The Stoic Division of Philosophy*

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To discuss philosophical issues under the three broad headings of logic, physics, and ethics, is customary in every introduction to Stoicism[1]. After all, the justification of this threefold presentation of Stoic philosophy can be found in the ancient sources; for there are many texts which report that the Stoics themselves approved of such an exposition of their philosophical system. For example, Sextus Empiricus (*PH* II 13) explicitly states that the Stoics, as well as several other philosophers, advocated a division of philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics; also, Philo of Alexandria (*Leg. alleg.* I 57) and [Plutarch] (I Prooem. 2 = *SVF* 2.35) clearly confirm that the Stoics followed a tripartite division of philosophy.

Nevertheless, a systematic inquiry into all the existing textual evidence which either directly or indirectly bears on this subject-matter, shows that the Stoic view on the three parts of philosophy certainly is more complex than it has generally been presented. In fact, difficulties in comprehending the exact nature of the threefold division of Stoic philosophy already arise from the study of a well-known passage in Diogenes Laertius (VII 39-41), which is found right at the beginning of his doxography of Stoicism and which constitutes one of our main pieces of evidence concerning the Stoic account of the parts of philosophy. Given its importance, I quote this text in full:

Τριμερῆ φασὶν εἶναι τὸν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μέν τι φυσικόν, τὸ δὲ ἠθικόν, τὸ δὲ λογικόν. οὕτω δὲ πρῶτος διεῖλε Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐν τῷ Περὶ λόγου καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ ά Περὶ λόγου καὶ ἐν τῷ ά τῶν

[1] For example, see: E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, vol. III, Leipzig, ed.5 1923; M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*, Göttingen, 1948; A.A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, London/Berkeley/Los Angeles, ed.2 1986; F.H. Sandbach, *The Stoics*, London, 1975.

φυσικῶν καὶ ᾿Απολλόδωρος καὶ Σύλλος ἐν τῇ πρώτῳ τῶν Εἰς τὰ δόγματα εἰ-
σαγωγῶν καὶ Εὔδρομος ἐν τῇ ᾿Ηθικῇ στοιχειώσει καὶ Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος
καὶ Ποσειδώνιος. Ταῦτα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὁ μὲν ᾿Απολλόδωρος τόπους καλεῖ, ὁ δὲ
Χρύσιππος καὶ Εὔδρομος εἴδη, ἄλλοι γένη. εἰκάζουσι δὲ ζῴῳ τὴν φιλ-
οσοφίαν, ὀστοῖς μὲν καὶ νεύροις τὸ λογικόν προσομοιοῦντες, τοῖς δὲ
σαρκωδεστέροις τὸ ἠθικόν, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὸ φυσικόν. ἢ πάλιν ᾠῷ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς
εἶναι τὸ λογικόν, τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ ἠθικόν, τὰ δ᾿ ἐσωτάτω τὸ φυσικόν. ἢ ἀγρῷ
παμφόρῳ· <οὗ> τὸν μὲν περιβεβλημένον φραγμὸν τὸ λογικόν, τὸν δὲ καρπὸν τὸ
ἠθικόν, τὴν δὲ γῆν ἢ τὰ δένδρα τὸ φυσικόν. ἢ πόλει καλῶς τετειχισμένη καὶ
κατὰ λόγον διοικουμένῃ. Καὶ οὐθὲν μέρος τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀποκεκρίσθαι², καθά
τινες αὐτῶν φασιν, ἀλλὰ μεμίχθαι αὐτά· καὶ τὴν παράδοσιν μικτὴν ἐποί-
ουν. ἄλλοι δὲ πρῶτον μὲν τὸ λογικὸν τάττουσι, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ φυσικόν, καὶ
τρίτον τὸ ἠθικόν· ὧν ἐστι Ζήνων ἐν τῷ Περὶ λόγου καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ
᾿Αρχέδημος καὶ Εὔδρομος. ῾Ο μὲν γὰρ Πτολεμαεὺς Διογένης ἀπὸ τῶν ἠθικῶν
ἄρχεται, ὁ δ᾿ ᾿Απολλόδωρος δεύτερα τὰ ἠθικά, Παναίτιος δὲ καὶ Ποσειδώ-
νιος ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ἄρχονται ... ἄλλοι δ᾿ οὐ τοῦ λόγου ταῦτα μέρη φασίν,
ἀλλ᾿ αὐτῆς τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὡς Ζήνων ὁ Ταρσεύς.

There are four points in this text which are extremely puzzling: First,
Diogenes' claim that according to the majority of Stoic philosophers, it is
not ἡ φιλοσοφία but ὁ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγος which should be divided
into physics, ethics, and logic. Second, Diogenes' report that different Stoic
philosophers used different terms when referring to the three parts of
philosophical discourse. Third, Diogenes' statement that Stoic philoso-
phers were not unanimous in the order of the three parts of philosophical
discourse. Fourth, Diogenes' presentation of quite different similes used by
the Stoics to describe the close interrelation of the three parts of philosophi-
cal discourse. In what follows, I undertake to investigate these issues; for I
believe that it is only through their closer analysis that we may come to
understand in what sense Stoic philosophers divided philosophy, and how
they perceived the unity of the philosophical disciplines thus divided.

To start with the first issue, although most ancient sources and certainly all
modern scholars talk about the Stoic division of philosophy without any
further qualification, Diogenes indicates that the Stoics for the most part
talked of the division of philosophical discourse into physics, ethics, and
logic, and not of that of philosophy. His claim is made sufficiently clear not
only by the use of the term κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγος instead of φιλ-

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² ἀποκεκρίσθαι is only Cobet's conjecture, whereas all the codices have προκεκρί-
σθαι. For the significance of the difference in meaning between the two verbs, see: I.G.
Kidd, "Posidonius and Logic", in J. Brunschwig (ed.), Les Stoiciens et leur logique,
Paris, 1978, 274.

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οσοφία, but more importantly by the information that a group of Stoic philosophers, among them Zenon of Tarsos, disagreed with the other Stoics and declared that physics, ethics, and logic should be viewed as the three parts of philosophy itself.

Therefore, even if it is doubtful whether the early Stoics actually distinguished between philosophy and philosophical discourse, Diogenes provides us with strong evidence that by the time of Chrysippus' successor this distinction was in the centre of a significant dispute among Stoic philosophers. After all, Diogenes is not unique in testifying to the Stoic preference for dividing philosophical discourse into physics, ethics, and logic, rather than philosophy itself; there is a passage in Stobaeus (*Ecl.* II 42,7f.), in which it is twice stated that Eudorus suggested – following, obviously, a Stoic practice – that ὁ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγος should be divided into ethics, physics, and logic. The same idea, namely that it was philosophical discourse and not philosophy that some Stoics proposed to divide into these three parts, seems to lie behind a text by Plutarch (*St. rep.* 1035A) on the division of Stoic philosophy. For in this text also, Chrysippus is not presented as having stated that philosophy should be divided into logic, ethics, and physics; rather, he is reported to have suggested the division of τὰ τοῦ φιλοσόφου θεωρήματα into logical, ethical, and physical theorems[3].

But what is the distinction between, on the one hand, ἡ φιλοσοφία and, on the other, ὁ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγος or τὰ τοῦ φιλοσόφου θεωρήματα? Moreover, how are we to interpret the fact that some Stoic philosophers favoured the division of philosophical discourse or of the philosopher's theorems into logic, physics, and ethics rather than that of philosophy itself?

There are, of course, no Stoic fragments explicitly dealing with the difference between ἡ φιλοσοφία and ὁ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγος. Thus Hadot's hypothesis[4], according to which ὁ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγος refers to the exposition of philosophy for teaching purposes, seems at first quite

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[3] The stress on the division of τὰ τοῦ φιλοσόφου θεωρήματα rather than on that of φιλοσοφία reminds us of a difficult passage in Aristotle (*Top.* 105b19-26), where he presents a threefold division of προτάσεις and προβλήματα into ethics, physics, and logic. Taking into consideration that Aristotle defines πρόβλημα as a διαλεκτικὸν θεώρημα (*Top.* 104b1), it becomes clear that it is the philosophical theorems that he divides here into ethical, physical, and logical, and interestingly enough, this division does not correspond to that other division by Aristotle of ἐπιστήμη διανοητική into theoretical, practical, and productive (*Met.* 1025b25).

[4] P. Hadot, "Les divisions des parties de la philosophie dans l'Antiquité", *Museum Helveticum*, vol. 36, 1979, 215.

plausible. However, what becomes obvious from Diogenes' text is that this constitutes a rather hasty and not well-grounded speculation; for it is clearly implied here that even the Stoics who insisted on keeping the exposition of philosophy mixed, i.e. τὴν παράδοσιν, presupposed the threefold division of philosophical discourse. Hence, ὁ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγος is distinguished from ἡ παράδοσις τῆς φιλοσοφίας, so that it cannot be taken to refer simply to the process of transmitting philosophy in the form in which the teacher expounds philosophy to the students.

At this point another Stoic distinction may be introduced, as it proves to be quite illuminating in specifying the difference between the terms φιλοσοφία and κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγος; that is to say, we need to discuss briefly the distinction between the terms ἀλήθεια and τὸ ἀληθές as defined in Stoicism[5]. According to our sources (cf. *PH* II 81-83; *M* VII 38-45), the Stoic philosophers declared that truth and the true differ in three ways; namely, in essence, composition, and potency. To focus just on the difference between truth and the true in essence, it was thought that although truth can be said to be a body, the true is incorporeal. In particular, truth was defined as knowledge declaratory of all true things, and since knowledge was viewed as a disposition of the soul's commanding part, it was concluded that truth was a disposition of the soul's commanding part, and hence it was said to be corporeal; on the other hand, the true was defined as a proposition and a sayable, and therefore it was said to be incorporeal.

To compare now this distinction with that between philosophy and philosophical discourse, the similarities between the terms φιλοσοφία and ἀλήθεια should first become obvious. For philosophy was defined by the Stoics as the practice of wisdom (cf. *M* IX 13; Philo, *De congr. erud.* 79; Clement, *Stromat.* I 5 30,1) or as indistinguishable from wisdom (cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 89,4-8); but whether philosophy was thought of as striving after virtue or as identical with virtue, it would be understood as a disposition of the soul's commanding faculty, and hence it would be treated as corporeal. Therefore, philosophy was seen as being similar or comparable to truth, for both ἡ φιλοσοφία and ἡ ἀλήθεια were perceived as bodies identical with certain states of the soul's commanding faculty. As for the term κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγος, it seems quite reasonable to associate it with τὸ ἀληθές; in that case, the claim is that the Stoics viewed philosophical discourse in the same way they thought of the true, namely as incorporeal, and more precisely as the incorporeal counterpart of philosophy under-

[5] For a systematic discussion of this issue, see: A. Long, "The Stoic distinction between Truth and the True", in J. Brunschwig (ed.), above n.2, 297-315.

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stood as a body. Besides, there are two further passages (Epictetus, *Diss.* IV 8,12; Papyrus 1020 = *SVF* II 131 41,27-30) which, though elliptical, support the view that ὁ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγος was conceived by the Stoics as the articulate, ordered collection of true philosophical propositions. To make my point clear, I suggest that the Stoics regarded philosophy as a body identical with a disposition of the soul's commanding part, whereas they understood philosophical discourse simply as the incorporeal articulate aggregate of true philosophical propositions.

Having this distinction in mind, it is time to make sense of the preference expressed by the majority of Stoic philosophers for dividing philosophical discourse into physics, ethics, and logic rather than philosophy itself. For if philosophy was seen as a body identical with a disposition of the soul's commanding part, it could not be said to have as its parts the philosophical disciplines of logic, physics, and ethics. The division of philosophy thus understood would rather resemble the division of virtue, a controversial subject raised in Stoicism and discussed by modern scholars[6]; more specifically, by applying in the case of philosophy the divergent Stoic views on the unity of virtue (Galen, *Plac.* 7.1.10-15; Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 440E-441B; *St. rep.* 1034C-E; Stobaeus, 2.63,6-24), one could argue that the parts of philosophy are different relative dispositions of the soul's commanding faculty or that each part is a distinct quality of the virtuous state of the soul. Leaving aside the complexities arising from this comparison, what seems to be important from our point of view is that the parts into which philosophy is divided are the logical, the physical, and the ethical virtue and not the philosophical branches of logic, physics, and ethics. On the other hand, there seems to be no obstacle to dividing the true propositions of the incorporeal philosophical discourse under the headings of logic, physics, and ethics; in fact, it is reasonable to assume that most Stoics, being concerned with the study of philosophy, proposed and employed the division of the philosophical theorems rather than that of philosophy as a disposition of the soul.

The next interesting issue in Diogenes' passage concerns the different terms used by Stoic philosophers for the parts of philosophical discourse. After all, Diogenes is not our only source mentioning the Stoic debate over the terminology preferred in this context; apart from some Greek passages in which the terms εἶδος, τόπος, and γένος, are actually used, there are also Latin texts testifying to the Stoic use of different terms. That is to say,

[6] M. Schofield, "Ariston of Chios and the Unity of Virtue", *Ancient Philosophy*, vol.4, 1984, 83-96.

the Latin authors do not always talk about the "partes" of philosophy, but on some occasions they attempt to produce translations of other terms which follow closely the original text; thus, they often name the parts of philosophy "species" or "loci". For example, in Apuleius (*De interpr.* 176,1-4), "species" is presented as an alternative way to talk about the branches of philosophy; also, in Seneca (*Ep.* 89,11; 16), a philosophical discipline is given the name "locus" more than once.

But having established that the Stoics disagreed as to the terms used for the parts of philosophical discourse, we next need to understand the reasons for such a dispute; in other words, it is important to explain why some Stoic philosophers suggested to replace the common term μέρος with εἶδος, or with τόπος, or even with γένος. Were these terms used promiscuously with no intended differences or were they thought to represent different views on the division of philosophical discourse? To answer this question, it is first necessary to inquire whether there is any difference in meaning among these terms, and if so, to discover what is the rational that renders them more or less appropriate for the division of philosophical discourse.

To start with the term εἶδος, an intuitively rather sensible hypothesis is put forward by Verbeke[7] concerning the particular meaning of the term and the motivation that led some Stoic logicians to prefer εἶδος to μέρος in this context. According to his view, some Stoics did not like to use the term μέρος to refer to the various branches of philosophy, because this term may refer to a component which has some independent existence, and hence it does not reflect the fundamental unity of the various disciplines; on the other hand, they preferred the term εἶδος, because it reflects the fact that philosophy does not include distinct, independent parts, but several kinds of inquiry. Tempting though it may be, Verbeke's suggestion is not convincing, for it does not sufficiently explain why it was the term εἶδος and not the term μέρος that was more in accordance with the unity of Stoic philosophy. In other words, Verbeke's undestanding of the two terms is not based on their Stoic use, since there is no evidence that μέρη had more of an independent existence than εἴδη. On the contrary, the Stoic account of μέρος together with that of εἶδος suggest that it was probably the other way round: according to our sources (cf. *PH* III 98), if a part ceases to exist, the whole is also said to be destroyed; on the other hand, the standard view in Greek philosophy (cf. Aristotle, *Met.* 1059b34-40), which we may rea-

[7] G. Verbeke, "Ethics and logic in Stoicism", in M.J. Osler (ed.), *Atoms, pneuma, and tranquility*, Cambridge 1991, 14.

sonably suppose was shared by the Stoics, is that the genus does not perish, if one of its species becomes extinct. Hence, μέρος was perceived as indispensable for the constitution of ὅλον, but though it was accepted that εἶδος presupposed γένος, it was also thought that it did not presuppose the genus with all its species, and consequently it did not presuppose the other species.

A more plausible hypothesis concerning the significance of replacing the term μέρος by εἶδος can be suggested after investigating the meaning of the term εἶδος together with that of the other alternative term τόπος. But first a preliminary remark: it is worth observing that the frequent use of the terms εἶδος and τόπος in a variety of Diogenes' passages, relevant to the division of philosophy not only does not prove to be illuminating, it can also be misleading. To make my point clear, I cite some of Diogenes' texts:

τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος φασὶν ἔνιοι εἰς δύο διαιρεῖσθαι ἐπιστήμας, εἰς ῥητορικὴν καὶ εἰς διαλεκτικήν. τινὲς δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ὁρικὸν εἶδος, τὸ περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων· ἔνιοι δὲ τὸ ὁρικὸν περιαιροῦσι. (VII. 41)

Τὴν διαλεκτικὴν διαιρεῖσθαι εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν σημαινομένων καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπον· καὶ τὸν μὲν τῶν σημαινομένων εἴς τε τὸν περὶ φαντασιῶν τόπον καὶ ... (VII 43)

Τὸ δ' ἠθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε τὸν περὶ ὁρμῆς καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τόπον καὶ ... (VII 84)

Τὸν δὲ φυσικὸν λόγον διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε τὸν περὶ σωμάτων τόπον καὶ ... (VII 132).

The above passages are misleading in the sense that they could be taken as evidence in favour of another view according to which εἶδος was used by the Stoics for the parts of philosophy – namely, dialectic, physics, and ethics –, whereas τόπος was used only for the subparts of philosophy – namely, the parts resulting from the subdivision of the three main parts of philosophy. But although this account seems at first elegant in its simplicity, it is certainly wrong; for not only does Diogenes' text mention the terms εἶδος and τόπος as alternatives, there are some passages in Diogenes where it is obviously the main parts of philosophy themselves which are called τόποι:

ὅσα τε τοῦ φυσικοῦ τόπου τυγχάνει καὶ αὖ πάλιν ὅσα τοῦ ἠθικοῦ. (VII 83)

τόν τε φυσικὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν λογικὸν ἀνῄρει... (VII 160)

Λογικοῦ τόπου (VII 189 = heading in the catalogue of Chrysippus' works).

But there is another passage in Diogenes (VII 61-62) which deals with both εἶδος and τόπος. What is particularly interesting about this text is the fact that, although it is not directly related to the discussion of the division of philosophy, it nevertheless introduces the two terms in the context of a clearcut Stoic distinction between two notions of division;

namely, the distinction between διαίρεσις and μερισμός[8]:

Διαίρεσις δέ ἐστι γένους ἡ εἰς τὰ προσεχῆ εἴδη τομή, οἷον Τῶν ζῴων τὰ μέν ἐστι λογικά, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα ... Μερισμὸς δέ ἐστι γένους εἰς τόπους κατάταξις, ὡς ὁ Κρῖνις· οἷον Τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέν ἐστι περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα.

In other words, it seems that there are two ways to divide a genus; when we divide it into species, it is called "division" in a technical sense, whereas when we divide a genus into topics, it is called "partition". What still remains unclear is the difference in the actual processes of division and partition; in fact, it is only after we understand this difference, that we can come to a conclusion as to the reasons that made some Stoics divide philosophical discourse into εἴδη, whereas others were in favour of its partition into τόποι.

Fortunately, there are some Latin texts which confirm the significance of the difference between division and partition, i.e. between "divisio" and "partitio", and which provide us with illuminating details as to its nature. Specifically, in Cicero (*Top.* 28; 30), we first find two passages discussing division and partition as distinct ways to produce a definition. Cicero repeats here more or less the information provided by Diogenes, with the difference that he does not give a translation of the term τόποι but uses instead the general term "membra"; otherwise, division into species is "divisio" and the equivalent of διαίρεσις, whereas "partitio" is the division into parts and, obviously, the equivalent of μερισμός. It is mainly later in the same text (*Top.* 33-34) that Cicero stresses what distinguishes the actual procedures of division and partition. According to this text, the species of a genus are definite in number, and division should not fail to list all the species; on the other hand, the parts resulting from partition are infinite, and failure to enumerate all of them is acceptable, if not unavoidable:

At si stipulationum aut iudiciorum formulas partiare, non est vitiosum in re infinita praetermittere aliquid. Quod idem in divisione vitiosum est. Formarum enim *certus* est numerus quae cuique generi subiciantur; partium distributio saepe est *infinitior*, tamquam rivorum a fonte diductio.

The last point also emerges from another passage in Sextus Empiricus (*M* XI 10-17), in which the systematic and definite character of the process of division is also regarded as its distinctive feature. In particular, Sextus

[8] An informative historical survey of the different notions of division can be found in: J. Mansfeld, *Heresiography in context. Hippolytus' Elenchos as a source for Greek Philosophy*, Leiden/New York/Köln, 1992, 326-331.

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introduces here the notions of τέλειος διαίρεσις and ὑγιὴς διαίρε-σις, indicating that in order to have a proper division it is necessary to enumerate all the species belonging to a genus, and especially all its proximate species. Moreover, there is a passage in Alexander of Aphrodisias (*in Top.* 93,27-94,2) in which, although nothing is said about the distinction between division and partition, it becomes nevertheless clear that the parts into which the class of philosophical theorems is divided only qualify as εἴδη in those cases in which the division is actually systematic and complete. This difference between division and partition, and thus between εἴδη and τόποι, helps to explain why any particular area or subject which falls within philosophy might be called a τόπος when it is not clear that it corresponds to a part reached by division, and in particular, when it is clear that it does not correspond to a proper division of philosophy into εἴδη.

However, does the systematic character of division constitute the only reason to distinguish it from partition? To decide this issue, more textual evidence is needed; this is provided by two additional passages on the difference between partition and division, namely a passage by Martianus Capella and another by Boethius. To start with the passage by Martianus Capella (*De Nupt. Phil. et Merc.* III 352-354), the definitions of "divisio" and "partitio" are similar to Cicero's. However, the passage which concentrates on the distinction between the two notions, introduces a further element; what Martianus stresses here is the fact that although in the case of division we talk about species for which the name and definition of their genus is appropriate, in the case of partition we talk about parts for which the name and definition of their whole cannot be used:

> Interest autem inter DIVISIONEM et PARTITIONEM quod in divisione per formas currimus, in partitione per partes. formae autem sunt, quae generi subiciuntur et *eius definitionem tenere possunt et nomen*. partes sunt quae in toto sunt et *definitionem numquam, nomen interdum totius recipere possunt.*"

Furthermore, Boethius (*In Top.* 1105B-1106C) also comments on Cicero's concise passage on the difference between partition and division, but he gives a more elaborate account of the distinction. So after establishing the difference between species and parts by a reasoning similar to that of Martianus, Boethius focuses on the distinction between the genus and the whole; the genus which is constituted by the species is a universal, whereas the whole which is composed by the parts is a particular. Leaving aside the details of this latter distinction, it is important to note that according to Boethius, the genus remains intact even when a species becomes extinct, whereas the whole is really destroyed if a part perishes:

Quo fit ut si genus pereat, species quoque perimantur; *si species intereat, maneat genus quod in partibus totoque contrarium est*. Nam si pars quae libet una pereat, totum necesse est interire; si vero totum, quod partes junxerant, dissipetur, partes maneant distributae.

To summarise, what distinguishes διαίρεσις or "divisio" from μερισμός or "partitio" is mainly the fact that the first procedure results in the enumeration of the species of a genus, whereas the latter leads to a list of the parts of a whole or of a genus; more precisely, some of the features which are supposed to differentiate the species from the parts are the following:

(i)   the number of the species belonging to a genus is well-determined, whereas that of the parts may be indefinite;

(ii) the species share the characteristics of the genus, whereas the parts do not;

(iii) the species are not indispensable for the existence of a genus, whereas the parts are.

But how can we apply this distinction between διαίρεσις and μερισμός in the case of the Stoic division of philosophical discourse? Although there is not sufficient evidence attributing all the features of this distinction specifically to the Stoics, by following Diogenes' definitions of partition and division, we may infer that the Stoics who named the parts of philosophical discourse εἴδη had in mind a procedure similar to διαίρεσις, whereas the Stoics who used the term τόποι were more in favour of something like the process of μερισμός. However, the issue that still remains unsettled is what it really means that some Stoics preferred to divide philosophical discourse into species, while others chose to part it into topics.

Taking into consideration the first difference between the species resulting from division and the parts resulting from partition, it might be suggested that the Stoics who used the term εἴδη stressed the systematic and complete character of the division of the philosophical disciplines, whereas those who used the term τόποι considered the number of topics discussed in philosophical discourse as not strictly defined.

On the other hand, the second feature differentiating the division into species from the partition into parts cannot be said to have a straightforward application in the case of philosophical discourse; for although in the division of philosophical discourse its species share the same characteristics with the genus, i.e. the theorems of logic, ethics, and physics share the same characteristics of being philosophical theorems in general, it makes no sense to claim that the topics into which philosophical discourse is parted cannot accept the definition of their genus. Therefore, it is more plausible to understand this aspect of the distinction between the division of philo-

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sophical discourse into species and its partition into topics in a different way; that is to say, I suggest that each species resulting from the division of philosophical discourse shares with the rest all the philosophical theorems but from different perspectives, whereas each topic resulting from the partition of philosophical discourse deals only with a portion of the philosophical theorems. In other words, it seems that the Stoics who used the term τόποι viewed philosophical discourse as a unitary discipline divided in parts which correspond to different areas of knowledge; on the other hand, the Stoics who used the term εἴδη stressed the fact that each part of philosophical discourse shares with the rest common theorems but from different perspectives.

Having this distinction in mind, it becomes now clear how the third feature which differentiates the division into species from the partition into parts can be applied in the case of philosophical discourse; for if each species shares with the rest all the philosophical theorems, it certainly is not indispensable for the existence of any kind of philosophical discourse, whereas if each topic deals with a portion of the philosophical theorems and it is abandoned, the whole of the philosophical discourse is destroyed.

In general, the difference between the two Stoic views concerning the terms εἴδη and τόποι as alternative ways to name the parts of philosophical discourse seems to have reflected a different approach towards the unity of philosophical discourse. Of course, there is no doubt that as Diogenes Laertius points out (VII 46-48), most Stoic philosophers declared that the philosophical disciplines are inseparable; however, this does not exclude the possibility that the unity of philosophical discourse was actually based on different grounds. That is to say, I suggest that the term εἴδη represents a Stoic approach which views the philosophical discourse as a plurality of independent parts which are united as far as they all share the same theorems from different perspectives, whereas the use of the term τόποι implies another Stoic approach which views the philosophical discourse as a unitary whole divided into interdependent parts which deal separately with a portion of the philosophical theorems. Speculative though it may sound, this interpretation is supported both by some examples of philosophical theorems which are present in all parts of the philosophical discourse (for example, the definition of καταληπτικὴ φαντασία or the doctrine about ὁρμαί), as well as by some texts which testify to the Stoics' insistence about the at all times unbreakable interrelation of the different parts (cf. Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1035E-F; Epictetus, *Fragm.* 1).

Having dealt with the terms εἴδη and τόποι, we now turn to the use of the term γένος in the context of dividing philosophical discourse. The

standard Stoic definition of γένος associates it with the term εἶδος (DL VII 60-61), and thus it seems appropriate to deal with γένος as connected with the process of διαίρεσις; in other words, I suggest that the term γένος should not be perceived as being associated with a completely different further alternative to the view associated with the term εἶδος. This should already be clear from the fact that, although Diogenes reports that Chrysippus used the term εἴδη for the parts of philosophical discourse, Plutarch quotes Chrysippus as referring to the three γένη of philosophical theorems. So, instead of attempting to find an elaborate interpretation for this alleged discrepancy, we should simply understand the use of the two terms as representing the same alternative to μέρος, but seen from different points of view: from the perspective of the particular philosophical theorems and their kinds, logic, physics, and ethics are obviously called γένη; from the perspective of philosophical discourse itself, logic, physics and ethics are its species.

The third important issue raised by Diogenes' account concerns the different opinions expressed by Stoic philosophers about the order of the parts of philosophical discourse. For it is not only that according to Diogenes different Stoic philosophers proposed different orders; the information other ancient sources provide us with also makes it difficult to determine what the standard view was and suggests inconsistencies in the doctrine of particular Stoic philosophers. More specifically, although Diogenes claims that the order of the philosophical parts according to Zenon, Chrysippus, Archedemus, and Eudromos was logic-physics-ethics, and Sextus Empiricus (*PH* II 13) agrees that this was the order followed by the majority of the Stoic philosophers, Sextus elsewhere (M *VII* 22) declares that the most favoured order was in fact logic-ethics-physics. Furthermore, Plutarch (*St. rep.* 1035A-F) criticises Chrysippus severely for being contradictory, because the Stoic logician is said to have on different occasions suggested two different orders; namely, the order logic-ethics-physics as well as the order logic-physics-ethics.

Therefore, what becomes clear is that there were at least four different Stoic opinions about the order of the parts of philosophical discourse: the first two assumed a sequence that started with logic which then was followed by physics and ethics, on the first view, and by ethics and physics, on the second; as to the other two opinions, the third started with ethics and the fourth with physics, but there is no evidence as to the order they adopted for the remaining parts. What remains puzzling is which order constituted the mainstream Stoic view, and why Chrysippus seems to have

contradicted himself in following on different occasions different orders. To settle these issues, I suggest that we now should closely examine the reasons offered in the ancient texts to justify the different Stoic accounts of the order of the philosophical disciplines.

To start with the third and the fourth order, it is extremely difficult to reconstruct the criteria on which they are based, for there is no text which explicitly tells us what motivated some Stoic philosophers to propose these specific orders with ethics and physics respectively as their starting point. Fortunately, a passage in Sextus (*M* VII 20-21) may prove to be of some help:

> Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τριμεροῦς οὔσης τῆς φιλοσοφίας οἱ μὲν πρῶτον μέρος τάττουσι τὸ φυσικόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ χρόνῳ μὲν πρεσβυτάτη ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὴν φυσικὴν πραγματεία ὡς καὶ μέχρι νῦν τοὺς πρώτους φιλοσοφήσαντας φυσικοὺς καλεῖσθαι, τάξει δέ, ὅτι πρῶτον ἁρμόττει περὶ τῶν ὅλων διαλαβεῖν καὶ τότε περὶ τῶν ἐπ᾽ εἴδους καὶ τἀνθρώπου σκέπτεσθαι. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἠθικῶν κατήρξαντο ὡς ἀναγκαιοτέρων καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπισπώντων.

Of course, it is not clear who are the philosophers to whom Sextus refers here, but their reasoning may give us a clue as to the reasons that urged Ptolemaeus to start with ethics, while Panaetius and Posidonius started with physics. That is to say, it really seems plausible that the Stoics who started with physics could have done so either with reference to the order in which the different parts of philosophical discourse emerged from the history of philosophy, or by claiming to start from universal nature before moving on to the role of the particular in it; on the other hand, those who started with ethics might have found it more convenient to begin their philosophical inquiry from what is more important to human life.

Concerning the first and the second order, Sextus (*M* VII 23) indicates that those Stoics who presented logic as the most appropriate introduction to philosophical discourse, thought that logic can guard us from mistakes in reasoning:

> πρῶτον γὰρ δεῖν κατησφαλίσθαι τὸν νοῦν εἰς δυσέκκρουστον τῶν παραδιδομένων φυλακήν, ὀχυρωτικὸν δὲ εἶναι τῆς διανοίας τὸν διαλεκτικὸν τόπον.

As to the difference between the first and the second order, the idea is that the first order was meant to leave physics at the end of philosophical discourse because it would ultimately deal with the gods, whereas the motivation behind the second order was to start from universal nature before tackling the issue of the individual's life; actually, this latter point is made clear in an illuminating passage by Plutarch (*St. rep.* 1035A-D):

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι κατὰ τὰ ὀρθῶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων εἰρημένα τρία
γένη τῶν τοῦ φιλοσόφου θεωρημάτων εἶναι, τὰ μὲν λογικὰ τὰ δ’ ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ
φυσικά· εἶτα τούτων δεῖν τάττεσθαι πρῶτα μὲν τὰ λογικὰ δεύτερα δὲ τὰ
ἠθικὰ τρίτα δὲ τὰ φυσικά· τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν ἔσχατος εἶναι ὁ περὶ τῶν θεῶν
λόγος· διὸ καὶ τελετὰς προσηγόρευσαν τὰς τούτου παραδόσεις ... δεῖ γὰρ
τούτοις συνάψαι τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, οὐκ οὔσης ἄλλης ἀρχῆς
αὐτῶν ἀμείνονος οὐδ’ ἀναφορᾶς, οὐδ’ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκεν τῆς φυσικῆς θεω-
ρίας παραληπτῆς οὔσης ἢ πρὸς τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν διάστασιν.

The suggested reconstruction of the reasons behind the different orders
shows that the general character of these criteria was not necessarily con-
nected with the philosophical importance of each part of the philosophical
discourse; it rather seems that the different criteria which the Stoic philoso-
phers presupposed in the different orders were related to the most appro-
priate way of setting forth the philosophical theorems. For though the
Stoics certainly gave overall priority to ethics and considered theology as
the ultimate stage of knowledge, the different orders of philosophical
discourse could be said to reflect simply their interest in a clear exposition of
the Stoic doctrines. In other words, starting from physics for historical
reasons and because we should place the general before the particular, or
starting with logic because it enables us to reason correctly, can be certainly
seen as criteria that are concerned with the better presentation or more
effective teaching of philosophical doctrines; even the criterion on which
philosophical discourse begins with ethics, namely the need to start with
what is most important for human beings, can also be understood as
presenting first something which is closer to the interests of the student.
Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the apparent conflict among the
different orders should be viewed simply as a conflict among different
expository and pedagogical orders.

This approach to the different orderings of the parts of philosophical
discourse also helps to settle the problem concerning the standard Stoic
view on the order of the classes of philosophical theorems. For if the criteria
which motivated the different orders merely concerned the exposition of
philosophy, it would make sense that the ancient sources insist that the
majority of Stoic philosophers subscribed to a view according to which the
order of the parts of philosophical discourse should start with logic. Never-
theless, there is no way to judge whether the order logic-ethics-physics in
general was regarded as preferable to the order logic-physics-ethics, or
conversely; for it becomes clear now that if the criteria were merely expos-
itory, the acceptance of the first did not exclude the acceptance of the latter
on different occasions.

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This conclusion brings us finally to the question regarding Chrysippus' alleged inconsistency. The Chrysippean texts cited by Plutarch show that the Stoic philosopher advocated the order logic-ethics-physics, although on some occasions he also declared that the study of physics should precede that of ethics. But even if Chrysippus on different occasions did follow the two different orders logic-ethics-physics and logic-physics-ethics – after all, both these orders are said to have been suggested by the Stoics –, would Plutarch be justified in accusing Chrysippus of inconsistency? Of course, there is no doubt that Chrysippus stressed the practical aspect of philosophical discourse and thus the importance of ethics, but also acknowledged the crucial role of theology as the initiation to the mysteries. Nevertheless, the importance of the disciplines of ethics and of physics does not seem to contradict the pedagogical orders logic-ethics-physics and logic-physics-ethics respectively, as long as these are understood as orders followed for expository reasons. For example, if for a given audience one wanted to present a very strict and highly scientific account of ethics, this would have to be based on a prior treatment of physics; if, on the other hand, the audience required a lower level introduction to ethics, an antecedent account of physics would not be necessary. Hence, if the two different orders were introduced on different occasions because of different expository criteria, they should not be thought of as contradictory; and consequently, Chrysippus – or any other Stoic philosopher who at different times suggested different orders – could be defended against Plutarch's polemic.

But before we move on to the next issue, a further remark concerning the order of the philosophical theorems is needed. According to Diogenes' account the teaching of philosophy in the Stoic school did not always follow the different orders of the three parts of philosophical discourse, for there was a group of Stoics who insisted that the presentation of the different theorems should be mixed; for example, one should start with an ethical theorem and then refer to the closely related theorems in physics or in logic. This extreme view reflects the Stoics' attempt to emphasise their doctrine about the close interrelation of the parts of philosophical discourse.

Let us turn, finally, to the fourth issue raised by Diogenes' report on the division of the philosopher's theorems; that is to say, let us ask how effective the Stoic similes were in representing the interrelation of the parts of philosophical discourse. But in order to resolve this question, we first need to establish the Stoic origin of the standard three similes; namely, the similes of the garden, the animal, and the egg.

Diogenes Laertius includes these similes in his doxography of Stoicism,

but the other passage which also presents the same similes gives an interesting account as to the philosophers who first introduced them. It is Sextus Empiricus (*M* VII 16-19) who vaguely implies that, apart from the Stoics, the Academic Xenocrates and the Peripatetics may have had their share in formulating these similes:

ῥητότατα δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενοκράτην καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔχονται τῆσδε τῆς διαιρέσεως. ἐνθένδε πιθανῶς ὁμοιοῦσι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν παγκάρπῳ ἀλωῇ, ἵνα τῇ μὲν ὑψηλότητι τῶν φυτῶν εἰκάζηται τὸ φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ νοστίμῳ τῶν καρπῶν τὸ ἠθικόν, τῇ δὲ ὀχυρότητι τῶν τειχῶν τὸ λογικόν. οἱ δὲ ᾠῷ φασὶν αὐτὴν εἶναι παραπλήσιον· ἐῴκει γὰρ τῇ μὲν λεκίθῳ, ἥν τινες νεοττὸν ὑπάρχειν λέγουσι, τὰ ἠθικά, τῷ δὲ λευκῷ, ὃ δὴ τροφή ἐστι τῆς λεκίθου, τὰ φυσικά, τῷ δὲ ἔξωθεν ὀστρακώδει τὰ λογικά. ὁ δὲ Ποσειδώνιος, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν μέρη τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀχώριστά ἐστιν ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ φυτὰ τῶν καρπῶν ἕτερα θεωρεῖται καὶ τὰ τείχη τῶν φυτῶν κεχώρισται, ζῴῳ μᾶλλον εἰκάζειν ἠξίου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, αἵματι μὲν καὶ σαρξὶ τὸ φυσικόν, ὀστέοις δὲ καὶ νεύροις τὸ λογικόν, ψυχῇ δὲ τὸ ἠθικόν.

In addition, there is further evidence which shows that it is quite doubtful whether the garden simile is specifically Stoic; for both Philo (*De mut. nim.* 74f.; *SVF* II 39) and Origenes (*SVF* II 40) talk about the garden simile, but they make no reference to its Stoic origin; on the contrary, Philo attributes it in general to "the old philosophers", which presumably suggests a pre-Stoic origin. However, the most important argument in favour of the view that the garden simile is not specifically Stoic comes from the analysis of the simile itself. For according to the garden simile, logic is the wall of the garden, physics are the plants, and ethics are the fruits; thus, the interrelation of the parts of the garden, and consequently, that of the three classes of philosophical theorems seems to be extremely loose. In other words, since the garden simile does not emphasise the unity of philosophical discourse the way the Stoics stressed it in their philosophical system, it may reasonably be concluded that the garden simile did not originate in the Stoic tradition. Hence, it was probably first used by other philosophical schools who also accepted the threefold division of philosophical discourse, and some Stoics just availed themselves of an already traditional simile.

On the other hand, the unity of philosophical discourse is nicely represented in the egg and animal similes; after all, Sextus explicitly states that the animal simile was introduced by Posidonius to bring out the inseparability of the parts of philosophical discourse[9]. But if the animal simile is definitely Posidonius' invention, who was the Stoic philosopher who introduced the egg simile? Of course, it is extremely difficult to answer this

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[9] For the advantages of Posidonius' simile over the others in connection to the unity of philosophical discourse, see: I.G. Kidd, op.cit. 274-275.

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question; however, there is some evidence that may help us at least to exclude some Stoic philosophers from the list of possible candidates. I suggest that it could not have been Chrysippus or Eudromus who first proposed the egg simile, since their view of the division of philosophical discourse would have been rather badly illustrated by the use of this particular simile. Since both Chrysippus and Eudromus preferred the term εἴδη instead of the term μέρη for the parts of philosophical discourse, we should be able to infer that it is unlikely that either of them would have introduced this simile, as the shell, the white, and the yolk of an egg are not its species.

Focusing now on the egg and the animal as the genuinely Stoic similes, we have to ask how effective they are. Actually, if their descriptions in Diogenes and Sextus are analysed more, some further points concerning the function of the two similes become clear. In particular, let us first study the actual comparison of the parts of philosophical discourse with the parts of an egg or of an animal, and then let us examine the order of the parts as it is presented in these similes. In fact, in both aspects our sources differ considerably: That is to say, for Diogenes the shell and the bones are logic, the white and the flesh are ethics, while the yolk and the soul are physics; on the other hand, for Sextus the shell and the bones are also logic, but it is the white and the flesh that are physics, while the yolk and the soul are ethics. Moreover, Diogenes presents the parts of philosophical discourse with the order logic-ethics-physics in both similes; on the other hand, Sextus presents different orders in the two cases, namely the order logic-physics-ethics in the case of the egg simile and the order physics-logic-ethics in the case of the animal simile.

But if we start with the order of the parts in the similes, it soon becomes clear that the two issues are interrelated; in other words, comparing the parts of an egg or of an animal with those of philosophical discourse seems to have depended primarily on which order was actually preferred for a clear exposition of the philosophical theorems. For example, Sextus' presentation of the animal simile corresponds exactly to Posidonius' doctrine about the order of the parts of philosophical discourse; that is to say, since Posidonius accepted physics as his starting point, it obviously made more sense to compare physics with the animal's flesh, logic with the bones, and ethics with the soul. Similarly, since Sextus' description of the order in the egg simile ends with ethics being the yolk, it seems probable that this simile was used by the Stoic philosophers who favoured the order logic-physics-ethics for expository reasons, or because they really wanted to underline the practical aspect of philosophical discourse. Furthermore, I am inclined

to read Diogenes' expositions of the order in the egg and animal similes as a presentation of these similes from the point of view of those who preferred the order logic-ethics-physics for teaching purposes, or because they also needed to stress the crucial role of theology as the initiation to the mysteries.

Hence, the differences in our ancient sources concerning the comparisons between the parts of philosophical discourse and the parts of an egg or of an animal, can be better understood by taking into consideration the different orders suggested by the Stoics for the philosopher's three classes of theorems. Actually, this conclusion proves to be important, for it clearly implies that the different ways of comparing the parts of philosophical discourse with those of an egg or of an animal are not contradictory, and they should not necessarily be interpreted as the outcome of different Stoic views on the significance of the parts of philosophical discourse; rather, as in the case of the differences in the order of the parts of philosophical discourse, these differences could also be perceived as resulting from different views on the exposition of the philosophical theorems.

To conclude, the inquiry into the four problems raised by Diogenes' text shows that the division of philosophy in Stoicism is not merely interesting for its systematic character, but also for the subtle distinctions which it presupposes. Differentiating between philosophy and philosophical discourse, choosing very carefully the terminology used for the parts of philosophical discourse, arranging the order of the parts in accordance with the different occasions, introducing suitable similes to depict the unity of the philosopher's theorems, all these aspects strongly suggest that the Stoics had to offer an elaborate approach to the issues concerning both the variety of philosophical theorems and their unity. So even if the parts of Stoic philosophical discourse do not exactly correspond to the different branches of modern philosophy, the study of the Stoic views does not only prove illuminating for those interested in reconstructing the Stoic philosophical system; it may also help to deepen the insight of those who try to comprehend the diversity as well as the unity of philosophy.

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