

POLEMICAL AUSTRIA

THE RHETORICS OF NATIONAL
IDENTITY: FROM EMPIRE TO
THE SECOND REPUBLIC

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CONTENTS

Preface	5
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Part One

Towards a Theory of Austria

1. <i>Felix Austria?</i>	15
2. Locating Austria	26
3. Austria and Concepts of Identity	55

Part Two

Writing Austria

4. Austria's Identity and the Response to Revolution	77
5. Vienna: Print and Pre-eminence	107

Part Three

Austria: Revived, Reviled, Revised

6. Failure at the First Attempt: The First Republic	133
7. Austrian Identity and the Impediments of History	166
8. Voicing Austria in the Second Republic	193
9. Challenging and Confirming Identity in the Second Republic	215

Notes	255
Bibliography	280
Index	297

PREFACE

This study of the complex nature, development and articulation of Austrian identity began life as a narrowly focused question: how had the decade and a half between the election of Kurt Waldheim to the office of President of the Republic of Austria in the mid-1980s and the entry into coalition government of Jörg Haider's populist right-wing party at the start of the new millennium – events provoking international disapproval – manifested themselves in the way Austrians talked about their country and represented themselves in public utterances? After all, it did appear initially curious that an immensely prosperous country by world standards should experience such a crisis of identity at the close of the twentieth century or that such a small country standing outside any military alliance could attract worldwide attention for reasons which the country found both disconcerting and unwelcome.

Very soon it became clear to me that the neatness of such a strictly defined time framework would hardly do justice to the issues involved, and that readers looking for some explanation for the upheavals in Austrian self-perception would be ill served by such a limitation. Contemporary Austrian identity is the product of a long and involved process, one over which Austrians themselves have had little influence for much of that time.

To attempt a more adequate explanation required at the very least a return to the beginning of the nineteenth century and to a consideration of the impact of the Napoleonic wars upon the need for nations and states to define and justify themselves. This study therefore became an attempt to follow the emergence

of particular rhetorical traditions employed to express the often nebulous concept of Austria, and then to trace in particular how those traditions manifested themselves after 1945 in the life of the Second Republic.

Other countries have also struggled with their identity and their very composition. Germany, Italy and Spain, for example, are much larger entities than modern-day Austria, and the scale of loss of life in the making of those states has also been considerably greater, with the consequence that Austria has been either neglected or else only referred to along with other smaller states when illustrative examples were felt to be illuminating. But it has always struck me that Austria is especially difficult to force into a mega-theory of either nationalism or identity formation and it thus requires a specific discussion, for much that pertains to it stands in opposition to general trends in nation and state creation. It is my hope that this work will give those coming new to the study of Austria some insight into the unique problems facing a structure that went from a large continental empire to a small Alpine republic more or less overnight. How the Second Republic, the Austria emerging out of the Second World War, coped with this legacy forms the dominating theme of the last part of this study.

The arrangement of the book is in part chronological in its ordering, especially in the earlier chapters. When we encounter in later chapters the emergence of the Second Republic after 1945 it sometimes treats the same material and events across several chapters, but approaches them from different angles in order to highlight particular problems facing the emergence of a stable Austrian identity. I have tried to keep in mind, and that of readers, the particular events in history that may have triggered a response. Often the occasion is long since forgotten, and this makes for perplexity for those attempting from a later standpoint to reconstruct the fortunes and vicissitudes of the notion of Austria. The book may be read as a narrative, for it is the story of the emerging struggle for an Austrian identity, but it is also hoped that the individual sections are able to stand alone, should the

reader be seeking a particular discussion, and that each chapter may also be taken as a freestanding essay. The book's nine chapters are formed into three parts, with each part dwelling on what were felt to be significant elements in the formation and defence of Austrian identity. The first part takes Austria in the twenty-first century as its starting-point and asks the questions: when did the need for a definition of Austria become urgent, and who required such a definition? This section then attempts to place that identity against the broad spectrum of theoretical approaches to national identity, and to explain how difficult it is to place Austria within many of the theoretical models encountered in the academic literature. Part Two considers the articulation of an Austrian identity against the background of emerging European industrial states in the nineteenth century and in an age approaching near-universal literacy. Particular attention is placed here on Vienna and on the rhetorical strategies adopted by the flood of publications emanating from that city which were becoming readily available to the citizens and subjects of the Empire. The antipathy between Vienna and provincial Austria has proved to be a further stumbling-block to the emergence of a strong and all-embracing notion of Austrian national identity. In Part Three we encounter the problems faced by the unwanted First Republic and its failure to assert successfully its young identity between the two World Wars. The final chapters of the book not only spend time looking at how the Second Republic in 1945 began to articulate its identity in the shadow of the country's absorption into the Third Reich in 1938, but also draws attention to the many ways post-1945 Austria was still frequently driven back to the rhetorical strategies of earlier times. Here it devotes attention to what had been the initial question raised by this study, the impact of the Waldheim and Haider phenomena on Austria's self-understanding, since they were events which exposed the fragility of Austrian national identity.

The range of material under discussion is intentionally eclectic and draws on work from political theorists, politicians, playwrights and authors, journalists, historians, architects, satirists, cartoonists

and diplomats. This study also considers material, some of it decidedly ephemeral, that is often neglected by political and literary historians alike. It draws on nineteenth-century pamphlets, on theatre productions, on twentieth-century election campaign slogans, on draft constitutional bills that were never enacted, on the cinema, on radio addresses, diary entries, street names and the occasional incautious but recorded aside. Austrians encounter expressions of their identity in many forms, ranging from scholarly treatises, ostensibly light-hearted television or radio chat shows, or simply the packaging of chocolates in the country's national colours. They are also challenged constantly in their assumptions, as they are, for example, when a player for the national football team bears on his shirt an unmistakably Turkish name. This study has tried to reflect the diversity of these many and very different forms of expression.

Not all the key players in this book are or were Austrians, for it is remarkable just how many influential voices in the formation of the idea of Austria came from outside the borders of present-day Austria. A further, and accidental, discovery was just how many of the principal players held law degrees from the University of Vienna, a phenomenon perhaps worthy in itself of further study. The law also offers undeniably the most striking example of the existence of some remarkable continuities in Austrian identity despite all the upheavals that have beset the country, for up to the present day the legal system of Austria is still based on the civil code introduced in 1812, *Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch* (ABGB).

Although not intended as a literary history, numerous references have been made to individual writers, for understandably these issues have claimed their attention. Writers have often been responsible for insisting that Austrian public opinion engage with the country's history, and as practitioners of language the country's writers have had a highly developed ear for some of the false tones of national rhetoric. It is in the sphere of literature too that for once, especially in the Second Republic, the voice of women has become able, albeit slowly, to be heard.

This work makes no attempt to enter fully into the field of research devoted to the study of the voices to be found in public opinion surveys or similar popular expressions, although readers are pointed in that direction in the final chapter. The study is conscious too of many other elements that could have been brought legitimately within the compass of this discussion. It is probably difficult, for instance, for many English-speaking readers to gauge the importance of sporting success in international skiing competitions to the formation and securing of an Austrian identity, whilst a chapter could have been devoted to the theme of identity and incarceration in the light of the Natascha Kampusch and Josef Fritzl kidnapping scandals which shocked Austrian society in the first decade of the twenty-first century and led to considerable speculation regarding the alleged repressed psyche of the Austrian character. I also felt it essential to draw attention to Austria's many provincial identities, for although they form part of a Federal Republic the provinces also often look back on a more venerable and stable identity than the Austrian Republic itself.

Many of the elements making up the debate regarding Austria remain a constant over the years despite the markedly different circumstances in which they are discussed. This study's conclusion, provisional as it must be given the nature of its subject, was not the one I had initially expected. I had not expected the intense and often caustic dissection of Austrian society by Austrian writers and social commentators in the Second Republic to do anything but undermine the concept of an Austrian identity. Yet despite the anger and sometimes despair exhibited, this intense preoccupation with Austria was also an expression that those commenting sensed they were dealing with something very specific. This study draws particular attention in its concluding pages to those whom it sees as constituting the principal carriers of the notion of an Austrian identity. My expectation had been originally that it would be the political élites who would have performed this task, since they obviously had a vested interest in the concept, yet I hope I have demonstrated that many of the key and effective players were and are to be found elsewhere. Readers may, however, draw very

different conclusions on the basis of the material presented to them in this volume, and if this study stimulates them to read further I shall be very satisfied. The bibliography deliberately caters for those who may be comfortable in both German and English, but also for those who have little or no German but nevertheless have an interest in the fascinating but elusive problem of European identities, and there is now available a growing and stimulating corpus of scholarship in English addressing the question of Austrian identity.

I am very conscious of the many lacunae in this work. Those possessing a far deeper knowledge of Austria than I have will have no difficulty in recalling the many names I have not treated here, or only in passing, yet who could legitimately be said to represent important or at least characteristic elements in the search for and articulation of Austrian identity; these names range from Joseph Freiherr von Sonnenfels, the voice of Enlightenment Austria who tried so hard to improve Austrian tastes, to Guido Zernatto, an influential figure in the Patriotic Front during the inter-war years and a man who attempted to come to some form of understanding with the National Socialists before going into American exile and an early death. (Both Sonnenfels and Zernatto had studied law in Vienna.) Missing too is a full discussion of the gifted Jura Soyfer, a left-wing journalist, satirist and cabaret writer who tragically left it too late to go into exile. Nor was there space for Alfred Kubin's uniquely esoteric evocation of social dislocation in his 1909 novel *Die andere Seite*. The very broad nature of this study often insisted on a harsh process of selectivity

All quotations given in German have been translated by me if not stated otherwise. It has certainly not always been easy to capture the tone or flavour of comments made in dialect, but by providing translations I hope the book will serve the needs and interests of readers for whom German is not a working language. All quotations in German have been given in the orthography in which they were printed in the source material. This means there will be some discrepancies in spelling between quotations printed from before and after the German spelling reform. It also means,

for instance, the name ‘Dollfuß’ in German quotations often appears as ‘Dollfuss’ in English sources.

I have incurred an immense debt of gratitude to a number of colleagues and institutions, and it is a pleasure to acknowledge this debt. The British Academy supported my research work in Vienna, making it possible for me to consult material held in the Austrian National Library, a building situated close to the spot where Hitler announced the entry of his Austrian homeland into the German Reich in 1938. The Austrian ambassador in London, His Excellency Dr Emil Brix, and the Director of the Austrian Cultural Forum in London, were instrumental in supporting an international conference which Martin Liebscher and I organized in 2010 at the Ingeborg Bachmann Centre and the Institute of Germanic and Romance Studies, University of London, dedicated to an initial exploration of the theme of this study. The Governing Body of St. John’s College, Oxford generously granted me a visiting scholarship, which allowed me space and facilities during the final stages of preparing the manuscript, and I am deeply indebted to the college and its members for their hospitality. The College of Arts and Humanities of Bangor University has also been most supportive of this project, and I have appreciated the encouragement of many friends and colleagues. The University Press at Cardiff and its commissioning editor Sarah Lewis have once more shown their commitment to Austrian studies and I am most thankful to them, along with two anonymous readers, for the invariably constructive advice and guidance offered and received. Henry Maas and Dr Dafydd Jones gave valuable assistance preparing the manuscript for publication. The remaining errors of judgement and fact are, however, very much all my own work.

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PART ONE

**TOWARDS A THEORY
OF AUSTRIA**

CHAPTER ONE

FELIX AUSTRIA?

Introducing a small handbook of facts and figures about Austria, the type of publication produced by most governments, but here uncharacteristically without a date of publication, the Chancellor of the Republic of Austria, Dr Wolfgang Schüssel, wrote in his short preface lines that would be the envy of any political leader:

Österreich ist ein leistungsfähiges Land. Die Bilanz der wirtschaftlichen, kulturellen und soziologischen Entwicklungen seit 1945 zeigt Österreichs Erfolgsgeschichte. Dies hat auch zu dem Ruf unseres Landes als ‘Insel der Seeligen’ (*sic*) beigetragen.¹

(Austria is a competitive and efficient country. The record of its economic, cultural and social development since 1945 is a story of success, helping our country to earn the reputation of being an ‘island of the blessed’.)

The Chancellor had indeed much to be pleased about in what must have been late 2004 or early 2005. By any international standards most Austrians had tangible cause for contentment as they looked back on their country’s history since 1945. Austria’s citizens were now enjoying some of the highest standards of living on the planet, the Republic’s welfare provision was exceptionally good, and in such countable areas as low youth unemployment rates or the least number of days lost through industrial disputes Austria had been ranked for years amongst the world’s leaders. Its status as a neutral and non-aligned state meant that the Republic and its

citizens were not involved in costly or bloody military operations apart from some small-scale peace-keeping duties on behalf of the United Nations, an expression of Austria's laudable desire to contribute to the well-being of the international order. After some initial nervousness, the Republic of Austria had also weathered the tensions surrounding the collapse of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s and the subsequent implosion of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a state with which it had shared an at times contested border. To its east Austria suddenly found itself flanked by former Warsaw Pact states that had embraced with alacrity market economy values, thereby offering Austrian enterprises considerable, and very profitable, opportunities for increased trading and the chance to export advanced Austrian technical and commercial know-how to newly emerging economies. Chancellor Schüssel had good cause to be personally satisfied too, as his photograph accompanying the preface suggested. His gamble in breaking away in the late 1990s from Austria's traditional grand coalition pattern of post-war government seemed to have paid off. The price had been coalition with Jörg Haider's Freedom Party, which had enjoyed breathtaking success in the 1999 elections. Schüssel was leader of the conservative People's Party, the ÖVP, and although his party had performed poorly at that election, receiving fewer popular votes than either Haider's right-wing populist Freedom Party, the FPÖ, or Austria's Socialist Party, the SPÖ, Schüssel was politically shrewd enough to make the most of a weak hand by forming a government with the politically inexperienced Freedom Party. The international response to a Freedom Party in government in Vienna was initially one of alarm and protest. Schüssel, however, was to keep his political nerve, and by the time of the next elections in 2002 his party had recovered well enough to emerge as the strongest party whilst the Freedom Party fell back with the loss of thirty-four of its seats in the lower house of Austria's Parliament, the Nationalrat.² Schüssel prolonged the coalition with the Freedom Party but it looked as if the populist upsurge had been tamed. It was little wonder therefore that he felt and looked secure in the photograph accompanying

his preface. (Interestingly, in earlier years such publications carried pictures of all the Republic's past and serving chancellors and presidents. His was now the only picture, and the absence of a date of publication might even suggest that Austria's contentment had become truly timeless.) His preface did make mention of one date in history, 1945, and that date alone would serve many purposes. It was the date which would act as a base line for modern Austria, a state popularly referred to as the Second Republic. Using the end of World War Two as the point of departure for most measurements and comparisons implied that there was no need to look back any further to earlier dates. The shadow of the weak First Republic, created out of the chaos of the defeat of 1918 and the ending of over six centuries of Habsburg rule, was just that: a mere spectre, an unpleasant but fading memory that had not even been experienced by most living and voting Austrians in the early part of the twenty-first century. And 1945 was, at least to those who could still remember their basic European history, the point at which Austria disentangled itself, or more accurately had been disentangled by the Allies, from its incorporation into the German Third Reich. The final element in the quotation above taken from the preface, the accolade of being an island of the blessed, was surely an example of Austria being more Catholic than the Pope, for it was a variation on an expression used by Pope Paul VI on the occasion of a visit to the Vatican of Austria's President Franz Jonas in 1971. In the early 1970s Austria was still a solidly Catholic society, as it had been for centuries. The Jesuits had ensured such a state of affairs by encouraging the forcible expulsion of Protestants within Habsburg territory in the wake of the Counter-Reformation. Luther's Bible translation into German had spread dangerously quickly amongst the independently minded and literate skilled craftsmen of Vienna, and without a concerted effort by the emperor and the Church large parts of the Habsburg territories could well have joined the Reformation lands to the north.³ That threat had passed and, with the exception of Vienna, modern Austria would remain a generally loyal and obedient ally of the Vatican. Even as late as the 1970s there was

little sign amongst Austrian Catholics of that querulous nature of more progressive Dutch Catholics whose spirit of liberalism was causing their bishops so many problems. Pope Paul VI rewarded Church obedience and apparent social harmony by bestowing the expression 'Insel der Glücklichen' (island of the happy, or fortunate) upon Austria when he received President Jonas. It was in the subsequent repeating of the expression that Austrians took the opportunity to upgrade the term from happy to blessed and so imbue it with even greater pontifical and religious fervour.

Austria: a country of the prosperous and a land enjoying, or so it would seem, divine sanction. Schüssel's description of the process as a success story could hardly be gainsaid. Sixty years on since Austria's emergence from the end of a painful war was an undeniably appropriate time-span for taking stock, and the chancellor and many of his generation would also have been conscious of many other anniversaries now inviting comparison between Austria's present, happy state and far more difficult times in previous decades. It had been half a century since the State Treaty had been signed in 1955, restoring Austria's sovereignty after a decade of foreign occupation by the Americans, the British, the French and the Soviet Union, and although many Austrians would claim that the period under Hitler's rule following the Nazi annexation of 1938 had been a violation of Austrian statehood, it did not follow that most Austrians regarded the presence of those armies which had ended that occupation as therefore worthy of being hailed as forces of liberation. Other anniversaries also lurked beneath the surface, although there remained considerable reluctance to evoke them for fear of unleashing unresolved antagonisms. At the time that Schüssel's preface was published Austria's short-lived civil war of 1934 already lay seven decades in the past, an event most Europeans would today struggle to recall, given the hold on the imagination of the ferocity of the Spanish civil war which had broken out two years later in 1936. This would be understandable, for the Austrian civil war had claimed a few hundred lives and some ten executions were carried out. Approximate calculations for the Spanish civil war, by contrast,

suggest half a million killed and a slightly lower number forced into exile. Yet the Austrian civil war would paralyse Austrian politics for decades just as much as Spain's civil war and its unimaginable brutality would shape the course of political life on the Iberian peninsula. Initially the Austrian civil war guaranteed with disastrous consequences that the non-Nazi parties in Austria would be incapable of combining to form a united front in the face of Germany's annexation ambitions. The longer-term impact of the civil war would be of a different nature but also insidious to the development of democratic traditions within the Second Republic. Post-war Austria coped with its painful history initially not by a fearless and in-depth re-examination of its past, but by an act of denial, by putting its history to rest without further disturbance. Accordingly the little handbook for which Schüssel wrote the preface offered startlingly few dates from the inter-war period. It finds it important to relate that 1920 was the year the most easterly and least populated province Burgenland was admitted into the young Republic but makes no mention of the dates of the many plebiscites in which most of the other provinces in the early 1920s voted to join Germany or Switzerland, an expression of the despair most Austrians felt over a future in the truncated state which the Allies had granted Austrians after the fragmentation of the Empire. Other and far more fateful dates for which one would search in vain in the handbook included the shooting of Socialist demonstrators in the Burgenland village of Schattendorf in January 1927, an event which in turn provoked an arson attack upon Vienna's Palace of Justice in July 1927 following the acquittal of those right-wingers charged with the shooting at Schattendorf. The burning down of the Justizpalast was regarded as an expression of class war and drove a wedge through any hope of social harmony in the new Republic. The civil war, the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss in July 1934 during a failed Nazi putsch, and the unopposed entry of German troops into Austria in March 1938 also receive no mention in Schüssel's preface or anywhere else in that government publication.

Harmony after 1945 would thus be achieved at the cost of

partial amnesia. Avoidance of any confrontation with its own painful past became not only a psychological tool to avoid self-scrutiny; it was an approach instrumentalized by the Austrian state to ensure national and social cohesion. Robert Menasse, an untiring critic of the way in which post-war Austria had dealt with its historical legacy after 1945, expressed the rationale used in these terms:

Die Gründerväter der Zweiten Republik, die erlebt hatten, daß Menschen wegen ihrer Gesinnung verfolgt worden sind, beschlossen, damit dies nie wieder geschehe, ein System zu errichten, in dem man sich ohne Gesinnung zusammensetzen kann.⁴

(The founding fathers of the Second Republic, who had witnessed people being persecuted for their convictions, resolved that, in order to prevent such things happening again, a system should be put in place in which people could be brought together without the need for any conviction.)

Menasse's perspective of viewing the Second Republic as a state constructed upon the foundations of ahistoricism might be explained by many influences at work: initially after the end of World War Two there was a reluctance by an older generation of politicians to go over troubled ground or to antagonize those many Austrians who had been stripped of their voting rights by virtue of the denazification legislation but whose disenfranchisement was not a lifetime ban and who could therefore be expected to reappear as a sizeable element in post-war electoral equations. This neglect of Austria's recent history explained in part the intensity of response and the subsequent convulsions caused not only by the rise of Jörg Haider but was also the fall-out from an equally turbulent time in Austrian politics a decade earlier which had been brought about by the election in the mid-1980s of Kurt Waldheim to the office of president of the Republic of Austria. The international furore surrounding Waldheim's election campaign against a background of serious allegations challenging his own minimalist account of

his record as a serving officer in the German Wehrmacht during World War Two will be discussed later in this study, but both the Waldheim and the Haider phenomenon deeply disturbed Austria's preferred projection of itself. It would provoke, as will be shown later in this study, a belated and intense occupation by Austrian writers, intellectuals, journalists and professional historians with Austria's history and Austrian identity. But the drift towards a position in which Austria placed itself outside of history had been detected some time before the Waldheim débâcle. By the late 1970s a former editor-in-chief of *Die Presse*, a leading Viennese newspaper with roots going back to the year of revolution in 1848, surveyed post-war Austria and could see a country that had placed its own history behind itself and was now lying comfortably in the autumn sunshine and resting, as he expressed it, against the wall of its house whilst securely sheltered against any cruel winds that might still be blowing outside.⁵ The distinguished Austrian historian and political scientist Anton Pelinka saw such a stance as part of the inevitable and necessary process of national healing and self-protection, but he nevertheless recognized such strategies as also belonging to a world of taboos and self-deception.⁶

Schüssel's confidence was shared by another conservative chancellor of Austria, Josef Klaus, and in another preface, this time in a work published in 1965 and thus marking the first two decades of Austria's post-war reconstruction, *Zwanzig Jahre Zweite Republik*.⁷ The book's subtitle, 'Austria finds its way back to itself', acknowledged unmistakably a country that had been blown off course but had now rediscovered itself. It is remarkable how much Klaus's preface anticipated Schüssel's. No date before 1945 was offered as a constituent of Austria's modern identity. The preface does not deny the darker and more painful aspects of Austrian identity, but the roots of that pain had been visited upon Austria by forces that were not indigenous to the country but had been imposed from outside, by a 'ein landfremdes System' (an alien system). As in Schüssel's preface, the name of Germany is never invoked. Klaus, like Schüssel, is keen to talk of the Second Republic in terms of success. Indeed 'der größte Erfolg' (the

greatest success) of the Second Republic as it celebrated its first twenty years was, according to Klaus, the creation of a sense of community, 'Gemeinschaft', uniting all Austrians after years of division. Like Schüssel, Klaus looked at Austria's record sheet and was well satisfied with what he found, and clear distance between now and the past is claimed, for twenty years have been enough to permit conclusions on that achievement, 'ein abschließendes Bild' (a concluding picture), to be drawn. Klaus was no more generous than Schüssel to his political rivals, but at least he names two of his predecessors, Leopold Figl and Julius Raab, both from his own party, as the main architects of the Second Republic's success. Nor did Klaus lose the opportunity to identify his own party, the ÖVP, as the principal contributor to the emergence of this successful new Austria, although he stressed that such a view stood above any party political evaluation.⁸ Klaus concluded by stating that the various contributions in the book demonstrated impressively that Austria had once again found its firm place in the consciousness of the rest of Europe, of the world and, above all, amongst Austrians themselves, as if they were the last constituency still to be convinced. Both chancellors did not shy away from emotional language. For Klaus the reborn Austrian state had found its way, he claimed, into the hearts of the Austrian people; forty years on, and this modern Austria was for Schüssel firmly embedded in the very heart of Europe ('eingebettet im Herzen Europas').

Eulogy, optimism, party political opportunism, a newspaper industry lacking at times in credibility, and amnesia, both individual and institutional – to talk about Austria is to encounter a myriad of approaches towards the phenomenon of Austria that so often refuses to come into focus. It would be tempting to dismiss much of what Schüssel and Klaus wrote about post-war Austria as merely the obligatory cheerfulness of serving politicians in high office, were it not for the fact that the prosperity and the civil cohesion of Austria's Second Republic which they invoked in their respective prefaces had become tangible achievements. What appeared at first sight to be Klaus's shameless praise of his own party's contribution to the restoration of an Austrian identity was not so misplaced: the

ÖVP was to provide all the elected chancellors of the country after the war until 1970, when Bruno Kreisky became the first post-war Socialist chancellor. And the Austrian Conservatives and even the Austrian Communists were to find their way back to an Austrian identity well before the Austrian Socialists had overcome their own considerable ideological reservations regarding an independent Austrian state. In the years running up to the First World War Rosa Luxemburg, in a series of astute articles for the Polish journal *Przegląd socjaldemokratyczny* on the problems of nationality and autonomy, had been conscious of the struggle that Austrian Social Democrats were experiencing in attempting to resolve the nationality problem within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and it was only after the ending of the Second World War that the Socialist Party finally became firmly committed to an Austrian state.

Those differences between the various Austrian parties and factions, and between individual Austrians, serve as a reminder that in any debate on the nature of Austria there are various and conflicting time-scales involved. The contributors to the debate are often on widely diverging historical cycles, bringing to the already diffused issue of Austrian identity markedly different sets of memory and historical legacies. This was most obviously expressed after 1945 in the attitude displayed towards the First Republic. Unlike West Germany, where there was much talk – much of it unfounded – of starting afresh, a notion encapsulated in such terms as ‘Stunde Null’, ‘tabula rasa’ or ‘Kahlschlag’ (zero hour, clean slate or radical new beginning), the general view in Austria was very different. To believe in a completely new beginning was considered an unacceptable concession to the impact of National Socialism and an acknowledgement of the brittleness of the notion of an independent Austria. For many Austrians after 1945 it was important to minimize the damage done by the Anschluss, the Nazi annexation, and to maintain the validity of eternal Austrian values, and thus important to reconnect with the First Republic as an expression of historical and cultural continuity which had been only temporarily dented, but certainly not permanently damaged,

by its incorporation into Hitler's greater Germany. The problem was to agree on the question of which part of the First Republic should be the point of reconnection. Logically and legally there was good sense in turning to that date on which Austria had ceased to exist: 12 March 1938, the date of the German invasion. Although acceptable to Austrian Conservatives and the inheritors of the party tradition of Chancellors Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, the date was unacceptable to those on the left of Austrian politics, for by 1938 they had already been driven underground and into a state of illegality by Dollfuss's authoritarian, one-party corporate state, the *Ständestaat*. Socialists and Austria's Communist Party, the latter an electorally spent political force in the very early years of the Second Republic, looked to the founding years of the First Republic as the legitimate point of continuity. Thus even when Austrians after 1945 believed in the idea of Austria it was not automatically the same Austria.

Why had the notion of Austria proved such a difficult concept to maintain or assert? Why did Chancellors Klaus and Schüssel feel compelled to choose their material so selectively and why was it only as late as 8 July 1991, almost half a century after the Second World War, that an Austrian Chancellor, this time the Socialist Franz Vranitzky, felt the country was now strong enough for it to bear his declaration before the Austrian Parliament:

Wir bekennen uns zu allen Daten unserer Geschichte und zu den Taten aller Teile unseres Volkes, zu den guten wie zu den bösen.⁹

(We acknowledge and accept all the dates of our history and the deeds of all sections of our nation, both the good deeds and the evil ones.)

Some of the answers to these questions reside in the upheavals of Central European politics in the first half of the twentieth century, and much will be found in the history of Germany, no matter how hard Austrian politicians have attempted at times to airbrush Germany out of the equation of Austrian identity. Yet these issues also have roots which lie much further back, and in the case of

Austrian identity they often developed almost counter-intuitively, moving against the general grain of European history and the emergence of nation states following the Napoleonic wars.

In his preface to a collection of essays by some of Germany's leading historians devoted to problem of writing contemporary history in the twenty-first century, Hans-Georg Golz argued that the old continent of Europe lacked but needed a new narrative which could lift national histories into a greater pan-European story.¹⁰ Austria's problems lay in the opposite direction. In the fifteenth century the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus could speak of the Habsburg Empire as a land of the fortunate, 'Felix Austria'. Contentment is not what the succeeding centuries would bring. Austria has needed to find its own narrative thread amidst the many external and competing claims that have challenged its identity. An understanding of the complexities and the vagaries of Austrian identity before the twentieth century will allow a better appreciation of the difficulties facing those attempting to articulate the nature of a concept of Austria after 1945. It will be in large measure also a study in the language used to evoke this concept, for Austria has often existed principally in its evocation and, as such, is subject to influences that more often than not cannot withstand strict academic or scientific scrutiny. Austria has been argued into and out of existence many times, leaving the search for substance an often Sisyphean task.

CHAPTER TWO

LOCATING AUSTRIA

Austria as an Issue

On 1 January 2010 the London newspaper *The Times* celebrated its two hundred and twenty-fifth anniversary, and, as a present to its readers, it gave away facsimile editions of the very first issue of the newspaper from Saturday, 1 January 1785, when the paper had appeared under its initial, ambitious and rather unwieldy title of *The Daily Universal Register*. To those of a certain age today the appearance of that first number would not be totally unfamiliar. The front page was taken up with numerous small advertisements giving a fascinating glimpse of people's daily concerns towards the end of the eighteenth century: a Mrs King begged leave to inform friends of her intention to open a school for young ladies at Chigwell in Essex. One must fear that even in the eighteenth century the reputation of Essex girls was the source of some concern. In another advert a publisher's notice alerted readers to the appearance of a new novel with the inviting and intriguing title of *The Young Widow, or the History of Mrs Ledwich*. If that caught readers' attention they would no doubt have been attracted by a further title on offer: *A Lesson for Lovers or the History of Colonel Melville and Lady Richly* – two volumes for 7 shillings, and for those writers who have ever received a bad review at the hands of an unsympathetic critic there was great encouragement to be taken from a pamphlet offered for sale and directed to the readers of the *London Medical Journal*, a pamphlet which the author had produced in order 'to improve the Principles and Manners of the Editor...'

There was also, however, far more substantial matter within. On page 2 of that very first issue could be encountered significant news from abroad. Given that the first edition of the paper consisted of only four pages, the ratio of foreign news to the rest of the paper's content was probably greater in 1785 than can be found in British newspapers more than two centuries later, and there was certainly plenty to report concerning grave military matters in Europe, and in particular regarding troop movements across the continent. For the purposes of any discussion on Austria the column entitled 'Foreign Intelligence' is most revealing. In the course of its report the term 'Austria' or 'Austrian' is used four times and, almost as perfect synonyms and without further qualification, the terms 'Imperial' and 'Emperor' can be encountered ten times. For good measure, and for those who subscribe to the statistical school of historical research, it is perhaps worth noting that the term 'Prussia' appeared but once in this report and the expression 'German' or 'Germany' not at all.

In other words, those behind this publication felt that their fellow citizens buying the paper on the streets of London on that first Saturday in 1785 would have not the slightest difficulty in coping with the expression 'Austria' and that there was no need for further elucidation; it was enough to write the word 'Emperor' for the reader to be expected to know unmistakably that this was a reference to Joseph II and that Vienna was not a peripheral or distant place but rather represented the centre of a major European power. It would appear at first sight, therefore, that Austrian identity was not causing any problem to Londoners in the 1780s, and it might initially be concluded that the question of Austrian identity has been much overstated subsequently or even professionalised by academics who have made a career out of discussing such topics. Admittedly Austria may not be a simple matter to define, but neither are such concepts as 'happiness', or 'love', or 'beauty', yet most people instinctively know what they mean by these ideas even if they cannot give definitions that would satisfy perfectly philosophers or the compilers of dictionaries. It was an approach used by Germany's most renowned writer of the twentieth century, Thomas Mann, when

he insisted in 1936 in reply to the question whether there was such a thing as a distinct Austrian literary tradition, one quite separate from Germany's, that there was indeed: 'Die spezifische Besonderheit der österreichischen Literatur ist zwar nicht leicht zu bestimmen, aber jeder empfindet sie'¹ (Admittedly the uniquely specific quality of Austrian literature is difficult to define but we all sense it). It would appear that that we know what we know.

A similar contradiction can be found in that most sensitive of writers and scholars, W. G. Sebald. Introducing a collection of essays devoted to Austrian literature, Sebald detected that, despite all the vicissitudes Austria had experienced in the course of its history, one constant in the otherwise nebulous idea of an Austrian literature had been a characteristic preoccupation with the idea of 'Heimat' (home). Yet this presupposed, of course, that Austrian writers knew what and where that Heimat was.²

But both Austria and the London of 1785 belonged to a pre-revolutionary world order, and certainly by the time of the appearance of Napoleon we begin to sense that the question of Austrian identity is not such a straightforward matter. In part the problem resided in the fact that the ruling dynasty of the Habsburg family had come to their considerable power and property centuries before the era and before the vocabulary of modern nationalism. After the emergence of a republican France Austrian identity would struggle hard, and never completely succeed, in its attempts to counter, or simply adjust to, the emerging vocabulary of modern nationalism that developed steadily through the course of the nineteenth century.

To this must be added the lack of political and military success which handicapped from the early nineteenth century onwards Austria in most of its manoeuvres to defend or define its identity, and so the impression gained is that of a chess-player holding a losing position; and the majority of Austria's moves were to become forced moves ('Zwangszüge' to use the technical chess term in German) brought about in response to the stronger and usually superior tactics of its opponents.

Few of the actions taken by Austria throughout the nineteenth century were really what those who held power in Vienna would

have wanted. Relinquishing in August 1806 the symbolic title of Holy Roman Emperor of the German Nation was just one of many reluctant decisions taken as the court in Vienna gave way to growing external and internal pressures. The concessions made in the face of civil unrest in 1830 and 1848 were yielded grudgingly and were rescinded wherever and whenever possible. The great settlement between Vienna and the intransigent Hungarians, the 'Ausgleich' of 1867, was born out of the disastrous military confrontation with Prussia a year earlier and Austria's comprehensive defeat at the battle of Königgrätz on 3 July 1866, a battle which demonstrated Prussia's tactical, strategic and industrial superiority over Austria and her allies. And nobody in the War Ministry in Vienna – a department incidentally that could not even sustain the title Reichskriegsministerium (Imperial War Ministry) because of the complex composition of the Dual Monarchy and had therefore been obliged to return in 1911 to its former prosaic title of Kriegsministerium (War Ministry)³ – nobody there would have argued, say, in 1912 that what the country needed was a war out of which a small Alpine republic would emerge, yet this is of course what happened after 1918 as the First Republic eventually arose out of the sprawling and defunct empire.

Austria after the First World War

The history of the first Austrian Republic proclaimed in 1919 would be marked by an unending litany of decisions either thwarted or thrust upon the country against its will. Even if we put aside the conditions contained in the Treaty of Saint-Germain in 1919, which dictated the fate of the Empire, Austria found many of its aspirations denied or its decision-making simply overturned. Large numbers of Austrians would have supported the concept of 'Deutschösterreich' (German Austria) in 1918, the idea of a post-war Austria merging with Germany, yet this aspiration was blocked and the various regional referendums expressing a desire for union with Germany, or in one case Switzerland, were

dismissed or actively discouraged by the Allies. Two further vital decisions were withheld from Austria in the course of the short-lived First Republic of the 1920s and 1930s: Austria's wish for a customs union with Germany in the mid-1920s in an attempt to solve a desperate economic situation was vetoed by the Allies. And when Kurt Schuschnigg, the last Austrian Chancellor before the start of the Second World War, finally roused himself into action in 1938, his referendum to endorse Austrian independence was also denied the people of Austria when Hitler moved his army into Austria before that referendum could take place.

This cumulative impression of a nation prevented from shaping its own destiny persists with surprising tenacity well into the life of the Second Republic. Few Austrians in 1945 would have wished for a ten-year occupation before sovereignty was restored in 1955, yet this is what happened to Austria. Part of the deal to persuade the Soviet Union to leave occupied Austria was the country's pledge not to enter into military alliances. Permanent neutrality may well have been a price most Austrians were willing to pay, yet sovereignty surely embraced the right of a state to enter into any alliance it wished to, and at will.

Austria had little say in either the start or the cessation of the Cold War or the lifting of the Iron Curtain. It has had to watch the countries with which it shares international borders come and go, and it has had only moderate influence upon such events. There have been great disappointments too. Immediately after 1945 there was a real conviction in certain circles in Austria that the painful issue of the South Tyrol, the territory ceded to Italy after the First World War as a reward for Rome changing allegiances, could be revisited with the possibility of favourable renegotiation. This belief was grounded in the assumption that the Allies would regard Italy in 1946 in a very different light to the Italy of 1919. Yet these hopes were to be unfulfilled. Austrians' reading of history was not to be shared by those who had the power to make the necessary changes.

The Second Republic and its people did make two profound decisions that would be fulfilled. The first was in a way a negative

decision: the early post-war general elections in November 1945 and October 1949 gave a clear indication that the country had little enthusiasm for supporting the Communist Party despite a sizeable Communist movement in Austria in the inter-war years, and this wish to be free of both Communists and the Soviet Red Army was eventually realized after a decade of occupation.⁴ The second decision came much later and is one that perhaps still deserves more attention because it has been rather the exception than the rule in Austria's history since Napoleon for the country to express an intention and then see it fulfilled: this event was the referendum on joining the European Union when over 66 per cent of Austrians who voted on 12 June 1994 supported membership.⁵ But the habit of the outside world directing Austria's decisions has persisted. Having remained out of world news for years, prosperous post-war Austria found itself at the uncomfortable centre of international attention when Dr Kurt Waldheim, a former UN general secretary, stood for election to the presidency of the Second Republic in 1986. Claims were made that Waldheim had suppressed many details regarding his wartime service and had in fact been part of an army unit, so it was alleged, that was responsible for transporting Balkan Jews to concentration camps in Germany. Whatever the merits of these accusations were, the Austrian outburst 'Wir wählen, wen *wir* wollen' (We'll elect whom we want) at the time of the Waldheim election gave an indication of the irritation felt in some quarters at what was perceived as outside interference in a purely internal matter. This tradition of external direction, it could be argued, was manifested well into the life of the Second Republic with the extraordinary international response to the formation of the new right-wing government in the year 2000, a government reliant on the support of the Freedom Party leader Jörg Haider.

Austria and Europe

The ensuing ostracism of Austria within the European Union and beyond is a complex issue, examined at a later point in this study, but it is in some way part of that phenomenon of Austria's decisions being subject to external revision, if not outright prohibition. Rhetorically the response to the EU's disapproval of the formation of right-wing coalition is interesting. The new Austrian government felt obliged to issue in February 2000 a declaration entitled 'Verantwortung für Österreich – Zukunft im Herzen Europas' (Responsibility for Austria – A Future in the Heart of Europe) and it revealed that the government in Vienna had mastered impeccably a rhetoric acceptable to Brussels. The opening section from the document began:

Die Bundesregierung bekräftigt ihre unerschütterliche Verbundenheit mit den geistigen und sittlichen Werten, die das gemeinsame Erbe der Völker Europas sind und der persönlichen Freiheit, der politischen Freiheit und der Herrschaft des Rechts zugrunde liegen, auf denen jede wahre Demokratie beruht. Die Bundesregierung tritt für Respekt, Toleranz und Verständnis für alle Menschen ein, ungeachtet ihrer Herkunft, Religion oder Weltanschauung. Sie verurteilt und bekämpft mit Nachdruck jegliche Form von Diskriminierung, Intoleranz und Verhetzung in allen Bereichen. Sie erstrebt eine Gesellschaft, die vom Geist des Humanismus und der Toleranz gegenüber den Angehörigen aller gesellschaftlichen Gruppen geprägt ist.⁶

(The Federal Government reaffirms its unswerving adherence to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of the peoples of Europe and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy. The Federal Government stands for respect, tolerance and understanding for all human beings irrespective of their origin, religion or *weltanschauung*. It condemns and actively combats any form of discrimination, intolerance and demagoguery in all areas. It strives for a society imbued with the spirit of humanism and tolerance towards the members of all social groups.)

What this brief review so far of Austria's history reveals is that we are

dealing with a modern state which has to explain how it got where it is today by looking back upon a series of events and decisions that its predecessors would have preferred, more often than not, to have avoided. Consequently and understandably, the general tenor of Austria's history for the last two centuries has frequently been one of frustration or disenchantment, and this has shaped much of the tone of Austrians' discourse upon themselves. There is so often an unmistakable air of regret, of weariness, or even of impotence in Austrian writing regarding the notion of Austria which is rooted in this long series of reversals and disappointments. Thwarted on so many occasions, a pre-emptive resignation and fatalism, and often a self-deprecation rarely encountered in German discourses on the idea of the German nation, has become the distinguishing hallmark of much of the language and rhetoric used.

Austria and National Identity

Admittedly national identity has many facets but it nearly always has a backward- and a forward-looking component. Backward-looking, it draws on events, personages and memories – some real, some mythical – that are cherished and regarded as formative. National identity can also be forward-looking. It can be aspirational, particularly if the nation has yet to be realized in the form of a sovereign state. National identity can also look to the future in a defensive manner, evoking potential threats to its identity and citing them in an attempt to anticipate and defeat them. It is remarkable how easily writers can slip into this habit of projecting backwards and forwards identities that have yet to be established. It occurs in the most innocent and unselfconscious of places and is by no means limited to matters of Austrian national identity. In his introduction to a lavishly illustrated guide to the cathedrals of Germany the writer of the introduction, an art historian, could observe, 'Not until the tenth century did a clear-cut and final distinction appear between the national styles.'⁷ But this immediately raises the question: which nations are these in

the tenth century to which the author is referring? We the readers may well have a strong notion of national styles and associate them with the names of the nations that would ultimately appear on the territory on which these buildings were located. The writer has projected the differing styles onto concepts that have yet to emerge, but since they did emerge there appears to be little sense of incongruity at what has been said. Projecting forward the idea of a nation onto future structures gives a legitimacy to historical events and offers the comfort, illusory or not, of a narrative and a purpose to events in history. Projecting backwards is perhaps an even more commonly occurring approach. Thus in a short guide to the history of the Netherlands, *Geschiedenis van Nederland*, published under the auspices of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the first chapter speaks of the formation of the country, ‘De wording van Nederland’:

Oudheid – Natuur en mens hebben het landschap van Nederland van oudsher beïnvloed. Duizenden jaren geleden, lang vordat er sprake was van ‘Nederland’, was het gebied een grote drassige delta.⁸

(Antiquity – From time immemorial nature and man have shaped the landscape of the Netherlands. Thousands of years ago, long before we can speak of ‘the Netherlands’, the area was a vast swampy delta.)

This is straightforward enough. The author clearly indicates that the term for the nation is a subsequent accretion, yet since the territory of the modern state of the Netherlands rests upon land pre-dating the creation of the Dutch state there is a sense in which the modern state can lay claim to that distant past as part of its origins. It imbues the inanimate with intentionality: this water-logged terrain would one day emerge as the Netherlands, and thus it appears natural and logical to claim that a relationship existed between then and now. Disconcertingly, the notion of the nation, and what is associated with it, is so pliable that not only can it be projected forwards or backwards, as in the two examples just given, it can simply be dismissed, and what might have been

taken for granted can be asserted to be no more than a chimera. A leading authority on Canadian literature can aver without qualification: 'Canadian identity is indeed a fiction, the product of an overactive imagination. But this fiction has had serious political ramifications.'⁹ The chimera is not totally without substance for although the identity may be said to be unreal what is performed in the name of that identity can be very tangible as the same author, with reference to the fate of the indigenous tribes, suggests a few moments later when he argues: 'the nation's unjust acts force us to view the country as a fragile entity that is pieced together out of the ideological abominations of a disturbing past.'

It is important to note therefore that it is not a uniquely Austrian characteristic to make claims upon the past or to invest distant events in history with the idea of forming a clear line of succession to the present. And there have been many who would claim that Austrian identity is also a fiction. Indeed, this has always been the tenet of the German nationalist element within both the Empire and the later Republic. Yet the very vicissitudes of Austrian history make the temptations to raise such claims particularly great, all the more so given the highly contested nature of a land situated in the centre of Europe and at the meeting point throughout history of so many competing linguistic, ethnic, national and religious entities; and where there is little clear evidence for a particular reading of history, or where there are competing claims, it is natural that those uncertainties manifest themselves in a particularly strident rhetoric.

What is striking about the rhetoric of Austrian identity is how little emphasis has been placed on the language of anticipation despite the avowed optimism included in the text of the Austrian national anthem 'arbeitsfroh und hoffnungsreich' (keen to work and abounding in hope). Indeed, of all the anthems of the nine individual Austrian federal states only that of Burgenland, a rather late construction, contains explicitly the word 'Zukunft' (future). The rhetoric in the anthems of all the other provinces is heavily weighted towards retrospection rather than to the future.¹⁰ An inherent aversion to entering new terrain for fear of losing that which is considered the constituting element in identity can manifest

itself in many ways. Even in such praiseworthy endeavours as preserving national monuments and buildings there are regressive elements at work within Austrian identity. In the conclusion to his study of Austria's attitude towards maintaining its cultural heritage in architecture, Manfred Wehdorn could observe that the growing extension of the concept of protecting historical monuments held many dangers and that both architects and politicians feared Austria's becoming petrified in its own tradition and reducing its landscapes and its villages to lifeless museums.¹¹ Austria's post-war cinema had reduced the land to the status of a museum with its portrayal of an imagined and charmed country that had never existed in reality with a stream of *Heimat* films such as *Echo der Berge* (1954), *Heimatland* (1956), *Das heilige Erbe* (1957) and *Almenrausch und Edelweiß* (1957) along with a succession of costume dramas based on the life of 'Sissi', the glamorous if wayward wife of Emperor Franz Josef.¹² It did not strike anybody as incongruous at the time that in celebrating the life of the vivacious young empress that they were in fact holding in affection a Bavarian rather than Austrian. A generation later, Austrian literature, including writers such as Hans Lebert, Gert F. Jonke, Franz Innerhofer, Robert Schneider and Norbert Gstrein, would take revenge on this attempt to seek refuge in the past by producing a specifically Austrian genre of anti-*Heimat* literature which offered a far bleaker image of the realities of life in the country.¹³

Certainly there have been moments when the future was evoked, and that was immediately after the collapse of the Third Reich, and it is striking how similar the rhetoric of both the political left and right was in evoking a restored Austria. In a speech delivered before the Austrian Parliament on 21 December 1945, a day after he had become the Conservative chancellor of the first freely elected post-war Austrian government, Leopold Figl declared:

Das Österreich von morgen wird ein neues, ein revolutionäres Österreich sein. Es wird von Grund auf umgestaltet und weder eine Wiederholung von 1918 noch von 1933, noch eine von 1938 werden ... Wir wollen das neue, das junge Österreich!¹⁴

(The Austria of tomorrow will be a new, revolutionary Austria. It will be changed root and branch and will be neither a repetition of 1918 nor of 1933, nor of 1938 ... We seek an Austria that is new and young!)

Not simply these emotions but these very words had been anticipated a few months earlier by somebody who, like Figl, had also spent time as inmate of the Dachau concentration camp, but who came from a very different political background. After the war Viktor Matejka had become head of Vienna's Department for Culture and Adult Education, emerging alongside Ernst Fischer as one of the best-known of the Austrian Communists in the early post-war period. On 25 July 1945 Matejka gave a lecture in Vienna entitled 'What is Austrian Culture?' in which he rejected as a point of contact any of the many fateful dates in Austria's history, including the emergence of the First Republic following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War or the Austria immediately before the Nazi occupation:

Mögen große Teile unseres Volkes Kultur rein sentimental als Erbe auffassen, wir sehen hier eine Aufgabe, die auf einem Ruinenfeld noch dringlicher geworden ist ... Es gibt daher kein Zurück auf 1789 oder 1848 oder 1918 oder 1934 oder gar 1938. Wir müssen uns unsere Kulturwelt selbst bauen.¹⁵

(Even if large parts of the population regard culture in purely emotional terms as something inherited, we see here a challenge that has become more urgent, set as it is amidst a sea of destruction...For this reason there will be no going back to 1789 or 1848 or 1918 or 1934 or even 1938. We must be the constructors of our own cultural world.)

What is noticeable is how both texts, although stressing a new Austria, could express this primarily only through a backward glance and working *ex negativo*, stressing what kind of country the new Austria would not be.

Austrian national identity is frequently a case of expressing the present by a reference to a particular point or date in the past.

Perhaps the most devastating example of this in the whole of post-war Austrian writing can be heard in two short lines from Austrian literature's bad boy, Thomas Bernhard. He was at the centre of a public and largely manufactured scandal in 1988 when he staged at Vienna's leading theatre, the Burgtheater, his play *Heldenplatz*, named after the great square in the heart of Vienna where countless thousands had gathered to welcome Hitler in March 1938. In the play, Anna, daughter of the illustrious exiled Austrian scholar Schuster, whose funeral is the occasion of a family gathering in Vienna, succeeds in a single utterance in negating everything the highly successful Second Republic had achieved when she delivers laconically the devastating lines describing present-day Austria: 'es ist doch alles viel schlimmer als achtunddreißig' (and you know everything is really much worse than in '38).¹⁶

One strategy to cope with disappointment is to disengage. The paraphernalia of the state and of national celebrations, including the rhetoric employed to evoke national identity, may be ignored or rejected. They are perceived as the activities and concern of a particular political class or élite but have little relevance to life as it is really lived. Here is the voice of Peter Handke, Austria's professional and prolific pessimist, in his *Persönliche Bemerkungen zum Jubiläum der Republik* (Personal remarks on the anniversary of the Republic), where he discusses the irrelevance for ordinary Austrians of the celebrations surrounding the State Treaty of 1955, whose signing marked the formal re-establishment of a sovereign Austria:

Als der Staatsvertrag erreicht wurde, war ich 13 Jahre alt, und es hieß, daß Österreich nun frei sei und daß die Besatzungsmächte das Land verlassen würden. Ich aber ... fühlte mich in dem befreiten Land alles sonst als frei, und es gab ganz andere Besatzungsmächte, als die so genannten, weitaus realere, weitaus bedrückendere. Der Staatsvertrag wurde von uns reinem eher als sportliches Ereignis aufgenommen, das man neugierig verfolgt, solange es im Fernsehen übertragen wird. Aber wenn man abschaltet, ist man in seiner eigenen Welt wieder ganz verriegelt ... So hat der Staatsvertrag für mich und meine Familie zum Beispiel und alle, die in einer ähnlichen Lage –

nicht lebten, sondern sich eher durch die Jahreszeiten durchschlagen mußten – keine Konsequenz gehabt.¹⁷

(I was thirteen when the State Treaty came into being and we were told Austria was now free and that the occupying powers would be leaving the country. But I didn't feel the least bit free in this liberated country and I felt there were other occupying forces than these, forces far more tangible, far more oppressive. Amongst the sort of people I lived with the State Treaty was regarded as if it were some sort of sporting event which claimed their curiosity just as long as it was being shown on the television, but once the set was switched off people were shut firmly back in their own world ... And so for me and my family, for example, and all those living in similar circumstances – well, not so much living as simply struggling through from one day to the next – the State Treaty was an irrelevance.)

It is striking how Handke's tone of disenchantment runs right through much of Austria's polemical writing. Fifty years later, at the time of the official celebrations in 2005 to mark half a century since the signing of the State Treaty and Austria's regaining of sovereignty, leading Austrian writers were asked for their responses. The distinguished Austrian dramatist Peter Turrini sounded as if he were simply picking up from where Handke had left off when he replied to the invitation to respond:

Zum Republikanischen Jubeljahr möchte und kann ich nichts schreiben. Ein Schreiberleben lang habe ich Polemiken, Reden und Essays zu Österreich geschrieben, immer aus einem Antrieb, manchmal aus einer Wut, die aus mir kam. Das Jubeljahr löst eher ein Verstummungsbedürfnis bei mir aus.¹⁸

(There's nothing I would want to or could write about this jubilee year for the Republic. For my whole life as a writer I have produced polemical pieces, speeches and essays devoted to Austria, always driven by some compulsion, sometimes out of a sense of rage I was experiencing. What this year of celebration arouses in me is more a need to fall silent.)

Austria after the Second World War

Amongst writers coming of age in the Second Republic the image in Austrian literature of the modern Austrian state after 1945 is frequently critical and is initially surprisingly so for a country which had achieved by global standards such a high standard of living for the majority of its citizens. Sometimes lives are lived at such remote distances from the state – as in Franz Innerhofer's novel *Schöne Tage* (Good Times) set in a rural Alpine community around Salzburg – that the mechanisms and institutions of the state barely impinge, or else the state is depicted as obstructionist and oppressive, as in Anna Mitgutsch's novel *Haus der Kindheit* (The House of Childhood), a work set in the Austrian provinces after 1945, in which the child of an émigré Jewish couple returns as an adult to Austria and attempts to regain the ownership of his parents' former property, only to encounter legal hindrances placed in his way at every turn.

Even where writers have tried to speak in favour of the restored Austrian Republic there has been considerable difficulty, and often embarrassment, in finding a suitable rhetorical form in which to evoke and celebrate the concept of Austria. Gerhard Fritsch, one of the leading lights amongst the first generation of younger Austrian writers to emerge after 1945, produced in 1960 as a state-commissioned work *Groß ist das Erbe. Festliche Stunde zum Tag der österreichischen Fahne* (Great is the Heritage. Solemn Celebration of the Austrian Colours), an event which was a precursor to Austria's 'Nationalfeiertag' (Day of National Celebration). The work is an unrhymed verse drama and pageant intended for public performance and spoken by various choirs of schoolchildren. (In 1960 it was performed in the presence of Federal President Schärf and Chancellor Raab in the Wiener Konzerthaus.) The work exposes a set of ideological and linguistic challenges. Fritsch was undoubtedly a committed Austrian, but he nevertheless had serious misgivings as to how Austrian identity was re-emerging after 1945 and struggled to find an appropriate format and rhetoric. In a celebration of Austria's national colours it was not unnatural

that in Fritsch's script the flags of the nine individual Bundesländer should be first brought together in a show of national unity: 'Neun Länder/untrennbar verbunden/Vorarlberg,/Land des Fleißes weit im Westen,/Tirol, Land der Berge und der Treue'¹⁹ (Nine provinces indissolubly united, unflagging Vorarlberg in the far west, faithful Tyrol high in the mountains ...), and so on until all the *Länder* have been named and introduced. Yet in this gathering of the Austrian clans it is not possible to eradicate the memory of a scene in Leni Riefenstahl's filmic celebration of the Nazi party, *Triumph des Willens* (Triumph of the Will), in which separate German-speaking regions are united under one identity following the question: 'Kamerad, woher stammst du?' (And where do you hail from, comrade?).

This involuntary recollection of the rhetoric and pathos of National Socialism becomes all the more apparent when in Fritsch's work a speaker calls on the assembled youth of Austria with the following words:

Und so frage ich dich,
Jugend von Österreich,
bist du bereit,
dein Vaterland zu lieben
und es niemals
für die Lockung einer fremden Idee ... zu verraten?²⁰

(And so, youth of Austria, I ask you: are you ready to love your homeland and never to betray it for the enticements of an alien idea?)

Yet even the simplest of words such as 'bereit' (ready/prepared) carried the burden of history, for it is impossible not to hear the echo of its earlier use in Joseph Goebbels's infamous Berlin Sportpalast speech from 1943: 'Seid Ihr von nun an bereit, Eure ganze Kraft einzusetzen ...?'²¹ (Are you ready from now on to dedicate all your strength?).

Defining Austria

If the manner in which Austria has celebrated itself has been contentious then the problem becomes still greater – to the point of intractability – when the seemingly innocent question is posed: which Austria is being celebrated? Many commentators discussing the evocation of Austrian identity from the nineteenth century onwards have been aware of the synchronic and diachronic instability of the term. In the nineteenth century the term ‘Österreich’ could be used variously as a geographic concept to denote territory lying north and south of the river Enns, as an administrative term, usually in distinction to Hungarian administered territory, and as a form of shorthand to denote the German-speaking and therefore the most influential elements of the population within the Empire. This instability is compounded once a further question is added, namely: who is using the term? More precise studies show great variation in the understanding of the term, depending upon the social or professional group applying the term or to those to whom the term is applied. Amongst the aristocracy, the army, the diplomatic corps, the Church or the civil service, the bourgeoisie and the peasantry the expression ‘Austria’ during the time of the Empire did not conjure up precisely the same set of associations or acts of identification. A moment ago we mentioned the name of one of the Second Republic’s elder statesmen, President Adolf Schärf. It is remarkable how many leading politicians of the immediate post-war period, including other presidents such as Karl Renner and Theodor Körner, shared Schärf’s dilemma. When they regarded the map of Austria they could not claim their homeland and the Republic of Austria to be one and the same thing. All three men had been born during the reign of Emperor Franz Josef in places outside the borders of the future Austrian Republic.

Even within the linguistic or ethnic minorities of the Empire careful distinctions needed to be made. Ernst Bruckmüller’s study of school texts used by Slovenian-speaking children before the First World War revealed that alongside a Slovenian national awareness there existed simultaneously a definite ‘habsburgischer

Patriotismus' (loyalty to the House of Habsburg) but this could not be interpreted as an 'österreichisches Staatsbewußtsein (consciousness of Austrian statehood).²² The Badeni crisis of the mid 1890s – a time of bitter disputes regarding the official status and usage of the German and Czech languages – was only the most extreme expression of the precariousness attached to any attempt to reconcile linguistic and ethnic aspirations within a system that basically required the subjugation of such aspirations in order for the Empire and the state to function effectively.

Austria and Religion

The emergence of the First Republic and the loss of Empire resolved after a fashion the ethnic complexities of the Empire. The new Republic was now a predominantly German-speaking affair. Whilst before the First World War Austrian identity could be said to be based on the twin pillars of throne and altar, the First Republic had to make do with only one of those pillars and the Church was a significant presence in the life of the First Republic, to the extent of providing in the prelate Ignaz Seipel one if its chancellors. So strong was this presence that left-wing electoral posters in the inter-war years would demonize the Church in its pictorial rhetoric by depicting it in the form of the well-fed prelate marching arm-in-arm with a top-hatted capitalist and a monocle-wearing general to form a triumvirate oppressing the working masses.

The Austrian historian Anton Pelinka has claimed that one of the most distinctive developments in the Austria emerging after 1945 was the early withdrawal of the Church from active political participation in the life of the Second Republic,²³ and more recent developments and tensions may well mark a further change to the formation of Austrian identity as the relationship between the state, its citizens and the Catholic Church enters a new phase. The gradual withdrawal of the Church from daily political life would change the tone of the national rhetoric, but it did not signify the disappearance of religion from national discourse.

Religion shapes language in numerous and often indirect ways, and especially through its influence upon education. By the end of the sixteenth century there were situated on land that now falls within modern Austria four universities, which remain to this day the country's principal universities: Vienna, Graz, Salzburg and Innsbruck. The theological and philosophical faculties of those universities were dominated by the Jesuit Order with the sole exception of Salzburg, which as an independent domain fell under the authority of the archbishop of Salzburg and the Benedictine Order.²⁴ Emperor Josef II during his reign of 1780–90 had attempted to reform the Austrian administration and to encourage the development of the general education of his subjects and, in turn, their economic productivity. This brought him into conflict with the Jesuits in particular. His mother, the empress Maria Theresia, had already dissolved the Jesuit order in Austria 1773, and Franz Josef subsequently expelled them, allowing the universities and grammar schools to be either secularized or placed under the administration of the Piarists, the Benedictines or other orders. Secularization did not last long. After Josef's death the grammar schools were again placed under religious supervision and eventually, in 1853 the Jesuits were allowed to return to Austria. Indeed, it would be a feature in the future development of the Austrian educational system to see attempts at reform and progress comprehensively reversed by the Church. This is what happened to the pioneering work of Otto Glöckel, a Social-Democratic educationalist and politician who was briefly undersecretary of state for education in 1919–20 and rose to become one of the most influential figures in Vienna's school administration, where he tirelessly promoted modern teacher training and the reform of the curriculum. The rest of Austria had no appetite for educational change, and by means of an amendment to the Constitution in 1929, and subsequently by the secret concordat with the Vatican in June 1933 – but announced publicly only on 1 May 1934 – reactionary pressure from the Catholic Church was allowed to influence the shaping of Austria's educational system.²⁵ After 1945 there still remained a noticeable reluctance to make a brave break

with tradition. A review of school textbooks, for instance, would reveal a marked reluctance to embrace fresh ideas.

The consequences of the decision to allow the Jesuits to return to Austria were, unwittingly, to prove fatal for Austria's future, for it was to the Jesuit college of the Stella Matutina at Feldkirch in Austria's most westerly province of Vorarlberg that the nine-year-old Kurt Schuschnigg, later to become the last Austrian chancellor before Hitler's annexation, came as a boarder in 1907. The Jesuit priests who taught him were not even Austrians but exiles from Hohenzollern Germany, and they left an indelible mark upon his attitudes.²⁶ The result was that Schuschnigg was never able to disassociate clearly Austria from the Germany for which, through his education and his German teacher-priests, he had developed a sense of awe. It prevented him until it was too late from forming a wholehearted commitment to Austria or even from acquiring a rhetoric that was unmistakably disassociated from the concept of a Greater Germany. Austria's most renowned post-war historian, Friedrich Heer, dismissed Schuschnigg's concept of the nation with a single line: 'Seine Heimat war Tirol. Sein Vaterland war: sein Deutschland. Österreich hat er nie verstanden'²⁷ (His home was the Tyrol, his fatherland was 'his' Germany. He never had an understanding of Austria).

In the course of nineteenth-century discussions regarding emerging national identities the role of religion would often be removed from the centre of attention, to be dismissed frequently as antiquated or irrelevant. One of the earliest and most influential theoreticians of nation identity, the French academic Ernest Renan, had claimed in his Sorbonne lecture in 1882, 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?' (What is a nation?) that 'religion cannot supply an adequate basis for the constitution of a modern nationality,'²⁸ yet despite this conviction Renan nevertheless could not manage without the language of religion, for a few paragraphs later he would claim: 'A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle.'²⁹

At the Second Republic's lowest ebb, the bitter winter endured by post-war Austria immediately following the end of hostilities in 1945, Chancellor Figl used a Christmas radio address to appeal to

his fellow Austrians. The language was unmistakably laden with religious pathos: ‘Wir haben nichts. Ich kann euch nur bitten: Glaub an dieses Österreich!’³⁰ (We have nothing. I can only ask one thing of you: believe in this Austria!). This could equally well be translated as ‘Have faith in this Austria.’ And religion has remained a powerful and defining element, and one to which the constructors of Austrian identity have always looked back. We have only to consider the platform on which some of the candidates stood during Austria’s presidential elections of 2010, when two of the three appealed consciously to conservative and religious sentiments amongst the electorate, and one (Rudolf Gehring) ran on an explicitly religious ticket for the Christian Party of Austria, *Christliche Partei Österreichs*.

Religion can be found at the very heart of modern discourse on Austria, and it appeared in the earliest attempts to mobilize the new media to express a concept of what Austria is. When Koblenz-born Prince Metternich feared the Empire could fall to the invading French armies of Napoleon he encouraged Friedrich Wilhelm Schlegel, a Hanoverian then resident in Vienna, to establish a newspaper to promote the cause of, and the case for, Austria.

Metternich’s Austria

Metternich and Schlegel were by no means the only Germans to enter the service of the Habsburgs or to base their professional life in Vienna. Beethoven and Brahms may be the best-known examples of German artists residing in nineteenth-century Austria, but waves of politicians and academics have poured down from Germany: Baron Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust, a former prime minister of Saxony, was appointed Franz Josef’s foreign minister after the defeat of 1866. Karl von Vogelsang, a Prussian Protestant, became an ally of the anti-Semitic and hugely popular mayor of Vienna, Karl Lueger. The Catholic jurist Adam Müller moved from Berlin to Vienna, whilst from Württemberg came the

brilliant economist Albert Schäffle. He taught as a professor at the University of Vienna and made a valiant effort to bring enlightened structural reforms to the Empire during the Hohenwart ministry in the late 1860s.

These few names are a reminder how deeply non-Austrians were involved in the forming and articulating of an Austrian identity. They are also a reminder that sometimes their motives were not exclusively to promote the idea of Austria, but rather to find a position from which they could conduct personal or ideological struggles against those forces to the north which had driven them south. (Bismarck's confrontation in the 1870s with Germany's Catholics, the so-called 'Kulturkampf',³¹ drove many German Catholics out of Prussia and into Austria, and it was from within Habsburg borders that they mounted their attacks on Protestant Germany.) To this degree Austria served them in their struggle over German identity. Inevitably this generated a conviction of seeing Austria as 'the better Germany', and with baleful effect the idea of Austria as the better Germany would become a leitmotif through much of the polemic surrounding Austrian identity. It will be seen later in this study how after 1945 many Austrians, and particularly academic Austrian historians, would react with barely concealed outrage at the thought of German participation in any discussion on the nature of Austrian identity. German migration to Austria, however, was by no means an exclusive phenomenon of the nineteenth century. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Austria and its administration exerted a considerable force of attraction upon very able men from the north, men such as Kedd from the Rhineland, Procopius from Brandenburg and Sancta Clara from Bavarian Swabia.³² Their presence must encourage us to conclude that there was never a time when a purely 'Austrian' community existed to define its nature, and that many who had been raised outside the Empire would contribute significantly to the conduct of the discourse on what it meant to be Austrian.

Friedrich Wilhelm Schlegel's contributions to the task of defining Austrian national identity may represent only a fraction of the philosopher's vast literary output, but they were in several

key respects contributions that established the terms and the framework by which Austrian identity would be discussed for the next two centuries. Austria was cast by the Catholic convert Schlegel in the role of defender of the true faith and, vitally, he especially depicted Austria as the better Germany. Schlegel could even justify the strict censorship imposed by Metternich in moral terms that protected national identity:

Die beste Rechtfertigung der österreichischen Zensur gibt die Erfahrung und die Geschichte selbst an die Hand – Was hat wohl mehr beigetragen, den sonst so männlichen deutschen Nationalcharacter zu erschaffen ... als die ... in Deutschland überhandnehmende Vielschreiberei und Leserei?³³

(The best justification for the Austrian censorship is provided by experience and by history itself ... What has contributed more to the debilitating of the otherwise so masculine German national character as that uncontrollable flood of scribbling and passion for reading we now witness in Germany?)

The disunity of the German lands had had disastrous results. Schlegel claimed that ‘Mit der Trennung Deutschlands in mehrere kleine Fürstenstaaten ... ging das Nationalgefühl verloren’³⁴ (The division of Germany into numerous small principalities brought about the loss of a sense of nationhood). But this had not been the case in the lands of the Habsburgs, for here there still prevailed a strong martial and moral spirit. In the face of French ungodliness it is Austria, according to Schlegel, that preserves the very best of German values:

Denn wo würden wir wohl jetzt jene ungeschwächte Nationalkraft, jenen unerschütterlichen patriotischen Mut, jenen treuen Charakter und kriegerischen Geist noch finden, durch welchen die österreichischen Völker sich so sehr von dem übrigen Deutschland auszeichnen, wenn man der von daher einbrechenden geistigen und sittlichen Erschlaffung keinen Damm entgegengesetzt hätte?³⁵

(Then where would we otherwise find today that undiminished national energy, that unwavering patriotic courage, that true character and martial spirit which mark out the Austrian peoples from the rest of Germany had it not been for the stop that has been put to the incipient undermining of our spiritual and moral values emanating from there?)

This leads Schlegel to his conclusion: ‘Die Sorge um die Erhaltung der Religion ist daher in Österreich die erste Bedingung der Kraft und Gesundheit des Staats’³⁶ (The concern to preserve religion is thus Austria’s first condition for remaining a strong and healthy state). Schlegel’s justification in 1811 for the existence of Austria reads like the first draft to the Declaration from the year 2000 ‘Verantwortung für Österreich – Zukunft im Herzen Europas’ – discussed a little earlier, for Schlegel championed Austria’s centrality within Europe and its absolute allegiance to moral values:

Der Begriff von Österreich, als derjenigen Macht, welche mit allen andern Mächten innig verknüpft und fern von den beschränkten Grundsätzen einer kleinlichen politischen Selbstsucht vielmehr auf das Große und Ganze gerichtet, der Mittelpunkt der gesitteten europäischen Staaten zu sein, die alte Würde und Verfassung Deutschlands und Italiens zu schützen, überhaupt aber die allgemeine Gerechtigkeit in Europa aufrechtzuerhalten, vor allen andern berufen sei.³⁷

(Austria as a concept, as that power which is linked from within with all other powers and stands above the limited principles of petty political egoism but is focused rather on that which is great and complete, being at the heart of European states ruled by moral values, safeguarding the ancient dignity and constitution of both Germany and Italy, indeed championing justice for all Europe – this is what Austria is called to be before all others.)

Austria and the German Question

Schlegel was incapable of discussing Austria outside the context of Germany. He has not been alone in this approach: 'Österreichs Geschichte und Identität ist untrennbar mit der deutschen Geschichte verbunden' (Austria's history and identity cannot be separated from the history of Germany). This is the voice of Jörg Haider writing in the pages of his book *Die Freiheit, die ich meine* (The Freedom that I Mean) published in 1993 and at a time of rapidly growing popular support for him amongst the Austrian electorate.³⁸ *Die Freiheit, die ich meine* was Haider's first book and thus his first opportunity to develop in over 300 pages his political and philosophical credo. That in itself would have roused general interest given the surge of political support his party was enjoying and the press and television attention that this media-savvy, quick-witted and quick-tongued politician was able to attract. (Haider's Freedom Party was on the point of increasing dramatically its electoral support from 16.6 per cent in the general election of 1990 to 22.5 per cent in 1994.) The fact that the book was published by Ullstein Verlag, a leading and distinguished German publisher, also deserves comment. Post-war Austrian politics had rarely aroused the interest of the West German political establishment. West Germany's founding chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, had often been noticeably cool towards the restored Austrian state, whilst the West German media devoted little attention to their small neighbour to the south. Haider had therefore scored something of a breakthrough by winning so much attention in Germany, where there was clear unease at the growth of far-right-wing activity, especially in the former East Germany, and it was by means of a platform offered by a German rather than an Austrian publishing house that Haider was now attempting to lend reflective weight to his populist views. Haider also represented the third major current in Austrian political positions, namely the sizeable German nationalist tradition standing alongside the Catholic conservative tradition of the Austrian People's Party or the left-wing, sometimes Marxist, stance of the Austrian Socialists. Talking to a German and not just an Austrian audience was therefore no uncongenial prospect to Haider.

What Haider wrote next in *Die Freiheit, die ich meine* was intentionally audacious. He negates, indeed reverses, one of the fundamental tenets of Austrian identity, that it was bound up with, and formed by, the continuity provided over many centuries by uninterrupted Habsburg rule. Haider claimed:

Österreichs Geschichte ist ... viel tiefer und viel verzweigter in der Geschichte Deutschlands, ja Gesamteuropas verwurzelt, als es die heute übliche Beschränkung auf Habsburger- und k.u. k.-Nostalgien erscheinen läßt.³⁹

(Austria's history is ... more deeply and more complexly rooted in that of Germany, and indeed of the whole of Europe, than the usual emphasis today on the Habsburgs and the nostalgia for Empire would permit.)

For Haider it is Habsburg Austria which represented a near-700-year interruption or distortion in what is for him essentially an aspect in the flow of German history. By offering the idea of an interrupted development Haider had of course usurped a key tactic in defining Austrian identity in the immediate period after 1945. It was understandable that many Austrians wished to deny the National Socialist period and Germany the right of interrupting or changing permanently the course of Austrian history, and naturally there were arguments put forward insisting that the Anschluss period could be wiped from Austria's memory as the country found its way back to its real destiny. The best-known and perhaps most notorious example of this was the claim by the leading post-war conservative Austrian writer, Alexander Lernet-Holenia, who declared in the journal *Der Turm* in late 1945, and only months following the defeat of Nazi Germany:

In der Tat brauchen wir nicht voraus-, sondern nur zurückzublicken. Um es vollkommen klar zu sagen: wir haben es nicht nötig, mit der Zukunft zu kokettieren und nebulose Projekte zu machen, wir *sind*, im besten und wertvollsten Verstande, unsere Vergangenheit, wir haben

nur zu besinnen, daß wir unsere Vergangenheit sind – und sie wird unsere Zukunft werden. Auch das Ausland wird kein neues, es wird, im Grunde, das alte Österreich von uns erwarten.⁴⁰

(Indeed we do not need to look ahead but rather simply to look back into our history. To be perfectly clear we have no need to flirt with the future and construct vague projects. In the best and most valuable sense, we are our past and we only have to recall this and it will become our future. Nor do those who view us from abroad demand a new Austria; rather it is the Austria of old that they expect of us.)

For Lernet-Holenia the annexation years of 1938 to 1945 lived out under the Nazis represented no more than, as he claimed, the mere interruption of a madman, which could and should now be forgotten. Austria's future was her past and he brought to the debate an idea which we considered a little earlier, namely that Austria is the product of what others want it – or allow it – to be. Superficially we see this confirmed every year by the broadcast of the New Year's Day concert from Vienna to the rest of the world. This is the picture Austria wishes to offer of itself and, no doubt in the estimation of its producers, it is believed to be the image, the visual rhetoric, the world wishes to have of Austria. And how many viewers would notice immediately if by mistake Austrian television rebroadcast a concert from previous years – such is the intentional timelessness of the image on offer. The ability simply to ignore the past was best exemplified by the Austrian film industry in the immediate post-war years. Its starting point was that Austro-Fascism, German National Socialism in Austria, and bleak post-war realism had not and did not exist, and they accordingly left no trace in the films offered to audiences in the young Second Republic.⁴¹

One rhetorical resource for a new identity was quickly smothered by Lernet-Holenia's generation. It was the voice of exiled Austria. Without a government in exile a whole constituency had no formal status or official mouthpiece through which to redefine Austrian identity, and those who did eventually return from years abroad –

and many opted not to – found their foreign experiences were not the subject of intense curiosity or unbounded interest among those who had remained in Austria and showed little desire to acquire fresh rhetorical resources. Power – and certainly the staffing of key institutions such as the civil service, the judiciary, journalism or the university and educational systems – was not to pass out of the hands of those Austrians who had remained in Austria throughout the Anschluss years. There may have been some outward changes such as the renunciation by conservatives of the adjective ‘christlich’ in favour of the term Volkspartei, but there was hardly any radical systemic change. New rhetorics could be assumed, however, when it was necessary or expedient. This was nowhere so apparent as in the world of university German studies. Austrian universities had succumbed readily to National Socialism well before 1938, and Austrian Germanists readily chimed in with the prevailing ideology which saw Austrian literature as simply one element within the overall literary expression of the Germanic tribes. Those same academics at Austrian universities who had championed this approach in the 1930s found no difficulty after 1945 in arguing the very opposite when they now presented the Austrian voice in literature as something both unique and timeless.

The need to protect Austrian identity from external encroachment can be encountered in Austrian literature long before the re-emergence of a sovereign Austria in 1955, even if it is sometimes thinly disguised as comedy. It constitutes much of the charm of Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s peerless comedy from 1921, *Der Schwierige*, where the melodious and graceful Viennese tones of the principal character Hans Karl are contrasted with the harsh gutturals of the distinctly unsympathetic North German Neuhoff, who is also Hans Karl’s rival for the hand of Helene. But this distinction is really nothing new. We can look far further back to encounter similar linguistic rivalries, and we discover the deeply disturbing fact that not even in fairyland has Austrian identity always been safe. In 1826 Ferdinand Raimund produced perhaps his best-loved play for the Viennese stage, *Das Mädchen aus der Feenwelt oder der Bauer als Millionär* (The Lass from Fairyland, or the Peasant

as Millionaire). Most of the older principal characters in the play, such as the lead figure Fortunatus Wurzel, speak unmistakable Viennese, but when the allegorical and slightly ridiculous figure of Youth appears Raimund's stage instruction in the sixth scene of the second act regarding the character Jugend are most precise: 'Sie spricht im hochdeutschen Dialekte, mit einem Anklange des preußischen'⁴² (Youth speaks in the High German dialect with a hint of Prussian).

In the late 1930s, in the dying days of the First Republic, Austrian youth also succumbed to these Prussian tones, and indeed it prompted the government to revise the laws regarding the voting age. Knowing, probably correctly, that the youth of Austria was very likely to vote for the National Socialists the government raised the voting age considerably. In Raimund's play, over a century earlier, the figure of Youth with its Prussian accent would seek common cause with the distinctly Austrian Wurzel, reminding him: 'Wir sind ja schon zusammen auf die Welt gekommen, weißt du denn das nicht mehr?' (Do you not remember how we both entered this earthly world together?). The rhetoric of Wurzel's answer must serve as a polemical answer as to how the very un-Prussian Wurzel looked back upon this alleged shared ancestry and the possibility of a common identity: 'Ja, ja, ich erinnere mich schon, nachmittag wars, und gregnet hats auch'⁴³ (Yes, yes, I can remember – it was an afternoon – and it was raining too).

CHAPTER THREE

AUSTRIA AND CONCEPTS OF IDENTITY

The Impact of Upheaval and Industrialisation

The dramatist Ferdinand Raimund wrote his comedies for a Viennese public in the 1820s and 1830s. These were years when Metternich's foreign policy was directed at uniting European powers in the task of stifling revolutionary forces,¹ for he, the court he served and many of the citizens going to see Raimund's plays, regarded revolution as the cause of most of Austria's miseries. The shock of the recent Napoleonic upheavals, which had come so close to destroying the prevailing order, sat deep within many Austrians and there was a profound desire in many quarters for no further social or political experimentation. Francis I, the emperor whom Metternich represented after his own fashion, made it crystal-clear that innovation was not wanted when he told an educator in 1821:

There are new ideas around, that I cannot, and shall never, approve of. Stay away from these and keep to what you know, for I do not need scholars, but rather honest citizens. Your duty is to educate youth to be such. Whoever serves me must teach as I order; anyone who cannot do this, or who comes to me with new ideas, can leave, or I will arrange it for him.²

Metternich's censorship may have been all-pervasive and certainly detested by many, but there was also a strong sense of self-censorship at work too. A leading authority on Raimund could claim that 'Raimund himself did not seek social revolution ... he

longed to be part of an established middle-class society, he longed to be contented and at peace with himself and other people ... His greatest professional desire was to be loved and respected by bourgeois Viennese audiences.²³

But these were not to be stable times. One thing is particularly noticeable in the wake of the Congress of Vienna and Metternich's attempts to define the post-revolutionary order: it was the reminder of the instability of the territory of Habsburg Austria. Defeat of Napoleon had resulted in the reincorporation of the provinces of Tyrol and Vorarlberg with Austria, as well as the return of parts of Upper Austria, which had all been ceded under Napoleonic pressure. There remained the difficult and unresolved issue of Salzburg. Should it fall to Bavaria or to the Habsburgs? Vienna opted to take Salzburg, but Metternich was also conscious of the importance of not antagonizing the royal families of southern Germany and he was thus prepared to pay the heavy price of relinquishing long-standing Habsburg territory in Breisgau, the *Vorlande*, sometimes referred to in English as Anterior or Further Austria. As a consequence the so-called Salzburg *Flachland* – and Hitler's future mountain retreat of Berchtesgaden – would become part of Bavaria.⁴

Raimund's fairy world, indebted to the traditional theatrical *Volksstück*, was superficially so far from reality that it could appear to pose little subversive threat to Metternich's order. But not all theatregoers or dramatists were content to retreat into a world that denied the tensions which were clearly emerging within Metternich's 'system' for Europe. Those tensions erupted across Europe initially in the July revolution of 1830 when the Parisians threw out the reigning Bourbons in favour of the Citizen King, Louis-Philippe. This set off a chain reaction engulfing the Belgians, the Poles and parts of Central Italy, and although both Prussia and Austria withstood on this occasion the buffetings unleashed by the July Revolution, some of the smaller German states such as Brunswick did not, and one distinguished historian noted that 'the psychological effects were profound. The external fabric of Restoration Europe was beginning to crumble.'⁵

At the same time the manifestations of an industrializing society, both at a scientific-technical and at a financial-economic level, were making themselves felt in Vienna. Those financial structures that both accompanied and underpinned a capitalist market-place now started to appear. On 1 June 1816 Austria's national bank, 'Die Österreichische Nationalbank', was founded. A few years later saw the creation, in October 1819, of the first savings bank, 'Die Erste Österreichische Spar-Casse'. (It was the collapse of the Viennese Stock Exchange on 9 May 1873 and the failure of the Boden-Credit-Anstalt on 5 October 1929 which showed how financial weaknesses could rapidly sap confidence in the viability of Austrian identity. It was a series of financial and banking scandals that would also overshadow and discredit the Schüssel years of government in the first decade of the twenty-first century.) The Industrial Revolution also made its slightly belated entry into Viennese life. The first gasworks were established in January 1828. (By contrast, the first gasworks in Great Britain date from 1812.) Transportation was also about to undergo truly revolutionary changes: the Danube Steam Shipping Company was founded in 1829, and the initial testing of a steam railway engine in Austria took place on the line between Florisdorf and Deutsch-Wagram in November 1837, only eight years after George Stephenson's Rocket engine had been trialled in England. A revolution was also about to take place in the world of communications and was marked in Austria by the initiation of the first telegraph line between Vienna's Nordbahnhof and the railway station serving Florisdorf on 4 July 1845.⁶

These few examples alone mark out how quickly the structures and apparatus of a modern, capital and cash-based industrialized society came to Austria, and especially to Vienna, whose particular and unique place in the formation of Austrian identity will claim special attention in Chapter 5. These febrile developments are immediately registered in the comedies that were now being offered to the theatre public of Vienna and their insatiable appetite for entertainment. Whilst still subject to the same stringent censorship restrictions imposed by Metternich the next star of the Viennese stage, Johann Nestroy, who like Raimund was an outstanding writer-

performer, evoked a very different world. Still continuing to draw on many of the elements found in the tradition of the *Volksstück* (popular drama, often in dialect), Nestroy offers a world very much closer to reality and to the immediate life of his audiences. Here the perennial topic is money and those fortunes meted out by life which can plunge the individual into penury or raise him from proletariat status to petit-bourgeois security, or even to great wealth. Nestroy's plots might often seem threadbare, and were usually little more than stories plagiarised unashamedly from whatever was the current rage in the theatres of Paris,⁷ but his audiences learnt to read between the lines and to hear the social criticisms. Nevertheless, the impression remained that the modern world was threatening to become so complex that sometimes for a character in a Nestroy work only an inexplicable stroke of luck – perhaps a winning lottery ticket or a legacy – could hope to raise the individual above the perils and imminent threats of sudden financial catastrophe that await those who aspired, like Ferdinand Raimund, to establish themselves securely in bourgeois society. The transition in the Habsburg lands from a feudal to a market capitalist society may not have been so complete as in mercantile Britain or in some of the rapidly industrializing German states, but it was profound enough to alter the very nature of the issue of Austrian identity.

The question of national identity appeared to be crystallizing by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Indeed, it is often argued that the majority of classical theorists in the field of studies devoted to nationalism maintain that it is a phenomenon that dates back no earlier than the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.⁸ Eric Hobsbawm has drawn attention to the relationship between the nation-state and what he called the 'process of capitalist development', and he noted how those very national principles that allowed states such as Germany and Italy to be brought about would also lead to the partition of Austro-Hungary after 1867. Another pioneering student of the emergence of the modern state and national identity, the Czech historian and social theorist Miroslav Hroch, also stresses this vital interdependence in the judgement of certain political perspectives:

In the course of the nation-forming process the economic relation gains in importance ... Marxist theoreticians agree on this point ... they consider the development of exchange relations and the national market to be the most important and decisive precondition for the formation of a modern state.¹⁰

To this position must be added the conviction held by both Marx and Engels that the proletariat had no nation and were simply governed by capital.¹¹ For revolutionary Communists the phenomenon of nationalism was often rejected or dismissed as a distraction, hence theorists and practitioners of change such as Rosa Luxemburg had little sympathy for those Finns or Lithuanians aspiring to establish states based upon a sense of nationhood. The distrust of nationalism had not always been present amongst revolutionaries, but it began to grow out of a profound sense of disquiet and disappointment at what nationalism could destroy, as was already apparent in the year of revolution of 1848: 'Initially nationalism had not been regarded by many revolutionaries as a term opposing freedom and solidarity. Only when the nationalist movements turned against each other did they tend to undermine the appeal of international solidarity and liberty in central Europe.'¹² One of the most striking and unexpected developments in Austrian identity is the late realization amongst Austrian Communists of the need in the middle of the twentieth century for an Austrian national identity, a conclusion at which they arrived in many ways before the Austrian Socialists, who, as will be discussed in a subsequent chapter, came remarkably late, and often tortuously, to the position of supporting the idea of a distinct Austrian national identity.

Linguistic Identities

Nationalism was shaped by the process of industrialization, according to Ernest Gellner, 'deriving from the requirement of industrial economies for a workforce with at least a basic generalized

education, such as is provided by the centralizing nineteenth-century state'.¹³ Empress Maria Theresa had done much to initiate that development within her own realm by her promotion of education, which would do a great deal to combat illiteracy, although it would also produce unintended problems in the future since compulsory education was conducted in the vernacular languages, thus giving a great stimulus to future dissident linguistic communities.¹⁴ These languages, often codified in the nineteenth century for the first time by virtue of the herculean labours of individual national grammarians, had the technology at their disposal to disseminate themselves, and it is for this reason that Benedict Anderson attributed such significance to what he termed 'print-language'. For Anderson it is this print-language which invents the nation by evoking the idea of a community in the mind of the individual reader: 'These fellow-readers, to whom they were connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined community.'¹⁵ Print-language in the vernacular did much to weaken the hegemony of Latin, and, by extension, the intellectual and moral authority of the Catholic Church, the accepted religion of the court in Vienna. Rome and Latin no longer held a monopoly of the language or the manner of debate. Latin's rhetorical formulations were now also challenged by other and competing linguistic currencies, although Latin would still remain highly formative in the school education of so many of the men and women in Austrian public life until well into the twentieth century. Of President Karl Renner it was said by one who taught him: 'Selbst Cicero habe kein besseres Latein geschrieben'¹⁶ (Not even Cicero himself could write better Latin). During his internal exile in Gloggnitz, following the German occupation of Austria in 1938, Renner kept himself busy writing many hundreds of pages of didactic verse after the manner of the Roman poet Lucretius.

Of course, language need not necessarily weaken the controlling power of empire. Much depends on the degree to which the ruler's language could succeed in asserting itself or supplanting other languages, and print can be an agent in an aggressive policy. As colonial languages English, Spanish and Portuguese had been, by

and large, successful in that attempt. Other colonial languages, such as Dutch in Indonesia, were rather less so. The contradiction involved in Austrian identity was that in asserting German it would be promoting a language that also belonged to other and ultimately more powerful forces, capable of supplanting Austrian identity. Thus the German-speaking population of Sudetenland, aggrieved at what they felt was their unjust assignment to Czechoslovakia after the First World War, were able to switch their loyalty and their aspirations for remedy from Vienna to Berlin without any sense of linguistic dislocation.

The fear of losing linguistic identity was without doubt an issue which pressed heavily upon the First and Second Republics. The break-up of the Habsburg Empire resulted not only in a loss of social prestige for German as competing languages now began to gain ascendancy in the newly created states of central Europe; but the existential right of German-speakers to remain in those new states and yet continue as German-speakers also became a bitterly contested matter. In border territories such as Carinthia a militant defence of Austrian, and therefore German-speaking identity, was very evident immediately after 1918 when unofficial military units took it upon themselves to repel any incursion from the newly created Yugoslav state. Similarly tensions were lived out immediately after 1945 when the wholesale expulsion of German-speaking communities was undertaken throughout Eastern Europe. However, this fear amongst German-speakers for their linguistic identity was not novel but already well established by the nineteenth century. In a dictionary of dialect usage of the German-speaking communities scattered around Krain (Carniola in present-day Slovenia), prepared for the Imperial Academy of Sciences in Vienna in 1870, the dictionary's compiler, Karl Julius Schröer, spoke of the sad fate of the scattered linguistic islands of the German-speaking communities of the Empire. For the Gottscheer German-speaking Austrians there was no prospect of intellectual furtherance in German and of necessity they were obliged to renounce their native language and acquire Slovenian if they wished to advance socially.¹⁷ The fate of this particular community

after 1945 was particularly harsh. As with the South Tyroleans, the belief that Hitler's coming to power would secure their future was a delusion. Whilst the German invasion of Yugoslavia appeared to remove the dominance of Slovenian culture and language over the German-speakers of Gottschee, they found their homeland handed over to the Italians, as Hitler continued his policy of remaining on good terms with Mussolini. After 1945 nearly all German-speakers in the communities studied in Schröer's dictionary had left their homeland or been forced out by Tito's partisans. Today the history of the Gottschee communities is almost entirely forgotten outside the region, but it helps explain the inflexibility of many Austrians in the province of Carinthia towards the prospect of bilingual education in the region or even simply erecting bilingual place names. It also explained Jörg Haider's ability to profit electorally from such lingering resentment.

Competing Concepts of Identity

Not all theories are comfortable with attempts at national grand narratives. Approaches that accompanied post-classical approaches have preferred specific thematic methodologies emerging from developments, for example, in gender, sexuality and feminist social thought. Feminist theory in particular often appears at odds with nationalism. The American feminist philosopher and professor of government Cynthia Enloe argued in her book *Bananas, Beaches and Bases* that nationalism was largely the product of what she termed 'masculinised memory' to the general exclusion of women's experiences.¹⁸ But women have been helping to shape Austria's post war history whether or not they were consciously acting as women rather than as Austrian citizens who happened to be women. The very first general election in Austria, held on 25 November 1945, barely months after the ending of World War Two, came to be known as the women's election because so many men, either lost in combat, held as prisoners-of-war, or debarred under denazification laws, were not on the electoral roll. The

voting pattern of women in that election would set the points for Austrian politics for decades to come.

Poststructuralist theory, postcolonial theory and cultural studies belong to those terms that all invited rejection of established 'history of the nation' narrative perspectives, but these in turn have brought attacks upon postmodernism as incapable of handling historical awareness or of displaying an understanding of deep underlying economic influences, criticism articulated by the American Marxist literary critic Fredric Jameson in his response in 1996 to what he perceived to be the weaknesses and superficiality in postmodernist culture, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*.

So as Austria entered the period of the *Vormärz*, those years preceding the outbreak of revolution in the year 1848, and against the unremitting industrial and social changes that had taken place even within the Habsburg lands, it is perhaps appropriate to consider the many understandings of the concept of 'nation' and 'nationalism', and to see why the notion of Austria now begins to sit so uneasily in any theoretical discussion.

Undeniably the most pressing issue to establish is how recent the explicit articulation of the idea of the 'Austrian nation' (Die Österreichische Nation) is. Gerald Stourzh, a leading historian at the University of Vienna, could trace the expression back to no earlier than July 1933 when it began to be used as a rallying cry for conservative forces within Austria in the struggle against National Socialism, first appearing in an article in a journal of the Schuschnigg-led paramilitary organization, the 'Ostmärkische Sturmsharen'.¹⁹

Steven Grosby has been at pains to expose the misuse of the term 'nationalism' as being synonymous with 'nation'. For Grosby nationalism constitutes a set of beliefs invested in the notion of the nation.²⁰ The situation is hardly helped by the fact that in everyday language clear distinctions in the terminology of national identity are rarely made. In English terminology is applied with less than scientific precision: State, country, homeland, motherland and fatherland may be heard in turn, depending on how formal or

how ecstatic the evocation is. In Britain, for instance, there exists a multiplicity of terms used for essentially the same concept. At the United Nations the country may refer to itself as the 'UK'; on cars and international mail it refers to itself as 'GB'. In addition, a particular nation may not be able to control how others outside that nation apply labels to it, and so Welsh or Scottish holidaymakers abroad frequently find locals referring to them as English, for in many European languages England is often the informal but accepted designation for the whole of the United Kingdom. And on postage stamps the citizens of the United Kingdom appear to make do quite happily without any nomenclature. This near-anarchic state of affairs is replicated in many other states. Holland, for instance, is not the same entity as the Netherlands, but few outside the Netherlands would give regard to such distinctions. Regional identities in Spain are very strong, but the idea of a 'regional' identity could itself be objected to by members of the various linguistic 'minority' groups. When we turn to look at the history of the nomenclature for what is today called 'Austria' we are faced with such complex and multifaceted terminologies that it is tempting to abandon the project. Yet this very resistance to simplicity constitutes part of the explanation for the dilemma of Austrian identity.

Not surprisingly a considerable amount of academic energy has been invested into bringing some sense of order to the discussion of nation and its corresponding quality of national identity. These efforts reflect in part the particular period in which the effort is being made and the particular academic discipline attempting to establish definitions. Such attempts have certainly not been unpartisan, and we find marked tendencies to go in certain directions depending on the political persuasion of those discussing the topic.

Michael Billig's study from 1995, *Banal Nationalism*, had argued that academic research into nationalism had still to form part of mainstream social theory and that the topic had remained the preserve of students of international relations. Yet the rate of academic endeavour within this field was intensifying, partly

because the age of the nation-state had refused to die – despite its many obituaries or Marx’s conviction that nationalism represented a diminishing historical force²² – with the rebirth for instance of the Baltic states, the emergence of brand-new sovereign countries such as Slovenia and Slovakia, and the creation of a host of hitherto unheard-of lands, at least to West European and North American ears, out of the remains of the Soviet Union.

The Turkish political scientist Umut Özkirimli identified three basic approaches to the theory of nationalism: firstly, the now largely discredited primordialist approach, which believed in the notion of unchanging entities; secondly, the work of scholars influenced by theories of modernism, who attempted to expose the pseudo-scientific elements apparent in the construction of national identity; thirdly, the approach of what he termed the ethno-symbolists, who did not object automatically or *per se* to an element of fabrication within national identity.²³ Özkirimli then adds the observation: ‘For the purposes of classification it does not matter who “creates” or “imagines” the nation in the first place, nor how nationalism spreads among wider strata.’²⁴ This is a more contentious assertion, for there may well be a great deal of divergence between those who create national identities in the knowledge that they are working with symbols and those who are convinced that the identities they propound are factual and are rooted in antiquity. Özkirimli is also alive to the work of the British political theorist David Miller, whose 1995 study *On Nationalism* stressed how national identities relied on strong elements of myth and pure invention.²⁵ Whilst scholars such as Hobsbawm and the social anthropologist and philosopher Ernest Gellner might talk of myths as ‘fabrications’, other influential theoreticians of national identity, including Benedict Anderson, John Breuilly and Paul Brass, have been reluctant to use the term ‘false’.²⁶ Later in this study we will have to raise the question of what myths a short-lived Austrian Republic could draw on to establish or to prove its identity, caught as it was in the dilemma of being a republic, and thus a form of state diametrically opposed to the form it had replaced, yet nevertheless almost totally indebted

to Habsburg imperial history as a source for its repertoire of national symbols and historical events worthy of celebration or commemoration.

Özkirimli's objection to the modernist approach is that it succumbs to the temptation of becoming reductionist, wishing to identify a single process when there is really no overarching theory of nationalism which will adequately explain individual manifestations. Almost as an act of compensation other leading theoreticians such as Anthony D. Smith have tended to the other extreme of identifying great numbers of contributing factors. (Smith argued in his book *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* – yet another work from 1995 – for a very strict definition of the concept of the 'nation-state': 'when a single ethnic and cultural population inhabits the boundaries of a state, and the boundaries of that state are coextensive with the boundaries of that ethnic and cultural population'²⁷). This already anticipates the problems encountered when discussing present-day Austria. The break-up of the old Empire had indeed left the rump of territory which was to become the First Republic, a more homogeneous society once the Czechoslovaks, the Hungarians, the Slovenes and the Croats had gone their own ways. Yet although homogeneous, the First Austrian Republic was still hardly exclusive in many of the terms that have come to dominate the question of national identity, namely linguistic, ethnic, religious, cultural or even class uniqueness. Unanimity is also lacking amongst theoreticians when it comes to the question of the means employed by the evocation of nationalism in the task of establishing identity: 'Nationalism, for Gellner, is the vehicle for forging efficient and cohesive societies. Therefore, reality implies a break with the past. For Smith, nationalism is the ideological formulation which gets in motion the setting for a modern collectivity.'²⁸

Volition, although not entirely neglected, has not always been a criterion fully considered. Ernest Gellner believed people were to a large extent forced into a particular nationalist identity by the contingencies of economic development and by social change. This identity is not, however, an expression of what has been

called 'willed voluntarism'.²⁹ It is certainly a problem to be found at the heart of discussions regarding Austria after 1918. The small Alpine republic was the very last thing the majority of Austrians wanted, and the state could not be termed a 'Willensnation'; it had been imposed upon its citizens under the terms of the Treaty of Saint-Germain. After 1945 the same territory would, after some hesitation, emerge wholeheartedly committed to its identity in a way unprecedented in the course of the First Republic. The basic ingredients had not changed between 1918 and 1945. The territorial borders remained the same and both the linguistic and ethnic make-up had remained relatively stable: in both cases the land was a predominantly German-speaking and Catholic state. Nor had there been massive changes in population numbers between the two wars, yet nevertheless a radically different self-perception emerged. This should suggest that identity is a dynamic concept, but it appears that this insight is relatively late, some dating it to discussions in the 1990s. Hans-Rudolf Wicker, drawing on work by Gallissot, Friedman and Hannerz, sees this as a fresh impulse in our understanding of national identity, claiming: 'once freed from its static element, identity is conceptualized in such a way that its process-related aspects are emphasized,' and adding that 'process-based thinking ... negates the existence of stronger inner organizations,' and as a consequence particularism is favoured over universalism.³⁰ It seems to be forgotten however that as early as the eighteenth century Herder, who did so much to recognize and promote the idea of the particular and the ethnically unique, and Friedrich Schiller, as much a practising historian as he was a poet and dramatist, had already shown they were alive to the idea of process and the mutable rather than the static and eternal. Herder propounded some of these ideas in his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (Ideas towards a Philosophy of the History of Humanity), as did Schiller in his inaugural lecture at Jena in May 1789, *Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte?* (What is Universal History and why do we study it?)

For them history was a process and the state transformed itself from absolute arbitrariness to a state in which humanity

was achieved through the development of the individual. But how could the Habsburg Empire be made to fit this model? The Empire might expand, but what was it meant to develop? And it is to Herder, as Stefan Berger has argued, that we find the claim that it is poetry and language rather than history itself that expressed the essential nature of the nation.³¹ Herder had also claimed that the spiritual and intellectual characteristics of a nation or people (Volk) arose out of myth, a concept imprecise enough to permit considerable leeway in interpretation.³² Berger reads national history as a response to the Enlightenment, and in particular Protestant monarchs and leaders exploiting the notion of the Protestant nation 'as an anti-universalist oppositional term against the pope and constructed national pasts which were separate from and opposed to Rome'.³³

The issue of the nation cannot be said to be the exclusive preserve of the eighteenth century onwards, a discovery or invention from the time of the French Revolution. Surprisingly few scholars discussing national identity recall how in 1599, and from the vantage point of Tudor England, Shakespeare had impressed the issue upon his Lancastrian ancestors. In *Henry v*, on the eve of the battle of Agincourt, the dyspeptic Irish Captain Macmorris challenges the Welsh Captain Llewellyn with the question: 'What ish my nation? Who talks of my nation?'³⁴

Nationalism after World War Two

It is understandable that since the end of the Second World War and the defeat of National Socialism there has been great reluctance to evoke concepts of nation and race in the same breath. The work of the sociologist Tariq Modood is an example of a shift of focus from what has been perceived in the discourse as biological racism and a move towards cultural racism, but it cannot hide the fact that someone such as Karl Renner, Austria's first chancellor after the First World War and the Republic's first President after the Second World War, most certainly did think in biological and racial terms

in his earlier theoretical writings on the nature of the state. His views were not simply an aspect of an ethnic understanding of national identity but betrayed a frequently encountered vulgar Darwinism characteristic of nineteenth-century socialism, but were also informed in part by an emerging Freudian interpretation of social behaviour as rooted in sexual behaviour. The following extract not only makes this clear but also runs counter to the idea of the nation as a spiritual idea, which in turn helps anticipate the answer to the puzzling and problematic question of why Austrian socialists in particular found it difficult to accept or to develop the notion of a specific Austrian identity:

Die Sexualbeziehung der Paarung zweier Individuen und das Generationsverhältnis zwischen Erzeugern und Erzeugten sind einfache Relationen physiologischer und wenn man will zoologischer Natur. Aber in tausendjähriger Entwicklung hat sich über diesem einfachen Substrate ein gesellschaftlicher Überbau gebildet, der alle menschlichen Beziehungen durchdringt und zum Schluß die ganze Menschheit in Rassen und Völker zerlegt hat. Der Sexualnexus ist einer der wichtigsten Sozialisierungsfaktoren geworden und damit auch zur Grundlage besonderer Gesellschafts- und Staatstheorien.³⁵

(The sexual encounter of two individuals mating and the generational relationship between procreators and procreated are simple relationships of a physiological and, if one will, of a zoological nature. But in a development across countless years a social superstructure has formed over this simple substructure, permeating all human relationships and has ultimately divided entire humanity into races and *völker*. The sexual nexus is one of the most significant socializing factors and therefore is also the basis of particular social and state theories.)

There is something uncomfortable about such language when it appears under an imprint date of 1952 and therefore still under the shadow of National Socialism's biological arguments for the emergence of distinct racial groupings. Renner's perspective is

that of the tribe and of ethnic allegiance, which of course was his position, and that of most Austrians, after 1918, when he drafted the proclamation for 'Deutschösterreich', Austria as part of a greater German republic, a position he had every right to believe corresponded to President Woodrow Wilson's well-meant but naïve vision of a post-war Europe made up of nations founded on the principle of clearly delineated ethnic divisions but a principle that the Allies were not prepared to grant to Austria after the First World War.

Ethnicity could no more be used as a case for a distinct Austrian identity than language could be. Indeed, these two elements would rather argue the case against a separate Austrian identity, for Austria could be said to be in large measure linguistically and anthropologically an extension of those settlement patterns which characterized Bavaria and from where migratory groups entered what would become ultimately the territory of modern-day Austria. The sudden influx of other ethnic identities, however, can provoke a self-questioning of national identity and be reflected in political and voting responses, and Austria is no more immune to migration patterns than any other West European state. In January 2011, for instance, the percentage of the population in Austria of non-Austrian descent ('ausländische Herkunft') was 17 per cent but in Vienna, the country's capital, that figure went as high 33.4 per cent.³⁶

Origins of the Idea of Austria

This brings us to perhaps the most neglected of the criteria used in contemporary theoretical discussions devoted to national identity, although it is also the most obvious: geography and space. Postmodernism has encouraged much thought on the construction and deconstruction of images and appears to have graduated beyond the restrictions of the tangible, being more at home with constructed identities which can be reproduced electronically and in infinite forms. Yet a nation claims specific and measurable space on a planet that is ultimately finite. It is timely to recall that Austria

is essentially a geographic description, Österreich, the eastern realm. The geographic description tells us, however, far more than the simple point on the compass: it tells us from whose perspective the term was created. Whoever was awarding the name was clearly in a position of power to do so and was equally clearly situated some point to the west of the territory.

The name of Austria first emerges in a Latin document dealing with the gifting of land near Neuhofen an der Ybbs in present-day Lower Austria by Emperor Otto III to Bishop Gottschalk of Freising on 1 November 996. (The document followed the pattern established in 973 when Bishop Abraham of Freising received land south of the Karawanken (Karavanke in Slovenian), in which the area was also named in the vernacular.) In the case of the deed from 996 we read of 'territory called Austria in the vernacular' (in regione vulgari vocabulo Ostarrîchi). The Viennese medievalist Karl Brunner commented that from an everyday geographical term there had now developed the name of an emerging country. By the first half of the twelfth century there can be found in manuscripts references to land held by Leopold II describing his possession as *terra, quae nunc orientalis dicitur*, meaning not simply land lying in the east but land that now constituted, and was called, the east, i.e. 'Österreich'.³⁸

Austria could be said to be a place on the map, but maps are by no means neutral witnesses, as J. B. Harley insists in his study of the manipulation of cartography, 'Deconstructing the map'. Postmodernity has taken issue with space, denying it any status as an *a priori* given, for directing the work of the cartographer are the kings and emperors, the politicians and state institutions, the Church, and a host of other bodies, who 'have all initiated programmes of mapping for their own ends'.³⁹ Yet in addition to these external forces Harley identifies forces that are internal to map making: 'To catalogue the world is to appropriate it so that all these technical processes represent acts of control over its image which extend beyond the professed uses of cartography.'⁴⁰ Thus for Harley the act of 'deconstructing' a map is thus to dispute what he refers to as the epistemological myth presented by cartography.

Such reservations are not, of course, unique to Austria, and they could be used to undermine the certainty of a national representation through cartography. During the years of the annexation, 1938–45, Austria was removed absolutely from the map, and not just those printed in the Reich. Its restoration was marked by the production of new maps, but it was not those acts of printing which either created or eradicated Austria. The various maps were responding to events in the political and the tangible world as manifested in its social construction. A postmodernist might possibly wish to deny the existence of Austria or claim it to be merely a construction, yet that construction will have visible presence should the postmodernist attempt to enter the country without a passport. And it is in the social presence of the concept that we come nearer to a working idea of Austria. The French sociologist and anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu had offered the concept of ‘habitus’ in his *Outline of a Theory of Practice* of 1977 (originally under the French title *Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique*, 1972). Habitus represents the knowledge we pick up simply by living our lives in a particular context, even if we do not reflect upon this knowledge.⁴¹ This does not resolve the question regarding that context: does it represent a state or a nation? But the drift of Bourdieu’s argument, and that of later work by scholars such as the American sociologist Craig Calhoun, is towards those perceptible manifestations of the nation which engender identity with, or at least acknowledgement of, a particular country.

One of the most difficult questions to resolve, despite Thomas Mann’s earlier optimism, is the exact nature and quality – if any – of Austrian literature, and it is surely instructive that Klaus Zeyringer in his extensive study of post-war Austrian literature, running to almost 650 pages, was obliged to define his subject precisely by going outside literature itself and evoking the presence of the state, the bureaucratic and institutional manifestation of the notion of Austria, as a constitutive moment in that definition: ‘Österreichische Literatur ist Literatur im Kontext des sich wandelnden Kulturraumes und Staates Österreich’⁴² (Austrian literature is literature within the context of Austria’s changing state and cultural presence).

Confidence in those structures manifesting the Austrian state in its historical form has not remained static. In Friedrich Schiller's great Wallenstein trilogy, the third part *Wallensteins Tod*, published in 1800 and set in Pilsen and Eger in 1634 at the time of the Thirty Years War, sees Wallenstein in negotiations with the Swedish commander Wrangel. Wallenstein is contemplating changing his allegiance and the Swede, although eager to win over the Bohemian Wallenstein, is clearly disgusted at such lack of national fervour. The exchange tells us much:

- Wrangel: Herr Gott im Himmel! Hat man hierzulande
 Denn keine Heimat, keinen Herd und Kirche?
- Wallenstein: Ich will Euch sagen, wie das zugeht – Ja,
 Der Österreicher *hat* ein Vaterland
 Und liebt's und hat auch Ursach', es zu lieben.⁴³
- (Wrangel: Good God in Heaven! Are you people without
 home, without hearth or faith?
- Wallenstein: Let me tell you how things stand here. Certainly,
 the Austrians have a homeland, which they love,
 and with good cause to love it too.)

In 1946 the Ministry of Education marked Austria's 950 years existence with an official publication intended for school use. Leading politicians wrote prefaces for the book, including Education Minister and Vienna University law graduate Felix Hurdes of the ÖVP on behalf of the ministry. His preface was part of that long process in which the Austrian Republic set about the task of turning the population into self-conscious and self-confident Austrians. Entitled 'Bekennntnis zu Österreich' (Declaration of faith in Austria), a title with echoes of the pro-Nazi declaration issued by Austrian writers during the Anschluss and using a vocabulary reminiscent of the corporate state, Hurdes drew a direct line to Schiller's text when he concluded with the wish:

Mögen die Jubiläumsfeiern alle Österreicher einen im Bekenntnis zur Heimat, mögen sie alle, was Alters und Standes auch immer, erfüllen mit der verpflichtenden Erkenntnis, daß der Österreicher ein Vaterland hat und auch Ursache hat, es zu lieben!⁴⁴

(May these celebrations unite all Austrians in a profession of support for their homeland, may they fill them all, irrespective of age or station, with the binding recognition that the Austrian has a homeland and has cause to love it!)

What was a given fact for Schiller's *Wallenstein*, the certainty of Austria, has to be talked into existence in Hurdes's exaltation.

This chapter has considered some of the many conflicting interpretations of the nature of national identity, and it must be apparent that the division between nation and state identity is often blurred. It is also apparent how uncomfortably Austria sits within any one set of criteria, and yet the notion of Austria persists. Whilst loyalty and identity were still located in the subject's allegiance to his monarch then Austrian identity, with its two uncharacteristically long dynastic periods, the Babenbergs between AD 976 and 1246 and the Habsburgs between the years 1278 and 1918, could be said to be fairly stable. That stability was seriously threatened by the Napoleonic invasions and further undermined by the revolutions taking place across Europe in 1830. What makes the 1848 revolutions, and the years immediately preceding them, so significant, is that they challenged Austrian identity from within, and it is for that reason they claim our attention, for they now show that Austrian identity was becoming a negotiable product and that the presence of an emperor could no longer be accepted as a given and eternal fact in the composition of that identity.

PART TWO
WRITING AUSTRIA

CHAPTER FOUR

AUSTRIA'S IDENTITY AND THE RESPONSE TO REVOLUTION

Revolution had brought Louis-Philippe to the throne in France in 1830, and it was revolution that took it away from him on 24 February 1848. Within three days of that February uprising in Paris there were mass demonstrations and assemblies taking place on the other side of the Rhine, and, as so often in the history of the democratic process in the German-speaking lands, it was accompanied by much rhetoric. Before the crowds in Mannheim the liberal Karl Mathy and the far more radical Friedrich Hecker repeated the familiar demands of the German national movement: freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, and a national parliament for Germans.¹ This would be an age, however, not only of speeches but of the extensive use of the printing presses. In Baden, for instance Hecker, an advocate by profession, together with another anti-monarchist, Gustav von Struve, had used Joseph Ficker's journal *Seebblätter* to propagate republican views, and so the issue of national identity could no longer be divorced from the printing context in which it was being discussed. Wide levels of literacy and the ready availability of material fuelled this appetite for news and opinion. (Already by the end of the eighteenth century there was an impressive industry producing journals and periodicals in the German-speaking world. Hans-Ulrich Wehler counted more than 2,000 new titles between 1765 and 1790, ranging from literary titles to the historical-political, from the academic to the theological, and it was calculated that a profit could be made from a sale of at least five hundred copies.²)

One of the most distinguished scholars of Habsburg history has commented that the impact of the revolution upon the masses

in 1848 was the unleashing of 'a vast and quite unprecedented bulk of journal and pamphlet literature'.³ And pamphlet literature, short, polemical and intimately bound up with the political issues of the moment, developed its own inherent rhetorical and polemical strategies that stood in marked distinction to more measured and scholarly treatise writing. We begin to see the emergence of that polemical Austria which becomes very much the hallmark of subsequent literature devoted to the discussion of the nature, and the justification, for or against, of an entity entitled Austria. It was only a matter of a few years between that pamphlet literature and the flourishing of that very specific Viennese *feuilleton* tradition, an essayistic format immune to academic scrutiny although often masquerading as logical argument, that was propagated by numerous newspapers and in which so much of the debate on Austrian identity would be conducted.

It should also not be forgotten that in contrast to England's mere three universities existing in 1848, namely Oxford, Cambridge and the only recently founded University of London, there were universities spread throughout the German-speaking world in what are the modern states of Germany, Austria and Switzerland, as well as those standing on territory that now falls outside those three countries. This meant that in most districts of the German-speaking world there were concentrations of young, literate and politically passionate young men who would be quickly caught up in revolutionary fervour. Accordingly, on 12 March 1848 students in Vienna had collected their own petition calling for essentially the same rights as had been heard in Mannheim: the students demanded press freedom, freedom in instruction and religion, and general and popular representation.⁴

Revolution and mob violence came to Vienna on 13 March. By the end of the day Metternich had resigned, his 'system' was in pieces and the man himself in disguise on his way to England, where, once he had arrived, he felt immediately anything but a man in exile, such was his sense of well-being in Palmerston's England. Agitation did not stop with Metternich's departure; rather it continued throughout the year. The journals and hurriedly

printed newsheets reproduced lithographs of street fighting and barricades, such as one depicting the ambitiously named 'Kaiser-Barrikade' erected on Vienna's Naglerstrasse in May 1848 and showing students, members of the national guard and workers all fighting together under the flag of German unity. (Symbolic barricades and street protests in Vienna would mark both the election of President Waldheim in 1986 and the formation of the ÖVP–FPÖ government in 2000.) Other pictures from the period showed workers storming the weakly defended imperial arsenal in the Renngasse on 7 October 1848. One picture, a watercolour by Johann Christian Schoeller from the same month, and probably pandering to the more lurid appetite of the reading market, portrayed a mob lynching from a Viennese lamppost the minister of war, Count Theodor Baillet von Latour, a member of the constitutional government. In that picture it can also be clearly seen that the crowd was made up of a cross-section of Viennese society: artisans, students, some women, and also respectable hat-wearing members of the bourgeoisie.⁵

The implications of events were remarkably well and quickly understood even in the most obscure parts of the Habsburg territories. Professor R. J. W. Evans found in Romanian sources a perspicacious report written by the court agent in Transylvania only two days after the fall of Metternich: 'With 15 March 1848 there begins for the Austrian monarchy a new era of her political life and history. The immediate results will quite certainly be a closer link with Germany and a strengthening of German national feeling'.⁶

The pace of events was intoxicating, with outbursts of protest and violence by no means confined to the imperial capital. This chapter does not intend to narrate the story of the 1848 revolutions; it is a challenge even to the most competent of professional historians to document them, but Professor Evans offers us a profound insight when he comments:

We should bear in mind that contemporaries could hardly cope either ... Only one institution was necessarily involved in all convolutions

and actively responded to most of them: the dynasty itself – a clue to its own eventual survival, and to that of its territorial possessions as an undivided whole.⁷

Once the commotion of revolution had finally settled and liberals brought to heel, although only after much internecine fighting amongst the various ethno-linguistic groupings that would leave a great trail of bitterness, the outcome would yet again be a case of Austria imitating and responding to events from outside, especially in France. So it was that at the very end of 1851 Emperor Franz Josef, who had replaced the weak-minded Ferdinand, chose to return Austria to absolutist government, as Napoleon III had done following his *coup* in France.⁸ Austria had again fallen into a characteristic pattern of rarely initiating events to shape its future but of hurriedly copying from others. Naturally it was difficult to produce a language of vitality to represent and glorify such passivity, and throughout the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries those defending the notion of Austria appeared to be on the back foot. By contrast, opponents to such notions, usually voicing support for union with a Greater Germany or the creation of nation-states based on ethnic identity, found it much easier to vocalise and energise their campaigns. This situation would be repeated in the 1930s and reminds us that age can play an important role, often neglected in theoretical studies, in the formation of national identity. The Nazis' self-stylization as 'Die Bewegung' (the movement) appealed to the imagination of many younger Austrians, who found, for instance, Dollfuss's concept of the corporate state hopelessly lacking in dynamic appeal. This attraction of the dynamic was also reflected in the fact that the average age of members of paramilitary Nazi formations was lower than that of their counterparts belonging to Republican groups.⁹

The events surrounding the Revolution of 1848, embracing the frustration of the preceding years of those hoping for democratic progress, the initial euphoria amongst many when Metternich's structure appeared to have been toppled, and the subsequent

disenchantment at the apparent failure of the political unrest to produce very tangible political benefits would all find expression in the outpourings of the printing presses. Indeed, there is some justification in seeing the issue of what the Revolution was really about in language itself, for the Habsburg Empire was now beset by claims from the smaller nations to be granted ever greater freedom of language.¹⁰

The State as an Instrument of Control

The government in Vienna believed it had the legal and moral right to control what its citizens were reading and saying, even when those citizens were residing outside the country and also publishing abroad. The state felt particularly vulnerable to political activity beyond its frontiers where its control was limited. To this extent a situation arose foreshadowing the Austria of the mid- and late 1930s when members of the Austrian NSDAP and the Austrian Legion could gather in Munich, agitating and writing with impunity, and causing immense harm to the stability of Austria's First Republic.

The extent to which Vienna in the 1830s feared the power of the printed word is evident from the painstaking, tortuous and pedantic reports of the Empire's chief of police, Count Sedlnitzky, Präsident der obersten k.k. Polizeihofstelle in Vienna, an office whose remit also included censorship. For more than three decades Sedlnitzky attempted to snuff out every sign of intellectual life in the Habsburg lands. The following extract, from a report by Sedlnitzky for the personal attention of Metternich concerns the interrogation of Hofrat von Hammer, a close friend of the outspoken poet Anastasius Grün, and it betrays the leaden stylistic qualities of its author. It is a note written in 1836 regarding Graf Anton Alexander Auersperg, whom Sedlnitzky rightly suspected of being the real name behind the poet publishing under the *nom de plume* of Anastasius Grün. Count Sedlnitzky was pursuing Auersperg in connection with such 'odious' works as

the *Spaziergänge eines Wiener Poeten*, published in Hamburg in 1831, whose very title (Walks by a Viennese Poet) would give birth to a venerable Austrian tradition, as we shall shortly see, of using the trope of the stroll along the streets of Vienna as a tool with which to expose the moral and social ills of the nation. To Sednitzky's dismay the most inflammatory of the poems in that collection had begun to reappear elsewhere:

Die Anstössigkeit mancher dieser Gedichte und insbesondere jener, welche sich in dem bei Weidmann in Leipzig verlegten *Deutschen Musenalamach für das Jahr 1836* mit der Bezeichnung 'Anastasius Grün' vorfinden, vorzüglich aber die in höherem Grade schlechte, in religiöser wie in politischer Hinsicht verwerfliche Tendenz mehrerer Gedichte aus jener Sammlung, welche im Jahr 1835 in der obengenannten Leipziger Buchhandlung unter dem Titel *Schutt; Dichtungen von Anastasius Grün* erschienen sind, veranlaßt mich, mir womöglich die volle Gewißheit über die Identität der Person des Grafen von Auersperg mit Anastasius Grün zu verschaffen, um hiernach denselben wegen der ihm solchenfalls wiederholt zur Last fallenden Übertretung der allerhöchsten Zensurvorschrift, daß ein k. k. Untertan im Ausland nichts drucken lassen dürfe, was nicht von der k. k. Zensurbehörde zugelassen worden ist, zur Verantwortung ziehen zu lassen.¹¹

(The offensiveness of many of these poems and in particular of those appearing under the designation 'Anastasius Grün' in the *Deutschen Musenalamach für das Jahr 1836*, published by Weidmann in Leipzig, and most notably those poems from that collection displaying religiously and politically a deplorable inclination to such a high degree and available in the aforementioned Leipzig bookshop in 1835 under the title of *Schutt; Dichtungen von Anastasius Grün* obliges me to establish, where possible and with complete certainty, the correspondence of the identity of the person of Count von Auersperg with that of Anastasius Grün and thus call to account the very same person for being guilty of the repeated breach of those censorship prescriptions issued by his most exalted Majesty, that no subject of the emperor and

king should be allowed to publish anything abroad that has not been sanctioned by His Majesty's office of censorship.)

Rigid censorship would have a particularly retarding effect in one area of literary national consciousness in the late eighteenth century and the earlier part of the nineteenth. It is particularly striking how, in contrast to the German territories, the historical novel was underdeveloped in Austrian literature. A survey of publications in the period 1784–1850 suggested that Saxons alone were writing six times as many historical novels as Austrians, and that up to the year of Revolution in 1830 Metternich's censors were placing on the index (banned) half of all the historical novels they examined. The Habsburgs were nervous of such sorties into the past, and works dealing with Bohemia's history, especially by writers such as Carl Herloßsohn, seven of whose novels were prohibited, fell particularly foul of the censors.¹² As a result the historical novel, according to Kurt Habitzel, was perceived by Austrian writers as principally the terrain belonging to Germans and did not constitute a major element in Austrian identity-making. And aversion to history remained a notable feature of early post-1945 Austrian literature for, in stark contrast to German writing, there was a marked dearth of novels or poetry dealing with the recent war.¹³

Expressing Discontent

What language had been evoked by the poet Anastasius Grün on his stroll through Vienna which could cause so much offence to Sedlnitzky? In the poem 'An den Kaiser' the Emperor himself is addressed directly by the poet; in tones that are confident, although by no means abrasive, the monarch is urged to grant, in lines that echo Schiller's *Don Carlos*, concessions for the well-being of his long-suffering but far from disloyal people:

Herr, gib frei uns die Gefangnen: den Gedanken und das Wort! –
Sieh, es gleicht der Mensch dem Baume, schlicht und schmucklos
grünt er fort;
Doch wie schön, wenn der Gedanke dran als bunte Blüthe hängt,
Und hervor das Wort, das freie, reif als goldne Frucht sich drängt!...

O gib frei uns den Gedanken und auch seinen Freund: das Wort!
Denn es sind gar wackre Gärtner für die Rosenkeime dort;
Zu den Lorbeern und den Palmen, die dein graises Haupt umweh'n,
Müßten gut und schön die Rosen jugendlicher Freiheit steh'n!¹⁴

(Sovereign, release our prisoners: thought and word! Behold, man is like a tree, at first simply and without adornment he grows; yet how beautiful when thought flowers and the word bursts forth as golden, mature fruit. Set free our intellect and its companion, the word! Eager gardeners are ready to attend to the rose buds. How well these roses of youthful liberty would set off the laurels and palms that adorn your venerable head!)

No less an act of *lèse-majesté* was the poem unmistakably evoking Metternich himself and bearing the barbed title 'Salonscene'. Here an unnamed but matchlessly radiant prince is depicted gliding through a glittering social gathering; men and women of the highest rank are all in his thrall:

Er ist's, der das rüst'ge Prachtschiff Austria am Steuer lenkt,
Er, der im Congreß der Fürsten für sie handelt, für sie denkt;

(He it is who steers the mighty ship of Austria, he who at the congress of the princes acts and thinks for them.)

But waiting outside the door of this sumptuous ballroom and looking in is somebody in great distress. It is the Austrian nation itself. Yet it poses no threat to the Prince, for it carries no weapon with which to harm him. Instead, it waits humbly and with the most modest of requests: 'Sieh, es fleht ganz artig: Dürft' ich wohl

so frei sein, frei zu sein?¹⁵ (Behold, it pleads most respectfully to request the freedom to be free).

The tone is unmistakably pre-revolutionary, for the balance of power still favoured those in office. The fate of Anastasius Grün is interesting for it exemplifies a common pattern in Austria's national development. For those in his position following the apparent failure of the Revolution to secure its objectives the choice was often between exile or capitulation. Many of the leaders of the Revolution, in both the Austrian and the Hungarian lands, would leave the territory altogether. Many too would begin a new life in the United States. Graf von Auersperg chose the latter path of compromise by reconciling himself with the prevailing political system after 1848 and even taking his place in the Reichsrat in 1860 and the Herrenhaus in 1861.¹⁶ The choice to flee or accept the status quo would also face many Austrians from the mid-1930s, and especially after the civil war of 1934. Joined later by those fleeing from the annexation in 1938, the experience of those in exile would also repeat the situation from almost a century earlier. Once in exile there would be very little clamour from those in authority in Austria after 1848, or 1945, to see the emigrants return.¹⁷

The Revolution of 1848, and the tensions leading to it, threw up in stark relief many of the issues that were to shape the way in which Austrians would now come to regard themselves and their situation. Franz Schuselka (1811–86) was very much a product of those tensions, becoming a tireless pamphleteer and polemicist. Born in Budweis in Bohemia and a graduate in law at Vienna, he worked for a time in the criminal courts there before attempting an independent career as a tutor to the aristocracy and then as a tireless writer. His short polemical piece *Ist Österreich deutsch?* (Is Austria German?) appeared anonymously in Leipzig in 1843 but was quickly taken note of and reviewed both inside and outside the Habsburg lands.

Schuselka sees Austria caught in a dilemma, unable to be one thing or another. Initially Schuselka answers the question he offers with a clear 'No'. How could Austria be German when only 7 million of its 36 million inhabitants are really German,

and only 3,594 miles of its territory, out of a total of 12,167, are shared with the German *Bund*? The acquisition of the Hungarian and Bohemian realms brought about of necessity Austria's withdrawal from a closer union with the other German lands and also incited the envy of the other German princes. Habsburg campaigns against the Protestants in its territories also had its inevitable consequences: 'Da ging die Hälfte Deutschlands für das habsburgische Kaiserhaus verloren' (Thus the Imperial House of Habsburg forfeited half of Germany). France knew how to profit from this division and greedily fell upon Germany, and to its cost Austria discovered that without Germany as an ally it could achieve little. For Schuselka Austria's decision to renounce the title of Holy Roman Emperor of the German Nation had dire consequences, as the Napoleonic invasions had so painfully demonstrated:

Die Idee des gemeinsamen deutschen Vaterlandes, die man in den Tagen der Gefahr in so vielen schönen Proklamationen anerkannt und zu Hilfe gerufen hatte, wurde der Vergessenheit überliefert, und Deutschland war für Österreich bald wieder in jeder Beziehung Ausland.¹⁹

(The idea of a common German fatherland, which had been summoned for help and recognized in moments of peril in wonderful proclamations, was consigned to oblivion and very soon Germany was again and in every respect for Austria something alien.)

Austria's Response to History

Responsibility for this loss of identity rested with Austria, according to Schuselka,

Österreich nahm sich ... selber seinen historischen Grundstein; es vergaß, daß es nicht nur gefährlich, sondern unmöglich ist, bei einem fertigen Gebäude die Grundlage zu ändern.'

(Austria deprived itself of its historical basis, forgetting that it is not only dangerous but also impossible to change the foundations of an edifice once it has been erected.)

What choices remain for Austria? Here we tread the line between such notoriously difficult concepts as nation and state, but this appears to be the decision facing Austria:

Ein eigentliches gemeinsames Vaterlands- oder Nationengefühl konnte Österreich in seiner bunt gemengten Bevölkerung bisher nicht erzeugen und wird es von nun an noch viel weniger im Stande sein; durch Gestattung einer bewußten Theilnahme am Staatsleben würde es den Mangel der Nationaleinheit durch eine wahre Staatseinheit ersetzen; denn die einzelnen Völker würden dann recht lebhaft zum Bewußtsein aller Vortheile gelangen, die ihnen aus der Vereinigung zu einer Weltmacht entspringen.²⁰

(Hitherto Austria had not been able, with its mix of peoples, to achieve its own common sense of nation or fatherland, and from now on even less so. By conceding a certain degree of participation in the affairs of state it would make up for the lack of national unity by a genuine state unity, for the individual peoples would come alive to the awareness of all the advantages which arise from being part of a union with a world power.)

Schuselka, however, is prepared to step outside an Austrian perspective and raise an issue that would after 1945 almost become a taboo in Austrian historiography: 'So ist es auch für Deutschlands nationale Entwicklung Österreichs Einigung oder Trennung eine Lebensfrage von entscheidender Wichtigkeit'²¹ (Austria's cohesion or separation is thus also for Germany's national development an absolutely vital question of the greatest importance). This acts as a reminder that decisions regarding Austria's future shape would often rest principally in the hands of those residing outside Austria. Pressure for Prussia to press ahead and form a unitary state to the exclusion of Austria was already well developed before

it become reality after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1 and is clearly expressed throughout the 1830s in the work of men as diverse as Paul Pfizer, Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann and David Hansemann. Sensing this danger of isolation Schuselka pleaded for the German states not to hinder Austria's metamorphosis into a more democratic and tolerant state. He asks Germany not to forget the heroic sacrifice Austria has made over the centuries defending the borders of Germany from incursions, and he thus concludes his article with the opposite hypothesis from its opening claim, and ends with an appeal to Germany to heed his cry as both a warning and an act of instruction: 'Österreich ist deutsch!' (Austria is German).

The tone and the dilemma of Schuselka's piece have an uncanny anticipation of Chancellor Schuschnigg's fateful radio broadcast to the Austrian people on the Friday evening of 11 March 1938 when he capitulated before the approaching German Wehrmacht. Schuschnigg too could not extract himself from his German identity, and his language betrayed his failure to resolve the issue of Austrian identity:

Wir haben, weil wir um keinen Preis auch in ernster Stunde nicht, deutsches Blut zu vergießen gesonnen sind, unsere Wehrmacht den Auftrag gegeben ... ohne Widerstand sich zurückzuziehen ... So verabschiede ich mich in dieser Stunde von dem österreichischen Volk mit einem deutschen Wort und einem Herzenswunsch: Gott schütze Österreich! ²²

(Because we cannot contemplate at any price the thought of shedding German blood, not even in this grave hour, we have given our armed forces the order to fall back without offering resistance. And it is in this moment that I take my leave of the Austrian people with a German word and a heartfelt wish: may God protect Austria!)

Schuschnigg's and Austria's dilemma in 1938 have origins reaching far back, of which Schuselka's *Ist Österreich deutsch?* is but one expression. It would never have occurred to him, as it did

only belatedly to Schuschnigg a century later, that the German-speaking territories of the Habsburg lands could constitute a viable unit in themselves. And Schuschnigg had at his command only the language of German nationalism, or as Friedrich Heer, the most celebrated of Austria's post-war historians said of Schuschnigg: 'Seine Heimat war Tirol. Sein Vaterland war: sein Deutschland. Österreich hat er nie verstanden'²³ (The Tyrol was his home; his fatherland was his Germany. He had no concept of Austria).

But Heer's belief in a unified Austria and his mistrust of the atomizing influence of the Provinces constituted only one reading of Austrian history, and one that had been greatly shaped by the increasingly absolutist and centralizing impact of a rigidly bureaucratic state towards which Austria after 1848 continued to move, following the lead given in the eighteenth century by Empress Maria Theresia and her son, Joseph II. In the years running up to the Revolution of 1848 could be heard voices protesting at the strangulation caused by such an inflexible government structure. The aristocratic Viktor Freiherr von Andrian-Werbung (1813–58) had received, like so many of the principal figures in this study, a legal training in Vienna. He rose swiftly through the ranks in Austria's administration in Venice and Milan. Greatly influenced by what he saw as England's advanced government structures with its large element of self-government existing alongside free institutions, Andrian-Werbung first caused a stir with his anonymous pamphlet of 1842, *Österreich und dessen Zukunft* (Austria and her future), in which he claimed Austria's bureaucratic structures of control were unsustainable and its legal system in need of a thorough revision. As a possible remedy he pleaded for a reinvigoration of Austria's traditional provincial structures. When revolution came closer his tone became increasingly shrill, his questions, as so often in Austrian discourse, purely rhetorical. His anonymous piece of 1847, on the eve of the Revolution, entitled 'Prognosis' appeared, like so much of this material, well away from Vienna and under the imprint of the Hamburg publisher Ludwig Giese, a cover name for the publisher Hoffmann und Campe, whose activities the Habsburgs had nevertheless managed to curtail.

Wir fragen laut und zuversichtlich: Wer in Österreich, wer vom Throne herab bis in die niedrigste Hütte, wähnt nicht im Innersten seiner Seele die Überzeugung von der Nothwendigkeit, der imminenten Nothwendigkeit einer durchgreifenden Systemänderung?²⁴

(We ask loudly and confidently: Who in Austria, who in the innermost part of his soul, from the throne right down to the humblest crofter, does not hold to the conviction of the necessity, the pressing necessity, of a root-and-branch overhaul of the system of government?)

Andrian-Werbung speaks of a loss of faith: ‘Der alte felsenfeste Glaube [ist] verschwunden – und ohne diesen bewegt man keine Berge mehr’ (That old, steadfast faith has vanished, without which mountains can no longer be moved). Almost a century later, in December 1945, when Austria was about to celebrate its first Christmas after the Second World War, the newly elected chancellor and former Dachau inmate, Leopold Figl, in a memorable radio address to his fellow Austrians, pleaded for their faith in the Austria that had yet to be reborn. Austria would be an act of commitment, a nation evoked into being through belief and with unmistakable religious overtones, which would remain a constant throughout Austrian discourse:

Ich kann euch zu Weihnachten nichts geben. Ich kann euch für den Christbaum, wenn ihr überhaupt einen habt, keine Kerzen geben, kein Stück Brot, keine Kohlen zum Heizen, kein Glas zum Einschneiden ... Wir haben nichts. Ich kann euch nur bitten: Glaubt an dieses Österreich!²⁵

(I have nothing to give you for Christmas. I can give you no candles for your Christmas tree, even if you were to have one, no piece of bread, no coal for your oven, no glass for your windows ... We have nothing. I can only ask one thing of you: believe in this Austria!)

Andrian-Werbung’s prognosis is also instructive for other reasons. He speaks of the ‘Nationalstolz des Österreichers’ (the national

pride of the Austrian) as if these concepts would be immediately understood and accepted by his readership, requiring no further elucidation. Two other aspects of his pamphlet deserve our attention, for they reflect certain constant characteristics in Austrian rhetoric and in Austrian solutions for the country's perceived problems. The first is the disparity between the initial and emboldened rhetoric and the subsequent means then offered to achieve the desired goals, which turn out to be remarkably meek and far from radical:

Klar und offen liegt der Weg vor uns, welcher uns in das Land der Verheißung führen soll – nicht durch das rothe Meer einer Revolution, sondern auf dem friedlichen Wege einer stufenweisen, aber durchgreifenden Reform.²⁶

(The path that will lead us into the Promised Land lies clear and open before us – but it will not take us through the Red Sea of revolution but rather along a peaceful road of thorough and incremental reform.)

When Andrian-Werburg does venture into offering tangible structural proposals, although they remain far from detailed, they have as much a conservative as radical quality about them. The new Austrian order will be based upon three pillars, which he terms the 'eternal triumvirate of any well-ordered constitution': the aristocracy, the intellectual classes and the autonomy of local communities ('Municipalfreiheit'). With hindsight it is easy to dismiss this list as a hopelessly contradictory *mélange*. To give the aristocracy such pride of place in an age pressing for the extension of suffrage may appear simply anachronistic. The position of the intellectual, a much more belated figure in Austria than, say in England or France, was far from secure. Only from the second half of the nineteenth century was it becoming possible for German-language writers to live off their writing thanks to the emerging popular press. The insistence on democratic freedom at the lowest administrative level also rested awkwardly with the demands of a rapidly industrializing society and the growth of large urban

centres. Uniformity of policy, implicit in legislation regulating work, education and health, demanded a high degree of centralisation. Nevertheless, the conviction that Austrian society rested on certain key pillars of social activity or social standing remained remarkably tenacious and reappeared in the 1930s in Chancellor Dollfuss's ill-fated advocacy of Austria as a corporate state ('*Ständestaat*'), a society in which each knew his place and each had his place, including the social élites, the intellectuals, the clergy, the skilled craftsman in his guild and the peasantry. It was a concept doomed from its inception, and betrayed both a naïve understanding of social dynamics as well as an unfounded assumption that all citizens would adhere to the role birth had assigned to them. It was also an expression of a desperate desire for stability, just as Andrian-Werbung's prognosis had no stomach in 1847 for the revolution that was just a year away.

Standing between flight or compromise was one other choice after 1848 which would also become a familiar Austrian rhetorical response: resignation.²⁷ In 1844 an article appeared anonymously in Hamburg. It began: 'Grillparzer schweigt. Auch das Schweigen ist eine Sprache'²⁸ (Grillparzer remains silent. But silence too can speak). The piece itself is a polemic against a government official, Freiherr Münch-Bellinghausen, who was also a poet and head of the court theatre. It was written by Hungarian-born Josef Tuvora (1811–71), an energetic and somewhat shady figure, who possibly worked at times as an informant for tsarist Russia. Before the revolution Tuvora was a theatre critic and also a tireless supplier to German newspapers and journals of material describing the deplorable conditions in the Empire. When he learnt of the flight of the imperial family from Vienna on 18 May 1848 Tuvora went so far as to proclaim in Gumpendorf the establishment of a republic, an act of bravura which led to his arrest. Armed students and workers brought about his release a few days later. Tuvora's career is interesting because of what happened next: the violent unrest in Vienna in October brought about a change in Tuvora's position, and he moved into the conservative camp, switching allegiances by changing the journals for which he wrote, an act for which he was

vilified by his former comrades and fellow journalists. His reference to Grillparzer may have been no more than a means of belittling the prolix Münch-Bellinghausen, but it reminded readers of a missing voice in the discussion of Austria's future.

Grillparzer: A Loyal Servant of his Habsburg Master?

Franz Grillparzer (1791–1872), long fêted as Austria's national poet, had indeed fallen silent long before the outbreak of the Revolution. After initial success at Vienna's most prestigious theatre, the Burgtheater, Grillparzer had reacted badly in 1838 to the poor reception with which the Viennese public had greeted his comedy *Weh dem, der lügt!* (Woe to Him Who Lies). He sensed that he was living in a prosaic age out of step with his imagination and his inspiration.²⁹ He withdrew his work from performance and, to the outside world at least, he appeared to have turned his back on society and political events. The most cursory glance at Grillparzer's collected volumes reveals, however, that he had certainly not ceased to contemplate his world or to write about it, but he had already fallen foul of the authorities as far back as 1819 with his poem 'Die Ruinen des Campo vaccino in Rom', which had aroused charges of atheism, whilst other poems had unintentionally offended members of the royal family. Weariness and wariness drove him more and more into a private sphere in which he did not write for a public at large, hence Tuvora's assertion that Grillparzer was not contributing to what were dramatic developments in Austria's history. Grillparzer's resignation, however, had other dimensions to it and was also an expression of a distinctly Austrian dilemma: he was profoundly aware of, and discontent with, the state of affairs prevailing in Austria but he was astute enough to know that the alternatives might be far less inviting once the mob had been let loose. He dreaded the anarchy he sensed was lurking beneath the surface, and had no confidence in those who acted as mouthpieces for reform to control the forces they were unleashing. His reaction, as with so many would-be reformers, would be to move closer

to a conservative stance in the conviction that this alone would guarantee stability. Furthermore Grillparzer's loyalty to a notion of Austria was markedly strong, as was his personal attachment to the house of Habsburg despite the many points of friction he experienced from various members of the imperial household. If the existing structures were to be removed, he was well aware that the competing alternatives would be ethnic nationalism, which would bring about the inevitable disintegration of the Habsburg territories, or else the hegemony of an ugly and aggressive German nationalism, the thought of which he abhorred. The response to the emergence of that German nationalism is reflected clearly in Grillparzer's diary entries and private conversations over the course of his long life. In his earlier years Grillparzer had understood himself to be a German, albeit a feeling expressed with only modified enthusiasm. In 1842 he would record:

Ich bin froh ein Deutscher zu seyn. Nicht als ob ich die Nazion so hoch stellte, eher das Gegentheil ... Der Deutsche bringt von allen Völkern die wenigsten Vorurtheile mit. Das ist sein Vorzug, aber villeicht sein einziger.³⁰

(I am pleased to be a German, not that I particularly esteem the idea of the nation — quite the opposite. Of all peoples the German carries the fewest prejudices. That is his merit, perhaps his only one.)

By the time Prussia had emerged as the dominant force within the German-speaking world Grillparzer's reaction was one of retreat, and not simply by taking refuge in an Austrian identity. At the age of eighty and against the background of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1 Grillparzer recoiled from Bismarck's expansionist ambitions:

Und wie es heute bei uns aussieht, muss ich sagen, ich bin kein Deutscher, sondern ein Österreicher, ja ein Niederösterreicher, und vor allem ein Wiener.³¹

(And as things stand with us today I have to say that I am not a German but an Austrian, indeed a Lower Austrian and, above all, Viennese.)

Outwardly and apparently cowed by his bruising brushes with Metternich's censors, Grillparzer was in fact a diligent and detailed observer of political currents, committing his thoughts to paper but vacillating when it came to their publication. Many of his finest pieces went unpublished in his own lifetime and only saw the light of day in the great multi-volumed Sauer and Backmann edition of 1909–48. One noticeable short satire was his piece 'Nachrichten aus Cochinchina' (News from the Province of Cochinchina), written sometime in 1839. It certainly would not have been allowed to be published had it reached the office of the official censors, and Grillparzer would have run grave risks as a civil servant had it appeared, even anonymously, if there were the slightest possibility of his authorship being established, for it is a merciless exposure of the congenital imbecility and incompetence that in his view distinguished contemporary court life in Vienna. Grillparzer both picks up on a literary tradition and also establishes it further for future generations of writers in the Habsburg lands by using the device of evoking a fictitious land in the Far East which has only just been opened to enlightened travellers from Western Europe.

The piece purports to be the account of the journey of a wealthy Englishman to the hitherto inaccessible capital of a distant realm. (Initially Grillparzer had set the piece in China, but subsequently changed it to territory located in Vietnam but owing allegiance to the Chinese court.) The device of using China as a disguised way of describing affairs closer to home was well established in European literature. Grillparzer was familiar with Voltaire's use of it. Suggesting Austria was the China of Europe had become a common image before Grillparzer seized upon it, and can be found in numerous references of the period. It was used by the German Ludwig Börne, the Hungarian Lajos Kossuth, repeated by the Frenchman Gérard de Nerval, and again by Andrian-Werbung in his influential pamphlet *Österreich*

und dessen Zukunft. But it is Grillparzer's evocation of Austria as the 'European China' that has been described as the 'first sustained allegory on this theme'.³² It would also anticipate a recurring image of Austria as China in the work of distinguished writers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries such as Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Franz Kafka. The very name of Austria as the eastern empire naturally encouraged this perception of the country as a place on the periphery of European consciousness. In Grillparzer's hands the image swiftly descends into the seriously ludicrous as the English traveller describes the state of affairs he has discovered. Cochinchina is a land held together only by memory. Its late emperor, Schmamfu (a name that every Viennese reader would hear as the local dialect word 'schmafu' (vulgar, common), which was Grillparzer's own assessment of the personal qualities of the late Emperor Francis I), is considered a model of perspicacity although he had lost most of his provinces to a Mongolian invader, a clear reference to Napoleon. By pure luck for the land of Cochinchina the Mongolian invader had lost his army crossing a river – an unmistakable allusion to the disaster the French had experienced at the battle of the Berezina in 1812, when they had only just managed to escape from the Russian army by a desperate flight across the River Berezina:

Das Reich der Mitte wird gewissermaßen nur noch durch die Erinnerungen an den jüngst verstorbenen Kaiser Schmamfu zusammengehalten; der für das Muster aller Weisheit gilt. In der ersten Hälfte seiner Regierung war zwar das Urteil über ihn ziemlich schwankend, da er den besten Teil seiner Provinzen an einen mongolischen Eroberer verlor ... Nachdem aber der fremde Eroberer mit seinem ganzen Heer bei einem Flußübergang erstickt war und somit die verlorenen Provinzen von selbst zurückfielen, auch die ursprünglichen Staatsgläubiger durch Hunger und Mangel ins Reich des Stillschweigens hinübergegangen, nicht mehr die Zufriedenheit der Lebenden mit den Ausbrüchen ihres Mißvergnügens störten, galt Kaiser Schmanfu (sic) für einen Helden und Vater seines Volkes, und die Erinnerungen an ihn und seine Grundsätze beherrschen, wie gesagt, noch jetzt das Reich.³³

(The Middle Kingdom is in a certain sense only held together by the memory of the recently deceased emperor, Schmamfu, who was esteemed as a paragon of all wisdom. During the early part of his reign it is true that judgement of him was anything but fixed, since he had lost the best part of his provinces to a conquering Mongolian ... However, after the foreign assailant had drowned along with his whole army whilst attempting to traverse a river, thus causing the lost provinces to return by themselves, and after the state's original creditors, driven by starvation and want, had crossed into the Kingdom of Silence, thus ceasing to disturb the contentment of the living with their outbursts of discontent, the emperor Schmanfu [*sic*] was viewed as a hero and as father of the nation, and his memory and his principles, as has been said before, continue to dominate the Kingdom.)

In this short passage alone Grillparzer succeeded in employing many of the images that would become the standard, even stock, ingredients with which Austria would be discussed. There is the general assumption that the state is run by idiots – and later parts of this text present thinly disguised and easily recognizable portraits of the rest of the royal family, most of whom appear to be mentally infirm. The passage assumes that the state itself survives by evoking a far from certain collective memory of itself. There is the amazement that such a state could ever have come about; indeed it was something of a European mystery how the House of Habsburg, with so many undistinguished members, could have acquired such vast tracts of land and then held on to them. Only chance or accident, such as the drowning of the Mongolian aggressor, appears to be the criterion on which the continuity of the kingdom is assured, and by no means by virtue of any brilliance of policy. There emerges an underlying assumption that this state cannot be taken wholly in earnest. It cannot shake off a comic quality to its aspirations, in remarkable contrast to the language that would be used to discuss the emerging Prussian state. Austria's ever-precarious finances are also lampooned by Grillparzer. The joke in Viennese dialect at the expense of the emperor's name,

and subsequent and similar jibes in the passage at such institutions as the office of censorship, remind us that the readership, actual or simply intended by Grillparzer, was expected to be first and foremost Viennese and thus completely at ease with the local dialect. This is a significant assumption for it now places the city of Vienna, and the audience it can provide for such material, very much at the heart of the polemic and the language used in discussing Austria.

Austria after Revolution and the Shadow of Prussia

The city of Vienna, despite its status as the imperial residence, was far from being a major metropolis. When the composer Joseph Haydn began the first of his successful visits to England at the beginning of the 1790s he was left almost speechless by the sheer size and complexity of a city such as London, for which his acquaintance with Vienna had been a poor preparation. In the year 1700 Vienna's population was put at about 80,000. By 1740, when Maria Theresia came to the throne, it had risen to 130,000 and by 1790 it had reached 207,000. (By contrast, the population of London had already reached one million by 1800; on the eve of the French Revolution the population of Paris was estimated at 630,000.) During Grillparzer's life Vienna's population grew rapidly so that by 1849 it had reached over 400,000, of whom, however, only 6,000 had the franchise, a clear cause for discontent for that silent majority without any voting rights.³⁴

The 1850s, the years immediately after the Revolution, might be regarded as an unexciting and dull decade in the history of Austria, lacking on the surface any particular glamour, as one historian has expressed it, yet it marked a passage of a tremendous transformation in Austria's fortunes between the year of Revolution in 1848 and the 'spectacular realignment of European power' in the 1860s.³⁵ To begin with, the disturbances had swept away the mentally infirm Emperor Ferdinand I, who abdicated in favour of the young Franz Josef, a man of no great imagination but blessed

with remarkable longevity, for he would now sit on the throne until his death in 1916. For many subsequent generations of Austrians loyalty to the person of Franz Josef would constitute the definition of what it meant to be Austrian. His death in the middle of the First World War caused a tremendous loss of faith in the ability of the Habsburgs to resist the centrifugal forces tearing the Dual Monarchy apart.

In foreign affairs Austria's history stood in the shadow of its inevitable drift towards military defeat by Prussia. The clear weaknesses in the Austrian Empire's military structures were exposed by the repeated reverses of fortune in the territories it held in Italy, and most spectacularly by Austria's defeat at the Battle of Solferino in June 1859 by the combined French and Sardinian armies. In the summer of 1866 Austria would lose its hold on its Venetian territories. The culmination of its military collapse was its comprehensive defeat at the hands of the Prussians at the Battle of Königgrätz on 3 July 1866. The significance of Prussia's victory against the Austrians is often overshadowed by attention given to Bismarck's victory in the Franco-Prussian war just four years later. This may be a mistaken judgement, for the defeat of the French in the war of 1870–1 did not prevent further and brutally costly wars against them in 1914 and 1939. Prussia's victory over Austria, however, was total and irreversible. Never again would the Habsburgs be able to challenge Prussia for leadership of the entire German-speaking world. From this point onwards Austria would be excluded or included in any notion of a German Reich as Prussia saw fit.

Austria's humiliation in 1866 had a lasting impact on the way in which Austria would now speak of itself. The defeat had not been simply to the superior strategy and tactics of the Prussian general staff. It was seen as a triumph of Prussia's more advanced scientific and technical skills, and its organizational superiority was tellingly demonstrated by its ability to make far better use of railways. Prussian manufacturing had, moreover, produced far more effective weaponry, and Prussia's administrative machinery was able to harness and deploy recruits in a way appropriate in an

industrialized society.³⁶ Prussia's scientific and industrial influence was also being felt at a linguistic and rhetorical level, as a study of language and the Austrian Academy of Science in the nineteenth century has revealed. Theoretically the proceedings of the Academy were open to all the languages of the Empire, yet after 1848 there is a marked trend not only to publish largely in German but to publish work by Germans from outside the monarchy and in a style that reflected their language models.³⁷

Now that it was clear that Austria had lost its claim to being the foremost power within the German-speaking world a discernible strain begins to enter Austrian polemic. It begins to abandon any aspiration, founded or not, to be a principal power in continental Europe. The tone of much discourse suggests the start of a retreat inwards. Austria can no longer compete with Prussia's military or industrial expertise and has to leave the field to its northern neighbour. Instead Austria becomes increasingly obsessed with itself. In political terms the defeat of 1866 brought about profound internal changes as the Hungarians exacted an ever greater price from Vienna to stay within the Empire. Military defeat in 1866 meant that Vienna had lost status in the eyes of many of the ethnic groups and was hardly in a position to throw its weight about. The Settlement (or Compromise) with Hungary in March 1867 meant that in many respects the Hungarians, especially the landed nobility, had virtually created a state within a state in which to pursue an energetic policy of Magyarization. It certainly 'sealed a gradual alienation of Austria and Hungary'.³⁸ The impact on Austrian polemical writing expressed itself in a growing self-concern, even self-obsession, leaving major policy decisions to the Prussians and to an emerging German Reich from which it would be excluded. Strangely enough, although the events bringing about this state of affairs had been dire for Vienna, the outcome as far as literature was concerned was often the opposite. A tone of playfulness enters the many columns of the popular press. Earnestness was now often sensed to be out of place since real power had shifted to Berlin. If the outside world was beginning not to take Austria too seriously then there seemed little reason

for the Austrians themselves to be too solemn, although it would be a mistake to believe all Austrians would shrug off the outcome of Königgrätz so lightly. Alongside that element of playfulness in Austrian writing there is also a constant undertone of self-reproach, a sense of failure which would produce sporadic attacks of self-flagellation. An additional feature also becomes more marked: if Austrians could not demonstrate their superiority on the field of battle they would have to demonstrate it elsewhere. If they could not present themselves as the natural martial leaders of the region they could at least dominate in other spheres. So where once Schlegel had projected Austria as the better Germany by virtue of supposed more manly qualities, the Austria of the later nineteenth century onwards becomes the better Germany by virtue of its cultural and intellectual prowess. Here at least Vienna need not fear comparison with Berlin, the latter being dismissed as a rather late and undistinguished arrival on the international arena of capital cities. Culture becomes a point through which Austria could signal to the rest of the German-speaking world that it still retained its pride of place. Austria thus now also becomes an intellectual and cultural construction.

The Growth of Vienna

Modern culture is primarily an urban phenomenon, both as a place of its production and as a place of its enjoyment and consumption. Theatres, symphony orchestras, art galleries, libraries, academies, printing presses and those myriad meeting places for the leisured classes all tend to congregate in centres in search of one another. To this extent discussion of Austrian identity now bifurcates, for in many respects it becomes a discussion of the place of Vienna, the only considerable urban centre in Austria, on the one hand, and the provinces on the other.

The rapid growth in Vienna's population has already been mentioned. The appearance of the city itself was about to undergo a huge transformation. On Christmas Day of 1857 the emperor

Franz Josef handed to his minister of the interior, Alexander von Bach, instructions for the 'regulation and beautification' of the imperial capital. (Once more it was France that had set the example for Austria, for the changes that were about to take place in Vienna had been prompted in part by the breathtaking example of Baron Haussmann's radical restructuring of the layout of Paris.) In early 1858 work began in Vienna with the levelling of the old fortifications. Until then Vienna still retained a very local quality, with distinct districts lying outside the city boundaries. By 1860 the first buildings of the new Ringstrasse had begun to be erected and the main boulevard received its official opening on 1 May 1865. The Ringstrasse would now become Vienna's template along which would be located nearly all the principal buildings of the capital from which the Empire would be ruled or in which the Empire and its wealthier subjects would be entertained. To walk or ride by tram along the Ringstrasse is even today to encounter almost every aspect of official Austria: the Parliament buildings, the Burgtheater, the major museums, the Staatsoper, the Imperial Residence. Only a few steps away from the Ringstrasse are located the City Hall, the University of Vienna, the Musikverein. And within the encircling line of the Ringstrasse can be found the great St Stephen's cathedral, the various palaces of the leading families, many significant medieval church buildings and foundations, and the numerous coffee houses that would become such a central feature of Austrian intellectual and artistic life.

Such huge investment in the external structuring and appearance of the city helps explain the introversion apparent in Viennese intellectual and cultural life. Vienna becomes increasingly not only the location but also the topic of its own discourse. It begins to appear as if it were a character in its own theatrical production. Nor were the apparent contradictions lost on the Viennese, for the city seemed to be becoming ever more grandiose in its architectural aspirations just as the reality of Austria was diminishing as a realm representing substantial international power and influence. Other social changes would manifest themselves in changes in the way Austrians would talk

about themselves. The growth of the city embraced large numbers of immigrants, particularly from the neighbouring Czech and Slovak communities. There was also a dramatic and sudden rise in Vienna's Jewish population. It has been calculated that in the years between 1857 and 1880, the very years that saw the creation and blossoming of the Ringstrasse, the percentage of Jews living in Vienna rose from 2.16 to 10.06 per cent, a rate of expansion unparalleled in the whole of the continent of Europe except for Budapest.³⁹ The growth in Vienna's Jewish population is a complex issue to interpret. Firstly, there was no single, homogeneous Jewish population. It embraced impoverished and very distinctively attired Jews escaping the poverty of the Galician shtetls, but it also contained prominent and highly educated members of Vienna's cultural bourgeoisie, the *Bildungsbürgertum*. Many of the latter would have very little in common with poorer Jews. Assimilation or conversion further weakened such ties.

Certainly for generations of Jewish writers such as Leopold Kompert (1822–86) or Karl Emil Franzos (1848–1904) the transition from the ghetto to assimilation represented the dilemma of defining identity in the nineteenth century and onwards. Liberated Jews were challenged by this question: was home represented by their arrival in a city such as Vienna or by the 'shtetl', the Jewish quarter that had been left behind?⁴⁰

To many writers and politicians of Jewish or partially Jewish descent, the Jewish faith may have held scant interest or meaning. It certainly meant little to Arthur Schnitzler or Karl Kraus. Even the Second Republic's first Socialist Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, regarded his Jewish background as simply a part of his family history over which he had no control. Neither rejecting nor embracing his Jewish ancestry Kreisky's attitude represented an intricate element in defining the idea of being Austrian, and it will require some consideration in our later discussion of the reconstitution of Austrian identity after 1945.

The Jewish Presence in Austrian Identity

The migration of Jews into Vienna ran simultaneously with another notable development taking place within Viennese society: this was the gradual weakening of the influence of the aristocracy and the emergence of a bourgeois society as men from often humble backgrounds rose to prominence in the capital's municipal life. Two such men rose to the highest office that Vienna could offer: Cajetan Felder (1814–94) had lost both parents by the age of twelve, yet through sheer perseverance and intelligence – he was an outstanding linguist – he studied law in Vienna and established a successful legal practice. He became involved in politics after 1848, becoming a leading figure in the liberal movement. In 1868 he was voted in as mayor of Vienna, and during his time in political office he was responsible for initiating a number of major projects, including some of the major buildings on the Ringstrasse, securing the city's provision of safe drinking water, regulating the flow of the River Danube, and even addressing the problem of Vienna's many unhygienic cemeteries by creating the city's vast Zentralfriedhof.⁴¹ These arrangements reflected a city beginning to meet the needs of its ordinary citizens rather than creating follies for self-indulgent princes, and Vienna's concerns were becoming increasingly domestic and bourgeois. Felder's time in office came to an end because of pressure from an ambitious rival who also illustrated the ascendancy of men from the lower social strata such as Dr Karl Lueger, Vienna's mayor from 1897 to 1910. Also from very modest origins, Lueger's father worked as a 'Saaldiener', a factotum, at Vienna's Polytechnikum, the forerunner of today's Technical University, and Lueger himself went on to study law at the University of Vienna before starting a legal career and becoming involved in local politics. The growing influx of Jews into the city provided the context for his zealous Catholic political credo. He presented himself as a champion of the common working man whose working and living conditions were being pushed lower by the uncontrolled influx of Jewish migrants. Lueger thus proposed various acts of legislation to restrict

such immigration, even though he was aware that the economic hardships encountered by small tradesmen and shopkeepers were not purely the result of the rise in the Jewish population but rather had their origins in the problems engendered by late capitalism.⁴² In 1893 he founded the Christlichsoziale Partei, which aspired to appeal to both the *petite bourgeoisie* and to a broader working-class and Catholic base. His clear anti-Semitic position – along with his many acts of long-remembered public good works – brought him considerable electoral success at the cost of his rivals in the Liberal Party. Anti-Semitism was no longer a theological issue; it had become an instrument for harnessing electoral power, and it was little wonder that Hitler admired and learnt from Lueger, as his comments in *Mein Kampf* demonstrated.⁴³ Even a century after Lueger's death Austria's relationship in the Second Republic to Lueger throws up many unresolved problems which the Republic has with its pre-Republican history. It was only as late as April 2012 that Vienna's community politicians voted to replace the imposing stretch of Vienna's principal thoroughfare which bore his name 'Dr-Karl-Lueger-Ring' with the more neutral, if not innocuous, name of 'Universitätsring'. It may appear odd that the city had retained for so long the name of such a prominent anti-Semite, especially in the light of the fate which had befallen Vienna's Jewish population. Yet even those who championed the change recognized the weakness of their own position, for as one SPÖ spokesman conceded, such names reflected the city's history, and to change names would constitute act of whitewashing and sanitizing, of pretending there were no dark chapters in Vienna's history.⁴⁴

If Jews and anti-Semitism had become a topic within Austria's national discourse, Jews were also to become an important element in contributing to and shaping that discourse. In addition to the law and medicine, the profession most accessible to well-educated Jews was journalism, and for good reasons, since the latter part of the nineteenth century witnessed a rapid expansion of the newspaper industry with its insatiable appetite for copy. This was a specifically, if not uniquely, Viennese phenomenon, and a century later little

would have changed in Austria, for in the closing decades of the twentieth century one experienced newspaper editor claimed that over three-quarters of all Austria's newspapers were published in Vienna and that the capital was also the working base for two-thirds of the nation's journalists.⁴⁵ For this reason Austrian identity becomes very much a question of Viennese identity as the capital itself begins to dominate Austrian consciousness. It is to the city as a major element in national discourse that we must now turn.

CHAPTER FIVE

VIENNA: PRINT AND PRE-EMINENCE

As with so much in Austrian intellectual and cultural life, France often constitutes the source for a particular phenomenon. Just how dominant France could be is illustrated, as Robert Vilain reminds us, by the playlists of the most illustrious theatre in Austria and the entire German-speaking world, Vienna's Burgtheater. Between the years 1776 and 1888 a quarter of all plays put on stage there were translations from the French, and that figure rose to almost one-third between 1776 and 1790.¹ This influence is emphatically present when we address the question of the significance of Vienna not only in the formation of an Austrian identity but in the manner in which that identity would come to be articulated. In his monumental study of Paris as represented in literature and in the imagination the Konstanz academic Karlheinz Stierle could assert at the very outset of his work: 'In Paris kommt die Stadt zu Bewußtsein. Das Stadtbewußtsein hat hier zuerst seine Ausdrücklichkeit gefunden.'² (It is with Paris that the city acquires its awareness of itself. This consciousness of being a city first finds its explicit expression here.) Significant for our appreciation of the city as an element in a rhetorical tradition is Stierle's drawing of our attention to the work of Paul Valéry, especially his essay of 1937, 'Présence de Paris', in which the French poet and philosopher had perceived the city as possessing the structure of human consciousness, and, with perhaps equally profound consequences, Stierle acknowledges the seminal importance of Walter Benjamin's insight when in one of his *Passagen* pieces Benjamin raised the question of the 'Lesbarkeit' (readability) of Paris, the most significant metropolis in the nineteenth century.³

The city, it would seem, allows itself to be read, and it exists to some degree through, and is perceived in, language with a similar effect, for instance, to that which Benedict Anderson in his book *Imagined Communities* had assigned to the impact of ‘print-language’ in the creation of national identities. Language, of course, is rarely neutral but rather is frequently open to arrangement and manipulation. Here too France provided an early and distinguished model for treating the complexities of a large urban concentration with its vast discrepancies in wealth, social standing, moral and civic behaviour. *Le Tableau de Paris* was the work of Louis-Sébastien Mercier and it appeared in instalments between 1781 and 1788. An American editor of his works describes Mercier as ‘a pioneering urban ethnographer’ and significantly attributes to him an ‘ability to distil the daily life of the city into short, incisive essays’, and in doing so Mercier thus became the creator of an innovative form of ‘urban journalism ... the *feuilleton*’,⁴ a form of writing which would soon play such a momentous role in the shaping of Austrian discourse. (Others have attributed the origins of the *feuilleton* elsewhere – but still allow it to remain a French achievement – by pointing to the Abbé J. L. de Geoffroy and his publication *Journal des Débats* founded in 1789.)

It was Mercier’s apprenticeship as a journalist, contributing to the *Journal des Dames* in pre-revolutionary France, that honed his writing skills and through which he found the appropriate medium and style to reflect the kaleidoscopic variety of urban life: ‘Mercier’s Paris of the 1780s is already Balzac’s Paris of the 1830s, simultaneously a universal market-place, in which everything had its price, a theatre of appearances, in which nothing was what it seemed, and a crucible of desires, its inhabitants driven ceaselessly by lust and ambition.’⁵

The city throws up a panorama of competing and contradictory forces, yet all who live there are obliged to assert themselves within the same shared compass of space. Whatever social pressures may exist in the nation at large, the urban centre brings them into clear focus and exposes them by violently concentrating them into an often chaotic cheek by jowl existence. Here is a typical and telling example of Mercier’s entertaining but never uncritical method:

C'est un spectacle curieux que de voir tout à son aise, du haut d'un balcon, le nombre et la diversité des voitures qui se croisent et s'arrêtent mutuellement; les piétons qui, semblables à des oiseaux effrayés sous le fusil du chasseur, se glissent à travers les roues de tous ces chars prêts à les écraser. L'un qui franchit le ruisseau de peur de s'éclabousser, et qui, manquant l'équilibre, se couvre de boue des pieds à la tête; l'autre, qui pirouette en sens contraire, une face dépoudrée, et le parasol sous le bras.

... Un procureur, pour sa pièce de vingt-quatre sols, arrête le garde des Sceaux; un recruteur, un maréchal de France. La fille de joie ne cédera point le pas à un archevêque. Tous ces différents états à la file, et les cochers qui parlent leur langue scandaleusement énergique devant la Robe, l'Église et les duchesses; les portefaix du coin, qui leur répondent du même style. Quel mélange de grandeur, de pauvreté, de richesses, de grossièreté et de misère!⁶

(One of the more curious sights of Paris may be seen without trouble; you have only to lean over your balcony and look down into the street below, upon carriages crossing and blocking each other's way, and pedestrians, like game that flees before the menace of the gun, dodging in and out among the wheels of stationary juggernauts; one leaps the gutter to escape a shower of mud, miscalculates an inch and finds himself in mud up to the eyes, while another, more lucky, goes mincing along unscathed, parasol under arm ... A poorly paid lawyer in his cab at twenty-four sous the hour may hold up the Lord Chancellor; a marshal of France must wait while the recruiting sergeant's party drags its slow length along, and a call-girl yields no ground to an archbishop. All these different interests in motion, perched up behind coachmen whose vocabulary respects neither ducal, nor clerical, nor legal ears; and the porters at the street corners, giving in their own lingo as good as they get; what a sight, what a blend of splendour, and poverty, and riches, and wretchedness.)

Journalism in Vienna

The French Revolution had given birth to major changes and developments in France's publishing industry. It had spurred Mercier into producing a new title, the *Annales patriotiques*. The Revolution of 1848 had a similarly creative and radical impact on publishing in Vienna, as it had throughout the German-speaking lands. In Prussia the number of newspapers that could be called political rose by 56 per cent between the years 1847 and 1850, whilst in Austria that figure rose to 79 per cent once press censorship had been relaxed.⁷ Perhaps the most lasting manifestation of these changes in Vienna was the publication of a new daily newspaper, *Die Presse*, which made its first appearance on the streets on 3 July 1848, well over half a century after the appearance of *The Daily Universal Register* in London. The paper was an immediate success at a time when many other ventures folded after a brief period (a situation repeated immediately after 1945 amongst the plethora of short-lived journals in both Austria and Germany).⁸ *Die Presse* was the creation of what would become a significant figure in the world of Austrian self-expression, the newspaper owner and editor with a thirst for profit, a desire for political influence, and a willingness to be flexible with political allegiances and political truths as circumstances and opportunities dictated. August Zang (1807–88), Viennese born and bred, based the format of his new title on what he had seen of newspapers produced in post-revolutionary Paris. (Karl Kraus would also be indebted to French influence, taking as a model for his *Fackel* the work of the political pamphleteer Henri Rochefort and his publication *La Lanterne*.) Zang employed two men as editors-in-chief, Michael Etienne and Max Friedländer, whose contribution was so considerable that they have been described by Günter Haller as the fathers of professional journalism in Austria.⁹ In the 1860s, a febrile time in Austria's newspaper history as well as the country's history, the two editors finally broke with Zang, on whom the aura of corruption had come to rest, and launched on 1 September 1864 their own venture, a newspaper which would come to dominate Austrian opinion making, the *Neue Freie Presse*.

In many respects the new paper differed only marginally from its predecessor. It became the mouthpiece for a liberal bourgeoisie and, by implication, an essentially urban Viennese audience rather than that of a provincial and largely rural Austria. It also developed a markedly pro-Austrian line although it was not hostile to German sentiment.¹⁰

Zang kept going with *Die Presse* until 1867, when he stopped active direction of a paper, which had by then changed its position to align itself ever more closely with conservative tendencies in the government. In 1896 the paper announced its closure but newspapers in general flourished. The historian Oliver Rathkolb argues that newspapers in Austria remained the most important source of information for Austrians until as late as 1961.¹¹ (Television did not come to Austria until 1955.) Zang himself was but the first of a series of press barons, and he certainly had no monopoly over questionable practices. Following the death of Etienne two liberal Jews took over the editorship of the *Neue Freie Presse*, Eduard Bacher and the far more influential Moritz Benedikt, the latter being editor from 1880 to 1920 and responsible for the development of the 'Leitartikel', the leader article, and for promoting the *feuilleton* as a favourite element within the paper. Already we see opinion as much as fact and investigative reporting as a characteristic feature of Austrian journalism, and to this day Austrian newspapers, which rarely enjoy an international reputation, are distinguished by the large proportion of their pages given over to columnists commenting on whatever is, or can be made into, the topic of the hour. There are today no Austrian newspapers that can stand comparison with, for instance, Germany's *Die Zeit* or *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* or *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Even Switzerland, whose German-speaking community is much smaller than that of Austria, can sustain a quality newspaper of record such as the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, a paper whose origins predate even *The Times*.

Zang would not have complete domination of the newspaper market. Gustav Davis (1856–1951) founded the *Österreichische Kronen-Zeitung* in 1900. It became the *Illustrierte Kronen-Zeitung* in 1906, the forerunner of another highly successful and polemical newspaper;

the *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*, a paper associated with its long-standing and controversial editor Hans Dichand (1921–2010), a man credited with considerable patronage and influence over many generations of Austria's post 1945 politicians and political parties. By the year 2000 the *Kronen-Zeitung* had attained a circulation figure of 1.08 million daily copies, a staggering figure in such a small country, and reaching 43.4 per cent of the population.¹²

The prominence of Jewish editors such as Etienne and Friedländer drew hostility from many quarters and becomes itself a constant theme in Austrian polemical writing. The two men were also the target of another and non-practising Jew, a man who was without doubt the most celebrated figure in Austrian journalism, Karl Kraus (1874–1936). He was to conduct an unremitting campaign against press corruption, whose crimes were in his view just as much linguistic as they were financial. By the 1920s Kraus was denouncing many titles in Vienna's newspaper industry. Be they anti-Communist such as the *8 Uhr Blatt* or *Neuer Tag* or pro-Communist such as *Abend*, Kraus objected to their 'complete disregard for the principles of objective reporting, financial corruption and scandal-mongering', for unlike the *Neue Freie Presse* and the *Neues Wiener Journal* some papers not only accepted money but also indulged in vicious blackmailing.¹³ The nadir in the history of Austrian newspapers and the worst example of the blatant disregard for ethical writing was embodied in the notorious Imre Békessy (1887–1951), for whom Kraus developed a zealous hatred.

Jewish by birth but Protestant by conversion, Békessy moved to Vienna from his native Budapest immediately after the First World War. He created Vienna's first boulevard newspaper in 1923, *Die Stunde*. With lavish illustrations and a ceaseless parade of scandal stories the paper proved a commercial success, although its political stance was generally moderate. Blackmail and sheer thuggery meant that Békessy encountered few public opponents with the exception of Kraus. *Die Stunde* and other titles such as *Börse* and *Bühne* edited by Békessy ultimately fell victim not to justice but to the financial irregularities and speculations of his publishing house's proprietors.

Kraus's significance in Austrian polemical writing will be mentioned at a later point in this study, but what cannot be ignored here is his judgement on where the story of the debasement of the popular press would take both Germany and Austria. In 1933, the year that Hitler came to power, Kraus could write damningly in a work originally intended for publication as part of his long-running and one-man publishing undertaking *Die Fackel*, but which became known separately as *Die Dritte Walpurgisnacht* – and has been aptly described as ‘a remarkable anti-Nazi polemic’¹⁴ by Edward Timms in his magisterial study of Kraus – that: ‘Der Nationalsozialismus hat die Presse nicht vernichtet, sondern die Presse hat den Nationalsozialismus erschaffen’¹⁵ (National Socialism has not destroyed the Press, rather it is the Press that has given life to National Socialism).

The dismal state of much political writing in the earlier part of the twentieth century had consequences for Austrian political discourse after 1945. What models could be drawn on, what texts could act as inspiration for later generations of politicians attempting to reconnect Austria, with its depressingly short and modest parliamentary history and democratic institutions? The dearth of possibilities meant that the heyday of *feuilleton* writing from the nineteenth century exerted a particular appeal and freshness, and some of the most distinguished figures from this period reward exploring. Although they had very different backgrounds, it is Vienna that unites them all: Vienna as a place of production for their material but often Vienna as the topic of their writing.

Origins and Significance of the *Feuilleton*

The political upheavals of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century had had a profound influence upon social life. It has been argued that this period marked the end of the literary salon as the place of exchange for ideas, and that newspapers now took on the role of the salon, most particularly in the guise of *Feuilletonismus* as a literary genre. But like a literary conversation in the salon the

feuilleton remained close to the spoken word. It was not a treatise but a series of insights and perceptions stimulated by dialogue. As one historian of the form has claimed, listing the many facets and even contradictions of the genre:

Der Feuilletonist ist ein Redner, der vor einer Gesellschaft seine Meinung äußert ... Er ist humoristisch und doch ernst, von beißender Ironie und gleichzeitig voll Sentimentalität.¹⁶

(The writer of *feuilletons* is somebody who is addressing others, expressing his opinion before an assembled company. He is witty and yet serious, cuttngly ironic and yet at the same time full of sentimentality.)

The form had considerable literary aspirations and its practitioners were amongst the leading writers of their time. Often given pride of place on the title page, rather than tucked away inside the newspaper, its prominence also reflected the financial rewards successful writers of the form might acquire.

It was Ludwig Speidel (1830–1906), a German from Ulm and a writer much admired by Hermann Bahr, who raised the form to prominence and in the process made Vienna, its people, its festivities, and the unique theatrical and musical life it could offer, his central themes. (Theatre criticism in particular would become a very dominant element in the polemical range of many Austrian writers. The theatre often provides Austrian writers with a metaphor when discussing their country, and even today theatre and opera news can form the lead item in the Austrian media.) Speidel wrote for a bewilderingly large variety of Austrian publications such as *Der Wandere*, *Lloyd*, *Die Donau*, *Die Österreichische Zeitung*, *Die Morgenpost* and *Die Wiener Zeitung*, all of whose existence revealed the insatiable reading appetite that had now developed amongst the population of Vienna and beyond.¹⁷ Speidel advanced to become the chief editor for *feuilletons* for the *Neue Freie Presse* shortly after his arrival in Vienna in the 1850s and remained in that post for almost half a century.¹⁸ In a piece written in the latter part of his career and

published in January 1881, Speidel devotes himself to that archetypal Viennese phenomenon, the great actor-playwright Johann Nestroy. Speidel's piece, though full of affection, displays both a critical attitude towards Speidel's contemporaries as well as an awareness of Nestroy's shortcomings, for Speidel sees beyond the individual qualities of Nestroy to expose the corrosive and deeply debilitating impact of the Austrian censorship upon Nestroy's generation:

Witz ist eine Macht, die sich schwer handhabt; der Witz strebt nach Souveränität und macht häufig den, der ihn besitzt, zu seinem Sklaven ... Von dieser Sucht, alles zu bewitzeln, ist auch Nestroy nicht freizusprechen. Die weitverbreitete Manier, sich mit der ernstesten Sache durch einen schlechten Witz abzufinden, hat er zwar nicht erfunden, aber durch sein Vorgehen befestigt. Daß sich Nestroy zu stark in die Zote eingelassen, hängt gleichfalls mit der Zeit zusammen, die jedes freie Wort über große Gegenstände unterdrückte, wo sich denn der Witz immer des allezeit beliebten Themas der geschlechtlichen Beziehungen bemächtigt, die, falls nicht Leidenschaft oder sittlicher Ernst dabei ist, so leicht ins Lächerliche fallen. Die Schauspielfreunde Wiens strömen gegenwärtig in das Theater, um Nestroys neu aufgewärmte Stücke zu sehen. Es ist ein halb historisches Vergnügen, aber die gegenwärtige Generation hat wenig Grund, auf die Schauspiele, die einst das Ergötzen der Väter und Großväter gewesen, mit Geringschätzung herabzublicken. Wir sind weit davon entfernt, einen Nestroy zu haben, der den Geist und den Mut besäße, die zum Himmel schreienden Mißstände unserer Zeit unter die Geißel zu nehmen.¹⁹

(The power of wit is not easy to control, for it seeks sovereignty and often enslaves those who would possess it. Nestroy was not free of that addiction. He may not have been the inventor of the habit of dismissing deeply serious matters with a lazy piece of humour but he confirmed the practice. That Nestroy opted for the cheap joke was bound up with the fact that he lived in a

time when talking about real and serious topics was suppressed and so humour monopolized the eternally popular theme of relations between the sexes, relations which if not discussed in the context of great passion or moral seriousness can simply descend into the ridiculous. Today we see theatre lovers in Vienna flocking to watch his rehashed works. It is in good part a historical pleasure, yet this present generation has little cause to look down patronisingly on plays which once enthralled their fathers and grandfathers. We are nowhere near to having our own Nestroy, one possessing the mind and the courage to lampoon those outrages of our times that cry out to heaven.)

The second great name of the Viennese *feuilleton* tradition had worked initially, like Speidel, for *Die Presse* before moving to the *Neue Freie Presse*. Daniel Spitzer (1835–93) was a native of Vienna and enjoyed unprecedented popularity for a writer amongst his huge Viennese readership. Whereas Speidel would often stress the comfortable, indulgent side of the Viennese character, Spitzer became known for a biting irony and sometimes a malicious and satirical wit that exposed and derided the various abuses of office and corrupt practices he saw all around him. In November 1869 he offered a piece on the design of the new city hall, a building that would soon become a landmark of the capital, standing imposingly, if not pompously, on the Ringstrasse between the Parliament buildings and the university, and across from the Burgtheater:

Der Streit, welcher seit einiger Zeit unter den Aesthetikern der Landeshaupt- und Residenzstadt Wien geführt wurde, ist endlich entschieden, indem sich die Bausektion des Gemeinderats für den Bau eines Rathauses im gotischen Stile erklärt hat. Was mich betrifft, so ist es mir, da man einmal entschlossen ist, den sechs Millionen Österreichischer Währung unter Anwendung architektonischer Hilfsmittel ein Ende zu machen, einerlei, ob dies im gotischen, im Renaissance-, im byzantinischen oder im Pyramiden-Geschmacke geschieht, denn auch von den Architektur-Arten gilt, was die Epikureerinnen von Neudorf

einander in ihrem so rasch populär Rundgesange nachrühmen: 'Die eine hat dies, und die andere hat das, aber jede hat was.' Nur habe ich durch häufigen Besuch des Theaters so viel gelernt, daß die Kostüme mit den Dekorationen in eine gewisse Harmonie gebracht werden müssen, und ich würde mir daher ... den Vorschlag erlauben, daß man den Köstümzeichner des Hoftheaters ... schon gegenwärtig beauftrage, den P. T. Mitgliedern des Gemeindrats auf ein paar gotische Beinkleider das Maß zu nehmen.²⁰

(The row that has been raging for some time amongst Vienna's aesthetics in the nation's capital and home to the imperial family has at long last been settled with the Council's Building Committee coming out in favour of a design in the Gothic fashion. As far as I'm concerned the decision to lose six million in Austrian currency with a little architectural help makes not a jot of difference to whether this will happen in the Gothic, Renaissance, Byzantine or Pyramid style, for what the lady Epicureans of Neudorf chant to general acclamation also holds good in matters architectural: 'A bit of this, a bit of that, a bit for everybody.' Now many visits to the theatre have taught me that costumes must not clash with the sets so I would like to be permitted to offer the following suggestion, namely that the costume designer for the Theatre Royal be engaged immediately to take the leg measurements of the present members of the Council with a view to attiring them with some Gothic trousers.)

In this fragment can be found the essence of Spitzer's method: he takes a topic that would be on the minds of all his readers, since few in Vienna could have escaped noticing the huge civil engineering projects that were transforming the appearance of what was, as he reminds his readers, the principal city of the Empire. The topic is therefore important and of universal interest to all parts of Viennese society. That there existed a widespread belief that fortunes were also being made by some through obscure acts of

speculation could be taken for granted by Spitzer. He plays on this belief but instead of expressing outrage he allows the debate to move in the direction of the ludicrous. Those privileged few making decisions on behalf of ordinary Viennese citizens are now held up to ridicule, and in characteristically Viennese fashion Spitzer makes use of the theatre to bring his point home. Linguistically too Spitzer's piece betrays some characteristic features of the *feuilleton*. It is almost conversational in tone and it is also able to switch registers swiftly, one moment a classical reference, the next an expression in the local dialect.

Vienna as Location and as Topic of Polemic

Spitzer's text forms one of the countless pieces he wrote under the rubric *Wiener Spaziergänge* (Strolls through Vienna). Spitzer claimed in later years he had only become aware of Anastasius Grün's use of the expression after he had begun his own column under that heading.²¹ What was an essential element in Austrian rhetorical usage was not simply the specific choice of Vienna. Many writers have indeed set their work in Vienna. Heimito von Doderer's 1951 novel *Die Strudlhofstiege oder Melzer und die Tiefe der Jahre* bears the name of a specific location within the city, as did Thomas Bernhard's *Heldenplatz*. It was Doderer who raised Vienna to the status of being the very embodiment of the concept of Austria when he asked in 1938 where 'das grosse alte Österreich' (the great Austria of old) could still be found. He supplied the answer to his own question:

...nur in Wien war es ganz anwesend. So wie Rom, die urbs, allein das ganze Reich der Römer in sich enthielt ... Österreich ein antiker Staat, ein Stadt-Staat.²²

(Only in Vienna was it entirely present. Just as Rome alone, the *urbs*, embraced the whole Roman *imperium*, so Austria was and is a city of antiquity, a city-state.)

The narrator in Robert Musil's epic but unfinished novel *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* spends an extraordinary amount of energy in the opening pages denying any importance to the fact that the work is set in Vienna, and most of the leading names in Austrian literature in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have used Vienna as an integral part of their fiction, including such prominent names as Ilse Aichinger, Ingeborg Bachmann, Hermann Broch, Elias Canetti, Milo Dor, Alfred Polgar, Joseph Roth, Hilde Spiel and Peter Henisch. But it is not simply location that Spitzer's idea of the stroll introduces into this rhetorical device; perambulation adds other vital qualities. As a trope it is certainly not new, but it has been enduring; unsurprisingly columns entitled 'Wiener Spaziergänge' can still be encountered in Austria's daily newspapers.

Many important works in European literature are based on the idea of a walk. Denis Diderot's *Le Neveu de Rameau* begins in such a fashion: 'Qu'il fasse beau, qu'il fasse laid, c'est mon habitude d'aller sur les cinq heures du soir me promener au Palais-Royal. (Come rain, come shine, I am in the habit of taking a walk each evening at about five o'clock to the Palais Royal.)' Heinrich von Kleist's intriguing essay *Über das Marionettentheater* (On the Puppet Theatre) begins with a casual encounter as two men meet and fall into conversation whilst out taking an evening walk. If the device has a pedigree it must to some extent be indebted to Plato's Socratic dialogues. *The Republic*, it will be recalled, starts as a walk when Socrates and Glaucon begin their return home from Piraeus and encounter Polemarchus, with whom they strike up a conversation. The walk allows the writer certain possibilities: not only can it bring momentum into the narrative; it is also a simple and effective device for introducing new characters into a story and giving a pretext for others to depart as people go off in different directions. The incidents and sights encountered on the stroll also permit the unforced introduction of particular topics, or the denunciation of some perceived mismanagement or abuse, and those places, objects, or characters may find an immediate resonance with readers, to whom they may be familiar but are being shown in a new light. The walk or stroll also allows for a constant change of mood, pace or tone. This is why the Ringstrasse, for instance, with its wide

boulevard footpaths and flanking public gardens, cafés and parks, is so attractive as a device, for it invites the citizen to promenade. From Arthur Schnitzler to Thomas Bernhard, the nation's history is played out here in countless personal incidents, from high tragedy to petty and often squalid comedy. Here, as in Mercier's Paris, the rich and the poor, the moral and the decidedly immoral, rub shoulders with each other. And it is with absolute geographic precision, insisting on a specific spot on the Ringstrasse, that Karl Kraus began his vast and peerless dissection of the decaying Habsburg Empire in 1914 in his virtually unplayable drama *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit* (The Last Days of Mankind).

On a far more modest scale, and in the shadow of the Second rather than the First World War, is a short work by post-war Austria's most prolific historian, Friedrich Heer. His melancholic essay *Dunkle Mutter Wien, mein Wien* (Dark Mother Vienna, My Vienna), published in 1978, also takes the form of a walk through Vienna. It is in a minor key to Kraus's strident drama. The city is shown in its various moods and at various times, and with the keen eye of the historian Heer on his walk strips off the surface to expose the many underlying sediments: Roman Vienna, Baroque Vienna, the Vienna in the years of acute hunger immediately after 1918, the Vienna of Czech immigrants and persecuted Jews. The terms 'fear' and 'guilt' haunt Heer's text. The city can awaken childhood memories, but also nightmares. Everything is open to conflicting interpretations, for Vienna does not have a single history. In the following passage he recalls visiting Vienna's St Stephen's cathedral immediately after the war when the bomb damage was so great one could look up from the foundations and stare into the open sky, but Heer is also aware of other memories and other times such as a decade earlier when – although Heer has no need to be explicit with his readership – Hitler had entered the city to a jubilant reception:

Als ich hinaustrete, auf den Stephansplatz, an diesem späten Märztag 1946, merke ich, daß es gar nicht kalt ist ... Es ist aber nicht so lind, so frühlingsschön mild wie die Luft, wie sie hereinweht ... 12. März 1938.²³

(When I step out of the cathedral and into the Stephansplatz, on this late March day in 1946 I notice that it is not at all cold, although it does not have that beautiful spring mildness as there was in 12 March 1938 when the air blew gently into the city.)

Spitzer had paved the way for later writers such as Heer to use the city as an endless source of possibilities to bring out the contradictions and absurdities of life, sometimes by the mere evocation of a mood, as in the passage from Heer quoted above.

The third voice in the great triumvirate of nineteenth-century *feuilleton* writing belonged to Ferdinand Kürnberger (1821–79). Like Spitzer, he was Viennese-born, but of extremely humble origins. He was caught up in the excitement of the 1848 Revolution and was obliged to flee Austria for a while to escape arrest, returning in 1856, by which time he had established himself as a correspondent and theatre critic. Kürnberger's achievement was to introduce a harder strain of politics into a genre that could often verge on the frivolous. (The period had witnessed an outpouring of humorous journals such as *Tritsch-Tratsch* and *Kikeriki*.) His response to the charge that he had deflected the purpose of this light-hearted format was instructive: 'Am I writing about politics? ... I am writing the theatre review of the Austrian tragedy.'²⁴ Kürnberger brings a longer view and a moral register to the *feuilleton*, and it embodies that sense of loss which becomes a characteristic feature of Viennese writing. The following extract is taken from a piece entitled 'Ein Besuch in Wien' (A Visit to Vienna) dated February 1865, when the city was experiencing a building frenzy. Most educated readers would no doubt have flattered themselves in recognizing in the opening of the piece Kürnberger's variation of a line spoken by Mephistopheles in Goethe's *Faust*, for literary allusions were an essential element in the arsenal of the *feuilletoniste*:

Von Zeit zu Zeit seh' ich die Alte gern. – Unter der Alten vestehe ich meine Vaterstadt Wien. Vielleicht verbietet sie sich den ungalanten Beinamen, seitdem sie sich einbildet, neu und jung geworden zu sein. Die gute Alte! Mit wem kokettiert sie, doch nicht mit mir? Ich, der ich

ihre Gesichter im Herzen trage, wie wenige ihrer Söhne, finde sie weit ehrwürdiger in ihrem Alter als liebenswürdig in ihrer Verjüngung.

(I like to see the old girl from time to time, by which I mean my home town of Vienna. Perhaps she disapproves being called by such an unflattering title since she now fancies she has become new and young. Good old Vienna! Who is she flirting with? Certainly not with me, who always carried her images in my heart unlike so many of her children, and I find her far more worthy of respect in her old age than endearing in her rejuvenation.)

The relationship between the writer and the city is a recurring model for later writers wishing to express a perceived historical or social development. Half a century after Heer had walked the streets of Vienna the most prominent of the Second Republic's left-wing writers, Michael Scharang, could follow similar paths in 1999 and he noted just how long it had taken for the city to emerge from the shadow of the Second World War and to shake off the traces:

Im vorigen Jahr hatte ich, als ich an einem Sommertag durch Wien spazierte, erstmals das Empfinden, daß wir, die Stadt und ich, nicht mehr in der Nachkriegszeit leben. Ein halbes Jahrhundert hatte es gedauert, bis die Wunden vernarben, die in der ersten Jahrhunderthälfte von eben den Katastrophen gerissen wurden, welche von dieser Stadt ausgegangen waren.²⁵

(Last year, whilst taking a walk through Vienna on a summer's day, I sensed for the first time that we, the city and I, were no longer living in the post-war period. It had taken half a century for those wounds to cover over, wounds which this city had caused in the first half of the century by the disasters it had unleashed.)

Kürnberger's *feuilleton* piece had gone on to denounce the follies of certain developments he has witnessed: the tearing down of long-standing features of the city's landscape or Vienna's failure to make the most of its access to the Danube. Even Bamberg, Würzburg

and Ulm, he claims, have made more of this trading potential. By contrast Vienna has simply sold off the best access land to the water to an English company. Everything has run full circle and Kühberger sees nothing has really been achieved in this new Vienna:

In meinen wallenden Jünglingslocken unterschrieb ich in der ersten Märzwoche des Jahres 1848 eine Journalistenpetition um Aufhebung der Zensur, und jetzt, da auf meinem Scheitel der Mond aufgehen will, möchte ich eine Journalistenpetition unterschreiben – um Einführung der Zensur!²⁶

(When I had lots of hair I signed a journalists' petition in the first week of March in 1848 calling for the lifting of the censorship, and now as the moon shines off my ageing head I'd be happy to sign a petition calling for its introduction!)

Here Kürnberger adds to his injection of political topics into the *feuilleton* his second and perhaps most penetrating addition to the genre, namely his insight into the debilitating impact of journalism upon language itself. In a piece written in 1866, 'Sprache und Zeitungen' (Language and Newspapers), he argued that journalism was like oxygen; it penetrated everywhere, 'zerstörend, zersetzend, auflösend' (wrecking, corroding, dissolving) everything with which it comes in contact.²⁷ His exposure of the hollow rhetoric of so much popular journalism, with its inflated phraseology, anticipated and indeed prepared the ground for Karl Kraus a generation later, by which time matters had begun to turn very sour in Austrian politics.

The Problem of Language and the Expression of Anti-Semitism

Count Badeni, the Ministerpräsident, had attempted in 1897 to bring some form of order to the linguistic situation in Bohemia and Moravia, where Czech nationalism was becoming ever more vocal and strident. His ill-prepared regulations for the introduction of bilingualism at an

administrative level in the region unleashed huge and bitter protests amongst German-speakers. An example of the rhetorical standards to be heard in the Austrian parliament can be gleaned by the reaction of one Austrian member representing the pan-German position:

Wenn man uns Deutsche zumutet, die Sprache eines solchen kulturell minderwertigen Volkes uns aufdrängen zu lassen, so werden wir uns dagegen natürlich auf das allerentschiedenste wehren.²⁸

(If there are those who are so presumptuous as to believe that we Germans are going to allow the language of such a culturally inferior people to be foisted upon us then we are certainly going to fight back with all the means at our disposal.)

The rise of anti-Semitism, indicated by the electoral success of the Christian Social Party in 1897, the assassination of the emperor's wife in 1898, and the emergence of Theodor Herzl's Zionist movement all suggested, as Edward Timms points out in his study of Karl Kraus, major political developments that the *feuilleton* form could no longer contain. Those very serious, and ultimately intractable, events now pressing in upon Austria caused Kraus to believe that the genre was simply collapsing under their weight.²⁹

Paradoxically, Theodor Herzl (1860–1904) had himself achieved remarkable eminence in the genre, even becoming the *feuilleton* editor of the *Neue Freie Presse*.³⁰ Herzl was a master of the format, employing many of its characteristic devices and registers.³¹ He too could take his readers on walks through Vienna. He begins a piece, such as 'Frühling im Elend' from 1896, by walking past a house in a part of Vienna known as 'im Elend', where the young Franz Grillparzer is said to have lived. He then muses on this strange word, for in modern German 'Elend' means wretchedness or squalor. But Herzl delves into its etymology to show that the district name has a different origin and is linked to the Greek word for otherness or foreign. This gives Herzl the prompt he needs to muse on this district and its history and then to raise indirectly the considerable social ills to be encountered there:

Wer nicht das Gruseln lernen will, braucht diese Gegend nicht zu durchschreiten. Die Studenten der Medizin, die man da trifft, haben einen edlen, jungen Ernst im Gesicht, weil sie vom ewigen Geheimnis kommen.³²

(Those who scare easily had best avoid this area. The students of medicine to be encountered here have a noble, youthful earnestness in their eyes for they are returning from having encountered the eternal mystery.)

The relationship between the work of Kraus and Herzl becomes a clear marker of how the issue of the presence of Jews in Austrian society and in Austrian public discourse was now coming to a head. Gerald Kriehhofer expresses the dilemma and the conflict with succinctness when he writes: ‘Kraus tried to prove that Zionism was based on the affirmation of anti-Semitic prejudices and that Social Democracy was a better solution to the poverty of the Galician Jews than that provided by the builders of castles in the air.’³³ It also marked a turning-point in the language used to discuss Austria.

It would be a misrepresentation, however, to believe the *feuilleton* had been the only form of literary rhetoric dealing with major issues, although it certainly emerged as a dominant and immensely popular form after 1848. Other writers, often close to the circle of writers in popular journalism, were also using the printing press to air the various social and political evils they saw at work in Austrian society. In many cases this meant at work within Vienna. Two prominent examples of campaigning journalism aligned to political activism were Josef Schöffel (1832–1910) and Heinrich Lammasch (1853–1920).

Josef Schöffel is best remembered for having saved the Wienerwald from wilful deforestation. He achieved this through his skilful press intervention in the pages of the *Wiener Tagblatt*. He became the mayor of Mödling and was responsible for a series of other measures to ameliorate the social conditions of the very poorest elements in the Empire. In 1902 Kraus’s journal *Die Fackel* published a special number from Schöffel entitled *Der Parlamentarismus* in which Schöffel looked back at his thirty years of parliamentary service. He

draws a depressing balance, as he does in his consideration of some neighbouring parliamentary systems. Schöffel is also pained by the language used by so-called parliamentarians and dwells on comments he found in Bismarck's memoirs *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*. The great Prussian chancellor was aware of the discrepancy between the private and public use of language. In personal dealings Bismarck could find individual politicians to be models of rectitude, but once in the public arena they felt obliged to descend into unrestrained vulgarity and brutality, believing nothing to be so base that it could not be excused if it served the party interest. So, muses Schöffel, what would the great man have done had he found himself instead the chancellor of the Habsburg monarchy with its host of warring parties? 'Ich glaube dieser geniale Staatsmann hätte zu dem von ihm empfohlenen Mittel Zuflucht genommen, – zur Dictatur!'³⁴ (I believe this brilliant statesman would have taken refuge in his own advice and introduced a dictatorship!) Fortunately Austrians do things differently, according to Schöffel, as he continues:

Bei uns geht das nicht! Wir sind gemüthlicher! Wir besitzen, wie Kürnberger sagt, eine geradezu niederträchtige Gemüthlichkeit! Wir wurscht'ln seit fünfzig Jahren fort und werden fortwurscht'ln bis wir ausgewurscht'lt haben.

(That wouldn't work with us. We are far more congenial! As Kürnberger says, we have a downright vile congeniality. We've been bugging on for the last fifty years and we'll keep bugging on until we are completely bugged.)

The Limitations of the *Feuilleton*

Confidence in the ability of the monarchy's institutions to assert themselves was weak. Financial and personal scandals, such as the suicide of the heir apparent in 1889, had damaged the reputation of the state. And all this took place in the knowledge that Vienna had been completely outplayed by Berlin. The growth of the various

Slav nationalist movements only encouraged the German-speakers in the Empire to look to their northern neighbour, now at long last unified into a single, powerful state, as a natural guarantor of their cultural and linguistic values and superiority. However, Austria was not completely without a rhetoric of dignified self-assertion, although it would be drowned in the jingoism that erupted with the onset of the First World War. Heinrich Lammasch was one such voice. He had enjoyed a distinguished career as an academic and, like so many names in this study, had attended Vienna University's law department, where he graduated with outstanding results in 1876. In addition to holding a chair in law at Innsbruck University he became the last Minister-Präsident of the Empire. During the First World War he pressed for an armistice and for a clear separation from the German Reich. In these efforts he was very much supported and admired by Karl Kraus.³⁵ Lammasch was also a clear opponent of the Anschluss, the idea of Austria becoming part of the German Republic, a proposal which became the dominant thought of most Austrian politicians of both the left and right in the chaotic days immediately following the collapse of the monarchy in 1918. Lammasch's recollection of the turbulent days serving at the highest political level are a timely reminder of how much in Austrian discourse is shaped by personality rather than pure policy. Here is Lammasch's assessment of Count Czernin, a confidant of Archduke Franz Ferdinand until the latter's assassination in Sarajevo. Czernin served as foreign minister in the final years of the Empire, when Lammasch had the opportunity to observe him at close quarters. Czernin was the man behind the Sixtus débâcle, an attempt by the young and inexperienced emperor Karl to go behind the back of the Germans in the middle of the First War World and, via contacts in the Vatican, attempt some form of understanding with the French that might lead to an armistice. Once the affair had become exposed the German High Command put the Austrians firmly in their place. They humiliated them by ostracizing them to a large degree from all future strategic planning. It represented the 'surrender of any remaining Austro-Hungarian independence'.³⁶ Here is Lammasch's assessment of Czernin, which throws an

informative and far from flattering light on how politics and careers were made in a very unprofessional fashion in the Monarchy and how the Press could be harnessed in such undertakings:

Er hatte kurze Zeit in der Diplomatie gedient, hatte die Karriere aber schon als Legationssekretär verlassen. Über die Gründe dieses frühzeitigen Austrittes hört man verschiedenes, manches ungünstige, aber auch, daß er einfach sich seiner Familie und seinen Gütern widmen wollte. Was richtig, weiß ich nicht. Um dem Erzherzog gefällig zu sein, schrieb er Artikel gegen den früheren Ministerpräsidenten Freiherrn von Beck, die *bête noire* des Erzherzogs. Durch den Einfluß der Herzogin kam er ... ins Herrenhaus, wo er zwei- oder dreimal ganz interessant über auswärtige Politik sprach. Kurz vor der Ermordung des Thronfolgers und der Herzogin wurde er Gesandter in Bukarest. Er ist ein lebhafter, nach dem Urteil eines ehemaligen Chefs in der Diplomatenskarriere, ein gewissenloser Kopf, guter Redner und insbesondere ein interessanter Causeur, Hofmann, aber noch nicht Staatsmann.³⁷

(He served for a short time in the diplomatic service but left before attaining high office. One heard various things said about his early departure, some of them not flattering, some suggesting he wanted to devote himself to his family and to his estates. I cannot judge what was true. To oblige the archduke he wrote articles attacking the former prime minister, Freiherr von Beck, who had been the archduke's *bête noire*. The archduchess's influence brought him into Parliament, where he gave two or three quite interesting speeches regarding foreign policy. Shortly before the assassination of the archduke and duchess he became ambassador in Bucharest. He is a man of some vitality and has, in the opinion of a former senior diplomat, an irresponsible mind; he can deliver a good speech and in particular he is an interesting *causeur*, a courtier but not yet a statesman.)

The Duden dictionary of foreign words offers a definition of a *causeur*: 'gesprächiger Mensch, der andere mit (belanglosen) Plaudereien unterhält' (a talkative person who entertains others

with inconsequential chatter) and, for good measure, it marks the expression as ‘veraltet’ (dated). The definition comes uncomfortably close to that of the *feuilleton*, and it was in the hands of such loquacious persons as Count Czernin that the monarchy would reach its dismal end. Yet it is neither to an Austrian nor to a German that we must turn to find the most moving language for the significance of the demise of Austria’s international position and, in particular, the loss of Vienna’s traditional authority. In the following extract the writer is speaking of the unsatisfactory consequences of the Treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain and Trianon, which dealt respectively with Germany, Austria and Hungary after the First World War:

The ... tragedy was the complete break-up of the Austro Hungarian Empire ... For centuries this surviving embodiment of the Holy Roman Empire had afforded a common life, with advantages in trade and security, to a large number of peoples, none of whom in our own time had the strength or vitality to stand by themselves in the face of pressure from a revived Germany or Russia. All these races wished to break away from the Federal or Imperial structure, and to encourage their desires was deemed a liberal policy. The Balkanisation of South-eastern Europe proceeded apace, with the consequent relative aggrandisement of Prussia and the German Reich, which though tired and war-scarred, was intact and locally overwhelming. There is not one of the peoples or provinces that constituted the Empire of the Habsburgs to whom gaining their independence has not brought the tortures which ancient poets and theologians had reserved for the damned. The noble capital of Vienna, the home of so much long-defended culture and tradition, the centre of so many roads, rivers, and railways, was left stark and starving, like a great emporium in an impoverished district whose inhabitants have mostly departed.³⁸

This unusually warm paean to the blessings that the multinational Empire had conferred upon its many peoples, and to Vienna as the very heart of this civilization, comes from Winston Churchill, writing in volume 1 of his history of the Second World War, *The Gathering Storm*. By 1918 few in the Empire would have been able

to share Churchill's benevolent if not munificent opinion of the Empire, and at first sight his view is unexpectedly warm, for it is often forgotten that many British and French politicians of his generation had lost brothers, sons and cousins in the First World War and that they held Vienna responsible for this loss by having allowed in 1914 a little local difficulty in the Balkans to get so terribly out of hand. (This might also explain, although it is rarely if ever mentioned in historical accounts of events in 1938, why politicians in western Europe had little stomach for offering the lives of their own troops in defence of Austrian sovereignty.) But Churchill is writing with a further purpose: an imperialist to his fingertips, he no doubt had genuine affection for the Dual Monarchy, and by speaking so glowingly of the advantages Vienna bestowed upon those whom it governed he was of course also making the case for the British in India and the benefits that Empire controlled from London brought to an otherwise hopeless patchwork of conflicting ethnic and linguistic groups. Churchill's grand and panoramic evocation of Vienna and the Danube monarchy prompts reference to Michel Foucault's awareness in his work *Discipline and Punish* of the relation between power and the visual. Visual authority represents power, and certainly in the heyday of empire building in the nineteenth century it had become a rhetorical convention to offer a sweeping panorama in travel writing and landscape descriptions as if to suggest that what was being beheld was also owned.³⁹ That rhetorical possibility also becomes forfeit to republican Austria after 1918 with the huge territorial loss that occurred.

Churchill held on to a notion of Empire long after most in the Habsburg lands had renounced the idea after 1918. The abrupt political changes throughout Central Europe would have a profound impact not simply on people's economic and social conditions but on the very language with which they sought to find orientation at a time when all the foundations of their existence appeared to have given way and nothing but anarchy, revolution or authoritarianism appeared to be the alternatives.

PART THREE

**AUSTRIA:
REVIVED, REVILED, REVISED**

CHAPTER SIX

FAILURE AT THE FIRST ATTEMPT: THE FIRST REPUBLIC

The Emergence of the First Republic after 1918

In her perspicacious study, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse*, the Byzantine scholar Averil Cameron recalls that the spread of the idea of Christianity meant far more than the establishment of a set of behavioural practices. By the time it had entered mainstream social practice, and then finally emerged as the prevailing faith, Christianity had also acquired a particular language and a characteristic rhetoric:

Christianity was not just a ritual. It placed an extraordinary premium on verbal formulation; speech constituted one of its basic metaphors, and it framed itself around written texts. Quite soon this very emphasis on the verbal formulation of the faith led to a self-imposed restriction – an attempt, eventually on the whole successful, to impose an authority of discourse. And eventually ... this approved discourse came to be the dominant one in the state. The story of Christian discourse constitutes part of political history ... What we might call the ‘rhetoric’ of early Christianity is not ... rhetoric in the technical sense; rather, the word is used in its wider sense, denoting the manner and the circumstances that promote persuasion.¹

The passage is pertinent to our study of how Austria has been presented through language if we consider that, as applied to the year 1918, the process that Cameron described above was now to be put into reverse: as the Empire disintegrated at a bewilderingly

rapid pace so too did much of the language, the nomenclatures, and the linguistic assumptions that had been part of the fabric of national identity. Most obvious was the loss of language that applied to the imperial court and to the territories of the Dual Monarchy, both 'kaiserlich und königlich'. The institutions which bore imperial names, the royal office-holders and the functionaries of the Dual Monarchy, were all shorn of their titles. It was a struggle also played out abroad and in public when the country's embassies were split up and haggled over as Budapest and Vienna made their rival claims to some of the most prestigious real estate in a host of European capitals, although both the nascent Austrian Republic and an independent Hungary were often too near bankruptcy to afford their maintenance.

At the heart of the problem was that the outcome that eventually emerged after the First World War was the one for which the majority of people in Austria had made no preparation and for which they had had not the slightest expectation. When the hawks in the War Department in Vienna in 1914, centred around the head of the general staff Franz Freiherr Conrad von Hötzendorf and supported by the foreign minister Leopold Count Berchtold, embarked upon their punitive war against Serbia in revenge for the assassination of the heir apparent there was certainly no belief that the goal of such an enterprise should be the emergence of a disembowelled Austria as a small Alpine republic, a mere shadow in territory and population of the defunct Dual Monarchy. Yet this is what would happen after four bitter and wasteful years of fighting which exposed the incompetence and the corruption of the Austrian state when put to the test, an experience that subsequently did little to promote Austria's self-esteem in the inter-war years. In the course of that war Austria had been humiliated by being reduced from the already lowly status of a junior partner to being no more than a mistrusted vassal of the German war machine.

The structure that would now be dismantled had been four centuries in the making. The great constitutional historian of the Habsburg Empire, Josef Redlich, had located in his monumental,

two-volume history *Das österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem* the exact date and moment on which that structure had come about: 29 August 1526. On that day the Turks had defeated the Hungarians at the battle of Mohács, a battle in which Ludwig II of the House of Jagjelo and bearer of the crowns of Bohemia and Hungary had fallen. His death permitted the archdukes of Austria to make good their claims to Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Hungary and Croatia and thus to consolidate the hereditary power base ('Hausmacht') of the German branch of the Habsburg dynasty, which, when taken with the Spanish branch of the family, justified the Habsburgs in being viewed from this time on as a truly world power.² What is particularly striking in Redlich's account, however, is not just his description of the origins of that state but also of its ending. Both the content and the sentiment of his words concluding the first volume are worth recalling:

Das österreichische Reichs- und Staatsproblem ist den habsburgischen Herrschern, aber auch den politischen Führern der Deutschen und Magyaren bis zum letzten Tage ein reines Machtproblem geblieben, wie das schließlich in der geschichtlichen Natur der europäischen Dynastien und in den noch immer vorherrschenden Anschauungen europäischer Völker vom Staate tief begründet liegt. Und deshalb ist dann in unseren Tagen das Problem endlich durch die gesammelte, wider die deutsche Nation aufgebotene Macht fast ganz Europas und Amerikas zwar nicht gelöst, aber mechanisch vernichtet worden.³

(The problem regarding the Austrian Empire and the Austrian state remained to the very end not only for the Habsburg rulers but also for the Germans and the Hungarians purely an issue of power, reflecting ultimately as it does the deep-rooted and prevailing understanding of the peoples of this continent of the historical nature of European dynasties. And for this reason the problem in our own times has not been solved but rather it has been structurally obliterated by the combined efforts of most of the rest of Europe and America directed against the German nation.)

Much can be drawn from these remarks. Putting aside Redlich's own political allegiances, there is a clear and unsentimental understanding of the Austrian entity: it was that which could be successfully held together – by force if necessary. Once that power had lapsed, however, there remained no reason for that entity's continuation. Yet the aftermath had not been dealt with adequately. Instead, and this would now become the pattern for Austria for large parts of the twentieth century, outside rather than internal forces would decide what structures the post-imperial territories would acquire. Redlich's reference to the German nation in the immediate days after 1918 was a reminder of what the dominant element in Austrian rhetoric and discourse would be for the next two decades.

None of the options viewed by the former citizens of the Empire in 1918 invited a belief in a small, viable and unified Austria embracing the German-speaking elements of the Monarchy. Certainly there had been no preparation for what was to come and no language with which to ease the transition. What, for instance, would the new entity call itself?

The various possibilities in play were all centrifugal in direction, with the inevitable result of the atomization of the former state. It was clear for the most part which path most of the non-German ethnic and linguistic groups would take. The thought of independence came readily enough to the Hungarians and the Poles. For those groups, such as the Slovaks or the Slovenes, with a far less secure tradition of independence there was at least the prospect of combinations with kindred linguistic groups, holding out the chance, at least on paper, of economic and social viability. Of the non-German groups one was particularly exposed. What would happen to the Empire's not inconsiderable Jewish population? In 1910 the population of the Austrian part of the Empire had been placed at just over 28.5 million.⁴ Making up 4.69 per cent of that population were the 1,313,698 Jews.⁵ It was not simply a question of which of the newly emerging states they might opt for, since that decision would not rest entirely in their hands. The issue was just as much about what attitude those new entities would take towards their Jewish populations. Historically

the Jewish population in Prague, for instance, had tended to see social advancement more closely associated with integration into the dominant German community and its culture, education and language. The case of Franz Kafka's family comes readily to mind. At least Kafka (1883–1924) and his family could function in Czech, unlike his near-contemporary, the poet Rainer Maria Rilke (1875–1926) from a German-speaking but non-Jewish Prague family. There was little incentive for the newly sovereign Czechoslovakian state to be well disposed towards a Jewish bourgeoisie whom in many cases they identified with the very German-speaking classes that many Czechs now wished to see removed from their positions of influence or authority.

In the German-speaking territories there was a strongly articulated fear amongst the myriad anti-Semitic associations in existence at the time that the breakdown of the Empire would result in a tidal wave of migration of poorer Jews from the periphery of the Monarchy to the heartlands. The issue of the 'Ostjuden' was a matter for heated debate amongst politicians, whilst amongst the plethora of anti-Jewish publications, such as *Der Eiserne Besen. Ein Blatt der Notwehr* (The Iron Broom: A Publication for Self-Defence) there was also no lack of suggestions as to how to solve the potential threat, and it was expressed in an unmistakably brutal rhetoric:

So ein Pogrom braucht nicht einmal blutig zu verlaufen, denn wenn nur ein Dutzend Juden an den Laternenpfählen baumelt, dann verschwinden die übrigen ... von selbst nach Galizien und Ungarn, woher sie gekommen sind.⁶

(You don't even need a pogrom to be bloody because if just a dozen Jews were to dangle from lampposts then the other lot would of their own accord disappear back to Galicia and Hungary where they came from.)

The position and the dilemma of Jews in the disintegrating Empire found its most poignant expression in a celebrated scene in Franz Theodor Csokor's drama *3 November 1918*, performed to great

acclaim when it premiered in 1936. The play is set in the dying days of the First World War amongst a group of officers in the Austro-Hungarian army who are recuperating at a convalescent hospital. The assembly of characters represents the various nationalities of the Empire, and the tensions between them are an ominous sign of events soon to unfold. One of their number commits suicide, unable to adjust to the prospect of a new world order and the loss of the familiar structures in which he has been raised. At his funeral his colleagues in turn shake a small amount of earth onto his grave intoning, ‘Earth from Hungary’, ‘Earth from Poland’, and so on, until all the nationalities have been named, implicitly and symbolically stressing the break up of the Empire into its discrete nationalities. Then comes the turn of the regimental medical officer, the Jewish Dr Grün, who hesitates and finally proclaims ‘Erde – aus – Erde aus – Österreich!’⁷⁷ (The soil of – Austria!)

The Position of Jews after 1918

To a potentially stateless people such as the Jews of the Empire the multinational structure had suited well their exposed and often precarious position. Unless they adopted Herzl’s Zionist aspirations or identified completely – and at a linguistic level – with one of the new national formations their status would remain insecure. Total integration or total extraction seemed the stark options facing most Jews. In his study of the fate of cosmopolitan Jews in the ethno-national age of Austria’s First Republic the historian Malachi Haim Hacoheh came to the bleak conclusion: ‘Die Juden erlebten eine Blütezeit im Kaiserreich; der Nationalstaat, das Herzstück der Moderne, wurde dann zu ihrem Todesurteil’⁷⁸ (The Empire constituted a renaissance for Jews; the nation state, that essential expression of the modern period, would become their death sentence). Viewed in this light it does not seem so strange that the most nostalgic literary celebrations of the monarchy, long after there was any possibility of its resurrection, should have come

from the pen of an East Galician Jew, Joseph Roth. Almost as soon as the Empire had vanished it was Jewish writers such as Roth and Stefan Zweig in particular who could be heard lamenting its passing, and in their writing they contributed to that mythologizing of the Empire which the Italian German scholar Claudio Magris traced in his much-debated and contentious study *Der Habsburgische Mythos in der österreichischen Literatur* (The Habsburg Myth in Austrian Literature). Now that it was all too late the alleged merits of the Empire were extolled. Magris draws attention to the Jewish writer Franz Werfel in his New York exile recalling how the Empire had asked its subjects to renounce and overcome their individual national identities for something loftier, turning German, Poles, Czechs and Ruthenes into something greater, into Austrians.⁹ This is also a reminder how the concept of Austrian has been used as a supranational expression and of a different order to such terms as 'German' or 'Czech'. Yet Magris's myth may in turn be partly myth, for he evokes the existence of a Habsburg myth both during the period when Habsburgs were sitting on their thrones and after their demise, yet even if such a myth had existed its function would be radically different in purpose before and after 1918. Kenneth Segar has argued that even before the collapse of the monarchy Hugo von Hofsmannthal in particular had begun to replace the Habsburg myth, that expression of 'unity and harmony', by a cultural myth, which he expounded in his writings for the Salzburg Festival and which anticipated the emergence of Austria as an authoritarian society whose Catholic roots united Austria and Catholic southern Germany into a union which swept aside the unnatural political boundaries separating them.¹⁰ Wendelin Schmidt-Dengler argues convincingly that Magris's Habsburg myth is based on too exclusive a selection of texts, from which an over-ambitious theory of Austrian literature's failure to deal with political realities has been extrapolated.¹¹ Those many writers who had come to loathe the Empire in its last days had little stomach for returning to it as their subject matter after 1918, and in many works of fiction in the First Republic it is possible to encounter remarkably few references to pre-Republican days.

Jewish voices would still play a part in articulating Austria's future and her identity, even if not all of those voices were resident in the Empire. The Treaties of Saint-Germain and Trianon encouraged the non-German communities to go their separate ways. The guiding principle behind the break-up had been the so-called 'Fourteen Points' proclaimed by the American president Woodrow Wilson to Congress in January 1918 when he called for the right of self-determination for the peoples of the Empire. In the drafting of those points Wilson had been aided greatly by a young man of German-Jewish origin, the future political commentator Walter Lippmann.¹² Specifically relating to the Dual Monarchy Wilson's tenth point stated: 'The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.' For a moment the Austrians had hoped this might not mean the total destruction of the Empire, but the evolving nations clearly took it as a green light to begin immediately the process of achieving independence from Vienna. Wilson's ninth point would also be of consequence for post-war Austria and its identity. Here Wilson stated: 'A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.'¹³ When Italy was ceded the South Tyrol, unambiguously Italy's reward for having switched her allegiances to the Allies in the First World War, the ruling was seen by Austria as a flagrant breach of Wilson's own principles since the region was demonstrably German-speaking and ethnically related to the rest of Austria. This territorial loss left a bitter mistrust towards the western parliamentary democracies and their perceived double-standards.¹⁴ This disappointment would later play into Hitler's hands by sapping Austrians' faith in democratic institutions and the language of democracy, although Hitler in turn was quite prepared to leave the South Tyrol to its Italian fate as a price he was more than willing to pay in order to stay on good terms with Mussolini, whose forbearance had allowed him to annex Austria in March 1938.

Austria after the Treaty of Saint-Germain and the Departure of the Habsburgs

Within the German-speaking Austrian community there were three basic political camps, whose existence was not the product of the First World War, for they had already been well established by the late nineteenth-century. The importance of the war, however, was in its impact upon the perceived opportunities each of these camps felt they had gained or lost by the events of 1918. The weakest of the three was understandably the monarchist or legitimist faction. The ignoble end of the Empire resulted in a huge withdrawal of respect and affection for the monarchy. The terrible toll in human life, the pointless privations and near-starvation endured for the last four years made the House of Habsburg an anathema in the eyes of many, even those in the German-speaking community. Those who still remained loyal to the throne took consolation from the fact that the young Emperor Karl had not signed, unlike the German Kaiser, any formal instrument of abdication. The generally inexperienced Karl had not been so naïve as to sign off the possibility of a backdoor entry to his throne at some later and more favourable date. Before removing himself from Vienna, he first attempted but failed in his ‘Völkermanifest’ of 16 October 1918 to assuage the conflicting national groups with promises of autonomy.¹⁵ When his situation became untenable he issued on 11 November 1918 a declaration, wishing his peoples well and, in order not to be an obstacle to future developments, renounced all participation in the affairs of state: ‘Ich verzichte auf jeden Anteil an den Staatsgeschäften.’¹⁶ Apart from not being a formal act of abdication the document is illuminating in another respect, namely the terminology Karl used to anticipate what had yet to come about: ‘Im voraus erkenne Ich die Entscheidung an, die Deutschösterreich über seine künftige Staatsform trifft’ (In advance I give my recognition to whatever decision German-Austria makes regarding its future political form). These words did at least free the leader of the conservative Christian Social Party, Jodok Fink, to place his party’s support behind the proclamation of a republic. ‘Deutschösterreich’ was the most

natural term Emperor Karl could come up with to anticipate what was left of the rump of this thousand-year enterprise. It was also the most common term used by the other two factions competing for the leadership of post-war Austria.

The German nationalist movement within Austria had been clearly visible in Austrian politics since 1848. The political and military mastery displayed by Bismarck had convinced German nationalists in Austria that a brighter economic and political future lay with Prussia, whose superiority had been displayed in 1866 against Vienna and in the war of 1870–1 against the French. President Wilson had made ethnic nationalism seem respectable, and so if Hungarians and Czechs had chosen that course it seemed only natural to the pan-Germans in the Dual Monarchy that their lot belonged with their northern and ethnic neighbours from whom they had only been separated, in their opinion, by virtue of Habsburg incompetence. In the uncertain times after 1918 it appeared sensible to find shelter in greater numbers, and so the thought of union with Germany, despite its own massive problems, swept through Austria and was expressed in many demonstrations and in popular regional referendums which supported almost unanimously union with the newly formed German Republic. The western province of Vorarlberg, the linguistic exception in Austria in not speaking a Bavarian but rather an Alemannic dialect which is also encountered in Switzerland, even came out in favour of union with Switzerland in a referendum held in May 1919. Naturally the French- and Italian-speaking Swiss cantons would have had no desire to see another German-speaking canton added to their country's list, whilst German-speaking Swiss Calvinists had little motivation to welcome more Catholics as fellow citizens, and all financially prudent Swiss saw no economic sense in taking on a bankrupt fragment of the former Habsburg Monarchy.

Those seeking union with Germany did not have to look far for appropriate rhetorical models. From the late nineteenth century onwards the language of German nationalism, anti-Semitic and often anti-clerical, had been propagated in both Germany and Austria. Its brutality matched the brutal conditions of the time

when the politics of the streets would be dominated by armed paramilitary units and parliamentary debate was either dismissed as ineffectual or else itself reflected the coarsening of public discourse.

These various referendums were all an acute expression of the fears and lack of confidence amongst Austrians to address by themselves the desperate social and economic problems which military exhaustion had brought about. Deprived of the fertile food-producing land of Hungary or the industrial productivity of those factories now located in the newly created state of Czechoslovakia, a small and independent Austria held out little attraction.

The right wing of Austrian politics was by no means the most zealous in seeking union with Germany. For very different reasons the left, both Socialist and Marxist wings, had also seen union as the only possible solution to the present emergency. For those on the left union with Germany had long been a programmatic ambition, proclaimed and pursued even before the disaster of the First World War. The motivation was not simply ethnic but rather class in nature. It had been standard Marxist conviction, expressed in the *Communist Manifesto*, that the coming and inevitable revolution would take place amongst the most advanced of the proletariat classes. It had therefore been a surprise that revolution had come first to tsarist Russia, incomparably backward when set against Germany. Yet the revolution had come, and there was after 1918 a confident expectation that it must now spread to Germany, where in the dying days of the German Empire the naval mutinies, the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm and the various short-lived Workers' Revolutionary Councils all suggested the time was almost ripe for revolution to erupt in Europe's most industrialized nation.

In the eyes of the Socialists what was now happening in post-war Austria had been long predicted by their party ideologues, and so events were seen as taking their inevitable course. The rhetoric of Austrian Socialists encouraged this belief in their correct reading of history and in the belief that they were in some way masters of the historical moment. Nowhere is this so apparent than in the self-congratulatory voice of the most charismatic member of the Austrian Socialist Party, the Sozialdemokratische

Arbeiterpartei (SDAP), Otto Bauer, who held senior posts in the party from a very early age, representing the Marxist wing of the party in opposition to the far more conservative position of Karl Renner. Like so many leading intellectual and political figures of the time, Bauer was Jewish, a law graduate of Vienna University, and the son of a prosperous business owner. (In this respect he shared much in common with significant voices in Austrian political life, ranging from Karl Kraus to Bruno Kreisky.) Bauer was renowned as a mesmerising orator, somebody in whom the historian Friedrich Heer believed he detected a combination of German and Jewish pathos.¹⁷ Bauer's later actions showed that he was not always a shrewd judge of events. He bore considerable responsibility for the débâcle of his party's position in the brief civil war of 1934, and he interpreted the prospect of the return of the Habsburgs to be as great a threat as Hitler. In one regard he held a common conviction with Renner, and with many others in his party after 1918: Austria needed to be part of Germany. Bauer was a lifelong adherer to the idea of pan-Germany, as were so many of his party comrades, and he and his party held on to this belief with a tenacity that seriously distorted his party's ability to read the historical situation correctly, not only throughout the 1920s and 1930s but even into the post-1945 period and certainly well after Bauer's death in Parisian exile in July 1938. By contrast, and at first sight bewilderingly, the Austrian Communists would find their way to a concept of an independent Austria well ahead of the Socialists and for reasons that will need to be explained later.

In the immediate years after the First World War, however, unity with Germany was a firm element in Bauer's programme and in his rhetoric. It is illuminating to retrace his line of argument in some detail by considering the following, and in so many respects fateful, passage taken from his optimistically entitled study of 1923, *Die österreichische Revolution*:

Am 1 Oktober [1918] verkündete der Ministerpräsident Hussarek im Abgeordnetenhaus als Programm der Regierung die Föderalisierung Österreichs, die Umwandlung des österreichischen Staates

in einen Bundesstaat autonomer Nationen. Was das Brüner Nationalitätenprogramm der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie im Jahre 1899 gefordert hatte; was in der Reichskrise von 1905 als ein mögliches Ziel aufgetaucht und mit dem Verrat Habsburgs an der ungarischen Demokratie im Annexionsjahr 1908 für immer zur Utopie geworden war – daran suchte sich jetzt, in der Sterbestunde, Habsburg zu klammern. Zu spät! Tschechen, Jugoslawen, Polen antworteten Hussarek: nichts könne sie mehr befriedigen als völlige Unabhängigkeit! Ratlos stand Habsburg den Nationen gegenüber, die nun ihre Stunde gekommen sahen. Und ebenso ratlos war die deutschösterreichische Bourgeoisie. Sie hatte sich soeben noch über die tschechischen ‘Hochverräter’ entrüstet, soeben noch der abermaligen Ankündigung eines ‘deutschen Kurses’ durch den Ministerpräsidenten Seidler zugejubelt, hatte bis zur letzten Stunde noch die Aufrechterhaltung, ja, die Befestigung der deutschen Vorherrschaft innerhalb Österreichs erhofft. Auch ihr war nun alles zusammengebrochen. Nie waren die Gegensätze zwischen den deutschbürgerlichen Parteien und der deutschösterreichischen Sozialdemokratie so schroff gewesen wie im letzten Kriegsjahr. Jetzt, da ihre ganze Politik gescheitert war, wandten sich die bürgerlichen Parteien an die Sozialdemokratie. ‘Bei den Tschechen sind bürgerliche Parteien und Sozialdemokraten längst im *Český svaz*, bei den Polen alle Parteien im Polenklub vereinigt; wäre solches Zusammenwirken nicht auch für uns Deutsche möglich?’ Am 3. Oktober versammelte sich der Klub der deutschen sozialdemokratischen Abgeordneten, um die Anfrage der deutschbürgerlichen Parteien zu beantworten. Seine Antwort lautete: ‘Die Vertreter der deutschen Arbeiterschaft in Österreich erkennen das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der slawischen und romanischen Nationen Österreichs an und nehmen dasselbe Recht auch für das deutsche Volk in Österreich in Anspruch. Wir erkennen das Recht der slawischen Nationen an, ihre eigenen Nationalstaaten zu bilden; wir lehnen aber unbedingt und für immer die Unterwerfung deutscher Gebiete unter diese Nationalstaaten ab. Wir verlangen, daß alle deutschen Gebiete Österreichs zu einem deutschösterreichischen Staat vereinigt werden, der seine Beziehungen zu den anderen Nationen Österreichs und zum Deutschen Reiche nach seinen eigenen Bedürfnissen regeln soll.’¹⁸

(On 1 October 1918 Prime Minister Hussarek announced to the Lower House the government's programme of federalization, the transformation of the Austrian state into a federal state of autonomous nations. What Austrian Social Democrats had demanded in their 1899 Brno Nationality Programme, what had emerged as a possible goal during the state crisis of 1905 only to become a permanently unattainable utopia after the betrayal of Hungary by the Habsburgs in the annexation year of 1908 – to this the Habsburgs now attempted to cling just as they were in their death throes. Too late! Czechs, Yugoslavs, Poles gave Hussarek their answer: nothing could now satisfy them short of complete independence! The Habsburgs could only look on helplessly as these nations saw their moment had come. And equally at a loss was the bourgeoisie of German-speaking Austria. They had just expressed their indignation at the 'betrayal' by the Czechs, just as they had cheered to the rafters yet more proclamations from Minister Seidler of a 'German path'; they had hoped up to the very last moment for the preservation, indeed the strengthening of German dominance within Austria. They too were to see all this collapse. The differences between the parties of the German bourgeoisie and the Social Democrats of German-speaking Austria had never been so stark as in the last year of the war. Now, with their whole policy in ruins, the bourgeois parties turned to the Social Democrats saying: 'The Czech bourgeois parties and the Social Democrats there have been united for some time in a Czech Federation, all the parties in Poland are members of the Polish Club. What would be the possibility of similar co-operation for us Germans?' The parliamentary faction of the German Social Democrats gathered on 3 October to reply to the parties representing the German bourgeoisie, and this was their answer: 'The representatives of the German labouring class in Austria recognize the right of self-determination for Austria's Slav and Romance nations and also claim these same rights for the German population of Austria. We recognize the right of the Slav nations to form their own nation-states; at the same time we reject unconditionally and for all time the subjugation of German territories into these nation-states. We call for all German territories in Austria to be united into a German-Austrian state, which should regulate its relations to the other nations of Austria and to the German *Reich* according to its needs.')

The text, no doubt prolix in a manner characteristic of Bauer's general rhetorical style, betrayed both the dilemma and ultimately the tragedy of the Austrian Socialist position. It is undeniably triumphalist in tone. It congratulates itself on having read political and historical trends more accurately than its opponents. It takes considerable pleasure in the routing of the Habsburg position and, in its apparent moment of victory, it rejoices at the sight of the Austrian middle classes and their parties being worsted.

Interne Party Politics and the Consequences for Austrian Unity 1918 – 1938

In the dying days of Austria's First Republic in 1938, when Hitler's army was already gathering on the Bavarian border ready to cross into Upper Austria, Chancellor Schuschnigg would appeal for all-party support to form a common front to oppose the Germans without and the Austrian National Socialists within. Bauer had cried, 'Too late', to describe what had happened in the last days of Empire. The same would hold good for the last days of the First Republic. The enmity between the parties and their various political ideologies had not been overcome for the sake of a common purpose. Schuschnigg's predecessor, Chancellor Dollfuss, had driven all the opposition parties underground in 1934 when he proclaimed his corporate state, but that enmity went back much further. It had been a feature of the rancorous debates that purported to be the Dual Monarchy's attempts at parliamentary behaviour. And hardly any politicians on either the left or the right, although there were a few as we shall shortly see, could find a language to bridge the huge gap between the various elements in the German-speaking community. Bauer's rhetoric is not an invitation to enter a dialogue. Events just a few years after the year of publication of Bauer's book would drive the rift between Austria's left and right to a point beyond repair, pushing the country irretrievably into the destructive rhetoric of class war. The early years of the First Republic were marked by incessant

street protests as the militias associated with the various political groupings attempted to assert their control. Violent confrontations were routine. On 30 January 1927, however, one incident would prove the long-term undoing of the Republic. In Schattendorf, a small settlement in the most easterly province of Burgenland, right- and left-wing militias clashed. Members of the right-wing paramilitary formation, the Frontkämpfervereinigung, opened fire killing two people, a war veteran and a child, both associated with the Socialist side. Those accused of firing were put on trial in Vienna, where they put in a plea of self-defence. A jury acquitted them on 15 July 1927.¹⁹ The verdict outraged Vienna's workers, who saw this as a flagrant example of class justice.²⁰ The power and the raw language of the newspapers now also played their part in what happened next. Friedrich Austerlitz, the veteran editor of the *Arbeiterzeitung* (The Workers' Paper) appeared in his leading article commenting on the verdict to give licence for workers to take natural justice into their own hands. The Palace of Justice was set on fire, and its destruction was caught graphically in early newsreel pictures. Army and police intervention left eighty-nine dead, a foretaste of the civil war less than a decade away. From the moment of the Schattendorf acquittal the Socialist movement and its supporters abandoned hope of finding justice in the First Republic; the middle classes, on the other hand, believed they had seen the prelude to Bolshevik anarchy. Only strong remedies could hold back the monster, suitably demonized in Conservative electoral literature and posters at the time. The rift would be permanent, and in popular language the left could also make good use of Vienna's lampposts. The Chancellor at the time of the Schattendorf deaths was the Roman Catholic prelate, Ignaz Seipel. A popular song doing the rounds in the 1920s went like this:

Auf jede Gaslatern, auf jede Gaslatern,
da hängt man jetzt hinauf ein Herrn ...
Der erste von den Herrn, der erste von den Herrn,
das wird der Herr von Seipel sein.²¹

(From every lamppost, from every lamppost, there hangs a sir, there hangs a sir, and the first of these, the first of these, will be Monseigneur Seipel.)

When both Socialists and Conservatives were on the point of elimination in 1938 no common language or identity existed between them, for none had been nurtured.

Bauer's text also reveals other contradictions. The generosity of the Austrian Social Democrats towards the non-German groups both before and immediately after the First World War might appear genuine, yet it was also relatively painless to grant, for the Austrian Socialists were giving the other ethnic groups permission to leave an association that they too were on the point, or so they hoped, of deserting. Such generosity cost them little in certain respects. They held to a Bismarckian view, namely that the presence of a large number of non-Germans was untenable in a united Greater Germany. They were thus happy to let go of that which they had no wish to retain. The Austrian Socialists had little time for the model of a German Austria independent of Berlin, a model that held more appeal to the Austrian middle classes, especially amongst those who were Catholic and therefore more suspicious of Prussia since the years following the *Kulturkampf*, that bitter conflict between Bismarck and the Vatican. (Spearheading the polemical attack in literature on the Roman Catholic Church was a sensational work by a virtually unknown young Viennese playwright, Ludwig Anzengruber, whose play *Der Pfarrer von Kirchfeld*, staged at the Theater an der Wien in 1871, had caused a particular *furor*.²²) But Bauer's attitude to the Slavs was not without unresolved reservations, betraying his and his party's gut German nationalism. It reaches almost religious fervour when in the passage quoted he speaks of the eternal ('für immer') rejection of the thought that German land could be ceded to the Slavs. The dichotomy would cost Austrian independence dearly. To Viennese intellectuals Prague might have represented one set of associations, and during the civil war in 1934, and again in 1938, as the Germans marched into Austria,

many of the leading Austrian Socialists found refuge in Prague, which still had a sizeable German-speaking population and a German-language press free from the control of Berlin. But to countless Austrian families working the farms along the Czech border and resentful of lost territory or broken family contacts with compatriots in the Sudetenland, the young Czechoslovakian state represented not liberty but an encroachment. Many rank-and-file Austrian Socialists and Communists in German-speaking Austria were not immune to the pull of these atavistic loyalties, which only contributed in sowing confusion in their reaction to Hitler's seductive rhetoric of a Germany of all the ethnic Germans.

Even after the annexation, the Anschluss, the Austrian Socialists did not revert immediately to a belief in an independent Austria free from National Socialism. It was a measure of the party's political naïvety that they thought the Anschluss could be turned in the long run to their own advantage: Hitler might have brought about union for the wrong reasons, but at least union had been achieved; in the next phase of inevitable historical development, so it was argued, the German proletariat would eventually dispose of Hitler and thus, with a little delay, the desired outcome of a united, working-class Greater Germany would have been achieved. What Bauer could not see was that his passage, far from revolutionary, was instead treading the eternal ground of Austrian national discourse: Austria's relationship to the surrounding non-German ethnic groups and the degree of its integration into the ethnic and linguistic community from which it had emerged over the course of hundreds of years.

The Conflicting Languages of Constitution

Two key documents now to be considered, separated by a mere twenty-seven years, map out the remarkable and contradictory search for an Austrian identity. They were in so many respects identical: identical in the conditions under which they were written; identical in the function they were meant to perform,

and virtually identical in their authorship and in the register of language used. They are, however, diametrically opposed in their content. Surely no two texts illustrate so strikingly the vicissitudes and contradictions of Austrian history as the first draft law brought before the provisional national assembly on 12 November 1918 and the proclamation agreed by the three non-Nazi parties that appeared in the newspaper *Neues Österreich* on 28 April 1945. Both were intended to bring stability and direction at a time of social collapse following military disasters. Both were utterly dependent on the grace and favour of foreign powers.

In 1918, outside the parliamentary buildings, Communist demonstrators were tearing out the white from the new flag of the Republic, the red-white-red stripes which replaced the Habsburg colours. (The fact that the new flag of the Republic had taken recourse to the Barbenberg colours, that of the dynasty preceding the Habsburgs, was an indication of the Janus quality of the new administration.) Inside the former Reichsratsgebäude the representatives were agreeing on the country's future. The first two articles for the proposed new state of Deutschösterreich (German Austria) stated:

Art. 1. Deutschösterreich ist eine demokratische Republik. Alle öffentlichen Gewalten werden vom Volke eingesetzt. *Art. 2.* Deutschösterreich ist ein Bestandteil der Deutschen Republik. Besondere Gesetze regeln die Teilnahme Deutschösterreichs an der Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung der Deutschen Republik sowie die Ausdehnung des Geltungsbereiches von Gesetzen und Einrichtungen der Deutschen Republik auf Deutschösterreich.²³

(Art. 1. German Austria is a democratic republic. All public authority originates from the people. Art. 2. German Austria is a constituent part of the Republic of Germany. Special laws will regulate the participation of German Austria in the legislation and administration of the Republic of Germany as well as the degree to which the laws and institutions of the Republic of Germany may be applied to German Austria.)

The language could not have been clearer. Those gathered at three o'clock on that November afternoon were holding a closing-down sale, albeit it an orderly one. The Empire had ceased doing business, and those left behind had no wish to create a new company; they were now not simply inviting tenders from the main competitor but had already begun to trade under its name.

The proclamation paid little heed to what might be going on in Germany where politicians in Berlin were struggling with a series of dire situations in that same month. There had already been a naval mutiny in Kiel in early November and between the 6 and 8 November revolutionary violence had spread throughout the former German Reich. Incorporating the remnants of the Habsburg Empire was therefore not an overriding priority for politicians in Berlin, but quite irrespective of their position, the Allies, especially an embittered France and Belgium, had not the slightest intention of rewarding a detested Germany by allowing the former Reich to acquire a huge extension to its territory in the south.

By contrast, the proclamation of 28 April 1945, published whilst the Second World War was still raging on Austrian territory, could not have appeared without the approval of the major power broker on Austrian soil in the dying days of the War, the Soviet Union, whose Red Army had reached Vienna, as they had Berlin, well before the western allies had arrived. The first two articles of the 1945 proclamation read:

Art. I. Die demokratische Republik Österreich ist wiederhergestellt und im Geiste der Verfassung von 1920 einzurichten. Art. II. Der im Jahre 1938 dem österreichischen Volke aufgezwungene Anschluß ist null und nichtig.²⁴

(Art I. The democratic Republic of Austria is restored and will conform to the spirit of the constitution of 1920. Art. II The annexation imposed upon the Austrian people in 1938 is null and void.)

The sombre and firm tone of both documents cannot disguise the volte-face of Austrian identity. The latter may speak of a forced

annexation and invoke the year 1920, but the spirit of 1920 was unmistakably for union with Germany, which was forbidden by the victorious and far from magnanimous Allies after 1918. Most difficult to reconcile, however, is the authorship of these texts for they are essentially the work of the same man: Karl Renner (1870–1950), a law graduate of Vienna University, Austria's first chancellor in the years 1918–20, and the first head of government and the first president of a restored Austria after 1945. Renner is often portrayed as a rather colourless but politically effective technocrat, in contrast to the passionate and eloquent Bauer, yet Renner's basic political instincts were genuine enough. He was a Socialist, a conviction born out of the very harsh poverty experienced in his childhood growing up in southern Moravia. (Like many politicians of his generation Renner's place of birth would lie outside the frontiers of the Austrian Republic, leaving open the question of what the Austrian homeland must have meant to them as a concept.)

Renner had called for union with Germany after the First World War and was in his political retirement two decades later far from hostile to the annexation of 1938. That he could champion an independent Austria after 1945 did not strike him as a cynical reversal of the position of a supremely pragmatic politician. (It would not be until the very end of the twentieth century that a younger generation would risk iconoclastic judgements. The prominent literary critic Karl-Markus Gauß described Renner as an example of the nation's opportunism dressed up as an imposing father figure.²⁵) When Renner's political history of Austria came to be published after his death Renner could claim, as if from the grave, that the political concept of Austria 'so wie es damals war' (as so conceived of at that time) was not viable in 1918 and was not capable in 1938 of resisting external pressure.²⁶ He was right on both accounts, but he was already rewriting his own attitudes from his earlier enthusiastic championing of union with Germany to one of reluctant political realism. His view of Austria after 1945 was emphatically in favour of an independent state. Austria had paid a bitter price to learn its lesson, he claimed. It would

never again allow class differences to cause the rifts which had destroyed the First Republic, and it would defend itself against the encroachments of Communists or 'faschistische Velleitäten' (fascist velleities).²⁷ (Renner's choice of vocabulary and his rhetoric were never entirely free of the pedantic academic.)

In the course of writing his much-admired histories of Poland the British academic Norman Davies had confessed that, although linear history might be very satisfying intellectually, sometimes material could not be adequately accounted for in such simple lines of progressions.²⁸ When sifting through the political material of Austria's Second Republic it is impossible for the reader not to have in his or her mind simultaneously a parallel history from the First Republic in which the same players produced the very opposite arguments to those espoused so happily in the Second Republic. Renner was by no means an exception in this respect in the contradictory story of Austria's rhetorical identity in the twentieth century.

The Significance of the Austrian Provinces

At the time of the foundation of the First Republic many political groupings, ranging from the far right to the far left, had designs to replace the fledgeling state by other structures, so that it was hardly surprising that its life was so short and that no adequate ideological or linguistic defence would be mounted on its behalf. The fact that it continued at all rested on two factors, neither capable of preserving for very long the Republic against a concerted threat such as the German annexation. The first factor preserving the Republic for at least a few years was simply the intransigence of the Allies, who would not permit Austria to merge into Germany or even to enter into a joint customs union. Such an embargo in itself, of course, would prove barely sufficient to sustain a national identity for very long. The second factor helping the Republic to limp on for a while lies outside the scope of this study but does require acknowledgement. The distinguished Austrian social and

economic historian Ernst Bruchmüller rightly draws attention to Austria's many provincial identities. In contrast to the Austrian state, whose identity has been marked by a process of disintegration, provincial identity has been 'unbroken and constant'.²⁹ This is a reminder that the history of events in Vienna was not always synonymous with the history of provincial Austria.

Regions such as the Tyrol, Styria and Carinthia possessed strong and well-developed individual identities and particular histories reaching back for many centuries and claiming deep-rooted loyalty and patriotism from their respective citizens. Theirs was an identity far more secure than that which the First Republic could claim. Collectively it could be said they also constituted a form of Austrian identity, and at their local level they were able to retain allegiances during the obliteration of the national identity that the Nazis visited upon the country after 1938, when the name 'Österreich' was removed from the map and public discourse to be replaced by several attempts at new nomenclature, including 'Ostmark', 'Ostmarkgauern' and finally, and on Hitler's personal instruction, 'Alpen- und Donaugau'.³⁰ ('Gau' had been an old Germanic tribal term for territorial districts and was an expression appropriated by the National Socialists in the restructuring of Germany. Austria was therefore to be renamed simply after its two most prominent geological features, its mountains and the River Danube.)

Austrian provincial identity could preserve elements of a concept of Austria when the latter was forbidden by the National Socialists, but provincial identity could on occasions also turn violently against national superstructures, and particularly against Vienna's concept of a national identity. When Jörg Haider fell out with the FPÖ after the electoral disappointments of 2005 he formed a breakaway party, the BZÖ, a party that was very much specific to the Austrian province of Kärnten (Carinthia) where he had established a formidable personal following. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries provincial Austria would march against Vienna with the intention of bringing the capital's radical elements to heel. Prince Windisch-Graetz and his army did so successfully in 1848, Walter Primer and his Steiermark Heimwehr abortively in 1931.

The Corporate State and the Coming of Civil War, 1934

It was not, however, Hitler's achievement to have put an end to democratic rule and democratic language the First Republic. That work had been done already by Austria's own elected representatives on 4 March 1933 when parliamentary business could no longer be conducted. For tactical and voting reasons each of the Parliament's three presidents resigned in order to vote along party lines regarding measures in response to a paralysing strike by railway workers and the occupation of stations by the army under Dollfuss's instructions. Dollfuss used the resignations to suspend normal parliamentary proceedings and to attempt to rule by decree. The disintegration of the First Republic as a multi-party democratic state now proceeded apace. Socialists, Communists and National Socialists were all driven underground by various measures taken by Dollfuss. By 12 February 1934 Austria had reached a state of civil war, the immediate cause of which was a police raid on a workers' hostel in Linz in search of weapons held by Social Democrats. In the few but bloody days of fighting the government may have lost around a hundred men, the Socialists much closer to a thousand.³¹ The party's principal politicians, such as Otto Bauer and Julius Deutsch, escaped over the border to Bratislava to leave the party without effective direction. Meanwhile the Vatican's Nuntius to Vienna, Enrico Sibilio, urged Rome to remain aloof so as not to distract Chancellor Dollfuss.³² Nine of the Socialist ringleaders were summarily executed. On 1 May 1934 a new Austrian constitution was proclaimed, its preamble beginning in stark contrast to Renner's republican draft: 'Im Namen Gottes, des Allmächtigen, von dem alles Recht ausgeht'³³ (In the name of God, the Almighty, from whom all authority emanates). At exactly the same time a Concordat with the Vatican was made known, granting the Roman Catholic Church considerable influence in a number of spheres within Austrian society, particularly regarding marriage and education. The structure and the language of Dollfuss's Austria took on the features of a state moving towards a theocracy, an impression reinforced by many of Dollfuss's

appearances captured on the newsreels of the time showing him almost invariably accompanied by priests. His political gatherings often had the character of large open-air masses, and the symbol adopted by his Patriotic Front, as Chancellor Dollfuss manoeuvred Austria towards a one-party authoritarian state, was the 'Kruckenkreuz', the cross potent, redolent of the age of the Teutonic Knights and the Cross of Jerusalem. As a piece of visual rhetoric it was as retrogressive and as lacking in dynamism as the structure and language which Dollfuss offered for his vision of Austria, the 'Ständestaat' or corporate state. Dollfuss may well have been motivated by a desire to bring stability into a restless and increasingly violent Austrian society, but he came closer to establishing a static society. Inasmuch as the corporate state had a theoretical basis it might well have been taken from Wagner's opera *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg*, a world of the medieval guilds where each knew his place in the social hierarchy and was content to remain loyally and dutifully in that place. The only difference from Wagner, whose operas had for years been kept out of Vienna in the nineteenth century because of royal displeasure, was that Wagner's craftsmen were the product of the Reformation rather than the Counter-Reformation. Like Hans Sachs, they were literate and capable of independent thought.

There were attempts at articulating the philosophical and structural basis for Dollfuss's concept of an Austrian identity. Chief amongst these was the work of a man regarded as the principal ideologue of the right-wing Heimwehr, Odo Neustädter-Stürmer. A member of the aristocracy and yet another Viennese law graduate, Neustädter-Stürmer had served as an officer in the First World War, as had Dollfuss and Schuschnigg. He worked in the administration in Upper Austria after the war before becoming a member of Parliament in 1933. His death in 1938 exposed the descent of Austrian politics into the abyss. He committed suicide a week after the German army entered Austria knowing full well what awaited him for in 1934 he had perjured himself at the trial of those Nazis involved in the July Putsch in which Chancellor Dollfuss had been murdered.

In 1930 Neustädter-Stürmer published his short formulation of the corporate state, *Der Ständestaat Österreich*. The book is dedicated ‘to the young Austria’, but it was the young in particular that in their droves turned their back on the concept in favour of what was perceived to be the far more dynamic and successful movement headed by Hitler. Neustädter-Stürmer’s basic premise was that a state made up of many parties represented a political model which has served its time (‘abbaureif’).³⁴ It must be replaced by a structure resting on three pillars: ‘Staatshoheit’, ‘Wirtschaft’ and ‘Kultur’³⁵ (Sovereignty, economic activity, and cultural and intellectual activity). This constituted, he argued, an organic structuring of social activity with each sector requiring its dedicated practitioners:

So gewinnt der Bau des Staates organische Form: die Hoheitsverwaltung bildet sein Knochengerüst, gibt ihm Halt und Festigkeit, frisch durchpulst ihn das Blut des geistigen Lebens, während die Nerven und Muskeln des Staates, das ist die Wirtschaft, sich frei und ungehemmt betätigen können.³⁶

(In this way the formation of the state gains organic form: the exercise of authority constitutes the state’s skeleton, giving it firm support; pulsating invigoratingly through it is the blood of creative and artistic life whilst the economy provides the nerves and muscles capable of working freely and without impediment.)

Karl Kraus

Austria’s loss of faith in the intuitions of parliamentary democracy and their ability to function effectively was widespread. Even Karl Kraus in his third decade as the incomparable one-man editor of the journal *Die Fackel*, that remarkable instrument exposing the mental and linguistic hypocrisy of Austrian society, was showing clear signs of scepticism towards democracy, even going so far as to believe restricting press freedom and abolishing trial by jury

would be no bad thing.³⁷ Despite his disdain for National Socialism Kraus, who was also dismissive of the Austrian Social Democrats, came only belatedly to a defence of Austrian identity: 'Kraus was always contemptuous at least until 1933 of any attempt to talk of a distinctively Austrian culture as opposed to that of Germany'.³⁸ Yet for all his considerable insight Kraus's own style also proved to be an impediment. Edward Timms has spoken of the satirist who created 'a diffuse panorama of linguistic fragments and broken voices'.³⁹ By the time the journal made its last appearance in February 1936 the dying Kraus had, like Austria itself, lost vitality; the last numbers of his journal seemed obsessively preoccupied with the nuances of performing and translating Shakespeare. This was not a format that could withstand Nazism, and Kraus's political impact is perhaps best viewed in the light of one response by a young Austrian, Albert Fuchs (1905–46). Fuchs was to be a leading figure amongst émigré Austrians based around the Austrian Centre in London during the Second World War.⁴⁰ His posthumous study, published in 1949, of Austria's intellectual life *Geistige Strömungen in Österreich 1867–1918* so impressed the leading historian Friedrich Heer that he provided a preface to it when the work was republished in 1984.

Fuchs had been born into a comfortable and enlightened Viennese Jewish family and he moved politically to the far left in the course of growing up in the city. It is illuminating to see the stations of his life by consulting a street map of Vienna: He was raised in a spacious house in the Garnisongasse, situated just behind the Votivkirche, and studied law at the University of Vienna, whose main building stands across the road from the Votivkirche. Fuchs's knowledge of Marxist literature was gained through intensive study amongst the holdings of one of the largest social science libraries in Europe, that belonging to the Arbeiterkammer and situated in the Ebendorferstraße. These places were and are literally within a few yards' walk of each other, underlining once more how self-contained Vienna could be in the formation and education of its citizens.

As a young man Fuchs had been greatly attracted to Kraus and *Die Fackel*, as were so many of his generation. By the early 1930s, however, Fuchs had come to regard Kraus's influence as harmful,

as he confessed in a brief autobiographical sketch accompanying his book:

1931/32 standen riesenhafte politische Umwälzungen bevor: totaler Sieg des Faschismus, oder totaler Sieg der demokratischen Massen. Jeder, der nicht mit Blindheit geschlagen war, sah die Entscheidungen herankommen. Mir war zwar durch Karl Kraus ein bestimmter Grad von Blindheit vorgeschrieben, aber die Dimensionen der heraufziehenden Ereignisse tendierte dazu, die Lebensregeln des Dichters außer Kraft zu setzen. Kraus konnte hundertmal proklamieren, er bleibe
‘im Erdensturz dem Umbruch einer Zeile
Noch zugewandt’ –
in mir rührte sich das Verlangen,
meinen Blick dem Erdensturz zuzuwenden.⁴¹

(The years 1931 and 1932 presented huge political upheavals: the complete triumph of Fascism or of the democratic masses. Unless they had been struck blind anybody could see that a decisive moment was approaching. As a Karl Kraus devotee it is true I could not escape a certain degree of blindness, but the scale of what was coming helped to cancel out the poet's maxims. Had Kraus not boasted a hundred times: 'Even if I were plunging to earth my attention would still be on the typesetter.' But something inside me demanded that attention should be directed to the fall.)

Despite all their brilliance, Kraus's polemical arguments were in the eyes of Fuchs not so much a means as rather an end in themselves and to that extent a dangerous distraction to the political realities the young Fuchs saw around him. Kraus's wit did not translate into tangible action for which the younger generation of Austrians were so impatient; indeed this sort of polemic encouraged political passivity because it believed a brilliant argument was sufficient in itself, yet in the end it was clear that not all the words of the 922 editions of *Die Fackel*, which ran a remarkable span from 1899 to 1936, had been able to prevent the ascendancy of Hitler and National Socialism. By contrast, Kurt Tucholsky, the one

German writer with a sense of humour to match that of Kraus, was despairingly aware by the mid-1930s of the impotence of the written word to prevent the rise of Hitler.⁴²

Alternative Voices in the Last Days of the First Republic

It would be tempting to leave Austria in 1938 on this sombre note. The First Republic was undeniably a failed state, one unable to convince the outside world or many of its own citizens of its right or its need to exist. It had not succeeded in establishing a self-confident identity that did not need to make reference to Germany as part of any act of self-definition, and it had not found an appropriate language with which to proclaim it. Yet that would not be a wholly accurate picture and, by way of conclusion, this chapter draws attention to two Austrians of diametrically opposed political views and backgrounds but whose activity gave the early signs that an Austrian identity embracing all shades of opinion on the political spectrum might be achievable. This would not happen in the lifetime of the First Republic, but it would lay the foundation for the remarkable changes in the fortune of that identity after 1945.

Alfred Klahr (1904–44) was a Viennese-born Jewish Marxist, a journalist and a leading intellectual and writer for the Austrian Communist Party, the KPÖ. He wrote under a pseudonym for the Communist publication *Weg und Ziel*. During the Second World War he attempted to flee from the Nazis but was captured, transported to Poland and shot in Warsaw. Ernst Karl Winter (1895–1959) was a Viennese Catholic academic, specializing in sociology, and active as a politician on behalf of the Patriotic Front, the Vaterländische Front, the political vehicle for Dollfuss's corporate state. Between 1934 and 1936 he served as one of Vienna's deputy mayors but was politically sidelined, and eventually he emigrated in 1938 to Switzerland and subsequently to the United States. He returned to Austria in 1955 although, like so many returnees, he found homecoming a difficult process.

What distinguished Klahr and Winter from most Austrian

politicians of the time was that they had the vision and the courage to think outside traditional party lines and to look for points of connection, a move which went against the grain of political trends, for there had developed from the 1920s a clear divide in Austria: the Social Democrats, it has been said, had taken refuge in the ghetto of a 'Red' Vienna whilst Conservatives were very much associated with provincial and rural Austria.⁴³ In their examination and projection of a concept of Austrian identity, although rejected by their party colleagues at the time, Klahr and Winter showed a remarkable perspicacity in regarding a possible Austria of the future,⁴⁴ and it is extremely instructive to see what mental and ideological obstacles both men had to overcome in their effort to find a common Austrian identity.

For any Communist there was, as a given starting-point, the clear proclamation of the *Communist Manifesto*, the most influential product of the Year of Revolution. In 1848 Marx and Engels had pronounced that 'working men have no country.' (Samuel Moore's long-serving English translation of 1888 fails to convey the emotional force of the original German: 'Die Arbeiter haben kein Vaterland.'⁴⁵) It had been axiomatic throughout the history of the Austrian Communist movement that Austria was part of the German nation. Marx and Engels had demanded the destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy and called for Austrians to be reunited with their fellow Germans. (Marx's concept of 'Stämme' (tribes) had a Darwinian quality to it which continued, as we have seen, into the work of Karl Renner.) Klahr was therefore committing heresy when he began to question whether a perspective based on conditions arising from the events of 1848 could be applied to the situation prevailing in Austria after 1918. He believed he could justify this by developments in Lenin's and Stalin's understanding of the idea of the nation. It is evident that Communist theory was also struggling with the issue of national identity and had no patent solution. Roman Szporluk reminds us that long before the Revolution Lenin had rejected the national approach to solving the dilemma of the numerous national groups within tsarist Russia and that even after 1917 the alternative he was left with was that of a continuing imperial solution.⁴⁶ Karl Renner and Otto Bauer had

regarded the nation in essentially linguistic and cultural terms, but Klahr began to see that this perspective disregarded the material-historical conditions which brought about a nation. Klahr held that there had never been a united German nation that had included German-speaking Austria, and that after 1871 this group had been excluded from the Reich.⁴⁷ By 1937 Klahr was arguing that, in distinction to 1848, the Austrian bourgeoisie, the petite bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the agricultural classes had taken a conscious turn after the events of 1871 towards a path of what he termed Austrian orientation. That this process was yet to be completed could be explained by a remnant of German nationalist tendencies still to be found amongst the Austrian intelligentsia and the Austrian bourgeoisie. Klahr identified a specific Austrian cultural tradition by listing the names of such diverse writers and composers as Grillparzer, Anzengruber, Anastasius Grün, Raimund, Nestroy, Schnitzler, Wildgans, Karl Kraus, Rosegger, Schubert, Strauß and Bruckner. (Ingeborg Bachmann, Austria's most celebrated female poet to emerge after 1945, felt moved to create an almost identical list of names of Austrian writers who, she felt, could never be mistaken for German writers.⁴⁸)

Klahr was aware of the challenge facing Austrian Communists. The Socialists had pressed for union with Germany after 1918. Only a handful of Communists had recognized that this constituted a great danger, diverting the Austrian proletariat from their goal by means of nationalist notions.⁴⁹ Klahr suggests that the KPÖ had been, historically speaking, under the thrall of their bigger German brothers.

The catastrophe of the February civil war in 1934 had exposed the incompetence and woeful leadership of the Austrian Socialists. Many of their intellectuals now moved their allegiance from the SPÖ to the KPÖ, most noticeably the man who would be the leading Communist ideologue immediately after the Second World War, Ernst Fischer. That the Austrian Communist Party had not completed the radical transformation of this process before the outbreak of the Second World War is demonstrated in the person of the party's chairman, Johann Koplenig (1891–1968). Encouraged by the seventh World Congress of the Communiste International,

Austrian Communists now began to oppose thoughts of an Anschluss in favour of a united anti-Fascist front. However Kopleinig was still at pains to warn the party against indulging in a demagogy in support of a nationalist Austria.⁵⁰ Although the process may not have been completed, the Austrian Communists had started on a journey towards an independent Austria that precedes the position belatedly taken by the Austrian Socialists.

Ernst Karl Winter had also come to challenge, as Klahr had done, the received view on nationality by revisiting history. Winter believed the path leading from Martin Luther to Frederick the Great was an aberration. Wotanism, the theological heresy of Arianism, and Protestantism had destroyed genuine German values. Winter nevertheless felt that the manner in which Chancellor Dollfuss was asserting Austrian values was wrong. It was a mistake to suppress Marxism because the proletariat was in danger of being stripped of its self-discipline. Winter saw the need for some form of rapprochement with working people. Indeed, a study of Austria's history demonstrated the presence of what he termed socio-political traditions, as he set out in his book of 1934 devoted to the working classes and the state, *Arbeiterschaft und Staat*.

A study of the Gothic, Baroque and Renaissance periods in Austrian culture would reveal anti-capitalist elements. Here Winter anticipates a conclusion that would be articulated by Ernst Fischer after the war, namely that the working classes would need an Austrian national identity in order to be weaned off National Socialist ideology and to be given a structure to which they could commit themselves and for which they could work. Winter expressed it in these terms:

So wird es der österreichischen Arbeiterschaft möglich sein, an der Erzeugung des österreichischen Mythos, ohne es auf die Dauer keinen österreichischen Staat geben kann, entscheidend mitzuarbeiten, damit das Fundament dieses Staates von Haus aus nicht nur ein österreichisches, sondern auch ein soziales sei.⁵¹

(Thus the Austrian workforce will be enabled to play a decisive part in the creation of the Austrian myth, without which in the long term

there can be no Austrian state, and so the foundation of this state may not only be inherently Austrian but also social.)

By 1935 Winter had anticipated with chilling precision the course of events and the ultimate and fatal contradiction of a position that Schuschnigg would assume. In an essay devoted to the theme of the monarchy and the working class, published in 1935, Winter could predict:

Wer Österreich als 'deutschen Staat' betrachtet und vom 'deutschen Volk in Österreich' spricht, muß früher oder später auch den österreichischen Staat negieren.⁵²

(Those who regard Austria as a 'German state' and speak of the 'German nation in Austria' will sooner or later have to deny the Austrian state.)

Winter boldly breaks, as Klahr did, with that long tradition dating back to Herder of viewing the nation exclusively as a linguistic and cultural unit. He pleaded for the recognition of the achievement of other groups such as the Marxists and the many Jews who had contributed to organizing the working class. (Winter's own rhetoric had shown in earlier years unmistakable anti-Semitic tones, from which he only distanced himself in his later work.) What he was suggesting was a desperately needed olive branch, one that would have to be grasped if the non-Nazi parties were to make common cause on behalf of an independent Austria. But many Austrians could not cross well-entrenched boundaries. The rejection of such approaches could be couched in language that was chillingly brutal. Austria's Revolutionary Socialists, for instance, mocked the approaches of those whom they belittled as armed Jesuits, narrow-minded Austro-cronies, anxious money Jews or legitimists, all of whom were destined for history's garbage bins: 'Sie gehen für immer unter, ihr Österrichtum hat kein Morgen, keine neue Auferstehung'⁵³ (They are entering a permanent eclipse, their concept of Austria has no future, it will never be resurrected).

CHAPTER SEVEN

AUSTRIAN IDENTITY AND THE IMPEDIMENTS OF HISTORY

The Nazi Annexation of 1938

Chancellor Schuschnigg's snap decision to hold a referendum in March 1938 to confirm Austria's resolve to remain an independent state would sting Hitler into giving the invasion order to prevent such a vote taking place. Once successfully installed in Austria, and without having incurred any armed resistance, Hitler offered Austrians an opportunity to endorse retrospectively by means of his own referendum what had taken place. On 10 April 1938, and with a turnout of 99.7 per cent, a yes vote of 99.6 per cent was achieved in favour of the annexation.¹ The Austrian film maker and academic historian Helene Maimann commented almost six decades later that there had been no need for the undoubted electoral manipulation, 'Große Wahlfälschungen waren nicht nötig.'² Austrian writers who had supported and been supported by the Ständestaat now appeared to drift effortlessly into the camp of the National Socialists: Rudolf Henz, Josef Weinheber, Max Mell and Karl Heinrich Waggerl, amongst many others. Austria's first chancellor, Karl Renner, and Cardinal Theodor Innitzer of Vienna had been invited, cajoled, or manoeuvred by the National Socialists into appearing to be enthusiastic supporters of the annexation. The Catholic bishops had even issued a pastoral recommendation for the 10 April vote in language worth recalling:

Am Tage der Volksabstimmung ist es für uns Bischöfe selbstverständlich nationale Pflicht, uns als Deutsche zum Deutschen Reich zu bekennen,

und wir erwarten auch von allen gläubigen Christen, daß sie wissen, was sie ihrem Volk schuldig sind.³

(On the day of the plebiscite we bishops regard it as our obvious national duty to identify ourselves as Germans belonging to the German Reich, and it is also our expectation that all faithful Christians will know what they owe their nation.)

If the country's most prominent Socialist and Catholic were both apparently in favour, who could possibly want to say no? Within the bishops' text, however, were individual words that would remain tenaciously potent in future polemical discussions. In his post-war Christmas radio address of 1945 Chancellor Figl, Austria's first freely elected post-war leader, also made Austria a matter of faith when he had pleaded, 'Glaubt an dieses Österreich!' (Believe in this Austria!), although he had no material comfort to offer his freshly liberated but also occupied fellow citizens. There was, however, a second word in the bishops' text that would be far more controversial. They had spoken of their duty ('Pflicht'); a few years earlier Bishop Gföllner of Linz had proclaimed in 1933 that it was a Christian duty to counter the degeneration which Judaism represented by opposing the 'Jewish spirit'.⁴ That word 'duty', as will be discussed in the final chapter, would by itself almost prove the very unmaking of Austria nearly half a century later.

Hitler's speech before the many thousands of cheering Austrians gathered on the Heldenplatz in the centre of Vienna on 15 March 1938 really did constitute the unmaking of the First Republic for it culminated in his near-messianic proclamation to the ecstatic crowds below, and before German history itself, of the entry of his home, his 'Heimat', into the German Reich. The new legal position was expressed in unambiguous language. Article 1 of the Bundesverfassungsgesetz (Federal Constitutional Law) of 13 March 1938 stated unequivocally: 'Österreich ist ein Land des Deutschen Reiches'⁵ (Austria is a land of the German Reich). What many Austrians had wanted since 1918, indeed since 1848, had now been achieved, although, as so often in matters of Austrian identity, by means of a largely external impetus.

After the Second World War Austrians felt it necessary to devote considerable energy and linguistic ingenuity explaining away the large crowds that had greeted Hitler in central Vienna. It had been calculated that at least a tenth, perhaps more, of the entire population of Vienna had crowded into the Heldenplatz on 15 March to hear Hitler's proclamation.⁶ The shops, the factories and the schools had been closed in Vienna for that day and the weather happened to be particularly fine.⁷ The rhetorical question being asked was this: what else was there left for an ordinary citizen to do but to go along and listen? The issue at stake here for Austrians after the war, as with the general matter of Austria's part in the life of the Third Reich, was not so much to establish the facts as to find a language and a perspective that could help exonerate post-war Austrians and the revived Austrian state from the events occurring between 1938 and 1945. Post-war literary references to the reception accorded to Hitler at the Heldenplatz in the heart of Austria remain an uncomfortable, undigested and, for many, an unwelcomed element in the country's attempt to find a way back to an acceptable identity. Thomas Bernhard's play *Heldenplatz* from 1988 unleashed an orchestrated barrage of protest in Austria's popular media towards a work which suggested, half a century after the Anschluss, that the country was not one jot better than it had been in 1938,⁸ whilst post-war Austria's most inventive poet, Ernst Jandl (1925–2000), turned to a dark humour by reducing Hitler's address to an acoustic parody in his translation-defying poem 'wien : heldenplatz'.⁹ (The sting in the poem is not simply against Hitler for the apocalyptic tirade he bellowed out across the Heldenplatz but against Jandl's fellow Viennese citizens for succumbing to such ranting as if they were responding to an animal-like mating call.)

It would be in post-war Austria's interests if the rest of the world regarded the Anschluss years as an imposed and alien interruption in the flow of the nation's history. One of the best-established Austrian writers of the time, and a later president of Austria's PEN-Club, Alexander Lernet-Holenia (1897–1976), had argued just that. Writing in the journal *Der Turm* in 1945, an example of the myriad

and often short-lived publications that appeared with remarkable and bewildering speed immediately after the war and, although largely forgotten today, did so much to shape the debate on the new Austria, Lernet-Holenia dismissed the whole Hitler period as an irritating caesura to the natural course of Austria's history. Hitler had been insane, he pronounced, and he could now therefore be quickly forgotten while Austria reconnected with its past.

Lernet-Holenia's encouragement to airbrush the Nazi years from the collective memory formed part of a number of strategies adopted immediately after 1945, and for many years to come, in order to cope with what had happened to Austria. Those strategies ranged from the downright suppression of discussion, the placing of taboos on particular topics, aggressive reaction to distasteful or unpalatable facts, or simply externalizing events by attributing responsibility or culpability to others, most notably the Germans.¹⁰ Some would even argue in the most unexpected of places that the annexation years had helped Austrians find their way back to themselves and discover their unique voice. Thus in the preface to an edition of the comedies of Johann Nestroy the literary scholar Franz H. Mautner would argue that Austria's incorporation into the Third Reich had in fact helped trigger a reawakening of Austrian identity:

Die Jahre 1938 bis 1945, der Versuch, österreichische Eigenart 'gleichzuschalten', haben ein dieser Absicht gegenteiliges Endergebnis gehabt: Das österreichische Selbstbewußtsein, als österreichisches, wurde herber; dies scheint es auch zu ernsthafterer Beschäftigung mit einem so typisch österreichischen Werk wie Nestroy getrieben zu haben und damit zu seiner Entniedlichung und Entverulung.¹¹

(The years 1938 to 1945 and the attempt to make Austria's uniqueness conform to the uniformity of the Third Reich achieved the very opposite result. Austrian self-awareness of being Austrian grew more astringent, leading, it would seem, to a more serious-minded occupation with such typically Austrian works as those by Nestroy, stripping them of those accrued harmless or inane layers that prevented the works from being seen for their real value.)

The Legacy of the Annexation in Post-1945 Austria

The Nazi annexation was to represent both the end of a flawed Austrian identity but also the painful beginning of what would become for the first time a sustainable concept of republican Austria. But first of all those seven years of National Socialism within the Third Reich had to be endured, along with all those measures that formed part of the 'Gleichschaltung', the integration of every aspect of Austrian life into the National Socialist state. That Austrians now wished after May 1945 to be disassociated from all things German was certainly understandable. The looming matter of war crimes and reparations in the newly emerging post-war European order had not escaped Austrians' notice. It would clearly be to their advantage to be regarded by the rest of the world as a wholly distinct and separate entity from that of Germany. Austria's restored government would stress that as it had ceased to exist after 1938 – and had not the Allies themselves accepted the Anschluss as a *fait accompli*? – that it therefore followed that the Republic of Austria could not be held responsible morally or legally for the terrible events that had taken place in the course of the Second World War. It was not in the uniform of an Austrian army or under the colours of an Austrian flag that its men, some 1.2 million of them from a relatively small country of less than ten million, had been conscripted to fight once the country had been absorbed into the Third Reich.¹² Moreover, the Allies in their Moscow declaration of 1943 had recognized Austria as Hitler's first victim. The Austrian historian Anton Pelinka did not mince his words when he spoke of taboos and self-deception as post-war Austria looked back upon its history:

The process of forgetting started as early as 27 April 1945, when in the preface to the Declaration of Independence only the victim hypothesis was formulated, while the hypothesis of joint responsibility was almost hidden at the end of the document. Another part of this forgetfulness was that the State Treaty no longer included any reference to the concept of joint responsibility.¹³

Here Pelinka is referring to that part of the Moscow declaration in which the Allies said they would take note of the degree to which occupied Austria had contributed to its own liberation from National Socialism.

The Hitler years had ultimately brought disaster to Austria. The country was bombed heavily by the American and British air forces in the latter stages of the war from their bases in Italy, and it was pounded on the ground by a Red Army that swept in from the east with tank regiments moving across the unresistingly flat terrain of Hungary, with the result that only the most ideologically obstinate Nazi in Austria could escape the conclusion that union with Germany had come at an unbearable price.

The Nazi years had grown progressively more onerous for ordinary Austrians. Sons and husbands had perished in their thousands on the Russian front. Many brave Austrian individuals, such as Franz Jägerstätter, or Roman Catholic priests and nuns, such as Father Otto Neururer, Anton Granig and Sister Restituta, or Communist activists, had been executed for opposing the regime.¹⁴ One reason why Hitler did not encounter fiercer resistance from the working-class and trade union movement in Austria was the fact, it has been argued, that this particular constituency had already been subject to the 'discipline' of the Dollfuß–Schuschnigg regime.¹⁵ Many who might have opposed Hitler in 1938 had already fled Austria in 1934. There were, however, also uncomfortable signs that the Nazi years were not simply an alien structure imposed upon an unwilling Austria and therefore capable of neat and painless extraction. It cannot be said, for instance, that there was always a clear linguistic or rhetorical distinction before and after 1938. An academic study of the language of anti-Semitism revealed that there was no discernible difference in the discourse and linguistic strategies of National Socialism and that of the conservative Austrian Christian Social Party.¹⁶

Post-war Austria may have been extracted from Nazi Germany and the new Austrian government might honestly denounce all that the Third Reich had stood for, but the Second Republic was, consciously or not, to be shaped significantly in two major

respects by the legacy of its absorption into the Reich. Firstly, the industrialization of Austria had been forced on apace by the Nazis, who had desperately needed Austrian resources as part of their preparations for war. (It followed too that the industrial skill levels of the Austrian population had also increased and would be available for post-war reconstruction.) The industrial infrastructure of the Second Republic had inherited those benefits, including major road and electrification projects as well as advances to Austria's steel industries around the Linz area. The second legacy of National Socialism to post-war Austria had been the fate of Austria's Jewish population. Large areas of post-war Austria were now truly 'judenrein', free of any Jewish presence, for of the 185,000 to 190,000 estimated Jews living in Austria before the war, principally in Vienna, perhaps between 125,000 and 130,000 had managed to flee, whilst 65,459 had perished at the hands of the National Socialists. Other social and religious groups had also been the subject of annihilation programmes: approximately half of Austria's 11,000 Sinti and Roma had been murdered.¹⁷ (It is an expression of the stasis that frequently characterizes Austria's memory of the suffering brought about by the Second World War that the number of those who perished at the hands of the National Socialists in Austria is matched by the 250,000 Austrians who fell fighting in the German Wehrmacht. Quoting the latter figure has helped certain elements in Austrian society to relativize the profundity of the losses to NS terror. This policy of balancing out suffering becomes a pronounced feature of Austrian polemics. Initially, Jörg Haider, the populist politician and sometime leader of the FPÖ party, had argued against compensation for NS victims. Subsequently he conceded the principle but linked it, as if it were part of a continuum, with the question of the losses and suffering of those ethnic Germans who had been expelled from countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia after World War II.¹⁸)

The loss of those killed by the Nazis could be regarded as some of the missing voices in the Second Republic, and undoubtedly the eradication of the Austrian Jewish intelligentsia from all walks of the country's academic, scientific and cultural life represented

an impoverishment of Austria's rhetorical resources, but at least their loss could be accounted for. Two other constituencies, whose presence and whose voice might have been expected to become a major feature in the creation of post-war Austria's new, or at least, restored identity, were also to fail to make their mark. Their absence, however, requires rather more effort to explain.

Missing Voices in Austria after 1945: Women and Emigrants

Statistically the voice of women should have been the dominant voice of the early Second Republic. When the first electoral lists were established after 1945 women constituted the clear majority of voters, forming more than two-thirds of the electorate.¹⁹ At the time of Austria's first and remarkably early post-war general election (25 November 1945) many men were either missing in action or still being held as prisoners-of-war – some for up to ten years in the Soviet Union. The political history of women in Austria showed generally, however, that the former Habsburg state had not been the most enlightened of states by West European standards. Women had clearly played a part in the revolutionary upheavals of 1848 and could be seen in contemporary drawings of street protests. Reforms after 1848 allowed suffrage based on property qualifications, and so a few privileged women acquired the franchise. Universal suffrage, however, only came in the wake of the collapse of the Empire and formed part of Renner's parliamentary programme announced on 12 November 1918. (This was still better than the situation in the United Kingdom where new laws in Britain gave votes to women in 1918 under certain strict conditions: they had to be over thirty, householders, married to a householder, or holders of a university degree.) Full equality was not granted to Austrian women until 1 July 1975 when the law governing their legal status in marriage was changed in favour of full recognition of their individual status and rights. The under-representation of women in Austria's far from energetic parliamentary system replicated the patriarchal nature of

what was a predominantly Catholic society. The weak and generally belated nature of Austria's parliamentary system is seen in the fact that whereas, for instance, a country such as Belgium in 1833 and Britain in 1834 made government answerable to Parliament (to be followed in quick succession by France, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian states), Austria did not achieve this status until after the collapse of 1918. Moreover, it was not until 1873 that Austria elected by means of a direct vote. Germany, whose own parliamentary traditions were equally underdeveloped, had at least introduced male suffrage in 1871, a reform that did not reach Austria until 1907. The constitutional historian Karl Loewenstein rightly described Austria as a semi-parliamentary state ('Halbparlamentarismus').²⁰ In the First Republic's moment of crisis, in 1933, its parliamentary system failed completely, heralding the way for Dollfuss's introduction of what was essentially government by decree and to the exclusion of democratic party politics in parliamentary participation.

The relative conservatism of a male-dominated Parliament in Vienna would be reflected in Austria's social legislation. Whereas abortion legislation, for instance, was introduced in England and Wales by Parliament in 1967, it would be almost another decade before this happened in Austria with amendments to the penal code on 1 January 1975.²¹ Austria had to wait until 1966 to see its first woman appointed to a ministerial portfolio when Grete Rehor (1910–87) became minister for social administration. By contrast, the United Kingdom's first woman to reach ministerial rank was Margaret Bondfield, appointed minister of labour under Ramsay MacDonald in 1929.

Education would represent one of the keys to political confidence and participation for women, but the Austrian state had been slow to meet women's desire for formal qualifications. The University of Vienna had only opened its doors to women who wanted to study medicine in 1900. Women had to wait until 1919 if they wished to study law in Vienna. Should they wish to pursue Protestant theology they would have to wait until 1928, whilst the Faculty of Catholic Theology in Vienna was only available to women from 1945. Austria's first woman to qualify as

a university teacher was Elise Richter, who also became Austria's first woman professor in 1922. She and her sister Helene, a fellow academic, are thought to have perished in the Theresienstadt concentration camp sometime in the early 1940s. The late nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw many remarkable Austrian women: Bertha Freifrau von Suttner received the Nobel Prize in 1905 for her Peace Movement; Gabriele Possanner von Ehrenthal was the first woman to receive a doctorate at the University of Vienna in 1897; Eugenie Schwarzwald promoted the education of girls and pioneered the understanding of the educational needs of children growing up in large industrial centres, and Lise Meitner undertook ground-breaking research in the field of nuclear physics for which she would receive only belated recognition. In literature and the arts women in the inter-war period were beginning to make their reputations, although they would often be subjected to cruel caricature. Could there be anything more indicative, if only at an aspirational level, of a growing confidence and spirit of independence in the new Austrian woman than the lines sung by one of Vienna's favourite daughters, Fritzi Massary, in the operetta composed by her fellow Viennese citizen Oscar Straus, *Ich bin eine Frau, die weiß, was sie will*, which played to full houses in Berlin in late 1932 and right up to the moment Hitler came to power?²²

Mein Herr, Sie wollen ein Interview,
Also bitte notieren Sie, hören Sie zu,
Das melden Sie Ihrem Leserkreis,
Ich sag Ihnen alles, was ich von mir weiß:

Ich bin eine Frau, die weiß, was sie will ...
Ich liebe das Geld, die Schönheit, die Kraft,
Ich liebe das Geld, weil es Freiheit mir schafft
Verlang von der Welt, von mir selbst sehr viel.

(You asked for an interview Well, Sir, pay attention and note this down. I'll tell you all I know about myself and then you can tell your readers. I'm a woman who knows just what she wants, I adore money

and power and beautiful things, I love money because it gives me my freedom and I ask of the world, and of myself, a great deal.)

But Austria in the first half of the twentieth century was not an operetta, and its daily reality remained unremittingly harsh for the majority of women. The huge military losses in the First World War meant that countless thousands of women often had to raise families alone and in poverty. And in an age when independent careers were reserved for only a few women the prospect of no husband brought with it real economic hardship to large numbers of unmarried women, for whom there was a generation of missing men. Many women struggled to keep their children fed and healthy. Movingly, it was despite the absence of language that this was brought home when the Staatliche Filmhauptstelle caught on silent film in 1919 scenes from a children's tuberculosis hospital in Vienna and also a children's food kitchen set up in the grounds of the former imperial residence at Schönbrunn.²³

Although few women made it to the most senior posts of the political parties or held high government office they were certainly present at grass-roots level. The pictures of various parades, especially of the Socialist and Communist movements in the early 1920s, often reveal women in the ranks of the marchers. What would be the abiding political memory for most women in the Second Republic on which they could draw? In the year 2000 Anna Mitgutsch, one of Austria's leading post-war writers, published her seventh novel, *Haus der Kindheit*. Its subject matter would tackle a topic the early Second Republic had ignored but which refused to go away: the restitution of confiscated property and the state's obligations to those Austrians who had suffered during the Third Reich. In the novel the central figure Max, a very successful American architect, returns in his retirement to Austria, the land of his infancy and from which his Jewish parents had managed to flee to the United States just in time. Max's intention is to try and retrieve the house of his childhood, a property which his parents had had to abandon. The fate of much property after 1938 had been either its compulsory aryanization without compensation or

else its sale at ridiculously uncommercial rates as a precondition for issuing the right documentation allowing Jews to leave the country. The Austria to which Max returns is now extremely comfortable, but also extremely reluctant to make restitution. At one point in the novel Max is on a train journey; the reader is told the year is 1974. As Max's train crosses the Swiss frontier into Austria two ladies enter his compartment. Mitgutsch describes them as 'alterslos'; they could belong to any generation. Max cannot help but overhear their conversation. Initially it is about everyday matters: their health, their children and their grandchildren. Then their conversation becomes a reminiscence as they look out of the window into the Austrian countryside. They recall their youth and in terms of affection ('mit einem sehnsüchtigen Klang in der Stimme') they talk of earlier, exhilarating times when they would be out walking in this landscape. They remember the hikes into the mountains, the camp fires, the songs, and also the boys as if it were all only yesterday. There is talk of a 'Mädelführerin' and a date of 1938.²⁴ Max and the reader need little prompting. These two unexceptional ladies had obviously been members of a Nazi youth organization for girls, and now three and a half decades later the recollection is still a source of fond memory. Many adult women in the Second Republic would have shared similar backgrounds and experiences to these two nameless figures. Sissy Waldheim, the wife of President Kurt Waldheim, for example, had been a member of the NSDAP.²⁵ Jörg Haider's mother, Dorothea Rupp, had been a section leader in the girls' equivalent of the Hitler Youth, the Bund Deutscher Mädel.²⁶

Mitgutsch's novel had raised the difficult issue of restitution. The Second Republic had not been slow to pass legislation after 1945 where it felt that it was in its own interest to lay claim to art and other cultural artefacts or buildings, for it was well understood that such property or objects could be as potent an embodiment and symbol of national identity as much as, say, any literary work. Three restitution laws ('Rückstellungsgesetze') were passed in quick succession in 1946 and 1947 as the Second Republic became anxious to take back into Austria's possession valuable items,

such as works of art that had been appropriated by the National Socialists and in some cases moved to other parts of the Reich.²⁷ By contrast, the Second Republic was in less of a hurry to restore art works which it had inherited from the Anschluss years, often belonging to Jews who had emigrated or had perished, to their individual owners or to their legal successors.²⁸ Even after more than half a century following the ending of the Second World War the concluding report of the Historikerkommission published in 2003 was still having to express an opinion on what was an issue which had yet to be completely resolved.²⁹

The Rhetorics of Forgetfulness after 1945

The recollection in the Second Republic of how Austrians had behaved in the Second World War followed a familiar pattern and acquired an almost characteristic rhetoric to justify what had happened. Similar to Mitgutsch's fictional incident in the train compartment is an exchange from a novel written a quarter of a century earlier but still remaining perhaps the most convincing engagement of the post-war generation with the story of their parents' generation, Peter Henisch's 1975 strongly autobiographical novel *Die kleine Figur meines Vaters*. In this work the author asks his terminally ill father to tell him about his (the father's) childhood, and the father explains how as a lad he had wanted to join the Boy Scouts but his authoritarian stepfather from the Sudetenland had obliged him to join the much more nationalistic German Gymnasts' Association (Deutscher Turnerbund). Looking back, the father believes it did not really matter what he had joined, for in his eyes they both served the same purpose, simply his need for friendship and the opportunity to put on a uniform and so lose his own identity during a stressful childhood.³⁰ Both the father here and the two ladies in Max's railway compartment had succeeded in uncoupling personal memory and behaviour from the political significance of their actions. Their recollections are wholly apolitical. There is no reflection upon the causes they

might all have been serving. This act of disengagement required both separation of the personal from the communal and also a large degree of forgetting. To this extent it also mirrored the behaviour and language of the Second Republic. Not until the long chancellorship (1986–97) of the Socialist Dr Franz Vranitzky did the Austrian state have the confidence to look back on the country's history in its entirety as he did in a speech before the Austrian Parliament (Nationalrat) delivered on 8 July 1991 and mentioned in Chapter 1 of this study:

Wir bekennen uns zu allen Daten unserer Geschichte und zu den Taten aller Teile unseres Volkes, zu den guten wie zu den bösen; und so wie wir die guten für uns in Anspruch nehmen, haben wir uns für die bösen zu entschuldigen – bei den Überlebenden und bei den Nachkommen der Toten ...³¹

(We acknowledge and accept all the dates of our history and the deeds of all sections of our nation, both the good deeds and the evil ones, and just as we claim as our own the good ones so we must apologize for the bad ones – apologize to the survivors and to the descendants of those who perished.)

Vranitzky's response, then and subsequently, was heralded as breaking new ground in Austria's dealing with its identity and its legacy. For instance, the Austrian scholar Irene Etzersdorfer believed the chancellor had taken on a number of well-entrenched taboos:

Franz Vranitzky will go down in history as the government leader who demolished the state-official 'victim thesis', which claimed that the injustices were made by a foreign criminal regime. At the same time, he himself was the first Austrian chancellor free from the phenomenon of 'second guilt' – the aggressive denial and tabooing of the events between 1938 and 1945.³²

Not all, however, were convinced by this apparent fresh approach to the country's history. The social and cultural commentator Robert

Menasse was more scathing, seeing the Chancellor's so-called admission in a very different light. Writing in his caustic dissection of modern Austria, *Das Land ohne Eigenschaften* ('A Land without Character', a title clearly playing with that of Robert Musil's great but unfinished novel *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*), Menasse read the Chancellor's words very differently and against the background of President Waldheim's much-debated wartime military service in the Balkans:

Nun war aber Vranitzkys Erklärung leider keine grundsätzliche Erklärung zu Österreichs Geschichte und Verfaßtheit, sondern gewissermaßen nur eine Fußnote über die Situation in Jugoslawien. Und die 'österreichische Mitschuld an den Nazi-Verbrechen' wurde in einer Weise zugegeben, die sie gleichzeitig einmal mehr dementierte: Es habe eine Mitschuld gegeben – aber nur von seiten einzelner Österreicher, jedoch nicht von seiten Österreichs. Mit anderen Worten, es bleibt dabei: Österreich war ein Opfer.³³

(Sadly Vranitzky's declaration was no fundamental expression regarding Austria's history and its composition, but rather it constituted to some degree no more than a footnote to the Yugoslav issue. And Austrian 'complicity in crimes committed by the Nazis' was conceded in a way which at the same time was a further denial. Yes, there had been complicity – but only on the part of individual Austrians and not on the part of Austria. In other words there was to be no change and Austria remained a victim.)

The reason why it had taken so long for Austria even to begin to approach its own history had its origins in its numerous uncertainties, not simply in understanding the part its citizens had played within the machinery of the Third Reich, but in trying to establish what sort of state Austria represented. If the voice of women had not brought new perspectives to Austrian identity of the Second Republic a second constituency might have, but it too was essentially smothered before it had had a chance to make itself heard.

In the immediate history of post-war Germany one of the most urgent questions revolved around when Thomas Mann

might return from his American exile. A Nobel Prize winner for literature and the perceived conscience of that other, better, Germany, Thomas Mann was by far the best-known German to have left Germany during the Nazi years. There had many been others, ranging from Marlene Dietrich to Bertolt Brecht, but Mann was regarded as the very epitome of German civilization, and Germany itself, a country now occupied like Austria by four powers, wished to show the world that better face. It was therefore a matter of vital importance to Germans after 1945 if and when Mann would return to the land of his birth and the land of his language. Many pleas went out to Mann at his home in California, for it was believed that his return to German soil would signify a sort of approval, an act of blessing on and identification with the new Germany. In the end the cautious Mann was in no hurry to return to Europe and when he did he opted for a life in Switzerland.

What is a noticeable and contrasting feature of Austrian life after the Second World War was how little enthusiasm was shown within Austria for those who had gone into exile around the world, many to Great Britain and the United States, others to the Soviet Union, Turkey, Mexico or even New Zealand. (Many Austrians had been forced into two exiles. Having gone to France, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands or Scandinavia, they had to flee a second time when those lands were invaded by the Germans.) No call would go out from Vienna after 1945 to the Austrian diaspora. Whatever experiences or skills those in exile had acquired, it appeared not to be something those who had remained behind particularly wanted or felt they needed.

The position of Austrians in exile was weakened by the fact that there had been no Austrian government in exile — in distinction to many other European nations. Those Austrians in exile therefore possessed relatively little political leverage. The Allies themselves were also in a quandary. By definition many Austrians who had fled to London or New York would have been on the political left. Did Washington or London really want to install Communists or Marxists in power in Vienna, when the alternative was compliant locals — and often former Nazis — who had in most

instances at least impeccable non-Marxist credentials? Not all émigrés wished to return, for some had changed their nationality by the time the war had ended, whilst many Austrian Jews had understandable reservations about returning to post-war Austria. Their potential contribution, intellectually and linguistically, would be lost to Austrian society permanently. Those who had remained in Austria did not defer before any notion of the noble self-sacrifice of those who had given up their homeland rather than compromise themselves politically; instead they often made émigrés feel awkward, giving them the impression that those who had remained behind had endured far worse suffering. It was even suggested that exile distorted people's mind and that returnees could not be considered as genuine Austrians, wholly reliable or rounded in character, and that their command of the language had in some way been warped by having left their native culture.³⁴ Germany showed more interest in her émigrés than Austria, and it also took the concept of re-education of those who had remained behind, a key Allied policy in occupied Germany, far more seriously than was discernible in occupied Austria, for Austria was more concerned with its old, its pre-Nazi, identity.

If post-war Austria was reluctant to hear new voices, be they those of women or émigrés, it seemed very content to hear familiar voices, for in three key areas there would be remarkably little change: in university education, in journalism and in the civil service, all three spheres in which language is paramount, there would be no drastic revision of personnel, no root-and-branch clear-out of the old to make way for the new. Instead, those working with language displayed a striking continuity, and the early years of the Second Republic would come to be framed linguistically by those who had in essence stayed on and worked in Austria through both the period of the corporate state and the Anschluss. (An example of what the state regarded as continuity is illustrated by the fact that those Austrians who had served in the SS had that time calculated into their post-war Austrian pensions. By contrast, those Austrian who had gone into exile had to wait until 1967 before the state of Austria would recognize those 'lost'

years, by which time many had already died.³⁵) The continuity of personnel in Austria's civil service is far more than a cursory observation. For much of its history and noticeably since the age of Josephinism and in the period associated with Austria's most renowned if unenthusiastic civil servant, the great dramatist Franz Grillparzer, the state bureaucracy has been acknowledged as perhaps the principal bearer ideologically and culturally of Austrian society.³⁶

A Second Attempt at Finding Nationhood

The deeply unreflective character of the early years of the Second Republic, often bordering on the completely apolitical, was a method for avoiding confrontation in a state that was still attempting to heal itself. Most adult Austrians in 1945 could not forget the instability of the First Republic and of experiencing life under sixteen chancellors between 1919 and 1938. The fact that post-1945 Austria had begun to rid itself of its German fixation did not mean that it had automatically found its Austrian identity. Responses to various public opinion surveys reveal just how long a sense of Austrian identity was taking to emerge. By 1964 those answering 'yes' to the statement 'Die Österreicher sind eine Nation' (Austrians are a nation) amounted to only 47 per cent. This figure grew progressively but not spectacularly or without setbacks over the next quarter of a century: in 1970 it stood at 66 per cent, in 1972 at 62, in 1980 at 67, in 1987 at 75, in 1989 at 78 and in 1990 at 74 per cent.³⁷ Gradually Austrians had ceased to think in standard linguistic and ethnic terms, and by no longer thinking in predominantly these classifications the country had started to wean itself of its German dependency.

In what has become known as 'identity process theory' four identity principles have been generally recognized: firstly, the self-esteem principle, secondly, the continuity principle, thirdly, the distinctiveness principle, and, fourthly, the efficacy principle.³⁸ Applied to the First Republic that emerged out of the chaos of

1918, it is not hard to understand how the Republic would have failed on all four accounts. By contrast the Second Republic would in time meet all four criteria, but not immediately, which helps illuminate the often seemingly prevaricating attitude the Republic would take. In the very first moments of the Second Republic conditions prevailed that were very similar to those of the First Republic. There was initially a Socialist head of administration (in both cases Renner), followed shortly by a succession of conservative political leaders. In both cases external powers made the major decisions. The great difference was that whereas 1918 represented the start of the disintegration of territorial control, the situation after 1945 was the very reverse: Austria's territorial integrity and sovereignty were restored. Furthermore, some of the Allies started to invest hugely and generously in the country, in marked contrast to 1918. Whilst the Soviet Union extracted for its own use almost 2.5 billion American dollars from the Austrian economy between 1945 and 1955, the Americans by contrast put in almost a billion dollars of support. Austria was thus the recipient of the second highest amount of aid under the terms of America's European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan). This amounted to \$132 for each Austrian; the figure for West Germany was \$19 per capita.³⁹ Austrian identity would lean firmly towards a market economy model favoured by the United States even if the state itself would often become heavily involved directly through state-owned monopolies in certain key sectors. Documents now available to historians show with what seriousness the economic situation in Austria was being taken and how clearly the occupiers understood how political stability in the new Austria, and thus the success of its identity, would depend to a great extent on economic stability. There is also evidence that amongst the Allies there were experts who could view Austria's situation very much over a longer historical context. As early as 27 June 1945 a memorandum (Public Records Office: Foreign Office 1020/1305) offering an economic survey of the country was presented to the British Foreign Office and it showed an acute awareness of what had been the situation prevailing after the First World War:

As in 1919, Austria's immediate outlook is clouded by the post-war economic chaos which prevails throughout most of the continent. Dislocation of transport, and of the whole mechanism of international trade, political unrest and shortages of material essential to a resumption of normal economic activity, will make it difficult to bring about speedy reorientation of the European, and with it, the Austrian economy. The United Nations have long been aware of these post-war difficulties and have created machinery to deal with them. The problem, however, is whether they have the resources adequately to carry out their intentions, particularly with the war in the Far East still to finish. Considerably, if belatedly, helped by foreign loans, Austria managed within twenty years of the last war to achieve the beginnings of a workable economy. Only German imperialism prevented a realisation of what those beginnings portended. Austria is now to be given a second chance, under the auspices and conditions which in some respects at least are more favourable than in the past.⁴⁰

Almost sixty years on from this memorandum it was clear that the success of the Austrian economy would contribute massively to securing the stability of an Austrian identity without, however, making the slightest difference to what would remain the basic and unchanging fact of life for that economy: Austria's near-total dependence on the German market and economy. In 2004 Germany represented the most significant market for both Austrian imports and exports, far outstripping any other country. For that year Austria sold 31.9 per cent of all its exports to Germany (in second place was Italy at 8.8 per cent), whilst the proportion of its imports from Germany represented 40.8 per cent of all its imports, followed again by Italy at 7 per cent.⁴¹ With its large northern and southern neighbours claiming almost half of Austria's foreign trading activity it came as no surprise when Austria overcame many of its reservations in order to join the European Union in 1995, a matter to which we will have to return when we consider Austrian identity half a century after having been given that 'second chance'. Yet as early as the first decade after 1945 there was already a significant strain in Austrian polemical discussion that was wary of imbuing

rapid economic progress with greater spiritual values. Writing in 1955 for the strongly Catholic-orientated Munich journal *Neues Abendland. Zeitschrift für Politik, Kultur, Geschichte*, the Viennese historian Friedrich Heer offered his own note of caution, but also pride:

Österreich hat seine wirtschaftliche Produktion der Vorkriegszeit gegenüber um 273 Prozent gesteigert, das ist ein höherer Prozentsatz als in den meisten Ländern Europas. Der Österreicher erliegt aber nicht dem Irrtum, Produktion zu identifizieren mit Produktivität, mit der Schaffung menschlicher Lebensräume und Spielmöglichkeiten, mit Politik oder gar mit Schöpferkraft.⁴²

(Austria has increased its economic output by 273 per cent over pre-war levels, a greater rise than in the majority of European countries. But no Austrian succumbs to the error of identifying production with productivity, with the creation of those spheres for living worthy of human life, with opportunities for leisure, with politics or even with the forces of creativity.)

The Second Republic had one particularly serious challenge to meet: what from the country's past could be called upon to help underwrite an Austrian identity? For the Republic to turn to the years of the Empire was almost an admission of failure for its post-Habsburg identity. So it had to pick out of the repository of theatrical props from the defunct Empire those symbols that could help to encourage a sense of identity amongst its disorientated citizens. The Second Republic could call upon little from the First Republic that would create a sense of either unity or optimism. At a symbolic level it retained the flag of the First Republic but opted for a new national anthem. It is for this reason the Second Republic behaved in many respects apolitically: it was simply having to play for time. It is interesting that the public opinion surveys show an increase in confidence in an Austrian identity from the late 1960s onwards. The passage of time had allowed the country to start to meet those four identity principals. A quarter of a century after the end of the Second World War Austria had become a

prosperous society and Austrians were becoming aware of that prosperity as they began to travel abroad. Also, and importantly, the first generation of Austrians born and raised wholly within the lifetime of the Second Republic were coming of age. They had known no other form of society. (By contrast all adult citizens of the First Republic had predated the creation of that state.) With prosperity and the passage of time came both self-esteem and a sense of continuity. A flourishing welfare and education system, with ever more Austrians enjoying further and higher education, fulfilled a sense of efficiency.

Austrian Identity in the New Post-war World Order after 1945

The distinctiveness of Austria was emphasized by its status as a neutral and non-aligned state, belonging neither to Nato nor to the Warsaw Pact, and forming one of the few European states without foreign bases on its territory. The appeal of Germany was also diminishing. Most obviously Germany itself was a divided country, a fate that Austria had managed to avoid. Communist East Germany held little attraction to most Austrians whose own Communist Party polled so few votes that even under a proportional representational system its lack of support was unmistakable. In the 1949 election it only secured five parliamentary seats, in 1954 it gained four and in 1956 it managed to secure only three seats. From the 1959 elections onwards it failed to meet the minimum qualification to secure even a single mandate and would no longer be represented in the Austrian Nationalrat.⁴³ Only the presence of the Red Army in Austria until 1955 and the signing of the State Treaty caused Austrian politicians of all parties to treat the Austrian Communist Party with a degree of circumspection. The Hungarian uprising of 1956 did irreparable damage to the standing of the party amongst the general population, and it also brought about the resignation of many from the party, as it did throughout other West European Communist parties. The

Austrian Communist Party failed to hold on to its most gifted and articulate members, Ernst Fischer and Viktor Matejka. Both men, who embodied a link to the pre-war party, gave vital intellectual and cultural expression to the need for an Austrian identity for working people immediately after 1945. They would both end their days outside the party; Fischer in particular was disillusioned by the events surrounding the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968.

Germany, East and West, however, was generally regarded in Austria as a place of tension, as the Berlin crisis would make abundantly clear in 1961. Unlike the First Republic, the Second Republic was able to feed and find employment for its citizens and had evolved political structures such as ‘Proporz’ which guaranteed remarkable political and economic stability at the willingly paid price of a less than robust parliamentary democracy, for governments in the early years of the Republic took the form of grand coalitions between the SPÖ and ÖVP. (Austria had to wait until 1966 for its first non-coalition government, when Josef Klaus was able to lead his ÖVP party to a stunning electoral success and an absolute majority. Nevertheless, coalition governments have remained very much the basic model for Austrian politics.)

Expressing Austrian Identity after 1945

If political life in the early years of the Second Republic was marked by a reluctance to speak in open political terms for fear of exposing the societal rifts of the 1920s and 1930s, then the task of stimulating national identity could be subcontracted to other domains, those which were felt to be safer territory and which circumvented more contentious topics. Austrian culture and the arts were to be instrumentalized by successive governments and by the individual political parties in the creation of that identity and in creating the impression that a continuity of culture defined Austria and held all Austrians uniquely together over the generations.

Post-war Austria would become a country in an almost permanent state of celebration of its cultural identity, or more

precisely of those elements it could claim to constitute the expression of that identity. Music in particular would serve that purpose ideally and in practically every year an anniversary relating to the birth or death of composers ranging from Mozart to Haydn, from Schubert to one or other member of the Strauß family, would offer itself as the occasion for festivals or commemorations or postage stamps. Music was especially useful in this respect for it dispensed with language, it was effortlessly exportable and, superficially at least, it seemed apolitical and therefore inoffensive. The annual New Year concert from Vienna would become the supreme and ritualized expression of this pleasant face of Austria. Seen by countless millions around the globe, and barely changing in its format of a synthesis of music, ballet, architecture, and stunning floral displays, presented to a well-dressed international audience in Vienna's Musikverein, it would be offered as a timeless expression of an Austria at the very centre of the classical European tradition. That this concert tradition itself was begun in the very first new year of the Nazi Anschluss would be mentioned rarely or that the popular 'Radetsky March' celebrated a general who had done his part to suppress the struggle for freedom throughout the monarchy. Joining music as a medium of expressing Austrian identity without recourse to language or explicit ideology would be the regular broadcasting of winter sports events from Austria, which, as in the case of the New Year concert, the Austrian Broadcasting Service, would make generously available to other television services around the world. Naturally such events were and are far from apolitical since they served at the very least the commercial interests of Austria's considerable tourist industry and its manufacturers of ski equipment.

Nonetheless, the written word would still remain paramount in the task of fashioning and championing an Austrian identity. What would Austrians be encouraged to read after 1945? And which set texts and prescribed literature would the Austrian Education Ministry allow the next generation of Austrians to read in the country's schools and in an educational system in which textbooks had to bear the imprint of ministerial approval? It became quickly

apparent which direction the 'new' Austria would take and also just how much patronage and influence the state had in directing the reading tastes of the population. As in Germany, immediately after 1945 there was an enormous thirst for reading matter, partly to be explained by the lifting of Nazi censorship and partly by the lack of competing material goods. Yet the highly and overtly political poet Erich Fried (1921–88), who had already emigrated from Vienna to London by 1938, could see by the 1970s what different paths the literatures of West Germany and Austria had taken since 1945. He detected that West German literature was more open to external influences, in particular to impulses from America, than Austrian literature had been willing to be. He argued that Austrian literature had succumbed to an error, to the illusion that after the war it was at liberty simply to return to its own traditions, and to this extent it would be far more inward-looking and parochial than West German literature.⁴⁴ (It is an indication of the assessment Fried made of his former homeland's political development that he addressed most of his adult work to a West German rather than an Austrian readership.)

The language of Austria's post-war identity would be most decidedly anything but new. In his detailed study of the relationship between pre- and post-war literature in Austria, *Zäsuren ohne Folgen. Das lange Leben der literarischen Antimoderne Österreichs seit den 30er Jahren*, the literary historian Karl Müller was able to demonstrate the degree to which those writers associated with and approved by both the corporate state of Dollfuss and the National Socialists were able to resume their careers in post-war Austria with little difficulty, leaving the impression, as the title of his book suggests, that there had been no real interruption to either their careers or their literary style, a literary style which was pronouncedly non-experimental.

The fault line in Austrian literature could be traced back at least to May 1933 and a bitter split amongst Austrian writers attending a meeting of the International PEN movement in Ragusa. Some of the Austrian authors present had attempted to bring a motion condemning the book burning which had taken place recently in Germany following Hitler's accession to power.

The state-approved German writers at Ragusa naturally walked out in protest, and they were joined by a number of their Austrian colleagues in an act of solidarity. Support of National Socialism by prominent Austrian writers became explicit in 1938 when they contributed to a book entitled *Bekennnisbuch österreichischer Dichter*, a text approving Hitler's annexation of their country.

In post-war Austria leading literary figures from before the war, such as Rudolf Henz, virtually the court poet to the corporate state, enjoyed considerable prominence and influence. Karl Müller was able to establish the NSDAP party membership numbers of literally dozens of established Austrian writers who continued to flourish and publish in Austria after the war, such as Max Mell and Gertrud Fussenegger, or even where their membership of the party could not be established definitely, had published in unmistakably pro-Nazi publications.⁴⁵ Klaus Amann noted how much these writers were heeded and supported by the reconstituted Austrian government after 1945 by the granting of the numerous literary prizes and awards, which were a marked feature of Austrian literary life and often secured the professional existence of writers.⁴⁶ By contrast, avant-garde and experimental writing went generally unsupported. Its very abstractness and its many textual demands offered the Austrian state little it could exploit in support of its view of Austrian identity; and such work raised issues which the state saw no advantage in encouraging with financial support. Confirming the government's view of literature was the academic interpretation of Austrian literature; in post-war German literature courses offered by Austrian universities many prominent scholars from the National Socialist era continued to teach or publish after 1945. Prolific literary historians such as Heinz Kindermann or Josef Nadler, who had identified strongly with National Socialism, helped in turn to influence the tastes and attitudes of the next generation of schoolteachers of German literature or academic literary scholars. This situation was not unique to Austria. Generations of West German students of German literature were raised, for instance, on the studies and anthologies of Benno von Wiese, a long-time and assiduous

professor of German language and literature at Bonn University who had been an early and energetic member of the NSDAP, and its various cultural bodies, before the war, and who was cleared after the war to continue his academic career. Recognition of difficult, or simply uncomfortable, writers often came initially from outside Austria. Thus Austria's leading female literary figures after the war, Ilse Aichinger and Ingeborg Bachmann, came into general prominence by their award of the West German Gruppe 47 prize in 1952 and 1953 respectively.

If the conservative, *Heimat*-orientated style met state approval, and was often prescribed for school reading in Austria, it did not follow that experimental writing constituted the critical and analytical voice of Austrian literature, for experimental writing in Austria emerging in the 1950s took a markedly linguistic turn. It became obsessed with the sounds of language; it was a literature in which language was often allowed to play with itself. The specific, the solid and recognizably historical point of reference, the narrative reconstruction of recent history, was often left to one side, and so neither conservative nor experimental writing took the complexities of Austrian identity head on, and to this extent literature mirrored the general behaviour of Austrian institutions and Austrian society. Klaus Amann drew attention to a diary entry of the Austrian writer and philosopher Günther Anders, one of the relatively few émigrés to return. A passage for October 1950 noted how people in Vienna avoided discussion of those 'critical years' with one another for fear of what might emerge. People were engaged, according to Anders, in a game of pretence and he conceded that this arrangement might be unavoidable in order for life to go on. Yet his entry suggested that an opportunity for unvarnished self-scrutiny had been missed at the very start of life in this new Austria and it would not offer itself again.⁴⁷ Many in Austria did not share his concern, and felt immediately after 1945 that there were far more pressing tasks facing the country as it passed through uncharted territory, but the opportunity, surprisingly, would present itself again, although it would certainly not be one actively sought by the Austrian state.

CHAPTER EIGHT

VOICING AUSTRIA IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC

Identity and Space

The Dutch scholar Frits van Oostrom, in his 2009 survey of literature in the Middle Ages, recalled the passionate debate that once raged regarding the great medieval poet Hendrik van Veldeke. Did he belong to Dutch or to German literary history, for both traditions claimed him as their own? Van Oostrom observed that

there is ample reason for such controversy to have arisen, since literary history is rooted, as a genre, in nineteenth-century ideas of nationhood. In every self-respecting European country, authoritative scholars set about writing literary histories to show how, over the centuries, literature had been instrumental in shaping the nation and in demonstrating and displaying the nation's identity.¹

This is a serious reminder that nothing had changed in the substance of van Veldeke's work, but that the issue at stake was essentially one of perception and ownership. From the perspective of the twenty-first century we might dismiss such controversies from earlier times, convinced of our own freedom from such apparent narrow-mindedness. In intellectual matters we may feel we have become far more generous and now sense little danger in a liberal element of pan-Europeanism that is unfettered by awareness of national boundaries. And certainly in the realm of the abstract and the artistic such liberality comes at a relatively moderate price. By contrast, whilst the idea of statehood or nationhood may

well be constructs subject to changes and revisions in perception, they are also attached very firmly to the undeniably tangible and finite realm of territory, where generosity to concede comes as a far greater sacrifice. All self-respecting European entities, be they states or nations, are indissolubly linked to the idea of territory and place, and for this reason the intellectual open-mindedness we may welcome in cultural matters may not be so achievable or practical when it comes to national identities.

This tenacious need to reduce matters to clear national ownership was strikingly, if not bizarrely, highlighted in September 1991 when a body, mummified in ice, was discovered in the Ötztaler Alps in the South Tyrol region striding the present-day Austro-Italian frontier. The corpse, which rapidly acquired the sobriquet 'Ötzi', was removed to the University of Innsbruck for scientific analysis, whose findings suggested that 'the man in the ice' had perished over 5,000 years ago whilst on an ill-equipped journey in the mountains.² What was also established was that the corpse had been found just on the Italian side of the present-day border, a frontier which had been redrawn when the South Tyrol had been ceded to Italy in 1919. There erupted a fierce argument as to whether 'Ötzi' was an Austrian or an Italian. Ultimately he was returned to Italy but was housed in a museum located in a German-speaking district.

These two examples, ostensibly trivial and inconsequential in themselves, show the degree to which the instinct to relate all phenomena to ideas of national ownership is entrenched and how it can be rarely discounted in any discussion of national discourses. Austria in particular, restored to its uncertain and unstable legacy after 1945, felt initially it could ill afford to be nuanced or generous in conceding any part of its identity, for that identity had still to be secured. The immediate implication was to be a very brittle relationship to its self-perception as a German-speaking land that had been such a major element over the centuries in the formation of German culture.

By the time the Second Republic had entered the twenty-first century, however, both its self-perception and that of it held by the outside world would reveal in many respects a remarkable

change from that associated with the First Republic. In 2005 the Second Republic could celebrate six decades of existence and fifty years of independence. It had thus outlived the First Republic three times over. Not only was this diachronic perception so dramatically different but so too was the synchronic view. If the First Republic had been marked by a permanent state of instability then the Second Republic offered the very reverse prospect. It was contemporary Austria that now appeared as if it were a rock of stability amidst a sea of instability. Looking at its many international borders Austrians at the beginning of the twenty-first century could not help but see that they had lived through and withstood huge changes and rifts, sometimes sudden and often violent. The neighbouring Czechoslovakian state had fragmented into two separate republics; Yugoslavia had imploded amidst savage violence, leaving a new and untested state of Slovenia on Austria's border and a Croatia not far from it. And if Hungary had remained unchanged in its borders its relentless lurch to the extreme right in its internal politics and the rising tension with Slovakia and Romania, both home to Hungarian-speaking minorities, suggested problems ahead. Internal instability in Italy, and in particular the rise of regional movements with separatist tendencies, such as the Northern League, also pointed to potential future problems, even suggesting on the distant horizon that the South Tyrol question might not yet be completely off the agenda. Nor was there absolute harmony in what the outside world must have regarded as the most stable of frontiers: that which Austria shared on its western flank with Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

The Principality of Liechtenstein is represented diplomatically and externally by Switzerland, and here too tensions had not been absent in the face of a marked divergence of opinion between Liechtenstein and Switzerland over the merits of EU membership. Moreover, Liechtenstein's banking laws and its profitable role as a mailbox address for many international companies seeking a tax haven was causing extreme irritation, especially to the Finance Ministry in Berlin. And Germany itself had experienced a massive transformation in 1990 with its absorption of the former

German Democratic Republic. The old West Germany had had a population more or less the equivalent of that of the United Kingdom, France, or Italy. The addition of some seventeen million former East Germans to the Federal Republic of Germany changed that status and meant that Austria now had by far the largest state in Europe as its northern neighbour. The unification of Germany would have many ramifications for Austria: whilst the old East Germany was still in existence Austria had been able to step back from its historically fateful and fatal role of being viewed as the ‘other’ Germany. The two Germanies created in the late 1940s were based on opposing economic and political premises. Austria’s existence post-1945, by contrast, was founded on its concept as sovereign state and, as it would hope its citizens and the outside world would accept, also on being a separate nation. The existence of two Germanies had also allowed Austria to assume the mantle of a role it enjoyed projecting to the outside world, namely that of mediator between East and West. All at once, however, the traditional ‘East’ no longer existed following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Particularly challenging to Austria was the sight of so many of its eastern neighbours and former members of the Warsaw Pact scrambling to join Nato. The question of Nato membership was to some degree the other side of the coin to the pressing question of European Union membership, and both questions not only placed pressure on the relatively recent foundations of modern Austrian identity; they also threw up the geological fault lines in Austria’s party political make-up despite all the lip-service paid to the success of the Austrian consensus approach to post-war government.

Challenges to Identity after 1945

Austrian identity from 1945 to the twenty-first century went through a number of distinct phases, some of which could be explained by changes in the surrounding geopolitical situation and some resulting from internal changes. Some developments were obvious

but nonetheless profound. The story of the Second Republic was one in which at the start of its history none of its citizens had been born and raised in that state, but with the passage of time a point was reached at which the vast majority of Austrians would be exclusively children of the Second Republic unless – and here a new note enters the discourse of Austrian identity – they belonged to an ever-growing number of the population who had emigrated to Austria, often from lands which had no historical tradition of migration to Austria, and especially to Vienna. The growing presence of migrants from Turkey in particular provoked the invective and rhetoric from Austria's far right. Herbert Kickl, chief ideologue of the Austrian Freedom Party and a university-trained philosopher, encapsulated his party's programme and its members' mentality in a series of short and catchy slogans, and he is credited with leading his party's 2005 election campaign with such slogans as 'Daham statt Islam' and 'Abendland in Christenhand' to make the most electoral capital out of the fears sensed by many Austrians, especially in traditionally working-class and socialist-voting areas of Vienna, at the influx of people from a different and instantly discernible background.³

Post-war Austria: Scandals, Protests and Prejudices in Everyday Discourse

With the passing of each year the Second Republic grew to become increasingly the unquestioned norm, and that confidence was expressed symbolically by the fact that all political parties could be represented at the funeral of Otto (von) Habsburg, the son of the last emperor, in 2011. His funeral service at St Stephen's cathedral and the long ceremonial procession to the Kapuzinergruft for burial, a cortège in which units of the Austrian army also participated, may not have been an official state funeral but in all other respects it was, and it indicated that the Second Republic had at least come to terms with that element in its past. Such confidence could not have been taken for granted in the earlier years of the Second

Republic, but Austria's re-emergence as a sovereign state took a very particular course. The ten years of occupation and the further ten years of grand-coalition government brought a discipline that had been wholly missing in the First Republic. Noticeably both the main parties lost their more extreme edges. The Socialist Party in particular jettisoned its earlier pronounced Marxist tradition.⁴ In its own historiography Austria believed the internment of left-wing and right-wing anti-Nazis during the Anschluss years had forged a new sense of Austrian identity. Whether that was indeed the case is open to question, but at a pragmatic level neither party, ÖVP or SPÖ, was able to destroy the other electorally, and the realists in both parties were well aware they would have to establish a *modus vivendi* of some sort whilst also showing a united front towards the occupying forces, which they feared might remain in Austria for ever or else might divide the country as they had Germany.

The country had to come through a number of early challenges and strains. Communist-inspired strikes in the early 1950s had brought to a head the struggle between the Socialists and Communists for control of the Austrian trade union movement, out of which Franz Olah would emerge as the *éminence grise* of Austria's labour movement.⁵ Olah's career would end in scandal and imprisonment for embezzlement of union funds but not before he had fallen out with the SPÖ and ruined the Party's chance of electoral success in March 1966, an election from which the ÖVP emerged with its first absolute majority. With considerable self-satisfaction and anything but diplomatic language Olah would proclaim later of his impact on the SPÖ: 'Ich hab ihnen die Wahl versaut!⁶ (I screwed up the election for them!). Olah personified the importance of the party machinery, which became the means by which post-war Austria would be governed. This system, although assuring stability, often brought to prominent positions of authority rather colourless individuals, sometimes no more than shrewd party functionaries who had worked their way up through the party ranks but possessed little popular appeal or charisma. This would in part explain the subsequent meteoric rise in support for the populist politician Jörg Haider. His apparent freshness,

youth and vitality, combined with a smart media awareness which he exploited to the full with his quick and effective tongue, stood in stark contrast to the often drab figures that had emerged through the established apparatus of Austria's two largest political parties. In the initial phase of the life of the Second Republic the two parties were able to monopolize their control of the various players in the political landscape, a control, however that weakened as Austria's identity became more secure. As Kurt Richard Luther has noted in his study of the Austrian party system,

the post-war petrification of Austrian politics around the socialist and Catholic-conservative *Lager* (camps) was in large measure a consequence of their capacity for organisational penetration and hierarchical control of their subcultures. This in turn gave them duopolistic access to control over a system of material rewards which enabled them to maintain their dominant position.

But neither of the major parties in the Second Republic found a way of coping with the passing of that group mentality which brought about a political de-alignment and an 'increasing distance from the grassroots of their respective subcultures and their perceived excesses of the *Lager's* patronage practices'.⁷

There would be many other scandals in addition to the Olah affair, some based on political rivalries, others on financial irregularities or sheer graft. In August 1980 the then president of the Republic, Rudolf Kirchschläger, took the unprecedented step of saying Austria needed to drain dry its stagnant bogs. He was referring principally to the scandal threatening to overwhelm the country as a result of the huge sums of money spent in often shady business practices during the building of the country's largest hospital, the Wiener Allgemeines Krankenhaus.⁸ There would also be the so-called Noricum scandal, which would occupy Austria throughout the 1980s, shedding light on the otherwise murky world of Austria's armament industry and its export practices to various dictatorships around the world. These scandals, however, were not uniquely Austrian and caused little stir outside the country, for

most other countries, even in advanced western Europe, had no shortage of similar cases of their own. But it was two other scandals that gave some insight into the waning power of the political élite to impose policy or the national press to dictate opinion.

Although the growing student population in Austria in the late 1960s failed to emerge into a full-blown activist movement there nevertheless emerged in the early 1970s something akin to a fledgeling citizens' movement and early forerunner of a Green movement, where again Austria would lag well behind developments in West Germany. To most outside observers the prevailing image of the Austrian public over the course of the history of the Second Republic might be one of general docility and passivity. Not even the student riots of 1968, which swept through most of Europe and certainly changed the face of both French and West German politics, seemed to perturb Austria. As a character in a text by the Viennese author Peter Henisch says to himself of the violent student protests all over the continent, 'Was sich in Berlin getan hat, in Paris oder sonstwo, das haben die Wiener Studenten durchs Fenster betrachtet'⁹ (What took place in Berlin, or Paris or elsewhere, the students of Vienna watched from their windows).

Nevertheless the power of these civil movements, unaligned to the various party blocs, manifested itself in the débâcle concerning the proposed building of nuclear power stations in Zwentendorf and Hainburg. The Austrian state had planned to invest in nuclear power as an insurance measure following the shock of the Middle East oil boycotts of the early 1970s, and the first Socialist chancellor of post-war Austria, Bruno Kreisky, invested all his personal political prestige in the project and was no doubt convinced of the authority that his support would bring to the undertaking. Yet both he and supporters of the project had miscalculated the mood within Austria, and civil protest and defeat in a national referendum held in November 1978 led to the abandonment of the project. The cost of decommissioning the unused reactor at Zwentendorf has been put by some sources at €1 billion, and the decision permanently damaged Kreisky's status in the eyes of the Austrian electorate. If parts of the Austrian electorate were ahead of the political parties

in environmental matters the population could also behave in a more reactionary manner than even some of its own conservative press. This was manifested in one national scandal that threw up Austria's unresolved legacy of the 1930s and 1940s.

University academics have always enjoyed more status, deference and attention in the German-speaking world than in the United Kingdom. (It was in part this strong sense of hierarchy that had fuelled the unrest in West Germany's ossified universities in the late 1960s.) For the first two decades after 1945 universities in Austria were often staffed at a senior level by men (but rarely women) who had risen through the academic ranks in the years of Dollfuss's corporate state and then through the period of National Socialism. Many had indeed been party members. Professor Tara Borodajkewycz had been both a devout Catholic with links to Archbishop Innitzer and, from 1934, a member of the NSDAP at a time when it was still an illegal organization in Austria. He typified how those with a past could still rise to, or maintain, professional prominence in the Second Republic. His case also raised the question of how thorough denazification in Austria had really been.¹⁰ (With grim humour, and in the wake of the Waldheim affair, one Austrian writer commented that in Austria denazification had acquired a new meaning: the cleansing of National Socialists of any accusation of guilt.¹¹)

By 1955, thanks (it was said) to his excellent contacts within the ÖVP, Borodajkewycz secured himself a professorial appointment in Vienna.¹² In 1962 one of his students published an article in a small Socialist publication asking if neonazism still existed in Austria. In later publications he cited Borodajkewycz's biography and again asked rhetorical questions: should such people be placed before students as a model?¹³ Were they fit to teach the next generation of Austrians? Litigation soon followed, and in November 1963 the student was fined 4,000 schillings for publicly impugning Borodajkewycz's honour. There had been no shortage of material revealing Borodajkewycz's political leanings. He had once said that witnessing the crowning of Pius XII and hearing Hitler's speech at the Heldenplatz had been the two greatest experiences in his life.

Following the case tensions rose. Demonstrations in support of the student and counter-demonstrations by right-wing students led to clashes. At one of these, in March 1965, a former concentration camp inmate and member of the Austrian resistance, Ernst Kirchweyer, was hit by a right-wing demonstrator and died a few days later. The Second Republic now had its first political death and martyr in its twenty year history, and in a manner that reminded everyone of the street battles that had torn Austria apart in the 1920s and 1930s. Its resolution also took on a distinctly Austrian pattern. Borodajkewycz was ultimately retired off on full pension and the student, Heinz Fischer, would eventually become the eighth president of the Second Republic.

Public opinion at the time did not share the left-wing students' dismay that people such as Borodajkewycz could hold senior academic positions. The case also illustrated that, contrary to expectation, the popular press could also not always shape public opinion but rather was obliged to follow it or suffer. The mass-circulation paper *Der Kurier* was a creation from the time of the Allied occupation. Founded with American support and originally entitled the *Wiener Kurier*, its purpose was to promote a spirit of democracy and liberalism in a heavily nazified population. In 1954 the paper's ownership passed into the hands of Ludwig Polsterer who in turn appointed perhaps the country's best-known journalist, Hugo Portisch, as the paper's principal editor. The paper's stance on the Borodajkewycz affair and his reported flagrantly anti-Semitic remarks were not well received by the paper's readership, who were more dismayed by the sight of left-wing student demonstrations. The paper's moral position stood to lose it a huge section of its readership, as Polsterer later admitted.¹⁴

The distressing aspect of the Borodajkewycz scandal was not so much the background of the man, which, as in the Waldheim scandal, was by no means exceptional. The disturbing element was the unmistakable anti-Semitic rhetoric that imbued not only Borodajkewycz's own comments but those of his supporters, and these tones would resurface two decades later in the wake of the Waldheim affair, a reminder that a language familiar from before

1945 had still not been eradicated from Austrian discourse after the Second World War. Drawing on detailed academic research by Bernd Marin and Hilde Weiss, the sociologist and historian Karin Stögner could offer a sobering balance of the place of anti-Semitism in the life of the Second Republic:

...es lässt sich feststellen, dass der Zusammenbruch des Naziregimes sehr oft zu keiner nachhaltigen Veränderung in der Handlungsmotivation vieler ÖsterreicherInnen und zu keiner Abnahme des Antisemitismus geführt hatte.¹⁵

(It can be concluded that in many instances the collapse of the Nazi regime had resulted in no long-term change in behaviour amongst many Austrians and to no reduction in anti-Semitism.)

Heinz-Christian Strache, who replaced Haider as leader of the FPÖ in 2005 following a decline in the party's electoral success, was not afraid to draw on the image of the Jew in his public and private utterances, yet not always for the same rhetorical purposes. On one occasion he endorsed the right of a colleague to refer to the director of the Jewish Museum in Hohenems as an 'Exiljude', a designation which could hardly be intended to generate a sense of common citizenship between the director and the Austrian electorate.¹⁶ On another occasion Strache told his audience at a ball for a right-wing student fraternity that they were now the new Jews after having come under attack by left-wing demonstrators, and by using the term he had extended the victim theory to his own party.¹⁷

Electoral Rhetoric in Post-war Austria

Demonizing threats to Austrian identity through simple slogans has been a long-standing hallmark of the FPÖ's political campaigns. Where once Jews had been portrayed as the insidious threat to a healthy national community, other religious and national groupings would take their place but play an almost identical

role. Thus in the Innsbruck community elections of early 2012 the principal FPÖ candidate August Penz released posters with the slogan ‘Heimatliebe statt Marokkaner-Diebe’ (Standing up for our country and not for thieves from Morocco). The outcry that greeted the poster caused the party to withdraw it immediately, but the necessary effect had been achieved, for the FPÖ had articulated a popular perception, fuelled by daily press reports, of growing crime throughout Austria, a land now apparently swamped by gangs of foreign criminals. The regional head of the FPÖ, Gerald Hauser, attempted to make political capital out of the débâcle by reportedly declaring that ‘im Gegensatz zu den anderen Parteien nennen wir die Probleme beim Namen’¹⁸ (Unlike the other parties we’re prepared to say what’s really going on).

Political posters in the course of the Second Republic deserve – and are now receiving – serious academic attention, for they offer a fascinating and revealing insight into the perceptions, aspirations and fears, some real and some clearly manufactured, that act as a barometer of the emergence and development of Austrian consciousness.¹⁹ Hugo Portisch had already drawn attention to the powerful iconography of political posters in the electoral history of the First Republic. All parties employed then a poster style that heightened the sense of violence and danger threatening the voter from all sides. According to political persuasion, those threats took the form of Communists, Socialists, Jews, prelates, bankers, legitimists or German nationalists. Many posters contained images of destruction, with buildings alight and civil order lost. In the election of 1920 all parties offered the same solution in their posters: a giant figure employing his Herculean strength to defend the weak and helpless. The voter was invited to associate the giant with the party canvassing his or her vote and the message was clear: a vote for that party would unleash the might of the depicted giant for the good of Austria.²⁰ Disastrous for the future of the First Republic was the additional implication that the only way to respond to other parties was to attempt their physical destruction.

The iconography of the electoral posters of the Second Republic betrays an interesting development. Once the initial uncertainties

of the immediate post-war years had passed, the emphasis of the two principal parties was far less orchestrated towards fear underpinned by images of the apocalypse so common to the posters of the First Republic. Initially after 1945 both parties had displayed the antagonisms inherited from the First Republic. An SPÖ poster for elections in 1953 shows a bleak winter landscape and a black crow holding an unemployment card beneath which a text suggests that misery and distress reign where the ÖVP prevail. The long-established right-wing portrayal of socialism as the thief of others' labours was articulated in an ÖVP poster of 1956, a year after the Allies had left. The Socialists are portrayed as a burglar making off with Austria's industries in his swag-bag, an allusion to the SPÖ's intention to nationalize major industries now that they had been wrested out of the hands, in particular, of the departing Soviets.

Demonizing the opposing party in electoral campaigns was, however, a difficult stance to maintain, since the major two parties were of necessity locked into coalition government and voters could hardly be asked to accept from one party the conviction that the other party was wholly untrustworthy, only for that party then to enter into a parliamentary coalition with it. By contrast, demonizing perceived threats to Austrian identity would be very much the stock-in-trade of the FPÖ once Haider became the party's leader.

The dominant themes emerging in the Second Republic moved away from portraying discord and demonizing the opposition in favour of a rhetoric expressing stability and confidence. Text often becomes less important than the simple visual message of the strong but not militarized leader in a prosperous Austria. Many of the posters even suggest a faint smile on the face of the principal candidates. Both parties, ÖVP and SPÖ, now also embraced the colours of the Republic, and the red-white-red stripes that had failed to evoke much of an emotional response for many Austrians during the inter-war years became omnipresent in election material and would often be set against brilliant Alpine-blue skies. And once prosperity had come to Austria there enters the theme of maintaining what has been achieved. Fluctuations

in economic and international events, always alarming to small countries such as Austria which may have very little influence over their course, are traceable in posters as if they were seismographic changes. For the 1986 general election the Socialist chancellor Franz Vranitzky was dutifully portrayed against a background of the national flag and blue sky with the slogan: 'Vor uns liegt das neue Österreich. Gehen wir den Weg gemeinsam' (Ahead of us lies the new Austria. Let's take that path together). Almost a decade later and for the December elections of 1995, quite the reverse in tone is suggested by a poster, now showing a slightly older and more experienced Vranitzky. Here the appeal is one of caution, a clear expression of a detectable nervousness amongst most Austrians: 'Für Experimente ist unser Österreich zu kostbar' (Our Austria is too precious to be experimented with).²¹ This was, amongst other things, a veiled threat to the ÖVP not to challenge the stability of coalition government by entering into a possible alliance with Haider's Freedom Party.

Wisdom and experience had been concepts behind the poster designed to promote Kurt Waldheim's presidential campaign of 1986. Incongruously, his poster depicted him in a lounge suit set against a typical Austrian landscape of forests and snow-lined mountains and bore a two-line slogan: 'Ein Mann mit Erfahrung./ Ein Mann für Österreich.' (A man with experience./ A man for Austria.)

The growing predominance of faces on posters owed something to American campaign techniques, where it was generally felt the electorate would not respond to involved textual arguments. This might also suggest that with growing social stability and prosperity there was little to distinguish the parties other than the appeal and alleged charisma of their leading candidates, amongst whom women had yet to play a prominent part. The posters of each party would often emulate those of others if a particularly successful trend was detected. For the 2002 national election the emerging Green party broke with its own tradition of avoiding the cult of the leader – previously posters for the party suggested the concept of a team – and the decision was taken to promote

the image of its leader, the Vienna academic Professor Alexander Van der Bellen. His open-shirt image, in contrast to the suit and tie image usually offered by the other parties, was an attempt to lift the aura of the ivory-tower lecturer from their lead candidate. In turn other parties responded to the growth in interest in, if not always support for, the Greens by showing their own environmental credentials. This was very noticeable in the 2006 general election poster of the ÖVP showing their lead candidate, Chancellor Schüssel, in traditional Austrian hiking attire drinking with his bare hands the crystal-clear mountain water for which Austria was rightly renowned. The slogan, now with the almost ubiquitous and obligatory inclusion of the name of the country, contained a simple statement: 'Österreich. Hier geht's uns gut' (Austria – a good place for us to live). Schüssel's clasped hands under the running water hinted at an attitude of prayerful devotion and a suggestion that the Conservatives were second to none in appreciating what God and nature had bestowed upon Austria. (As so often in Austrian political rhetoric Grillparzer's frequently evoked lines from his 1825 drama *König Ottokars Glück und Ende* in praise of the beauties of Austria, 'Es ist ein gutes Land', are never far from the surface.) Yet Schüssel's words had already been anticipated a year earlier by one of Austria's most successful writers to emerge from what might be deemed the third generation of post-war Austrian writers, Arno Geiger, born in Vorarlberg in 1968. His critically acclaimed novel of 2005, *Es geht uns gut* (We're doing fine), carries a degree of irony that undermines Schüssel's electoral message as it takes the reader through the history of three generations of a Viennese family. The eldest figure in the family, Richard, is a career civil servant who has risen to considerable seniority in the Second Republic, having already established his career as a young man in the Corporate State. In his retirement his life is marked by incipient dementia. Like the Second Republic, Richard too is often subject to bouts of intermittent memory loss.

Schüssel's poster for the 2006 election went a step further. Not only was the Austrian flag displayed in discreetly modest proportion but Schüssel's signature also ran across the middle white strip,

almost awakening the impression of a signature on a bank note, a personal guarantee of the value and the values of what was printed on the paper of the poster. By the time of this election there was no Austrian currency for Schüssel to endorse, for the country had been amongst the first states to accept the euro after abandoning its own stable schilling currency. The prominence of the flag of the European Union in Austria – in remarkable contrast to the scarcity of its showing in the United Kingdom – and the withdrawal of the familiar Austrian banknotes, might also have prompted Austrian politicians to feel the need for visual means on their posters to offer the electorate something familiar, reassuring and unmistakably Austrian.

Whilst the Conservatives and Socialists have wished on the whole to be positive or simply strong in their poster rhetoric since the 1960s the FPÖ have preferred on occasion to return to the style of the First Republic and have used their posters to summon up dangers or, through very memorable slogans, reduce complex social issues to simplistic solutions. In general its stance is very much of that of a party not used to being in power. It could attack without having to defend. A poster from the FPÖ's 2006 election campaign tried to combine many targets and messages in a single visual image. It shows its leader, a radiant-looking and open-collared Heinz-Christian Strache set against the Austrian flag, and it offered two slogans. In the red of the national colours it proclaimed 'Heimat statt Schüssel & Brüssel' (Our homeland – not Schüssel and Brussels). The term 'Heimat' was a well-established element in the rhetoric of the right wing, but now the poster also included a personal attack by naming the former coalition partner. Attacks *ad hominem* had been a trade mark of the FPÖ's rhetoric under Haider, a tradition which Strache chose to perpetuate. Neatly, the slogan rhymed the name of Schüssel with the capital of the EU, which by 2006 was becoming a source of irritation amongst many Austrians once the initial euphoria of EU membership had faded. A second slogan is squeezed beneath the picture of Strache proclaiming 'Wir für Österreich' (We're standing up for Austria). The conclusion the voter should take from that slogan, naturally,

was that the other parties had sold the country short and were now in the grip of the EU bureaucrats. Vranitzky's election posters from 1995 had proudly incorporated the flag of the EU as a symbol believed to be adding value to the SPÖ campaign. By 2006 the FPÖ was exploiting what they perceived as an electoral liability for the other parties. What is striking about Austrian posters and their language is the degree to which they have mirrored the rhetoric of Austrian newspapers, for if Austrians read newspapers at all they are for the most part those titles printed in relatively small format but with large headlines, leaving very little space for the development of detailed analysis.

The Significance of the Provinces in Austrian Identity

The posters discussed here were almost without exception prepared for distribution nationally. The exception was the poster suggesting an element of foreign criminality entering Austrian society and produced for a very particular local election in Innsbruck. This is a timely reminder that Austria has pronounced provincial identities that cannot be left out of any discussion of what constitutes Austria. At times these provincial identities have competed strongly for the loyalty of Austrians. Some of the provinces, such as Tyrol, Steiermark, Kärnten or Salzburg, predate the Republic by many centuries and have viewed with hostility the creation of a modern republic – with centralizing ambitions and with Vienna at its centre – as at least an encroachment and very often as a force that needed to be repelled.²² There is some theoretical uncertainty amongst constitutional experts if Austrian state sovereignty is carried collectively by the Bund or the Länder (that is, by the central state or the recognized provincial administrations).²³ It has been argued that it was the act of coming together of the provinces after 1918 that brought the Republic into existence.²⁴ Yet these provinces have also been responsible for keeping a notion of Austria alive. After the German annexation of 1938 the National Socialists made a great effort to eradicate the name and manifestations of Austria. But the

provinces retained much of their identity, and to that extent they represented a counter-force to the powers of ‘Gleichschaltung’ and the total subjugation of Austrian identity to that of the Third Reich. Those local identities were restored relatively swiftly after 1945, notwithstanding the administrative structures imposed and frequently revised by the four occupying powers. If Austrians have sometimes doubted their state or corporate identity, it has not been a problem causing the undermining of local identities.

Only by appreciating the strength and the history of the various provinces can misreadings of trends in European identity be prevented. One of the most marked developments in Europe since the end of the Second World War has been the decline in church attendance. The academic theologian Siegfried Wiedenhofer believed that by the end of the twentieth century it was in Central Europe, and above all in Austria, that the discrepancy between the traditional structure of the Catholic Church and the reality of rapid social change was most marked.²⁵ Religious identity has been seen as moving from the public to the private sphere, with a marked change in pace between urban and rural parts of Europe. By the beginning of the twenty-first century Catholic and Austrian identity could no longer be said to be synonymous. Kardinal Schönborn in Vienna and Pope Benedikt xvi in Rome were confronted by large numbers of Austrians leaving the Church,²⁶ and within the ranks of the clergy and laity there had grown considerable discontent, fuelled in part by a series of scandals concerning child abuse in Catholic institutions within Austria and also by dissatisfaction with the apparent rigidity of the Church hierarchy, a discontent that manifested itself in such movements as ‘Aufruf zum Ungehorsam’ (A Summons to Disobedience), whose very title, consciously or not, re-enacted one of the most important literary texts of early post-war Austria, Ilse Aichinger’s 1947 manifesto ‘Aufruf zum Mißtrauen’ (A Call to Mistrust), in which Aichinger had pleaded for Austrians to perform a brutal act of self-scrutiny by not suppressing their history.

More detailed studies can reveal the unexpected in religious adherence. Outside of Vienna there are few large concentrations of

urban populations. (Just how small settlements can be is illustrated by the fact that at the beginning of the twenty-first century the population of Bregenz, the provincial capital of Vorarlberg, was 26,853, whilst that of Eisenstadt, the capital of Burgenland, stood at 11,394.²⁷ By contrast, the population of Vienna was well over 1.5 million, offering a clear explanation of why Viennese identity is often erroneously regarded as being automatically the expression of Austrian identity.) It might be expected that Austria, once regarded as bulwark of Catholic loyalty, would fall into this pattern, and that church attendance in sparsely populated regional areas would be uniformly high. However, studies show that even in provincial Austria there are marked differences in church-going and identification with the Catholic Church. In rural areas of Kärnten and Upper Styria there are strikingly low church attendance figures, which cannot be explained by reference to some early manifestation of modernization but can only be understood historically and in the context of a tradition specific to these regions of anti-clericalism.²⁸ And although in recent years the upper chamber of the Austrian Parliament, the Bundesrat, whose function is to reflect the interests of the provincial administrations within a federal state, has lost some of that influence to the centralizing powers of the political parties,²⁹ it still remains very clear that the Second Republic has inherited from previous centuries the strong and particular identities of the various provinces.

As Austria shares so many international borders it follows that the various provinces are often involved in specific cultural and economic relationships with states across the border that are not shared by other provinces in Austria.³⁰ Even the notion of an identity and a place in 'Mitteleuropa', especially after the fall of the Iron Curtain, will have an immediacy to Austrians living in the east of the country that may not be automatically sensed or shared by those living much further to the west.³¹

Migration and Austrian Identity

The provinces also do not replicate the migration patterns experienced by Vienna. There are major discrepancies in immigration patterns within the country. Figures for January 2011 showed the percentage of the population in Austria of non-Austrian descent ('Bevölkerung ausländischer Herkunft') was 17.3 per cent, but its distribution across the provinces was remarkably uneven, ranging from 9.4 per cent in Burgenland to 33.4 in Vienna.³² Such a concentration of 'foreigners' in Austria means the social profile of the capital is very different from that of rural Austria, and it replicates in the Second Republic that phenomenon of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of the concentration of Jewish migration from the outreaches of the Empire to the metropolis.³³

There is now a substantial literature, both creative and academic, relating to the large Turkish presence in (West) German society. Second- and third-generation German-speaking Turks have entered the mainstream of German political life and are also familiar faces as television presenters and news readers, and some as celebrated footballers in both the leading clubs and the national squad. Austria has been much slower in recognizing that its migrants, and especially the children of those migrants growing up entirely in Austria, will also be part of an Austrian identity; Austria has been at least one generation behind Germany in this respect. Certainly Turkish names began to emerge by the twenty-first century in the public domain in Austria. In football one can point to Tanju Kayhan, Yasin Pehlivan and Ramazan Özcan, in politics to the Green member of the Nationalrat, Alev Korun, and amongst writers of Turkish descent to Inan Türkmen. Wiebke Sievers has argued that the much more subdued presence of Turkish-Austrian writers is rooted in the very different structure of the literary market-place in Austria when set against that of (West) Germany and that in the German context there has been a far more marked collective response from the German-Turkish community in distinction to

the more 'individualised approach to social change' articulated amongst Austrians of Turkish origin.³⁴

The rhetoric and the experiences of migrants are still relatively muted but in 1993 Lisl Ponger produced a large volume, with an accompanying essay from Elfriede Jelinek, which did give space to migrants from around the globe now living in Vienna to voice their own experiences of life in the capital. Their responses were personal and anecdotal rather than academic and structured; their tone was generally sombre, as was the title of the book, *Fremdes Wien* (Unfamiliar/Alien Vienna). One Egyptian Arab, a trained engineer, concluded his experience of life in Vienna with words that suggested he too could draw parallels between life in the Second Republic towards the end of the twentieth century and earlier phases in the life of the First Republic:

Wenn man in diesem Land FPÖ-Leuten zuhört, dann bekommt man als Ausländer Angst, Kinder in die Welt zu setzen oder sich hier ein Haus zu kaufen. Ich kann nur jedem Menschen, der nicht gebürtiger Österreicher ist, raten, am gesellschaftlichen Rand zu bleiben und sich nicht zu integrieren. Denn es besteht für diese Menschen noch immer, oder soll man sagen schon wieder, eine Gefahr. Wichtig ist in Krisenzeiten nämlich stets, daß jemand der Schuldige ist. Und diesmal wäre es die islamische Gemeinde, das spüre ich ganz genau.³⁵

(If you listen to FPÖ supporters in this country then as a foreigner you start to worry about bringing children into this world or buying a house here. I can only advise anybody who is not a born and bred Austrian to remain on the edge of society and not to integrate, because there is still danger for these people, or should we be saying there is once more a danger. You see, in times of crisis it's always important to find somebody who is guilty. And I feel very certain that this time around it would be the Islamic community.)

Present-day Austria is, however, not only a place of new migration; it is home to long-standing minority ethnic and linguistic groups, such as members of the Slovene-, Hungarian- and Croatian-

speaking communities and their presence is a reminder of the diversity still existing within the concept of an Austrian identity in the Second Republic.

This chapter has drawn attention not only to some of the ways in which those factions claiming to represent Austria have gone about expressing that view in the life of the Second Republic. It has also suggested that within a relatively small state such as the Second Republic there are tensions of diversity still at play, especially between the metropolis and provincial Austria, which need to be taken into account when attempting to understand how the Second Republic has dealt with its historical legacy. The growing presence of Austrian citizens with family roots outside Austria means that the debate is not static and that new elements are entering the discourse all the time, even if responses to those changes often cling to older patterns. The next chapter will examine how Austrian identity responded to its two greatest moments of crisis to date in the Second Republic as the country moved away from the immediate shadow of the annexation years into a period of general economic prosperity.

CHAPTER NINE

CHALLENGING AND CONFIRMING IDENTITY IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC

Many West European states in the decade after the ending of the Second World War were still struggling to come to terms with unresolved issues from their pre-war history. The Algerian war and the Suez crisis were evidence that both Britain and France had not yet completed their retreat from their colonial or imperial self-understanding. Small countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium would also find it difficult to extricate themselves from their own unsustainable overseas possessions. Eventually, however, these matters would be resolved. With the passage of time and a reconstituted state many Austrians in the Second Republic believed their country had also, and finally, begun to put behind it the problems of the First Republic, but such a hope would prove premature because it was unfounded.

Bruno Kreisky and the New Austria

Between the Borodajkewycz affair of the 1960s and the Waldheim phenomenon of the 1980s came the Kreisky era, a time in which it might have been supposed that Austria had started to put to rest its anti-Semitic past. Bruno Kreisky had emerged as one of very few Austrian politicians who seemed comfortable – or even perceptible – on the world's political stage. Twelve years of exile in Sweden, to which he had fled in 1938 after having experienced a period of 'protective custody' in Austria, gave him a perspective and an international aura far greater than the Austrian provincialism of so many of his political generation. (As a well-dressed and well-

educated Vienna law student from an extremely comfortable and assimilated Jewish bourgeois background he was certainly viewed initially with a large degree of mistrust and bewilderment by the working-class members of the various young socialist groups, such as the SAJ, which he had joined in the late 1920s.)

Exile and his opposition to National Socialism had heightened his personal standing in the eyes of the Allies, from which Austria generally benefited as he rose quickly through the ranks of the post-war SPÖ, for as one of his eulogists asserted, 'Er hat weit über Europa hinaus die internationale Reputation Österreichs gefördert'¹ (He promoted Austria's international reputation far beyond Europe). Kreisky was an energetic man in the field of international politics and without doubt his freedom from the taint of the Hitler years gave him a measure of movement to represent Austria internationally that other Austrian politicians who had served in the German army could not acquire so easily. In this respect Kreisky shared many facets with a fellow Socialist politician and future leader returning from exile in Scandinavia, Willy Brandt. Both men would also experience similar prejudices at home, branded by their conservative and nationalist opponents as men who had deserted their fatherland and had been spared the miseries of the final years of the war with its bombings and privations.

The fact that Kreisky was Jewish and could become chancellor of the country, as he did in 1970, appeared to send out a clear message to the rest of the world that the Second Republic was a new society, one that had learnt the lessons of history. Kreisky, however, remains long after his death in 1990 an extremely complex phenomenon both in his personality and in his policies, a complexity that is simultaneously an expression of many of the unresolved issues in Austria's search for its identity. Kreisky was careful neither to deny nor to emphasize his Jewish background. He insisted that he had gone into exile in Sweden as a political and not as a religious refugee. For Kreisky, the latter were essentially passive victims whilst the former were being punished for their active convictions. (Kreisky had also abandoned his membership

of the Jewish community as far back as the early 1930s and is said to have held no religious convictions.) As an astute politician, however, he was well aware of how carefully he had to tread before the Austrian electorate, and so he would declare: 'Ich habe keine jüdischen Mitbürger, ich kenne nur österreichische Landsleute'² (I do not have fellow Jewish citizens, I recognise only Austrian compatriots). Nevertheless, Kreisky would be faced by anti-Semitic taunts during his political career in the Second Republic. His Conservative opponent in the 1970 election was Josef Klaus, who by contrast had served in the German Wehrmacht during the war. Klaus produced publicity material depicting himself as 'ein echter Österreicher' (a genuine Austrian).³ Few Austrians would have had difficulty in decoding that message.

Kreisky's Jewish background had profound implications for Jewish and non-Jewish Austrians alike and exposed elements in the struggle of the country to come to terms with its recent history. Kreisky's contacts with Palestinians in the 1970s and his well-known friction with Israeli politicians have been the cause for considerable and often baseless speculation, ranging from suggestions of Jewish self-hatred to the distain felt by an assimilated western Jew towards the poorer and often east European Jews who had emigrated to Israel. These tensions were manifested in the acrimonious legal battles Kreisky fought with Simon Wiesenthal, founder of the Jewish Documentation Centre. Wiesenthal had exposed the SS background in the hierarchy of the FPÖ, a party on which Kreisky might have to rely in forming a coalition government at the expense of the rival ÖVP. In turn, Kreisky suggested Wiesenthal could have been a collaborator during the war. It was an unedifying scandal, one that threw up a fault line in Austrian identity. At stake was a vital choice for Austria. What would be more important to the country: an investigation of the painful and often brutal history of some of its citizens or a spirit of pragmatic compromise in order to secure the stability and prosperity of present-day Austria?

As late as 2012 the outgoing head of Austria's Jewish community (Israelitische Kultusgemeinde), the often outspoken Ariel Muzicant, could say in a television interview that he regarded

Kreisky as an anti-Semite.⁴ The impact of Kreisky's Jewish identity was, however, of more lasting impact on another constituency within the Austrian electorate. The psychologist Wilfried Daim examined the reasons why many former Nazis voted for Kreisky:

Für sie war es eine Erlösung, einen Juden zu wählen. Die Nazis waren über den Juden Kreisky schon deswegen so glücklich, weil er allein imstande ist, sie wieder gesellschaftsfähig zu machen. Ein jüdischer Bundeskanzler sollte für sie Schlußstrich unter einer Vergangenheit sein, mit der sie nichts mehr zu tun haben wollte.⁵

(It was an act of redemption for them to vote for a Jew. The Nazis were so pleased with Kreisky the Jew because he alone could make them socially acceptable again. In their eyes a Jewish chancellor was meant to draw a line under the past, a past with which they no longer wanted to have anything to do.)

Kreisky, like many Austrian politicians before him, had made the political calculation that the voting potential of the former Nazis was too great either to ignore or to antagonize, but it would be a serious misreading to see his attitude as a cynical tactical move to ensure his electoral success. It reflected his own conviction as to how Austria would have to heal its wounds and he did not see direct confrontation as a constructive move. Nor should it be forgotten that it was not the Austrian National Socialists who had imprisoned him before the war but Dollfuss's clerical conservatives, who would mutate after 1945 into the ÖVP.

Kreisky adopted a consciously paternalistic role towards the Austrian people to whom he returned after his long period of exile. It was an approach often manifested in his personal rhetoric. One of the criticisms of Kreisky's period in office was that he was prepared to run up large state debts if it meant ensuring full employment, something he regarded as a cornerstone of Austrian social stability. In volume three of his memoirs, published posthumously in 1996, this paternalism is very apparent, and it did not disguise the impression that he felt the Austrian electorate had still not reached

full maturity or had recovered from the privations of the inter-war years, a conviction he expressed in a typically homely manner:

Das österreichische Volk war so lange ... das passive Material der Weltgeschichte, vor allem in den 30 Jahren vor 1955 – es gab immer nur Kriege, Krisen, die Industrie war verschwunden –, daß man wirklich ein bißchen Verständnis dafür haben soll und – das ist ein Wort an die Grünen, die ich gar nicht verteufeln möchte – es den Österreichern wirklich gönnen muß, daß sie auch einmal ein bißchen besser leben und sie diesen Lebensstandard erhalten wollen.⁶

(The people of Austria had been for so long the passive object of world history, especially in the thirty years up to 1955. There were constant wars and crises; industry had vanished, so that one really ought to have a little understanding – and here I direct my remarks to the Greens, whom I in no way wish to demonize – and not begrudge Austrians for wanting a better life and for wishing to hold on to the standard of living they had achieved.)

Kreisky saw Austrian identity anchored in both social peace on the home front and in an active and acknowledged position in the international sphere. He had been an instrumental player in the successful delegations to Moscow in the early 1950s, which brought about the final and surprising willingness of the Soviet Union to agree to leave Austria along with the other Allied occupying powers after a decade of military occupation. Kreisky viewed the passing of the State Treaty in 1955 as the moment when even those who had been formerly implacable enemies of an independent Austria discovered their sense of a specific Austrian identity and had abandoned once and for all any thought of unity with Germany:

Über Nacht war ein österreichischer Patriotismus entstanden, wie ich ihn bis dahin nie wahrgenommen hatte. Die überwältigende Mehrheit – selbst viele unter der mehr als 500.000 registrierungspflichtigen österreichischen Nazis – wollte plötzlich diesen Staat und glaubte in fast irrationaler Weise an seine Zukunft.⁷

(Overnight there emerged an Austrian patriotism such as I had never experienced before. The overwhelming majority – even amongst the more than half a million Austrians whose former Nazi membership had to be registered with the post-war authorities – suddenly wanted this state and held an almost irrational faith in its future.)

Kreisky's term of office as chancellor ended in 1983, by which point Austria could look back on periods of grand-coalition government and also periods when each of the two principal parties had succeeded in achieving absolute majorities. It thus appeared that the country was displaying all the features of a normal, well-functioning democracy, one in which power moved peacefully between the active players and against a background of Austrians enjoying a level of prosperity unimaginable at the time of the First Republic. What happened in 1986 thus caught both the Austrian political establishment and foreign perceptions of Austria off guard and would plunge the country into almost two decades of at times bitter self-scrutiny, leaving in its wake the impression that neither Austria's past nor its contemporary self-perception indicated a land that had come fully to terms with itself.

Waldheim and the Unacknowledged Past

The year 1986 is associated with the names of two men from very different generations: Kurt Waldheim (1918–2007) and Jörg Haider (1950–2008). Uncomfortably for Austria, their names, after that of Bruno Kreisky, belong to only a very small group of Austrian politicians who would ever register on the general consciousness of the rest of the world. It is not imperative to treat the Waldheim and Haider affairs as a single case, although they cannot be said to be unrelated, and it is clear that Haider made political profit from the unfolding Waldheim drama, which would leave Austria isolated in the international democratic community. And although both cases revolve around their two names, the issues they exposed were not ones of mere individual responsibility, for Waldheim and

Haider represented generational or wider and systemic social and political questions in Austria.

The Waldheim affair has been told many times, and in many respects it was a straightforward story.⁸ An Austrian diplomat of no particular charisma but enjoying the patronage of one of the main political parties rises to the highest office in the United Nations, returns to Austria to be adopted as this party's presidential candidate, and as that election is about to take place is denounced in certain quarters as a man who had suppressed a large part of his war service record, one which, or so it is claimed, associated him with war crimes committed in the Balkans. The diplomat denies the allegations and goes on to win the election. Nevertheless, the allegations persist and the now president of the Second Republic finds himself virtually ostracized by every civilized state in the western world, banned from entering the United States but free to accept invitations from the Arab world to perform official visits.

Over the years the Waldheim story has received many fresh interpretations. These included the belief that the Soviet and Yugoslav secret services held (and withheld) information with which they could later usefully influence Waldheim. It has been claimed, for instance, that Waldheim took a noticeably less than proactive role during the Prague Spring when he was serving as Austria's ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Later Waldheim was portrayed by the Austrian right as a victim of the American East Coast lobby, a term which in Austria acted as a generally recognized euphemism for the Jewish World Congress. Waldheim spoke of himself as a victim of a defamation campaign.⁹ In subsequent years the leaking of purported details of Waldheim's army service was attributed to disgruntled elements in the SPÖ who were unhappy at the thought of the office of the presidency falling into the hands of the ÖVP and that for internal party political reasons Hans Pusch, the man running the office of the Socialist Chancellor at the time of the election, Fred Sinowatz, leaked details in order to discredit the ÖVP's candidate.¹⁰ The internal politics of the Waldheim debate has been generally overshadowed by the international response, yet in the history of party politics of the Second Republic it was

an echo of the internecine attitudes which had undermined party political life of the First Republic

Even after a quarter of century from his election fresh details concerning Waldheim still continued to emerge. In November 2011 the Austrian political magazine *profil* released information showing that as far back as 1946 the ÖVP were well aware of Waldheim's NSDAP membership but that the young ÖVP Foreign Minister at the time, Karl Gruber, had used all his influence to protect Waldheim, who had become in the meantime Gruber's devoted and loyal secretary in 1946.¹¹

In his election material Waldheim had disclosed very little of his personal biography relating to the Second World War and had certainly not mentioned his membership of the Nazi Party. Such reticence was anything but uncommon, and countless politicians and figures in public life in both Austria and West Germany behaved similarly in the decades after the war. The electorate were quite used to these lacunae, for many had them in their own curriculum vitae. The silences were understood and generally accepted. And despite intensive research nobody could ever prove that Waldheim had personally committed a war crime, unless – and here the issue ceased to be a matter solely concerning Waldheim as an individual – by being a member of the armed forces of the Third Reich Waldheim had allowed a system to exist which had committed war crimes. And if Waldheim were guilty on this basis then so too would be every German and Austrian who had seen war service in the Third Reich. It was this thought that undeniably exposed a deeply buried unease in public opinion at large and it was to that opinion Waldheim thought he was appealing when he made the first of those two statements that still pointed to Austria's struggle with its accountability towards the Hitler years.

Waldheim, deeply wounded but also enraged by the charges that were threatening to derail his hopes of becoming Austria's president, defended his military past in a sentence that constituted the real issue at the heart of the Waldheim phenomenon, a sentence far more condemning than anything contained in the avalanche of the many thousands of assiduously gathered documents and

statements that now began, by their sheer volume, to obscure his case, for he had declared in an interview for the Austrian Broadcasting Service on 9 March 1986: 'Ich habe damals nichts anderes getan als Hunderttausende andere Österreicher auch, nämlich meine Pflicht als Soldat erfüllt'¹² (At the time I did nothing other than what hundreds of thousands of other Austrians did: I fulfilled my duty as a soldier). This apparently simple utterance was in fact a highly complex and contradictory piece of language and rhetoric. It served as an explanation, a rationale, a defence, an appeal, and also a veiled retort. It sought by the simple adverb 'damals' to place the events in another age, one contextualized and distinct from the 'now' of modern Austria and the Second Republic. The speaker claims no special moral authority, but rather he stresses his very ordinariness, for his behaviour reflected that of countless other Austrians. In making that connection to other Austrians, however, he had drawn them into his case, for any negative judgement passed on Waldheim would automatically be one passed on them, and since countless Austrians of his generation shared similar wartime biographies they were now mobilized into his defence. There was also the emotional appeal to the code of military honour. He was a soldier and as such subject to the disciplines and sacrifices required of soldiers the world over and from time immemorial. The most contentious word, however, rested with the concept of 'duty'. Duty is an obligation, a requirement in which one cannot exercise choice or preference. It also requires a preposition: duty towards whom or what? Waldheim's sentence does not name the recipient of his duty and loyalty. Had he and those countless other Austrians owed a duty to Adolf Hitler, or to the ideology of National Socialism, or to the conscription laws of the Third Reich? In 1986 Waldheim would not have wished to endorse those concepts. This suggested that there was some object apart from them that Waldheim and those other Austrians in German uniforms had felt obliged to serve. Inevitably there was much that went unspoken in these words because both the speaker and its recipients could work with the unspoken. The inference was, of course, that no matter how regrettable the Nazi regime

might have been, there was still the concept of hearth and home, women and children, to be defended and that actively to assume the uniform of those who would eventually be bombing Austrian soil would have been a step too far. Indeed, those Austrians who did take the decision to fight in Allied uniforms would not find universal acclaim on their return to Austria.

It is for this reason that Josef Haslinger provocatively dedicated his 1987 exposure of the Waldheim era, *Politik der Gefühle*, to Ilse Aschner, who as a Jewish child had escaped to Britain, and to all Austrians ‘who did not fulfil their duty’.¹³ Haslinger believed he saw in the defence mounted on behalf of Waldheim amidst cries of a Jewish conspiracy a characteristic of Austrian discourse in the Second Republic, namely the stressing of the emotional at the expense of the logical and analytical. Thus what is at stake is never a truth or a principle but a feeling, which is then mobilized in the quest for political power.¹⁴ This became apparent in the slogan on which the Conservatives succeeded in getting Waldheim elected. As a response to the growing international condemnation of Waldheim during the 1986 campaign the general secretary of the ÖVP, Michael Graff, and the then political director of the ÖVP’s parliamentary party, Kurt Bergmann, came up with the short but highly effective retort, ‘Wir wählen, wen wir wollen’¹⁵ (We’ll elect who we want). This was hurriedly attached to all Waldheim’s electoral posters. As we shall see, such slogans often embodied the gut feelings of many Austrians, and their rhetoric constituted a truer reflexion of Austrian mentality than longer and more carefully worded political manifestoes.

The criticisms of Waldheim ran contrary to the cherished victim thesis on which post-war Austria had based much of its identity. Those supporting Waldheim were able to convince the electorate that their small country was under attack by external forces using dubious methods, and that national pride demanded that they should not yield to such pressure. It was noted at the beginning of Chapter 6 how a historian such as Josef Redlich, writing in the wake of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, could utter the belief that external forces were shaping Austria’s destiny and not with the country’s best

interests at heart. The Waldheim debate was able to play into that latent belief and made some sections of the press and the population extremely defensive when it came to criticisms issued from both within or without the country. Austria's most popular newspaper, *Kronen Zeitung*, declared Waldheim, and all those who had served in the war, to be the victim of a witch hunt.

Waldheim won the election campaign and was duly appointed as the sixth president of the Second Republic, but Austria found herself isolated internationally and was deeply fractured internally. The Austrian political establishment itself became almost paralysed. Throughout Waldheim's years in office, 1986–92, this ÖVP president had to be defended internationally by a Socialist chancellor, Franz Vranitzky. Whilst the political establishment might have to tread water until Waldheim had served out his time, and unusually for an Austrian post-war president he did not serve a second term in office, there were fissures opening up in the political landscape. If Waldheim's initial comment on duty had betrayed the problem at the heart of Austria's attitude to its past, a subsequent comment he made on that same statement only served to endorse the inability of some elements in the country to come to terms with the country's history. The polemical essayist Robert Menasse recalled that President Waldheim had apologized for his lack of candour and for his statement on duty in an address he gave on the occasion Austria's Day of National Celebration in 1991. What struck Menasse was that Waldheim was not really apologizing for the content of that earlier statement but for not having been shrewd enough to have foreseen what impact it would have. Austria had no intention of using the Waldheim affair as part of a belated learning process. Language's function was, according to Menasse, simply to obfuscate:

Mit anderen Worten: Der Präsident, der einen Großteil seiner Amtszeit mit dem Dementieren des Vorwurfes, daß er gelogen habe, zugebracht hat, erklärt am Ende seiner Amtszeit, daß er auch an diesem Punkt lieber gerne gelogen hätte, wenn er auch besser darüber informiert gewesen wäre, was die Öffentlichkeit in dieser Frage zu hören wünscht.¹⁶

(In other words, at the end of his time in office the President, who had spent much of his time in that office denying the charge of having lied, declares that regarding this issue he would have preferred to have lied had he been better informed about what the public wanted to hear in this matter.)

Demonstrations and around-the-clock protest vigils in the heart of Vienna were just part of the reaction to the Waldheim affair. There quickly followed an outpouring of self-scrutiny that Austria had not experienced hitherto in almost half a century of existence. Some observers found little difficulty in exposing absurdities, as Robert Menasse summarised the wider significance of Waldheim's stance:

Waldheim ist als oberster Repräsentant nicht zuletzt deshalb ein Symbol für die österreichische Identität geworden, weil er sich vehement und ausschließlich *ex negativo* definierte: Nein, er sei *nicht* bei der SA gewesen, nein, er sei *nicht* Nazi gewesen, nein, er sei *nicht* Kriegsverbrecher gewesen, nein, er sei *nicht* verantwortlich gewesen, nein, er sei *nicht* informiert gewesen, und so weiter. All dies ist mit der Zeit in gewisser Weise glaubwürdig geworden, und nur deshalb funktioniert er tatsächlich als österreichisches Symbol. Bezeichnend dabei ist, daß er das einzige, was er garantiert *nicht* gewesen ist, nie gesagt hat, obwohl es ihm unmittelbar geglaubt worden wäre: Er ist sicher *nicht* Widerstandskämpfer gewesen.¹⁷

(As its most senior representative Waldheim finally became a symbol for Austrian identity because he defined himself vehemently and exclusively *ex negativo*: no, he had *not* been in the SA, no, he had *not* been a Nazi, no, he had *not* been a war criminal, no, he had *not* been responsible, no, he had *not* been informed, and so on. All this became plausible with the passage of time and only for that reason did he indeed act as an Austrian symbol. What was characteristic in all this was that he never said the one thing that beyond doubt he was *not*, although it would have been immediately believed: he had certainly *not* fought in the resistance.)

Haider and the Unrepented Past

The year 1986 signified Austria's belated confrontation with its past amidst growing signs that it no longer enjoyed the immunity of its victim status even amongst all of its own citizens. Contemporary Austria was also presenting a new face and new and more aggressive tones as consensus politics began to display signs that it had run its course. In September 1986 Jörg Haider, a graduate in law from the University of Vienna, staged a dramatic *coup* whilst still in his thirties at a convention of the FPÖ in Innsbruck. He succeeded in deposing the party leader, Norbert Steger, who was also at the time Austria's vice-chancellor and representing the junior partner in a coalition with the SPÖ.

Haider's right-wing populism would be by no means unique within the European political spectrum for it contained the four basic components associated with such a phenomenon: firstly, an advocacy of market liberalization coupled with the dismantling of the social or welfare state; secondly, the assumption of often fundamental or authoritarian moral positions; thirdly, the emergence of a charismatic leader who projected manly qualities and professed a concern for the 'little man' who purportedly had been ignored by other parties; and, finally, policies of an extreme or anti-democratic nature with implied or expressed threats to its opponents.¹⁸ What was so striking about Haider's success was the speed with which he disentangled the party's involvement with the SPÖ, moved his party back to the far right of the political spectrum and then returned the FPÖ into power with the ÖVP, who were now tempted into breaking the coalition they had formed with the SPÖ. Both of the traditional parties struggled to maintain their hold on the high ground of political debate or to find effective ways of countering Haider's understanding of Austrian identity as voters from both parties switched allegiance to the FPÖ throughout the 1990s.

The FPÖ might be able to trace its ideological roots back to 1848, for it represented the German nationalist element within Austria, but its immediate origins lay with the formation in 1949

of the *Verband der Unabhängigen* (VdU), a party designed to attract the support of the many former NSDAP members in Austria who faced the loss of the franchise under denazification laws. The party became the home for those non-socialist Austrians who could not identify with the clerical alignment of the ÖVP and who still held on to their belief in Austria as part of the German nation. The FPÖ proper came into existence in 1955 and although its electoral performance was always far stronger than that of the Communists it was for many years unable to break the monopoly of power and office held by the two major parties. It achieved a degree of respectability when it entered government in coalition with the SPÖ in 1983. Indeed, the party had managed to get itself accepted as a liberal party within the European association of liberal parties, the Liberal International, founded in Oxford in 1947. It was an indication of the relative insignificance accorded internationally to Austrian politics that the party could have been perceived for so long as being liberal. The European liberal association itself was admittedly a very broad church, ranging from the British Liberal Party, whose policies were often well to the left of the British Labour Party, to the West German FDP, a party usually associated with small businesses and often standing to the right of the CDU in some of its economic policies. The FPÖ would eventually leave the association in 1993, just in time before it could be expelled. In the same year Heide Schmidt, a senior figure in the party, and one of the few female politicians in Austria with a national profile, broke away from the FPÖ, dismayed at her party's strident immigration policy and its 'Austria first' campaign; Schmidt subsequently co-founded the *Liberales Forum*, but as a party it struggled to gain votes and was perceived by the electorate as a small collection of intellectuals based in Vienna. Its failure was, moreover, a measure of the absence of a genuinely broad liberal base within Austria's identity.

After his success in 1986 Haider raised the temperature of Austrian politics. Whereas Waldheim had brought a tone of lachrymose defensiveness into Austrian rhetoric, Haider saw an opportunity to go onto the attack. The historian Karl Vocelka has

adumbrated the reasons for Haider's startling success: Haider had found a political rhetoric that allowed him to reach out and connect effectively with the right wing of the Austrian electorate, to exploit latent xenophobia (heightened by the Waldheim affair), to ignore the long-standing taboo of discussing National Socialism by making revisionist comments – notoriously on Hitler's apparent success in achieving full employment. He skilfully exploited the general disenchantment with the monopoly of the two parties and their patronage, and through well-presented media events he was able to stress his own dynamic youthfulness – in contrast to the perceived grandees running the two established parties – and he thus attracted the support of younger voters.¹⁹ Haider was also an accomplished platform speaker and was always able to turn a memorable phrase in good Austrian rather than in bureaucratic High German. In addition, he was careful to secure himself a political power base in provincial Austria, making the state of Carinthia (Kärnten) into a virtual personal fiefdom and was again able to cast himself in the role of champion and to make the most of an inherent mistrust in the deeply conservative provinces towards Vienna-based politicians. Haider's German nationalism found a ready reception in the province of Carinthia, whose history was that of a border territory asserting its German identity against perceived intrusion from Slovenes and other Yugoslavs.²⁰ The Salzburg historian Hanns Haas has remarked that 'Austrian consciousness developed more in confrontation with Slavic peoples than in identification with Germany'.²¹ As governor of the province of Carinthia Haider dragged his feet very publicly over the nationally agreed policy regarding bilingual place-name signs in those communities where Slovene-speakers reached a certain proportion of the population.

Since the ÖVP and SPÖ were of necessity back in grand-coalition government from 1987 Haider had a free hand in opposition. Unencumbered by the responsibility that comes with holding office, Haider was able simply to pick and choose the topics he wished to discuss. He could ignore policies from which he could not wring electoral profit, but could mercilessly lampoon those areas where he sensed government weaknesses. Haider and

the FPÖ felt no need to be consistent in their policy-making and were quite capable, as in the pressing question of Austria's possible EU membership, of changing their position to catch any perceived electoral mood swing.

In Chapter 2 we saw how Haider was capable of turning the givens of Austrian identity on their head by declaring that it was the many centuries of Habsburg rule which constituted an interruption of the natural participation of Austria within Germany's history. His move to the far right was confirmed when, for instance, the extreme right-wing NDP encouraged their supporters to vote for Haider's FPÖ in the 1986 election, an endorsement that Haider did not repudiate.²² With growing electoral support, but also growing international unrest at the policies and statements coming from Haider and the FPÖ, he needed to acquire a more statesmanlike profile, and in 1992 he issued his 'Vienna Declaration' (*Wiener Erklärung*). Its various elements, many palpably contradictory, revealed how pliable Austrian identity could be in Haider's hands. Some of the comments in the following extract are clearly intended as acts of appeasement, others as those expected by the international community from any responsible party as it edged closer to power and office, but yet other remarks were intended to offer reassuring reconfirmation to key elements within the party's natural support base:

Wer mit mir geht, steht für eine FPÖ ohne braune Flecken, aber auch ohne Angst vor einer ehrlichen Geschichtsbetrachtung, die der historischen Wahrheit und nicht der Wahrscheinlichkeit verpflichtet ist. Wer mit mir geht, steht für eine FPÖ mit glaubwürdiger Distanz zur Zeit des Nationalsozialismus, aber mit respektvollem Eintreten für die ältere Generation, die nach bitteren Erfahrungen den Weg in die Demokratie gefunden hat. Wer mit mir geht, steht für eine FPÖ, die sich zur deutschen Volks- und Kulturgemeinschaft bekennt, aber mit der Einschränkung, daß dadurch das Bekenntnis zu Österreich als unverwechselbar in seiner Identität, unverletzbar in seinen Grenzen und unbestreitbar in seiner souveränen Existenz nicht eingeschränkt werden darf.²³

(If anybody wants to join me they have to believe in a Freedom Party unblemished by Fascism yet not afraid of looking at history honestly and truthfully. If anybody wants to join me they have to believe in a Freedom Party that is clearly distanced from the National Socialist era but yet has the respect to stand up for an older generation who after bitter experiences found their way to democracy. If anybody wants to join me they have to believe in a Freedom Party that acknowledges it is part of the German ethnic and cultural community but with the condition that there can be no compromising in its commitment to Austria, its identity, its borders or its sovereignty.)

Three-quarters of a century after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire Haider and his FPÖ were now prepared to acknowledge Austria as a sovereign state, but many could still not bring themselves to accept it as a separate nation.

Austria and Europe

Haider's political rise coincided with Austria's membership of the European Union on 1 January 1995, which had followed from a respectable yes vote of 66.5 per cent from a turnout of 81.2 in a national referendum held in June of the previous year.²⁴ Although both major parties sponsored the proposal to enter the EU, the move towards membership exposed persistent problems within the individual parties in their understanding of Austria's identity and even its legal status. The Socialist Party had by far the greater reservations regarding EU membership. Amongst their rank-and-file members there was the fear of the home labour market being swamped by cheap labour which would then deflate Austrian workers' income. Amongst the ideological circles of the party there was a fear that membership might compromise Austria's declaration of neutrality, which had been a condition that had gained the country its independence in 1955. Above all, there was the perception that being in an association where most members were also Nato members Austria would be exposed to irresistible

pressure to abandon its neutrality commitment. By contrast, the ÖVP, and especially sections of the party close to the vice-chancellor, Erhard Busek, had far fewer reservations. They stressed the business opportunities being lost by the country if Austria continued to stand outside the European Union. Some in the ÖVP even openly countenanced Nato membership. The German nationalist element in the electorate also perceived membership as a move towards a closer union with a by now reunited Germany. Some academic commentators regarded Austria's EU membership as no more than the inevitable outcome of a fifty-year process of the country's gravitation towards West European economic integration.²⁵ Few, however, saw the contradiction that EU membership meant for Austrian identity. In 1918, as the Empire disintegrated, German-speakers in Austria had only experienced life in a multinational state and therefore had little faith in being a small independent state. The First Republic failed in this respect to convince its citizens, but fifty years of dedicated self-promotion in the Second Republic had finally brought about that belief in Austria as a discrete entity. (One group of astute commentators on Austrian identity perhaps condensed a little too rapidly the process when they judged that 'after 1945 at the latest, whatever resident "German" identification Austrians still retained was removed.'²⁶) The disorientating element for the Austrian population in the EU debate was that after having struggled to reach that sense of independence they were now being told the opposite: that a small country such as Austria could not exist in isolation, and that its natural home would be amongst that larger union of nations which the EU represented. If this did not hint at a return to life before 1918 there was still the added irony that the most active figure in the pan-European movement encouraging greater links with those Central and East European states which would be joining the EU shortly after Austria's accession was none other than Otto von Habsburg, the son of the last emperor.

Only a couple of years after joining the EU, Austria assumed its presidency in 1998, an event that was given much weight by the political establishment as evidence of Austria's restored

importance in the world community. Many publications were issued both to prepare and subsequently to celebrate what was perceived as a momentous confirmation of the status and responsibility entrusted to the Second Republic.²⁷ The Socialist chancellor at the time, Viktor Klima, was invited to write a preface to a special English-language edition of the publication *Europäische Rundschau* dedicated to the theme of 'Austria and the European Union'. What was noticeable about Klima's contribution was the extent to which his rhetoric fell back almost exclusively on older concepts of the function and identity of Austria, and, in so doing, portrayed the Second Republic as a continuation of an earlier political identity: 'In the function of EU president Austria can continue the long-standing tradition of being a link within Europe. In the preparation for enlargement of the Union it can extend and strengthen its function as a historical bridge to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.'²⁸

Membership in the European Union meant by definition union once more with Germany, along with the other member states, and Austria would be made very conscious of its neighbour's powerful presence, enhanced by its status as one of the six signatories of the original Treaty of Rome, for even in such simple matters as the names of agricultural products Austria had to press hard to have recognized Austrian terms for such produce as tomatoes and potatoes, which differ from forms used by Germans.

Humour and Criticism

By the 1990s ordinary men or women on the streets of Vienna and elsewhere could not escape noticing they were living in turbulent times. The dramatic changes in neighbouring countries were plain to see, whilst the collapse of the Soviet bloc was rewriting both mental and territorial maps. We have seen how the 'little man' was identified by the FPÖ as a promising electoral resource, but the figure of the ordinary man could take on many forms. It had been one of the great achievements of the nineteenth-century

Austrian dramatist Johann Nestroy to have peopled his plays not with kings and generals but with his ordinary and very recognizable fellow citizens in Biedermeier Austria. Nestroy might have been the darling of the theatregoing public in his time, and his death would bring them out in their thousands to pay their respects to his funeral procession in 1862, yet that same public could turn against him when he offered them a picture of themselves that did not correspond to, or flatter, their own perception of their identity. This was the fate of his 1837 comedy *Eine Wohnung ist zu vermieten in der Stadt* (Rooms to Let). Nestroy's satirical depiction of unattractive elements in the ordinary Viennese character was greeted by immediate disapproval. The play ran for two performances only and was never staged again in Nestroy's lifetime.²⁹ Unsurprisingly, its rediscovery was the work of Karl Kraus and his untiring promotion of the play after the First World War.

A little man also made his appearance on the Viennese stage shortly after the Second World War. Karl Bockerer was the principal character in the eponymous play *Der Bockerer*, written in their New York exile by Ulrich Becher and Peter Preses and first performed in Vienna in 1948 at the Scala Theatre in the Soviet-controlled zone of Vienna. Bockerer is a Viennese butcher who refuses to be impressed by National Socialism in the days of the Anschluss. Whilst others, including his own family, go over to the new ideology Karl remains true to himself and to basic human decencies. He does not, for instance, disown his Jewish contacts. He is no intellectual, nor is he an avowed resistance figure, but his very apolitical and often naïve world view, coupled with his earthly grounding in his Viennese language and values, made him appear all that was good in the Austrian character whilst others might assume the false tones of their northern neighbours, who in 1938 appeared in their droves in Vienna. His unguarded tongue exposes the madness of the ideology to which others have succumbed: 'Führer befehl, wir folgen dir! Sixt ja, wo er's hingeführt hat!³⁰ (Leader command and we will follow you! O yes, and just look where he's led us!). In the pointed words of one literary scholar: '[Bockerer] rejects duty as an excuse for going along with the Nazis.'³¹

Karl Bockerer's moral position is seen firmly anchored in his unreflecting, instinctive Austrian, and specifically Viennese, identity, to which he remains true when others do not. It struck a chord with audiences, and the play went on to be the springboard for a number of popular films starring Karl Merkatz. No doubt those behind the making of these films sensed the 'little man' image was in tune with Austria's understanding of itself as a small nation overpowered by larger forces but still capable of retaining its uniqueness. Using the same historical ingredients, a very different image of the small man and Austrian identity emerged through the work of the Austrian satirists Helmut Qualtinger and Carl Merz in their 1961 one-man play *Der Herr Karl*, in which Qualtinger himself played the role of a small-time shopkeeper, who in post-war Austria explains in his laconic manner to an imaginary younger audience the many hardships his generation had experienced in the bad old times of Austria before the Second Republic, although it is quite clear that Herr Karl had experienced very few hardships and that then, as on stage now, he was quite capable of looking after his own interests. The depiction of Herr Karl outraged many Austrians at the time, and when the play was subsequently broadcast viewers rang to protest furiously at this perceived disgraceful portrayal of the Austrian character.³² It is not difficult to see what might have caused offence, for in Qualtinger's performance this ordinary Austrian emerges as a self-serving, opportunistic, morally unedifying figure who blows with the prevailing political wind. Qualtinger's language, like that of Bockerer and the numerous creations of Nestroy, is so deeply rooted in its Viennese diction and mentality that it cannot be dismissed as being but an aspect of human nature in general. Its identity is unmistakably an expression of a particular place. What is striking about Herr Karl is that he seems genuinely to want to invite both pity and understanding, for as he tells his audience,

Na – im Vierdreißigerjahr ... wissen S'eh, wia des war. Naa, Se wissen's net. Se san ja z'jung. Aber Se brauchen's aa net wissen ... Das sind Dinge, da wolln ma net dran rührn, da erinnert man sich nicht

gern daran ... niemand in Österreich ... Später bin i demonstrieren
gangen für die Schwarzen ... für die Heimwehr ... net? Hab i fünf
Schilling kriagt ... Dann bin i ummi zum ... zu de Nazi ... da hab i
aa fünf Schilling kraigt ... naja, Österreich war immer unpolitisch ...
i maan, mir san ja kane politischen Menschen ... aber a bissel a Geld
is z'sammkummen, net?³³

(Well, back in '34, you know how things were then. But of course
you don't. You're too young, so why should it bother you? Things
went on in those days, well it's best to leave them in peace; nobody
likes to remember them, nobody in Austria. Later on I did a bit of
demonstrating for Dollfuss's lot. You follow me? I picked up a couple
of bob from them. Then I went over to the Nazis, and picked up a few
more bob. Let's face it, Austria was always unpolitical. What I mean
to say is that we're not a political people. But still, it brought in a few
shillings, you with me?)

Giving offence as a means of self-enlightenment would be the
hallmark of Austria's best-known post-war political and social
cartoonist, Manfred Deix, (born in Lower Austria in 1949). His
work, appearing over many years in the political magazine *profil*
and the business paper *Trend*, showed in unadorned frankness
the recognizable faces – and other candid anatomical parts – of
both high-profile members of the political establishment and the
Catholic Church hierarchy as well as ordinary and clearly well-fed
Austrian men and women, all of whom appear to be inhabiting a
world of greed, ignorance and self-gratification. Deix stands in a
long line of those who would exploit the rhetoric of the ridiculous
which had been established and cultivated by the nineteenth-
century *feuilletons* when dealing with Austrian identity. Indeed,
since the Revolution of 1848 Austrian discourse could throw
up many gifted, and often anonymous, cartoonists. Deix's most
famous caricature is undoubtedly one that took as its cue a much-
circulated photograph of Kurt Waldheim as a young officer in the
German army, mounted on a horse. As Waldheim had gone to
great lengths to insist on his own very minor part in the war effort,

Deix produced a cartoon in which the familiar swastika armband was placed not on a Waldheim-looking figure but on one of the horse's legs. Deix is clearly suggesting that it was the horse and not Waldheim that had been the committed party member, and for good measure it is the horse shown wearing the SA uniform. This perceived Austrian habit of deflecting blame and guilt is also reproduced in the accompanying caption in which Waldheim is cursing the horse in good local dialect: 'Du bist schuld, wenn i später amol Schwierigkeiten kriege, du saublödes Vich'³⁴ (It's your fault if this gets me into trouble later, you stupid bloody nag).

National Socialism and the Anschluss brought Germany and Germans into the world of Karl Bockerer and Herr Karl. Qualtinger's Herr Karl recalls their arrival in 1938, the martial music of their army bands, the change of names for the country and then the shortages which war brought in its wake. Discussion of Germany would generally remain almost the last taboo of Austrian discourse after 1945. (The final taboo would be the civil war, which alone amongst the major events in Austria's collective memory would be avoided in the many commemorative events, for it was the one issue from the past that reached into the present and threatened social and party political cohesion.)

The German Question

After the war Austrians at official level appeared to avoid mentioning Germany – even the term 'Deutsch' as a subject on Austrian school timetables was removed for a time – whilst (West) Germany in turn initially kept a safe distance from commenting on Austrian matters. It was noticeable that after the Waldheim affair West Germans began to turn their attention increasingly to their southern neighbour. When German academics did appear to encroach on Austrian topics the irritation felt in some quarters in Austria was revealing by the very intensity of its response. This was most noticeable in the reaction of the well-known Austrian political scientist Anton Pelinka to an article written by a prominent

historian working at the University of Kiel, Karl Dietrich Erdmann. In an article originally published in 1987 Erdmann had reversed the traditional question of how much Austria was a part of Germany by posing the question from the opposite angle when speaking of German identity:

Wir können uns selbst nicht verstehen, wenn wir von Österreich als einem Element unseres historischen Erbes absehen ... Die deutschen Ursprungslande Österreichs sind in ihrer tausendjährigen Geschichte nun einmal 900 Jahre hindurch Bestandteil des übrigen Deutschland.³⁵

(We will not be able to understand ourselves if we ignore Austria as an element within our historical legacy ... The German territories which formed the origins of Austria were, after all, for nine hundred years of their 1,000-year history a constituent part of the rest of Germany.)

Pelinka's furious, almost intemperate, response was rooted not only in perceived errors of fact in Erdmann's article but in the unprofessional manner with which, in Pelinka's opinion, Erdmann spoke of Austria, and precisely because it was Austria and not a state such as France or the United States. Erdmann was guilty of busying himself with Austrian history

in einer Art und Weise, die doch immer und immer wieder an den Stil eines aufgeklärten, wohlmeinenden wilhelminischen Kolonialoffiziers in Deutsch-Südwest um 1910 erinnert.³⁶

(in a way that time and again recalls the style of an enlightened and well-meaning Wilhelmine colonial officer in German South-West Africa around the year 1910.)

There were those in Austria who nevertheless regarded defending Austrian identity from alleged German encroachment as a false strategy and even a threat to a mature Austrian self-perception. This was particularly marked in a debate regarding the nature of

Austrian literature. By insisting on a discrete and unique Austrian voice such champions within the ranks of literary academics in Austria, were, according to Walter Klier, doing the national identity a disservice: 'Wem dient die Germanistik beziehungsweise die Austriaistik?' (Whom do German literary studies, or Austrian Studies, serve?) Klier argued that, by insisting on an Austrian identity, the discipline was impoverishing itself by becoming the willing servant of the state, which needed such an identity to justify its existence, for the state did not require a literature that could question such an identity but rather would confirm it as being part of an immutable tradition.³⁷

Austria was discovering, especially after 1986, that it no longer held a monopoly when it came to discussing its identity. The Stuttgart journalist Klaus Harpprecht produced in 1987 an Austrian diary in the light of the Waldheim story, and the book's very title, *Am Ende der Gemütlichkeit* (No Longer Snug and Cosy) was a deliberate barb at Austrian's stylized and comforting self-perception. Against the date April 1986 Harpprecht wrote, 'Nun scheint Österreich für die Vergeßlichkeit bitter zu büßen'³⁸ (Austria appears to be making bitter atonement for its forgetfulness). Rolf Steininger, a German historian working at Innsbruck University, had little time for the victim hypothesis or attempts to uncouple Austria's history from that of Germany. Austria's history 'was inextricably intertwined with Germany's in the years 1938–45', and drawing on diplomatic records from the period he argued that the question of Austrian sovereignty after the Second World War had become 'a hostage for the German question'.³⁹

The Waldheim affair and the emergence of Haider from the German nationalist tradition in Austrian politics meant that, like it or not, Austria could not suppress its involvement in the Third Reich. In the polemical struggle that followed, it exercised even more of Austria's ingenuity. Just as the Heldenplatz reception given to Hitler was asked to be seen in the context of the many Austrians who were not to be seen there that day, so the Austrian career diplomat Gabriele Holzer stressed the unusual low turnout for the presidential election in 1986, with the result that Waldheim might

have won the election but was put in office by only a minority of those entitled to vote.⁴⁰ In making this case Holzer was drawing on a strategy and polemical practice the fledgling Second Republic had used in an important early publication, the *Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch* of 1946, subtitled 'Justice for Austria'. Anxious that the rest of the world, and especially the occupying powers, should see Austria in the correct light, it produced documents which proved in its own judgement that 'Österreich [war] niemals in der überwiegenden Mehrheit seiner Bevölkerung nationalsozialistisch'⁴¹ (The overwhelming majority of Austrians were never National Socialists). Other documents, allowed to remain hidden from general public view, offer a very different picture and may still threaten to destabilize Austria's self-perception if ever allowed to see the light of day. Austrian membership of the NSDAP was already disproportionately high when compared with other regions of the Reich. It would have been even higher had not the Nazis themselves put a halt to the masses of Austrians attempting to join the party immediately after the annexation. Long-standing Nazi members with low party membership numbers were particularly disdainful at this sudden conversion of Austrians to Nazi ideology, and the party itself did not want what it regarded as a privileged honour to be degraded by a surge of opportunistic applications, and thus many thousands of applications were rejected, but those applications, as the historian Oliver Rathkolb has pointed out, were not lost and are today stored away by the Americans in the National Archives at College Park, Maryland.⁴²

Holzer saw Germany taking delight in the phenomena of Waldheim and Haider, believing it even allowed for German *schadenfreude* at Austria's international discomfiture, for she argued that the German perception was based on a conviction that Austria had managed after 1945 to evade the issue of its responsibility whilst her neutrality was a cause for both mistrust and envy amongst Germans.⁴³

The Bearers and Custodians of Austrian Identity after 1945

The Waldheim election and the growing electoral support for Haider coincided approximately with three clear developments in Austrian intellectual life, including two academic developments which would begin to shed fresh light on the far from agreed nature of Austrian identity, and they would also introduce new voices to the debate. The first was the relatively young discipline of discourse studies (or more formally Critical Discourse Analysis), pioneered in the United Kingdom by scholars such as Norman Fairclough and drawing on a far more diverse range of sources than encountered in the orthodox studies of political rhetoric, with the purpose of adopting a multidisciplinary approach that would reveal how discourse manifests the structure of power relations in a given society, and also showing how such discourse is historical in nature.⁴⁴ (In the Austrian context this approach has been particularly associated with the numerous and illuminating publications of Ruth Wodak and Rudolf de Cillia.) Such an approach often involved detailed questioning of a cross-section of respondents, an approach that yields information that a study of standard printed material or the transcripts of speeches made by the principal political actors would not yield. Such an approach does harbour, however, inherent dangers: the act of questioning can create the very responses it claims to be the object of its research. If the ordinary passer-by in the street or target group were not asked certain questions their views might never have been articulated, or articulated in the way that such questioning elicits. And although the aim of discourse analysis is to be ‘interpretative and explanatory’,⁴⁵ there are limits to the degree of insight such an approach can offer. Looking back on data collected, Ruth Wodak and her co-authors could sometimes identify positions but not necessarily account for them: ‘Austria’s strong contemporary economic and cultural independence vis-à-vis Germany was often stressed. In semi-public and quasi-private discourse differentiation from Germany seemed to be an emotional need; it is not clear,

however, why this was felt to be so important and what exactly the differences between Austrians and Germans were perceived to be.⁴⁶ Despite these reservations, discourse analysis was able to demonstrate, with reference to the significant year of celebrations and commemorations in 2005, marking both fifty years since the signing of the State Treaty and sixty years since the ending of Nazi rule, how the Austrian state was able to project itself and its desired identity upon the consciousness of its citizens as if the state itself had become an act of performance.⁴⁷

The second academic development was within the practice of history itself. By 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of Austria's liberation, a new generation of Austrian historians had come of age, and they had by now worked their way up to the most senior academic positions in their respective university departments and were producing critical work of an often very high quality. As children of the Second Republic they were untouched and unburdened in their personal biographies by any association with the Third Reich, although this did not preclude, of course, any tensions they may have experienced within their family relationships with their parents' generation.⁴⁸ These historians – almost exclusively male to such an extent that the uninitiated might be forgiven for asking if until recently women were not allowed to teach history at Austrian universities – did not have the inhibitions of returning to the theme of Austria's involvement within the Third Reich. Their willingness to undertake painful self-scrutiny was fostered by additional factors, which naturally included the international attention provoked by the Waldheim and Haider phenomena. These factors also included an almost insatiable demand from German and Austrian publishing houses for works of both serious and popular historical research with which to mark the many commemorative dates, for, as many had commented, the round numbers such as fifty and sixty seemed to invite a response. Of particular stimulus was the 'Historikerkommission', a government sponsored academic investigation intended to resolve the unsettled issue of restitution and Austria's part in the Third Reich. It was commissioned in 1993 and presented its reports from 2003.

Its work put into the public domain vast quantities of material which helped stoke further interest in the question of Austria's recent history. A final, and for full-time academic historians also fortunate, bonus was the need by the 1990s for Austrian universities to compete at an international level with other universities vying for coveted high research rankings. The government was therefore prepared to provide generous subventions to sponsor many of these publications in a field in which Austrian academics had a natural advantage and pre-eminence.⁴⁹ The impact of such intensive research by a younger generation of historians was the immediate professionalization of the questions raised, replacing the type and tone of often partisan studies and memoirs produced in the 1950, 1960s and 1970s by those actors directly involved in events or by historians who had often served or studied in the corporate state or in the Anschluss years. This more recent research also benefited and strengthened Austrian identity, for it explained to a younger generation of readers the problems encountered by the First Republic and thus drew out by contrast the very tangible successes of the Second Republic despite the many issues still unresolved.

The third element that played a significant role in shaping Austrian identity from the time of the Waldheim election onwards was located in the realm of culture and in particular in literature. The relationship between literature and the Second Republic has been described as 'chronique scandaleuse' by one editor of a collection of essays devoted to this theme by some of Austria's leading writers in the 1990s, authors who belonged to precisely the same generation as the new breed of historians.⁵⁰ The earlier avoidance of the painful or unpalatable in Austrian self-reflection was certainly not limited to literature alone. Wolfgang Kos recalled the 1946 exhibition held in Vienna and entitled graphically 'Niemals vergessen!' (Never forget). Taking place so soon after the war and although depicting uncomfortable scenes from that recent war, it demonstrated, according to Kos, an Austrian habit of neutralizing and deflecting criticism by capturing a topic and either rendering it harmless or revising its intentions. Instead of being an opportunity for self-reflection the exhibition became

an opportunity for exculpation by externalizing the guilt and portraying Germany as the sole culprit.⁵¹

Since the Austrian state subsidised much of the publishing industry, writers of literature were often to a large degree dependent upon state patronage, and in the early years after 1945 those established writers, such as Max Mell and Rudolf Henz, who endorsed the continuity of the Austrian tradition, were frequently favoured. By the late 1980s such patronage, as in the sphere of political ‘Proporz’, was no longer able to contain all voices, and the picture of Austria emerging in works of literature gave an extremely critical view of contemporary Austrian society. Exceptionally for modern Austrian writers some of their names even reached in translation an international audience, as in the case of Thomas Bernhard, Peter Handke or the Nobel prize winner Elfriede Jelinek.⁵² But many others — and here the voice of women writers would finally become prominent — added to this sobering and often caustic exposure of the Austrian character.⁵³ With a weak parliamentary tradition, a generally undistinguished newspaper industry, and a state broadcasting system over which the established political parties had considerable influence and control, it was left to individual literary figures to articulate in increasingly desperate terms the concerns that the present-day Austrian state and its population had retained many of the prejudices and attitudes from the period of the corporate state and Austria’s incorporation into the Third Reich.

A decade and a half before Haider’s FPÖ party entered government in coalition with the ÖVP in the year 2000, Elfriede Jelinek had placed both Waldheim and Haider in her sights when she turned her attention, in Allyson Fiddler’s words, not only to ‘the fascism of Austria’s past’ but also to the ‘dangerous latent fascism in modern Austrian society’.⁵⁴ The occasion of her attack was her speech of thanks on receiving the prestigious Heinrich-Böll-Preis in Cologne in December 1986. She took the opportunity to ridicule the tourist clichés of Austria. Beneath their façade there lurked dark secrets, and Jelinek was just one of a number of Austrian writers who did not pull her punches by suggesting

the continuation of an unexpurgated Fascism in Austrian society. Haider had often stylized himself as a Carinthian, although he was born in Upper Austria, by wearing the distinctive Carinthian jacket. In her acceptance speech Jelinek spoke of the 'brown' (a colour inescapably associated with Hitler's SA) Carinthian jackets worn by many of the country's inhabitants with their deep pockets in which, she claimed, much could be concealed.⁵⁵

The prospect of Haider's party entering government in 2000 caused consternation amongst many Austrian artists and intellectuals. Much of their response had something of the ritual about it, repeating in many ways the response to Waldheim's election and the inflated confrontations, for instance, concerning the staging of Thomas Bernhard's play *Heldenplatz* in 1988 at Vienna's Burgtheater. There was much talk in 2000 of artists abandoning Austria as an expression of protest, and although a high degree of posturing was involved, it was an uncomfortable repetition in the Second Republic of a similar but deadly serious split in the First Republic when many authors demonstrably deserted the Austrian state at the infamous PEN World Congress in Ragusa in late May 1933, when a protest against book burning in Nazi Germany split the Austrian delegation between those condemning the act and those who displayed their allegiance to the Third Reich and thus symbolically turned their backs on the Republic.⁵⁶

What was particularly uncomfortable for Austrian public opinion was the fact that Jelinek was making her unflattering remarks about the Second Republic abroad and in Germany of all places. By now Austrian writers were becoming used to being denounced as 'Nestbeschmutzer', those who fouled their own nests.⁵⁷ Whereas literature had been widely used in the first two decades of the Second Republic as an extension of government, and had been instrumentalized in the task of promoting an Austrian identity, by the the 1980s onwards literature was turning on its paymaster. A growing corpus of texts began to examine real or fictional events from the years before 1945 and also to examine habits and attitudes in the Second Republic that suggested the country was still in the thrall of its encounter with National

Socialism and anti-Semitism. In particular the family unit in Austria emerged in Austrian literature as a place where very few democratic values were installed but was rather an institution of repression and suppression.

Jelinek and those of her fellow Austrian writers who had responded critically to the election of Waldheim and the electoral success achieved by Haider's style of political rhetoric were to make the same painful discovery in the Second Republic that had been made in the First Republic by the experience of Karl Kraus: no matter how much was written, nothing appeared to have an impact on changing the course of events. Not a word that Jelinek published in the 1980s and beyond prevented Haider's electoral rise towards sharing power in the year 2000, nor by the same token did it account for Haider's subsequent political eclipse. One well-informed commentator was probably correct in describing what took place in the following terms: 'The bitterness that characterized the [non-]exchanges between a Haider and a Jelinek will come to be seen as one inevitable but in the end unproductive aspect of the post-war scene.'⁵⁸ This did not prevent such writers from exposing what they saw as the malaise of Austrian society and to that extent it was an unintentional testimony to the stability of the identity of the Second Republic that authors felt it worth their effort to dwell on these perceived failings. It also continued a long tradition, more pronounced in the German-speaking world than perhaps in English-speaking lands, of creative writers fulfilling a didactic, even moral, role.

Who Voices Austrian Identity?

By highlighting in particular the activities of three groups within Austrian public life – the linguists, the historians and the cultural commentators including authors, three groups wholly dependent on language itself – we have begun to approach a possible, if provisional, conclusion and we have come almost full circle, for their work touched and touches on those three central pillars of

debate when talking about a national identity, three concepts which even have their origins in the German language: Austria has long been measured against such concepts as ‘Sprach-, Willens- und Kulturnation’, Austria as an expression of a distinct linguistic, aspirational and cultural identity.⁵⁹ From 1918 onwards, as we have seen in this study, large question marks were placed against each of these entities, and Austria was for long regarded as deficient in some way, incapable of fulfilling completely one or all of these concepts. Yet despite the trauma of the Waldheim and Haider years it may not be pressing home the argument too forcefully to claim that because of, rather than despite, these ruptures Austrians now began to see themselves precisely in these three terms.

Language in particular had always been regarded as the major stumbling-block in establishing a discrete identity, for Austria shared the language of its large northern neighbour, yet, as the linguist Rudolf de Cillia noted, it is precisely in language, and principally the spoken language, that Austrians have come to find a distinct symbol of their identity, something that had escaped the notice of Austria’s élites, who had for too long seen themselves as belonging to the German linguistic and cultural sphere.⁶⁰ Even in an apparently ephemeral field such as popular music, in Austria the issue of identity could be deeply bound up with language, and research has indicated that many Austrian song writers had by now begun deliberately to reject High German in favour of a natural Austrian idiom.⁶¹ This can be illustrated by a favourite song performed on the Austrian music circuit by the Viennese-born singer-song writer and actor Rainhard Fendrich. In 1990 he achieved considerable success with a song whose text was wholly in his local dialect, except for its English title ‘I am from Austria’:

Dei hohe Zeit is lang vorüber
 Und a die Höll’ hast hinter dir
 Von Ruhm und Glanz is wenig über
 Sag ma wer ziagt no den Huat vur dia
 Ausser mir

I kenn die Leit', i kenn di Ratten
 Die Dummheit die zum Himmel schreit
 I steh zu dir
 Bei Licht und Schatten
 Jederzeit
Chorus: Do kann man moch'n wos ma wü
 Do bin i her, da ghör i hin
 Do schmützt des Eis von meiner Sö (Seele)
 Wia von am Gletscher im April
 A wenn ma's schon vergessn ham'
 I bin dei Apfel du mei Stamm.
 So wia dei Wasser talwärts rinnt unwiderstehlich und so hell
 Fost wia die Tränen von am Kind wird auch mei Bluat auf amoi
schnell
 Sog i am End der Welt vol Stolz und wann ihr woits a ganz allan
 I am from Austria.⁶²

(The golden days are long since past, the years in hell are left behind, there's little left of fame and glory, tell me who now raises their hat to you apart from me? I know the people, I know the rats, the stupidity that screams to heaven. In good times and in bad I'll stand by you.
Chorus: No matter what happens this is where I come from, this is where I belong. Here the ice melts from my soul as from the glacier in April. And if I ever forgot it, I am the apple and you are my tree. Just as the water runs irresistibly and so brightly down the valley, like the tears of a child, so my blood starts running faster. And full of pride I tell the world – or just myself: I am from Austria.)

Superficially this is a paean of praise to one's native country, and to that extent it stands firmly in the tradition of Grillparzer's 'Es ist ein gutes Land'. Putting aside the question of the presence or absence of any compositional merits, the text throws up a surprisingly complex set of associations and implications which bear directly upon our study of the expression of Austrian identity in the Second Republic. The exclusion of High German but the use of English in its title shows a complex development in the

attitudes towards language in the Second Republic. By using English for its title it suggested that Austrians wished to be heard by the outside world and to claim they had nothing to be ashamed of in being Austrian. (In 1990 the country was still enduring the political quarantine placed upon it whilst Waldheim remained in office.) By using dialect Fendrich performed simultaneously an act of inclusion and exclusion. It meant that although the English title might suggest a desire to make contact with the rest of the world it was using a language that only Austrians (and certainly few North Germans) would immediately understand. To that extent the text in fact looked inwards. The first two lines also prepare us for what might be a political song, for the allusions are unmistakable. The text acknowledges the passing of Empire and does not wish to dwell on or mourn that fact. The reference to years of hell would also suggest a desire for clear political realism, and Austrians would see it especially as a reference to the years 1938–45, but the emphasis is also unmistakably on the suffering which Austrians as victims had endured rather than suggesting any suffering that Austrians might have caused to others. These historical events are not allowed to inform the present, for the text places them firmly in the past, 'hinter dir'. There then follows an expression of love and commitment to this land and evokes its natural wonders. To this extent the lyrics are close to a *Heimat* text; it even makes reference to the idea of 'blood'. It also has a hint of defiance. The singer would hold this position no matter if others cared to know it or not. (Defiance had been the dominant emotional response of many Austrians who had voted for Waldheim.)

Although not quite a folk song, it draws on many of the ingredients of such material familiar in such music of the nineteenth century, and after 1945 such material was highly suspect in the German-speaking world. Max Nyffeler has discussed why there was a reluctance to return to songs celebrating nature. In part they were regarded as dull and irrelevant in a post-agrarian society. (In the Allied occupation period in both West Germany and Austria many young people switched wholeheartedly to listening to music on the readily available American Forces Radio,

a reminder of how swiftly Austria would be exposed, along with the rest of western Europe, to the impact of Americanization.⁶³) Such material was also suspect, for it was associated with those various youth and hiking movements emerging in the nineteenth century that were ultimately appropriated by the National Socialists. In 1964, however, a revival of folk music began at a music festival at Burg Waldeck in West Germany. One of its most famous products was Franz Josef Degenhardt, who had sung of the loss of faith in traditional music under the despoiling boots of the Nazis ('Wo sind eure Lieder, eure alten Lieder?').⁶⁴ The thousands of Austrian teenagers who would regularly sing along to the text of 'I am from Austria' at Fendrich's open-air concerts were most unlikely to be aware of the implications inherent in Fendrich's ballad. They did and do appear, however, to take immense and innocent pleasure in joining in the chorus 'I am from Austria', as they do in hearing the distinctive forms of the song's Austrian idiom.

Dialect had already been discovered, however, by the literary avant-garde in the 1950s in the work of such poets such as H. C. Artmann and Gerhard Rühm, poets associated with the movement which became known as the 'Wiener Gruppe'. Their poetry, written not in a rural form of the common dialect but often in the harsher, urban variety spoken in Vienna, may have undermined many of the cosier images the state would wish to have depicted by its poets, but the fact that these poets wrote in a specifically Austrian idiom of the language suggested they were conscious of a common linguistic identity which used language to mark a clear separation from most German-speakers located in the Federal Republic.

The detailed studies of the younger historians mentioned above, whose work juxtaposed the failure of the First Republic with the longevity of the Second Republic, also strengthened the notion of the viability of an independent Austria, and they expressed almost without exception a commitment on behalf of the population to the existence of this independent Austria. In far more subtle ways than Fendrich's simple testimony 'I am from Austria' they also proclaimed a critical allegiance to an Austrian

identity, although not without reservations based on the legacy of the country's history. Karl Vocelka concluded his *Österreichische Geschichte* with a warning of the dangers of the de-democratization of Austrian society under the pressure of neoliberal economic policies.⁶⁵ Oliver Rathkolb sensed that younger Austrians, many of whom having migrant backgrounds that detached them from Austria's earlier history, were simply disconnecting from an engagement with the country's history.⁶⁶ Here it is not simply a case of Austrian identity choosing between the three options or strategies of forgetting, denying or suppressing (*vergessen, velegnen, verdrängen*) when it has come to placing the Second Republic within its greater historical legacy, options which feature prominently in the attention of the growing academic discipline of memory studies.⁶⁷ Those formative events in Austria's history, such as the civil war and the annexation, are now no longer part of the lived experiences of most Austrians in the twenty-first century. Yet for a historian such as Ernst Hanisch memory remains the key to defining Austrian society as he expressed it in the conclusion of his monumental social history of Austria in the twentieth century. He asked if the memory of the experience of totalitarian experiments, of the First World War and National Socialism, would be strong enough to be carried over into the next century or would be lost amidst the myriad other images now presenting themselves. Drawing on the work of Jacques Le Goff, Hanisch was convinced of the moral duty of historians to maintain a society's critical memory.⁶⁸

Ernst Bruckmüller, along with other historians, placed faith in an Austria facing its many challenges in a European context rather than specifically national context.⁶⁹ Such confidence might also be regarded as an act of aspiration rather than established fact. Austrian Conservatives and Socialists remain cautious in their statements towards the EU but have not suggested Austria leave the union. The FPÖ would have far fewer reservations if it felt it was in their electoral interests. Employing a far more didactic tone and writing in the midst of the Waldheim crisis, the historian Anton Pelinka had placed the question of creating and

sustaining an Austrian identity directly in the hands of Austrians in what he regarded as their long-overdue need for an act of self-determination (and thus becoming a 'Willensnation'):

Den traditionellen Eliten fehlt die Kraft zur Bestimmung der österreichischen Identität – und den Großmächten fehlt das Interesse. Dieses Vakuum ist die Stunde der österreichischen Demokratie. Es liegt an den Menschen in diesem Land, und nur an ihnen, ihr Selbstverständnis festzulegen; und Vergangenheit und Zukunft ihres Landes zu bestimmen. Denn es ist nun – endlich – wirklich ihr Land.⁷⁰

(The traditional élites lack the energy to shape Austrian identity whilst the Great Powers have no interest in doing so. This vacuum is Austrian democracy's moment of opportunity. It is up to the people of this country, and only them, to establish who they are and to define both their past and their future, for at long last it is truly their country.)

Importantly the stance of the post-war generation of political historians had been reinforced by that of Austria's literary historians. Austrian literary history had swung between the wholesale identification in the 1930s with the literature of the Greater Germany to the very opposite position immediately after 1945, when the uniqueness of the Austrian literary tradition was stressed. (Ironically and opportunistically it was often the same literary historians such as Josef Nadler and Heinz Kindermann who could champion both positions.) From the 1970s onwards, however, a generation of Austrian literary scholars began to appear who, like their colleagues in university history departments, expressed a critical affirmation of Austrian identity. Their work was nuanced enough to acknowledge those elements in post-war Austrian writing that formed part of a larger German-language and European debate, for many issues discussed were by no means unique to Austria, but they were also committed to showing that Austrian literature was not merely a sub-branch of its larger German neighbour, even if many Austrian writers were being published by West German rather than Austrian publishing

houses, a reminder that in these instances the copyright of Austrian identity was literally and legally located outside the country. Austrian literature after 1945 would develop into an advance party for Austrian identity, one that had little to do with New Year concerts from Vienna or the unblemished Alpine scenery promoted by the Austrian Tourist Board. It possessed in the works of many writers, and in the words of post-war Austria's most distinguished literary scholar, a markedly radical quality,⁷¹ whilst a prominent literary historian of the next generation concluded his major study of post-war Austrian writing with the verdict that the country's literature constituted a picture of a possible Austria still to be realized.⁷²

In Chapter 7 of this study we encountered the assertion of the historian Friedrich Heer, writing in the early years of the Second Republic and for a German readership, that Austrians had not allowed economic recovery to blind them to higher values. This appeared to have been forgotten by Chancellor Schüssel, as we saw in the opening quotation of Chapter 1, when he implied a direct connection between economic success and spiritual grace. In 1999, and in the critical days during the formation of the Schüssel–Haider coalition pact, the writer Robert Menasse claimed Austria's economic success constituted in fact a deceit, for the country had contented itself with material prosperity in preference to basic human rights.⁷³ He and many writers of the Second Republic offered a picture of a truly democratic Austria as still being a work in progress, a country yet to be achieved. What Menasse could not gainsay, however, was that Austria's remarkable economic stability and prosperity since 1945 had been the guarantor of a willingness for its citizens to accept the advantages of an Austrian national identity.

It is undeniable that identity constitutes an elusive concept. One distinguished professor of medicine has even claimed that 'there is no real identity outside of personal identity'.⁷⁴ Yet such personal identities are not perceived as sufficient. In his monumental study of the self the academic philosopher Charles Taylor had noted that modernism had left men and women feeling bereft of identity.⁷⁵

We seek something larger than our individual, corporeal selves by reference either to the metaphysical or the collective, and the nation is just one of many ways human beings have responded to such needs. In the course of this study we have tried to show how those various and many acts of intense critical examination of Austria, past and present, and often in polemical and exaggerated forms, have served as a confirmation of the particular presence and nature of an Austrian identity, one that has been shaped, willingly or not, by the Second Republic's inheritance of a unique legacy and that in turn has contributed to the making of that specific and complex identity.

NOTES

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¹ *Österreich. Konkret. Daten und Fakten*, Bundeskanzleramt und Bundespressdienst (Vienna, n.d.), p. 1.

² Statistics for all Austrian elections may be found on the official website of the Austrian Parliament.

³ Erich Zöllner and Therese Schüssel, *Das Werden Österreichs* (Vienna, 1985), pp. 119–20.

⁴ Robert Menasse, *Das Land ohne Eigenschaften* (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), p. 14.

⁵ Otto Schulmeister, *Der zweite Anschluß. Österreichs Verwandlung seit 1945* (Vienna, 1979), p. 12. In April 2009 the Austrian political magazine *profil* claimed that there was material to suggest that Schulmeister had worked for the CIA and had written or encouraged stories sympathetic to the American point of view in the 1960 and 1970s. The suggestion that senior figures in post-war Austrian journalism were secretly working for foreign powers was hardly a revelation. The speculations about Schulmeister were only one of the more recent regarding some of Austria's foremost editors, publishers and journalists. For years it had been common talk that Friedrich Torberg, a doyen of Austrian letters, had acted for the CIA. The impact of such claims is naturally to cast doubt on the intentionality and integrity of much material produced by Austrian newspapers, especially during the Cold War years.

⁶ Anton Pelinka, 'Taboos and self-deception: the Second Republic's reconstruction of history', in Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (eds), *Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity* (New Brunswick, 1996), pp. 95–102 (p. 100).

⁷ Ludwig Reichhold, *Zwanzig Jahre Zweite Republik. Österreich findet zu sich selbst* (Vienna, 1965).

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

⁹ Walter Kleindl, *Österreich. Daten zur Geschichte und Kultur*, ed. Isabella Ackerl and Günter K. Kodek, 4th edn (Vienna, 1995), p. 527.

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⁴ By the general elections of 1966, when the conservative chancellor Josef Klaus was returned for a second term of office, the popular vote for Austrian Communist Party had shrunk to an insignificant 18,636. Wolfgang Oberleitner, *Politisches Handbuch Österreichs 1945–1972* (Vienna, 1972), pp. 18–19.

⁵ Michael Gehler, ‘Österreich in Europa’, in Günter Dürigl (ed.), *Das neue Österreich* (Vienna, 2005), pp. 315–24 (p. 320).

⁶ The German text may be accessed at members.aon.at/djrproductions/pr_de.pdf. The English translation is the official version issued by the Austrian government’s Press Service.

⁷ Julius Baum, *German Cathedrals* (London, 1956), p. 6.

⁸ *Geschiedenis van Nederland* (The Hague, 1995), p. 5. A striking example of this practice of retrospective anticipation in Austrian historical scholarship is Professor Herwig Wolfram’s standard work, published in Vienna in 2003, devoted to Austria between the fourth and early tenth centuries AD, which he entitled *Grenzen und Räume. Geschichte Österreichs vor seiner Entstehung* (Frontiers and Territories: The History of Austria before its Emergence).

- ⁹ Justin D. Edwards, *Gothic Canada: Reading the Spectre of a National Literature* (Edmonton, 2005), p. 110.
- ¹⁰ All the texts of the anthems may be found in Heinrich Neisser et al., *Unsere Republik auf einen Blick. Ein Nachschlagewerk über Österreich* (Vienna, 1996).
- ¹¹ Manfred Wehdorn, *Das kulturelle Erbe. Vom Einzeldenkmal zur Kulturlandschaft* (Innsbruck, 2005), p. 92.
- ¹² Susanne E. Rieser, 'Bonbonfarbene Leinwände. Filmische Strategien zur (Re-)Konstruktion der österreichischen Nation in den fünfziger Jahren', in Thomas Albrich et al. (eds), *Österreich in den Fünfzigern* (Innsbruck, 1995), pp. 119–36 (pp. 121–3).
- ¹³ For a discussion of anti-*Heimat* literature see, for instance, Klaus Zeyringer, *Österreichische Literatur 1945–1998* (Innsbruck, 1999), pp. 164–76; J. J. Long, 'Austrian prose fiction, 1945–2000', in Katrin Kohl and Ritchie Robertson (eds), *A History of Austrian Literature 1918–2000* (Woodbridge, 2006), pp. 223–47 (pp. 226–30).
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- ²² Ernst Bruckmüller, 'Österreichbegriff' und Österreich-Bewußtsein in der franzisko-josephinischen Epoche', p. 279.
- ²³ Peter Dusek, Erika Weinzierl and Anton Pelinka, *Zeitgeschichte im Aufriß. Österreich seit 1918*, 3rd edn (Vienna, 1988), p. 342.
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- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 106–9.

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- ²³ Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke, 2000), p. 213.
- ²⁴ Ibid., p. 218.
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- ⁸ See Janet K. King, *Literarische Zeitschriften 1945–1970* (Stuttgart, 1974).
- ⁹ Julius Kainz und Andreas Unterberger (eds), *Ein Stück Österreich. 150 Jahre 'Die Presse'* (Vienna, 1998), pp. 12–13.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- ¹¹ Oliver Rathkolb, *Die paradoxe Republik. Österreich 1945 bis 2010* (Innsbruck, 2011), p. 196.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 185.
- ¹³ Frank Field, *The Last Days of Mankind: Karl Kraus and his Vienna* (London, 1967), p. 149.
- ¹⁴ Edward Timms, *Karl Kraus, Apocalyptic Satirist: The Post-War Crisis and the Rise of the Swastika* (New Haven and London, 2005), p. 492.
- ¹⁵ Karl Kraus, *Die Dritte Walpurgisnacht*, ed. Heinrich Fischer (Munich, 1967), p. 280.
- ¹⁶ Jörg Mauthe, *Wiener Meister-Feuilletons. Von Kürnberger bis Hofmannsthal* (Vienna, 1946), pp. 8–9.
- ¹⁷ Ludwig Speidel, *Melodie der Landschaft*, ed. Eduard Frank (Prague, c.1944), p. 8.
- ¹⁸ Ludwig Speidel, *Ausgewählte Schriften*, ed. Sigismund von Radecki (Wedel in Holstein, 1947), p. 5.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 175.
- ²⁰ Daniel Spitzer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Max Kalbeck and Otto Erich

- Deutsch (Munich, 1912), vol. 1 *Wiener Spaziergänge 1*, pp. 314–15.
- ²¹ Daniel Spitzer, *Hereinspaziert ins alte Wien. Heiter-Satirisches aus der Donaumonarchie*, ed. Hermann Hakel (Munich, 1970), p. 266.
- ²² Lutz-W. Wolff, *Heimato von Doderer* (Reinbek, 1996), p. 66.
- ²³ Friedrich Heer, *Dunkle Mutter Wien, mein Wien* (Vienna, 1978), p. 27.
- ²⁴ Quoted in Timms, *Karl Kraus*, p. 33.
- ²⁵ Michael Scharang, 'Die Umnachtung eines Landes', *Literatur und Kritik*, 343 (2000), 54–62 (57).
- ²⁶ Ferdinand Kürnberger, *Spiegelungen*, ed. Rudolf Holzer (Graz, 1960), pp. 97–9.
- ²⁷ Ferdinand Kürnberger, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Otto Erich Deutsch (Munich, 1911), vol. 2: *Literarische Herzenssachen*, p. 19.
- ²⁸ Ernst Hanisch, *Der lange Schatten des Staates. Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1994), pp. 226–7.
- ²⁹ Timms, *Karl Kraus*, p. 35.
- ³⁰ Over a century later Austrian scholarship's assessment of Herzl's status as a *feuilleton* writer would not be so generous, regarding him as belonging to the second order. See Sigurd Paul Scheichl, 'Theodor Herzl's Wien-Feuilletons', in Sigurd Paul Scheichl (ed.), *Feuilleton – Essay – Aphorismus. Nicht-fiktionale Prosa in Österreich* (Innsbruck, 2008), pp. 107–23 (p. 123).
- ³¹ For a fuller discussion of Herzl as *feuilletoniste* see Henry Regensteiner's edition, *Theodor Herzl: Journalistic Stories* (Cranbury, NJ, 2002).
- ³² Theodor Herzl, *Feuilletons*, vol. 1 (Berlin, n.d.), pp. 149–50.
- ³³ Gerald Krieghofer, 'The case of Kraus versus Herzl', in Ritchie Robertson and Edward Timms (eds), *Theodor Herzl and the Origins of Zionism* (Edinburgh, 1997), pp. 107–21 (p. 116).
- ³⁴ Joseph Schöffel, *Der Parlamentarismus – Eine Studie. Sonderausgabe aus 'Die Fackel'* (Vienna, 1902), pp. 10–11.
- ³⁵ Timms, *Karl Kraus*, p. 356.
- ³⁶ Steven Beller, *A Concise History of Austria* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 190.
- ³⁷ Marga Lammasch and Hans Sperl (eds), *Heinrich Lammasch. Seine Aufzeichnungen, sein Wirken und seine Politik* (Vienna, 1922), p. 82.
- ³⁸ Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (London, 1951), pp. 26–7.
- ³⁹ David Spurr, *The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration* (Durham, NC, 1993), pp. 16–17.

Notes to Chapter 6

- ¹ Averil Cameron, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse* (Berkeley, 1991), pp. 19–20.
- ² Josef Redlich, *Das österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem*, vol. 1 *Der dynastische Reichsgedanke und die Entfaltung des Problems bis zur Verkündigung der Reichsverfassung von 1861* (Leipzig, 1920), p. 1.
- ³ *Ibid.*, p. 814.
- ⁴ Hans Kohn, *The Habsburg Empire 1804–1918* (Princeton, 1961), p. 141.
- ⁵ Bruce F. Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution: A History of Austrian Anti-Semitism* (Chapel Hill, 1992), p. 24.
- ⁶ Thomas Albrich, ‘Vom Vorurteil zum Pogrom. Antisemitismus von Schönerer bis Hitler’, in Rolf Steininger and Michael Gehler (eds), *Österreich im 20. Jahrhundert*, vol. 1 *Von der Monarchie bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Vienna, 1997), pp. 309–66 (p. 326).
- ⁷ Quoted and discussed in Walter Zettl, ‘Literatur in Österreich von der Ersten zur Zweiten Republik’, in Herbert Zeman (ed.), *Geschichte der Literatur in Österreich. Das 20. Jahrhundert* (Graz, 1999), pp. 15–220 (p. 80).
- ⁸ Malachi Haim Hacoheh, ‘Kosmopoliten in einer ethnonationalen Zeit? Juden und Österreicher in der Ersten Republik’, in Helmut Konrad and Wolfgang Maderthaner (eds), *Das Werden der Ersten Republik. ‘...der Rest ist Österreich’*, vol. 1 (Vienna, 2008), pp. 281–316, (p. 315).
- ⁹ Claudio Magris, *Der habsburgische Mythos in der österreichischen Literatur* (Salzburg, 1966), p. 13.
- ¹⁰ Kenneth Segar, ‘Austria in the thirties: reality and exemplum’, in Kenneth Segar and John Warren (eds), *Austria in the Thirties: Culture and Politics* (Riverside, CA, 1991), pp. 359–77 (pp. 360–1).
- ¹¹ Wendelin Schmidt-Dengler, ‘Wien 1918. Glanzloses Finale’ in *Ohne Nostalgie. Zur österreichischen Literatur der Zwischenkriegszeit* (Vienna, 2002), pp. 24–52 (p. 28).
- ¹² Ronald Schaffer, *America in the Great War* (New York, 1994), pp. 115–16.
- ¹³ *Congressional Record*, 65th Congress (1917–18), 2nd Session, vol. 56, pp. 680–1.
- ¹⁴ Ernst Hanisch, *Der lange Schatten des Staates. Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1994), pp. 271–2.
- ¹⁵ Norbert Schausberger, *Österreich. Der Weg der Republik 1918–1980* (Graz, 1980), p. 15.

- ¹⁶ Walter Kleindel, *Österreich. Daten zur Geschichte und Kultur*, ed. Isabella Ackerl and Günter K. Kodek, 4th edn (Vienna, 1995), p. 317.
- ¹⁷ Friedrich Heer, *Der Kampf um die österreichische Identität* (Graz, 1981), p. 179.
- ¹⁸ Otto Bauer, *Die österreichische Revolution* (Vienna, 1923), pp. 73–4.
- ¹⁹ Peter Dusek et al., *Zeitgeschichte im Aufriß. Österreich seit 1918* (Vienna, 1995), p. 16.
- ²⁰ Steven Beller, *A Concise History of Austria* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 212.
- ²¹ Hanisch, *Der lange Schatten des Staates*, p. 286.
- ²² Gordon A. Craig, *Germany 1866–1945* (Oxford, 1981), pp. 69–70.
- ²³ Kleindel, *Österreich. Daten zur Geschichte und Kultur*, p. 318.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 378.
- ²⁵ Karl-Markus Gauß, *Ins unentdeckte Österreich* (Vienna, 1998), p. 16.
- ²⁶ Karl Renner, *Nachgelassene Werke*, vol. 2 *Österreich von der Ersten zur Zweiten Republik* (Vienna, 1953), p. 254. The German term Renner used for ‘not viable’, ‘nicht lebensfähig’, was the sort of biological concept beloved of National Socialist rhetoric.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 268.
- ²⁸ Norman Davies, *Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw* (Basingstoke, 2003), p. xii.
- ²⁹ Ernst Bruchmüller, *The Austrian Nation: Cultural Consciousness and Sociopolitical Processes*, trans. Lowell A. Bangerter (Riverside, CA, 2003), p. 380.
- ³⁰ Erich Zöllner and Therese Schüssel, *Das Werden Österreichs* (Vienna, 1985), p. 245. This book, devoted to a chronological account of Austria from the earliest times to the time of publication, is an interesting example of the reluctance of many Austrian history books to devote space to the years Austrians spent as part of Nazi Germany. In a text running to just under 300 pages the section devoted to Austria in the Third Reich and in World War II amounts to less than two and a half pages.
- ³¹ Beller, *A Concise History of Austria*, p. 222.
- ³² Kleindel, *Österreich. Daten zur Geschichte und Kultur*, p. 348.
- ³³ *Ibid.*, p. 349.
- ³⁴ Odo Neustädter-Stürmer, *Der Ständestaat Österreich* (Graz, [1930]), p. 3.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- ³⁷ Edward Timms, *Karl Kraus, Apocalyptic Satirist: The Post-war Crisis and the Rise of the Swastika* (New Haven, 2005), p. 487.

- ³⁸ Frank Field, *The Last Days of Mankind: Karl Kraus and his Vienna* (London, 1967), p. 97.
- ³⁹ Timms, *Karl Kraus*, p. 538.
- ⁴⁰ Marietta Bearman et al., *Wien – London hin und retour. Das Austrian Centre in London 1939 bis 1947* (Vienna, 2004), p. 65.
- ⁴¹ Albert Fuchs, *Geistige Strömungen in Österreich 1867–1918* (Vienna, 1984), p. xxiii.
- ⁴² Klaus-Peter Schulz, *Kurt Tucholsky* (Hamburg, 1959), p. 165.
- ⁴³ Robert Kriechbaumer (ed.), *Liebe auf den zweiten Blick. Landes- und Österreichbewußtsein nach 1945* (Vienna, 1998), p. 9.
- ⁴⁴ The following comments on Klahr and Winter are particularly indebted to an invaluable article by Wolfgang Häusler, ‘Wege zur österreichischen Nation. Der Beitrag der KPÖ und der Legitimisten zum Selbstverständnis Österreichs vor 1938’, *Römische Historische Mitteilungen*, 30 (1988), 381–411.
- ⁴⁵ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Moscow, 1967), p. 71.
- ⁴⁶ Roman Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List* (Oxford, 1988), p. 217.
- ⁴⁷ Häusler, ‘Wege zur österreichischen Nation’, 386–7.
- ⁴⁸ Anthony Bushell, *Poetry in a Provisional State: The Austrian Lyric 1945–1955* (Cardiff, 2007), p. 50.
- ⁴⁹ Häusler, ‘Wege zur österreichischen Nation’, 388.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 389.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 397.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, 399.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, 405–6.

Notes to Chapter 7

- ¹ Helene Maimann, ‘Vergangenheit, die nicht vergeht. NS-Herrschaft in Österreich 1938–1945’, in Günter Dürriegl (ed.), *Das neue Österreich*, (Vienna, 2005), pp. 79–87 (p. 81).
- ² *Ibid.*
- ³ Walter Kleindl, *Österreich. Daten zur Geschichte und Kultur*, ed. Isabella Ackerl and Günter K. Kodek, 4th edn (Vienna, 1995), p. 365.

⁴ Kenneth Segar, 'Austria in the thirties: reality and exemplum', in Kenneth Segar and John Warren (eds), *Austria in the Thirties: Culture and Politics* (Riverside, CA, 1991), pp. 359–77 (pp. 363–4).

⁵ Norbert Schausberger, *Österreich. Der Weg der Republik 1918–1980* (Graz, 1980), p. 37.

⁶ Peter Dusek, Erika Weinzierl and Anton Pelinka, *Zeitgeschichte im Aufriß. Österreich seit 1918*, 3rd edn (Vienna, 1988), p. 241.

⁷ Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *The Austrians* (London, 1997), pp. 328–9.

⁸ For a discussion of the play's reception see my entry on the play in *Encyclopedia of German Literature*, ed. Matthias Konzett, vol. 1 (Chicago, 2000), pp. 98–9.

⁹ Ernst Jandl, *Laut und Luise* (Stuttgart, 1976), p. 37. Jandl was a performance poet long before it became a fashionable concept and his verse cannot be fully appreciated if divorced from its acoustic impact. Reproduced here in its German text is the first of the poem's three stanzas:

der glanze heldenplatz zirka
versaggerte in maschenhaftem männchenmeere
drunter auch frauen die ans maskelknie
zu heften heftig sich versuchten, hoffensdick.
und brüllzten wesentlich.

¹⁰ Anton Pelinka, Hubert Sickinger and Karin Stögner, *Kreisky – Haider. Bruchlinien österreichischer Identität* (Vienna, 2008), pp. 58–9.

¹¹ Johann Nestroy, *Komödien*, ed. Franz H. Mautner, 1: *Komödien 1832–1837* (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), p. v.

¹² Ernst Hanisch, *Der lange Schatten des Staates. Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1994), p. 360.

¹³ Anton Pelinka, 'Taboos and self-deception: the Second Republic's reconstruction of history', in Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (eds), *Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity* (New Brunswick, 1997), pp. 95–115 (p. 95).

¹⁴ In Austrian post-war historiography there are clear signs of partisan approaches to the history of the Nazi years in Austria. Under the title *Gelitten für Österreich* (Suffered for Austria) the Karl von Vogelsang-Institut published in an undated work running to almost 150 pages the names and details of those who had been persecuted, and many executed, under the Nazis in Austria. The subtitle of the text was 'The Persecution and

Resistance of Christians and Patriots'. This might explain the presence of the names of so many priests, but might also account for the striking absence of the many Communists and trade unionists who suffered the same fate. The publication took the view that their sacrifice may have been for some other cause.

¹⁵ Evan Burr Bukey, *Hitler's Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938–1945* (Chapel Hill, 2000), p. 71.

¹⁶ Thomas Albrich, 'Vom Vorurteil zum Pogrom. Antisemitismus von Schönerer bis Hitler', in Rolf Steininger and Michael Gehler (eds), *Österreich im 20. Jahrhundert*, vol. 1 *Von der Monarchie bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Vienna, 1997), pp. 309–66 (p. 338). Albrich draws on the work of Anton Staudinger.

¹⁷ Roman Sandgruber, *Illustrierte Geschichte Österreichs* (Vienna, 2000), p. 268.

¹⁸ Pelinka, Sickinger and Stögner, *Kreisky – Haider*, p. 223.

¹⁹ Oliver Rathkolb, *Die paradoxe Republik. Österreich 1945 bis 2010* (Innsbruck, 2011), p. 273.

²⁰ Anton Pelinka, *zur österreichischen Identität. Zwischen deutscher Vereinigung und Mitteleuropa* (Vienna, 1990), p. 26.

²¹ Kleindel, *Österreich. Daten zur Geschichte und Kultur*, p. 453.

²² Richter was not to be the only victim from this list of names. Meitner, Massary and Schwarzwald all went into exile.

²³ These and other relevant films are gathered together in a collection from the Filmarchiv Austria, *Österreich 1918–1938. Zwischen den Weltkriegen*.

²⁴ Anna Mitgutsch, *Haus der Kindheit* (Munich, 2000), p. 63. An English translation by David Dollenmayer, *House of Childhood*, was published by Other Press, New York, in 2006.

²⁵ *1986. Das Jahr, das Österreich veränderte*, ed. Barbara Tóth and Hubertus Czernin (Vienna, 2006), p. 36.

²⁶ Pelinka, Sickinger and Stögner, *Kreisky – Haider*, p. 121.

²⁷ Christoph Bazil, Reinhard Binder-Krieglstein and Nikolaus Kraft, *Das österreichische Denkmalschutzrecht* (Vienna, 2004), pp. 20–1.

²⁸ See in this context Robert Knight (ed.), 'Ich bin dafür, die Sache in die Länge zu ziehen'. *Die Wortprotokolle der österreichischen Bundesregierung von 1945 bis 1952 über die Entschädigung der Juden*, 2nd edn (Vienna, 2000).

²⁹ The Historikerkommission had been established by the Austrian government in October 1998 with the mandate, in its own words, to

investigate and report on the whole complex of expropriations in Austria during the Nazi era and on restitution and/or compensation (including other financial or social benefits) after 1945 by the Republic of Austria.

³⁰ Peter Henisch, *Die kleine Figur meines Vaters* (Salzburg, 1987), p. 43. Published in English as *Negatives of my Father* in a translation by Anne Close Ulmer for Ariadne Press, Riverside, CA, in 1990.

³¹ Kleindel, *Österreich: Daten zur Geschichte und Kultur*, p. 527.

³² *The Vranitzky Era in Austria*, ed. Günter Bischof et al. (New Brunswick and London, 1999), p. 66.

³³ Robert Menasse, *Das Land ohne Eigenschaften* (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), p. 17.

³⁴ For a discussion of attitudes towards Austrians returning from exile see my article, 'Many Happy Returns? The Status and Treatment of the Experience of Exile in Austria's Literary and Cultural Journals in the Early Post-war Years', *Yearbook of the Research Centre for German and Austrian Exile Studies*, 8: *Austria in Exile* (2006), 197–209.

³⁵ Josef Haslinger, *Politik der Gefühle. Ein Essay über Österreich* (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), pp. 69–70.

³⁶ Gerhard Scheit, *Grillparzer* (Reinbek, 1999), pp. 8–9.

³⁷ Gerald Stourzh, *Vom Reich zur Republik. Studien zum Österreichbewußtsein im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1990), p. 102.

³⁸ Jonathan Chase, 'A safe European home? Global environmental change and European national identities', in Glynis M. Breakwell and Evanthia Lyons (eds), *Changing European Identities: Social Psychological Analysis of Social Change* (Oxford, 1996), p. 220.

³⁹ Klaus Eisterer, 'Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung 1945–1955', in Rolf Steininger and Michael Gehler (eds), *Österreich im 20. Jahrhundert*, vol. 2 *Vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart* (Vienna, 1997), pp. 147–216 (p. 162).

⁴⁰ Quoted in Eduard G. Staudinger, "'Austria is now to be given a second chance...". Aspekte der Wirtschaftsplanung und -koordination in der Frühphase der britischen Besatzung bis zum Frühjahr 1946', *Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur*, 41/2 (1997), 104–21 (110).

⁴¹ *Österreich konkret. Zahlen und Fakten*, Bundeskanzleramt/Bundespressdienst (Vienna, 2005), p. 118.

⁴² Friedrich Heer, 'Österreich in Europa', *Neues Abendland. Zeitschrift für Politik, Kultur, Geschichte*, 5 (1955), 280–4 (283).

⁴³ Wolfgang Oberleitner, *Politisches Handbuch Österreichs 1945–1972* (Vienna, 1972), p. 17.

⁴⁴ The original article by Fried for *Die Zeit* is reprinted as ‘Mit dem scharfen Gehör für den Fall. Zum Tod von Ingeborg Bachmann’, in Michael Lewin (ed.), *Nicht verdrängen — nicht gewöhnen. Texte zum Thema Österreich* (Vienna, 1987), pp. 148–53 (p. 150).

⁴⁵ Karl Müller, *Zäsuren ohne Folgen. Das lange Leben der literarischen Antimoderne Österreichs seit den 30er Jahren* (Salzburg, 1990), pp. 319–29.

⁴⁶ Klaus Amann, ‘Vorgeschichten. Kontinuitäten in der österreichischen Literatur von den dreißiger zu den fünfziger Jahren’, in Friedrich Aspöckl, Norbert Frei and Hubert Lengauer (eds), *Literatur der Nachkriegszeit und der fünfziger Jahre in Österreich* (Vienna, 1984), pp. 46–58 (p. 57).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

Notes to Chapter 8

¹ Frits van Oostrom, ‘The Middle Ages until circa 1400’, in Theo Hermans (ed.), *A Literary History of the Low Countries* (Rochester, NY, 2009), pp. 1–61 (p. 8).

² Gudrun Sulzenbacher, ‘Der Mann aus dem Eis’, in *Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur mit Geographie*, 44/4 (2000), 252–4.

³ The slogans, although extremely simple in themselves, are not always easy to render into English for they are often couched in dialect to achieve a sense of immediacy and directness with their intended audience. They are however unmistakable in creating a sense of ‘them’ and ‘us’. They are also very memorable and offer a clear choice for the voter, requiring no nuanced consideration of the problems of globalization. The two examples quoted here might be expressed in English as ‘Ours not Issa’s’ and ‘Christian lands in Christian hands’.

⁴ Oliver Rathkolb, ‘The Austrian voter in historical perspective’, in Günter Bischof and Fritz Plisser (eds), *The Changing Austrian Voter* (New Brunswick, 2008), pp. 12–53 (p. 29).

⁵ Aspects of these struggles are discussed in Jill Lewis, *Workers and Politics in Occupied Austria, 1945–1955* (Manchester, 2007).

- ⁶ Christian Dickinger, *Die Skandale der Republik. Haider, Proksch & Co.* (Vienna, 2001), p. 27. Dickinger brings together in a single volume a helpful account of a number of the scandals referred to in this chapter.
- ⁷ Kurt Richard Luther, ‘Consociationalism, parties and the party system’, in Kurt Richard Luther and Wolfgang Müller (eds), *Politics in Austria: Still a Case of Consociationalism?* (London, 1992), pp. 45–98 (pp. 92–3).
- ⁸ Dickinger, *Die Skandale*, p. 87.
- ⁹ The quotation appears in Peter Henisch’s text of 1978 *Der Mai ist vorbei*, and is reproduced in Volker Kaukoreit und Kristina Pfoser (eds.), *Die österreichische Literatur seit 1945* (Stuttgart, 2000), p. 143.
- ¹⁰ For a detailed discussion of the complex issue of denazification in Austria see Dieter Stiefel, *Entnazifizierung in Österreich* (Vienna, 1981); Sebastian Meissl, Klaus-Dieter Mulley and Oliver Rathkolb (eds), *Verdrängte Schuld, verfolgte Sühne. Entnazifizierung in Österreich 1945–1955* (Munich, 1986); and Walter Schuster and Wolfgang Weber (eds), *Entnazifizierung im regionalen Vergleich* (Linz, 2004).
- ¹¹ Josef Haslinger, *Politik der Gefühle. Ein Essay über Österreich* (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), p. 60.
- ¹² Dickinger, *Die Skandale*, p. 56.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 58.
- ¹⁴ Hans Rauscher, ‘Das Bürgertum und die Pflichterfüllung. Die Waldheim-Affäre im Spiegel von zeitgenössischen Leserreaktionen an den “Kurier”’, in Barbara Tóth and Hubertus Czernin (eds), *1986. Das Jahr, das Österreich veränderte* (Vienna, 2006), pp. 63–73 (p. 66).
- ¹⁵ Anton Pelinka, Hubert Sickinger and Karin Stögner, *Kreisley – Haider. Bruchlinien österreichischer Identität* (Vienna, 2008), p. 55.
- ¹⁶ Reported in *Der Standard*, 25 August 2009.
- ¹⁷ Reported in the *Kurier*, 1 February 2012.
- ¹⁸ *Tiroler Tageszeitung*, 2 April 2012.
- ¹⁹ There is a dedicated website for the study and history of political posters in Austria, including and reproducing many posters discussed in this chapter: <http://www.demokratiezentrum.org/de/bildstrategien/oesterreich.html>.
- ²⁰ Hugo Portisch, *Österreich II*, vol. 3 *Ein Volk, ein Reich – kein Österreich* (Munich, 1993), pp. 150–1.
- ²¹ Unwittingly or not, the Austrian Socialists had copied a slogan

concept from a much earlier campaign of the Conservative West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, whose face had appeared on a poster in 1957 with words proclaiming: 'No Experiments.'

²² For a discussion of the tensions between Vienna and provincial Austria see my article, 'Facts, Fiction, and Friction in a Difficult Relationship: Vienna and Provincial Austria', *German Life and Letters*, 65/4 (2012), 237–52.

²³ *Ibid.*, 246.

²⁴ Rudolf Palme, 'Zentrifugale Kräfte in den Bundesländern (1945–1997) – insbesondere in Tirol – als Reibungsfläche für einen österreichischen Nationalstaat?' in Robert Kriechbaumer (ed.), *Österreichische Nationalgeschichte nach 1945*, vol. 1 (Vienna, 1998), pp. 789–818 (p. 802).

²⁵ Siegfried Wiedenhofer, 'Glaube und Kirche auf dem Weg. Ein systematisch-theologischer Diskussionsvorschlag', in Paul Wuthe and Walter Lukaseder (eds), *Kirche in der Gesellschaft. Wege in das 3. Jahrtausend* (St Pölten, 1997), pp. 21–40 (p. 24).

²⁶ In 2011 some 58,603 Austrians left the Catholic Church. The percentage of Catholics in the population had fallen from almost 90 per cent in 1951 to less than 65 per cent in 2011; *profil*, 30 April 2012, p. 21.

²⁷ Elisabeth Lichtenberger, *Österreich*, 2nd edn (Darmstadt, 2002), p. 353.

²⁸ Franz Höllinger, 'Die Privatisierung der Religion. Westliche Länder im Vergleich', in Max Haller et al. (eds), *Österreich im Wandel. Werte, Lebensformen und Lebensqualität 1986 bis 1993* (Vienna, 1996), pp. 275–99 (p. 283).

²⁹ Hans Katschthaler, 'Portio statt Pars. Der Föderalismus zwischen Bund und Ländern in Österreich 1945–1997', in Robert Kriechbaumer (ed.), *Österreichische Nationalgeschichte nach 1945*, vol. 1 (Vienna, 1998), pp. 819–57 (p. 837).

³⁰ See, for instance, Heimo Penker, 'Die Bedeutung der südöstlichen Nachbarländer für Kärntens Wirtschaft', *Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur mit Geographie*, 49/3–4 (2005), 250–3.

³¹ Gunda Barth-Scalmani, Hermann J. W. Kuprian and Brigitte Mazohl-Wallnig, 'National identity or regional identity: Austria versus Tyrol/Salzburg', in Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (eds), *Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity* (New Brunswick, 1997), pp. 32–63 (p. 56).

³² *Migration und Intergration: Zahlen, Daten, Indikatoren 2010*, compiled for the Kommission für Migrations- und Integrationsforschung der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Vienna, 2010), p. 107.

- ³³ For a discussion of Jewish migration see Bruce F. Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution: A History of Austrian Anti-Semitism* (Chapel Hill, 1992).
- ³⁴ Wiebke Sievers, 'Writing Politics: The Emergence of Immigrant Writing in West Germany and Austria', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 34/8 (2008), 1217–35 (1217).
- ³⁵ Lisl Ponger, *Fremdes Wien* (Klagenfurt, 1993), p. 50.

Notes to Chapter 9

- ¹ Gerhard Schmid, *Österreichische Sozialdemokratie in der Ära Kreisky (1970–1983)* (Innsbruck, 1999), p. 312.
- ² *Ibid.*, p. 78.
- ³ Peter Dusek et al., *Zeitgeschichte im Aufriß* (Vienna, 1995), p. 279.
- ⁴ Interview broadcast on 14 February 2012 by the Austrian television news programme ZIB2.
- ⁵ Anton Pelinka et al., *Kreisky – Haider. Bruchlinien österreichischer Identität* (Vienna, 2008), p. 51.
- ⁶ Bruno Kreisky, *Der Mensch im Mittelpunkt. Der Memoiren dritter Teil* (Vienna, 1996), p. 27.
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- ¹¹ *profil*, 28 November 2011, 42 (no. 48), pp. 30–4.
- ¹² Gehler, 'Die Affäre Waldheim', p. 358.
- ¹³ Josef Haslinger, *Politik der Gefühle. Ein Essay über Österreich* (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), p. 5.
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- ¹⁶ Robert Menasse, *Das Land ohne Eigenschaften. Essay zur österreichischen Identität* (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), p. 16.
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- ¹⁸ Joe Berghold and Klaus Ottomeyer, 'Populismus und neuer Rechtsruck in Österreich im Vergleich mit Italien', in Reinhard Sieder et al. (eds), *Österreich 1945–1995. Gesellschaft, Politik, Kultur*, 2nd edn (Vienna, 1996), pp. 314–30 (pp. 317–18).
- ¹⁹ Karl Vocelka, *Österreichische Geschichte* (Munich, 2005), p. 121.
- ²⁰ For background see Allyson Fiddler, 'Carinthia, Interculturalism, and Austrian National Identity: Cultural Reflections on 10 October 1920', *GLL*, 58 (2005), 195–210.
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- ²⁷ See, for instance, the official 500-page Austrian Foreign Ministry document *Österreichische außenpolitische Dokumentation. Sonderdruck: Erste Präsidentschaft Österreichs in der Europäischen Union 1. Juli–31. Dezember 1998*, Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten (Vienna, 1999).
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- ²⁹ Johann Nestroy, *Komödien*, ed. Franz H. Mautner (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), 1: *Komödien 1832–1837*, p. 575.
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- ³⁴ Deix's cartoon is reproduced in Roman Sandgruber, *Illustrierte Geschichte Österreichs* (Vienna, 2000), p. 307.
- ³⁵ Karl Dietrich Erdmann, 'Die Spur Österreichs in der deutschen Geschichte', in Gerhard Botz and Gerald Sprengnagel (eds), *Kontroversen um Österreichs Zeitgeschichte*, 2nd edn (Frankfurt am Main, 2008), pp. 241–65 (pp. 243–4).
- ³⁶ Anton Pelinka, *Zur österreichischen Identität. Zwischen deutscher Vereinigung und Mitteleuropa* (Vienna, 1990), p. 23.
- ³⁷ Walter Klier, *Es ist ein gutes Land. Österreich in den neunziger Jahren* (Vienna, 1995), p. 119.
- ³⁸ Klaus Harpprecht, *Am Ende der Gemütlichkeit. Ein österreichisches Tagebuch* (Munich, 1989), p. 18.
- ³⁹ Rolf Steininger, *Austria, Germany and the Cold War: From the Anschluss to the State Treaty, 1938–1955* (New York, 2008), pp. 25, 100.
- ⁴⁰ Gabriele Holzer, *Verfeindete Nachbarn. Österreich – Deutschland. Ein Verhältnis* (Vienna, 1995), p. 144.
- ⁴¹ *Rot-Weiss-Rot-Buch*, Teil 1 (Vienna, 1946), p. 7.
- ⁴² Oliver Rathkolb, *Die paradoxe Republik. Österreich 1945 bis 2010* (Innsbruck, 2011), p. 309.
- ⁴³ Holzer, *Verfeindete Nachbarn*, pp. 25–7.
- ⁴⁴ Laura Alba-Juez, *Perspectives on Discourse Analysis* (Newcastle, 2009), p. 238.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁶ Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, p. 192.
- ⁴⁷ Rudolf de Cillia and Ruth Wodak (eds), *Gedenken im 'Gedankenjahr'. Zur diskursiven Konstruktion österreichischer Identitäten im Jubiläumsjahr 2005* (Innsbruck, 2009), pp. 187–8.
- ⁴⁸ The difficult interplay of family and national history is discussed in Anthony Bushell, 'Family History as National History: Peter Henisch's Novel *Die kleine Figur meines Vaters* and the Issue of Memory in Austria's Second Republic', *Orbis Litterarum*, 59 (2004), 100–13.
- ⁴⁹ Some of these developments in historical practice are discussed by Gerhard Botz in his afterword to the revised edition of Gerhard Botz and

Gerald Sprengnagel (eds), *Kontroversen um Österreichs Zeitgeschichte*, 2nd edn (Frankfurt am Main, 2008). See especially pp. 608–15.

⁵⁰ Gerald Leitner (ed.), 'Was wird das Ausland dazu sagen?' *Literatur und Republik in Österreich nach 1945* (Vienna, 1995), p. 9.

⁵¹ Wolfgang Kos, *Eigenheim Österreich. Zu Politik, Kultur und Alltag nach 1945*, 2nd edn (Vienna, 1995), p. 12.

⁵² The award of the Nobel literature prize to Jelinek in 2004 helped raise and confirm the international status of Austrian literature despite Jelinek's own troubled relationship to the state of Austria. The prospect of Haider's party entering government in 2000 had caused her, so it was reported in the Austrian press in January 2000, to consider leaving the country. She denied claims that she was planning to leave, but newspapers received readers' responses, which split along the lines of those only too pleased to be rid of a state-subsidized artist who was, they claimed, bad-mouthing the country before an international public, and those who pleaded for her to stay and fight on. Jay Julian Rosellini, *Haider, Jelinek, and the Austrian Culture Wars* (Scotts Valley, CA, 2009), pp. 157–8.

⁵³ The first generation of post-war female writers in Austria such as Ingeborg Bachmann, Ilse Aichinger and Marlen Haushofer, would be followed by a very critical generation raised entirely within the life of the Second Republic, including Marianne Gruber, Lilian Faschinger, Elisabeth Reichart, Anna Mitgutsch and Marlene Streeruwitz.

⁵⁴ Allyson Fiddler, *Rewriting Reality: An Introduction to Elfriede Jelinek* (Oxford, 1994), p. 100.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁵⁶ Herbert Zeman (ed.), *Geschichte der Literatur in Österreich*, vol. 7 *Das 20. Jahrhundert* (Graz, 1999), pp. 21–2.

⁵⁷ For further examples see Ricarda Schmidt and Moray McGowan (eds), *From High Priests to Desecrators: Contemporary Austrian Writers* (Sheffield, 1993).

⁵⁸ Rosellini, *Haider, Jelinek, and the Austrian Culture Wars*, p. 194.

⁵⁹ For a discussion of the significance of some of these terms see, for instance, Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke, 2000), p. 211.

⁶⁰ Rudolf de Cillia, *Burenwurscht bleibt Burenwurscht. Sprachenpolitik und gesellschaftliche Mehrsprachigkeit in Österreich* (Klagenfurt, 1998), p. 102. By the 1990s it was clear that the status of the Austrian variation of German

was undergoing a change of perception amongst academic linguists. The changes in those perceptions are discussed in Richard Schrodt, 'Österreichisches Deutsch, Deutsch in Österreich', in Charles V. J. Russ (ed.), *Sprache Kultur Nation* (Hull, 1998), pp. 26–56.

⁶¹ Edward Larkey, 'Austropop: Popular Music and National Identity in Austria', *Popular Music* 11/2 (1992), 151–85 (182).

⁶² <http://www.songtexte.com/songtext/reinhard-fendrich/i-am-from-austria> (with minor textual corrections).

⁶³ For a general discussion of this important theme see Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (eds), *The Americanization/Westernization of Austria* (New Brunswick, 2004).

⁶⁴ Max Nyffeler, *Liedermacher in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Folge 1 (Bonn, 1978), pp. 5–7.

⁶⁵ Vocolka, *Österreichische Geschichte*, p. 124.

⁶⁶ Rathkolb, *Die paradoxe Republik*, p. 338.

⁶⁷ See, for instance, Jan Philipp Reemtsma, 'Wozu Gedenkstätten?' *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 25–6 (2010), 3–9.

⁶⁸ Ernst Hanisch, *Der lange Schatten des Staates. Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1994), pp. 488–9.

⁶⁹ Dieter A. Binder and Ernst Bruckmüller (eds), *Essay über Österreich. Grundfragen von Identität und Geschichte 1918–2000* (Vienna, 2005), p. 113.

⁷⁰ Pelinka, *Zur österreichischen Identität*, p. 151.

⁷¹ Wendelin Schmidt-Dengler, *Bruchlinien. Vorlesungen zur österreichischen Literatur 1945 bis 1990* (Salzburg, 1995), p. 541.

⁷² Klaus Zeyringer, *Österreichische Literatur 1945–1998. Überblicke, Einschnitte, Wegmarken* (Innsbruck, 1999), p. 592.

⁷³ Robert Menasse, *Erklär mir Österreich. Essays zur österreichischen Geschichte* (Frankfurt am Main, 2000), p. 133.

⁷⁴ Raymond Tallis, 'Identity and the mind', in Giselle Walker and Elizabeth Leedham-Green (eds), *Identity* (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 184–207 (p. 206).

⁷⁵ Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, 1992), p. 492.

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INDEX

- 3 November 1918 (Csokor) 137–8
1848 Revolution 77–81, 85, 98, 110, 173
- Adenauer, Konrad 50
Aichinger, Ilse 192, 210
Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) 155
Alps 155, 194, 253
Amann, Klaus 191, 192
America *see* United States
Americanization 249–50
Anders, Günther 192
Anderson, Benedict 60, 65, 108
Andrian-Werbung, Viktor Freiherr von 89–91, 95–6
annexation 18, 23–4, 45, 51–2, 72–3, 85, 127, 140, 150, 152–3, 155, 166–73, 189, 191, 209–10, 237, 240
anthems 35, 186
anti-Semitism 46, 105, 124–5, 137, 142, 165, 171, 202–3, 217, 218, 246
Anzengruber, Ludwig 149, 163
architecture 33–4, 36, 102, 116–17
aristocracy 91, 104
art 177–8, 243–4
Artmann, H. C. 250
Aschner, Isle 224
Auersperg, Graf Anton Alexander 81–5
Austerlitz, Friedrich 148
Austrian Academy of Science 100
Austrian Broadcasting Service 189, 223
Austrian civil war 18–19, 144, 149, 156, 163
Austrian Legion 81
avant-garde 191, 250

Bach, Alexander von 102
Bacher, Eduard 111
Bachmann, Ingeborg 163, 192
Baden 77
Badeni, Count 43, 123–4
Bahr, Hermann 114
banking 57
Bauer, Otto 143–7, 149, 156, 162–3
Bavaria 56, 70
Becher, Ulrich 234–5, 237
Bekennnisbuch österreichischer Dichter 191
Békessy, Imre 112
Belgium 56, 152, 174, 215
Benedictine Order 44
Benedikt, Moritz 111
Benjamin, Walter 107
Berchtold, Leopold Count 134
Berezina, battle of 96
Berger, Stefan 68
Bergmann, Kurt 224
Berlin 100, 101, 126, 152, 175
Berlin Crisis 188
Bernhard, Thomas 38, 118, 168, 244, 245
Beust, Friedrich Ferdinand von 46
Billig, Michael 64
Bismarck, Otto von 94, 99, 126, 142, 149
Bockerer, Der (Becher and Preses) 234–5, 237
Bohemia 83, 86, 123, 135
Bondfield, Margaret 174
Bordieu, Pierre 72
Börne, Ludwig 95
Borodajkewycz, Tara 201–2
bourgeoisie 58, 79, 103–5, 111, 146–7, 148, 149, 163
Brandt, Willie 216
Brass, Paul 65
Bratislava 156
Bregenz 211
Breisgau 56
Breuilly, John 65
Britain *see* United Kingdom
broadcasting 52, 189, 244
Bruckmüller, Ernst 42–3, 155, 251

Bruckner, Anton 163
 Brunner, Karl 71
 Brunswick 56
 Budapest 103
 Bund Deutscher Mädel 177
 Burgenland 19, 35, 148, 211, 212
 Burgtheater 38, 93, 102, 107, 245
 Busek, Erhard 232

Calhoun, Craig 72
 Cameron, Averil 133
 Canada 35
 capitalism 57–9, 105
 Carinthia 61, 62, 155, 209, 211, 229, 245
 Carniola 61
 cartography 71–2
 cartoons 236–7
 Catholicism 17–18, 43–5, 47, 48, 60, 67, 104–5, 139, 149, 156–7, 161, 166–7, 171, 174, 186, 210–11
 censorship 48, 55, 57, 81–3, 95, 110, 190
 Christian Party (CPÖ) 46
 Christian Social Party 105, 123, 141, 171
 Christianity 133; *see also* Catholicism; Protestantism
 Churchill, Winston 129–30
 cinema 36, 41, 52, 176
 City Hall 102, 116–17
 civil service 42, 53, 182–3
 civil war *see* Austrian civil war; Spanish Civil War
 coalition governments 16, 188, 198, 205, 217, 220, 227, 228, 229
 colonialism 60–1, 215; *see also* imperialism
 Communism 59, 144, 150, 151, 154, 162–4, 171, 176, 181, 198; *see also* Marxism
Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels) 143, 162
 Communist Party (KPÖ) 23, 24, 31, 59, 161, 163–4, 187–8
 concentration camps 31, 37, 90, 175, 202
 Conservatism 23, 24, 50, 91, 94, 148–9, 161, 174, 184, 207, 217, 224, 251;
see also People's Party (ÖVP)
 continuity principle 183, 187
 corporate state 24, 80, 92, 147, 157–8, 161, 191, 201
 corruption 112, 134
 Corvinus, Matthias 25
 Counter-Reformation 17, 157

Critical Discourse Analysis 241–2
 Croatia 135, 195
 Csokor, Franz Theodor 137–8
 cultural studies 63
 culture 37, 101, 129, 137, 139, 163, 188–9, 243; *see also* architecture; art;
 film; literature; music; theatre
 Czech language 43, 137
 Czech nationalism 123–4
 Czech Republic 195
 Czechoslovakia 61, 123–4, 137, 143, 146, 149–50, 172, 195, 221; *see also*
 Bohemia; Czech Republic; Moravia; Silesia; Slovakia; Sudetenland
 Czernin, Count 127–9

Dachau 37, 90
 Dahlmann, Friedrich Christoph 88
 Daim, Wilfried 218
 Danube, River 104, 155
 Darwinism 69, 162
 Davies, Norman 154
 Davis, Gustav 111
 De Cillia, Rudolf 241
 Degenhardt, Franz Josef 250
 Deix, Manfred 236–7
 demonstrations *see* street protests
 denial 19–20, 22, 170–1, 178–83, 251
 Deutsch, Julius 156
 dialects 53–4, 61, 97–8, 142, 247–50
 Dichand, Hans 112
 Diderot, Denis 119
Discipline and Punish (Foucault) 130
 distinctiveness principle 183, 187
 Doderer, Heimito von 118
 Dollfuss, Engelbert 19, 24, 92, 147, 156–7, 164, 171, 174, 190, 218
 draft laws (1918) 151–2
Dritte Walpurgisnacht, Die (Kraus) 113
Dunkle Mutter Wien, mein Wien (Heer) 120–1
 Dutch language 61
 duty 167, 223–4

economy 16, 30, 57–9, 97, 184–6, 188, 253
 education 44–5, 53, 55, 60, 73, 78, 156, 174–5, 182, 187, 189, 191–2
 efficacy principle 183, 187

Ehrental, Gabriele Possanner von 175
 Eisenstadt 211
 elections *see* general elections; presidential elections
 electoral posters 43, 148, 203–9, 224
 émigrés *see* exile
 employment 15, 188, 218, 229
 Engels, Friedrich 59, 143, 162
 England *see* United Kingdom
 English language 60, 248–9
 Enlightenment 68
 Erdmann, Karl Dietrich 238
Es geht uns gut (Geiger) 207
 ethnic minorities 42–3, 136, 149, 172, 213–14; *see also* immigration
 ethnic nationalism 94, 142; *see also* Czech nationalism; German nationalism
 Étienne, Michael 110, 111, 112
 Etzersdorfer, Irene 179
 European Recovery Plan 184
 European Union (EU) 31, 32, 185, 195, 208–9, 230, 231–3, 251
 Evans, R. J. W. 79–80
 exile 52–3, 85, 161, 181–3, 215–16
 experimental writing 191, 192

Fackel, Die 110, 113, 125, 158–60
 Fairclough, Norman 241
 Felder, Cajetan 104
 feminism 62
 Fendrich, Rainhard 247–9, 250
 Ferdinand I 98
feuilletons 78, 108, 111, 113–18, 121–5, 126–30, 236
 Ficker, Joseph 77
 Figl, Leopold 22, 36–7, 45–6, 90, 167
 film 36, 41, 52, 176
 Fink, Jodok 141
 First Republic 17, 23–4, 29–30, 37, 43, 61, 66, 81, 133–65, 183–4, 186,
 204, 245
 First World War 127, 130, 134, 138, 141, 176
 Fischer, Ernst 37, 163, 164, 188
 Fischer, Heinz 201–2
 flags 41, 151, 186, 206, 207–9
 folk music 249–50
 football 212
 forgetfulness 19–20, 22, 170–1, 178–83, 207, 251

Foucault, Michel 130
 France 28, 56, 77, 80, 86, 98, 99, 102, 107–10, 151, 174, 200, 215
 Francis I 55, 96
 Franco-Prussian War 88, 94, 99
 Franz Ferdinand, Archduke 127
 Franz Josef I 36, 42, 44, 80, 98–9, 102
 Franzos, Karl Emil 103
 Freedom Party (FPÖ) 16, 31, 50, 78, 155, 172, 197, 203–9, 213, 217,
 227–31, 233, 245, 251
Freiheit, die ich meine, Die (Haider) 50–1
 French Revolution 68, 98, 110
 Freud, Sigmund 69
 Fried, Erich 190
 Friedländer, Max 110, 112
 Fritsch, Gerhard 40–1
 Fuchs, Albert 159–60
 Fussenegger, Gertrud 191

 Gauß, Karl-Markus 153
 Gehring, Rudolf 46
 Geiger, Arno 207
Geistige Strömungen in Österreich (Fuchs) 159, 160
 Gellner, Ernest 59–60, 65, 66
 gender *see* feminism; women
 general elections 16, 31, 50, 62–3, 155, 173, 187–8, 197–8, 203–9, 217, 227–31
 geography 70–2, 193–6
 German language 17, 43, 61–2, 67, 100, 124, 137, 247–9
 German nationalism 89, 94, 142–3, 149, 163, 227–9, 232
 Germany 19, 21, 24–5, 29–30, 33, 45–54, 77–8, 85–9, 98–101, 111, 113,
 126–7, 129, 135–6, 139, 142–7, 149–53, 162–4, 166–74, 180–2, 184–5,
 187–8, 190–3, 195–6, 200, 201, 212, 222, 228, 232, 233, 237–44, 250,
 252–3; *see also* annexation; German language; German nationalism;
 Hitler, Adolf; Prussia; Third Reich
 Glöckel, Otto 44
 Goebbels, Joseph 41
 Golz, Hans-Georg 25
 Gottschee 61–2
 Graff, Michael 224
 Graz University 44
 Green party 206–7, 219
 Grillparzer, Franz 92, 93–8, 124, 163, 183, 207, 248
 Grosby, Steven 63

Groß ist das Erbe (Fritsch) 40–1
 Gruber, Karl 222
 Grün, Anastasius 81–5, 118, 163

 Haas, Hanns 229
 habitus 72
 Habitzel, Kurt 83
 Habsburg, Otto von 197, 232
 Habsburg dynasty 28, 74, 80, 94, 99, 135, 141–2, 146, 162
 Habsburg Empire 17, 25, 51, 56, 61, 66, 68, 81, 86, 129, 133–6, 138–9
 Habsburg myth 139
 Hacoheh, Malachi Haim 138
 Haider, Jörg 16, 20–1, 31, 50–1, 62, 155, 172, 198–9, 205, 208, 220–1,
 227–31, 239, 244–6
 Haller, Günter 110
 Hammer, Hofrat von 81
 Handke, Peter 38–9, 244
 Hanisch, Ernst 251
 Hansemann, David 88
 Harley, J. B. 71
 Harpprecht, Klaus 239
 Haslinger, Josef 224
Haus der Kindheit (Mitgutsch) 40, 176–8
 Hauser, Gerald 204
 Haydn, Joseph 98, 189
 Hecker, Friedrich 77
 Heer, Freidrich 45, 89, 120–1, 144, 159, 186, 253
Heimat 28, 36, 192, 208, 249
 Heldenplatz 38, 167–8, 201, 239
Heldenplatz (Bernhard) 38, 118, 168, 245
 Henisch, Peter 178–9, 200
Henry v (Shakespeare) 68
 Henz, Rudolf 191, 244
 Herder, Johann Gottfried 67–8, 165
Herr Karl, Der (Qualtinger and Metz) 235–6, 237
 Herloßsohn, Carl 83
 Herzl, Theodor 124–5, 138
 historical monuments 36
 historical novels 83
 Hitler, Adolf 38, 56, 62, 105, 120–1, 140, 150, 158, 160–1, 166–9, 170,
 171, 190–1, 201, 223, 229, 239; *see also* annexation; Germany;
 Nazism; Third Reich

Hobsbawm, Eric 58, 65
Hofmannsthal, Hugo von 53, 96, 139
Holland *see* Netherlands
Holzer, Gabriele 239–40
Holy Roman Emperor, title of 29, 86
Hötzendorf, Franz Freiherr Conrad von 134
Hroch, Miroslav 58–9
Hungarian uprising 187
Hungary 39, 86, 100, 129, 134, 135–6, 143, 146, 171, 195
Hurdes, Felix 73–4

'I am from Austria' (Fendrich) 247–9, 250
Ich bin eine Frau (Straus) 175–6
identity process theory 183–4, 186–7
immigration 103, 104–5, 137, 197, 212–14
Imperial Residence 102, 176
imperialism 129–30, 215; *see also* colonialism
industrialization 57, 59–60, 91, 100, 172
Innerhofer, Franz 40
Innitzer, Theodor 166, 201
Innsbruck 204, 209, 227
Innsbruck University 44, 127, 194, 239
intellectual classes 91, 92, 10, 102, 149–50
investment 184
Israel 217
Italy 30, 56, 62, 99, 140, 185, 194, 195

Jägerstätter, Franz 171
Jameson, Fredric 63
Jandl, Ernst 168
Jelinek, Elfriede 213, 244–6
Jesuit Order 17, 44–5, 165
Jews 31, 103–6, 111–12, 124–5, 136–40, 144, 159, 161, 165, 167, 172–3,
176–8, 182, 203, 212, 216–18, 224
Jonas, Franz 17, 18
Joseph II 27, 44, 89
journalism 105–6, 108, 110–13, 123, 125, 182, 202, 244
journals 77–9
July Revolution 56

Kafka, Franz 96, 137
Kaiser Wilhelm *see* Wilhelm II

Karl I 141–2
 Kärnten 61, 62, 155, 209, 211, 229, 245
 Kickl, Herbert 197
 Kiel 152
 Kindermann, Heinz 191, 252
 Kirchschräger, Rudolf 199
 Kirchweyer, Ernst 202
 Klahr, Alfred 161–3
 Klaus, Josef 21–2, 188, 217
Kleine Figur meines Vaters, Die (Henisch) 178–9
 Kleist, Heinrich von 119
 Klier, Walter 239
 Klima, Viktor 233
 Kompert, Leopold 103
 Koplenig, Johann 163–4
 Königgrätz, battle of 29, 99, 101
 Körner, Theodor 42
 Kos, Wolfgang 243
 Kossuth, Lajos 95
 Krain 61
 Kraus, Karl 103, 110, 112–13, 120, 125, 127, 158–61, 163, 234, 246
 Kreisky, Bruno 23, 103, 200, 215–20
 Krieghofer, Gerald 125
 Kulturkampf 47, 149
Kurier, Der 202
 Kürnberger, Ferdinand 121–3

 Lammasch, Heinrich 125, 127–9
Land ohne Eigenschaften, Das (Menasse) 180, 225–6
 languages 42–3, 59–62, 70, 100, 123–4, 247–50; *see also* dialects;
 linguistic minorities
 Latin 60
 Latour, Count Theodor Baillet von 78
 Le Goff, Jacques 251
 Lenin, Vladimir 162
 Leopold II 71
 Lernet-Holenia, Alexander 51–2, 168–9
Letzten Tage der Menschheit, Die (Kraus) 120
 Liberal International 228
 Liberal Party 105
 Liberales Forum 228
 Lichtenstein 195

linguistic minorities 42–3, 136, 213–14
 Linz 156, 167, 172
 Lippmann, Walter 140
 literacy 60, 77
 literature 28, 36, 38, 40–1, 53–4, 55–8, 72, 83, 118–21, 139, 189–92, 193,
 239, 243–6, 250, 252–3
 little man, figure of 227, 233–6
 Loewenstein, Karl 174
 London 26–7, 98, 159
 Louis-Philippe I 56, 77
 Lueger, Karl 46, 104–5
 Luther, Kurt Richard 199
 Luther, Martin 17
 Luxemburg, Rosa 23, 59

Mädchen aus der Feenwelt, Das (Raimund) 53–4
 Magris, Claudio 139
 Maimann, Helene 166
 Mann, Thomas 27–8, 72, 180–81
Mann ohne Eigenschaften, Der (Musil) 119, 180
 Mannheim 77
 maps 71–2
 Maria Theresia 44, 60, 89, 98
 Marin, Bernd 203
 Marshall Plan 184
 Marx, Karl 59, 65, 143, 162
 Marxism 50, 59, 143, 159, 161–2, 164–5, 181, 198; *see also* Communism
 Massary, Fritzi 175–6
 Matejka, Viktor 37, 188
 Mathy, Karl 77
 Mautner, Franz H. 169
Mein Kampf (Hitler) 105
Meistersinger von Nürnberg, Die (Wagner) 157
 Meitner, Lise 175
 Mell, Max 191, 244
 memory studies 251
 Menasse, Robert 20, 179–80, 225–6, 253
 Mercier, Louis-Sébastien 108–9, 110
 Merkatz, Karl 235
 Metternich, Klemens von 46, 48, 55–6, 57, 78, 83–4, 95
 Metz, Carl 235–6, 237
 middle classes *see* bourgeoisie

Miller, David 65
 Mitgutsch, Anna 40, 176–8
 modernism 65, 66
 Modood, Tariq 68
 Moore, Samuel 162
 Moravia 123, 135, 153
 Moscow declaration 170–1
 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus 189
 Müller, Adam 46
 Müller, Karl 190, 191
 Münch-Bellinghausen, Freiherr 92–3
 Munich 81
 music 52, 102, 114, 163, 189, 247–50
 Musikverein 102, 189
 Musil, Robert 119, 180
 Mussolini, Benito 62, 140
 Muzicant, Ariel 217–18

 ‘Nachrichten aus Cochinchina’ (Grillparzer) 95–8
 Nadler, Josef 191, 252
 Napoleon I 28, 46, 56, 96
 Napoleon III 80
 national anthem 35, 186
 national identity 33–9, 45, 58–9, 63–74, 77, 155, 162–5, 177, 193–4, 246–7
 National Socialism *see* Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
 (NSDAP); Nazism
 nationalism 28, 35, 50, 58–60, 63–8; *see also* Czech nationalism; ethnic
 nationalism; German nationalism
 Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) 81, 177, 191–2,
 201, 222, 228, 240
 NATO 187, 196, 231–2
 Nazi Party *see* Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP);
 Nazism
 Nazism 18, 19, 41, 51–4, 68, 69, 80, 113, 150, 155, 159–61, 164, 166,
 170–2, 177–8, 181, 190–2, 198, 201–2, 209–10, 216, 218, 222–4, 229,
 231, 234, 236–7, 240, 244–6, 250
 neonazism 201
 Nestroy, Johann 57–8, 115–16, 163, 169, 234
 Netherlands 18, 34, 64, 174, 193, 215
Neue Freie Presse 110–11, 112, 114, 116, 124
Neue Kronen-Zeitung 111–12, 225
 Neustädter-Stürmer, Odo 157–8

neutrality 15, 30, 231–2, 240
Nevveu de Rameau, Le (Diderot) 119
 New Year's concerts 52, 189, 253
 newspapers *see* journalism
 Noricum scandal 199
 nuclear power plants 200–1
 Nyffeler, Max 249

occupation 18, 30, 31, 181–2, 198, 210, 219, 249–50
 Olah, Franz 198
Österreichische Kronen-Zeitung 111
 Otto III 71
 Ötzi (mummified body) 194
 Özkirimli, Umut 65–6

Palace of Justice 19, 148
 Palestine 217
 pamphlets 78, 85, 89–91
 Paris 56, 77, 98, 102, 107–9, 110
 Parliament buildings 102
 Patriotic Front 157, 161
 Paul VI, Pope 17, 18
 Pelinka, Anton 21, 43, 170–1, 237–8, 251–2
 PEN movement 168, 190–1, 245
 Penz, August 204
 People's Party (ÖVP) 16, 22–3, 50, 78, 188, 198–9, 201, 205–7, 218,
 221–2, 224, 227–9, 232; *see also* Conservatism
 personal identity 253–4
Pfarrer von Kirchfeld, Der (Anzengruber) 149
 Pfizer, Paul 88
 Plato 119
 Poland 56, 136, 146, 161, 172
Politik der Gefühle (Haslinger) 224
 Polsterer, Ludwig 202
 Ponger, Lisl 213
 popular music 247–9
 Portisch, Hugo 202, 204
 Portuguese language 60
 postcolonialism 63
 postmodernism 63, 70, 71–2
 poststructuralism 63
 Prague 137, 149–50

Prague Spring 188, 221
 Preses, Peter 234–5, 237
 presidential elections 20, 31, 46, 206, 221–5, 239–40
Presse, Die 21, 110–11, 116
 Primer, Walter 155
 print-language 60, 108
 printing 60, 77–9, 81–6, 91, 108, 110
 proclamation (1945) 151, 152–3
 proletariat *see* working classes
 ‘Proporz’ 188, 244
 Protestantism 68, 86, 112, 164, 174
 provincial identities *see* regional identities
 Prussia 27, 29, 47, 54, 56, 87–8, 94–5, 99–100, 110, 129, 142, 149; *see also*
 Germany
 Pusch, Hans 221

Qualtinger, Helmut 235–6, 237

Raab, Julius 22, 40
 Ragusa 190–1, 245
 railways 57, 99
 Raimund, Ferdinand 53–4, 55–6, 163
 Rathkolb, Oliver 111, 240, 251
 Red Army 31, 152, 171, 187
 Redlich, Josef 134–6, 224–5
 Reformation 17, 157
 regional identities 64, 154–5, 209–11
 Rehor, Grete 174
 religion 17–18, 43–6, 133, 185, 210–11; *see also* Catholicism; Protestantism
 Renan, Ernest 45
 Renner, Karl 42, 60, 68–70, 144, 153–4, 162–3, 166, 173, 184
Republic, The (Plato) 119
 restitution of property 176–8, 242–3
 Revolutionary Socialism 165
 Richter, Elsie 175
 Riefenstahl, Leni 41
 Rilke, Rainer Maria 137
 Ringstrasse 102, 103, 104, 116, 119–20
 Rochefort, Henri 110
 Roma 172
 Romania 79, 195
Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch 240

Roth, Joseph 139
 Rühm, Gerhard 250
 Rupp, Dorothea 177
 Russia 92, 143, 162; *see also* Soviet Union
 Russian Revolution 143, 162

 Sachs, Hans 157
 St Stephen's Cathedral 102, 120–1, 197
 Salzburg 44, 56, 139, 209
 satire 233–7
 Scala Theatre 234
 scandals 198, 199–203, 217
 Schäffle, Albert 47
 Scharang, Michael 122
 Schärf, Adolf 40, 42
 Schattendorf 19, 148
 Schiller, Friedrich 67, 73–4
 Schlegel, Friedrich Wilhelm 46, 47–50, 101
 Schmidt, Heide 228
 Schmidt-Dengler, Wendelin 139
 Schnitzler, Arthur 103, 163
 Schoeller, Johann Christian 79
 Schöffel, Josef 125–6
Schöne Tage (Innerhofer) 40
 Schröer, Karl Julius 61–2
 Schubert, Franz 163, 189
 Schuselka, Franz 85–9
 Schuschnigg, Kurt 24, 30, 45, 88–9, 147, 165, 166, 171
 Schlüssel, Wolfgang 15, 16–17, 18, 22, 57, 207–8, 253
 Schwarzwald, Eugenie 175
Schwierige, Der (Hofmannsthal) 53
 Sebald, W. G. 28
 Second Republic 17, 19–22, 24, 30–1, 43, 45–6, 61, 154, 170–92,
 194–214, 215–54
 Second World War 21, 31, 129–30, 152, 161, 170–2, 217, 222–5
 Sedlnitzky, Count 81–3
 Segar, Kenneth 139
 Seipel, Ignaz 43, 148–9
 self-esteem principle 183, 187
 Serbia 134
 Shakespeare, William 68, 159
 Sibilina, Enrico 156

Sievers, Wiebke 212
 Silesia 135
 Sinowatz, Fred 221
 Sinti 172
 Slovakia 65, 136, 156, 195; *see also* Czechoslovakia
 Slovenia 61, 65, 136, 195, 229
 Slovenian language 42–3, 61–2, 229
 Smith, Anthony D. 66
 social class 19, 143, 147–8, 154; *see also* aristocracy; bourgeoisie;
 intellectual classes; working classes
 Social Democrats (SDAP) 23, 143–7, 149, 156, 159, 162
 Socialism 23, 24, 50, 59, 143–7, 148–50, 153, 163–4, 167, 176, 184, 198, 251
 Socialist Party (SPÖ) 16, 23, 105, 163, 188, 198–9, 205–6, 215, 221, 225,
 227–9, 231
 Solferino, battle of 99
 South Tyrol 30, 62, 140, 194, 195
 Soviet Union 30, 31, 65, 152, 173, 184, 219, 221; *see also* Russia
 Spain 18–19, 64
 Spanish Civil War 18–19
 Spanish language 60
 Speidel, Ludwig 114–16
 Spitzer, Daniel 116–18, 121
 Stalin, Joseph 162
 Ständestaat *see* corporate state
Ständestaat Österreich, Der (Neustädter-Stürmer) 158
 State Treaty 18, 38–9, 170, 187, 219, 242
 Steger, Norbert 227
 Steininger, Rolf 239
 Sierle, Karlheinz 107
 Stourzh, Gerald 63
 Strache, Heinz-Christian 203, 208–9
 Straus, Oscar 175–6
 Strauß, Johann 163, 189
 street protests 19, 79, 147–8, 173, 202, 226
 Stögner, Karin 203
 strikes 156, 198
 strolling, trope of 82, 118, 119–20
Strudlhofstiege, Die (Doderer) 118
 Struve, Gustav von 77
 student activism 78, 200, 201–2
Stunde, Die 112
 Styria 155, 211

Sudetenland 61, 150
 Suttner, Bertha Freifrau von 175
 Switzerland 19, 29, 78, 111, 142, 161, 181, 195
 Szporluk, Roman 162

taboo 21, 87, 169, 170, 179
 Taylor, Charles 253
 theatre 38, 53–4, 55–8, 93, 107, 114–16, 137–8, 149, 234–6
 Third Reich 17, 36, 167–9, 170–2, 176, 180, 210, 222, 223, 239–40,
 242–3; *see also* annexation; Germany; Nazism
Times, The 26–7, 111
 Timms, Edward 113, 124, 159
 tourism 189, 244, 253
 trade 16, 185
 trade unions 171, 198
 transport 57, 99, 172, 185
 Treaty of Saint-Germain 29, 67, 129, 140, 224
 Treaty of Trianon 129, 140
 Treaty of Versailles 129
Triumph des Willens (Riefenstahl) 41
 Tucholsky, Kurt 160–1
 Turks 197, 212–13
Turm, Der 51–2, 168–9
 Turrini, Peter 39
 Tuvora, Josef 92–3
 Tyrol 56, 155, 209

Über das Marionettentheater (Kleist) 119
 unemployment 15, 188, 205
 United Kingdom 26–7, 64, 78, 89, 98, 173–4, 181, 184–5, 208, 215, 228,
 241
 United Nations 16, 185, 221
 United States 85, 161, 181, 184, 190, 221, 249–50
 universities 44, 53, 78, 174–5, 183, 191–2, 201–2

Valéry, Paul 107
 Van der Bellen, Alexander 207
 Van Ostrom, Frits 193
 Van Veldecke, Hendrick 193
 Vaterländische Front *see* Patriotic Front
 Vatican 17, 44, 127, 149, 156
 Venice 89, 99

Verband der Unabhängigen (vdU) 228
 victim thesis 170, 179–80, 224–5, 239, 249
 Vienna 17, 19, 46–7, 52, 57, 70, 78–9, 98, 101–6, 110–30, 148, 155,
 167–8, 172, 197, 209, 211, 212–13, 234–5, 250
 Vienna Group 250
 Vienna University 44, 47, 102, 159, 174, 175, 201
 law graduates of 85, 89, 104, 127, 144, 153, 157, 216, 227
 Vilain, Robert 107
 Vocolka, Karl 228–9, 251
 Vogelsang, Karl von 46
Volksstück 56, 58
 Voltaire 95
 Vorarlberg 45, 56, 142, 207, 211
 voting rights 20, 54, 98, 173–4
 Vranitzky, Franz 24, 179–80, 206, 209, 225

 Wagner, Richard 157
 Waldheim, Kurt 20–1, 31, 78, 180, 202, 206, 220–6, 236–7, 239–40,
 244–6
Wallensteins Tod (Schiller) 73–4
 war crimes 170, 221, 222
 Warsaw 161
 Waldheim, Sissy 177
 Wehdorn, Manfred 36
 Wehler, Hans-Ulrich 77
 Weiss, Hilde 203
 welfare system 15, 187, 227
 Werfel, Franz 139
 Wicker, Hans-Rudolf 67
 Wiedenhofer, Siegfried 210
 Wiese, Benno von 191–2
 Wiesenthal, Simon 217
 Wilhelm II 141, 143
 Wilson, Woodrow 70, 140, 142
 Windisch-Graetz, Prince 155
 Winter, Ernst-Karl 161–2, 164–5
 winter sports 189
 Wodak, Ruth 241
Wohnung ist zu vermieten in der Stadt, Eine (Nestroy) 234
 women 62–3, 173–8, 180, 206, 242, 244
 Workers' Revolutionary Councils 143
 working classes 105, 143, 150, 163, 164–5, 171, 216

World War I *see* First World War
World War II *see* Second World War

Yugoslavia 16, 61, 62, 180, 195, 221, 229; *see also* Croatia; Serbia; Slovenia

Zang, August 110–11

Zeyringer, Klaus 72

Zweig, Stefan 139