




Othering
& Belonging
Institute

2019 Inclusiveness Index

Measuring Global Inclusion and Marginality



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The Othering & Belonging Institute at UC Berkeley, formerly the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society, is a vibrant hub of researchers, community leaders, policymakers, artists, and communicators that advances research, policy, and work related to marginalized communities. It engages in innovative narrative, communications, and cultural strategies that attempt to re-frame the public discourse around marginality and inclusion and respond to issues that require immediate and long-term action.

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The full report and database are online at belonging.berkeley.edu/inclusivenessindex.

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Introduction

The fundamental question of “who belongs?” is an increasingly acute one in every part of the globe. Matters of identity divide societies on every inhabited continent. Religion, ethnicity, skin color, age, sexual orientation, and race, among other identity groups, are shaping politics everywhere. Societies are polarizing around these fundamental axes, as demagogic political leaders promise to keep outsiders away. Xenophobia is on the rise, and anti-immigrant sentiment swells in a period of mass migration.

To what extent do societies, fracturing along these dimensions of difference, strive or even successfully bridge these social cleavages with fair and inclusive policies? In this, our fourth annual Inclusiveness Index report, we strive to answer this question, not simply by reference to particular policies or initiatives, but by examining the data to track how marginalized populations actually fare relative to dominant groups.

The Othering & Belonging Institute’s Inclusiveness Index is one of the first indices that measures equity without regard for national wealth or economic conditions. One of the challenges in measuring inclusivity is that it is difficult to disentangle policies aimed at inclusivity from the investments and resources available to marginalized communities. They are often the same and can be conflated. We surmount this challenge by focusing on policies, laws, and outcomes rather than government expenditures or investments. The Inclusiveness Index is uniquely focused on the degree of inclusion and marginality rather than a more general assessment of group-based well-being.

In addition to assessing how inclusive various societies are, the Inclusiveness Index serves as a diagnostic tool. It helps us identify places and societies that are improving, in terms of developing a more inclusive polity and set of institutions, and those places where societies are fracturing and becoming more divided along these lines. The data tells the main story, but we also seek to surface stories and trends that lie beneath the data.

In our conception, inclusiveness entails access to power and public and private resources, and improves the way society views marginalized group members. Inclusivity is realized when historically or currently marginalized groups feel valued, when differences are respected, and when basic and fundamental needs and rights—relative to those societies’ dominant groups—are met and recognized. Our index focuses on social groups rather than individuals, as marginality often occurs as a result of group membership.

We operationalize this definition of “inclusivity” by focusing primarily on the performance of groups that span salient social cleavages, such as gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation. We realize that such an approach cannot fully account for the unquantifiable or more qualitative aspects of belonging and inclusivity. For that reason, each version of the Inclusiveness Index report highlights stories and themes that go beyond the data.

Thus, our themes and findings sections look for patterns or stories that lay behind the data and touch on issues of inclusivity both across the globe and within the United States. Our 2016 report examined the global migrant crisis, while our 2017 report focused on the rise of ethnonationalism, and our 2018 report surveyed the reckoning brought about by the global #MeToo movement and the growing global water crises. This report takes a closer look at the role of social media in spreading hate and falsehoods, and how global leaders are responding. We also look at democratic backsliding across the globe and in the United States, political corruption, and food insecurity.

As always, a word of caution: Our rankings are not the final word on inclusivity nor a definitive assessment of any national or state performance. Rather, they are intended to spark a conversation and generate further inquiry into how and why some places, communities, and nations are more inclusive than others.

Please be sure to send us your suggestions, feedback, and ideas. Additional information about this project, including past reports and downloadable data files, is available at belonging.berkeley.edu/inclusivenessindex.

Inclusiveness Indicators

Developing an index that is capable of measuring inclusivity and marginality across many of the full range of human differences is an immense challenge. The Inclusiveness Index attempts to meet this challenge by selecting universal indicators that reflect group-based marginality in any context. In addition, the Inclusiveness Index relies on data sets for those indicators that can be measured across a range of social groupings.

In developing this index, we were guided by the conviction that multifactor indices paint a more vivid portrait of underlying structural conditions and forms of advantage and disadvantage experienced by marginalized groups than any single indicator, such as poverty or per capita GDP. Single indicator metrics fail to capture the myriad of inputs that shape individual and group life chances.¹ As a multifactor index that incorporates six core indicators of inclusivity, each indicator is given a preassigned weight within the Inclusiveness Index.

Another practical criterion for inclusion was that each indicator had to be scalable to the global level. Developing a global country ranking would not be possible if similar data sets did not exist for a sufficient number of countries to justify a global ranking. Not only are there a multiplicity of measures across nations for similar information, but some countries track and collect data sets that others do not. We were also limited by data sets that were commensurate or comparable across geographies and national boundaries.

Finally, we wanted our indicators to reflect cultural norms, policies, laws, and institutional practices rather than economic strength or tax base capacity. Otherwise, any measure or ranking of inclusivity risks becoming a function of national wealth. In the Inclusiveness Index, the poorest nations on the planet are capable of faring best in terms of inclusivity, while the wealthiest are capable of faring the worst. Insofar as possible, the indicators are noneconomic, and not proxies for governmental expenditures or investments in human capital, but rather reflect legal and institutional regimes.

In reviewing the range of possible indicators for the Inclusiveness Index, we ultimately selected six domains that we believe reflect the inclusivity or exclusion of marginalized populations: out-group violence, political representation, income inequality, antidiscrimination laws, rates of incarceration, and immigration or asylum policies. We explain the selection of these domains immediately below. Within these domains, we selected indicators that measure how various demographic subgroups fare, including by gender; LGBTQ populations; people with disabilities; and racial, ethnic, and religious subgroups.

Outgroup Violence

Out-group violence is a direct indicator of group marginalization and oppression. Disproportionate violence suffered by discrete social groups reflects prejudice toward those groups as well as group vulnerability. For example, in the United States, lynching of African Americans in the early twentieth century or assaults on LGBTQ people in more recent decades reflects both prejudice as well as vulnerability. This is also true internationally, where ethnic or religious conflict may result in violence and fatalities, with genocide being an extreme expression.²




Political Representation

Political representation and the extent to which citizens are able to participate in governance is another strong indicator of group-based marginality or relative inclusion. In democratic societies, ethnic, racial, or religious majorities are capable of outvoting minority groups in electoral politics. This can result in underrepresentation of minority groups. Similarly, if certain groups are marginalized within a society, even if they are not a numerical minority, we might also expect members of those groups to be underrepresented in electoral politics. If members of certain groups, such as women or religious or racial minorities, are consistently underrepresented in elected bodies, that is often suggestive of marginality. Although there may be limited choices ideologically or between political affiliation and party membership in some nations, there may still be a choice among social group membership. Political representation among appointed representatives is less indicative of marginality than representation among elected representatives because, in the case of appointments, democratic majorities lack direct say. For that reason, we only look at elected officials rather than appointments.



Income Inequality

Group-level income inequality is a revealing indicator of group-based marginality. It not only reflects discrimination in the provision of educational resources, investment in human capital, and employment opportunities, but may also be indicative of discrimination in private markets and segregation in social networks.³ The degree of income inequality within a nation or state is not dependent upon the size of the economy or the wealth of a nation, but is rather a function of political institutions, cultural norms, and law.⁴ In other words, group-level income inequality does not depend on the size of the economic pie, but the distribution of that pie among groups.



Anti-Discrimination Laws

The presence of antidiscrimination laws protecting marginalized groups is another direct indicator of institutional inclusion. Examples include laws that prohibit government and private discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, disability, religion, gender, or sexual orientation. Explicit protections for marginalized populations and social groups through antidiscrimination laws reflect not only a society's commitment to equality norms for minority or marginalized groups, but also the presence of a discriminatory problem requiring a policy and legal response. Enacting antidiscrimination laws is not an easy task, especially where a marginalized group is an unpopular minority or lacks political clout or influence.⁵ Such laws often reflect broad consensus about the moral and practical necessity of enacting such protections.



Rates of Incarceration


Marginality and inclusivity are often most dramatically evident in a nation's use of criminal law enforcement and incarceration differential rates. Criminal law reflects the cultural norms and values of the dominant group, and its enforcement through incarceration and other forms of criminal punishment are often inflected with social biases. Even in the absence of state oppression against minority or marginalized populations, incarceration rates may reflect cultural or social prejudices that disparately impact marginalized groups. Rates of incarceration more broadly reflect institutional and legal structures that impede inclusivity.



Rates of incarceration vary dramatically from state to state domestically and country to country globally. Lower rates of incarceration are sometimes reflective of more inclusive cultural norms generally, and an emphasis on rehabilitation and reentry over retribution and punishment. Differential rates of incarceration across subgroups, specifically, serve as an indirect measure of cultural perceptions of those subgroups and their relative social position within a society. For especially marginalized social groups, criminal law is a tool of social control that may result in higher rates of incarceration and punishment. This is why differential rates of incarceration by group is an indicator of inclusivity within the Index.


Immigration / Asylum Policies


Another indicator of a society's degree of inclusiveness and group-based marginality within it is the society's or nation's immigration or asylum policies. These policies are reflective of the values and perspectives of the society vis-à-vis the marginalized group and how welcoming or tolerant the dominant group is of out-groups. For example, Uganda has made hosting refugees a core national policy, making it "one of the most welcoming countries in the world."⁶ As an example of exclusionary immigration policies, the United States infamously had the Chinese Exclusion Act, quotas on many ethnic and racial groups, and a blanket prohibition on African immigration shortly after its founding. Strains of nativism and xenophobia tend to not only reflect the openness of a society with respect to the immigrant group, but also the degree of inclusivity within a society.



Each of these indicators reveals something distinctive about a nation's or state's inclusiveness. Finding data sources and measures for each indicator among many nations is a challenge, but not an impossibility. A complete list of measures used for each indicator and a description of sources is provided in the appendix of this report along with a more detailed explanation of the index calculation methodology.

Global Inclusiveness Rankings 2019





Global Inclusiveness Rankings 2019

| COUNTRY NAME | RAW SCORE | SCALED SCORE | CATEGORY CHANGE | COUNTRY NAME | RAW SCORE | SCALED SCORE | CATEGORY CHANGE |
|----------------|-----------|--------------|-----------------|------------------------|-----------|--------------|-----------------|
| Netherlands | 1.4489 | 100.00 | ● | Belgium | 0.5192 | 63.94 | ● |
| Sweden | 0.9984 | 82.53 | ● | South Africa | 0.5131 | 63.70 | ● |
| Norway | 0.9508 | 80.68 | ● | Australia | 0.5108 | 63.61 | ● |
| Portugal | 0.7934 | 74.57 | ● | Argentina | 0.4898 | 62.80 | ● |
| Ireland | 0.7541 | 73.05 | ● | Albania | 0.4771 | 62.30 | ● |
| United Kingdom | 0.7447 | 72.69 | ● | Czech Republic | 0.4683 | 61.96 | ● |
| Canada | 0.6605 | 69.42 | ● | Dominican Republic | 0.4599 | 61.64 | ● |
| Finland | 0.6469 | 68.89 | ● | Lesotho | 0.4367 | 60.74 | ● |
| Luxembourg | 0.6144 | 67.63 | + | France | 0.4318 | 60.55 | ↑ |
| Denmark | 0.6127 | 67.56 | ● | Bolivia | 0.4267 | 60.35 | ● |
| Germany | 0.6038 | 67.22 | ● | Japan | 0.4158 | 59.93 | ● |
| Austria | 0.5492 | 65.10 | ● | Italy | 0.4149 | 59.89 | ● |
| Croatia | 0.5246 | 64.15 | ● | Lithuania | 0.4034 | 59.45 | ↑ |
| Estonia | 0.3954 | 59.14 | ↓ | Serbia | 0.2329 | 52.83 | ● |
| Switzerland | 0.3946 | 59.11 | ● | Honduras | 0.2202 | 52.34 | ● |
| Fiji | 0.3778 | 58.45 | ↓ | Madagascar | 0.2126 | 52.05 | ● |
| Slovenia | 0.3569 | 57.64 | ● | Liberia | 0.2081 | 51.87 | ● |
| Costa Rica | 0.3400 | 56.99 | ● | Tanzania | 0.1988 | 51.51 | ● |
| Mongolia | 0.3224 | 56.30 | ● | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 0.1775 | 50.69 | ● |
| Cyprus | 0.3021 | 55.52 | ● | Djibouti | 0.1667 | 50.27 | + |
| Ghana | 0.2950 | 55.24 | ● | Burkina Faso | 0.1644 | 50.18 | ↑ |
| Namibia | 0.2516 | 53.56 | ● | Malawi | 0.1562 | 49.86 | ● |
| Paraguay | 0.2489 | 53.45 | ● | Senegal | 0.1549 | 49.81 | ↑ |
| Poland | 0.2474 | 53.40 | ● | Sierra Leone | 0.1429 | 49.34 | ↑↑ |
| Ecuador | 0.2438 | 53.26 | ● | Chile | 0.1335 | 48.98 | ● |
| Uruguay | 0.2398 | 53.10 | ● | Hungary | 0.1332 | 48.97 | ↑ |

| Legend (Change from 2018) | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| ● | No change |
| ↓ | Moved one category down |
| ↓↓ | Moved two categories down |
| ↑ | Moved one category up |
| ↑↑ | Moved two categories up |
| + | Added |

| COUNTRY NAME | RAW SCORE | SCALED SCORE | CATEGORY CHANGE |
|------------------|-----------|--------------|-----------------|
| Nicaragua | 0.1212 | 48.50 | ● |
| Mozambique | 0.1191 | 48.42 | ↓ |
| Slovakia | 0.1137 | 48.21 | ● |
| Armenia | 0.1081 | 47.99 | ● |
| Burundi | 0.1058 | 47.91 | ● |
| Belarus | 0.0972 | 47.57 | ● |
| Spain | 0.0895 | 47.27 | ↓ |
| Philippines | 0.0836 | 47.04 | ↓ |
| Gabon | 0.0500 | 45.74 | + |
| Colombia | 0.0453 | 45.56 | ● |
| Mali | 0.0381 | 45.28 | ● |
| Greece | 0.0367 | 45.22 | ● |
| Zimbabwe | 0.0298 | 44.96 | ● |
| El Salvador | -0.0640 | 41.32 | ● |
| North Macedonia | -0.0666 | 41.22 | ↓ |
| Montenegro | -0.0724 | 40.99 | + |
| Ethiopia | -0.0766 | 40.83 | ↓ |
| Papua New Guinea | -0.0904 | 40.29 | ↓ |
| Gambia | -0.0956 | 40.09 | ● |
| Benin | -0.0961 | 40.07 | ↓ |
| East Timor | -0.1006 | 39.90 | ● |
| Cote d'Ivoire | -0.1007 | 39.90 | ● |
| Romania | -0.1240 | 38.99 | ● |
| Lebanon | -0.1756 | 36.99 | ● |
| Chad | -0.1802 | 36.81 | ● |
| China | -0.1864 | 36.57 | ● |

| | | | |
|-------------------|---------|-------|----|
| Kazakhstan | -0.3531 | 30.10 | ↓ |
| Israel | -0.3596 | 29.85 | ● |
| India | -0.3643 | 29.67 | ● |
| Indonesia | -0.3847 | 28.88 | ● |
| Guatemala | -0.4058 | 28.06 | ● |
| Republic of Congo | -0.4298 | 27.13 | ● |
| Egypt | -0.4514 | 26.29 | ● |
| Botswana | -0.4528 | 26.24 | ● |
| Guinea | -0.4595 | 25.98 | ● |
| Russia | -0.4986 | 24.46 | ● |
| Kyrgyzstan | -0.5146 | 23.84 | ● |
| Togo | -0.5229 | 23.52 | ↓↓ |
| Mauritania | -0.5740 | 21.54 | ↓ |

| COUNTRY NAME | RAW SCORE | SCALED SCORE | CATEGORY CHANGE |
|--------------------------|-----------|--------------|-----------------|
| Kenya | 0.0175 | 44.48 | + |
| Zambia | 0.0154 | 44.40 | ● |
| United States | 0.0149 | 44.38 | ● |
| Panama | 0.0029 | 43.91 | ● |
| Solomon Islands | -0.0195 | 43.04 | + |
| Latvia | -0.0232 | 42.90 | ● |
| Bulgaria | -0.0251 | 42.83 | ● |
| Mauritius | -0.0268 | 42.76 | ↓ |
| Haiti | -0.0309 | 42.60 | ↑ |
| Peru | -0.0321 | 42.55 | ● |
| Niger | -0.0389 | 42.29 | ● |
| Mexico | -0.0476 | 41.95 | ↑ |
| Vietnam | -0.0638 | 41.33 | ● |
| Uganda | -0.2002 | 36.03 | ● |
| Sri Lanka | -0.2353 | 34.67 | ● |
| Guinea-Bissau | -0.2423 | 34.40 | ● |
| Cameroon | -0.2479 | 34.18 | ● |
| Nigeria | -0.2577 | 33.80 | ● |
| Bangladesh | -0.2578 | 33.80 | ● |
| Georgia | -0.2653 | 33.51 | ● |
| Moldova | -0.2706 | 33.30 | ↑ |
| Turkey | -0.2771 | 33.05 | ● |
| Ukraine | -0.3040 | 32.01 | ● |
| Brazil | -0.3061 | 31.93 | ● |
| Tunisia | -0.3348 | 30.81 | ● |
| Thailand | -0.3376 | 30.71 | ↑ |
| Nepal | -0.3510 | 30.18 | ● |
| Malaysia | -0.6042 | 20.36 | ● |
| Pakistan | -0.6170 | 19.87 | ● |
| Tajikistan | -0.6688 | 17.86 | ● |
| Jordan | -0.6826 | 17.32 | ● |
| Central African Republic | -0.7159 | 16.03 | ● |
| Algeria | -0.7170 | 15.99 | ● |
| Myanmar | -0.8205 | 11.97 | ● |
| Iran | -0.8237 | 11.85 | ● |
| Angola | -0.9077 | 8.59 | ● |
| Rwanda | -0.9538 | 6.80 | ● |
| Morocco | -0.9664 | 6.32 | + |
| Sudan | -0.9718 | 6.11 | ● |
| Iraq | -1.0936 | 1.38 | ● |
| Yemen | -1.1292 | 0.00 | ● |

Observations on Changes: Global

The Inlusiveness Index is a holistic measure of inclusivity. As explained earlier in this report, we look at gender, LGBTQ status, disability, race, ethnicity, and religion in the domains of out-group violence, political representation, income inequality, anti-discrimination laws, rates of incarceration, and immigration or asylum policies. We index these measures to generate a holistic score, which you can see on the table on the preceding pages.

The “raw score” is a composite value based upon the indicators selected and the absolute value within our Index. The “scaled score” provides a more intuitively meaningful value based upon a 0-100 scale. The scaled score allows readers to more easily observe each country’s relative performance.

We seek not only to assess how individual nations fare relative to one another, but how they perform relative to themselves over time. It is important not only to know how inclusive a nation is, but whether it has become more inclusive or is regressing. In this section, we review changes in direction for a number of countries, whether they have improved or regressed in our Index. We note changes in rankings for individual countries year over year.

Before presenting our findings, we note that we are unable to find data, and therefore rank, many nations. For the 2018 index, we were able to generate scores for 125 nations, compared to 120 in the 2017 report, and 138 in the 2016 report. This year, we were able to get reliable data for 132 countries. The seven countries added were Morocco, Montenegro, Solomon Islands, Kenya, Gabon, Djibouti, and Luxembourg.

It is also important to note that our index focuses on outcomes and on policies. Further, policy implementation often takes time to generate tangible effects measured at the group level, let alone for the data to be collected and reported. As a result, outcomes are usually lagging indicators, and it will take some time for the most recent policy changes to appear in our data. Nonetheless, we can see trends.

Most of the nations (102 out of 125 from 2018) held the same ranking in this index as they did in 2018. Only 24 nations, or about 19 percent, changed designation, and only two moved more than one category in the last year. Nonetheless, we observed a number of changes in the raw and scaled scores within the index based upon available data.

Eleven nations improved:

- Thailand and Moldova rose from the Low to Medium-Low category.
- Haiti and Mexico rose from the Medium-Low to Medium category.
- Hungary rose from the Medium to Medium-High category, despite its particular brand of xenophobic politics. This is not because it has had an absolute improvement but because other nations have become relatively less inclusive by comparison. In fact, Hungary’s raw score fell—although income inequality has fallen slightly and the country has more women in parliament.
- Senegal and Burkina Faso rose from the Medium to Medium-High category.
- France and Lithuania rose from the Medium-High to High category.
- Gabon, which was added in this index, and last seen in our 2016 index, moved from the Low to Medium category.
- Sierra Leone rose the most of all nations, from the Medium-Low to Medium-High category.

Thirteen nations fell:

- Mauritania and Kazakhstan fell from the Medium-Low to Low category.
- Benin, Papua New Guinea, Ethiopia, and Macedonia all fell from the Medium to Medium-Low category.
- The Philippines, Spain, Mozambique, and Mauritius fell from the Medium-High to Medium category.
- Fiji and Estonia fell from the High to Medium-High category.
- Togo had the greatest fall, from the Medium to Low category.

Our rankings confirm our observations and perceptions. For example, India has fallen from the Medium to Low category of inclusiveness since 2016. However, many nations that have experienced the most extreme political or economic volatility are unfortunately absent from our index, as are many of those that have experienced the most severe forms of exclusion, such as Myanmar, because of a lack of data. To address this deficiency, the themes and findings sections look behind the data, surface trends, and stories that indicate where inclusivity is taking root or falling short.

Social Media and the Threat of Fake News

At the dawn of the internet age, optimists believed that the internet would democratize knowledge. It would allow new, compelling voices to emerge uninhibited by powerful entrenched interests, just as previous communications technologies and mediums—like the printing press to radio and television—had done before. To some extent, the internet lived up to this hope. It has allowed individuals to access and share information more freely than before, to communicate more widely, and to escape the traditional mechanisms of government censorship. It has been a critical organizing tool for collective action, from the Arab Spring to Hong Kong protests against an unpopular extradition bill.⁷ Epitomizing this vision, in 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that the United States stood “for a single internet where all of humanity has equal access to knowledge and ideas.”⁸

Unfortunately, the internet, including social media and other communications applications associated with it, also have a dark side that has only recently come into full view. The full scope of how social media has been used to magnify hate, incite violence, and manipulate the public is only now becoming evident. In addition, we now have a better understanding of how such tools are manipulated by foreign powers in elections or to generate civil unrest, as well as the deeper issue of privacy and use of private data for profit or commercial purposes.

With the benefit of hindsight, the major elections of 2016, especially the Brexit referendum and the US presidential election, now appear to be an inflection point in the ways in which false information, circulated both through social media and over the internet more broadly, were used for nefarious purposes. Several prominent investigations, including Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s into presidential election interference, have uncovered many critical facts. For example, the Mueller Report found that Russia’s “Internet Research Agency” controlled more than 470 Facebook accounts that created more than 80,000 posts from 2015 to 2017, reaching as many as 126 million people.⁹ It created accounts designed to incite and polarize, including anti-immigrant social media groups such as Stop All Immigrants and Secured Borders.¹⁰ They also used Facebook and other platforms to organize rallies and events.

One of the most insidious examples of this during the 2016 presidential campaign was how several popular Black Lives Matter social media accounts, such as Black Matters, Don’t Shoot Us, and Blacktivist, were Russian fronts.¹¹ In particular, these accounts spread disinformation about Hillary Clinton and sought to discourage Black voters from voting in the November election. In any case, it was only the tip of the iceberg for how quickly fake news and other false information spread across the web.

Communal violence—especially against marginalized or minority groups—is not a recent phenomenon, but the use of social media to propagate hate and incite violence is only now being widely recognized, even by the owners of the platforms. In one prominent example, WhatsApp was identified in India¹² as a conduit for the spread of incitement in an episode in northwest India when fake photos quickly spread on the app, and a mob of thousands lynched five men.



Russia’s “Internet Research Agency”

controlled more than **470** Facebook accounts that
created more than **80,000** posts from 2015 to 2017, and
reached as many as **126 million** people

Source: The Mueller Report

Although the danger of state oppression by control over speech and communications technology is real, there are dangers at the other extreme. Where institutional guardrails are more lax, the spread of false or inciting information can be more difficult to combat. For example, after a long civil war, social media has been used in Sri Lanka to fray the civic bonds between the Tamil Muslim minority and the Sinhalese Buddhist majority. Specifically, rumors spread of a Muslim plot to destroy the Buddhist majority, including a plot to smuggle sterilization pills into ordinary medicines, which resulted in at least one man being burned to death.¹³

Riots, lynchings, and other forms of communal violence as a result of fearmongering and hate on social media platforms are now a larger pattern. For example, a lynch mob went after a maid in Mexico after social media rumors circulated.¹⁴ At least several riots in India have been attributed to such factors.¹⁵ And white supremacist mass murderers have taken cues from previous terror events, inspired in part by manifestos posted and circulated online.¹⁶

Facebook, the social media behemoth that owns WhatsApp and Instagram, has been a target of investigations into these occurrences and has only recently acknowledged its role. In the aftermath of the 2016 election, Facebook denied that its platform has been manipulated in such ways. But by 2018, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg testified before Congress, repeatedly admitting that false information was being circulated on Facebook, often by groups funded by Russian intelligence services, using paid advertisements on the platform.¹⁷ Even worse, later in the year, Facebook further admitted that its platform was used by the Myanmar military as part of a genocidal campaign against the ethnic minority Rohingya in western Rakhine state.¹⁸ An investigation by a human rights group revealed that Facebook was ill-equipped to monitor, let alone respond to, the use of its platform for genocidal purposes.

Responding to false information is easier said than done. Artificial intelligence technologies designed to address these problems, such as by identifying fake accounts or false information, have difficulty with novel or unusual forms of communication or posting. Any attempt to regulate such communication can also be viewed as government censorship or a slippery slope toward censorship. After all, governments could easily suppress speech under the pretext of stopping the spread of false information. Recently, Facebook announced that it would not regulate false or misleading political advertising, under the guise of protecting free speech.¹⁹

Even worse, it appears that governments themselves have been actively involved in facilitating the spread of false information through private platforms. A major report from the University of Oxford in England found that at least 70 countries were involved in “disinformation” campaigns through social media.²⁰ For example, the ruling party in Ethiopia hired social media influencers, and in Vietnam, the government enlisted citizens to post progovernment messages on Facebook. The study found that governments were using these platforms to stifle, discredit, and drown out dissenting voices, but also to drive division and polarization. In Nigeria, false information was spread on WhatsApp about violence at polling stations to deter voting in opposition strongholds.²¹

But even beyond false information or propaganda, political campaign experts have discovered how to manipulate these platforms to maximize their political communications effectiveness. These platforms can be microtailored to specific audiences. For example, the Trump campaign has a method called “test, learn, adapt,” which serially modifies messaging on social media platforms hundreds of thousands if not millions of ways to maximize the response they see. Unfortunately, one of the primary ways they do this is by crafting messages that incite their audiences, or otherwise incendiary messages.²² This was one of the strategies used by the Duterte campaign to win the Philippine presidency in 2016.²³

Even if corporations like Facebook were to regulate themselves, such regulation could be viewed as coercive in some regard. It is unclear exactly what to do, but it is clear that this is a problem, and one that we will be living with for some time to come. We are just now coming to grips with it.

Global Themes and Findings

De-Democratization

At the end of the Cold War, many pundits declared “the end of history” and that liberal democracy had become the presumptive universal form of government.²⁴ Indeed, between 1990 and 2011, the number of democratic governments around the globe nearly doubled, rising from 57 to 101.²⁵ Democratization was a galvanizing force, as former Eastern European autocracies and other Asian and Latin American states transitioned to free societies with democratic governments. By the end of the period, the share of the world’s population living in a democracy rose to over four billion.

This development proved quite hopeful, as the basic premise of democracy is that, as a system of government, it is most responsive to the needs of the people and committed to political and civic equality—a critical component of inclusivity. It is possible to have inclusivity under autocracy, but only if it is deliberate and carefully designed, as in Singapore.²⁶ Still, in most autocratic systems, it is harder for minorities to exercise their freedoms and make demands of government, and government may be less responsive to such demands in the absence of democratic channels.

Unfortunately, the last decade has seen a gradual process of de-democratization. Many of the Eastern European states that had once broken free from under the Iron Curtain are trending autocratic. Hungary and Poland, for example, have become case studies in democratic backsliding.²⁷ Key indicia include restrictions on freedom of the press, curtailing an independent judiciary, and one-party consolidated control of government. For example, in Poland, a recent law forces Supreme Court justices into early retirement. And press freedom, according to watchdog Freedom House, is worse in Hungary than anywhere else in the European Union.²⁸

The prime minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, even said in a speech in 2014 that “we are building...an illiberal state, a non-liberal state” with the questionable caveat that “a democracy is not necessarily liberal. Just because something is not liberal, it still can be a democracy.” But Brazil, Ecuador, Mali, and Venezuela are all additional instances of states where democracy is backsliding. For example, under the auspices of fighting terrorism, the Government of Mali declared a state of emergency in 2015 that has restricted civic freedom significantly. This trend is worrisome.

The end result is a world that may well be less inclusive.



Global Themes and Findings

The Food System Crisis


All food systems function within and are shaped by several social, political, economic, and environmental contexts at every scale: from local to regional and from national to global. The food system impacts many factors, such as free trade, commodification of food chain supply, and financialization. However, two major dynamics—climate and nonclimate stressors and corporate power—seem perilous for the future of food systems.

Our global food system is under pressure due to climate and nonclimate stressors, such as population growth and increased demand for animal-sourced products.²⁹ Indeed, an estimated 821 million people are currently starving, and “151 million children under 5 are stunted, 613 million women and girls aged 15 to 49 suffer from iron deficiency, and 2 billion adults are overweight or obese.”³⁰ Furthermore, ample studies and research suggest that climate crisis is affecting all four dimensions of food security: availability, accessibility, utilization, and stability.

In terms of food availability, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that after 2030, climate change will reduce the productivity of cropland, particularly in food-insecure areas such as sub-Saharan Africa.³¹ In the short term, increases in global temperatures are likely to benefit crop and pasture yields in temperate climates while having negative effects in tropical and dry regions. Concerning food accessibility, the FAO states that the effects of climate change on productivity may cause families to allocate food differently within the household, especially within communities that rely on producing food for their own consumption.


Further, low-income families will be more greatly affected by projected increases in food prices because, on average, they spend a larger portion of their income on food. As far as food utilization is concerned, climate crisis will likely increase malnutrition in food-insecure areas that depend on agriculture due to its negative impacts on income and purchasing power. In addition, climate crisis will change the distribution of pests and diseases, such as vector and waterborne diseases, posing risks to human health, food safety, and food security. Finally, the predicted growing incidence of droughts and floods make it harder for communities that depend on rainfall agriculture to prepare for changes in productivity, thus threatening food stability. Increasing food emergencies and conflicts for diminishing food supplies will fundamentally destabilize food systems.³²

These effects of climate crisis on food security will be especially pronounced for people whose livelihoods are dependent on agriculture, wildlife, and fisheries, and who are already marginalized and food insecure.³³ This is especially the case in the Global South, where, for example, in the densely populated areas of Asia and the Pacific, agriculture accounts for between 40 and 50 percent of the workforce, and in sub-Saharan Africa accounts for two-thirds of the workforce.³⁴




Climate Shocks and Food Crisis in 2017

Source: Food Security Information Network, Global Report on Food Crises 2018



American Caribbean



| Countries affected by climate shocks | Number of people | |
|--|---------------------|-----------------|
| | Food Crisis | Food Emergency |
| Burundi, Djibouti, Eswatini, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia, Somalia | 8.4 mil | 2.3 mil |
| Angola, Chad, South Sudan, Uganda | 6.9 mil | 1.7 mil |
| Sudan, Zambia | 3.7 mil | 0.1 mil |
| Cameroon, Gambia, Mauritania, Niger, United Republic of Tanzania | 5.7 mil | 0.1 mil |
| Guinea-Nissau | 0.3 mil | 0.0 mil |
| Malawi | 5.1 mil | N/A |
| Ethiopia | 8.5 mil | N/A |
| Zimbabwe | 3.5 mil | 0.6 mil |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | 6.2 mil | 1.5 mil |
| Madagascar, Mozambique | 3.4 mil | 1.3 mil |
| Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan | 7.8 mil | 3.3 mil |
| Bangladesh | 2.9 mil | 0.5 mil |
| Sri Lanka, Yemen | 11.1 mil | 6.8 mil |
| Guatemala, Haiti | 2.1 mil | 0.7 mil |
| Honduras | 0.4 mil | 0 |
| Sub total | 76.0 mil | 18.9 mil |
| Total | 94.9 million | |


Countries affected by

- * Conflicts
- Droughts
- Dry spells
- Seasonal variability
- Floods
- Flash floods
- Storms

Similarly, in a global food system premised upon trade liberalization, lax tariffs, cash crops, corporate subsidies, and vertical and horizontal integration in agriculture product marketing, the impacts of climate crisis will likely be felt more generally. Specifically, climate crisis would likely affect market values for land; the water and agrochemical inputs used in production; and the energy used in food processing, cold storage, transport, and intensive production of food.³⁵


In the Global South, where there are financial constraints to acquire expensive agricultural inputs, increased prices and higher price volatility have a greater impact on food system stability while still being locked within the global corporate food regime.³⁶ The demand for food and other types of assistance from the Global North could increase in nations that lack of purchasing power.³⁷ Thus, in the immediate future, and as the impacts of climate crisis continue, the rural poor of the Global South will be made more vulnerable to food insecurity. The effects will likely also be felt by low-income urban populations around the globe as their access to food will be threatened by extreme weather events, long-term environmental change, and volatile food prices.

Corporate power has long played a role in the institutions, processes, practices, and infrastructure that make up the global food system, particularly in how food is produced, processed, distributed, and consumed. Furthermore, since the 1980s, the emergence of neoliberal economic and political restructuring—characterized by privatization, free trade, deregulation, and cuts in government spending in favor of the private sector—has facilitated corporate influence on and control of the global food system.



The Era of Corporate Consolidation and End of Competition

Source: "The Era of Corporate Consolidation and the End of Competition" @belonging.berkeley.edu



TOTAL MERGER AND ACQUISITIONS: \$352.14 BILLION

CONTROLS 70% OF AGROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY

In the past three years alone, three major corporate mergers have begun to reshape what was an already concentrated international market for agricultural chemicals, seeds, and fertilizers. If the mergers gain final approval from their relevant regulatory agencies, the "Big Six" multinational corporations would fold into three giant corporations.³⁸ These mergers will have a profound impact on the future of global food and agriculture and would drastically reduce competition in the areas of crop protection, seeds, and petrochemicals; further consolidate the agrochemical market; reduce procompetitive research and development collaborations; and, most urgently, pose a critical danger to biodiversity and ecosystem sustainability and exacerbate the global climate crisis.³⁹

Unless we tackle the multiple crises of the food system head-on, the outcome will be dire for the most marginalized regions and communities worldwide. Many options are available for us to deal with such stubborn global crises of the food system, but two in particular demand immediate global action. On the one hand, we need to curb the impact of climate and nonclimate stressors by transitioning into more ecologically sound food production and consumption, and on the other, we need to strengthen and enforce environmental and social regulations on multinational corporations.

Global Themes and Findings

Corruption

From bribery to collusion, from conflicts of interest to revolving door hiring, and from tax evasion to illegal information brokering, corruption constitutes a major hurdle to social, economic, and political progress, corruption exacerbates marginality and encumbers the prospects of inclusivity. Moreover, corruption severely impacts the poor, women, and underserved racial, ethnic, and social minorities. Corruption's manifold effects on societies also burden governments that strive to improve polity and institutions to support inclusivity or seek to minimize existing exclusionary policies.

Corruption undermines social peace and economic opportunities. Consider the prevailing aspects of corruption that degrade civic engagement and citizen trust in public institutions and hinder people's ability to participate in the design of the institutions that impact their lives.

Corruption undermines democratic institutions and good governance—including election partiality and distortion of representation in policy-making—and ultimately compromises the rule of law. Consider the case of political corruption in Brazil, which is a major leading factor in the erosion of democracy in that country in recent years. For example, recent exposés by journalists uncovered serious, systematic, and sustained improprieties and possible illegality by Brazil's minister of justice and public security, Sérgio Moro, while he was a judge—the same judge who presided over the case that removed ex-president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from the 2018 election along with the chief prosecutor in that case. This paved the way for Jair Bolsonaro to become president.

Furthermore, corruption damages the environment. Consider the large-scale land grabs in sub-Saharan Africa—of the more than 220 million hectares of land leased or sold globally, 70 percent took place in that region. These land grab schemes have weakened existing legal frameworks and institutions that manage land allocation and contribute to environmental degradation.

It's well-documented that corruption undercuts education fulfilment. Consider bribery and nepotism cases in higher education and university admissions by some wealthy and influential parents in the United States. It may well lead to the growth of normalized corruption within corridors of power and decision-making and consequently impact the society as a whole.

Corruption demoralizes the objectives and goals of global solidarity. Consider the many cases of humanitarian aid that have led to and limit the scarce amount of aid reaching those in need and then subjecting beneficiaries to dehumanizing situations. This further normalizes abuse, violence, and sexual violence upon victims of natural disasters and wars.

Many initiatives, nationally and globally, attempt to combat the far-reaching impacts of corruption—some succeeded, while others failed miserably for reasons beyond anticorruption mechanisms. Although every country has its own mechanisms to respond to corruption, oftentimes these tools are compromised by the corruption schemes themselves. For example, the work of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) has shed light on massive global corruption schemes, such as tax evasions, shell companies, and financial crimes that appeared in the Panama Papers, Paradise Papers, Mauritius Leaks, and Luxembourg Leaks, which reveal the challenge of fighting corruption.

The work of ICIJ has brought considerable amount of hidden corruption cases into the public consciousness. However, in most of these cases, anticorruption activists, whistle-blowers, and journalists have paid a heavy price in exposing political, economic, and social corruption, risking their freedom and at times their lives. Consider the case of the Honduran environmental activist and Indigenous leader Berta Caceres, who was assassinated in March 2016 due to her activism in unveiling the corruption of Desarrollos Energeticos SA (Desa), the company that wanted to build the Agua Zarca hydroelectric dam in indigenous territory in the Honduran countryside. The assassination of Caceres was also linked to US-trained special forces units of the Honduran military. Another case is that of the Maltese journalist Daphne Galizia, who was assassinated in October 2017 due to her investigations into the alleged financial and political corruption that reached the office of the prime minister of Malta.

BERTA CACERES, Honduras
Environmental Activist, Indigenous leader



Picture source: lamericalatina.net

Assassinated in March 2016

due to her activism in unveiling the corruption of Desarrollos Energeticos SA (Desa), the company that wanted to build the Agua Zarca hydroelectric dam in indigenous territory in the Honduran countryside



Picture source: channelnewsasia.com


DAPHNE GALIZIA, Malta
Journalist

Assassinated in October

2017 due to her investigations into the alleged financial and political corruption that reached the office of the Prime Minister of Malta

Corruption is hard to measure due to the absence of a singular data source or tool that can offer a conclusive aspect of corruption. While measuring the perceptions of corruption is useful for observations, it is problematic because there are differences between perceptions and realities, such as lauding a government merely for improvement on one sector while turning a blind eye to other malpractices. For example, the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International rewarded the Government of Myanmar for improvement while the same government engages in genocidal acts against the Rohingya minority, and it rewarded Sweden while its government is embattled in corruption allegations. Criticism aside, public coverage of corruption by governments and officials has helped citizens become more aware of certain manifestations and what constitutes corruption, whether in the public or private sector, and that in itself brings more hope of systematically curtailing the prevalence of corruption everywhere.

US Inclusiveness Rankings 2019



| STATE | RAW SCORE | SCALED SCORE | CATEGORY CHANGE |
|--------------|-----------|--------------|-----------------|
| Hawaii | 1.4150 | 100.00 | ● |
| Nevada | 0.7688 | 69.33 | ● |
| Maryland | 0.6504 | 63.72 | ● |
| Washington | 0.3503 | 49.48 | ↑ ↑ |
| Vermont | 0.3444 | 49.20 | ● |
| New York | 0.2995 | 47.07 | ↑ |
| Colorado | 0.2984 | 47.02 | ↑ |
| California | 0.2682 | 45.58 | ● |
| Rhode Island | 0.2681 | 45.57 | ● |
| Illinois | 0.2221 | 43.39 | ● |

| | | | |
|---------------|--------|-------|-----|
| Georgia | 0.1966 | 42.18 | ● |
| Maine | 0.1831 | 41.54 | ● |
| New Hampshire | 0.1697 | 40.91 | ↓ |
| Alaska | 0.1592 | 40.41 | ↓ |
| New Jersey | 0.1337 | 39.20 | ● |
| Oregon | 0.0971 | 37.46 | ↓ |
| Nebraska | 0.0678 | 36.07 | ● |
| Michigan | 0.0667 | 36.02 | ↑ |
| Virginia | 0.0566 | 35.54 | ↑ |
| New Mexico | 0.0279 | 34.18 | ↑ ↑ |

| | | | |
|---------------|---------|-------|---|
| Minnesota | 0.0126 | 33.45 | ● |
| Florida | 0.0060 | 33.14 | ↓ |
| Arizona | 0.0059 | 33.13 | ● |
| Delaware | -0.0228 | 31.77 | ↑ |
| Utah | -0.0264 | 31.60 | ↓ |
| Connecticut | -0.0470 | 30.62 | ↓ |
| Indiana | -0.0484 | 30.56 | ● |
| Iowa | -0.0627 | 29.88 | ● |
| Massachusetts | -0.0717 | 29.45 | ↑ |
| Missouri | -0.0719 | 29.44 | ● |

| | | | |
|----------------|---------|-------|---|
| Wisconsin | -0.0797 | 29.07 | ● |
| West Virginia | -0.1034 | 27.95 | ↑ |
| Idaho | -0.1065 | 27.80 | ● |
| Kentucky | -0.1105 | 27.61 | ● |
| South Carolina | -0.1257 | 26.89 | ↓ |
| North Carolina | -0.1890 | 23.89 | ↑ |
| Oklahoma | -0.2092 | 22.93 | ↑ |
| Pennsylvania | -0.2115 | 22.82 | ● |
| Alabama | -0.2217 | 22.33 | ↑ |
| Montana | -0.2311 | 21.89 | ↑ |

| | | | |
|--------------|---------|-------|-------|
| Ohio | -0.2566 | 20.68 | ↓ |
| Tennessee | -0.2572 | 20.65 | ● |
| Wyoming | -0.3041 | 18.43 | ↓ ↓ |
| Kansas | -0.3173 | 17.80 | ↓ |
| Texas | -0.3754 | 15.04 | ● |
| Arkansas | -0.3989 | 13.93 | ↓ |
| Mississippi | -0.4480 | 11.59 | ● |
| North Dakota | -0.4810 | 10.03 | ↓ ↓ ↓ |
| South Dakota | -0.5978 | 4.49 | ● |
| Louisiana | -0.6924 | 0.00 | ● |

| Legend (Change from 2018) | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| ● | No change |
| ↓ | Moved one category down |
| ↓ ↓ | Moved two categories down |
| ↑ | Moved one category up |
| ↑ ↑ | Moved two categories up |
| + | Added |

Observations on US Changes

When we look at inclusivity in the United States, the first thing that stands out is that every region of the country has inclusive and less inclusive states. Inclusivity is not simply the domain of blue states or coastal regions. Inclusivity is a choice, not simply a political matter. States and metropolitan areas that have policies to reduce inequality, expand the rights of marginalized people, and draw back from the project of mass incarceration show improvements or high scores for inclusivity. It is true that political polarization has been an endemic feature of American governance in recent years, with policy following suit. But inclusivity transcends politics and political borders.

Our ranking and scores of all states are categorized as either Low, Medium-Low, Medium, Medium-High, or High in their inclusivity designation. We find that 25 states changed their inclusivity designation from 2018. A majority of those changes—21 (or 84 percent) of them—were a modest movement up or down a single category, from Medium-Low to Medium or High to Medium-High. Virginia, for example, improved from Medium to Medium-High. It is notable that Virginia recently attempted to enfranchise tens of thousands of citizens who had lost the right to vote due to felony convictions.⁴⁰ West Virginia moved one category up from Low to Medium-Low. It is notable that West Virginia reached a major settlement with teachers to increase pay in the last year.⁴¹

More striking, however, are the three states that leapt or fell two categories from last year's report. New Mexico rose from Medium-Low to Medium-High, and Washington State rose from Medium to High. However, Wyoming fell from the Medium to Low category due to increasing income inequality, especially for people with disabilities. Though Wyoming ranks tenth in the nation for disability employment,⁴² the American Community Survey data shows that in 2018, workers with disabilities earned 69 cents to each dollar earned by an able-bodied worker, which is much lower than the 76 cents to a dollar in 2017.

The most disappointing result, however, is North Dakota. In our 2018 report, North Dakota was ranked Medium-High in terms of inclusion but has since fallen to the Low category. It received only 80 refugees in 2018 compared to 361 in 2017, which is a drop of roughly 80 percent. Compare this to the overall drop of 31 percent in refugee intake in the nation: 22,872 in 2018 compared to 33,368 in 2017. Additionally, income inequality in North Dakota increased among women and people with disabilities.

As always, our measures reflect data that takes months and sometimes years to collect and report, so they must be viewed in that context. This is why we look beyond the data to surface stories and trends for which data is either unavailable or difficult to collect systematically and consistently. We now turn to those stories, including a look at violence against transgender women, food insecurity and the crisis in the food system, political gerrymandering, and political corruption.

US Themes and Findings

Antitransgender Violence

Violence is one of the oldest and most common mechanisms of “othering”—and the frequency by which a group is targeted is a particularly revealing indicator of group-based marginality. Violence is both a mechanism of social control and tool of oppression to instill fear and establish dominance over another group.⁴³ For example, lynching in the Jim Crow American South was both a mechanism of social control and racial dominance. Accordingly, violence is one of Iris Marion Young’s “five faces of oppression” in her classic work deconstructing oppression into more fundamental forces.⁴⁴ These reasons are why out-group violence is one of the six major domains for measuring inclusivity in our index.

Violence appears in many forms and guises. Sometimes it is state-sanctioned or state-endorsed violence, such as the police killings of primarily young Black men that motivated the #BlackLivesMatter movement. It can also occur primarily through private forms of extrajudicial terror, such as the activities of the Ku Klux Klan or individual terrorists like Dylan Roof and other shooters targeting marginalized groups. In our 2016 report, for example, we examined the spate of sexual violence against women in India.⁴⁵

At other times, the line between state and private violence is blurry. For example, leading up to the recent violence against the Rohingya in Rakhine state, Myanmar, private vigilante groups operated with the tacit sanction of local leaders and often received training from them.⁴⁶ Similarly, extrajudicial violence in the United States often occurred while local authorities did nothing or refused to intervene and protect victims.⁴⁷


In 2018 and 2019, there has been a noted and alarming incidence of violence—specifically murders—against transgender people in the United States. The Human Rights Campaign (HRC), a national network of LGBTQ persons, calls this a “national epidemic.”⁴⁸ In 2018, there were at least 26 transgender women who were murdered, according to the network. As of September, Bee Love Slater, a Black transgender woman from Florida, was the eighteenth such victim in 2019.⁴⁹ Her body was found burned beyond recognition in a car. Even the American Medical Association has called for new policies to stop this epidemic.

According to the HRC, the vast majority of the victims are transgender women of color. Although data is difficult to systematically collect, the HRC claims that “82 percent of them were women of color; 64 percent were under the age of 35; 55 percent lived in the South.”⁵⁰ The HRC cites legalized discrimination and poverty as underlying causes. Poverty and discrimination force transgender people to engage in riskier activities, including sex work, and their poverty makes them more likely to be victims of sexual assault and partner violence.

This spate of violence is not only a tragedy that must end, but also a symptom of deeper structural marginality of transgender Americans. We hope this index brings greater awareness to this problem, even if it is masked by the data of the US’ holistic inclusivity score. Stories of violence are one of the reasons we look behind the data.

Transgender Killings

Source: Human Rights Campaign “A National Epidemic”



US Themes and Findings

Democratic Backsliding

Democratic backsliding is not simply a global phenomenon, as described in the global section of this report, but is also occurring in the United States.

One of the main causes of democratic backsliding in the United States is political gerrymandering - the manipulation of political district boundaries to maximize political advantage.⁵¹ US state legislatures redraw congressional districts following each decennial census, as states lose or gain seats due to changes in population. State legislatures also draw district boundaries for state legislative bodies as well, often for the same purposes. Thus, when a new political party captures state government, it can redraw district lines to its advantage.

The problem, however, is that political parties can manipulate district lines to give themselves far more seats than their share of the vote. For example, in Ohio, 52 percent of voters supported Republican candidates, but gerrymandering after the 2010 census helped seat 12 Republicans compared to four Democrats, turning a bare majority into a three-quarters majority.⁵² This problem is widespread.

But the problem isn't just that political parties can turn threadbare majorities into supermajorities with gerrymandering, but that they can turn a minority share of the vote into a majority of seats. For example, after the 2010 census, Democratic candidates took 51 percent of the vote across Pennsylvania's 18 districts but garnered only five (28 percent) of the seats.⁵³ Similarly, Democratic congressional candidates in Michigan received 240,000 more votes than Republican candidates, but Republicans got nine seats compared to five for Democrats. One political scientist calculated that it would take 57 percent of the vote for the party out of power to take control of the state legislature in Wisconsin due to political gerrymandering.⁵⁴

Social scientists studying this phenomenon have even given a name to this problem: the "efficiency gap."⁵⁵ This gap measures the degree to which a party is able to "claim more seats, relative to a zero-gap plan, without claiming more votes."⁵⁶ This measure allows observers to identify extreme gerrymanders that might be worthy of judicial intervention. Unfortunately, the US Supreme Court recently affirmed that it refuses to intervene in political gerrymanders, allowing the antidemocratic practice to proliferate, absent of state court intervention.⁵⁷

When the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had the temerity to rule that such gerrymandering violated the state constitution, state legislators launched an effort to impeach the justices rather than comply with the ruling.⁵⁸


While gerrymandering has long been a possibility, the computerized technology makes gerrymandering much more precise and effective than ever before. Literally thousands of scenarios can be developed in a moment to determine how a district can benefit a particular party. This technology has been taken to the hilt. The death of a GOP strategist in North Carolina in May 2019 revealed just how extreme this can be, as thousands of maps were found on his computer hard drive.⁵⁹

The US Constitution does provide an answer, even if the Supreme Court refuses to take cognizance of the problem. The so-called Guarantee Clause, Article IV, Section 4 states that "the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." The framers of the Constitution understood this to mean not simply a system of representative government, but popular sovereignty, or the democratic principle. Unfortunately, this clause has fallen into disuse and has rarely been applied by federal courts to the states because the Supreme Court held in 1849 that such matters were mostly "political questions."⁶⁰ For that reason, one law professor has called the clause a "sleeping giant."

It remains to be seen how this problem will be addressed, given the Supreme Court's reticence to involve federal courts in managing this problem. Some states have adopted bipartisan or nonpartisan commissions to draw district lines. For example, seven states, including Hawaii and Arizona, have districting commissions charged with drawing such boundaries for both congressional seats and state legislatures.⁶¹ Other states lacking such commissions may apply state constitutions to the problem, as a way of challenging the most extreme practices.

Gerrymandering: 2012 state election results

Source: NBC Election Results 2012



US Themes and Findings


The Food System

For several decades and nearly in every aspect—socially, economically, politically, and environmentally—the US food system has been characterized by widespread structural barriers and corporate influence. First, structural barriers manifest in inequity among ethnic and racial groups, between genders and head of households, and between the wealthy and the working class.⁶² This inequity, however, is not accidental but orchestrated and perpetuated by structural barriers, particularly those rooted in racial and ethnic, gender, and income disparities. Second, corporate power is revealed in the influence and power that corporations exert upon US food legislation and federal food policies.⁶³


For example, the US Department of Agriculture’s 2018 statistics on food insecurity indicated that 11.1 percent (or 14.3 million) of Americans are food insecure, a designation for those who have low or very low food security in the United States. Households with children make up a substantial share of the steady trend of food insecurity. For two decades, the average of food insecurity for households with children stubbornly remained at 14.3 percent.⁶⁴ Additionally, in 2017 the United States as a whole had a poverty rate of 11 percent—over 34 million individuals, of which the majority were people of color.⁶⁵ Similarly, food system workers were more likely to live in or near poverty in relation to other industry workers and were far more likely to receive food assistance.⁶⁶ Additionally, of all government farm payments given to farmers, 97.8 percent of it went to white farmers. Of all farmers who received government farm payments, white farmers received an average of \$10,022 per farm, while Black farmers received an average of \$5,509 per farm.⁶⁷

Additionally, the US food system not only suffers from widespread racial and ethnic, class, and gender disparities, but it is also a reflection of a society that produces inequity in every domain of life. Inequity within the food system, such as limited access to nutritious and affordable food, income disparities for food and farm workers, or racial and ethnic disparities in accessing land, cannot be addressed without addressing inequality within society at large. This includes limited employment benefits for low-income communities, unequal treatment of people of color by state and federal institutions, and limited access to positions of power.⁶⁸

In 2012 Four corporations own



and manufacture



Source: The Farm Bill report @belonging.berkeley.edu

As for the corporate influence within the food system, while 95.3 percent of US farms are small and midsize family-owned operations, corporate large-scale operations dominate the production of the US food system. For example, a mere 4.7 percent of US farms account for 49.7 percent of the total value of agricultural production in the United States. In 2016, five companies accounted for almost 45 percent of ethanol production capacity⁶⁹ and owned 38 percent of all ethanol production plants.⁷⁰ As of 2007, four corporations owned 85 percent of the soybean processing industry, 82 percent of the beef packing industry, and 63 percent of the pork packing industry, and manufactured about 50 percent of milk; while five corporations controlled 50 percent of grocery retail.⁷¹ Globally, fewer than 500 companies control 70 percent of food choice.⁷²

Further, corporate leadership mirror similar societal racial, ethnic, and gender inequality. As of 2011, most corporate directors of Fortune 500 companies were white men (74.4 percent) and white women (13.3 percent), although white men and women make up just 72.4 percent of the US population.⁷³ Despite making up 12.6 percent of the US population, Latinx represented only 3.1 percent of the corporate directors (2.4 percent Latino men; 0.7 percent Latina women). Finally, only 6.8 percent of corporate directors were Black, despite making up 13.6 percent of the US population (5.3 percent Black men; 1.5 percent Black women).⁷⁴

Responding to the multiple structural crises of the food system in the United States, authorities and civil society need to coalesce and challenge structural barriers to food accessibility, create sound policy for food justice, and curb corporate power. Specifically, eliminating structural barriers to fair food accessibility and curbing corporate power within the US food system offer a prime opportunity to minimize structural marginality within, and beyond, the food system. Furthermore, structural change requires a strong and united movement that can organize and mobilize at both the local and national levels and that ultimately aims to produce the conditions required for fair access to livelihood.

It's worth noting that such attempts toward fair food accessibility will have little traction unless the demands come from a very powerful social movement for structural change. This includes restrained corporate influence in the public sphere and advancing claims for fair access to food, health equity, fair and living wages, land access to farmers of color and women, fair immigration policy, nonexploitative farm labor conditions, and ecologically sound food production, among other social, economic, and cultural claims.⁷⁵

Corruption

The United States lauds itself as a principal force fighting corruption worldwide. However, corruption within the country itself is multifaceted, and its widespread nature appears mostly in three domains: the influence and power of the elite, lobbying and revolving door hiring between the government and private sector, and corporate interference.⁷⁶ For example, the United States fell for the second consecutive year in the Corruption Perception Index, which recorded its lowest result in seven years.⁷⁷

As with its impact worldwide, corruption constitutes malaise to the polity and its institutions in the United States. It undermines good governance and democratization, including election partiality and the distortion of representation in policy-making, further compromising the rule of law.⁷⁸

Consider the influence of private citizens on certain government policies, which is often hidden from public scrutiny. Such influencers are those who, due to their financial capacity, can exert immense power on the government and its political agenda well beyond the awareness of citizens or even the corporate media. For example, the current Trump administration includes individuals who have close association with sectors and industries that make the administration's integrity questionable. Those influencers have included former state secretary Rex Tillerson, who has close ties with fossil fuel industries and was the CEO of ExxonMobil prior to assuming his post,⁷⁹ Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, who maintains business relations with companies owned by foreign governments,⁸⁰ and top Republican donor Paul Singer, global private equity investor who promoted curtailing international tax laws and regulations on corporations.⁸¹

Another form of corruption is the revolving door of government employees leaving office to become lobbyists and advocate for private clients, and vice versa, on issues related to their government expertise.⁸² For example, consider the cases of former vice president Dick Cheney and his relationship with military contractors;⁸³ former deputy administrator of the Environmental Protection (EPA) Agency Linda Fisher, who moved between giant agribusiness and the EPA;⁸⁴ or John Dugan of the Department of the Treasury, who relentlessly lobbied for the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act.⁸⁵

A byproduct occurrence of corruption takes place in the context of increased corporate power. Since the midcentury, corporate power—through consolidation—is on the rise across many sectors, including, but not limited to, industrial agriculture, pharmaceuticals, health-care insurance, energy, and firearms.⁸⁶ Such consolidation and power would not be possible without the revolving door system and lobbying.⁸⁷ For example, during the 1990s there were numerous consolidations between such firms that aimed to take advantage of the status quo of lax regulation on corporate behavior that enable even greater corporate profit and influence. By the 2000s, six companies that focused on agricultural, pharmaceutical, and chemical products held control over a majority of the global trade proprietary and market.⁸⁸ Apart from having a profound impact on aspects of fair competition, this concentration of power also undermined racial equity, the rule of law, and democratic institutions.⁸⁹ It paved the way toward the erosion of ethical norms at the highest levels of power that potentially led to normalizing greater political corruption.

The evidence of political influencers, revolving door appointments, and the consolidation of corporate power suggest that there are profound concerns about corruption within the US political process. Citizens and civil society alike often hint to the multidimensional and widespread nature of corruption.⁹⁰ The United States needs to pay more attention to strengthening ethics capabilities as it relates to government transparency, political campaign contributions, revolving door appointments between government officials and the private sector and lobbying, and increasing access to information about government actions—all of which might be of aid to fighting overt and covert corruption.

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
Appendix A: Data Analysis

The Inclusiveness Index is a comparative analysis, thus the index values are relative to other countries in the global context and to other states in the US context. The data described in the report is collected, cleaned, and prepared for analysis. Each data value for any indicator is analyzed relative to other data values for the indicator based on how far each value is from the mean value.

The outcome of this standardization of data is known as “z-score.” A z-score is a statistical measure that quantifies the distance (measured in standard deviations) a data point is from the mean of a data set. The use of z-scores allows data to be measured based on the relative distance of the data value from the data average for the entire data set for one indicator. Z-scores are calculated for all indicators in each dimension and adjusted where higher values of indicators meant lack of inclusion (e.g., higher index values for government restrictions on religion). The dimension z-score is the average of z-scores of each indicator within the dimension (e.g., z-score [by race] = average [political representation by race z-score, income ratio of non-whites over non-Hispanic whites z-score, and overrepresentation of African Americans and Hispanics in criminal justice system z-score]).

The Inclusiveness Index value is the average of all dimension z-scores. The level of inclusiveness (high to low) is determined by sorting the data in descending order and breaking it down into quintiles. Thus, the countries or US states identified with high inclusiveness represent the top 20 percent of scores among respective geographies. Conversely, countries or US states identified with low inclusiveness represent the lowest scoring 20 percent of respective geographies. This average allows the scores of states and nation-states to improve from year to year even if they are lagging or worsening in one area but are excelling in another area.

DATA MATRIX



| Race | Gender | Sexual Orientation | Religion | Disability |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| | | | Social Hostilities Index (SHI) | |
| | | Crime rate per 100,000 by bias motivation | | |
| Ethnic minorities political representation | Women in parliament | LGBT representatives in Lower House | | |
| Percentage of 116th Congress representatives who are non-white | Proportion of female State legislators | Proportion of State legislators who belong to LGBT community | Percentage of 116th Congress representatives who are non-Christian | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Female to male GNI per capita (PPP) Female labor force participation | | | |
| Non-whites to non-Hispanic whites per capita income ratio | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Female to male income ratio Female labor force participation | | | Median earning ratio of disabled people to able-bodied people |
| | Laws on gender rights | LGBT rights index | Government Restrictions Index (GRI) | Index based on existing disability laws and international treaties |
| | | LGBT rights index | Number of anti-Sharia bills enacted | |
| | Female incarceration per 100,000 people | | | |
| Ratio of over-representation | Female incarceration per 100,000 people | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

Appendix B: Data Infographics

General Population

| <i>Exposure to out-group violence</i> | Internally Displaced People (IDP) due to conflict/violence | Violent crimes per 100,000 people |
|---------------------------------------|--|---|
| <i>Measure</i> | Any conflict related internal displacement highlights the violence and backlash against communities forcing them to seek shelter elsewhere. Number of people displaced per 100,000 population is used as a measure for this indicator. | FBI's Uniform Crime Report provides data on violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault) and property crimes (burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft) for each state in the U.S. Crime rate per 100,000 people is used as the measure for this indicator |
| <i>Data available</i> | 250 countries | 50 states |
| <i>Year of data</i> | 2018 | 2018 |
| <i>Data source</i> | Global Internal Displacement Database | FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) |
| <i>Data link</i> | http://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data | https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/home |

| <i>Political Representation</i> | Political Rights | Not available |
|---------------------------------|--|---------------|
| <i>Measure</i> | An evaluation of three subcategories of political rights: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government on a scale from 0 (no political rights) to 40 (full political rights). | ... |
| <i>Data available</i> | 198 countries | ... |
| <i>Year of data</i> | 2018 | ... |
| <i>Data source</i> | Social Progress Index | ... |
| <i>Data link</i> | https://www.socialprogress.org/ | ... |

| <i>Income Inequality</i> | Gini Index | Gini Index |
|--------------------------|---|---|
| <i>Measure</i> | Income inequality is measured by Gini Index which compares the distribution of individual or household income to an equal distribution. A value of "0" signifies absolute equality whereas a value of "100" signifies absolute inequality. The most recent year, but within the last ten years, of data is used | |
| <i>Data available</i> | 152 countries | 50 states |
| <i>Year of data</i> | 2008-2017 | 2018 |
| <i>Data source</i> | World Bank Database | American Community Survey 1-yr estimates |
| <i>Data link</i> | http://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/world-development-indicators# | https://www.census.gov/ |

| Incarceration | Incarceration per 100,000 people | Incarceration per 100,000 people |
|-----------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| <i>Measure</i> | Prison Policy Initiative publishes prison related data for each year based on reported and survey data for nation-states and for each state in the U.S. Data for the most recent year on rates of incarceration per 100,000 people, has been included in the calculations for Inclusiveness Index. | |
| <i>Data available</i> | 164 countries | 50 states |
| <i>Year of data</i> | 2017 | 2017 |
| <i>Data source</i> | Prison Policy Initiative | |
| <i>Data link</i> | https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html | |

| Immigration | Refugees/Asylees/Stateless as a percentage of host country population | Refugees as a percentage of total population |
|-----------------------|---|--|
| <i>Measure</i> | United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) collects data on number of refugees and asylum-seekers (people who have applied for refugee status which has not yet been determined) from the country of origin and the receiving country. Data is aggregated for the host country and percentage of host country's population is calculated. | Bureau of population, Refugees and Migrants at the Department of State provides data on monthly and annual number of refugees received by the nation and by each state. The most recent data on number of refugees received by each state is normalized by state population to render the data comparable across all states. |
| <i>Data available</i> | 185 countries | 50 states |
| <i>Year of data</i> | 2018 | 2018 |
| <i>Data source</i> | United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) | Bureau of population, Refugees and Migrants, Department of State |
| <i>Data link</i> | http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern | http://ireports.wrapsnet.org/ |

Race

| Political Representation | Political representation by ethnic minorities | Percentage of 116th Congress representatives who are non-white |
|--------------------------|--|--|
| <i>Measure</i> | Ethnic Power Relations Core Dataset 2018 “identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power in every country of the world from 1946 to 2017. It includes annual data on over 800 groups and codes the degree to which their representatives held executive-level state power—from total control of the government to overt political discrimination.” The countries included in this dataset are the ones which had a population of 250,000 or above. The measure for this indicator is the proportion of population of groups which are categorized as “Powerless”, “Discriminated” or “Self-excluded.” Countries with no data are assumed to have no people in this category | U.S. House of Representatives and United States Senate shares race data on all members of congress. Percentage of non-white representatives for each State is used as a measure for this indicator. |
| <i>Data available</i> | 247 countries | 50 states |
| <i>Year of data</i> | 2017 | 2019 |
| <i>Data source</i> | International Conflict Research (ICR) Group at Swiss Federal Institute of Technology at Zürich | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. House of Representatives Press Gallery • United States Senate |
| <i>Data link</i> | https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/core/ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • https://pressgallery.house.gov/member-data/demographics • https://www.senate.gov/senators/EthnicDiversityintheSenate.htm |

| Income Inequality | Not available | Non-whites to non-Hispanic whites per capita income ratio |
|-----------------------|---------------|---|
| <i>Measure</i> | ... | Using ACS 1-yr estimates, per capita income is calculated for non-whites and non-Hispanic whites. Ratio of these two per capita incomes is used as the measure for this indicator |
| <i>Data available</i> | ... | 50 states |
| <i>Year of data</i> | ... | 2018 |
| <i>Data source</i> | ... | American Community Survey 1-yr estimates |
| <i>Data link</i> | ... | https://www.census.gov/ |

| Incarceration | Not available | Ratio of over-representation in criminal justice system |
|-----------------------|---------------|---|
| <i>Measure</i> | ... | Over-representation of racial/ethnic minorities in criminal justice system suggests that the structure is more biased towards penalizing these minorities, and is thus less inclusive for these groups. Prison Policy Initiative provides number and ratio on incarcerated and non-incarcerated population by race for all counties within the US. For this indicator, data is aggregated up to the state, and over-representation is calculated for African Americans and Hispanics. |
| <i>Data available</i> | ... | 50 states |
| <i>Year of data</i> | ... | 2015 |
| <i>Data source</i> | ... | Prison Policy Initiative |
| <i>Data link</i> | ... | https://www.prisonpolicy.org/racialgeography/counties.html |

Gender

| Political Representation | Women in Parliament | Proportion of state legislators who are women |
|--------------------------|---|---|
| <i>Measure</i> | Data on proportion of seats held by women in lower house of parliament as a percentage of total available seats is being used as the measure for this indicator. The focus of this indicator is on elected representatives rather than nominated. | Percentage of women state legislators for each state is available at Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University, and is used as a measure for this indicator. |
| <i>Data available</i> | 193 countries | 50 states |
| <i>Year of data</i> | 2018 | 2019 |
| <i>Data source</i> | World Bank Database | Center for American Women and Politics |
| <i>Data link</i> | http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SG.GEN.PARL.ZS&country= | http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/women-state-legislature-2019 |

| Income Inequality | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Female to male Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (PPP) ratio Female labor force participation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Female to male income ratio Female labor force participation |
|-----------------------|---|---|
| <i>Measure</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Derived from the ratio of female to male wages, ratio of female to male shares of economically active population and gross national income (in 2011 purchasing power parity terms) is used as a measure for this indicator. Percentage of females in labor force is used as a measure for this indicator. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ratio of female to male median income is used as a measure for this indicator. Percentage of females in labor force is used as a measure for this indicator. |
| <i>Data available</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 178 countries 186 countries | 50 states |
| <i>Year of data</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2017 2018 | 2018 |
| <i>Data source</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> United Nations Development Program (UNDP) World Bank Database | American Community Survey 1-yr estimates |
| <i>Data link</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/123506 https://tinyurl.com/y8q79pvd https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.FE.ZS?view=chart | https://www.census.gov/ |

| Anti-Discrimination Laws | Laws on gender rights | Not available |
|--------------------------|---|---------------|
| Measure | OECD provides index values for laws on violence, land and non land rights, political rights, access to justice, access to financial services, freedom of movement and workplace rights. Average index value for the these indices is used as the measure for this indicator | ... |
| Data available | 180 countries | ... |
| Year of data | 2018 | ... |
| Data source | OECD | ... |
| Data link | https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=71149 | ... |

| Incarceration | Female incarceration per 100,000 people | Female incarceration per 100,000 people |
|----------------|---|---|
| Measure | Prison Policy Initiative publishes prison related data for each year based on reported and survey data for nation-states and for each state in the U.S. Data for the most recent year on rates of female incarceration per 100,000 people, has been included in the calculations for Inclusiveness Index. | |
| Data available | 162 countries | 50 states |
| Year of data | 2017 | 2017 |
| Data source | Prison Policy Initiative | |
| Data link | https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/women/2018.html | |

LGBTQ

| Exposure to out-group violence | Not available | Crime rate per 100,000 people by bias motivation |
|--------------------------------|---------------|--|
| <i>Measure</i> | ... | FBI's Hate Crime Statistics provides data on crimes by bias motivation. Crimes motivated by bias towards sexual orientation and gender identity for each state in the U.S. per 100,000 people is used as the measure for this indicator. |
| <i>Data available</i> | ... | 50 states |
| <i>Year of data</i> | ... | 2017 |
| <i>Data source</i> | ... | FBI Hate Crime Statistics |
| <i>Data link</i> | ... | https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017/resource-pages/tables/table-13.xls/view |

| Political Representation | LGBT representatives in Parliament | Proportion of state legislators who belong to LGBT community |
|--------------------------|---|---|
| <i>Measure</i> | Data on proportion of elected representatives who belong to the LGBT community in lower house of parliament as a percentage of total available seats is being used as the measure for this indicator. Using IPU data for number of available seats in lower house of parliament, proportion of LGBT MPs is calculated for 203 countries to include it in the index. | Percentage of state legislators who belong to the LGBT community is used as a measure for this indicator. |
| <i>Data available</i> | 203 countries | 50 states |
| <i>Year of data</i> | 2016 | 2019 |
| <i>Data source</i> | UNC LGBTQ Representative and Rights Research Institute | Victory Institute, Out for America |
| <i>Data link</i> | https://lgbtqrepresentationandrights.org/data/ | https://outforamerica.org/?office-level=State%20Legislature |

| Anti-Discrimination Laws | LGBT rights index | LGBT rights index |
|--------------------------|---|-------------------|
| <i>Measure</i> | Equaldex is a collaborative LGBT knowledge base built through crowd-sourcing. They provide an equality index for nation-states and for each state in the U.S. based on existing LGBT rights. This index is used as the measure for this indicator | |
| <i>Data available</i> | 229 countries | 50 states |
| <i>Year of data</i> | 2019 (Downloaded in July 2019) | |
| <i>Data source</i> | Equaldex | |
| <i>Data link</i> | http://www.equaldex.com/ | |

Religion

| Exposure to out-group violence | Social Hostilities Index (SHI) | Not available |
|--------------------------------|--|---------------|
| <i>Measure</i> | Social Hostilities Index (SHI) measures – on a 10-point scale – acts of religious hostility by private individuals, organizations and social groups. This includes mob or sectarian violence, harassment over attire for religious reasons and other religion-related intimidation or abuse. The SHI includes 13 measures of social hostilities. | ... |
| <i>Data available</i> | 198 countries | ... |
| <i>Year of data</i> | 2016 | ... |
| <i>Data source</i> | Pew-Templeton’s Global Religious Futures project | ... |
| <i>Data link</i> | http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/explorer#/?-subtopic=76&countries=Worldwide&index=SHI&chart-Type=map&year=2016&pdfMode=false | ... |

| Political Representation | Not available | Percentage of 116th Congress representatives who are non-Christian |
|--------------------------|---------------|---|
| <i>Measure</i> | ... | Percentage of each state’s delegation in 116th Congress who are non-Christian. |
| <i>Data available</i> | ... | 50 states |
| <i>Year of data</i> | ... | 2019 |
| <i>Data source</i> | ... | Pew Research Center |
| <i>Data link</i> | ... | https://www.pewforum.org/2019/01/03/faith-on-the-hill-116/ |

| Anti-Discrimination Laws | Government Restrictions Index (GRI) | Number of anti-Sharia bills enacted |
|--------------------------|--|--|
| <i>Measure</i> | Government Restrictions Index (GRI) measures – on a 10-point scale – government laws, policies and actions that restrict religious beliefs or practices. The GRI is comprised of 20 measures of restrictions, including efforts by governments to ban particular faiths, prohibit conversions, limit preaching or give preferential treatment to one or more religious groups. | Othering and Belonging Institute researchers have created a database of all anti-Sharia laws introduced and enacted by the lawmakers in each state. Number of bills enacted into law are used as the measure for this indicator. We believe that using this measure would act as a proxy for the pattern of discrimination against all religious minorities. |
| <i>Data available</i> | 198 countries | 50 states |
| <i>Year of data</i> | 2016 | 2010-2018 |
| <i>Data source</i> | Pew-Templeton’s Global Religious Futures project | Othering and Belonging Institute |
| <i>Data link</i> | http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/explorer#/?-subtopic=76&countries=Worldwide&index=SHI&chart-Type=map&year=2016&pdfMode=false | https://belonging.berkeley.edu/global-justice/islamophobia#islamophobia-database |

Disability

| Income Inequality | Not available | Median earnings ratio of disabled people to able-bodied people |
|-----------------------|---------------|---|
| <i>Measure</i> | ... | Median earnings by people with disability as a ratio of median earnings by people with no disability is used as the measure for this indicator. |
| <i>Data available</i> | ... | 50 states |
| <i>Year of data</i> | ... | 2018 |
| <i>Data source</i> | ... | American Community Survey 1-yr estimates |
| <i>Data link</i> | ... | https://www.census.gov/ |

| Anti-Discrimination Laws | Laws against discrimination of disable people | Not available |
|--------------------------|--|---------------|
| <i>Measure</i> | <p>UN Convention on Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD) proposed a treaty for all member countries to sign “to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.” Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, a non-profit organization, provides a list of countries which have signed CRPD and/or have existing laws protecting the rights of disable people, was used. The data was coded as following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Countries which have signed CRPD and have more than two laws protecting the rights of people with disability: 3 • Countries which have signed CRPD and have two or fewer laws protecting the rights of people with disability: 2 • Countries which have signed CRPD but have no reported laws on disability: 1 • Countries that have not signed CRPD and have no reported laws on disability: -1 | ... |
| <i>Data available</i> | 190 countries | ... |
| <i>Year of data</i> | ... | ... |
| <i>Data source</i> | Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund | ... |
| <i>Data link</i> | https://dredf.org/legal-advocacy/international-disability-rights/international-laws/ | ... |

Appendix C: New Indicators or Measures

New Indicators or Measures

GLOBAL:

- Laws on gender rights: OECD provides index values for laws on a number of gender-based rights such as violence against women, land and non land rights, political rights, access to justice, access to financial services, freedom of movement and workplace rights. Please see page 41 for more details on this indicator and data source.

U.S:

- None

New Data Sources

GLOBAL:

- None

U.S:

- US House of Representatives Press Gallery: U.S. House of Representatives provides race data on all house representatives. Please see page 38 for more information
- United States Senate: United States Senate provides race data on all U.S. senators. Please see page 38 for more information
- Victory Institute, Out for America: Out for America provides data identifying currently serving out LGBTQ elected officials in the United States at every level of government. Please see page 42 for more information

The Othering and Belonging Institute at UC Berkeley brings together researchers, community stakeholders, and policymakers to identify and challenge the barriers to an inclusive, just, and sustainable society in order to create transformative change.



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