and 'person' in Aristotle's thought, an interpretation which seems to me equally wrong. The notes on Bk. II, 1 (pp. 88 ff) contain an interesting discussion of the adequacy of Aristotle's criterion for the distinction between natural and non-natural objects and of the connection of this with sources of change. Mr. Charlton flirts with but rejects the idea that Aristotle can have believed that animals may be 'moved mechanically by objects affecting their sense-organs' despite remarks in *Physics* VIII. I think that such a suggestion might be given a longer ride than it receives here.

There are other points which might be criticized, although it has to be said that these are incidental to a large amount of interesting and useful commentary. I shall finish with some comments on Mr. Charlton's treatment of teleology. He rightly rejects Wieland's suggestion that Aristotle's teleology is 'abs ob' and claims that 'the validity of teleological explanation is an empirical issue' (p. 126); but he seems to think that teleology should be restricted to things which are conscious or at least sub-conscious. Thus having (p. 126) said that Aristotle 'is in effect trying to give an account of the difference we feel there to be between living things and the processes of life on the one hand, and inanimate nature on the other' on the basis of the applicability of teleology to the former, he adds that 'Aristotle might have done well, however, to put more emphasis on the notion of awareness, and its connection with teleological explanation'. He goes on 'A factor, after all, can explain a thing's behaviour by showing the good of it, only if the thing is in some way, however dimly, aware of that factor; if Aristotle wants to maintain that the roots of plants grow down for food (199^{a} 28–9), he ought to allow plants some sensitivity to wet and dry.' Whatever may be said about plants *that* argument would lead to the conclusion that thermostatically controlled heaters have a dim awareness of the temperature of the room. If one allows teleology at all (and why not?) one must be more liberal with the idea than this. Still, as I have said, such points are incidental to a commentary which is generally very useful indeed. The book is a welcome addition to the series.

D. W. HAMLYN
Birkbeck College, University of London

Plato's 'Euthyphro' and the Earlier Theory of Forms. BY R. E. ALLEN. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970. Pp xi + 171. Price £2.50.)

This is an interesting but oddly constructed book. It consists in part of a translation of Plato's *Euthyphro* with introduction and interspersed commentary à la Cornford, and in part, and for the greater part, a discussion of Plato's theory of Forms, including a thesis to the effect that there is to be found in the early Socratic dialogues a theory of Forms different from that found in the middle dialogues. This latter thesis is putatively based on the *Euthyphro*, but that dialogue provides a very slender base for the argument and Dr. Allen ranges fairly widely over the early dialogues for his evidence. There is indeed very little in the *Euthyphro* outside two passages at 5d and 6d which is directly relevant to the theory of Forms, although the general pattern of the argument in the dialogue, like that of other early dialogues, may be of *some* relevance in an indirect way.

Dr. Allen's translation of the *Euthyphro* is clear and scholarly, and his accompanying remarks are generally judicious and informative. It has often been made a criticism of Cornford's translations of Plato's dialogues that the interspersed commentary sometimes loads the interpretation by splitting up the argument artificially or arbitrarily. The divisions that Dr. Allen makes in his translation are generally reasonable, but a lay-out in which several pages sometimes separate sections of the dialogue is not in itself very satisfactory and makes it difficult for the reader to look up individual passages. It would surely have been better to use some other format—parallel translation and commentary, for example.

The thesis presented in the last and longest section of the book is that there is to be found in the early dialogues a view of the Forms as universals in a realist sense, but

such that the Form is also a standard or model by which it can be judged what things are proper instances of the universal in question. Such Forms are, according to Dr. Allen, in no sense immanent; they are as much 'separate' as they are on later views, though Aristotle may be misleading on this point. Their inter-relationship is not, however, to be construed on the pattern of the Aristotelian classification of species and genus, since higher forms are richer rather than more impoverished than lower ones. (This, Dr. Allen maintains, suits mathematical and moral terms, since, e.g. 'the existence of figure implies the existence of circular figure' and 'the existence of virtue implies the existence of justice as a virtue'. The latter follows from the Socratic doctrine of the unity of the virtues, but the general view presupposed here deserves a great deal more discussion and justification than it receives.)

What then is the difference between this theory and that to be found in the middle dialogues from the *Phaedo* onwards? Dr. Allen's answer is that the difference lies in the ontological status of the Forms. This is not a very clear notion in itself. The difference turns out to be a fine one although, Dr. Allen claims, it is real enough. It is that while on the early theory a Form must be both a universal and a standard such that the Form cannot have ascribed to it the opposite characteristic, it is in virtue of the Forms that things are what they are; on the other hand there is in the middle dialogues the claim that instances of Forms 'are deficient imitations or resemblances of Forms' and a corollary of this is the theory of differing degrees of reality. The separation of Forms from sensibles in the early dialogues did not involve this difference in degree of reality and the change when it came was, though a natural one, due to epistemological problems arising over scepticism and *a priori* knowledge. These problems 'arose, not *in* Socratic dialectic, but *about* it'.

While I am not convinced that the change, if it occurred, took place for the reasons that Dr. Allen gives, it seems to me that his account of the theory of Forms to be abstracted from some, at any rate, of the early dialogues is in the main correct. Dr. Allen has done a service in pointing out the main characteristics of that theory and its differences from modern conceptions of the same subject-matter. Given, however, the now widely accepted view that Plato later became critical of his earlier theory of Forms on the grounds that they had to fulfil incompatible roles—that of universals and standards—I am inclined to think that Dr. Allen takes a little too easily the fact that the *Euthyphro* seems to imply that a Form is both a standard (a '*paradeigma*') and a realist universal. I do not mean by this to dispute his view of the facts. It is rather that I would have wished to be told rather more about how Socrates could have come to demand such a thing. Socrates seems to think that if he could arrive at an answer to the question what holiness is he would have not just a definition (real or otherwise) of holiness but a criterion for deciding what is holy, not just a theoretical understanding but also a guide to practice. It is noteworthy that many of the early dialogues begin not merely by pointing out that the respondent's answer to Socrates' 'What is it?' question is particular rather than general, but also by pointing out that the answers given do not give unequivocal examples of the universal under consideration. This is true of the *Euthyphro* but in a rather more complicated way than holds good, for example, for the *Laches*, the *Charmides* and *Republic* Bk. I. This suggests what is evident in any case—that the Platonic Socrates wants of his definition something that will provide an unequivocal rule of conduct. But there can be no such thing and Plato's continual attempts to find more and more abstract versions of such a rule (in e.g. the Form of the Good) are ethically a wild-goose chase. It is from this point of view not surprising that the early dialogues are so negative in their conclusions.

I emphasize the implications of this for ethics, partly of course because it is moral notions that are Socrates' prime concern, but also because the same difficulties do not arise for e.g. physical things. The definition of a table should tell one how to recognize tables, it is not at all clear that the same is true of e.g. justice. It is noteworthy that the issues involved in the theory of Forms arise first in connection with moral notions and

then in connection with relative terms as found in other spheres; it is only later that the theory as such explicitly takes account of natural objects (cf. *Parmenides* 130 b–d). It seems to me therefore that the seeds of the 'degree of reality' theory are there in the early theory of Forms just because the notion of a standard for moral notions provides an impetus towards a view of the Forms which makes them 'transcendent'. This is not altogether incompatible with much of what Dr. Allen says, except where he says that the reasons for the changes in the theory are of the epistemological kind that he mentions. But I am inclined to think that his account of the matter would have been improved by further consideration of the point of Socratic procedure—how it is, that is, that Socrates could have been demanding something which is both universal and standard.

Still, the book is undoubtedly a real contribution to the study of Plato. A new discussion of the *Euthyphro* was needed, and while I still think that the subsequent discussion of the theory of Forms has, from the point of view of the construction of the book, a relative independence of the *Euthyphro* itself, that discussion raises a large number of interesting and important issues. If there are still other questions to be raised this is hardly surprising.

D. W. HAMLYN
Birkbeck College, University of London

The Anti-Philosophers: A Study of the Philosophes in Eighteenth Century France. BY R. J. WHITE. (Macmillan, 1970. £2.75p.)

Mr. White tells us that the *philosophes* were not philosophers in the modern—that is to say Oakshottian-sense of the word. And it is in Oakshott's sense of the word that we are invited to consider the activities of the French philosophes. In his essay 'The New Bentham' Oakshott, characteristically, set out to cut Bentham down to size by describing him as a philosophe, contrasting that type with the philosopher. The philosophe, says Oakshott, is characterized by a naive confidence in the value of encyclopaedic knowledge. While he may well possess intellectual vitality, courage and range, he will also have little critical capacity or ability to be perplexed. His interests lie not so much in the exploration of ideas in themselves but in their application to the reform of society. Mr. White goes on to point out the philosophe's overriding concern with clarity and simplicity rather than with the necessary complexity and untidiness of ideas. He stresses their concern with style as much as with content—for the reformer to be effective must also be something of a propagandist.

In his essay Oakshott was rather vague about the original of this type although he clearly assumed that he originated somewhere on the continent in the age of the enlightenment. Mr. White is a historian and in his book he explores the French original of the Philosophe. He thinks of them as a group and gives, among others, Fontenelle, Condillac, Diderot, D'Alembert, La Mettrie, Holbach, Helvetius, and, collectively the Encyclopaedistes, as his examples. He has trouble, unfortunately, with the two men, who must be covered by any historically workable definition of the philosophe—Montesquieu and Voltaire. They feature as philosophes along with the others in chapter 1. But as the book progresses Mr. White clearly becomes embarrassed about imposing his definition upon them. 'Voltaire . . . like Montesquieu was something else than a Philosophe' (pp. 24 and 121). What, then, were they? Montesquieu's 'profound differences of temper' which set him apart from the rest are periodically asserted but never discussed. Nor does Voltaire fare any better; for example we are simply told that his anglophilia 'along with his genius . . . preserved him from becoming a philosophe'. More arguably, and in opposition to scholars like Peter Gay, Rousseau is also excluded from Mr. White's list and more properly, a chapter, and a good one, is devoted to telling us why. The problem is compounded if we recall that most scholars, like most contemporaries, would want to see the Enlightenment as more than a purely