea of naming Luther as a cardinal arose too late in Rome. The offer was not extended and the church had to pay dearly. *Thus it was at this good moment that Hitler received the dignity of cardinal from bourgeois society*. The captains of industry reacted quickly, without considering the expense. Since then, he has applied the method of the rebel to save the real cause of the bourgeoisie. That is his “national” Jesuitism which informed men detect immediately. His “national” socialism is the modern camouflage of shaken capitalism. Capitalism uses it to infiltrate the ranks of its natural enemies before disarming them.

# The Tragedy of the German Youth

The fact that National Socialism could only win the confidence of the youth after the war after finally giving them their particular dynamism and their political weight, full of promises. In this vibrant youth the forces of revolt put in question all the bases of existence, of the entire established order. Without understanding the situation, we cannot have access to the spirit of the post-war generation. 1918 represents a rupture with immeasurable consequences in the unfolding of German history. What came after had little relation with what preceded it.

The generation before the war was formed in an epoch where Germany had greatness and a considerable weight on the international scene. The generation that made war was still full of this past glory. Though these two generations feel powerless today in Germany, they do not realize the heavy consequences that arose. Their memory is still habituated to the past glory that once gave meaning to their lives. The humiliating present appears to them like a confused dream, like a blow of terrible fate but passing.

The *old* Germany remained for them the *true* Germany and they didn't doubt one day or another the country would be reborn with the power of all its force and splendor. For them, the situation today is nothing definite. They believe they live in an intermediary and provisional state. They find an interior support by holding the hope of the next return of the better past times. The optimism of foreign policy, disappointed a thousand times, can be explained by this.

The conditions of life of the post-war generation are entirely different. They have fundamentally lived in this Germany in its impotence, its material dependence on foreign policy, and lack of means of defense. The heart of this youth was never touched by the direct experience of a fatherland, majestic and proud of its existence. For it, political bitterness, social misery, and economic ruin are natural elements, always present in their everyday lives. Prewar Germany is for them a historical memory to be

put in the same scheme as the memories of Otto I, Frederick Barbarossa, and the state of Frederick the Great, this peerless Prussian. When the old generation reproaches this “historical” attitude of the youth regarding the Reich, it sometimes happens that they respond with cruel questions. Was not the destiny of the Reich in *your* hands? Was it not precisely *you* who lead to its loss? Yet how many times have you yet refused to take responsibility for the misfortune *you* provoked? Where did *you* find the courage to want to assert yourselves so pretentiously on the political stage? Was it not *you* who was ill prepared for the war, who didn’t know to lead it, in order to finally lose? And more, did you not dare to compromise the future of the German people with scams in matters of politics of finance and loans? And far from the conclusion of the Young Plan, did you hesitate to deliver in an infamous fashion, generations yet to be born to a painful task of tribute?

Deeply, the work and the heritage of the old generation is only a field of ruins. What they lead to was an immense chaos. For this reason, it cannot impose neither respect nor authority on the post-war generation. Seeing the sum of its existence as collapse, it cannot require it to hold them in esteem. The lack of consideration for the young generation regarding its elders is the reflection of their bankruptcy.

The post-war youth dragged behind them heavy consequences of this bankruptcy. The young people of all social classes, jurists, teachers, employees, and workers find themselves before closed doors. The horrible certainty of a rotten existence deprives them of fiery courage, extinguishing this flame of the juvenile need to act. Their wings were broken before they even learned how to fly. When, according to the law of their nature, they still should dream of accomplishing the impossible, they already despair of themselves and the world. They see no exit. The futures seems blocked to them. When the old still act, they begin, against their nature, to resign themselves. They no longer hope that “*their*” moment will come – there is no longer any moment to call them. They are under the impression that we don’t need them, that we had departed before having proven ourselves to them. *A great hate for their fathers accumulated.* The sons saw themselves looted by their fathers: the hope

of winning their bread, the possibility of founding a family, the liberty of movement to create work, a vital space in general and – above all – faith in a mission.

This opens an impassable gulf between the generation of the fathers and that of the post-war. The youth were wary of the traditions that remained sacred for the old. A tradition transmitted by such fathers, what value can it still have? For these youth, conservatism is claptrap. In their paternal heritage, there was no longer anything worth the pain of conserving. The patrimony of Germany before the war bore multiple traces of splendor of a bygone era that weakly reflected the past glory preventing the *perception of desolate reality in all its tragedy*. The entire heritage was transformed into lies and balderdash. The lot of the youth after the war was to know an existence without material security and possessions. The praise of the right for property seems to them as a sound coming from another world or as a mocking effrontery. They smell the fetid odor of bourgeois ideals, the ideals of the propertied. They do not correspond to them. They have nothing more to “take” there. The hopes and the anguishes of the propertied are not seen by them. This propertied are the residue of a world that is nothing to the youth.

In 1918, the situation of Germany was that of a *colonized and proletarian* country. Yet today, the old generation is too craven to openly avow this state of things. It is incapable of being hard and severe enough towards itself in the fashion of ruthlessly taking the consequences of this state. The post-war youth understands the situation and arm themselves for suffering the consequences. It is conscious of being banned, oppressed, exploited, and frustrated in its right to life. It is in this state of spirit where it believes “there is nothing left to lose except our chains.” *It adopts the attitude of those who no longer have the bases, bonds, or attitudes that scared that preceding generation*. Its scale of values is ultimately different. Secretly, they already despise the benefits of civilization, progress and humanism. They rightly despise them and do not recoil before the prospect of a barbarian life. Its “radicalism” truly attacks the roots. For them, the opposition is no longer a frivolous game, once, it was a distraction before committing themselves in the way of an

already planned career. They *want subversion*. Its tendencies and intentions are violently hostile to the established order. They join extremist parties, not because of their immaturity, but to make action happen. When they say “socialism,” they do not avow from their lips their faith in the Marxist doctrine. No, it thus expresses *their determination to revolt against the bourgeois world*. As the economy no longer offers them openings, they no longer consider it as their destiny. For them, the fact of possessing nothing no longer characterizes a given social category. By looking closer, we see that this youth is in the middle of converting its misery into a type of Prussian virtue: “It is suitable for the fighter to be discharged of any property.”

On the inside, this youth is adopted to the trembling soil on which they are placed and to the uncertain conditions of its existence. They live with expedients. The way of life of the bourgeois epoch, where we were content in ourselves, where we calculated and predicted, is completely foreign to them. The trajectory of their lives constantly touches on the gulf. Psychologically, they took part in living dangerously without making a tragedy.

They resemble human raw material *that is suitable for everything*, for better or worse.

In the National Socialist movement, this youth searches for its fulfillment. That is where they thought to receive their training for the struggle against the old world. Where they vowed rebellion against Versailles and the hostility regarding the powers which, in 1918, had imposed a foreign law on Germany. The acceptance of sacrifice was required of them, made them proud, and sure of themselves. The interventions demanded total engagement and making very dangerous enterprises part of their everyday lives. Now, they are forever ready to accept death.

It was the best of the youth and, in general, the best of the Germans who rallied here. Given the quality of the human substance, the SA and the SS occupied them, independently of their orientations and the political function, with a particular rank, existing by themselves. It was this

effective youth that gave its fire and splendor to the movement. It breathed its ardor into it and conferred its certainty of a near irresistible victory to it. What was attributed to the movement was in reality the merit of the youth arriving in mass. They were right such that they were the organic form of the obscure juvenile will, such that it translated it, to say so, into the political language of the current world, of the life, and the will of these youth, such that their effectiveness practically corresponded to the ideology of the youth.

They were in revolt against the old world. For them, the Third Reich was the embodiment of a new world. It interpreted the National Socialist movement as a troop on the march that would destroy the old world and build a new one. Their deep and unswerving faith clung to the flag of the movement.

This faith was so strong as to be the hardest proof. When the National Socialist movement embarked on a parliamentary course and participated in negotiations with coalitions and the government, it was in no way shaken. Certainly, the parliament and the coalitions are institutions of the *old* world, in the middle of crumbling. But the confident youth didn't doubt that it was only a ruse of war to enter into the interior in order to end the old world. Rare were those who were disturbed. Only the Stennes Revolt arose from the depths of a broken faith.

Those who presented it as a clever tactic and a ruse of war revealed, ultimately, a sordid liaison and a sly pact. The Third Reich was a lying illusion, as much as the "nationalism" and "socialism" of the movement.

There was a sign that betrayed the deceitful afterthought: the existence of the SA and the SS was already resented as bothersome and embarrassing. Bit by bit, they tried to "civilize" these men ready for battle. The interdiction on wearing a uniform came from a point named by Hitler. It habituated the wild and bellicose horde to the bourgeois style. But the responsibility of Hitler is apart from the cause. Here it relieves a great weight. It can act and protest.



The “National Socialism” of Hitler is the “German fashioned” habit of Latinity. It acts to put the vigilance of truly fooled Germans to sleep and attract them to the pitfalls made by the Latin world. The “socialism” of Hitler was a sleight of hand by the capitalist regime. The rebels, fascinated, forgot to combat it. The “Third Reich” was the makeup that the old world used to simulate the attraction of a new world. They thus fooled a certain spirit of ethnic revival, subversive tendencies, anticapitalists, and finally the enthusiastic youth. They abused them in order put them at the service of powers against whom they swore death.

When the National Socialist movement put something at work, they ran a trick. He utilized new bottles to sell the wine turned to vinegar. He defended a worm eaten past with the language of the future. His promises are appeasements. He does not want to stimulate, he wants to calm. He does not want to construct, he wants to dupe. In secret, he has become part of the decomposition. The phosphorescent lure of the gas of putrefaction is celebrated like the dawn of a new day. Those who follow these will-o-the-wisps will be drawn into the swamps where they believed they’d find peaks.

# The End of the Revolutionary

At the start, National Socialism had the pretension of putting in action the revolution of German existence. With its new German spirit, it would want to transform, thoroughly, every domain of the nation. According to the nature of things, it would direct its revolutionary energy primarily against the state existing on the *interior* of the country. It explained the “system” as an instrument of alienation, an administrative organism, literally conceived for the execution of the Diktat of Versailles. The attack lead against “the system,” with its parliamentarianism and pitiable mercantilism, would have equally touched on the regime of Versailles. No one doubted that the energy of the National Socialist push would finally reverse the international situation. As National Socialists, we consider equally it equally as a universal revolution. It was necessary to leave a German mark on the world.

This powerful pathos enchanted everywhere men greedy for action and charmed the youth. The torch that the movement bore was the construction gauge of a new world, after the former had been burned. Full of hope and impatience, hearts fluttered for this new world.

Certainly, the passionate revolutionary became bit by bit a simple covering. Hitler lost his revolutionary breath. He aspired to legality. The revolutionary will was paralyzed. On its sad vestiges flowered, luxuriously, the noble sentiment of a flawless legality.

As an Austrian, Hitler did not have, at any moment, the true temperament of a revolutionary. Never had an Austrian be able to defeat his instincts of order and calm. He always adopted a policy of waiting. Even through the blackest rage, we still feel his “sunny heart.” In all that he did, he brought “the heart.” In the worst case, it was a malicious and intriguing heart. The Austrian burst like a storm on a mountain, but even at the same time, he already desired to recover his calm and equilibrium. He was afraid when things were pushed to the extreme. We can never know how that would have ended.

When we put the world upside down, we lose our footing. Why initiate such a fatiguing work? When the spectacle happens at the strongest moment, compromise is not far away. We have fear when we want to scare others. We love to be considered as dangerous, but we were never required to be so in reality. We did not breach the law, we only kept it for an exit door. That, in summary, is the revolution we are capable of. When we learn to make revolution, it turns invariably to vaudeville – this applies as much to Hitler as for Pfriemer.

When Hitler affirmed his legality under oath, we discovered what he had been for years. The *legalist* Hitler is the *true* Hitler. The revolutionary was only a role that he permitted himself to play at the promising start.

The territory of legality extends today from Weimar to Versailles. Those who put their feet there are inevitably delivered from one to the other as well. Thus, neither Weimar nor Versailles can be destroyed by *legal* means. The profession of faith in favor of legality includes, from the beginning, the renunciation of all destructive intention. That is what binds the law to use it. Thus Hitler, by proclaiming his will to remain in legality, became a conserving element of the Weimar Republic and the regime of Versailles. Each regime has an opposition that is part of it. It is a means against stagnation and the guarantee maintaining its flexibility. In every case, it is an opposition “faithful to general opinion.” By taking the road of legality, National Socialism became this type of opposition for the Weimar Republic and Versailles. All intelligent tyranny voluntarily accepts such an opposition.

The legal revolution and the legal revolutionary do not exist, Where legality begins, revolution stops. Those who fight on the legal bases never touch the foundation. Their struggle is only a contest to obtain the best place on the common platform.

The legal protest of Hitler was the declaration of capitulation for National Socialism. The latter integrated itself into the existing system of internal and global politics. He renounced the ambition to destroy it. In this fact, his actions became simple simulacra. Finally Hitler employed all his

energy to exhort the President of the Reich and the Chancellor to scrupulously observe the Weimar Constitution. The revolutionary he once was became the most faithful “guardian of the Constitution.”

The arm of interior politics that he used now was the ballot. He feared the test of force with the other powers. He wanted to reverse them with the aid of the pencil and the voting booth. When the proof of arms slips away, we are already vanquished. We no longer impose our will and we must negotiate. We do not become the dictator, we become the member of a coalition. In place of accomplishing creative acts, we henceforth limit ourselves to tactical artifices. We become like everyone else. The only difference we might still be able to hold onto is the roughest tone and the most brutal process.

The willingness of Hitler to enter into legality was perfectly coherent. He assured *the foreigner* of his respect for treaties. Before foreign journalists, he said not a word against Versailles, but inveighed before all about the Bolshevism that even threatened Versailles. He expressly recognized the private debts of Germany towards the foreigner. The politics of parties, until thus in power, always follows the same way, the only difference regarding Hitler was that he had yet to extend his finesse in diplomatic expression. Those who sow the desire for legality in Germany today will forcibly reap the fruits of the politics of executing treaties and the politics of coalitions.

The National Socialist youth became the heroes of one of the greatest German tragedies. They wanted to fight, conquer, or die, At present, they should content themselves with electoral campaigns. They have a very large confidence in the Fuhrer and the movement. They let themselves be convinced that in this case, he also acted on very serious decisions. Their eyes brightened when he was dropped in the ballot box. They acclaim legality as a ruse of war. This ruse should be especially effectively for the youth to enter into the shell of legality. With a wild enthusiasm, they exhibit a petite-bourgeois legality, a legality that thinks of the lion's skin in which someone is draped. The youth, who thus still believe they are bellicose and subversive, were already contaminated by the poison of

pacifism. Ultimately, legality is nothing other than the will to live on good terms with their neighbors.

Although Hitler adopted a scrupulously legalistic attitude, he always kept up appearances. Externally, the revolutionary character of the National Socialist movement was maintained. We do not want more bite, but it is necessary to bark all the more strongly. They think it necessary to believe that those who want to be revolutionary could remain with it. The weak and peaceful souls and the calculating caricatures, flocking to him later, had nothing to fear. Hitler was no longer revolutionary, but they could always take him for such. Certainly, the legality of Hitler tightened the reigns of those who were indignant towards the internal and external coercive order and the traditional religious, social, and economic institutions. From now on, even when overwhelmed with anger, they could not endanger the status quo and the existence of the old world.

The legality of Hitler was of a particular type. Although it wanted to be serious, it secretly played with revolutionary ideas. Thus it became the trap into which all the German protesters and rebels fell. As soon as they were taken there, they were mastered and rendered docile for Weimar and Versailles to use them.

Maybe this flagrant contradiction between the revolutionary mask and legality – where National Socialism betrayed itself – is the most evident proof of disloyalty, ambiguity, and ambivalence proper to this movement. Hundreds of thousands of men have relied on this mask. They pay for this error by becoming – against their will – servants of the West.

## **Chapter 3 – The Way to Powerlessness**

## Coaxing Western Melodies

No political force knows what role it will play in history. Its goal is generally without any relation to its true function. Often the effect it produces is on another level and has another orientation than the idea that this force aimed for. The immediate intentions and political ideas are part of this multitude of means permitting training of men in the current of history. Although the promoters of an idea generally act in good faith, in a certain manner, they are all the same impostors. In the retelling of history, they lure themselves and they lure the world. But the order and logic of things remains and things follow their course.

As soon as Russian Bolshevism had achieved the destruction of bourgeois society, Russia, drawing from its Slavic-Asiatic instincts began to be reborn. During the campaign of annihilation against the bourgeoisie, Marxist doctrine had justified these instincts. They made them conscious of their mission and sure of their victory. But when the extermination was accomplished, we understood that Marxist ideas were not the origin of these motivating forces. Coming from the needs of the Slavic-Asiatic peoples, Russia transformed itself into a total state, though Marxism wanted to be done with the state, considering it as an obsolete institution. Despite the manifest antinomies between Marxism and the will of national preservation, it was all the same this doctrine that catalyzed the awakening, the mobilization, and the affirmation of the Russian will to life.

However, the National Socialist ideas seem to have a direct link with the German people's will to life. We could say that they have a natural language and form of expression that uses the vital instincts to manifest itself. National Socialism seems like the revelation of the deepest secrets of the German soul. Germany is more upset than ever. This upheaval is a phenomenon with a very large importance. The existence of Europe and the entire West is in danger. It is, by some fate, the source from which the German peril may brusquely arise, the peril that has always made France shudder. The danger threatens as soon as Germany breaks the chains of

its alienation. The true nature of the people, or the alienation that destroys the personality, that is question posed to Germany! Before, the same question was posed to Russia.

Knowingly, National Socialism ranked itself on the side of the West. The fact that it became Fascist, bourgeois, civilized, and parliamentary democratic is only, in summation, the proof of its Westernization. Certainly, this Westernization has a particular type and heavy consequences. It was constructed in Germany, draped in the skin of Germanic bears, and it invoked its German origins so no one could doubt its authenticity. Thus National Socialism offered to the German revolt its service of exegesis, defense, and pioneering – thus it won the confidence of the people. It mastered the obscure violence of ebullient blood and popular torment to obey its commands.

But despite all, it did not directly embody “the German peril” in the eyes in the eyes of the powers that wanted to alienate Germany in the exterior and interior plans. All on the contrary – it was a very intelligent means of surmounting this danger and triumphing. When National Socialism took the hand of the revolt that growled in the hearts of Germans, a decisive step was taken. The revolt was cornered in an impasse – and repressed. In Germany, a profound distrust of alienation from the stranger was reawakened. National Socialism succeeded in conquering this distrust. He trapped Germany, which had been in the middle of recovering its true nature, in the ditch of the Western way. Crying “Germany awake!” he marched before it.

This slogan of the propaganda of the day summarized bit by bit what

Rosenberg expressed in awareness in *The Myth of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*. This “Myth” touched on the deepest origins and militated in their favor. This book was nevertheless declared a “personal work.” Thereby, this proclamation of German awakening was labeled, within National Socialism, as an individual step, as a curiosity that the movement was not responsible for. The “Myth” existed and they could use it when it seemed



opportune, but without any engagement. It was reduced to bait whose scent attracted all sorts of German quarry.

The author of "Myth," Rosenberg had explored his depths. The magic, but poorly understood, word that Hitler had given to him was courage. And barely had he taken knowledge of that which was his own, then Hitler discarded it. What Rosenberg lived through is indicative of the life, in general, of the National Socialist today. The National Socialist movement gave him the illusion of a return to himself. It let him rock in sweet dreams and suddenly discover he is the new victim of foreign alienation, that again he denies.

The bourgeois parties have known the same fate. They were political organs of capitalist society. Each of them occupied, to say thus, a particular domain of economic interest; the interests of industry, of finance, of agriculture, of artisans and domestic work. All were founded before the war. After 1918, they had undertaken certain transformations. But only the form was changed and not the base. They had learned nothing, but they had forgotten nothing also. Certainly, they tried to follow the tendencies of modern democracy. In general, they all wanted to be considered as "democratic" parties, without true success. They resembled an aristocracy that had never ultimately hidden their secret disgust for the efforts that they must make to meddle with the people, to do as they do, to sit at the table with the man in the street and adopt his customs.

After that "great crisis" made its ravages, the foundations of capitalism were shaken and the precursory signs already announced its decline. In this extreme situation, the traditional parties had no relief; there was nothing for them that could save capitalism. We realized that the Parliament was only an organ to absorb the interior tensions of the bourgeois order and that put in question the entire institution.

When National Socialism invaded the electorate of the bourgeois parties and wiped the field in domestic politics, there was no question of changing the capitalist and bourgeois way of life. The parties were swept because they no longer fulfilled their function. The movement replaced

them in order to fulfill this same function in a more radical and durable manner. The old pillars of the bourgeois parties massively flocked to it. They had not changed, but they knew that no party could protect the bourgeois and capitalist way of life any longer, if not for National Socialism.

In this fashion, National Socialism equally bore grave prejudices against the Deutschnationale Volkspartei. This party, like all the others, represented interests, but its role was not limited to that. The typical German currents were united there and their conservation was essential to the existence of the nation. It acted from *rural, Prussian, and Protestant* forces.

By reason of its democratic spirit and its lack of traditions, National Socialism is far too urban to be able to understand the vital needs of the peasantry, as the Deutschnationale Volkspartei knew. *Although it could have had National Socialist peasants, there is no National Socialist peasant.* The fact that the National German party was submerged by National Socialism diminished, in a disturbing way, “the attachment to the soil.”

National Socialism completely broke the Prussian-Protestant resistance, which was better than what this party could generate. By infecting the moral substance of the Deutschnationale Volkspartei, National Socialism accomplished its mission in the name of the West. The dust raised by the collapse of this party of this party landed like a vapor of Catholic incense on the North East region of Germany. When the Stahlhelm was equally undermined by National Socialism, the last Prussian-German rampart on German soil was ceded.

In great spirit and with ardor, National Socialism began that which the Zentrum, equally engaged in the tortuous ways of the West, would gladly do. The separation with the populist and conservative elements, that Brüning had started in secret, was only a political means, permitting the Catholic tendency to check the Protestant-Prussian ensemble of the Deutschnationale Volkspartei. Hitler is more brutal. When he bites into something, he swallows it as well.

We thus understand the secret affinity between National Socialism and political Catholicism. They aim for the same goal, but National Socialism is the more violent, more enthusiastic, more boorish brother. When he utters his screams, the Zentrum is equally aware. That is why all the attempts of Hitler to dissolve it fail. When they have the same objective, it allows little impression of the savagery of Hitler. It is always possible to remove him under his arguments. We already possess the things of which he boasts. Brüning's politics of law-decrees resemble a more adroit Hitlerism.

The progress of National Socialism was nothing other than the emergency measures of the capitalist bourgeoisie. At the same time, they had so many successes over the remains of anti-Occidentalism, the antiOccidentalism that had so often aided the attempts to renew German independence.

Certainly, when National Socialism devoured the old parties, they freed Germany of certain remaining doubts and forms without a reason for being, but it had equally deprived it of the nourishing elements of unfathomable German stubbornness, that did not fear the world – “even if it is full of devils.” When Hitler won the territory in the North of Germany, under the sign of the Roman salute and the Fascist spirit, he nibbled away the Protestant heritage of Luther and tardily avenged the Austrian defeat of Königgrätz on the Prussian patrimony transmitted by Bismarck. The doctrine of Hitler's national liberation was a coaxing Western melody that made all the Protestants and all the Prussians lose their heads. Psychologically disarming Protestantism and Prussianism and abandoning them to the Roman fate that waits for them, that is the most important “Western” task which National Socialism could accomplish.

## His Method for Success

The confidence that Hitler enjoys is unparalleled. But no act has yet proven he deserves it. The confidence that we accord to him is blind. He is an unequalled master in the art of making believe before having to respond to the question of his capacities and power.

The German is credulous by nature. The greatest historical event of his life was the Reformation, the transformation of his religion. In *political affairs*, he is equally believing. Even the incarnation of his political existence, that is to say the Reich, was a more a home for the object of transcendent faith than a tangible reality. Certainly, it is necessary live daily in Reich in all its pitiable powerlessness, but we do that because nothing prevents the belief in its coming perfection. Belief in something signifies in Germany – in political affairs equally – being sure of the object of his faith and to have it, to thus say, in his pocket. As always, we sell volunteers bear skins before having killed it. When we refuse to look the truth in the face, we always invoke with vehemence the confidence in an unbreakable faith.

German credulity creates a state of affairs that benefits all the false prophets. This credulity incites a shameless exploitation. Those who know how to excite the imagination thirsting for faith can always find a good public. The more difficult the times, the more the faith persists. That is what must help to surmount difficulties. It suffices that someone knows to speak well of a new development so that we take it to the skies.

After the fall of Bismarck, in 1890, the decline of Germany began. It was in the nature of things. From this epoch came the doctrines of salvation. William II himself was full of them. He was the one who made the promise of “better days.” Bülow opened the way to enemies, permitting them to thus encircle Germany. No one had hoped for a grander future for Germany. If he had not thrown off the mask since his fall, Germany would still honor him today as one of the most remarkable statesmen “after Bismarck.”

In this unshakable confidence in victory, which reigned during the war, he had a wild ardor. Despite a mountain of contradictory facts, he did not allow himself to be won over by doubt. It is true that in these years, no one dared to take advantage of the German credulity by presenting himself like a political messiah. Such a messiah could fear that we wouldn't immediately take him at his word. The thunder of cannons did not shake the credulity of the Germans, but it dissipated the drunkenness of public prophets.

However, after the debacle, the public prophets emerged from their pits. Scheidemann promised "peace, bread, and liberty." Erzberger preached "forgiveness for enemies." Stresemann attracted the young people with the sweetness of Locarno and the magic of Dawes and Young. He was such a grand wonder worker that, under the influence of Genevan incantations, the German people considered their dishonored lives as the new existence of such a great power.

But all those who found a political claim in Germany were supplanted by Hitler. Never had he offered anything but slogans, and yet he won millions of hearts. We can say that since 1919, he was *seeking political credit*. He invented astute methods to solicit it. He knew that he would obtain credit more easily when propaganda was imaginative, such that it claimed knowledge to touch upon public opinion.

The writings of Hitler were always a bit confused, they lack precision. His thought is not clear. He does not have a clear vision of things. But the best that he published are the passages on propaganda that we find in two volumes. That is his favorite subject, that is the domain where he is most at ease. He then draws from his own experiences and reveals his most intimate secrets. In nearly all that he has written, there are un-assimilated elements, but when he acts on propaganda, he is an expert who knows his work deeply. "Propaganda", he writes, "is this art of seizing the imaginary and sentimental world of the masses and finding the psychological means to capture their attention and move them." Hitler *invented an extremely effective method of propaganda* that proved itself.

He passed the point where he must demand credit. We were pressed to offer it to him. He keeps very sure values: the faculty for the enthusiasm and the warm heart of the youth, the noble essence of the peasantry, the right of the bourgeoisie to keep to themselves. He had responsibility for millions of lives. The lenders, the creditors at no point doubted the solidity of Hitler's enterprise. The claim made its effect. Everywhere we believe that we must "bet on" Hitler and this will pay off later to each part of the happiness and liberty of Germany. We approve all the measures taken by Hitler. We have forgotten the little failure of 1923. We consider it as an amusing incident. "Has there ever been a great man who never made a faux pas? Is there anything more touching than the sins of young geniuses?" This little incident brings no prejudice to the credibility of Hitler. Certainly, Hitler has occasionally remained indebted to the actions that he risked. He let it mature on the 14 of the September 1930. At this moment, all the perturbed democrats feared that he would start marching the same night. They knew what was given by general and public opinion, the Republic was easy prey for him. *He did not start to march, but waded into the mire of parliamentarianism.* Then came "the exodus." We waited for something grandiose, for a brilliant political performance. The time passed and nothing happened. The "exodus" was a promise of payment that was not kept. Without having realized the least political profit, the group returned to the Reichstag. Already in 1931, Hitler believed he was strong enough to reverse the government and take power. No creditor moved to give the Führer all the serene and necessary latitude. The year ended and Hitler had only advanced to the Kaiserhof. The chancellery of the Reich was more inaccessible than ever. Even the day of Harzburg did not provide to the German nationalists political advantages which it had been given in advance of his reception. Brüning humiliated the SA and the SS by the interdiction on the wearing of the uniform. The prestige and the reputation of the entire National Socialist movement was at stake – thus the foreigners well understood. The situation required Hitler to throw all his political power into the balance. He must make it understood that under his protection, we were in perfect security and that the authority of the government could only expand beyond the limits he imposed. But Hitler comported himself like a

“political” beggar who lacked means and dressed himself for the pleasure of his benefactor.

Each day for which a decision had been announced bore a new deception. Each effect presented by Hitler had to be protected. The National Socialist movement became an enormous operation of credit, but until the present he had no relations with the big deal. Borrowing was very elevated, but he had yet to give birth to any creative act. We made a dalliance with those who claimed the hard cash and stumbled into a true political enterprise.

The future appeared as a terribly isolated Germany, submerged by forces of breakdown and decadence. France dreamed of butchering it, Russia consulted with Versailles. In this situation, it could have no politics of national success. It is impossible to escape to relapses, losses, and bad treatments. *At the timely moment, Hitler neglected to watch for a global conjuncture that could have been very favorable to him.* He wasted it by his primary anti-Bolshevism. He acted without circumspection, without prudence. He dreamed and he did not reflect enough on global politics. He dreamed of victory without having prepared strategic plans. They could have fallen on him from the sky. He was not, like Bismarck, tormented by the “nightmare of coalitions.” Ever the adventurer, he rushed into the dangerous spheres of international politics. At the moment where the political credit, which flowed without cease, could bear their fruits, he had realized that they melted in his hands, that they were wasted and fled away.

The years passed, Germany lives on foreign credit. It wasted the future of its children to ease the present. Imposture rules in the economy and politics. The credit swindlers live easily. Their rating shows in the spirit of everything. They are admired and celebrated – and suddenly that was the fall into the void.

National Socialism inscribed itself among this cadre. It is *the establishment of the most audacious credit fraud that had ever been erected on the political terrain.* The “Brown House” resembles those pretentious

palaces of businessmen in which fraudulent groups think about planning their flowering. The way and the fate of Stinnes, Lahusen, Dumcke, Katzenellenbogen, and Goldschmidt will be sooner or later that of Hitler.



# Fate

National Socialism is not a beginning – it's the end. It is the final note of the Wilhelmine epoch, that still resonates in it. Its spirit, its atmosphere shoots forth like a last burst of embers that are smothered. The Wilhelmine era is the sum of hallucinations in which this epoch of agony takes stock of its existence. When the sources of life dry up, mortal fever gives birth to a last dream of power.

One last time, the elements of the Wilhelmine epoch rally for an apparition of agitated phantoms. *Byzantinism* reawakes and, one more time, before a soft man, without character and without a line of conduct that, by Caesarist gestures, searches to hide how much is at stake from these events. A superficial *optimism* dances before a terrible abyss and does not realize what it is doing. The *dilettante* meddles with everything, ignorant of that which he destroys. We do not know what we want and, consequently, we fulfill gaps with *tactics*. By a general rule, when there are too many tactics, there is nothing deeper. We are *parvenus*, gentlemen playing. Everyone must know who we are. There is no longer a place for pessimists and critical spirits. Those who reflect have the authenticity of their patriotism put in doubt. We believe that drunkenness and love of country are the same thing. We consider a bad patriot as someone who tries to remain lucid and keep his feet on the ground. As soon as a political difficulty presents itself, the appeal for a concentration of armed forces to resolve it immediately. We have the power, we utilize it *in a total waste*. We proclaim a crowd of ideas, but we don't have *an idea*. We have at our disposal a marvelous heritage, great energies, but that has only lead us further into the Forest of Compiègne.

This enormous expense finally leads to catastrophe. The Wilhelmine destiny repeats itself. Like the valiant Hohenzollern Empire which went to defeat by towing behind it the Catholic Habsburgs, the National Socialist movement of Germany, under Austrian-Latin conduct, is headed towards an irremediable impotence.

When the Hohenzollern Empire crumbled, the forces of the German will and self preservation, until then united under a political state form, dispersed to engulf themselves in a bubbling chaos. The world of Versailles, the Latin-Occidental world immediately detected there the home of a future disaster whose extent they could not predict. *National Socialism bound, organized, and “channeled” the energies unleashed by this chaos. It forced them to turn against the East. A secret solidarity linked the Roman instincts of the Führer with the West, which quaked for its future. The obscure forces of Germany spread in this erroneous way.* Already the day was announced where, in a sterile exultation, they were lost in smoke until the last leap. They thus remained a people, exhausted, without hope. Tired, they doubted the meaning of the entire new German resistance. But the order of Versailles will be stronger than ever.

# Table of Contents

[Chapter 1 – The German Protest to Fascism](#)

[Chapter 2 – The Fall in Legality](#)

[Chapter 3 – The Way to Powerlessness](#)

[Alain de Benoist's Preface 4](#)