

REPLY ON CATHOLIC CHURCH, STEPINAC AND HOLOCAUST IN CROATIA TO *** (OUTLINE/SKETCH, 1936 - 1943)

Jewish refugees from Germany started to arrive to Zagreb mainly since 1934. A center of refugee relief in monarchial Yugoslavia since 1933 was Jewish Community of Zagreb while HICEM was included in the relief program in 1936 assisted by other charitable organizations. In March 1937 Pope Pius XI published an encyclical "Mit brennender Sorge" that condemns National Socialist ideology and racism. The editor of Jesuit magazine "Život" Stjepan Tomislav Poglajen SJ together with other Jesuits from Palmotićeve street in Zagreb wrote against National Socialism from September 1937 until the occupation in April 1941. Magazine distribution for that time was high 1500 pieces in ten numbers per year in comparison to 2000 pieces of Stepinac' Caritas monthly magazine.[1] On December 7, 1937 Archbishop Coadjutor Stepinac became the new Archbishop by succession. At the end of March 1938, fifteen days after Anschluss, Stepinac held a lecture to Catholic students in which he explicitly condemned racism and extremism and repeated similarly in a later sermon in Knin and another one in Zagreb Cathedral in December.[2] In an article from May 18, 1938, reprinted in March 1940, he gave clear condemnation of concentration camps, slavery and brutality as political tools of totalitarian regimes.[3] According to Boban, in November 1938 Stepinac informed Pope Pius XI about the Nazi actions in the monarchy and left the materials to cardinal Pacelli, later Pius XII, expressing his concerns about the near future while on 24th of the same month he approved the Act of St. Paul, an institution for aid to Catholic Jewish and other refugees as they started increasingly to seek assistance.[4] Pius XI sent John LaFarge SJ the same year to Stepinac, among other, for consultancy regarding the humanitarian crisis needed for writing of the unpublished encyclical "Humani generis unitas" that condemns anti-Semitism and racism. Stepinac's public condemnations under occupation are similar to this encyclical, however neither those prior to it are not far. John LaFarge also wrote for Poglajen's magazine in this period, together with Friedrich Muckermann SJ. The same year a Dominican Hijacint Bošković was holding lectures in which he attacks Nazism on theoretical grounds, which were published in 1939 under the title "Philosophical Roots of Fascism and National Socialism".[5] Aforementioned are not the only ones with open anti-Nazi positions, likewise anti-Communist and anti-Fascist. As Jewish emigration increased significantly after Anschluss of Austria, on December 16, 1938 the Archbishop wrote to his Chapter asking for assistance regarding Jewish refugees while on December 31, 1938 he established dedicated Relief Committee for Refugees and on January 11, 1939 sent requests to 298 addresses regarding humanitarian and financial help, given in the Appendix within SD Office II memo from March 8, 1939.[6] Gestapo was giving significant attention to Stepinac' Committee since his offices have routed thousands of Jewish and other refugees until the occupation while about four thousand were trapped within the country as it became surrounded by Axis.[7] On April 11, a day after entering into Zagreb, Gestapo has taken the building of Jewish Community at Palmotićeve 16 and settled there, while Jewish Community was resettled on Tomislav Square 4 in building of Friedfeld Foundation, closer to Main Railway Station, four days later. Same day on April 15, 1941 Gestapo conducted a raid of Committee's office at Kaptol 3 and arrested the secretary of the Committee Mrs. Terezija Škringer. Škringer was taken to Graz and sentenced to death, but after the Archbishop's intervention was released on September 1, while she was arrested for the second time on March 2, 1942 and sent to Auschwitz but obtained documentation through the Archbishop with which she managed to evade deportation. Stepinac's secretary dr. Franjo Šeper burned the Action's archival material that Gestapo could use for identification and tracking. According to Akrap, the approach Gestapo took was based on RSHA: Yugoslawien file written in Berlin before the occupation most likely by Sipo und des SD Offices from Graz and Vienna with assistance of Hans Helm and Wilhelm Beissner who were active in the monarchy in pre-war period and obtained positions within the EG during the occupation. Qualifications from the file regarding Catholic Church in Croatia as Akrap presents them can be divided into three aspects: Catholic press, political orientation and the Archbishop. Qualifications regarding the first aspect are "'excellent organization and construction of informative system of Catholic Church that publishes around 150 papers' in 36 different companies and printing offices" while text analysis determines a "close connection between Jewish circles and the Catholic press in spreading anti-German sentiment. Particularly 'harsh attack on German racial and National-Socialist politics'". Qualifications regarding the second aspect, political orientation of Catholic Church, document states that "Catholicism in Yugoslavia has a decisive role in spreading of anti-German spirit", building this on first aspect stating that "Catholic Church has clear demonstrative expression of anti-National-Socialist temper and continually instigates sentiments against German Reich". Further is stated that the key figure behind such actions in first and second aspect is the Archbishop Stepinac, as the last aspect of analysis of Catholic Church position, who is qualified as "distinctly anti-Nazi oriented", former Austro-Hungarian deserter and soldier from the Macedonian Front with allegations of "'entirely founded suspicions' that the Archbishop Stepinac is, with the help and mediation of Polish and Czech political and military circles, connected and closely cooperating with British and French intelligence service" where "Catholic priests serve as couriers for transfer of information to French intelligence service" for which reason Stepinac had an open dossier in counterintelligence Office of Gestapo. The document also pointed to the Relief Committee for Refugees as an expression of deutschfeindlich temper, as it is primarily understood in its relation towards Jewish emigration.[8] Stepinac' arrest was postponed for appropriate

conditions due to assessment of plausible political instability in the takeover and Vatican response. Instead he was placed under full surveillance.

New conditions imposed that Jews were segregated by the Aryan laws and the issuance of Catholic papers did not have any effect on it. Despite that Stepinac attempted to push related law formulation to the new regime already in April 23, 1941 that would exclude Catholic Jews from it (alongside visas, the papers, sometimes with new identity, had been distributed since 1938 which caused a membership decrease in Jewish community of Zagreb by 3860 members, 90% by 1941, which counts for around 30% of the entire community).[9] Another partial solution was found in mixed marriage formulas.[10] In May 22, 1941 letter Stepinac openly opposed the segregation of Jews and the obligation to wear yellow armband with a warning of disobedience to the regulation, while in another letter on May 30, as previous was ignored, again tried to argue only for Catholic Jews with wider criteria for law exclusions, however this was in the beginning of the so called **first phase** where law implementation included only segregation and excommunication from society, not mass deportations that started mainly in June, up to that point arrests being conducted mainly on individuals and smaller groups. According to the consular reports from French and German embassy in Zagreb at June 11, the letters among other forms of intercession, seems to have achieved a temporary result.[11] When regulation for deportations into concentration camps upon "the collective guilt" were introduced on June 26, having in mind that operation Barbarossa started 22nd, in July 21 Stepinac protested for the inhumane treatment of the arrested Jews and Orthodox and requested Geneva conventions to be respected which resulted with Red Cross mediation of the correspondences with family members with packet distribution to the internees, however with significant difficulties. Information and plead for intercession on behalf of Croatian Jews from the president of Unione delle comunita israelitiche Lionello Alatri in August 14 directed to Vatican Secretary of State Luigi Maglione shows very similar content to the letter of the Archbishop from previous month but with specific reference to camps showing that at that time humanitarians were concerned about forced labor conditions, without visible knowledge about mass extermination plans. The Archbishop did receive a reply to his letter from July through the Ministry of Justice and Religion (MoJR) memo at July 29 stating that his allegations "are based on information without foundation". According to Kvaternik's testimony to OZNA from September 21, 1946, at the end of summer the Archbishop was personally asking information from Pavelić regarding persecution of Jews among other, while their second meeting was during Autumn when he "very diplomatically, condemned Pavelić, Ustashe, and the regime. With the words that these persecutions and oppression will bring Croatian people into greatest calamity and affliction".[12] In October he publicly condemned the destruction of the synagogue in Zagreb and called a synod in November on which a resolution was defined seeking full protection for Catholic Jews, however at the end of a separate nine-page long letter from 20th sent to Pavelić in addition to the synod resolution Stepinac asked for "full respect of the human person, regardless of age, sex, religion, nationality or race" requesting for "restriction of violence of individuals" and "responsible authority" placing it into contrast to "irresponsible elements" while synod made a request that priests have entrance to camps for sacramental and spiritual needs of Catholic Jewish internees.[13] Another letter has been sent at December 3 from the Archbishop to the Pope where he stated at the second point of the synod they sent "una lettera chiedendo l'umano trattamento verso gli ebrei in quanto cio v'e ancora possibile a motivo della presenza dei tedeschi; in particolare poi di quelli che sono stati recentemente battezzati e sono provenienti da genitori e proavi ebrei battezzati".[14] According to testimony given by Hinko Mann to the National Commission at September 20, 1945, day before the synod he brought to the Archbishop a Jewish internee that escaped from Jasenovac camp that showed him beating marks and told him about his experiences while Mann's appeal was distributed at the synod and sent to Vatican.[15] On December 6 the Archbishop requested to send his Caritas representatives to the internees in the camps in order to "find about their needs" while Einsatzgruppe is informed at 29th about "political interference of that priest into internal affairs" of the imposed political system, next to connections with exiled government, asserting that his influence should be eliminated. EK dispatched another document at January 20, 1942 with further accusation of "anglofilic conspirations of the Vatican against Germany" with similar qualifications as previous one. Because of the pressure the authorities agreed to allow entrance to the camp. According to Prnjatović testimony, within the camp information came from Jewish circles already in January, while camp administration announced visitation after that in the middle of the month. On February 6, 1942 Stepinac sent his secretary dr. Stjepan Lacković with dr. Giuseppe Carmelo Masucci, secretary of Msgr. Marcone, together with foreign (axis) diplomats to inspect the situation of internees in Jasenovac camp, as entrance was not allowed before regardless of prior requests due to concerns of Geneva convention violations.[16] On March 7, 1942 the Archbishop sent a letter to the head of Ministry of Interior (MoI) in which he openly requested him to prevent the deportation of Jews to camps while don Masucci wrote in his diary dating to February 10 that Msgr. Marcone was asked to plead at the Ustasha authorities against deportation of Jews to camps, besides record of meeting with rabbi Freiburger that day. On March 18, 1942 a memorandum from Lichtheim was issued to Vatican with explication of state of Jewish internees, given in Appendix, which seems to be not much different from earlier Stepinac and Altari.[17] Since the Archbishop was in Rome in early April and Cardinal Maglione replied in April 21 to American Jews that the visit in February 6 was made, Vatican was well informed about the German actions while it seems the Archbishop Stepinac together with Marcone tried to diplomatically subvert them as reported by EK. In May 1942 sermon he stated that "it would be absurd to talk about some new world order, from whatever side, if within this order human person would not be respected, undead human soul,

that has unalienable rights that no human authority can and must not limit. It would be absurd to think that the Catholic Church would know fear in front of any human force in its defense of the human person and free conscience". Similarly in June 21 regarding Budak article. Msgr. Marcone informed Maglione on July 17 that, while having no response to further requests for information about the condition of Croatian Jews until now, probably since February while this was a response to Maglione's message from April 18, E. Kvaternik told him that German government imposes on him the deportation of Croatian Jews to Germany where 2 million Jews were already destroyed, what will mark the so called **second phase** in the destruction of Jews in Croatia, starting with the next month.[18] In August 25, 1942 Helm issued a report assessing the position of Croatian Catholic Church towards Germany with evaluation that "it is by its nature hostile towards National Socialism" and has issued "the latest action...standing under the motto 'Peace' (Mir), through which it works against the efforts of Axis forces for victory". Helm recognized the Archbishop to be behind the action, stating that after the celebration of the Feast of Corpus Christi "sermons followed in churches, that were according to instructions given by Stepinac dedicated to this theme. On this occasion there were many cases when the Catholic Church has taken position against Germany". The report continues to list priests with anti-German speeches and concludes with instruction "At the convenient moment, on this demeanor of Catholic vicars the Directorate for Public Order and Security (RAVSIGUR) will be notified". Steinberg quotes similar information given to von Horstenau in October 7, 1942 by informant Fliegermajor Josef Donegani, where another priest is mentioned regarding sermon in August who is not listed in Helm's report but agrees with its general outline.[19] After August deportations overseered by Franz Abromeit from Eichmann's office, within which the Archbishop again intervened to exclude Jews from mixed marriages as both non-Catholic and Catholic Jews were targeted, administrative change in RAVSIGUR and UNS occurred at October 13 as E. Kvaternik was relieved from his position, while replaced by Ljudevit Zimpermann who was non-negotiable, as seen in Marcone reports from November 8 and December 1.[20] In October 25 sermon Stepinac explicitly expressed what he wrote privately in a letter from March, stating that the Church always criticized "all deeds of injustice and violence, perpetrated in the name of class, race or nationality. It is forbidden to exterminate Gypsies and Jews because they are said to belong to an inferior race". In November 21 Hans Helm reported to Berlin that Stepinac is upset and distanced from the regime while he got closer to the Partisans. Julius Schmidlin was appointed to Zagreb in February 1943 as a humanitarian representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from Geneva to assist in the humanitarian crisis. In March 14, 1943 Stepinac again publicly condemned racist doctrine similarly as year before, while within the next two months the so called **third phase** of the destruction of Jews began. From April 8, 1943 Günther Hermann was appointed as head of Einsatzgruppe E Sipo und des SD in Zagreb. On May 5 Himmler was visiting Zagreb as RSHA expected that their "Judenaktion" will be completed until March among other while in May 2, according to Shomrony's testimony, Stepinac called Freiberger and his wife to hide in the Archbishop's Palace as SS and RAVSIGUR were gathering remaining Jews, but Freiberger decided to stay and he was arrested the same night while Stepinac intervened with authorities without success, all occurred probably within one day or so, when rabbi was taken to Auschwitz.[21] On May 8, 1943 Stepinac was writing to MoI asking for working permits and a release of the arrested members of the Jewish community of Zagreb. The same month 20, 1943 Helm requests for the interrogation of Milan Schwarz arrested at May 11 along with his transportation to Auschwitz with explanation that he was the closest cooperative (ger. Mitarbeiter) of the Archbishop and has endangered the work of his agent in Zagreb. Helm ordered an interrogation about the Archbishop and a copy of the interrogation report.[22] Julius Schmidlin was in direct contact with the Archbishop and representatives of Jewish community of Zagreb that were trying to secure finances, food and medicine for Jews while the Archbishop's Caritas organization was supposed to place Jewish internees under its care instead of decimated Jewish community that lost the ability to support its members, together with elderlies from the old people's home. In June the Archbishop together with Julio Schmidlin arranged the care of the remaining Jewish community of Zagreb that suffered genocide.[23] In July and October the Archbishop made another explicit public condemnation of the Nazi policy towards Jews and the regime, after which, according to some sources, Gestapo ordered 31 priest to be arrested while the Archbishop was placed into shorter house arrest as his imprisonment was obviously in preparation, as indicated by the Gestapo document from May 20 and an attempt to arrest Msgr. Marcone in September.[24] From other sources also can be read that he considered his life was endangered at that time (Meštrović writes that he was hit by a rock with notes in German and Croatian that he is going to be "shot like a dog in the street", similarly dr. Stjepan Steiner and Hans Helm).[25]

The relation of the Ustashe regime to German apparatus is described partly in Note [17], while extensive covering is given in UDB internal publication on German Intelligence Agency (NOS) volume V from 1958. General development within NDH is easier to follow when taken within the geopolitical framework within which occupation occurred, that is within preparations of Operation Barbarossa. ADAP, Serie E, Band I, No.108, January 10, 1942, pp.198-199, detailed by Browning, informs Eichmann that "the Romanian, Croatian and Slovakian governments have agreed that Jews with their citizenship may be deported with the German Jews" referring to an agreement on German initiative from November 1941 regarding non-German Jews in Reich, while No.150, Besprechungsprotokoll of Wannsee conference, contains footnote dating to December 8, 1941 holding Final Solution draft from Foreign Office for a meeting with Heydrich regarding deportations of Jews to the East from formally non-Reich territory in Southeastern Europe. Point 5 shows probable context for Ustashe requests in October 1941 and May 1942 that

Tomasevich quotes from Browning, showing in point 8 that all Jewish deportations and executions were coordinated by the Einsatzgruppe within its respective territory, while the local governments provided execution organ through its local police apparatus, point 1 referring to aforementioned agreement from November. Jasenovac camp was formed in September, while ADAP, Serie D, Band XIII.2, 15 September bis 11 Dezember 1941, No. 566, December 8, 1941, p.805 shows Benzler report regarding establishment of Semlin in December 8. In all cases the deportations to East were predicted but placed on hold as Einsatzgruppe had the priority in formal Reich territory, leading to their local elimination in formal non-Reich territories but *influenced* through the form of Besatzungszone. According to Luther report from August 1942, emigration was abandoned as a method of final solution since June 1940 and they switched to "eine territoriale Endlösung" which was also "Gesamtlösung der Judenfrage im deutschen Einflußgebiet in Europa". According to UDB section III publication, three elements of influence in its Besatzungszone in NDH were the Army, Foreign Office and RHSA that formed the Einsatzgruppe for territory of former Yugoslavian monarchy. It's EK Zagreb headed by SS-Sturmbanführer Beissner was working on radicalization of anti-Semitic measures through direct influence on the police while Foreign Office headed by Kasche was influencing the establishment of desired legal framework maintaining direct contact and coordination with the aforementioned, which is within the draft principles. EK Zagreb was assembled from RSHA sections III, IV and VI among which section IV, that is, Gestapo, was the strongest.[26] Although itself subordinated to Einsatzgruppe in Belgrade it was referring to it only in the matters regarding the Serbian or Yugoslav affairs, otherwise it was referring directly to RHSA in Berlin. On p.731 of Vol II however, Hilberg states, referring to Browning, that the "reports from the Einsatzgruppe in Serbia were sandwiched into the reports from the Einsatzgruppen in Russia", showing that the general framework of this period should be looked within the operation Barbarossa that started at June 22, while it was in preparation since March, in between occurring the occupation of Yugoslavian monarchy. This is also supported by general development of internal affairs in the satellite entity and their foreign affair meetings, like S. Kvaternik, Pavelić etc. that offered military participation on the Soviet front meaning that the satellite government was aligning its policy completely with die Besatzungsmacht or occupying force. EK Zagreb, as stated in aforementioned note, used domestic police for its executive organ for first couple of years. At the end of May 1941 Beissner from EK was leading a delegation with E. Kvaternik, the head of RAVSIGUR and UNS, and few of his associates to SS-HA meeting with G. Berger, returning on June 2, 1941 prior to operation Barbarossa. The result of the meeting was an agreement regarding training of a company size Ustashe soldiers at various SS services while from June 4 institutionalization of a camp complex Gospić - Velebit - Pag began within Italian Zone II, while Jasenovac was formed according to blueprint of Sachsenhausen Oranienburg camp under SS in Germany. No one outside the police and German authorities were able to approach the camps, because of which diplomatic pressure from the Church started to increase after November 1941 for camps to be opened for humanitarians.

Methodological error is to use person's attitude on the issue within the occupation as the only premise and exclude the attitude towards it in free or unforced conditions, especially if there is an indication of continuity. This is not violated with other groups so it should not be done in this case with the Church. Attitude under law enforcement by foreign military and intelligence service might be compulsory if not in accord with prewar attitude, which is what is seen in this case. It is apparent that the subject activities continued within the newly established conditions and were led less explicitly, else they could be treated as an enemy or "unlawful" activity for which a legal sanction is imposed as is seen in wartime reports of German provenance where his prewar humanitarian work was considered subversive. From paragraph one can be seen that his prewar political attitude is at most compatible with HSS of Maček stream, with of course differences in religious issues, while in 1935 advocated to declare the national extremists as a heresy by resolution. His main occupation is however with humanitarian work as he was a main person behind establishment of Caritas of the Archdiocese. In second paragraph, from letters in period to June it can be seen that he was being persuaded by the authorities, falsely, that measures against Jews had to be made because of Germans but will not be applied on which he expressed surprise after they started to declare more and more anti-Jewish laws with wide application. In June 1941, according to multiple sources, he publicly protested, along with many others, the first time against such practices (not 1943. as claimed by some authors). On start of persecutions, it is seen that he shares largely the same objections as Jewish representatives, which indicates they viewed camps in WWI manner, over which they asked for monitoring over conditions in them, that is, whether Geneva conventions are being applied in order to decrease mortality. This has changed after November, probably due to Hinko Mann meeting in the middle of the month, when more pressure was pushed to open the camps to humanitarians. Pavelić however already shared in December to Ciano that the Jewish population of NDH had already decreased to about a third of its size, which coincides with EG reports from other territories, as is also indicated in Heydrich report on Wannsee Lake. Up to that period the experience of humanitarians is mass deportations and expulsion that they witnessed from the Relief Committee for Refugees since 1938. This seems to be confirmed in Lichtheim memorandum on March 18, 1942 where he stated the same as Stepinac and Altari earlier, indicating that at that time no further information regarding camps was available to non-military and highest political circles. Although there are partial records of continual public protests in 1941 since June, from the beginning of 1942 more explicit opposition starts to emerge as authorities were asked openly to stop deportations of Jews to concentration camps while public protests were most explicit since August, same time when deportations started and information about two million

Jews came from Kvaternik. It could be expected that "decrease" largely happened between October and December, roughly coinciding with massacres in Ukraine and elsewhere and the beginning of EG actions in Serbia.[27]

REFERENCES AND NOTES

- [1] According to Tomasevich, among mentioned charitable organizations was "a committee established, apparently as early as 1936, with Archbishop Coadjutor Stepinac as patron, to support fleeing Jewish refugees". Tomasevich, J.: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945 - Occupation and Collaboration, Stanford University Press, 2001, p.582; Mladen M.: Odgovornost - središnja tema judaizma, Ha-Kol, ŽOZ, March/April, 2012, p.5; Kajinić, J., Stjepan Tomislav Poglajen o nacionalsocijalizmu u časopisu Život (1937.–1941.), Časopis za suvremenu povijest, Vol.42 No.2 Listopad 2010. (cro.): <https://hrcak.srce.hr/63650>
- [2] Stepinac, A., Propovijed katoličkoj akademskoj mladeži o odnosu katoličkog intelektualca prema svome narodu, osuda rasističke teorije i tumačenje kršćanskog pogleda na svijet [Lecture to Catholic Academic Youth on the Relationship of Catholic Intellectual to His People, Condemnation of Racist Theory and Interpretation of the Christian Worldview], March 27, 1938, given in Appendix. Batelja mentions another letter from August 9, 1935 to Nuncio Pellegrinetti in which he asks him to condemn extremism on the next synod as a heresy, "Immo dolorem magnum semper sentio propter nationalismum extremum ubique in mundo vigentem, per quem homo homini non amplius amicus et frater sed lupus actus est, ita ut in proximo concilio sanctae Ecclesiae inter primas haereses hodiernas extremum nationalismum tanquam pestem generis humani damnari deberet". In previous year, January 1934 he initiated the Caritas monthly magazine in order to motivate charity in practice and edited its first five numbers with contribution in several articles, same year he was appointed for Coadjutor Archbishop in May 28 and ordained as a bishop in June 24, 1934. It should be noted that Caritas as an organization within the Archdiocese was initiated by Arch. Bauer circular on Stepinac's initiative on November 26, 1931 when he returned from Rome, after which in May 1932 Catholic Caritas Secretariate for Zagreb was established while after another circular formally Caritas of the Archdiocese of Zagreb. In November 16, 1933 Stepinac was elected for temporary president of Caritas Community of the the Archdiocese of Zagreb for the city of Zagreb and confirmed next month on December 11 for regular president. According to Benigar and Horvat, under his presiding the same winter were established five soup-kitchens, one of them for students at Jesuits in Palmotičeva, where Jewish Community of Zagreb was also located (see Image 4.). The aforementioned letter from 1935 is written after assassination of the king in October 1934 that led to further radicalization within the monarchy, but also a month after establishment of Concordate between Vatican and the monarchy in July 25, 1935, which however authorities did not ratify and eventually annulled it in 1937 due to the SOC pressure. It can be considered to be politically beneficial if turned into resolution, however it is a private letter while he maintained the same tone in public relations after the annulment, indicating that this was his personal opinion more than a political gesture, as had been stated by Count O'Brien, pub., p.11. If it was turned into a public statement, it was entirely ignored by SOC and didn't contribute to Concordate ratification. Anti-extremist tendencies also resonated in Gestapo reports, see Note 11.
- [3] Batelja, J.: Bl. Alojzije Stepinac, Documents I, Book II, Postulatura bl.A.S., Zagreb, 2010, pp. 48-50.
- [4] Next to Relief Committee for Refugees that encompassed all refugees, the Archbishop instituted auxiliary organization for "spiritual and social help to all converts that truly want to enter the Catholic Church, especially - in these extraordinary times - sons and daughters of nation of Israel", while the same day issued a call to "all the people of good will and noble heart to help with their generous contribution 'the Act of St. Paul' that in these difficult times intends to enable and relieve the lives of many who are because of their faith exiled from their homes, their own country and suffer persecution", as quoted from AP, CVIII, p. 3137 by Berezinski. This center seems to be serving specifically Czech, Polish, Jewish and other Catholics. It seems that non-religious Jewish refugees from Europe, especially ones who became Catholics, were having difficulties to obtain aid in Jewish centers from where they were being sent to the Cathedral and Caritas, in Zagreb case. Similarly is seen in several other primary sources. Glavina, F., Nadbiskup Stepinac i nacionalsocijalizam u svjetlu izvješća Gestapoa, Croatica Christiana periodica, Vol. 21 No. 40 Prosinac 1997. (cro): <https://hrcak.srce.hr/81409>
- [5] Bošković, H.: Filozofski izvori fasizma i nacionalnog socijalizma, Dom i svijet, 2000
- [6] A letter by the Archbishop Stepinac from December 16, 1938 to the Cathedral Chapter (Prvostolni kaptol) of Zagreb regarding emerging humanitarian crisis, as quoted by Berezinski from AP, CVIII, p. 3140: "As is well-known to you, due to the law 'for the protection of race' a large number of members of the Jewish nation is required to flee from Germany and Austria, in most cases without any financial means and without a specific goal. Many of them are baptized and members of the Catholic Church. They are turning here for help or intercession in all larger and larger numbers. We do as much as we can for them to obtain a stay extension or travel visa to other countries. But all of this is not enough. The number of people who turn to us keep getting bigger by every day. In addition they are now turning not only for interventions but also a financial aid...It is, honorable Gentlemen, known to you that the Archbishop in the current situation is by all means not capable to help all by himself in everything what those unfortunates need. Help has to come from other sides as well. This

is why I asked for Your counsel what should be done". The result of the aforementioned was establishment of the Relief Committee for Refugees on December 31, 1938 with office at Kaptol 3 that had included efforts to build a financial construction (Image 4). For this reason a representative of the City Savings Bank (Gradska štedionica) was included into its work, together with other industrials and consulates while letters had been sent on 298 addresses for financial contributions, receiving good response as one million dinars has been collected according to Batelja's quotation of Biber report from CP, XCIII, pp.4401-02. Majority of people left for USA and England, in some cases China and Japan.

- [7] For pre-war compare Oral history interview with Lucie Sternberg Rosenberg, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Collection, September 24, 2002 (eng): <https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn512295>
- [8] One of the main activities of the Archbishop and other priests was to obtain free passage to other countries for which reason consulates were being pressured for document issuing. The Committee members as Škringer were receiving refugees directly at the Zagreb Main Railway Station. According to Benigar, Stepinac was also very often himself present on refugee receptions. Kvaternik statement agrees with anti-German qualifications of the Archbishop, stating that he was "expressing himself very adversely about Hitler: that he persecutes the Church, Church orders, confines and prosecutes priests, especially that he is corrupting children and youth, and that all of this is going to have an ill ending". According to statement of Jože Škorjanc, Slovenian refugee priest sheltered in the Archdiocese of Zagreb, Stepinac said in front of him that Hitler is incarnation of the devil. Batelja, Documents II, Book 3, p. 497. Akrap, Gordan: Cardinal Stepinac in Gestapo and OZNA documents, Udruga sv. Juraj, Glas Koncila, Laser plus, Zagreb, 2016, pp.24-45
- [9] Phayer talks about 60% until 1942, Brandl refers to Sobolevski with lower 1245 baptized Jews at the beginning of occupation. Since Sobolevski article is from 1998 and Phayer from 2001, for the time being using Gitman from 2011 due to more recent and systematic research. Kisić-Kolanović, N.: Siegfried Kasche: njemački pogled na Hrvatsku 1941., Časopis za suvremenu povijest [Magazine for Contemporary History], Vol. 43 No.3 Prosinac 2011, pp.773.-800; Brandl, N. M.: Židovska topografija Zagreba kojeg više nema, Historijski zbornik, Vol. 69 No.1 Ožujak 2017, pp.91-103; Compare dr. Ferdinand Stift biography (eng): <https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn88936>
- [10] There should be distinction however of honorary Aryan and Catholic marriage that Stepinac was insisting on as first was defined on racial criteria. Gitman, E.: When Courage Prevailed - The Rescue and Survival of Jews in the Independent State of Croatia 1941-1945, Paragon House, 2011; Gitman, E.: A Question of Judgement: Dr. Alojzije Stepinac, Review of Croatian history, Vol.II No.1 Siječanj 2007. (eng): <https://hrcak.srce.hr/15845>
- [11] Gueyraud to Darlan, Zagreb, June 11, 1941, Europe 94, ADAE, box 384, 2, given in the Appendix. According to Krizman, B.: Pavelić između Hitlera i Mussolinija, Globus, Zagreb, 1980, p.128, the same was reported by German embassy under Kasche stating that the Archbishop is responsible for exclusion of Catholic Jews from racial segregation laws while another memo from June 13 states that the Minister of Justice and Religion denied the information from June 11 when approached for explanation, showing however quick reaction time regarding these issues. In accordance with French and first German report is a report of Captain Arthur Evelyn Waugh from 1945 in which he states about the events of the month in question: "...in Zagreb in June 1941 the Archbishop Stepinac led a deputation to Pavelić to protest against the persecution of the Jews; many of the clergy of Zagreb wore the yellow star in the streets to ridicule Pavelić's attempt to mark Jews in the Nazi manner...", published in South Slav Journal, Vol.2 No.4, October 1979, pp.17-26, excerpt reprinted in Batelja, J.: Bl. Alojzije Stepinac, Book III, pp. 116-117. As the report is written before the end of the war prior to March 1945 it is not clear how the author obtained the information about wearing of yellow stars on the streets by clergy as this was a threat of the Archbishop in a private letter from May 22. If he obtained the letter through a distributed copy or intelligence work and compiled the report by task with an interpreter who speaks the language, it is still not clear why he would place this into June and not May together with the deputation as the information regarding latter is not present in the letter, so this is unlikely to be a concoction for intelligence purposes, as the report was also turned down by his seniors due to political reasons in favor of Tito, not the Catholic Church. In other words, this may not be his experience but of someone else, probably from the clergy he was in contact with, which makes it not less relevant as the Archbishop's letters were not widely available at that time nor this detail seemed to be of much importance to put a risk into it. There is no mention of deputation as Waugh states in other sources except June 26 but it should not be excluded as it would not be unusual after three issued letters from April to the end of May. His account is supported by a report of Stanislav Rapotec from 1942 stating, as quoted by Count Anthony Hery, that "As soon as the persecutions of the Serbs, Jews and all the others started, the Archbishop protested against such acts to the Quisling regime of Croatia. This happened about the end of June, 1941. When the persecutions did not stop, Archbishop Stepinac took more dramatic steps. He went to see Pavelitch himself...". Relevant statement in accord with aforementioned however is by priest Vilim Cecelja, stating "when the order came that Jews have to wear special markings in NDH, the Archbishop sent me to Pavelić to tell him that he will preach against these markings next Sunday, so he should withdraw the order and release the owner of Jutarnji list, dr. Ziga Šol, and return him his printing office (tiskara). It was in June 11, 1941. The Chief told me that we are not our own masters yet and that Germans are standing behind us. He asked me to tell the Archbishop Stepinac not to preach against the

regulation of markings for Jews. The Archbishop has regardlessly, to protect the Jews, stood in their defence and preached". Similarly is stated postwar by Louis S. Breier in October 13, 1946 claiming that he "publicly stood up against the infamous system of 'yellow star' advocating a position that it violates the dignity of man. And it is by his efforts that it has been abolished", probably referring to the period in question. Similarly has been published however in an article day earlier, October 12, 1946 in a weekly magazine *The New Leader* that stated the same so it is not clear whether Breier took the article for granted or vice versa, or each used its own sources. Based on first five sources that agree with each other, it is safe to conclude that prior to explicit sanctions for such actions, there were public protests against the segregation of Jews that may be the basis for the French report and that probably resonated in the later regulation issued by Pavelić at June 26. Regarding public protests outside the Catholic Church, the May 26, 1941 event, when school youth in Zagreb was brought at the Maksimir stadium from where young Jews, among others, were to be singled out, but all Croatian students stepped out with them, may be included here as it was a public protest against segregation. Similarly in case of Julius Mann Grgić shows that population in 1941 was not hostile towards Jews within the lower Zagreb region around Lekenik area but was rather protective which indicates that Marcone's note from August 23, *l'odio dei croati verso di loro*, should be understood as a created climate by the regime through laws and propaganda machinery. According to Gitman, E. research, both group and individual intercessions on behalf of Jews continued well into July when explicit sanctions were proscribed against this. Only consistent anti-Semitic behaviour outside of this framework can be seen among *Volksdeutsche* communities and partly influenced extremist groups. Batelja, J.: *Bl. Alojzije Stepinac, Documents I, Book 2, Postulatura bl.A.S., Zagreb, 2010, p. 147; Documents II, Book 3, pp. 451-452. O'Brien of Thomond, Anthony Henry, Count: Archbishop Stepinac - The Man and His Case, The Newman Bookshop, Westminster, 1947, pp.18-19; Grgić, S: Being a Jew on a Croatian countryside: A sketch for the portrait of Julius Mann, Lekenik's merchant and patron (1870-1943?), Radovi Zavoda za hrvatsku povijest Filozofskoga fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Vol.45 No.1, Dec 2013, pp.71-94.*

- [12] At the beginning of the occupation more than 300 priests and other members of the Church had been expelled from Slovenia that came to the Archdiocese of Zagreb. A letter in July 23 was sent to the Archbishop from the MoJR head Mirko Puk as a warning that these priests are spreading anti-regime propaganda claiming that "this is going to last at most two-three months, then it will collapse, and Yugoslavia will be again" while also claimed that the same has being talked about the Archbishop. In the same letter he stated that he doesn't believe the information about the Archbishop, but if he receives another similar report he will be "compelled to roundup all Slovenian priesthood and place them into a concentration camp, and those who are salient will face a court-martial [cro. prijeki sud]". That same month the Archbishop sent dr. Lončar to the same MoJR to protest against forcible conversions of the Orthodox where he threatened with excommunication to a priest writing conversion certificates. The result was that dr. Lončar was arrested and sentenced to death, after which both the Archbishop and Msgr. Marcone intervened to change the verdict, being able to get 20 years imprisonment (Krnjević however states, although from London, he was sentenced to death due to public criticism of the regime). According to Akrap, Stepinac despite this himself excommunicated the aforementioned priest, while similar accusations against the Archbishop are present in W. Beissner report from December 29, 1941, within it showing that they were also coming from S. Kvaternik from the beginning of the month. Kvaternik accused the Archbishop together with entire high clergy that they were in coordination with exiled government in London through the Vatican and, along with Pavelić, threatened them with confiscation of property. Akrap states that similar can be found in other documentation of Gestapo in main RSHA office in Berlin, stating mainly that the clergy is not inclined to the satellite government nor German officials in NDH. This may be strengthened however due to the later Stanislav Rapotec account with whom the Archbishop met five or six times between April and June 1942 while similar has been addressed by Count O'Brien. This was used by EK to strengthen the influence of National-Socialist ideology on the satellite regime, deepen the gap and lower the influence of the Church on it. The same accusation was used by the regime to justify non-recognition by the Vatican. Akrap mentions a Gestapo analysis of religious communities from August 25, 1942 within which is explicitly stated that "higher Catholic clergy, especially the Archbishop Stepinac, are more than unpopular within Croatian nationalist circles [Ustashe, auth. rem.]. Within the Croatian nationalist circles it is for a long time well-known that the Archbishop Stepinac, through influence from Vatican, issued a directive that Croatian priests may in no case support Croatian nationalist tendencies aimed against Belgrade, but should support Yugoslav opinion, as its dismemberment was merely one support of the enemies of the Church [Germany]...From this follows that by strengthening of the nationalist circles, the influence of the Vatican in Croatia can be quelled". The same document stated that Islam should be strengthened in order to suppress Catholic Church influence, all resulting in muslim SS divisions and Huseini's involvement into the theatre. According to the above, it is reasonable to assume that the letter from July 23, sent after the Archbishop's request for humane treatment in camps couple of days earlier, may be seen as a threat, as Goldstein also understood, "directed indirectly to the Archbishop and the whole Church" from the regime that considered the Church "should be subservient" to it "else neither she will be spared", although he abandoned the established finding in favor of contrary construction of ambivalence thesis in the rest of the subject treatment. Tomasevich however respects Stanislav Rapotec report of the talks with the Archbishop that show that he was aware of the danger of explicit conflicts. Akrap, Gordan: Cardinal

Stepinac in Gestapo and OZNA documents, Udruga sv. Juraj, Glas Koncila, Laser plus, Zagreb, 2016, pp.26-28, 45-47; Goldstein, I.: *Holokaust u Zagrebu*, Novi Liber, Zagreb, 2001. Compare Batelja, J.: *Bl. Alojzije Stepinac, Documents I, Book 2, Postulatura bl.A.S.*, Zagreb, 2010, pp. 218-219, 341-347. Tomasevich, pub., pp.566; O'Brien of Thomond, Anthony Henry, Count: pub., pp.10-11

- [13] In letter from 20th his reference to crimes and violence seems not different from ADAP, Serie E, Band I, document No.181 from January 29, 1942, and No.277 from February 23, 1942, also from information of Emanuel Schäfer report of May 1942 that says that unrests in NDH are according to their information on the field caused by incapability of the regime to build law enforcement order that would restrict Muslim and Ustashe element, although he uses terms as "das muselmanische und Ustascha-untermenschentum" used usually for Jews, however it should be kept in mind that, according to the section III analysts of The State Security Service (UDB) in NOS V from 1958, p.35, other reports show that Croats were viewed as other Slavs on the East while Kvaternik family was half Jewish. Similarly is found from Himmler in 1945, as quoted by Longerich, stating that sex "with racially inferior Croatian women [is] merely undesirable" as his opinion regarding earlier ban of "sexual relations with women and girls from a population of an alien race" for SS. This is in accord with a letter from February 8, 1942 in which Stepinac expresses a protest to Pavelić that his vicar had problems with Germans in his parish, where on their meetings they held speeches stating that they are native in this territory while Croats are immigrants as they viewed it as a part of the ancient German Empire from eight hundred years ago within master-slave Neuordnung and Lebensraum discourse, among threats directed to the Archbishop and the Church. Schäfer sees the unrests in NDH as a residue of old local monarchical Serbo-Croat origin that he considers to be a problem for resources of German army on the East: "this subhuman element could become a danger for Axis policy outside of borders of NDH, especially that Italian policy shows only one clear direction, which is to expand its influence all the way to Hungarian border and place its hand on the whole Bosnia and Slavonia". In this context it might be useful to mention Hans Helm investigation report on Rafael Boban from June 7, 1944 as it illustrates such kind of information; similarly Marcone report from December 1, 1942. The incapability of law enforcement was, as reported, the main reason behind relief of Kvaternik father and son from their duties. As Croatian Orthodox Church was established around February 1942 among other and Italians incorporated Chetniks into Fascist army, it is clear that these issues do not belong to strictly Holocaust studies but to entirely different subject towards which primary sources differ. Problems with manipulations regarding this are most clearly expressed by Phillip Cohen in article "Serbian Anti-Semitism and Exploitation of the Holocaust as Propaganda" from 1992. Various treatments of mass murder in primary sources are due to non-existent international law that would criminalize such policies and other, which was brought in 1948 and 1951. For details regarding Ustasha unrests and the regime in 1941 refer to Yeomans, R.: *Visions of Annihilation - the Ustasha regime and the cultural politics of fascism, 1941-1945*, Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 2013, pp.18-22; Longerich, pub., p.487
- [14] In other words they took official position with resolution only within their jurisdiction while for those outside of it, in accordance with instructions from the Vatican Secretary of State Luigi Maglione to Msgr. Marcone in August, are addressed indirectly, as indicated by Stepinac in the letter when expressed concern about possibility of humane treatment of Jews because of "presenza dei tedeschi". This should be rather seen in the increased demands for camp visitation by their priests and Caritas representative possibly as an effect of their meeting with Mann day prior to the synod. It should be noted that if someone had Catholic papers he could intercede for him directly and formally, else this would be considered interfering into the political system that could fall into sanctions as this goes outside Church jurisdiction which are marriage issues, anthropological and humanitarian issues, Catholic religious practices etc., in this case tangent with the foundations of imposed political system and vice versa; Phayer, M.: *The Catholic Church and the Holocaust 1930-1965*, Indiana University Press, 2001
- [15] Testimony held at HR-HDA-306 (ZKRZ); an internee named Hahn, according to Goldstein likely Gustav Hahn (1896) although not certain, came in front of the Cathedral where he met with Hinko Mann, a member of Jewish community of Zagreb, where both have been waited by the Director of Caritas Stjepan Dumić. They have been received in the library in front of the Archbishop, his secretary dr. Lacković and another priest for which Mann assumes was Msgr. Marcone. After Mann introduced him, Hahn "tossed off his coat and showed himself in a poor state as he came from Jasenovac, and began to describe the camp in Jasenovac, its torturers, its victims, and showed his open wounds that were still little bleeding". Mann further stated that he watched "the Archbishop's face. It was becoming darker and darker until tears came out of his eyes. When Hahn finished, the Archbishop turned to me and said, 'I have already requested of Pavelić for these atrocities within the camps to be abolished, but he was assuring me that this was untrue what is talked about the camps. Now, but nobody will reassure me [otherwise]. We stayed with the Archbishop from 8 in the morning to 10 at noon. There is much to say in two and a half hours. Before I left, I handed him one more written appeal, asking him to read it as well. While I left with Hahn, Dumić stayed with the Archbishop. Later, he told me that the Archbishop immediately sat down and read my appeal, and gave order for it to be translated into Latin at once. Then it was copied and distributed to all bishops at the synod, and also that it was sent with a side letter to the Vatican". The testimony is inline with internal correspondence between the Archbishop and MoJR which was not available to Mann. Also in Batelja, J.: *Bl. Alojzije Stepinac, Documents II, Book 3, Postulatura bl.A.S.*,

Zagreb, 2010, pp.252-253. Hinko Mann was one of 7 members of Contribution Committee formed at May 15, 1941 in Draskovićeve street tasked with collecting of 1 tone of gold as ransom for arrested Jews. For details see Brandl, N. M.: Jews in Croatia from 1944/5 until 1952, doctoral thesis, Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb, 2015., pp.88-89. It should be noted that already next month at December 16 Ciano reported that Pavelić and Kvaternik told him that the Jewish population has already been depopulated from 35 000 to 12 000 present within the territory, with reference that they had been "emigrated", which refers to "the East" showing that they were coordinated with EG activities during operation Barbarossa, as is also visible in ADAP documentation. Due to priority of Berlin and denial of transfer during the period, executions are considered to be done locally on site as in other satellites that had "lower priority", which probably resonates in Heidrich report on Wannsee regarding Slovakia and Croatia, and MoI Artuković speech in February 1942. Ciano's diplomatic papers, Odhams Press, 1948, pp.470-471; Hilberg, Destruction of Jews, vol 2, 2003, p.760.

- [16] Internee Vojislav Prnjatović described his experiences of the activities within the camp prior to the visitation in a report from March 11, 1942 made in the office of the Commission for Refugees in Belgrade while one of experiences of Axis members of visitation may be read, among other, in the report of Peter Lungov to the Bulgarian embassy made in February 7, 1942, that started to appear on the internet. Similarly from Maček, Ilija Jakovljević, Ilinčić Đuro, Branko Popović etc. According to individual testimony of Prnjatović, No.44, with group testimony of Prnjatović and twelve other internees that were released on March 31 from Jasenovac camp and given in April 15, 1942, No.52, Jewish internees had better treatment than Orthodox ones which should explain the flow of important information among them. Also, knowledge that one of them escaped probably existed and want of new information might be expected in such conditions. General knowledge obtained seem to have resonated in Lichtheim memorandum from March 18, having in mind that visitations were controlled with staged conditions, next to the efforts of the Archbishop from March 7 to stop deportations to camps entirely. Miletić, A.: Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac 1941-1945, Dokumenta, Knjiga III, No.52, pp.135-138; No.44, pp.106-120; No.45; No.49; Kevo, M.: International Committee of the Red Cross and Camps on the Territory of the Independent State of Croatia with special review of the Jasenovac Concentration Camp, Jasenovac - manipulacije, kontroverze i povijesni revizionizam, ed. Benčić, A; Odak, S.; Lucić, D., Jasenovac - JUSP, 2018, pp 287-311.
- [17] In the letter he raises concern regarding announcements of mass deportations and uses the term of "solving the Jewish question" as it was "told to us" but rebukes that this "cannot be honorable". Although the Law regulation of jurisdiction over solving the Jewish question (Zakonska odredba o nadležnosti za rješavanje židovskog pitanja) was installed in January 1942 that cancelled previous Racial-Political Commissariat founded at June 4, 1941, all under jurisdiction of the MoI, that was tasked with practical application of racial theory and eugenics, these concerns might be based on Artuković speech in February 24 but also German diplomats during the camp visitation at the beginning of the month. The Einsatzkommando (EK) Zagreb headed by Wilhelm Beissner was tasked with elimination of enemies of Reich but didn't had the executive organ as in other territories. The EK thus organised and arranged training of members of the police under E. Kvaternik as its director within the MoI, headed by Artuković, that performed executive tasks instead of EK. Organs were RAUSIGUR and UNS until 1943, merged as GRAUSIGUR until 1945 with EK influence to the personnel level. Within UNS the section III or UO headed by Luburić were camp organizers which used the military police for camp guards that served as a pool for death squads. The police in general was organized in a way that it performed execution in terms of arrests, raids etc. upon the requests that came from EK, and operated the file of around 12 thousand persons within its political section only, then turned over the detainees to the German authorities that would usually transfer them to Graz for interrogation after which they would be usually transported to camps, which is what is seen in the case of Milan Schwarz. The aforementioned terms were not used in prior letters of the Archbishop to my knowledge and here appears in the context of concentration camps organized under UNS and supervised by EK. Goldstein doesn't give much attention to the letter but selects only one sentence from it in order to support his alleged ambivalence thesis. The sentence however belongs in the context where Stepinac is trying to persuade the minister of Interior by arguing that he cannot arrest someone because he is something collectively (race), but only if he did something unjustly individually (elementary judicial concepts) in order to divert him from mass deportations ascribing them to the "side of irresponsible elements" as this would be the act of "injustice towards innocent citizens". In letter from March 6, 1943 regarding the same issue these elements are "uncalled", "led by personal passion and greed" and "foreign enemy attacking our moral value" causing "bitterness and revenge within our country", that is, anyone associated with Germans or "foreign occupational force" that pushes many Croats to Partisans because they cannot stand the injustice done as follows from the letter, same topics being reported to Berlin in November 21, 1942 by Hans Helm who headed the EK since March 1942. Report of the same letter from March 6 is found in German documents. Earlier in a letter from February 1943 he called the "whole camp" to be "a shameful stain on NDH". S. Kvaternik reported in a statement to OZNA from September 21, 1946 that when he met with Pavelić in front of the Cathedral in February 1942, the Archbishop said to him that "the abuse of authority is a mortal sin with catastrophic consequences" and "all men are equal in front of God, that goodness and justice [or righteousness, cro. pravednost] are the foundation of authority" which is not much

different than the content in aforementioned letters. Tomasevich findings also agree with Kvaternik statement with the addition that Pavelić turned to his delegation and called the Archbishop a brat (balavac), quoting Ciliga, while Kvaternik however doesn't report such expression except that Pavelić was infuriated. Politeo, again, had two witnesses stating Ciliga version. Tomasevich treats this as a widely known incident. According to Kvaternik's statement he did similar in the end of summer 1941 and fall same year. In other words the Archbishop holds Ustashe responsible for submissiveness to Einsatzgruppe and German politicians and requests them to stop what they're doing, similarly to earlier letter from February 8, 1942 regarding his priests. These "elements" are in accord with public sermons held since 1942. Štambuk-Škalić, M.: GRADIVO: Dokumenti obrane u sudskom procesu protiv nadbiskupa Alojzija Stepinca II dio, Fontes, vol. 02, br. 1, prosinac 1996., pp.135-220; Brandl, N. M.: Jews in Croatia from 1944/5 until 1952, doctoral thesis, Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb, 2015., pp.83-87, 91-93; Kovačić, D.: The characteristics of the German Police System in the Independent State of Croatia 1941-1945, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, Vol. 39 No. 3 January 2008, pp. 551-580. Akrap, Gordan: Cardinal Stepinac in Gestapo and OZNA documents, Udruga sv. Juraj-Glas Koncila-Laser plus, Zagreb, 2016. Browning, C. R.: The origins of the Final Solution: the evolution of Nazi Jewish policy, September 1939 - March 1942, University of Nebraska Press - Yad Vashem, 2004, pp.379-380. Tomasevich, pub., p.567.

- [18] World Jewish Congress from Geneva informed the State Department under Roosevelt in August 1942 about the extermination policy regarding Jews in Europe, after verification same made public in November 24 and further supported by Polish government-in-exile brochure The Mass Extermination of Jews in German Occupied Poland issued in December 10, 1942 to the countries that were UN members. Based on this a Joint Declaration by Members of the United Nations statement was issued on December 17, 1942 on behalf of Allied forces condemning the Nazi Germany's plan for extermination, which is the first time that political bodies made such statement. Stepinac however condemned this more explicitly in October 25 sermon and earlier.
- [19] BAMA, RH 31-III/5, Fliegermajor Josef Donegani to Glaise, October 7. 1942. in Steinberg, J., All or Nothing - The Axis and the Holocaust 1941-1943, Routledge, 2002: "The Archbishop Stepinac and his entourage are 'judenfreundlich' and therefore enemies of National Socialism. The same Archbishop had been the protector of Jewish emigrés under the Yugoslav regime, although he paid no attention to the misery of his own people...In August of 1942 at the Vlaška Church in Zagreb, a priest named Pietker preached among other things this: the Jews are the chosen people and have remained so to this very day. There is no other leader than God who has chosen the Jews." A phrase "paid no attention to the misery of his own people" is very similar to a phrase from a pamphlet distributed against Stepinac during fundraising period. Facsimile of the document from August with the Subject: Antagonist Anti-German activity of the Catholic clergy in Croatia (Neprijateljsko protunjemačko djelovanje katoličkog klera u Hrvatskoj) available in Akrap, G. pub., pp.31-32.
- [20] Majority of those from mixed marriages or with just marriage certificates survived after intervention. Although usually looked through political conflicts with Pavelić, more likely is that German influence is to be found behind relief of duty. Kisić-Kolanović states that Siegfried Kasche already proposed the relief of duty to Slavko Kvaternik in the end of June 1942 while in September 27, 1942 Lorković wrote that Kasche stated that Eugen Kvaternik has to go as well, what Lorković was instructed to inform Pavelić. Also is stated that the relief of both father and son were the topics of discussion on meeting between Pavelić and Hitler on September 23, 1942 in Berlin due to the incapability of establishing law enforcement, probably on the basis of report from Kasche to Luther on September 10, ADAP, Serie E, Band III, No. 280, pp.479-482. The UDB section III analysts write that main reason behind E. Kvaternik relief is "distrust in his loyalty to Germany" as reported by Helm in 1944 when Kvaternik wanted to return to Zagreb to which they add explicit order of Gestapo from Himmler to SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Polizei Huber in Vienna and SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Polizei Karl Brunner in Salzburg on February 10, 1943 forbidding any contact with Kvaternik family as they will stay in their district for couple of months. The document states: "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has asked that the institutions, which come into consideration, be informed and immediately directed that the connections, which would exceed the measures of personal communication with the Marshal, could easily lead to the suspicion of political plotting which might cause difficulties. The Reichsführer SS stated that it is not a matter for the security police to interfere in any form in Croatian affairs. He therefore forbids them to support or even listen to any opinions or intentions of the Kvaternik family against the decisions of the Croatian state" which is usual German behaviour as they themselves basically relieved them of duty and are evading responsibility through NDH administration. It is not clear whether Franz Abromeit reports and what Marcone was sending to Vatican had an impact to the Foreign Office action. The report No. 60 from September 30 shows that Marcone and Masucci had "frequenti contatti col Cap o della Polizia Eugenio Kvaternik" but "Purtroppo non abbiamo potuto ottenere di mutare il corso degli eventi". However, "molte eccezioni da noi proposte nella deportazione degli ebrei sono state concesse e le famiglie, a base di matrimoni misti tra ebrei anche non battezzati e cattolici, sono state senza eccezione risparmiate", that is, they had positive results regarding exceptions but were not able to change the entire directive as expressed in the letter from July. Tomasevich adds a note on Franz Abromeit report, Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5797, Fr. H309,832, where he states that on "intervention of NDH officials such as Marshal [S.] Kvaternik and Finance Minister Vladimir Košak, some Jews who were supposed to be deported were rescued, some of which were literally saved directly from

trains destined for deportation" while E. Kvaternik is mentioned in Marcone report to Vatican in July 1942 where Marcone asked him to stall the deportation while he proposed that he would be most satisfied if Italy would give Croatian Jews an island on Croatian coast to settle, Browning writing similarly regarding the ambassador of NDH at Rome in "The final solution and the German Foreign Office: a study of Referat D III of Abteilung Deutschland, 1940-43", p.139. Shomrony says that he and his father obtained protection papers from E. Kvaternik. From July report from which information about 2 milion Jews came out into Vatican seems that same has spreaded outside the police apparatus. Although it would not be the first time that NDH officials were relieved on German or Ustashe insistance when deflection from main political stream is noticed, timing for Kvaternik relief coinciding with Jewish deportations may on one hand be coincidental, on the other hand, the SS objected to the inefficiency of the police in implementation of the Final Solution which is seen as a part of general law enforcement that Kvaternik was incapable to implement. Additionally, they were not only relieved from duty but isolated politically, allegedly due to their unpopularity. For Franz Abromeit reports regarding deportations of Croat Jews see Tomasevich notes in Tomasevich, J.: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945 - Occupation and Collaboration, Stanford University Press, 2001, pp.594-595; for Marcone reports refer Vatican sources in Razum, S.: Sveta Stolica, Nezavisna Država Hrvatska i Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj 1941-1945, Fontes: izvori za hrvatsku povijest, Vol.02 No.1 Prosinac 1996., pp.343-463, reports No. 66 and 67 with the new Chief of Police. The EK Zagreb goes through Foreign Office unlike in other territories. For Siegfried Kasche influence on Ustashe regime see Kisić-Kolanović, N.: Siegfried Kasche: njemački pogled na Hrvatsku 1941., Časopis za suvremenu povijest [Magazine for Contemporary History], Vol. 43 No.3 Prosinac 2011, p.759. UDB, p.560

- [21] The case of Dragutin Jesih shows that hiding Jewish families in priestly quarters was not safe neither for priest nor family. Dragutin Jesih was a brother of Msgr. Pavao Jesih who was two times arrested by Ustashe, and severely beaten, because of connections with Croat Farmer Party (HSS). Maček was internated in Jasenovac from October 1941 to March 1942 as he was destabilizing factor for Ustashe regime that had no support in the population but depended completely on the occupational force. Msgr. Jesih was also responsible for illegal distribution of Stepinac's sermons and speeches while the two cooperated very closely, according to testimony of dr. Marko Vidaković who headed the Action for housing of war orphans. Dan Baram who was sheltered at Dragutin's quarters says that he and his mother were sent there by Stepinac together with false papers. Jesih was killed in November 27, 1944.
- [22] Kolanović, J.: GRADIVO: Nadbiskup Alojzije Stepinac u izvješćima Njemačkog poslanstva u Zagrebu, Fontes, vol.02, br. 1, prosinac 1996., 313-342 (Note: Person arrested is reported to be born August 8, 1901 in Ogulin and arrested in "Rann", probably Brežice on the border with Slovenia, with the title "prof.", not "dr." as the editor suggests in the description. Goldstein's Jewish Biographical Lexicon doesn't contain information from this source for any of listed Milan Schwarz nor aforementioned source materials are present in the references. Shomrony's father was reportedly born in Zaprešić in 1877. If he had false papers his real age would be 66 while would represent himself as a 42 year old, three year younger than the Archbishop. Regardless if the person in question is the father of Amiel S. as the editor suggests, as both were reported as residents of Zagreb, EK request shows that there was an ongoing investigative process against the Archbishop during the time of the last roundup. Shomrony talks that he was placed on a price list which coincides with the arrest of probably unrelated M. Schwarz although the document indicates that he was found coincidentally. Amiel Shomrony - Emil Schwarz - was a personal secretary of Miroslav Shalom Freiburger, aforementioned Chief Rabbi of Zagreb, and a person for contact with the Archbishop as he was excluded from segregation regulation; comp. Oral history interview with Amiel Shomroni, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Collection, August 14, 1992 (heb): <https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn502857> and elsewhere).
- [23] Kevo, M.: Designation of a Permanent Representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the Independent State of Croatia (1943), Croatica Christiana periodica, Vol.40 No.78 December 2016, pp.209-234: <https://hrcak.srce.hr/176644>
- [24] Likely similar to Maček, comp. note [12]; Gitman, E.: The Rescue and Survival...; Gitman, E.: A Question... 69
- [25] Gitman, E.: A Question... ; Krišto, J.: Katolička crkva i NDH 1941 -1945, I, Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb 1998, p.107, 311; Krišto, J.: Sukob simbola, pp.88-89; Hans Helm File, reports from December 6, 1943 and July 3, 1944, among other, that confirm the existence of Tomić-Herenčić assassination group, in later report shown to be targeting the Archbishop among other.
- [26] SS-Sturmbanführer Wilhelm Friedrich Beissler, head of Einsatzkommando Zagreb from April 1941 to March 1942 and decorated with War Merit Cross with swords of Second and First Class for achievements in EK Zagreb service. For details refer CIA FOIA documents [0097](#) and [0090](#) among other or Akrap, G. pub. pp.20-21. For Foreign Office and Gestapo coordination in satellite states see Hilberg, R.: The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol II, Yale University Press, 3rd Edition, 2003, pp.424-427, 574-575, 581-583, 724 and Luther report from August 21, 1942 in ADAP, Serie E, Band III, 16. Juni bis 30. September 1942, No.209, pp.353-360.
- [27] For general introduction to Einsatzgruppe structure and specifically EK Zagreb refer to Akrap, G., NOS V, Državni sekretarijat za unutrašnje poslove FNRJ, Uprava državne bezbednosti, III odeljenje, Beograd, 1958., pp. 393-545, 603-616 and Kovačić, D.: The characteristics of the German Police System in the Independent State of Croatia 1941-1945, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, Vol. 39 No. 3 January 2008, pp. 551-580. Note:

Some works like Shelah are outdated on Stepinac issue, ex. uses incorrect datings and misses several important primary sources, while others have rather strange interpretations of them (ex. Goldstein interprets letters from April and May 1941 as affirmation of Aryan law based on a word used, although himself later adds that bishop Šimrak returned from unsuccessful intercession against racial regulations indicating that nothing could be done as this is enforcement from occupying party making them irrelevant, as was also clear in a letter from May and Budisavljević diary among other like Siegfried Kasche trial. Based on this claims that the Church was ambivalent towards the law because of alleged selectiveness in favor of converts, while ignores the pre-war Action and Gestapo raids of its rooms together with the arrest of Škringer but also dr. Josip Andrić, the editor of Society of St. Jerome while Poglajen had to flee the country, also avoiding [11]. As Slovenia was conquered first, Gestapo immediately started expulsion of Church clergy that fled to the Archdiocese of Zagreb under Stepinac which continued in May resulting with around 300 expelled priests, all which would indicate based on this and prior Church experience with Hitler in Europe that the new regime should be approached avoiding open conflict, which is what is seen and seems to be done in agreement and coordination with the Vatican, as Goldstein himself similarly alleges. In September 3, 1941 Msgr. Marcone was given instruction by Maglione that "he should recommend in a discreet manner, **that would not be interpreted as an official appeal**, that moderation be employed with regard to Jews on Croatian territory. Your Eminence should see to it that ... the impression of loyal cooperation with the civil authorities be always preserved" according to which Phayer understands conclusions from synod in November, while Gitman stresses from Politeo's defense that as a Catholic prelate, Stepinac was obliged to follow Hague and Geneva conventions from 1907 and 1929 together with the papal bull *Sollicitudo ecclesiarum* from 1831 that obliges the officials to make contact with the side that exhibits factual government including those under military occupation in order to represent and intercede for the side of the Catholic Church. This is confirmed by Stanislav Rapotec report on Stepinac. As this is ignored, the isolation of usage of legislative term "non-Aryan" in these letters is then used for deriving a construction of alleged acceptance of racism, not just "silence", contrary to letter contents and meaning as well as primary sources of German provenance, while doesn't give explanation what else should an official be using when referring to imposed restrictions and laws especially in the first year when it is not clear what is tolerable by the regime and goes outside imposed but factual reality (S. Razum uses similar approach to some letters ending in distorted view of the material; either understanding is lacking or is deliberately misinterpreted). Although himself mentions the case of canon dr. Lončar that was sentenced to death in July because of an anti-regime attitude, besides imprisonment of multiple vicars and priests, ignores general political reality clearly seen in Ustasha regime and Gestapo reactions visible in [12] and elsewhere while in several occasions objects because of "missed opportunity to make clearer critique" which doesn't belong to historiography but subjective impression or opinion on event that lacks written materials (following his advice Jewish community would come out from WW2 with 3-5% survivors as in Serbia where there was no comparable opposition in this issue, and not 20-25% as in this case). Also claims that Shomrony's testimony on condemnation of destruction of synagogue in Praška is unusual for Stepinac of that time, but omitted to mention a sermon from 26th of the same month, which was used in Politeo's defense, while O'Brien mentions a sermon from July same year protesting against forcible conversions, pub. p.17 coming from a secondary source and another one from December 24, pub. p.19, all having report of the same tone as the sermon from Shomrony's testimony regarding October. Likewise Kvaternik statement regarding denunciation in Autumn 1941. Odd objection is that "Katolički List" published a praise to pornography ban, but did not object to racial law or Jewish persecution, which makes the statement unclear as WW2 was a war against Jews that were the principal enemy of the occupational force, as Stepinac himself addresses it, not war on pornography. Stepinac's letter in May 1941 in which he objects to the authority because of confiscation of "Katolički list" by HDNU that was passing its propaganda into journals has, among other, well established that control over media was under regime that either banned the publishing or allowed if complied with their regulations. Macut states that "Katolički list" in its 6 published numbers in 1941 didn't publish "even the slightest trace of anti-Semitism of any kind" (Macut, P.: *Anti-Semitic Propaganda in Croatian Catholic Publishing During 1941.*, in Macut, P.: *In the shadow of cross, revolver and dagger - Catholic press in the Independent State of Croatia*, Split, 2016) and that the editorial board was literally blackmailed with the arrest of Mr. Kolarek and his execution in front of a firing squad (Macut, P.: *Katolički tisak o uspostavi Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 10. travnja 1941. godine*, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest [Magazine for Contemporary History]*, Vol. 47 No. July 1, 2015. 81-102). It is well known that Stepinac' sermons were either censored or were not allowed for publishing. He also repeats similar in an article from April 14, 2018 in *Jutarnji list* although he himself contrasts this with adding Stepinac's reference from 1940 that states "God save us from 'protection' of National-Socialist Reich. It would mean definitive doom for European civilization and especially for Croatian people." He could rather mention Poglajen's "Život", regardless that it is a Jesuit magazine, since Poglajen was organizer of an anti-Communist exhibition under Stepinac patronage in 1939, even opened the show, while the two were active in same charity actions, obviously sharing more-less similar worldview. It seems that he doesn't refer to documents nor information from German provenance which might be considered essential as Stepinac is a part of the Holocaust studies in the context of the Church. He didn't consider important the information about interrogation of Milan Schwarz in Auschwitz regarding Stepinac and he didn't include this into his work which gives an impression, hopefully wrong, that this material

hasn't been read at the time of writing, although it was published in 1996 while the book was released in 2001. Some other remarks are more cynical than of useful value. Still he admits that he saved people through his interventions but the general treatment looks very unbalanced. He is more consistent with other topics than Stepinac so his interpretations should be taken with a second thought or considered outdated.)

APPENDIX

December 1, 1938 - March 24, 1941. Count Anthony Henry O'Brien memoirs

During the two years and a half of my stay in Zagreb I received innumerable signs of Mgr. Stepinac's favour. Once a week at least I was his guest for lunch or dinner. The ensuing discussions of topical problems, which in these critical years were more than abundant, developed and welded a friendship which I consider the greatest and most precious of the many favours he bestowed upon me. This close and intimate contact enabled me to get to know him as only a very few others do; to see his saintly life, which had won him the admiration and love of the faithful; to note his simple and modest, almost frugal, habits, keeping just the bare minimum (I learned from his secretary that he used but 3,000 dinars, about £12, a mere fraction of his monthly income, for himself; the rest went to the poor); to observe his unceasing work for his Church and his people. He established new parishes in Zagreb, which had trebled its population since World War I; built new churches, extended his care for the poor in his Archdiocese by founding new branches of Caritas throughout the country. He organized the yearly *Sotzialne Tjedne* (Social Weeks), attended himself all the lectures and at their conclusion had those taking part in them as his guests for tea in the Palace. He did everything in his power to ease the steadily increasing tension between the Croat Peasant Party and the Government in Belgrade. His was no small part in the conciliation, which began with the dismissal of the would-be dictator and friend of the Axis Stojadinovitch and ended in the successful conclusion of the *Sporazum* (Agreement) of August, 1939, giving Croatia a large measure of autonomy. From these discussions with Mgr. Stepinac I know that he still adhered to the ideal of his youth: an independent Yugoslav State, but in the sense in which it had been founded in 1918 - not a State in which there was a hegemony of the Serbs over the Croats and Slovenes, but a federation of the Serbs and Croats and Slovenes, in which Serbia would be a free Serbia, Croatia a free Croatia and Slovenia a free Slovenia. In the course of our discussions he often denounced bitterly the many clumsy and stupid attempts of the Serb regime in Belgrade, prior to the *Sporazum*, to curb the activities of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia and to impair her rights. He was particularly frank and outspoken on the many and constant attempts at proselytism by the Yugoslav authorities. I still remember how indignant he was - and it was then that I realized for the first time in my life the real and full meaning of "righteous indignation" when he told me of the Yugoslav school authorities' deliberate policy of transferring young Catholic school mistresses to remote villages where they had to work with young Orthodox teachers, in order to promote mixed marriages. I know that he was absolutely opposed to the Croat extremists, who were ready to identify Croatia's fate with that of National-Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy: the *Frankovitz* (as they were called by the Croat people after their ideological father, the late Dr. Josip Frank, a Jewish lawyer in Zagreb) or *Ustashe* (as they called themselves), whose leader, Dr. Ante Pavelitch, had been living in exile for over 10 years. His was a particularly high conception of authority and the rule of law. He was the most outspoken opponent of mob rule. And yet, it was to be his fate to live in two periods when mob rule in its two worst possible forms, was rampant in his own country: first the National-Socialist and Fascist regimes and then the Communist regime. Thousands and thousands of Austrian, German, Czech and Polish Catholics of Jewish origin owe perpetual gratitude to Mgr. Stepinac. They asked for his help and received it. Within his Caritas in Zagreb he organized a special Relief Committee for Refugees. For over two years. I was allowed to help him in this work. From what I have seen with my own eyes I can testify that he did all in his power to find shelter for these people in Croatia and to enable them to live an honest and decent life; that he helped those who wished to leave Yugoslavia, mostly for England, the United States or South America; that in most of these cases he paid out of his own pocket the major part of the travelling expenses, which were far beyond the means at the disposal of the Relief Committee. There were quite a number of Protestant refugees of Jewish origin living in Croatia. As most Protestant residents, nearly all Germans, either sympathized with, or were afraid of, the Nazis, the Protestant Bishop of Zagreb - an honest and kindhearted but weak and frightened man - did not dare to help them. So Mgr. Stepinac took care of them, too. His Relief Committee paid half of their weekly assistance, the other half coming from a Protestant Relief Fund in England. From the very first day the Relief Committee began to work, the German Consul-General at Zagreb kept close watch over Mgr. Stepinac's activity for the refugees. And the German Minister in Belgrade even made several formal complaints about it to the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the same manner he cared for the thousands and thousands of "Aryan" refugees fleeing to Yugoslavia from the German terror after the occupations of Czechoslovakia and Poland, and helped them to go to the Near East where they could join their compatriots. It did not matter to him what their political convictions were. I still remember, to quote but one example, the young German Communist who came to the Refugee Committee asking us to help him to go via Bulgaria and Roumania to the Soviet Union - which we did.

March 8, 1939. Graz Office II to SD-Oberabschnitt Donau, fundraising for Jewish refugees

Vfg.

II/212-124 Graz, den 8. März 1939

Fu./Th.

D-113

An den SD - Führer des SS Oberabschnittes¹

1. - Donau -, Wien.

Betr.: - Flüchtlingshilfsaktion für Emigranten unter dem Protektorat des Erzbischofs Dr. Alois Stepinac²

Vorg.: - ohne -

Beil.: - 1 -

Der deutschfeindlich kroatische Erzbischof Dr. Alois Stepinac hat eine Hilfsaktion für aus dem Reich geflüchtete Emigranten ins Leben gerufen und an alle Persönlichkeiten des öffentlichen Lebens das nachfolgende Schreiben gerichtet. Dem Schreiben lag die beiliegende Anlage bei.³

Flüchtlingshilfsaktion unter dem Protektorat von Dr. Aloisius Stepinac,
Erzbischof von Agram,
Kanzlei Kaptol, Part. 3⁴
Zagreb, den 11.1.1939

Verehrter Herr!⁵

Wegen [der] heftigen und unmenschlichen Verfolgungen hat eine grosse Anzahl von Leuten ihre Heimat verlassen müssen. Diese Bedauernswerten sind nicht nur ohne Heimat, sondern auch ohne Mittel zum Leben geblieben. Sie irren in der Welt herum, um ein Land zu finden, das ihnen und den ihren die Möglichkeit zur Gründung einer Existenz bietet. Eine grosse Anzahl solcher wohnt derzeit in Jugoslawien, viele von ihnen sind mit Frauen und Kindern. Ihre Tragik ist schwer und ihr Elend unbeschreiblich. Jeden Tag wendet sich eine solche Anzahl Emigranten an uns und bittet um Rat, Intervention, Unterstützung in Geld und in Naturalien. Es gibt unter ihnen auch Intellektuelle und solche, die irgendwo gut gestanden sind.

Es ist unsere christliche Pflicht, dass wir ihnen helfen. Deshalb halten wir es als notwendig, uns an Leute guten Herzens und edler Gefühle mit der Bitte um Hilfe für die erwähnten Elenden zu wenden. Ich bin so frei, mich auch an Sie, verehrte Herren, als Glieder unserer Kirche zu wenden, da sie am besten die Tragik unserer Leute, die jedes Heim, aller Mittel und jedes richtigen Zieles bar sind, verstehen werden, um dem Fond, der zur Unterstützung der Emigranten erforderlich ist, ihre Unterstützung zu geben. Ich bitte am beigelegten Zettel ihren freiwilligen Monatsbeitrag, mit dem Sie diese notwendige Aktion unterstützen werden, zu vermerken.

Mit vorzüglicher Hochachtung

Dr. Alois Stepinac e. h.

2. Z.d.A. F.S.F.II/212⁶

¹ To the SD Leader of the SS Main District

² Refugee Relief Action for Emigrants under the sponsorship of the Archbishop Dr. Alois Stepinac.

³ The anti-German (ger. deutschfeindlich) Croatian Archbishop Alois Stepinac has issued a relief campaign for emigrants who have fled from Reich and addressed the following letter to all public personae. The letter is enclosed within this memo.

⁴ Refugee Aid Action under the sponsorship of Dr. Aloisius Stepinac, Archbishop of Zagreb, Office Kaptol no. 3

⁵ The content of the enclosed letter.

⁶ Memo is authenticated with unreadable signatures.

March 24, 1941 - December 24, 1943. Count Anthony Henry O'Brien memoirs

Just as the morning of December 1, 1938, so the morning of March 24, 1941, is still clear in my mind's eye. Little more than three weeks before, the German armies had virtually occupied Bulgaria, and in the interval increasing pressure had been brought to bear on Yugoslavia. The following day the Yugoslav delegates were to sign the Three-Power Pact in Vienna. In long and detailed discussions during the previous days it had been decided that I should leave for Belgrade and complete there as quickly as possible all necessary arrangements for going to the United States via Turkey, Palestine and Iran. I had come to pay my last visit to Mgr. Stepinac. It was a sorrowful farewell. We both knew, though we did not mention it, that many hard and bitter years were in store for him and his country. For though we both firmly believed in the final victory of the Allies, we were both also fully aware that it was still a long way off. I remember well those few hours we spent together for the last time. Once again I had reason to admire his quick thinking. We discussed every chance and risk that I could meet with on my long journey to safety. Many an important point had never struck me at all. Mgr. Stepinac, however, not only thought of every one of them, but at the same time also knew how they should be dealt with. I still remember our discussion about the critical political situation in the Balkans and the almost certain involvement-in one way or the other-of his country in the war. As he talked to me of the many and great responsibilities awaiting him if the dreaded calamity should befall Yugoslavia, I felt very clearly that I was listening to a man of extraordinary strength of character, who would prove his worth in the times that try men's souls. After a week in Belgrade I had nearly completed all the necessary arrangements (British laissez passer, Yugoslav exit permit, Greek, Turkish and Iranian visas). In fact, I was to depart in the evening of Tuesday, April 8. But the beginning of the German Blitzkrieg in the Balkans-the bombardment of Belgrade by the Luftwaffe on Palm Sunday, April 6-frustrated my plan. By train, car and on foot I tried to make my way down to the Bay of Kotor, where I was to join the members of the British Legation in Yugoslavia and to embark with them on a British destroyer. But just as the sudden outbreak of the war, so its sudden end prevented me from carrying out my intention. When the Yugoslav Army capitulated on April 16 I had reached only Mostar and was still over 100 miles from my destination. So I made my way down to the Dalmatian coast where the Italian occupation authorities confined me to the island of Korčula (between the coastal towns of Dubrovnik and Split), on which I remained till Christmas Eve, 1943. Despite innumerable difficulties and obstacles, I managed somehow to remain in constant contact with Mgr. Stepinac, till the Italian surrender on September 8, 1943, when all communications with Zagreb were completely cut off. Hardly a week passed without bringing-some traveller, mostly a priest or a nun, either with a letter or a verbal message. Jewish refugees, of whom there were at one time nearly 1,000 confined to Korčula, so that the German and Croat Press used to refer to it scornfully only as the "Island of the Jews," were the first who brought the news of Mgr. Stepinac's attitude towards the German and Italian occupiers and the puppet regime of Croatia. What they reported made me feel proud of belonging to the Catholic Church, prouder than I have ever felt in my whole life.

O'Brien of Thomond, Anthony Henry, Count: Archbishop Stepinac - The Man and His Case, The Newman Bookshop, Westminster, 1947, pp.12-14

June 11, 1941. Gueyraud to Darlan about Jewish regulations in Croatia

Zagreb, le 11 Juin 1941, Direction des Affaires politiques et commerciales

J'ai eu l'honneur de signaler par ma lettre du 30 Mai No. 85 le sentiment de réprobation qu'avaient notamment dans les milieux de l'Eglise, certaines des mesures édictées par le gouvernement du Poglavnik contre les Israélites. Sans doute faut-il voir dans ces circonstances la cause d'une atténuation intervenue dans ces dispositions. Un nouveau décret-loi vient en effet de remplacer les chiffons jaunes que les Israélites étaient contraints de porter sur le dos et la poitrine, par un bouton métallique de couleur jaune et de 5 cm arboré à la boutonnière. En outre les Juifs le dont le conjoint est aryen, ne sont plus obligés au port de cette insigne, s'ils ont embrassé avant le 10 Avril 1941 la religion catholique, évangélique ou musulmane. Par contre le port des marques distinctives des non-aryens est imposé également aux Juifs citoyens allemands. Les adoucissements intervenus ont été cependant compensés par d'autres mesures empirant le sort des Israélites. C'est ainsi qu'il est désormais interdit aux Juifs de quitter le territoire de la ville de Zagreb. Les Juifs ne peuvent acheter que dans les magasins juifs et l'accès du marché ou des magasins ne leur est pas ouvert avant 10 heures du matin. Un décret impose interdit aux Juifs de collaborer au développement de la culture nationale et aryenne en s'occupant de littérature, théâtre, journalisme, musique, cinéma urbanisme, etc. Un comité a été créé pour s'occuper des questions intéressant la biologie raciale, etc.

Gueyraud to Darlan, Zagreb, June 11, 1941, Europe 94, ADAE, box 384, 2, in Krišto, J.: Sukob simbola - politika, vjere i ideologije u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj, Globus, Zagreb, 2001, pp.278-279

August 14, 1941. Altari to Maglione regarding Jews in camps

Richiamandoci a quanto abbiamo avuto l'onore e la possibilità di segnalare a voce al reverendissimo Mons. Grano, in Vostra assenza, ci permettiamo di esporVi quanto segue. Dalle notizie di fonte privata e di alcune organizzazioni assistenziali del Regno di Croazia, pervenute alla nostra Delegazione per l'Assistenza degli emigranti ebrei, ci risulterebbe che molte migliaia di ebrei croati residenti a Zagabria o in altri centri della Croazia vengono arrestate senza alcuna ragione, private di ogni loro avere edeportate.

Gli uomini vengono obbligati al duro lavoro nelle saline della Bosnia. Invece le donne, i vecchi ed i bambini vengono convogliati verso il paesetto costiero di Carlopago e l'isola di Pago, con una popolazione complessiva di circa 4 mila anime, tuttora presidiati dalle forze armate italiane.

Quest'ultimo gruppo, circa 6 mila persone, senza mezzi, senza indumenti, perché costrette a partire portando solo quanto può contenere un sacco da montagna, e forzato a vivere all'aperto in zone rocciose, prive di vegetazione, a tipo carsico, con clima torrido, senza acqua sufficiente, prive di ogni risorsa agricola, senza tetto nel senso letterale della parola.

Questa massa di persone, in continuo aumento, e costretta a stare la notte all'addiaccio ed il giorno sotto la sferza del sole, non avendo di che coprirsi ed ove ripararsi, con nutrimento assolutamente insufficiente, senza medicinali e lasciata completamente in balia di se stessa, giacché ogni forma di assistenza, sia da parte di privati che da parte di organizzazioni, è vietata dalle autorità croate.

Ci permettiamo di unirvi copia di una delle tante lettere pervenute alla nostra Delegazione la quale fa un quadro terribilmente veritiero della situazione di questi disgraziati fra cui moltissimi di fede cristiana cattolica.

Di fronte a tale stato di cose, mossi da infinita pietà verso tanti sventurati e fidando nell'alto senso di umanità e nei sentimenti di amore che hanno sempre ed ovunque ispirato l'azione del Sommo Pontefice, ci rivolgiamo a Voi affinché interveniate con la Vostra autorevole parola presso le autorità italiane e croate preposte a detti provvedimenti, in modo che questo dolorosissimo stato di cose venga quanto prima a cessare.

A tal uopo ci permettiamo suggerirvi di cercare di ottenere le seguenti misure:

intervenire presso il Governo croato perché siano revocate le disposizioni di spogliazione e di deportazione; perché le famiglie già colpite non vengano divise; perché il trattamento dei deportati abbia almeno un carattere di umanità; perché l'alimentazione sia sufficiente e perché sia provveduto all'alloggiamento di tutti gli internati;

raggiungere dallo stesso Governo croato che i lavori a cui gli uomini vengono adibiti siano adatti alle possibilità fisiche di ciascuno e che non abbiano il carattere di lavori forzati;

ottenere il permesso perché la nostra Delegazione di assistenza si mettersi a contatto con i detti campi di concentramento, per offrire a questi disgraziati assistenza morale e materiale.

Ove non si potesse ottenere la cessazione completa delle odierne persecuzioni, si potrebbe proporre alle autorità italiane di studiare la possibilità di trasferire queste famiglie nei campi di concentramento d'Italia, affinché le loro condizioni di vita siano rese possibili e possano avere il completo aiuto della nostra Delegazione.

Facciamo sicuro affidamento che questo nostro fervido appello sia da voi benevolmente accolto e considerato con cuore paterno e con senso di larga comprensione e quale suprema autorità morale dell'umanità, riuscirete rapidamente ad alleviare la sorte di questi derelitti. In tale certezza porgiamo i nostri vivissimi ringraziamenti ed i più deferenti ossequi.

September 3, 1941. Maglione to Marcone

...Presentandosene l'occasione, Vostra Paternità procuri, confidenzialmente e sempre in modo che ad eventuali Suoi passi non possa attribuirsi carattere ufficiale, di raccomandare a chi di dovere moderazione per quanto concerne il trattamento degli ebrei residenti in territorio croato. Quanto all'attitudine del clero, sia secolare che regolare in questioni politiche, Vostra Paternità continui a vigilare affinché esso resti al di fuori e al di sopra delle competizioni di parte, pur prestando all'autorità civile la sua leale e disinteressata collaborazione...

Razum, S.: Sveta Stolica, Nezavisna Država Hrvatska i Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj 1941-1945, Fontes : izvori za hrvatsku povijest, Vol.02 No.1 Prosinac 1996., pp.343-463

December 3, 1941. Stepinac to Pope Pius XII about the Synod

Beatissimo Padre,

L'infrascritto arcivescovo di Zagabria come presidente della conferenza dell'episcopato in Croazia prostrato ai piedi di Vostra Santità si fa dovere di umiliare la breve relazione sulle questioni pertrattate nelle sedute tenu te addì 17-20 di novembre scorso. Vi erano presenti soltanto sette ordinari, e precisamente: L'arcivescovo di Zagabria; i vescovi di Djakovo, Spalato, Lesina, Senj, Veglia e l'amministratore apostolico di Crisio; come ospite assisteva anche l'arcivescovo di Belgrado. Dispiacenti non potevano prendere parte alla conferenza causa le difficoltà di comunicazione: L'arcivescovo di Sarajevo; i vescovi di Mostar, Banjaluka, Sebenico e l'amministratore apostolico di Ragusa; essi però mandarono in iscritto alla presidenza il loro parere riguardo all'argomento principale che doveva essere pertrattato. Alla prima seduta intervenne anche il Legato Apostolico in Croazia, l'eccellentissimo abate Giuseppe Ramiro Marcone, OSB. ...

... 2. L'episcopato si è occupato pure della questione di tutti coloro che oggi tanto soffrono ed ha diretto allo stesso capo dello Stato una lettera chiedendo l'umano trattamento verso gli ebrei in quanto ciò v'è ancora possibile a motivo della presenza dei tedeschi; in particolare poi di quelli che sono stati recentemente battezzati e sono provenienti da genitori e proavi ebrei battezzati. ...

December 8, 1941. Luther – Heydrich meeting draft

Folgende undatierte Aufzeichnung ohne Unterschrift war Luther am 8. Dezember 1941. als Vorbereitung für die morgige Sitzung bei SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich:

"Wünsche und Ideen des Auswärtigen Amtes zu der vorgesehenen Gesamtlösung der Judenfrage in Europa.

1. Abschiebung aller im Deutschen Reich ansässigen Juden deutscher Staatsangehörigkeit unter Einbeziehung der kroatischen, slowakischen und rumänischen Juden nach dem Osten.
2. Abschiebung aller in den von uns besetzten Gebieten lebenden durch die jüngste Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz staatenlos gewordenen Juden früherer deutscher Staatsangehörigkeit.
3. Abschiebung aller serbischen Juden.
4. Abschiebung der uns von der Ungarischen Regierung übergebenen Juden.
5. Erklärung der Bereitwilligkeit gegenüber der Rumänischen, Slowakischen, Kroatischen, Bulgarischen und Ungarischen Regierung, die in diesen Ländern lebenden Juden ebenfalls nach dem Osten abzuschicken.
6. Einflußnahme auf die Bulgarische und Ungarische Regierung, Judengesetze nach dem Nürnberger Vorbild einzuführen.
7. Einwirkung auf die übrigen Regierungen Europas zur Einführungen von Judengesetzen.
8. Durchführung dieser Maßnahmen wie bisher im guten Einvernehmen mit dem Geheimen Staatspolizeiamt."

In einem hschr. Randvermerk vom 22. Dezember 1941 hatte Rademacher die Wiedervorlage dieser Aufzeichnung nach ca. einem Monat angeordnet.

ADAP, Serie E, Band I, Document No.150, Wansee protocol minutes (Dafür sieht das Auswärtige Amt für den Südosten und Westen Europas keine großen Schwierigkeiten)

March 18, 1942. Lichtheim and Riegner to Archbishop Filippo Bernadini

1. The multiplicity of measures, dictated by violent anti-Semitism, which have been taken in the past few years against the Jews living in Germany and the territories annexed to Germany are more or less well known to public opinion. They consist in absolute exclusion of Jews from all professions, all trades and all economic activity in general, except for incorporation in the system of forced labor adopted to meet the needs of war. They consist also in the confiscation of almost all the Jews' worldly goods, and in countless cases, of persecution in various forms, such as arrest, internment in concentration camps, or mass expulsion of Jews – stripped in advance of all they possess – either to Poland or to concentration camps in France. Through the forced emigration which was pursued up to the outbreak of war and by reason of the privation and persecution they have endured, the number of German and Austrian Jews has fallen from around 800,000 to about 200,000. The remainder of the Jewish population in what was once Czechoslovakia, now living in the "Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia", and numbering some 70,000 have been the victims, since the country has been occupied of similar measures, and are at this moment on the point of being concentrated *en bloc* in a ghetto established in Theresienstadt.

2. Analogous measures, less rigorous in certain cases but even more rigorous in others, have fallen upon the Jews in all the countries occupied during the war by the German Army, such as Belgium, Holland, the Occupied Zone of France, Yugoslavia, Greece, the Baltic countries and notably Poland, where concentration of masses of Jews

in ghettos surrounded by unscalable walls has created indescribable misery and caused epidemics which, at this moment, are literally decimating the population.

3. Germany's allies, imitating the example set by Reich, have followed the same course and introduced anti-Semitic legislation, or launched violent persecution, aimed at the total dispossession or even the physical extermination of the Jews. This is notably the case in Romania, in the newly created states of Croatia and Slovakia and, to a certain degree too, in Hungary, where preparations are now afoot to incorporate all Jews from 18 to 50 in forced labor units.

4. ... *i*) In Croatia [NDH, Image 3.] - where after the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, there were 30,000 Jews - several thousand families were either deported to desert islands on the Dalmatian coast or incarcerated in concentration camps. After a while, all the male Jews in Croatia (as happened in Serbia under German occupation) were sent to labor camps where they were assigned to drainage or sanitation work and where they perished in great numbers as a result of inhuman treatment or through lack of food and clothing. The Croatian Government has not even allowed relief parcels to be sent to them, and it is almost impossible to establish contact with the internees. At the same time, their wives and children were sent to another camp where they, too, are enduring dire privations.

Morley, John F.: Vatican diplomacy and the Jews during the Holocaust, 1939-1943, New York : Ktav Pub. House, 1980, pp.212-215, Appendix B: Memorandum from Richard Lichtheim, Jewish Agency for Palestine, and Gerhart Riegner, World Jewish Congress, to Archbishop Filippo Bernadini, the Nuncio in Switzerland, March 18,1942.

July 17, 1942 Marcone to Maglione

In risposta al foglio n. 48473 del 18 aprile corrente anno pregiomi riferire quanto segue:

Negli scorsi mesi le autorità croate, richieste di notizie sugli ebrei, si erano chiuse in un silenzio inspiegabile. Per suggerimento del Ministro degli Interni Dr. Artuković il mio Padre Segretario, durante la mia assenza, fece una protesta, dopo la quale si incominciò ad avere qualche risposta.

July 17, 1942 Marcone to Maglione

Dal capo stesso della polizia Dr. Eugenio Kvaternik, col quale mi ero lamentato per la crudeltà usate verso gli ebrei di tutte le età e di tutte le condizioni, ebbi a sapere quanto segue:

Il governo tedesco ha imposto al suddetto che entro lo spazio di sei mesi tutti gli ebrei residenti nello Stato croato debbono essere trasferiti in Germania, dove, secondo quanto mi ha riferito lo stesso Kvaternik, sono stati uccisi negli ultimi tempi due milioni di ebrei. Pare che la stessa sorte attenda gli ebrei croati specialmente se vecchi ed incapaci al lavoro.

Essendosi questa notizia propagata nell'ambiente ebraico, io sono continuamente sollecitato a fare qualche passo per la loro salvezza. Anche il caporabbino di Zagabria spesso viene a visitarmi ed a raccontarmi nuove sventure.

Io mi raccomando al capo della polizia, il quale, dietro mio suggerimento, ritarda, per quanto gli è possibile, l'esecuzione di questo ordine. Anzi egli sarebbe lieto se la Santa Sede potesse interporre per il ritiro di quest'ordine, o per lo meno per proporre che tutti gli ebrei croati fossero concentrati in un'isola o in una zona della Croazia, ove potessero vivere in pace.

Intanto vengo a sapere dal caporabbino che la Turchia è disposta ad accogliere cinquanta bambini ebrei di Croazia, ma per non passare per la Serbia dovrebbero fare il giro dell'Ungheria, della Rumania e della Bulgaria.

Mentre la Bulgaria ha già concesso il transito, l'Ungheria e la Rumania si oppongono.

Il caporabbino prega la Santa Sede di volersi interporre presso le due suddette Nazioni allo scopo di ottenergli il richiesto passaggio.

March 14, 1943. Stepinac Sermon on the Day of the Pontiff

...If you were to ask me in what we are looking the immense value of the Pontificate for the human race, then we would answer: in what is now under the world's feet, and this is the defense of the dignity of the human person, the defense of the rights of the family, the defense of small and defenseless nations. Undoubtedly, one of the most heavy mistakes of our time is that the value of the human person has fallen to nothing. On the fall of money value

the world has been accustomed to in the past war and sees in it nothing more to be seen. It had accustomed itself likewise to the fall of so many other material values. But with the fall of the dignity of the human person, with the fall of the value of man, no normal human mind can be reconciled. For whether he believes or doesn't believe in the personal God, everyone, even the follower of the most extreme materialistic worldview, feels in the depths of his soul and confesses it with his whole life that he is not and can not be the same as his dog; that he is not and can not be the same as a wheel in a machine; that he is not and can not be the same as a soap bubble blown by a child into the air. Everyone, and even the follower of the most extreme materialism, even when he rages most against God, feels in the depths of his soul the significance of the words, "ad majora natus sum!" I am, however, born for something higher.... Everyone, therefore, regardless to what race or nation he belongs, regardless of whether he graduated from a university in a civilized center of Europe or hunts his food in the rainforests of Africa, each of them equally carries the seal of God the Creator and has his inalienable rights, which can not be abducted or arbitrarily restricted by any human authority. Each of them has the right to physical life, has the right to a spiritual life, has the right to marriage, has the right to religious education, has the right to use material goods, if it doesn't go against just laws that protect the interests of the whole community; and many other rights. And any violation of these rights of the human person can not [be], without causing vile consequences. Although today we sigh so much after peace, I would dare to repeat the words of the Supreme Pontiff Pope Pius XII which appear in his message of last Christmas, "Let him who wishes that the star of peace appear, as it did in earlier times to the Wise Men, and that it may remain above human society, contribute, on his part, in rendering to the human person the dignity that God has given it since the beginning of time" (Osservatore Romano, 1942, No. 300, p. 2). But the Pontificate stands today as a solid wall in the defense of the family and family life. What this means, can understand only one, who has the opportunity to watch the tears of those who are threatened with destruction of a family household. We had several occasions last week to look at those tears and to listen the sighs of both serious husbands and gratuities of helpless women, who are threatened by similar vicissitudes just because their family sanctuary does not coincide with theories of racism....

Benigar, A.: Stepinac, Ziral, Rome, 1974, pp.439-440

May 20, 1943. Hans Helm interrogation request for Milan Schwarz

Schnellbrief.

Von der Deutschen Gesandtschaft in Agram ging am 20. d. M. nach stehendes Fernschreiben ein:

"Polizeiattache berichtet:

Prof. Milan Schwarz, Volljude, geboren 2. 8. 01 in Ogulin RMK., wohnhaft gewesen Agram, kroatischer Staatsangehöriger, wurden am 11. 5. 43 aus bestimmten Gründen unauffällig festgenommen und am gleichen Tage der Stapoaussonstelle in Rann zur Überführung an die Stapo Graz übergeben, mit der Bitte, seine Beförderung nach Auschwitz zu veranlassen. Schwarz war hier engster Mitarbeiter der Erzbischofs Dr. Stepinac und gefährdete die Arbeit eines dort tätigen VM. Ich bitte Auschwitz anzuweisen, Schwarz über seine Tätigkeit beim Erzbischof Stepinac eingehend vernehmen zu lassen und mir einen Durchschlag der Vernehmungsniederschrift zu übersenden. Bitte RSHA-Ref. IV B 4 SS-Stubaf. Guenther sofort zu verständigigen."

Ich bitte um weitere Veranlassung.

Im Auftrag
gez. Geiger
An den Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD-Attachegruppe
z. Hd. SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Plötz
Berlin SW 11
Princ-Albrechtstr. 8

Kolanović, J.: GRADIVO: Nadbiskup Alojzije Stepinac u izvješćima Njemačkog poslanstva u Zagrebu, Fontes, vol.02, br. 1, prosinac 1996., pp.313-342

Zagreb, 26. srpnja 1941.

NEZAVISNA DRŽAVA HRVATSKA
MINISTAR PRAVOSUDA I BOGOŠTOVLJA.
ZAGREB

Zagreb, dne 23. VII. 1941.

Preuzvišeni gospodine nadbiskupe !
Imademo najpouzdanije podatke ,da svećenici Slovenci,
koje Vi razmještavate po župnim dvorovima ,skoro bez iznimke
prave zločinačku propagandu protiv naše države.

Najčešće su izjave ,da će "ovo potrajati još najdulje
dva ,tri mjeseca,pa će propasti i opet će biti Jugoslavija".


Na nekoliko mjesta je u potkrepu tih tvrdnja rečeno na-
rođu : " i preuzvišeni Stepinac tvrdi isto ovo".

Slobodan sam ,po Poglavnikovoj odredbi ,upozoriti Vas
na ovu pojavu ,ne poklanjajući posve naravno ni vjere ni
važnosti na tvrdnju ,koja se tiče Vaše osobe .

Ako dobijemo još koji sličan izvještaj ,biti ćemo pri-
siljeni pokupiti sve slovensko svećenstvo i metnuti ga u
koncentracioni logor ,a one koji se napose ističu svojim
izjavama ,izvesti pred prijekli sud.

Umoljavam Vas ,da sa svoje st rane učinite najžurnije
što smatrate potrebnim.

Za dom spreman.

Ministar pravosuđa i bogoštovlja:


Gospodine Ministre,

Čast mi je potvrditi primitak Vašeg cij. pisma od 23.
o.m.j. u kojem javljate da ste s pouzdane strane obaviješteni da
slovenski svećenici, koji su prebačeni u Hrvatsku i sada se nalaze
na hrvatskom području, skoro svi bez iznimke prave zločinačku pro-
pagandu protiv naše države.

Na to pismo čast mi je odgovoriti slijedeće:

Ja sam svima svećenicima koji su ovamo prebačeni toplo
stavio na srce da se okane bilo kakvih izjava o političkim pri-
likama, naročito što se tiče Nezavisne Države Hrvatske koja ih je
tako gostoljubivo primila i kojoj su dužni zahvalnost. Ako se možda
koji od njih i zaboravio i štogod izjavio što nije uredu, ipak mi
je teško vjerovati da bi to bilo takovo, da bi se moglo nazvati
zločinačkom propagandom protiv naše države. Uostalom sam već spo-
menuo i Poglavniku, a i nekima od gospode Ministara, ako se koji
pojedinao među ovim slovenskim svećenicima ogriješi o državu, neka
ga jednostavno otpreme preko granice.

Što se tiče navodne tvrdnje slovenskih svećenika da
"i preuzv. Stepinac tvrdi isto ovo", ako je to rečeno za Nezavisnu
Državu Hrvatsku, onda je to puka izmišljotina koja nije ni prva ni
zadnja u pogledu zagrebačkog nadbiskupa, koji je već uostalom nau-
čen na to da se njegove izjave izvrću. Meni je savjest potpunom
čista i mirna, i nemam si u čitavom životu spoštitnuti da sam bilo
šta učinio protiv svoga hrvatskog naroda. Ako se itko iskreno veseli
slobodi hrvatskog naroda, onda je to sigurno sadanji zagrebački nad-
biskup.

Katolička je Crkva u Sloveniji (u pitanje naroda kao tako-
vog ne ulazim) proživjela teške dane. Ne bi bilo ni čudo, ako je kojem
od tih svećenika izmaknuo povik negodovanja protiv svega što su pre-
trpjeli. Ipak držim da to nije bila propaganda protiv naše države, po-
gotovo kad znam da su se spremali u deputaciju Poglavniku da mu se
zahvale. Ja ću ih međutim ponovno opomenuti i staviti im na srce da
se čuvaju izjava. Ako se koji unatoč toga ogriješi, držim da je dovolj-
no oštra kazna, ako se takovog prebaci preko granice.

Primite, gospodine Ministre, i ovom prigodom moje iskreno
poštovanje

Gospodin
Dr Mirko P u k,
Ministar pravosuđa i bogoštovlja
Z a g r e b

Nadbiskup


Image 1. 1941, July 23rd, MoJR to the Archbishop and July 26th, the Archbishop to MoJR

Poglavnice,

Smatram svojom dužnošću, da svratim Vašu pažnju ne nekoje nemile ~~incident~~ incidente, koji su se desili u zadnje vrijeme.

Na dan 3. veljače o.g. neki organi policije, na pritisak pretstavnik Italije pošli su tako daleko, da su htjeli zabraniti misu u crkvi sv. Blaža u Zagrebu, gdje se predmjevalo da Dubrovčani slave sv. Vlahu, a te u crkvi franjevacu u Zagrebu, gdje su Kotorani htjeli proslaviti sv. Tripuna, omiljeloga zaštitnika Kotora. U potonjoj crkvi morali su skinuti sa oltara sliku sv. Tripuna, na sablazan vjernika.

Ja uistinu ne znam, kako bih obilježio ovaj postupak, ali ću ga ubuduće, ukoliko pravovremeno saznam za njegovu odlučnije otkloniti, jer svaki vjernik ima pravo da se moli Bogu i svetima Njegovim. A kao Hrvat i sin ovoga naroda moram reći: ta valjda ne misle naši susjedi Talijani, da smo besćutna srca, i da ćemo im još zahvaljivati za to, što su nam odvezali dobar komad živoga mesa sa narodnog tijela. To se može očekivati od svetaca, ali ne od običnog puka, da bude zahvalan i za nepravedno. Ako to ima biti novi poredak, o kojem i oni toli govore, onda ne znam u čemu se taj razlikuje od toliko omraženog Versaillesa, osim u promjeni gospodara. Mislim da su barem oni imali prilike čuti, što suđi o novom poretku Otac kršćanstva Pijo XII u svom božićnom govoru.

U jednoj župi kraj Bjelovara/Velika Pisanica/dozvolili su si tamošnji Nijemci već nekoliko puta istupe pred crkvom u nedjelju upravo za vrijeme sv. mise. Župnik se usudio prigovoriti, a vodja Nijemaca mu otkresao, da je to njegovo pravo. Ne će biti, Poglavnice, na odmet, da vidite, što suda, kad iskreni sude o nama. Župnik ima svoga šovjeka, koji je uspio prisustvovati jednoj njihovoj sjednici u njemačkom domu, kamo se inače teško dodje, ako nisi Nijemac. Govornik je uz opću aplauz dokazivao, da su Nijemci ovdje u Hrvatskoj starosjedioci, a mi smo doseljenici, jer da je ovo prije osamsto godina bio njemački imperij.

Kad je župnik iza toga jednom prilikom oslovio tog istog vodju Nijemaca mu je otvoreno, da će onda, kad pobjede, najprije obračunati sa Katoličkom Crkvom i popovima. Nije mu dakako manjkala jedna bijesna opaska na zagrebačkog nadbiskupa, koji da je protivnik novoga poretka. A taj poredak je po njegovom shvaćanju taj, da se Hrvati izgube svoj teritorija u koliko ne budu roblje za gospodare Nijemce. Rekao je župniku i to, da bi u slučaju da izgube rat, poklali sve Hrvate prijenega bi i sami možda morali izgnuti. Njima Boga i crkve netreba.

Moram naglasiti, da ih se ja baš ništa ne bojim, ali možda ne bi bilo loše. Poglavnice, da naše vlasti malo pripaze na njihovo djelovanje i pokažu više energije. Jer ako imaju oni svoj *Lebensraum*, Bog ga je dao i Hrvatskom narodu. A ako je to prije osamsto godina bio njemački imperij, neka ne zaborave da je petsto godina prije toga još hrvatski narod bio ovdje, i na ovoj zemlji stupio u vezu s kršćanstvom, kojega i danas ispovijeda, i kojega se ne će odreći za volju neke nove religije, koja je plod fantazije.

Molim Vas, Poglavnice, da primite ovom zgodom moje iskreno poštovanje.

U Zagrebu, dne 8. veljače 1942.

Br. 1997/46.

Prepis se slaže sa izvornikom.

Zagreb, dne 1. listopada 1946.

Ravnatelj nadb. poslanici

Nadbiskup zagrebački.



Image 2. February 8, 1942. The Archbishop to Pavelić



Image 4. Zagreb center:

- 1. Caritas, Vlaška 36; 2. Jewish Community of Zagreb, Palmotićevo 16;*
- 3. Jesuits, Palmotićevo 33; 4. Relief Committee for Refugees, Kaptol 3;*
- 5. Main synagogue, Praška 7.*

ABBREVIATIONS

ADAP	Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik
AP	Arhiv postulature (Archive of Postulature)
BAB	Bundesarchiv Abt. Berlin
BAMA	Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv Freiburg
Beil.	Beilage (enclosure)
Betr.	Betreffend (concerning, regarding)
EG	Einsatzgruppen
EK	Einsatzkommande
HSS	Hrvatska seljačka stranka (Croatian Farmer Party)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
NDH	Nezavisna država Hrvatska (Independed State of Croatia), 1941-45
RAVSIGUR	Ravnateljstvo za (the Directorate for Public Order and Security)
Referat IV B4	Gestapo, Office B (Religious Communities), section 4 (Jewish Affairs)
RH	Republika Hrvatska (Republic of Croatia), 1991-present
RSHA	Reichssicherheitshauptamt (The Reich Main Security Office)
SRH	Savezna republika Hrvatska (Federal Republic of Croatia), 1945-91
UDB	Služba državne sigurnosti
UNS	Ustaška nadzorna služba (Ustasha Surveillance Service)
Vfg.	Verfügung (notice, notification, briefing note or memo)
VM	Vertrauensmann (V-Man, V-Person), agent or informant