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Ruler and state, state and society in Ottoman political thought

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Abstract
It can be argued that the late seventeenth century marks the transition of the Ottoman entity into an early modern state, with one of its main features identified as the distinction between the ruler and the state apparatus. The paper aims to explore whether, when and how such a process reflected in contemporary political thought. It analyzes the ways Ottoman elite authors represented society vis-à-vis the sultan; also, the development of the notion of "state" in the same authors and how it came to be considered different from that of the "ruler".

Keywords
Ottoman empire; Ottoman political thought; early modernity; state; bureaucracy

Contrary to the traditional image we used to have of the Ottoman empire, it is now commonly accepted that innovation and reform has been a constant feature of Ottoman administration even since the sixteenth century.[1] Some Ottoman thinkers did realize the need for reform and advocated for it, such as Naima in the beginnings of the eighteenth century; others, such Mustafa Ali in the late sixteenth, perceived changes as a challenge for the traditional order and suggested a return to what they considered the "Golden Age" of the empire, back in the beginnings of the same century. The process of transformation culminated, one can say, in the first half of the nineteenth century, when the *Tanzimat* programme of reforms was implemented. The traditional view of this change stresses the westernizing aspects of it and attributes it to the influence of western Europe. However, recent studies emphasize the internal dynamics of Ottoman society and

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administration rather than external factors,[2] stressing, for instance, the "constitutionalist" effects of the expansion of the political nation (a term that represents those actors that can legitimately participate in state decision and policy-making) throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[3]

This paper will focus on the notions of ruler, state and society as reflected in these authors. Rifaat Abou-El-Haj has argued that the late seventeenth century marks the transition of the Ottoman entity into an early modern state, with one of its main features identified as the "progressive separation between the state and the ruling class", as well as the distinction between the ruler and the state apparatus.[4] More recently, Baki Tezcan argued that "the early modern and modern periods had two very significant sociopolitical developments in common – the expansion of the political nation and the limitation of royal authority"; according to his analysis, both developments can be traced in the Ottoman seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as in this period, in contrast with previous centuries, "a much larger segment of the imperial administration came to consist of men whose social origins were among the commoners" and "[t]hus more and more men whose backgrounds were in finance and trade came to occupy significant positions in the government of the empire, replacing those military slaves and civilizing the imperial polity".[5] The "political nation" was expanded

his insightful comments and suggestions. The anonymous *THR* reviewers' remarks were very helpful and essential for the final formulating of my thoughts.

[2] See, for example, the overview by Quataert, Donald, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 64 ff. and pp. 141-6; cf. the early thoughts by Berkes, Niyazi, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (London 1964, repr. London: Hurst & Co., 1998), pp. 26 ff.

[3] Yılmaz, Hüseyin, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Batılılaşma Öncesi Meşrutiyetçi Gelişmeler", *Dîvân. Disiplinlerarası Çalışmalar Dergisi*, 13/24 (2008), 1-30; Tezcan, Baki, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World* (Cambridge – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). On the term "political nation" see, for example, Loades, David M., *Power in Tudor England* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 4.

[4] Abou-El-Haj, Rifaat Ali, *Formation of the Modern State. The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991); see esp. pp. 7, 18-19 and 54, where he enumerates more specifically the characteristics of early modern centralization as follows: "the separation of public affairs from the personal affairs of the ruler and his family, the tendency to transform the zone frontier into a demarcated linear border, a growing specialization of function in some branches of the central administration, and finally, [the] rapid conversion of public lands into semiprivate property".

[5] Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, pp. 232 and 10, respectively; cf. pp. 48 ff. for his analysis on two parallel, but coinciding, distinctions he names "absolutist/constitutionalists" and "conservatives/liberals"). Cf. the definitions of modernity by Shmuel N. Eisenstadt ("Multiple Modernities,", *Daedalus* 12 (2000), p. 2) as "actors' engagement with gradually larger sectors of their respective societies"; and by Karen Barkey (*Empire of Difference.*

throughout this period by the increasing role of the janissaries in political life (the janissaries constantly expanding their intermingling with the artisan world of Istanbul and other towns) and the intrusion of "strangers" (*ecnebi*) into both the military and the sociopolitical elite; on the other hand, according to Tezcan, royal authority *as such* started even from the beginning of the seventeenth century to be challenged and limited legitimately, in some way, by various factors of political life, including *ulemas*, army rebellions and powerful households.

According to a different interpretation, expounded by Linda T. Darling (who places the emergence of the early modern state in the beginnings of the sixteenth century), on the other hand, modernity is defined as the successful subordination of all sources of authority to the power of rulers.[6] However, in my view the two interpretations can be somehow reconciled if in the last statement we replace the term "rulers" with "state". In the process of emerging as an autonomous entity, the latter was taking gradually more and more power from the hands of the king himself and, in the same time, expressing more and more an extended "political nation" which tried to lay hands on the state power, instead of finding alternative loci of authority. This process may not have been entirely successful, as it is full of regressions and shortcomings, but it was evident at least in the level of legitimization. Insofar as it was signed not only by the provincial *ayan* and the sultan, but also by the highest hierarchy of the state, the famous *Sened-i İttifak* (1808),[7] although produced and imposed by the provincial elite *milieu*, may perhaps be considered the culmination (its eventual failure notwithstanding) of this double process, but arguably it was founded on a long

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The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 206), as "the constitution of a political arena increasingly defined by a struggle over the definition of the political".

[6] Darling, Linda T., "Political change and political discourse in the Early Modern Mediterranean world", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 38/4 (2008), 505-31 at p. 506.

[7] See the full text and literature in Akyıldız, Ali, "Sened-i İttifâk'ın Tam Metni", *İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi/Turkish Journal of Islamic Studies*, 2 (1998), 209-22, and cf. the analysis by Yaycıoğlu, Ali, "The Provincial Challenge: Regionalism, Crisis, and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1812)", unpublished Ph.D. diss. (Harvard University, Cambridge MA 2008), pp. 428 ff. Similar concepts can be seen in the slightly earlier *Hüccet-i Şer'iyye* (1807), agreed upon by "firstly our lord the sultan... secondly by the high officials of the state" ("evvelen ... padişahımız efendimiz sultan Mustafa han... ve saniyen vükelâ-yı devlet ve zâbitân-ı sadakat-menzilet taraflarından dahi ahdullah ve ahd-ı resûlüllahî yâd ü tekrar... olunacağı"): Beydilli, Kemal, "Kabakçı İsyanı Akabinde Hazırlanan Hüccet-i Şer'iyye", *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi*, 4 (2001), 33-48 at p. 45.

development.[8] The process toward modernity may thus be said to have occurred in two stages that cover more than two centuries. In a first stage, sultans like Mehmed II, Selim I or Süleyman I successfully took over powers and sources of revenue that had still remained in the hands of warlord or *ulema* households, reminiscent of the early Ottoman empire; in a second, which seems to have culminated from the late seventeenth century onwards, a state apparatus which reproduced itself through apprenticeship and patronage took over decision-making powers from both the palace and its recruits, especially in financial administration. One may stress the first stage (as Darling does) or the second (as Abou-El-Haj or Tezcan do), and indeed we can talk of two political trends coexisting and in conflict; as a matter of fact, this conflict characterizes the whole process of state formation. The very notion of "state" as (in Quentin Skinner's words) "an independent political apparatus... which the ruler may be said to have a duty to maintain"[9] is a sign of such a development, which took place from the late sixteenth century onwards, as I will try to show.

If such a process toward this distinction can be traced throughout the seventeenth century and on, how was it –or was it not– reflected in contemporary political thought? In this paper, I will try to explore the ways Ottoman elite authors represented society vis-à-vis the sultan, examining whether and when he was considered part of it or a kind of "gardener" of its variety; also, to analyze the development of the notion of "state" in the same authors and to seek whether and how it came to be considered different from that of the "ruler". Finally, I will try to analyze the ways Ottoman authors perceived society and whether their changing perceptions corresponded to the process of dismantling the traditional order of estates in the way towards modernity. Let me stress from the beginning that

[8] Precedents of this model can be found in provinces such as Crete throughout the late eighteenth century (Sariyannis, Marinos, "Rebellious janissaries: two military mutinies in Candia (1688, 1762) and their aftermaths", in *The Eastern Mediterranean under Ottoman Rule: Crete, 1645-1840 (Halcyon Days in Crete VI, A Symposium Held in Rethymno, 13-15 January 2006)*, ed. Antonis Anastasopoulos (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2008), pp. 255-74 at pp. 260-3), but also in an agreement imposed by Murad IV on *sipahis* as early as in 1632 (Mustafa Naima, *Tarih-i Na'îmâ*, 6 vols (Istanbul: Matbaa-i amire, H. 1282/1865-1866), III, pp. 119-21; *Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi: Târih-i Na'îmâ (Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn fî Hulâsati Ahbâri'l-Hâfikayn)*, ed. Mehmet İpşirli, 4 vols (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007), pp. 722-23).

[9] Skinner, Quentin, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 353. On the relation between political thought and state formation cf. Stuurman, Siep, "The canon of the history of political thought: its critique and a proposed alternative", *History and Theory*, 39/2 (2000), 147-66 at pp. 162 ff.

this terminological query in ideology does not claim any proving ability for this or another interpretation of Ottoman politics or state. Instead, its ambition is to offer a rather preliminary description of currents and ideas, which could serve as an auxiliary framework for the study of political developments, dynamically interrelating with them.

The term *devlet*, from "power" to "state"

It was Rifaat Abou-El-Haj who first stressed that the term *devlet* had neither "the connotation [nor] the denotation of the modern nation-state" but rather (conveying a definition by Andreas Tietze) meant up to the seventeenth century "the decision-making power of the legitimate head of state as well as of those to whom he has delegated this power".[10] Recently Nikos Sigalas studied the semantic development of this word,[11] showing that it only acquired the modern sense of "state" toward the end of the seventeenth century.[12] Following his analysis, the term (which started its political career, so to speak, in the Abbasid period with the sense of "luck, good fortune")[13] meant clearly "power" or "dynasty", with strong overtones of "divine favor", in the text of Aşıkpaşazade, for instance, and it continued to be structured around the divine charisma of the ruler throughout the sixteenth century. Sigalas finds that in Mustafa Ali's texts, almost a century later, the *devlet* is a power particular to the Prince or Sultan, which cannot in any way be delegated;[14] in contrast, from the beginnings of the

[10] Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, pp. 19-20.

[11] Sigalas, Nikos, "Devlet et Etat: du glissement sémantique d'un ancien concept du pouvoir au début du XVIIIe siècle ottoman", in *Byzantina et Moderna: Mélanges en l'honneur d'Hélène Antoniadis-Bibicou*, ed. Gilles Grivaud and Sokratis Petmezas (Athens: Alexandreia, n.d. [2007]), pp. 385-415; see also Idem, "Des histoires des Sultans à l'histoire de l'Etat. Une enquête sur le temps du pouvoir ottoman (XVIe-XVIIIe siècles)", in *Les Ottomans et le temps*, ed. François Georgeon and Frédéric Hitzel (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 99-127. Cf. also Doganalp-Votzi, Heidemarie and Römer, Claudia, *Herrschaft und Staat: Politische Terminologie des Osmanisches Reiches der Tanzimatzeit* (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2008), pp. 171-79.

[12] Quentin Skinner showed that in west Europe this procedure took place in the humanist circles of France, Italy and England during the sixteenth century, the more abstract meaning of the term being established toward the end of the same century: Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, vol. II, pp. 352-8.

[13] Lewis, Bernard, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 35-37; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, second edition, s.v. "Dawla" (F. Rosenthal).

[14] Sigalas, "Devlet et état", pp. 392 ff.

eighteenth century onwards (more or less just after the Treaty of Karlowitz, which marked the first official recognition of a loss of Ottoman territory), the use of the term *devlet* for other states of Europe marks the "desacralization" of its notion.

A closer inspection of the use of the term *devlet* seems to corroborate Sigalas's conclusions. In fifteenth-century texts "state" (in our sense of the word) is usually rendered as *saltanat*, and always with a highly personal connotation, as identified with the ruler's household and palace.[15] In Ahmedî's history, composed shortly after 1411, the word *devlet* occurs only twice. In the one instance, it means clearly "sultanic power, good fortune" (v. 329: "devletine irmesün anun fütûr"); in the second, Kastamonu is conquered by Bayezid I "because, for him such is the task of the *devlet*" (v. 264: "böyle olur devlet işi çün ona").[16] Here, too, I think we can translate "sultanic power"; at any rate, this is a strictly personal notion of *devlet*. In Lütfi Paşa's *Asafname*, written after 1541, the word is still used in the meaning of "power, good fortune" ("devlet-i dünya-yı fâni, ashab-i devlet"), even in ambiguous phrases such as "the death of [the Sultan's] power/state" (fena-yı devlet).[17] Similar observations can be made concerning the fundamental work by Kınalızade Ali Çelebi, *Ahlak-ı Alai* (composed in 1563-65): *devlet* means "power" as in "yümn-i sa'adet ü devlet", or "dynasty" ("Devlet-i Abbasiyye, Çerakise [= Mamluks] evahir-i devletlerinde").[18] Among other works of the late sixteenth century that use *devlet* in the same context, one can note the anonymous *Hırzü'l-Mülûk* ("stronghold [or amulet] of the

[15] See e.g. Mehmed II's *kanunname*: Akgündüz, Ahmet, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri ve Hukukî Tahlilleri*, vol I: *Osmanlı Hukukuna Giriş ve Fatih Devri Kanunnâmeleri* (Istanbul: FEY Vakfı 1990), p. 326 ("bu kadar ahval-ı saltanata nizam verildi") and cf. with the famous regulation on fratricide (ibid., p. 328: "her kimesneye evlâdımdan saltanat müyesser ola").

[16] *Tâce'd-Dîn İbrâhîm bin Hızır Ahmedî: History of the Kings of the Ottoman Lineage and Their Holy Raids Against the Infidels*, ed. Kemal Silay (Harvard: The Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 2004). On the political thinkers discussed in this paper see also Lewis, Bernard, "Ottoman observers of Ottoman decline", *Islamic Studies*, 1 (1962), 71-87; Fodor, Pál, "State and society, crisis and reform, in 15th-17th century Ottoman Mirror for Princes", *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 40/2-3 (1986), 217-40; Howard, Douglas A., "Ottoman historiography and the literature of 'decline' of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries", *Journal of Asian History*, 22 (1988), 52-77; Yılmaz, Coşkun, "Osmanlı Siyaset Düşüncesi Kaynakları ile İlgili Yeni bir Kavramsallaştırma: Islahatnâmeler", *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi*, 1/2 (2003), 299-338.

[17] *Das Asafname des Lutfi Pascha, nach den Handschriften zu Wien, Dresden und Konstantinopel*, ed. Rudolf Tschudi (Berlin: Majer & Müller, 1910), pp. 6, 13 and 12, respectively.

[18] *Kınalızâde Ali Çelebi: Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, ed. Mustafa Koç (Istanbul: Klasik, 2007), pp. 452 and 461 respectively.

kings", written probably around 1574; e.g. "devam-ı devlet ve beka-yı saltanat")[19] and of course (as Sigalas also does) Mustafa Ali of Gelibolu.[20] Even in mid-seventeenth century, a historian like Solakzade could use the term meaning still "power" or "dynasty", since (in Rhoads Murphey's words) he speaks of the "ten supports which he calls *payanda* that were responsible for shoring up the dome of the building of state" (these pillars being, for example, the maintenance of a defense network or the suppression of lawlessness in the provinces).[21] In the same vein, a "Sunna-minded" (as termed by its editor, Derin Terzioğlu) treatise dated shortly after 1630 speaks of the *devlet* as "a dream and phantasy of the world", i.e. as dynastic power: "dünyanun hâb u hayaldür devleti".[22]

However, one of the first instances of *devlet* meaning "state" can perhaps also be seen in Kınalızade's work: he speaks of the "pillars of the state" as "erkân-ı devlet" ("siyaset-i erkân-ı devlet ve tevkir ü adalet-i ayan-ı mülk ü millet", or elsewhere: "erkân-ı devlet ve ayan-ı memleket").[23] In about the same period an anonymous work, *Kitabu Mesalihi'l-Müslimin ve Menafi'i'l-Mü'minin* (Book on the Proper Courses for Muslims and on the Interests of the Faithful), seems to ignore *devlet* and uses instead the word *beğlik*

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[19] Yücel, Yaşar, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtına Dair Kaynaklar: Kitâb-i Müstetâb – Kitâbu Mesâlihi'l-Müslimîn ve Menâfi'i'l-Mü'minîn – Hırzü'l-Mülûk* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988), p. 175 = Akgündüz, Ahmet, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri ve Hukukî Tahlilleri*, vol. VIII: *III. Murad Devri Kanunnâmeleri/III. Mehmed Devri Kanunnâmeleri* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1994), p. 36.

[20] E.g. Mustafa Ali, *Mustafâ 'Âlî's Counsel for Sultans of 1581. Text, Transliteration, Notes by Andreas Tietze*, 2 vols. (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1979-1982), vol. I, pp. 38/122 ("bir devlet-i kâmile ve bir sa'adet-i şamile), pp. 39/123; *Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, Füsûl-i hall ü Akd ve Usûl-i Harc ü Nakd* (*İslam Devletleri Tarihi, 622-1599*), ed. Mustafa Demir (Istanbul: Değişim Yayınları, 2006), p. 141.

[21] Murphey, Rhoads, "Solakzade's treatise of 1652: a glimpse at operational principles guiding the Ottoman state during times of crisis", in Idem, *Essays on Ottoman Historians and Historiography* (Istanbul: Eren, 2009), pp. 43-8 at 46-7. In other instances, however, he seems to use the term in its "state/society" meaning, like his contemporary Katib Çelebi (ibid., pp. 45-6).

[22] Terzioğlu, Derin, "Sunna-minded Sufi preachers in service of the Ottoman state: the *Nasihatnâme* of Hasan addressed to Murad IV", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 27 (2010), 241-312 at p. 284. In other instances (ibid., p. 295 and *passim*) the term *din u devlet* is used as a synonym to "world", *alem* (meaning "the Ottoman world/kingdom": cf. ibid., p. 297: "cemî' dünya liman-ı selâmete vâsıl olup"). On this context cf. also Rosenthal, Erwin I. J., *Political Thought in Medieval Islam. An Introductory Outline* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 8: "usually the complement of *dîn* is *dunya* (this world); *dîn* means religion, not church, and is not contrasted with *dunya* which it comprises"; Watt, W. Montgomery, *Islamic Political Thought* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998 [1st ed. 1968]), p. 29.

[23] Koç (ed.), *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, pp. 452, 463.

referring clearly to the state: "matbah eminlerine... beğlikden develer virülürmüş".[24] Glimpses of a new meaning for *devlet*, mainly in connection to "government" or "state apparatus" can be seen in other works of the same period, which otherwise use constantly the term meaning "power", "dynasty" or "kingship". Hasan Kafi Akhisari, in his famous *Usulü'l-Hikem fi Nizami'l-Alem* (Elements of Wisdom for the Order of the World) which he first composed in Arabic in 1596 and translated into Ottoman Turkish almost immediately, speaks of the "sultanic power, kingship" as "padişahun devleti", or of "the Ottoman dynasty i.e. the House of Osman" ("devlet-i kahire-i Osmaniyye... ya'ni hazret-i Âl-i Osman"), but, in one instance, he seems to mean "state apparatus", as we can deduce from the phrase "ekrem olanlarun devlete vâsıl olması" ("the intrusion to the state apparatus of the most generous").[25] A similar sense can be detected in one or two references by Mustafa Ali, who names available positions and offices as "the food on the tables of government", "ni'met-i simat-i devlet".[26] This example may be considered ambiguous (as many others cited here), but another is much clearer: namely when he uses a simile of the state as a workshop ("kârhane-i devlet-i Osmaniye"); the task of securing its functioning as a big water-wheel; the king as the master (*üstad*) of the workshop; the *vezir* as a capable apprentice (*şagird*) who can repair the waterwheel.[27] By the beginnings of the seventeenth century, the sense of the term is much closer to that of "state": another anonymous work composed around 1620, *Kitab-i Müstetab*, speaks of the "high state [of the Ottomans]" in the form that would be

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[24] Yücel, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtına Dair Kaynaklar*, p. 100 (cf. ibid., p. 118). On the dating of this work see Tezcan, Baki, "The 'Kânûnnâme of Mehmed II:' a different perspective", in *The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation*, ed. Kemal Çiçek, 4 vols, vol. III, *Philosophy, Science and Institutions* (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), pp. 657-65.

[25] İpşirli, Mehmet, "Hasan Kâfî el-Akhisarî ve Devlet Düzenine Ait Eseri *Usûlü'l-Hikem fî Nizâmi'l-Âlem*", *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 10-11 (1979-80), 239-78, at pp. 261, 262 and 256 respectively.

[26] Tietze, *Counsel for Sultans*, I, p. 66/163.

[27] *The Ottoman Gentleman of the Sixteenth Century: Mustafa Âli's* Mevâ'idü'n-Nefâ'is fî Kavâ'idi'l-Mecâlis, *"Tables of Delicacies Concerning the Rules of Social Gatherings*, ed. Douglas S. Brookes (Harvard: The Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 2003), pp. 59-60 = *Gelibolulu Mustafa 'Âlî ve Mevâ'idü'n-Nefâis fi-Kavâ'idi'l-Mecâlis*, ed. Mehmet Şeker (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997), p. 307. The same simile ("kârhane-i devlet") is used in the mid-seventeenth century by Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrâr Zeyli (Tahlîl ve Metin)*, ed. Nevzat Kaya (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003), p. 213, 214, as well as in the early 1700s by Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, *Devlet Adamlarına Öğütler*, ed. Hüseyin Ragıp Uğural (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1987), p. 67.

common afterwards.[28] In the same vein, an anonymous chronicler covering the period from 1688 till 1704 and apparently belonging, along with Na'ima, to the circle of Rami Mehmed Paşa, inserts some advice to "the servants of the Ottoman state" ("devlet-i aliyye hüddâmına"), such as neither to offend their superiors nor to displease their inferiors;[29] he terms this advice "lisan-ı devlet", the "language of state" or, as we would say today, of politics.[30]

At any rate, by the end of seventeenth century it seems that the use of *devlet* in the sense of state or "government apparatus" was common enough, as when Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi, in his *Telhîsü'l-Beyân fî Kavânîn-i Âl-i Osmân* (composed most probably around 1675) writes that "the state was founded on the religious affairs; in fact, religion is fundamental, while the state was established as its subdivision" ("devlet umur-ı din üzerine bina olunup, din asıl, devlet anın fer'i gibi kurulmuşdur"). The author goes on arguing that the *şeyhülislam* is the head of religion, the grand *vezir* the head of state ("yalnız devlet reisi"), and the sultan the head of both.[31] In this case, the traditional coupling of *din ü devlet*, which used to denote an

[28] Yücel, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtına Dair Kaynaklar*, pp. 2, 5 = Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri*, IX: *I. Ahmed Devri Kanunnâmeleri/II. Osman Devri Kanunnâmeleri* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1996), pp. 601, 604 ("devlet-i aliyye umurunda, bu devlet-i aliyyenin temeli kazılmak üzeredir, devlet-i aliyyeye ne vechile hidmet idecekleri"), and passim. Cf. also a similar use in Aziz Efendi (ca. 1630): "would not this matter [reforming the office of the grand *vezir*] be most profitable and advantageous for the state" ("Devlet-i Aliyyelerine nafi ve sudmend"): *Kanûn-nâme-i Sultânî li 'Azîz Efendi. Aziz Efendi's Book of Sultanic Laws and Regulations: An Agenda for Reform by a Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Statesman*, ed. Rhoads Murphey (Harvard: The Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 1985), p. 22/41. Cf. also the formulation by Süleyman Nahifi (1645?-1738) in his *Nasihatü'l-Vüzerâ*: an important task for the *vezir*, he says, is to secure safety and protection in all the "domains governed by the Exalted State" ("devlet-i aliyye'nin havza-ı hükûmetlerinde"); see İpşirli, Mehmet, "Nahîfî Süleyman Efendi: *Nasihatü'l-Vüzera*", *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 15 (1997), 15-28, at p. 22.

[29] Özcan, Abdülkadir (ed.), *Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi (1099-1116/1688-1704* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), pp. 53-4; cf. Sariyannis, Marinos, "Ottoman critics of society and state, fifteenth to early eighteenth centuries: toward a corpus for the study of Ottoman political thought", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 25 (2008), 127-50 at p. 149.

[30] More accurately, he says of a fallen *vezir* that "although a statesman (*devletlü*), he had no knowledge of the language of state".

[31] *Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi: Telhîsü'l-Beyân fî Kavânîn-i Âl-i Osmân*, ed. Sevim İlgürel (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1998), p. 197; Yılmaz, "Mesrutiyetçi Gelişmeler", p. 8. An anonymous author of the same period, copying Hezarfen, writes that the *vezir* is head of "his own state" ("kendi devlet re'isi"), which might show that the term had still strong connotations of "power": İpşirli, Mehmet, "Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtına Dair bir Eser: *Kavânîn-i Osmanî ve Râbıta-i Âsitâne*", *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 14 (1994), 9-35 at p. 33. See also below for a comparison with late fifteenth-century formulations.

inseparable entity uniting religious authority to maintain the *Shari'a* with the sultan's personal rule,[32] is broken into its components in a way that shows clearly the development of the latter term. Significantly, the word *devlet* here modifies somehow the traditional formulation as exposed by al-Gazali who repeatedly stated that religion (*din*) and kingship (*mulk, sultan*) are inseparable twins, with the former being the essential basis (*asl*) and the latter its guardian.[33] Hezarfen's formulation, thus, may be the clearest example of the transformation of the term to something distinct from the ruler's personal or dynastic power.

State, community, commonwealth

As observed again by Sigalas, a turning point in the history of the term comes with Kâtib Çelebi's *Düsturü'l-Amel li Islahi'l-Halel* (Guiding Principles for the Correction of Defects).[34] Indeed, Katib Çelebi begins his tract by stating that "[the word] *devlet*, which [originally] meant *saltanat* and *mülk*, according to another view consists of the human society" ("ictima-ı beşeriyeden ibaretdir");[35] using this definition he proceeds to develop his version of the Ibn Khaldunian theory of state stages. This may be the first instance of the cyclist theory systematically expounded in Ottoman thought;[36] however, while Ibn Khaldun spoke of the life-stages of a dynasty

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[32] Cf. the definition by Andreas Tietze, as conveyed by Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, p. 19: "The phrase *din u devlet* (religion and state) refers perhaps to the general climate produced by this [decision-making] power in the community under the aspect of perpetuating itself". On the prehistory of this coupling cf. Lambton, Ann K. S., *State and Government in Medieval Islam. An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political Theory: The Jurists* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 108 and elsewhere.

[33] Laoust, Henri, *La politique de Gazâlî* (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1970), pp. 197 and 237. Al-Gazali's statement is based on a *hadith* that couples *din* with (alternatively) *mulk, sultan* or *dawla*, the latter here meaning "('secular') power" (Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, p. 8).

[34] Sigalas, "Devlet et état", pp. 400-5. For Katib Çelebi's text see Ayn-ı Ali Efendi, *Kavânîn-i Âl-i Osman der Hülâsa-i Mezâmin-i Defter-i Divan* (repr. İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1978), pp. 119-40; Turkish translation in Gökyay, Orhan Şaik, *Kâtib Çelebi'den Seçmeler* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1968), pp. 154-61.

[35] Cf. later on, "the present community of men, which consists of the state", "insanın devletden ibaret olan ictima-i hâli". Bernard Lewis ignores these definitions, I think, when he states that by "human states" Katib Çelebi "clearly means dynasties" (Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam*, p. 24).

[36] In a less systematic form such views may be found in Mustafa Ali's work; cf. Fleischer, Cornell, "Royal authority, dynastic cyclism and 'Ibn Khaldunism' in sixteenth century Ottoman letters", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 18/3-4 (1983), 198-220.

using the same term (*dawla*),[37] Katib Çelebi explicitly uses the term in his new definition, as "society" or "community". Sigalas shows that this transformation of meaning corresponds to a double conceptual and structural change, namely the transformation of the concept of "power" to that of "community", in the one hand, and the secularization of the concept of "power", now founded on the society instead of the ruler's charisma.[38] Here, however, one has to remark (along with Sigalas) that Katib Çelebi's use of the term as "society" seems rather isolated in the long run, although we will meet similar uses in Mustafa Na'imâ or İbrahim Müteferrika's work. Indeed, Na'imâ talks of "a *devlet* that is properly conducted" ("nizam verilen devlet");[39] in this instance, the term could mean either "state, government" or society in general. Moreover, although he uses in many instances the term in the sense of "power" or "dynasty", he also reiterates Katib Çelebi's analysis on the state as "human community" and speaks of the stages in the life of "states or communities" ("her devlet ü cemiyyetin hali"); elsewhere he seems to use interchangeably umur-ı cumhur, that is "affairs of the people, common affairs", and *umur-ı devlet*.[40] In a now famous apostrophe on the alleged plans of Çalık Ahmed Ağa during the 1703 rebellion, Naima says that he wished "to turn the Ottoman state, ruled for four centuries by kings, into a popular assembly and a state of crowds, like the polities of Algiers or Tunis" ("istiklâl-i mülûk ile mazbut ve muntazam olan devlet-i Osmaniye'yi...

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[37] Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, pp. 87-90; cf. ibid., p. 229. Ibn Khaldun's first translator to Ottoman Turkish, Pirizade Mehmed Sahib Efendi (1730), uses the alternative forms *mülk ü devlet* and *devlet ü saltanat*, with *devlet* clearly meaning dynasty or power, as in: "mülûk ü selâtin ibtida-yı zuhûr-ı devlette": ed. Yavuz Yıldırım, *İbn Haldun: Mukaddime Osmanlı Tercümesi. Mütercim Pîrîzâde Mehmed Sâhib* (Istanbul: Klasik, 2008), vol. I, p. 334 and *passim* (cf. also the treatment of territories split over various dynasties: ibid., vol. II, p. 167-9). In Pirizade's translation, the term *mülk ü saltanat* is closer to what can be called "the state", as in the famous quote that "royal authority means superiority and the power to rule by force... [it] is a goal to which group feeling leads": "mülk ü saltanat rütbe-i riyasetten ecell ü â'lâ olup... rical beyninde emr ü nehyini kahr u galebe ile tenfîz ü icraya kadirdir... mülk ü saltanat asabiyyetin gayet ü nihayeti olduğu sabit ü zahir oldu" (ibid., I, p. 275; cf. Baali, Fuad, *Society, State, and Urbanism: Ibn Khaldun's Sociological Thought* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), p. 53; Rosenthal, Franz, *Ibn Khaldun: The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History*, ed. and abridged by Nessim J. Dawood (Princeton: Bollingen Foundation, 1967), p. 108).

[38] Cf. also Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, pp. 60-1.

[39] Naima, *Tarih*, VI, appendix, p. 53; İpşirli, *Tarih-i Na'ima*, p. 1888; Thomas, Lewis V., *A Study in Naima*, ed. Norman Itzkowitz (New York: New York University Press, 1972), p. 87.

[40] Naima, *Tarih*, I, pp. 27 ("human community"), 34 ("states or communities") and 53 ("tedbir-i umur-ı cumhura mübaşir olan hall ü akd erbabı"); İpşirli, *Tarih-i Na'îmâ*, pp. 21, 26 and 39, respectively.

cumhur cemiyyeti ve tecemmu' devleti kıyafetine koyup").[41] Not much later, in 1732, İbrahim Müteferrika speaks of "the edifice of the state or the building of the commonwealth" ("bünyan-ı devlet ve bina-i cumhur-ı cemiyet"; it is worth noting that for "commonwealth" he uses the same term, *cumhur-ı cemiyet*, that for Naima denotes – rather reproachfully, as shown by the expression *kıyafetine koyup* – a kind of democracy), while he enumerates the three ways of government (monarchy, oligarchy and democracy) as *devlet*s (with *saltanat* in the meaning of "power", e.g. for English- or Flemish-styled democracy: "saltanat tedbir-i reayanın olmak gerekdir... bu üslûb üzere olan devlete "dîmukrâsiyâ" derler").[42] In the above last examples, it can be seen how Katib Çelebi's definition of the term functions as a bridge, so to speak, between the meaning "power, dynasty" and that of "state apparatus, government" and eventually "state, nation". A society has to be governed, and its well-being is identified with the good functioning of its government: this line of thought facilitated, it may be said, the semantic transition toward the development of the notion of "state" as such.

It is all too natural that when one tries to give a European-styled translation of the word in the examples above, some confusion is evident. However, other instances are perhaps clearer for the argument I am trying to make. For one thing, Naima uses also the term in the plural for foreign states.[43] This development, which must be connected with the treaty of Karlowitz where the Ottoman sultan recognized for the first time officially a loss of territory,[44] was quite an innovation. For instance, an anonymous tract

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[41] Naima, *Tarih*, VI, Appendix, p. 34; İpşirli, *Tarih-i Na'îmâ*, p. 1877. Cf. Kafadar, Cemal, "Janissaries and other riffraff of Ottoman Istanbul: rebels without a cause?", in *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World: A Volume of Essays in Honor of Norman Itzkowitz*, ed Baki Tezcan and Karl K. Barbir (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), pp. 113-34 at 133; Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, pp. 223-4. Kafadar notes the difficulty on translating these terms: "Any literal translation of this term ([*cumhur cemiyyeti*], popular assembly?) is hazardous since the word "cumhur" was used in several meanings including a rebellious crowd (rather than the whole population)". Writing in 1785, Süleyman Penah Efendi complained that provincial notables give and take the provinces "as if they had inherited them from their fathers", since they constitute "a kind of assembly" ("hükkâm ve ayan ve kocabaşıyan bir cumhur misillü olub memleketler mevrûs-i pederleri gibi alub viriyorlar"): see Berker, Aziz, "Mora İhtilâli Tarihçesi Veya Penah Efendi Mecmuası, 1769", *Tarih Vesikaları* 2 (1942-1943), fasc. 7: 63-80, 8: 153-60, 9: 228-40, 10: 309-20, 11: 385-400, 12: 473-80, at fasc. 10, p. 318.

[42] *İbrahim Müteferrika ve* Usûlü'l-Hikem fî Nizâmi'l-Ümem, ed. Adil Şen (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1995), pp. 130-1. Cf. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, pp. 42-3.

[43] Sigalas, "Devlet et état", pp. 404 ff.

[44] Cf. Abou-El-Haj, Rifaat Ali, *The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics* (Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1984), pp. 22, 36, 72ff; Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, pp. 66-8, 80-82.

composed probably toward the end of seventeenth century, speaks of Mehmed II's reign as "the first period of the state/dynasty" ("devlet evvelinde"), but it still does not consider European states as such, naming them "Christian kings" as opposed to the "Exalted State" ("devlet-i aliyyede Nasâra kırallarından birer balyoz... vardır").[45] By 1732, İbrahim Müteferrika talks freely of the "states" of France or Spain ("Fransa devleti ile İspanya devleti"),[46] although he prefers to refer to the Christian "countries" or "kings" ("milel-i Nasâra", "mülûk-ı Nasâra"; the word *milel* [pl. of *millet*] here is clearly meaning "countries" rather than "religious affiliations"); toward the turn of the century, a pro-Selim III author speaks of "the Exalted State and the other seven climes" ("Devlet-i Aliyye'de ve sair ekalim-i seb'ada").[47] This meaning (the "empire", rather than its governing apparatus) was common by the end of the seventeenth century, as attested by Meninski's dictionary (1681).[48] By the first decades of the nineteenth century, *devlet* had come to mean the state as an abstraction (a meaning resembling now "nation" or "country"), while "government" was then described as *hükumet*.[49]

The ruler versus society

As seen above, the notion of "state" seems to be absent in Ottoman literature until at least the late sixteenth century. Nonetheless, a perception of

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[45] İpşirli, "Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtına Dair bir Eser", pp. 23 and 31; cf. also ibid., p. 33.

[46] Şen, *Usûlü'l-Hikem*, p. 177. The use of *devlet* as "state" by Müteferrika is clear in phrases like "people who live within the area of a state" ("bir devletin saha-yı dairesinde mevcud efrad-ı nas"): ibid., p. 152.

[47] *Nizâm-ı Cedîde Dâir Bir Risâle: Zebîre-i Kuşmânî fî Ta'rîf-i Nizâm-ı İlhâmî*, ed. Ömer İşbilir (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 2006), p. 43. Cf. the expression "devlet-i aliyyeyi dahi düvel-i nasâra kavaidine irca" in the more official *Hüccet-i Şer'iyye* of 1807: Beydilli, "Hüccet-i Şer'iyye".

[48] After citing the initial meaning of "fortune, luck", Meninski notes also "Regnum, Imperium / Staat, Herrschaft, Königreich, Reich / Regno, imperio, stato / Royaume, Empire, Estat": Meninski, Franciscus à Mesgnien, *Thesaurus Linguarum Orientalium Turcicae – Arabicae – Persicae / Lexicon Turcico-Arabico-Persicum* [Vienna 1680 (repr. Istanbul: Simurg, 2000)], vol. II, pp. 2185-8.

[49] Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam*, p. 37; Doganalp-Votzi and Römer, *Herrschaft und Staat*, pp. 154-7 and 160-2. Lewis argues that the "first unambiguous occurrence of the new meaning [*hükumet* as "government"] that has so far come to light is in a Turkish memorandum of about 1837". However, the Ottoman texts of the constitution of the Ionian State (1800), translated from Italian, have *hükumet* for government ("senato ta'bir olınur hükûmet") and *cumhur* for state: see Nikiphorou, Aliki (ed.), *Συνταγματικά κείμενα των Ιονίων Νήσων* [Constitutional Texts of the Ionian Islands] (Athens: Idryma tes Voules ton Hellenon, 2008),

society was of course always present, and it would be highly interesting to study what was its relation to the ruler; in other words, was the king/sultan conceived as a divinely ordained power *outside* (or *above*) society, or do we have a certain notion of the ruler being elected in some way from among the society? In medieval Persian society, notes Roy Mottahedeh, the king "did not keep [people] in their places by virtue of his position at the top of the social hierarchy. Rather, he did so as an outsider, the man who was above categories and their associated hierarchies".[50] This medieval ideology clearly influenced the classical tradition of political theory, but one would expect a change in the latter reflecting changes in early modern society and state.

A starting point for this analysis could be the comparison between various formulations of the famous theory of the "circle of justice". Linda T. Darling notes that the Arabic version of the "circle of justice" described the "hedged garden" of the world as a pasture for sheep (with the subjects, *reaya*, being the "flock") and the king as a shepherd who kept the army in its corner, while in Davvani's Persian version, developed in the Akkoyunlu state, "kings ruled over a bounded world, not a pasture but an irrigated garden in an urban, even a palatial, setting".[51] Davvani's formulation is reiterated by Kınalızade Ali, who speaks of the "sultanic power" as the fence of the world-garden, the Holy Law as the power's regulator, and the sovereignty or kingship (*mülk*) as the "watchman" of the Holy Law, which has to be manned by people through justice ("cihan bir bağdır divarı devlet / devletin nâzımı şeriattir / şeriate olamaz hiç hâris illâ mülk").[52] In Mustafa Ali's formulation, the garden simile is implied and the emphasis is put on the

p. 709. Meninski's dictionary, at the end of the seventeenth century, has an intermediate meaning of "dominium, jurisdictio, imperium, seu ipsum imperare, aut imperium exercere, regimen absolutum, principatus / Dominio, padronanza, giurisdittione, commando, governo assoluto, autorità, & Principato" (Meninski, *Thesaurus Linguarum Orientalium*, I, pp. 1793-4).

[50] Mottahedeh, Roy, *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society* (London – New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001 [1st ed. 1980]), p. 178.

[51] Darling, "Political change and political discourse", p. 516. On the "circle of justice" cf. Eadem, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660* (Leiden – New York: E. J. Brill, 1996), pp. 283-9. On Persian continuations of the simile of the king to a shepherd cf. Lambton, Ann K. S., "Justice in the medieval Persian theory of kingship", *Studia Islamica*, 17 (1962), 91-119, now in Eadem, *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1980) at p. 94. On the garden simile in the works of Razi (d. 1209) and Ibn Khaldun cf. Eadem, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, p. 137.

[52] Koç (ed.), *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, p. 539.

king in person (*sultan*), rather than on his power.[53] The "pastoral" comparison is still alive in texts such as Hasan's treatise to Murad IV, where the sultan is compared to the shepherd, "his slaves" to lambs, and unjust judges and officers to wolves.[54] Katib Çelebi cites just the Arabic dictum, focusing on "kingship" ("mülk"),[55] while Naima, who does not use the garden simile either, speaks of "mülk ü devlet".[56] On the other hand, it has already been noted that the sultan as person had by mid-sixteenth century "largely retreated from [many authors'] conceptions of justice and the social reality it tendered" and that justice was viewed more as a "generalizable marker of the *status quo*, representing stability via social hierarchy" rather than "a personal quality emanating from the ruler".[57] Notions of the king as liable to (divine, at least) punishment for failing to meet these standards are not absent from Ottoman texts, not to mention political practice.[58]

The body metaphor: the king as head or heart of society

Another tradition concerning the relationship of kings to society took its metaphors from various Islamic interpretations of the human body and

[53] Mustafa Ali, *Mustafâ 'Âli's Description of Cairo of 1599. Text, Transliteration, Notes by Andreas Tietze* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1975), p. 80.

[54] Terzioğlu, "Sunna-minded Sufi preachers", p. 295 ("Allah... seni coban eyledi kulları koyuncuklarına. Bu kurdları gendi haline korsanuz beş on ra'iyyen kaldı"). In the same text, the circle of justice is implied by the phrase, "are you then to fill the treasury from the air?" ("hazine'i havadan mı cem' idersin sonra?").

[55] Ayn-ı Ali Efendi, *Kavânîn-i Âl-i Osman*, p. 124; Gökyay, *Kâtib Çelebi'den Seçmeler*, p. 156.

[56] Naima, *Tarih*, I, p. 37; İpşirli, *Tarih-i Na'ima*, p. 30. Cf. also Naima, *Tarih*, VI, p. 152; İpşirli, *Tarih-i Na'îmâ*, p. 1653 ("padişah kul ile, kul hazine ile, hazine reayadan hasıl olur"). On the various formulations of the "circle of equity" in Ottoman literature see also Fleischer, "Royal authority, dynastic cyclism and 'Ibn Khaldunism'", p. 201.

[57] Ferguson, Heather, "Genres of power: constructing a discourse of decline in Ottoman nasihatname", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, 35 (2010), 81-116 at pp. 97-8. The gradual abandonment of moralist approaches in Ottoman political thought fits well with this "institution-centered" development: see Sariyannis, Marinos, "The princely virtues as presented in Ottoman political and moral literature", Turcica 43 (2011), 121-144.

[58] Mustafa Ali, for instance, is implying such a view in his history of Islamic dynasties: see Demir (ed.), *Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, Füsûl-i hall ü Akd ve Usûl-i Harc ü Nakd*, passim. Similar views were expounded in early nineteenth-century Iran: see Lambton, A. K. S., "Some new trends in Islamic political thought in late 18th and early 19th century Persia", *Studia Islamica*, 39 (1974), 95-128, at pp. 116 ff. On political praxis suffice to note the *fetvas* allowing sultans to be deposed (a famous example is the 1703 rebellion: Özcan, *Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi*, pp. 241-2; Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion*, pp. 71-2; Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, p. 221).

soul. This body metaphor goes back to al-Farabi, according to whom (in the words of Erwin I. J. Rosenthal):[59]

> "[t]he members of the body are designed and arranged in a hierarchy; the highest is the chief (*ra'îs*), that is, the heart; the rank of the lower members is determined by their nearness or remoteness from the heart. Those members nearest to the heart both rule and are ruled, those farthest removed from the head only serve, but all are united in serving the purpose of the heart. It is the same with the state; when all parts of the state serve the purpose of the chief or ruler, we have the ideal state, *madîna fâdila*.

Al-Farabi considered the heart as the ruling organ, "followed in rank by the brain, which is also a ruling organ, its supremacy, however, not being primary but secondary: it is ruled by the heart and rules over all the other organs and limbs".[60] One is tempted to suppose that similes of the king to the brains, not to the heart (and there are such instances in Ottoman literature), imply that there is another, still higher source of social authority, namely the *ulema* (al-Farabi himself clearly identified the ruler with the heart); however, as it will be seen, a certain confusion in Ottoman formulations of this metaphor make this hypothesis dubious.

In his *Kanun-i Şehinşahi*, composed in Persian during the reign of Selim I, İdris b. Hüsameddîn Bitlisî states that the sultan is like the head in the body, or the brains in the head; elsewhere, the king is paralleled to the heart, while the *vezir* is the intellect.[61] Now, in the first simile, where the king has the place of the head within the kingdom, the head and the brains constitute two separate powers, the first controlling perception and the second movement. The motive power (*kuvve-i muharrike*) corresponds to the army, the people of the sword, while the power of perception (*kuvve-i hassa*) corresponds to the people of the pen; these two powers must be kept in balance by the head and brain, i.e. the sultan. Toward the end of the sixteenth century, the same simile is used by Hasan Kafi Akhisari, who writes that kings are to the other people ("sair halk-ı âlem") as the heart is to the body; their [spiritual] health guarantees the health of the whole

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[59] Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, p. 127; cf. Richard Walzer (ed.), *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State. Abû Nasr al-Fârâbî's* Mabâdi' ârâ' ahl al-madîna al-fâdila. *A Revised Text with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 231 ff. (and p. 435 on al-Farabi's neo-Platonic precursors).

[60] Walzer, *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State*, p. 175.

[61] Akgündüz, Ahmet, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri ve Hukukî Tahlilleri*, 3. Kitap: *Yavuz Sultan Selim Devri Kanunnâmeleri* (İstanbul: FEY Vakfı, 1991), pp. 32-3. In the same simile, the tax collector (*tahsildar*) corresponds to desire and "guards", i.e. the military, to anger (ibid., p. 21).

body.[62] In about the same period, Mustafa Ali argues that "king and subjects, especially army leaders and statesmen, all constitute one organism ("padişah u reaya, hususan ümera vu vükelâ nefs-i vahid menzilesinde olub"), serving [the king] in various ways, at times as his seeing eyes, his grasping hand... at times as his speaking tongue or his walking foot".[63]

These metaphors of the king as heart or brains of a body continue well into the seventeenth century, as when the anonymous *Kitab-i Müstetab* says somehow ambiguously that the sultan is like a glorious bird of the spirit of the world, whose body are the wise *ulema*; its right wing is the grand *vezir*, and its left one the *kapı ağası* of the sultan's harem.[64] Even Katib Çelebi takes the metaphor of the state or more correctly society ("heyet-i ictimaîyye-i beşeriye")[65] as a human body in order to argue for a well-known analysis of the structure of the society. In this analysis he states that "the sultan is the human reason, the *vezir* the power of intellect, the *şeyhülislam* the power of perception and the other classes the four humours" ("nefs-i natıka Sultan ve kuvvet-i âkıle vezir ve müdrike müfti ve ahlat-ı erbaa sair esnaf makamında oldığı").[66] This analysis does not correspond point-to-point to any of the known Islamic descriptions of human psychology; rather, it uses quasi-randomly some features from one description and some of the other, in order to convey the author's message.[67] Earlier on, Katib Çelebi makes the *ulema* the equivalent of the "animal soul" ("ruh-ı hayvanî"), which might reinforce the hypothesis that he meant the sultan

[62] İpşirli, "Hasan Kâfî el-Akhisarî", p. 252.

[63] Tietze, *Counsel for Sultans*, I, p. 25 = 100-1.

[64] Yücel, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtına Dair Kaynaklar*, pp. 25-7 = Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri*, IX, pp. 625-6.

[65] Ayn-ı Ali Efendi, *Kavânîn-i Âl-i Osman*, p. 124; Gökyay, *Kâtib Çelebi'den Seçmeler*, p. 157.

[66] Ayn-ı Ali Efendi, *Kavânîn-i Âl-i Osman*, p. 133; Gökyay, *Kâtib Çelebi'den Seçmeler*, p. 159.

[67] Kınalızade Ali speaks of the "soul" or "human reason" ("ruh", "nefs-i natıka"). Human reason or soul is composed by three components, namely the "vegetable soul" or spirit of growth ("nefs-i nebatî"), the "animal soul" or spirit of life ("nefs-i hayvanî"), and the "human soul" ("nefs-i insanî"). Kınalızade explains their respective "powers" or faculties in his Introduction: the "power of perception" belongs to the "animal soul", while the "power of intellect" is a power of the "human soul" (Koç, *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, p. 52-94). Tursun Bey, drawing from Nasireddin Tusi, mentions the human reason ("kuvvet-i natıka, nefs-i melekî") as one of the faculties of the human spirit, the other two being the faculty of wrath or passion ("kuvvet-i gazabî", "nefs-i sebuî"), moderated by the power of intelligence ("nefs-i âkıle"), and the faculty of lust or appetite ("kuvve-i şehvani, nefs-i behimî"), moderated by intelligence. See *Tursun Bey: Târîh-i Ebü'l-feth*, ed. Mertol Tulum (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1977), pp. 16-17, and cf. Sariyannis, "The princely virtues".

to be the "human soul".[68] At any rate, all these metaphors were current among Ottoman theorists, who wished to stress the idea of the sultan ruling over the social classes as a corollary of the composition of the human body and soul.[69] In the same vein, the ruler himself, or rather his soul, should first and foremost have control over his own body.[70]

The place of the ruler within Ottoman class theory

Now, a more elaborate perception of society as a system of "classes" (the term corresponding more or less to the English or French *estates*) was already in use in classical Persian political literature. In its commonest form this perception sees society as an assembly of four pillars, namely *ulema*, military, merchants and artisans, and peasants. A typical expounder of this view in Ottoman literature is Kınalızade, who states that societies (*temeddün*) are a composition and arrangement of various classes and communities (*tavaif, ümem*). Now, in the beginning of each state (or dynasty: "her devletin ibtidası") a class gets a unanimous agreement (presumably, on its aims and interests) and thus becomes strong; a small but united class prevails over larger but fractioned ones. It is evident that any ruling class ("her taife ki bir devletin ashabıdır") is very small in numbers in comparison to its subjects ("reayasına"); it prevails on them, however, because of its strength in unity and mutual assistance (*ittifak u teavün*). On the contrary, whenever such a ruling class was divided by fractions and disagreement, its power declined.[71] In Kınalızâde's perception, thus, the ruler is placed almost in the margin of the analysis, since he uses a more 'Ibn Khaldunian' view of "ruling class" dominating the society, although it is clear that he considers the king to be the head of this class.[72] When he next

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[68] Ayn-ı Ali Efendi, *Kavânîn-i Âl-i Osman*, p. 125; Gökyay, *Kâtib Çelebi'den Seçmeler*, p. 156 (Gökyay translates here *nefs-i natıka*, i.e. the sultan, as *ruh-ı insanî*). Kınalızade Ali speaks of the *nefs-i natıka* as identical with the human soul, *nefs-i insanî* or *ruh* (Koç, *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, p. 63).

[69] Cf. Tezcan, "Ethics as a domain to discuss the political"; Sariyannis, "The princely virtues".

[70] Terzioğlu, "Sunna-minded Sufi preachers", p. 285 ("Hünkârım... vücudun saltanatına malik ol... ruh-ı sultana haber it").

[71] Koç, *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, pp. 479 ff.

[72] Kınalızade does not mention Ibn Khaldun anywhere, but this description does not seem to originate from any of his known sources. According to Fleischer, "Royal authority, dynastic cyclism and 'Ibn Khaldunism'", p. 199 and 201, the circulation of Ibn Khaldun's work in the Ottoman world cannot be established for before the beginnings of the seventeenth

proceeds to examine the conditions (or prerequisites, *şürut*) that ensure the ruler's justice, he emphasizes that all people are treated equally ("cümle halaikı mütesavi tuta"), since men's relation to the world is like the four elements (the author draws from Devvani, and then describes the traditional four "elements of the world", "anasır-ı beden-i âlem").[73] As we shall also see below, this four-fold analysis of society is reiterated by many other authors, among which Katib Çelebi and İbrahim Müteferrika, who argues that the task of protecting those four "pillars of the state" belongs to the kings and sultans ("bu cümlenin zimamı eyadi-i mülûk ve selâtine teslim oluna"), in the same time including the latter to the *askeri* class.[74]

Indeed, it is interesting to note that in some texts the king himself is explicitly made a member of the society, instead of being a kind of gardener or shepherd ordained from outside. This view fits well with the notion of "desacralisation" of kingly power, noticed also above as far as it concerns the shifting meanings of the word *devlet*. A king belonging to the social structure himself is arguably nearer to the early modern concept of statehood and kingship than one ordained by God from outside society.

In Persian political theory, such a view can be seen in a seventeenth-century work, Muhammad Mufid's *Camii Mufidi*, where sultans belong to the same class with viziers and other high officials.[75] Undoubtedly, however, similar views can be found even earlier. Akhisari, innovative in many other ways as well, states that propagation of mankind comes with social intercourse, which comes with property (*mal*), which comes with custom (*teamül*), that is dealing with each other ("muamele ve alış-viriş"). To attain this aim, certain rules are needed, so God divided people to four categories

century, and "there is no evidence to support Na'ima's supposition that Kınalızâde read Ibn Khaldûn" (although Fleischer refers to the "circle of justice" scheme, which Kınalızade, according to Naima, copied from Ibn Khaldun).

[73] Koç, *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, pp. 485-6; on Devvani's formulation see Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, p. 220.

[74] Şen, *Usûlü'l-Hikem*, p. 153. For an early nineteenth-century specimen of the quatrifold theory see e.g. *Şânî-zâde Mehmed 'Atâ'ullah Efendi: Şânî-zâde târîhi [Osmanlı tarihi (1223-1237 / 1808-1821)]*, ed. Ziya Yılmazer (Istanbul: Çamlıca, 2008), vol. I, p. 481.

[75] The other three classes are (a) the *ulema*; (b) land-owners, merchants and skilled craftsmen; and (c) artisans, other craftsmen and workmen. Lambton, A. K. S., "*Quis custodiet custodies*. Some reflections on the Persian theory of government", pt. II, *Studia Islamica*, 6 (1956), 125-46 (now in Eadem, *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government*), at pp. 137-8. However, elsewhere Lambton omits the kings from the first class ("the chief military and civil officials and the court": Eadem, "Islamic society in Persia", an inaugural lecture, School of Oriental and African Studies (London 1954; now in Eadem, *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government*), p. 4. Lambton notes that in Mufid's exposition "the leading military and civil officials are placed together in the first class".

(*bölük, sınıf*): the men of the sword, the men of the pen, the cultivators, finally the artisans and merchants. Then God ordained kings and rulers ("padişahlık ve beğlik itdiler"), to possess and control ("tasarruf idüp", "zabt eylemeği") these four categories. However, when describing the first group, i.e. the military, Akhisari includes kings, together with *vezir*s, officials and soldiers, their purpose being to keep all four classes under control with justice and mild administration (*adalet, hüsn-i siyaset*).[76] This somehow awkward contradiction, with kings (and other administrators) controlling themselves as well as the rest of society, is perhaps due to Akhisari's concern to apply classical Persian notions of political theory under the light of his *ulema* background. The same background can perhaps be seen in a note containing *hadith*s and other material, which was added in 1652/3 to one manuscript containing *Kitab-i Müstetab*.[77] The note asserts that God divided humanity in five (not four) groups, adding kings as a group who practices justice and equity to the whole of society. It might not be a coincidence that both texts come from the same background, as it may be convincingly argued that ulema as a class felt more and more self-confident and strong throughout the seventeenth century.[78] This intermediary view, however, where kings are a separate class just like in the appendix of *Kitab-i Müstetab*, can be also seen in the early nineteenth-century historian Asim: after mentioning the traditional four-fold division, he adds that according to some thinkers the four pillars of the state are (a) the *ulema* and scribes, (b) the warriors, (c) the *reaya* and (d) the sultans, who constitute the soul (*nefs-i natıka*) of the other classes.[79] At any rate, the inclusion of kings to the four or five classes or "pillars" seems to have found its way to the standard inventory of political ideas in the next centuries. İbrahim Müteferrika, for instance, stresses that from among the four classes, that of the "men of the sword" is the greatest, and that it comprises "kings and sultans, their regents the ministers and *vezir*s, the provincial governors, other officers and in general the military classes".[80]

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[76] İpşirli, "Hasan Kâfî el-Akhisarî", p. 251.

[77] Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri*, IX, p. 640.

[78] Cf. Tezcan, Baki, "Some thoughts on the politics of early modern Ottoman science", in *Beyond Dominant Paradigms in Ottoman and Middle Eastern/North African Studies. A Tribute to Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj*, ed. Donald Quataert and Baki Tezcan (Istanbul: ISAM, 2010), pp. 135-56.

[79] Asim, *Tarih* (Istanbul 1874), 2:8-9, as quoted in Berkes, Niyazi, *Türkiye'de Çağdalaşma*, ed. Ahmet Kuyaş (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yay., 2002), pp. 114-15.

[80] See Şen, *Usûlü'l-Hikem*, p. 153 ("bunlar mülûk ve selâtîn ve anların nüvvâbı vükelâ ve vüzerâ ve mîr-i mirân ve sair zabitân ve bi'l-cümle tavâyıf-ı asâkirdir").

Ruler and state: The emergence of the central bureaucracy

In the examples mentioned above, the notion of "king" seems to be used as identical with what we could now call "state" or "government". From a sociological point of view, so to speak, no distinction is made between the ruler as such and the apparatus he uses to exert his dominion. However, as we also saw in the first section of this paper, a use of the term *devlet* corresponding to "state apparatus" had come to be common enough by the end of the seventeenth century, as the sultan was increasingly losing more and more possibilities of personal power against the decisions of both administrative and financial bureaucracy. Rhoads Murphey states that "[i]f the state and the sultan were not co-terminus entities, then they came closer to being so in the Ottoman society of the high imperial era than in any contemporary state";[81] however, I think that a notion of "state" or "government" as distinct from the ruler may be discerned by the second half of the seventeenth century. In the mid-seventeenth century, Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi could argue that sultans must take from "the state treasury" (*beytülmal*) only their portion in order to cover their eating and dressing expenses by reverting to no less than Caliph Umar's example: the Caliph, he maintains, used candles from the public treasury ("beytülmalden") when he was working overnight for state businesses ("mesalih-i mülk-i millet"), but from his personal property when working on his own matters.[82] The argument is old, as we will see also below, but the phrasing is telling.

Indeed, there are some signs that, independently of the meaning of *devlet*, Ottoman political authors were conscious of this distinction long before its semantic development. A text from the early 1630s speaks explicitly of the financial bureaucracy (*kalem*) and its know-how (*rakam*) as a collective entity that is "the eye to the affairs of kingship, the treasury of kings" ("bu umur-ı saltanata göz kalem / padişahlarun hazinesi rakam"), a hidden treasure and its alchemy, on the one hand, but also –if not reformed– the arch-enemy of the dynasty and the destruction of the realm ("al-i Osmana büyük düşmen kalem / din [ü] devleti yıkan ekser rakam"), on the other.[83] In an

[81] Murphey, Rhoads, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty. Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800* (London – New York: Continuum, 2008), p. 87. By "high imperial era" he means the period from 1480 to 1826 (ibid., p. 5).

[82] Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrâr Zeyli*, p. 218; copied almost verbatim half a century later by Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, *Devlet Adamlarına Öğütler*, p. 73. On this view see also below.

[83] Terzioğlu, "Sunna-minded Sufi preachers", pp. 306-8.

even earlier (and clearer) example, Mustafa Ali, as again mentioned above, uses the simile of the state as a workshop, with the king as its master:

> To ensure that the workshop known as the Ottoman state (*kârhane-i devlet-i Osmaniye*), or the foundation of the Seljuk or Samanid sultanates, should not suffer damage through bribery, and that those great wheels of fortune continue to turn according to their established rules (...) learned persons have compared this heavy task to that great revolving wheel (...) [B]y using intelligent and learned persons (...) one will ensure that the operation of that workshop and its regular functioning will be secured and guaranteed for months and years.
>
> However, whenever the foundation of the state (*bir devletün esası*) is damaged so that great personages turn their thoughts to bribery (...) then that waterwheel certainly begins to fall apart and collapse. Indeed its master [the monarch] (*üstadı*) even dies, comes to his end.[84]

In this parable, the king is explicitly the owner of the state, not the state/power itself, as implied in earliest uses of the term.

Perhaps more telling is a much later example already mentioned above: around 1675, Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi comments in the traditional pairing of the words *din ü devlet* and writes that the sultan is the head of both the *vezir*, i.e. of the head of the "state" ("devlet reisi"), and the *şeyhülislam*, i.e. of the head of the religion.[85] The comparison with previous such statements is illustrative for the emergence of a concept of "state" as distinct from the person of the ruler: for instance, in Mehmed II's *kanunname* the grand *vezir* is just the head of "*vezir*s and commanders" ("vüzera ve ümeranın başı"), while the *şeyhülislam* that of the *ulema*.[86] Naima shares a similar view with Hezarfen when arguing against *ulema* wielding temporal power (*umur-ı devlet*), which belongs to the *vezir* under the sultan.[87] In both cases, *devlet* seems to mean "government", "state apparatus" or, more accurately, "secular branch of the state";[88] what is more for our analysis, it places the ruler as a

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[84] Brookes, *The Ottoman Gentleman*, pp. 59-60 = Şeker, *Mevâ'idü'n-Nefâis*, p. 307.

[85] İlgürel, *Telhîsü'l-Beyân*, p. 197; cf. Yılmaz, "Mesrutiyetçi Gelişmeler", p. 8 and see above, fn. 31 for contemporaneous copyists. The notorious *şeyhülislam* Feyzullah Efendi "had penetrated so deeply into all government affairs that he was dubbed *sahibürreaseteyn* [holder of the two headships] (the *ilmiye* and the central administration)": Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion*, p. 50.

[86] Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri*, I, p. 318.

[87] Naima, *Tarih*, VI, appendix, pp. 10-13; İpşirli, *Tarih-i Na'îmâ*, pp. 1862-4; Thomas, *A Study in Naima*, p. 85.

[88] Cf. an expression in an early nineteenth-century treatise, where *devlet* is substituted by *dünya*, "world": "umur-ı din ü dünyeviye", in İşbilir, *Zebîre-i Kuşmânî*, p. 62; however, this reflects pre-Ottoman formulations (cf. above, fn. 22).

distinctly different entity that supervises the machinery of the state –which as a matter of fact was by then (and up to a degree) functioning independently from the personality of the sultan despite certain attempts to the contrary (e.g. by Mustafa II).

A note: why the scribal bureaucracy?

On the other hand, a growing separation of the central government mechanisms from the provincial military administration and the *paşa* households (and I will try to show that this might be the case in the late seventeenth century) would show what Abou-El-Haj viewed as "the tendency toward a progressive separation between the state and the ruling class", i.e. a common feature of the European early modern state.[89] In Weberian terms, this corresponds to the development of a rational bureaucracy, more and more independent of the ruler's wishes both in its decisions and in its reproduction.[90] In this respect, bureaucratic autonomy may be considered a sign of early modernity in the Ottoman empire. I will skip the judicial system here and focus on the central government apparatus, namely, in our case, the financial and administrative officialdom as an autonomous, self-reproductive locus of power; or, in other words, as a feature of the modern state.

To begin with, indeed, from at least the late sixteenth century Ottoman bureaucracy enjoyed an exceptional longevity and continuity of term,[91]

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[89] Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, p. 7.

[90] See Max Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. and trans. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley – Los Angeles – London: University of California Press, 1978), vol. II, pp. 956 ff. and esp. pp. 1028-31.

[91] On the financial bureaucracy see Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy*, pp. 49-80; Fleischer, Cornell, "Preliminaries to the study of the Ottoman bureaucracy", *Journal of Turkish Studies* 10, (1986) [*Raiyyet rüsûmu: Essays presented to Halil İnalcık*], 135-141. Cf. Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty*, pp. 129 ff. on the "domino effect" changes in Ottoman administrative apparatus with every change of sultan or even grand *vezir*, in sharp contrast with the apparent continuity in scribal state service. A treatise of c. 1630, however, advocates for judges and administrators to enjoy longer terms of tenure, and adds the same for the palace scribes, saying that the constant threat of discharge from office makes all of them greedy and corrupt; while he argues for a tenure of five or six years for all officials, scribes are to be appointed for life ("cümle mansıbı beş altı sene vir / hep kitabetlikleri ölünce vir"): Terzioğlu, "Sunna-minded Sufi preachers", pp. 270-1, 307. For his part, Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, an experienced bureaucrat himself, maintains in the early eighteenth century that high bureaucracy officials ("menasıb-ı divaniye erbabı") should serve for a

while it was possibly responsible for most of the financial experiments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries;[92] on the other hand, it made considerable steps toward rationalization, for instance by unifying tax-collection competence formerly divided between several departments.[93] As showed by Norman Itzkowitz, by the eighteenth century the *kalemiyye* career line had gained substantial importance, overshadowing the once omnipotent "Palace career". Inside this career line, the central administration bureaucracy under the *reisülküttab* gradually became more influential than the financial one under the *baş defterdar*, in fact "professionalizing" this latter office in a manner reminiscent, in my view, of Weber's definition of bureaucracy.[94]

Besides, the enhancing visibility of the government apparatus can also be seen in the symbolic level of political practice, for example in its role in the sultanic festivals.[95] Thus, while for instance the 1582 festival included meals offered to the *ulema*, preachers, various military groups, palace officials (including *vezir*s), and the people of Istanbul, no place was reserved

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complete year at least, if not two: Defterdar, *Devlet Adamlarına Öğütler*, p. 65. On the other side of the Ottoman border, note that the Persian author Rustam al-Hukama (late eighteenth – early nineteenth century) argued for a kind of stable financial bureaucracy and stressed the need of its wages to be raised according to the increase of the cost of living: see Lambton, "Some new trends in Islamic political thought", pp. 107 ff.

[92] In my view, the palace bureaucracy might be considered the real initiator of the constant financial and administrative experiments from the second half of the seventeenth century onwards (partial land-holding and *cizye* reform, introduction of lifelong tax-farming, and so on), having moved away from the fear of innovation that still dominated Istanbul politics: cf. Sariyannis, Marinos, "Notes on the Ottoman poll-tax reforms of the late seventeenth century: the case of Crete", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 54 (2011), 39-61, at pp. 40-1. On the size and composition of the scribal bureaucracy see Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty*, pp. 255-9.

[93] See, for example, Sariyannis, "Notes on the Ottoman poll-tax reforms", pp. 41-3. This late seventeenth-century reorganization process was preceded by another major reorientation and transformation of the financial bureaucracy in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries: Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy*, pp. 304-5 and *passim*.

[94] Itzkowitz, Norman, "Eighteenth century Ottoman realities", *Studia Islamica*, 16 (1962), 73-94, also re-published in *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World*, Tezcan and Barbir, pp. xvii-xxxii. On the *reisülküttab* taking presidency over the *nişancı* already in the late sixteenth century, see Woodhead, Christine, "Scribal chaos? Observations on the post of *re'isülküttab* in the late sixteenth century", in *The Ottoman Empire: Myths, Realities and 'Black Holes'. Contributions in Honour of Colin Imber*, ed. Eugenia Kermeli and Oktay Özel (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2006), pp. 155-72.

[95] On festivals and their symbolic role see Faroqhi, Suraiya, *Another Mirror for Princes. The Public Image of the Ottoman Sultans and its Reception* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2008), pp. 74 ff; Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty*, pp. 175 ff.

for palace clerks;[96] on the contrary, the eighth day (out of 15) of the 1675 festival was devoted to a feast offered to the bureaucracy officials (*reisülküttab, ruznameci, baş muhasebeci*).[97] Moreover, by 1789 at least, ranking members of the scribal classes were granted separate ceremonies on the occasion of every new sultan's enthronement, as did janissaries and other palace staff, on the one hand, and *ulema*, on the other.[98]

The visibility of scribes and bureaucrats in political theory

Now, to what degree have political thinkers followed this process of institutionalization of the central bureaucracy? In the traditional political theory, what can be described as "state" was divided among the "men of the pen", the ulema, and the "men of the sword", which included the *ümera* or provincial and military administrators.[99] If we may consider the scribal bureaucracy as an indispensable part of the early modern notion of "state apparatus" (especially when it develops a self-consciousness as such), it might also be useful to see whether and when this bureaucracy entered the various classifications of society.

Expounders of the classical quatrifold classification vary in this aspect. Usually, the traditional view has no special place for scribes, squeezed between the *ulema* and the military administrators.[100] Although Huseyin Vaiz Kaşifi in his famous *Ahlak-ı Muhsini*, composed in Herat in 1494/95,

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[96] See the description by Mustafa Ali in *Gelibolulu Mustafa 'Âlî: Câmi'u'l-Buhûr Der Mecâlis-i Sûr. Edisyon Kritik ve Tahlil*, ed. Ali Öztekin (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1996), pp. 58 ff. and 232 ff.

[97] Nutku, Özdemir, *IV. Mehmet'in Edirne Şenliği (1675)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1987), p. 56; İlgürel, *Telhîsü'l-Bbeyân*, p. 241.

[98] Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty*, p. 101; Veinstein, Gilles and Nicolas Vatin, *Le Sérail ébranlé. Essai sur les morts, dépositions et avènements des sultans ottomans, XIVe-XIXe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 2003), p. 286.

[99] Gibb and Bowen had argued that the latter term should "be taken in the sense of "Men supporting the Sword of Government", so that it may include the whole personnel of the Sultan's court and the central and provincial administration" (Gibb, H. A. R. and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), vol. I, pt. 1, p. 45). In his classic critique, Itzkowitz showed that in fact the financial bureaucracy constituted the core of the "men of the pen", gaining more and more in importance from the late seventeenth century onwards (see Itzkowitz, "Eighteenth century Ottoman realities").

[100] For example, a formulation of the quatrifold order in the early eighteenth century, recorded by Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, *Zübde-i Vekayiât. Tahlil ve Metin (1066-1116/1656-1704)*, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), p. 334; Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion*, p. 28 fn. 89.

has the bureaucracy ("the people of the pen, such as wazirs and scribes") put in the place of the *ulema*, whose he makes no mention,[101] it seems that Ottoman authors avoided so radical a formulation. Writing in the early sixteenth century, İdris Bitlisi notes that the sultan should make constant company but with two classes of people, namely the *ulema* in religious affairs and the men of the pen and of the sword (*ehl-i kalem, erbab-ı silah*) concerning the order of the kingdom; he adds that the sultan depends on two classes of people: the men of the sword (*erbab-ı seyf*) and the men of the pen (*erbab-ı kalem*).[102] While in the first instance the men of the pen seem to constitute a separate class from both *ulema* and the military, in the second it is not clear whether they include the *ulema* or not.[103] In his turn, Hasan Kafi el-Akhisari, an *ulema* himself, has administrative officials together with *vezir*s and soldiers, but seems to ignore the scribal classes at all.[104] Drawing from the Persian tradition on which he heavily relies, Kınalızade Ali includes scribes, together with the *ulema*, judges, doctors, poets and the like, to the "men of the pen" (*ehl-i kalem*),[105] a view that would prevail in the next century. By the end of the seventeenth century, indeed, the standard "four classes" model seems to have been a commonplace, so that it did not have to be explained. An anonymous late-seventeenth century author mentions the "four pillars" (*erkan-ı erbaa*), but only bothers to insert an excursion on the "most illustrious" of them, namely the *ulema*, whom he subdivides in many sub-groups; one of these sub-groups consists of the financial bureaucracy ("küttab-ı divan ki anlara hacegân-ı divan

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[101] Lambton, A. K. S., "*Quis custodiet custodies.* Some reflections on the Persian theory of government", pt. I, *Studia Islamica*, 5 (1956), 125-148 (now in Eadem, *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government*), at p. 147; Eadem, "Justice in the Medieval Persian theory", p. 117. Kaşifi's work was used by Kınalızade (Koç, *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, pp. 8-9).

[102] Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri*, III, p. 32.

[103] Sixteenth-century *kanunname*s use the term *ehl-i ilm* for the *ulema* (especially the *müderris*es) and *ehl-i kalem* for the scribal bureaucracy: Akgündüz, Ahmet, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri ve Hukukî Tahlilleri*, vol. IV: *Kanunî Devri Kanunnâmeleri, I. Kısım: Merkezî ve Umumî Kanunnâmeleri* (İstanbul: FEY Vakfı, 1992), pp. 594 (*erbab-ı kalem*), 607 (*ehl-i kalem*), 662 (*ehl-i ilm*).

[104] İpşirli, "Hasan Kâfî el-Akhisarî", pp. 251-3.

[105] Koç (ed.), *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, p. 485. Kınalızade draws again from Nasireddin Tusi and Davvani, who included secretaries and fiscal officials, together with doctors of theology and law, judges, geometricians, astronomers, physicians and poets, to the "men of knowledge" (*ilm*): Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, p. 220; Lambton, "Islamic society in Persia", p. 3. Tusi might be the first expounder of the four-fold social order theory: Ibn Sina, for instance, follows the Platonic three-fold division to rulers, artisans and guardians (Rosenthal, ibid., p. 152), while al-Farabi uses a more elaborate five-fold division (see below; Tusi uses it as well).

derler, bunlar ki rakam-ı Hindî ve siyakatda mahirlerdir").[106] Nahifi, writing in the turn of eighteenth century, speaks briefly of the "four classes of men from the point of profession" ("beni Âdem hirfet ve sanayi cihetinden dört kısma taksim olunmuşdur"), but mentions only the three of them, namely cultivators (*ehl-i ziraat*), merchants and artisans (*tüccar ve ehl-i sanayi*), and (explicitly) *ulema*.[107] More or less his contemporary, Naimâ clearly includes the financial bureaucracy and scribes to the *ehl-i kalem*, trying in fact to make the quatrifold order compatible with the Ibn Khaldunian theory of stages.[108] Strangely, Dihkanizade Kuşmani in the late eighteenth century includes scribes (*ehl-i kitabet*) to the military class;[109] however, he probably wished to stress the autonomous power of his fellow *ulema* and *şeyh*s, and it seems in general that the scribes' inclusion to the "men of the pen" was by then prevailing.[110] It is of some importance here to note that in most cases of such classification, the "men of the pen" come first (with Akhisari, an *ulema* himself, being a notable exception by beginning with the "men of the sword"), but I am not quite sure whether this can lead to any plausible conclusion;[111] on the other hand, the distinct place (and importance) attributed to the government clerks as related to the military and provincial administration can be considered a sign of the rise of this apparatus in the world view of Ottoman authors. In general, however, the discussion of the "four classes" in Ottoman theory seems to have followed somehow haphazardly the traditional patterns, rather than real developments in the administrative structure.

Nonetheless, some more elaborate classifications give greater place to the government apparatus. Describing the "virtuous state", Kınalızade explains that its citizens (if we can translate *ehl* thus) include five classes

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[106] İpşirli, "Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtına Dair bir Eser", p. 32.

[107] İpşirli, "Nahîfî Süleyman Efendi: *Nasihatü'l-Vüzera*", p. 27. İbrahim Müteferrika seems also to ignore scribes when talking of the *ashab-ı kalem*, whom he identifies with the *ulema* and judges: Şen, *Usûlü'l-Hikem*, p. 153.

[108] "Tahsil-i fevaid ü semerat ve cem'-i emval-i cibayât ve zabt-ı varidat u ihracat ve naks u ibram ve icra-i ahkâm misillü umurda tasrif-i kaleme ihtiyac mukarrer olmakla": Naima, *Tarih*, I, p. 50; İpşirli, *Tarih-i Na'îmâ*, p. 37; cf. Thomas, *A Study on Naima*, pp. 79-80.

[109] İşbilir, *Nizâm-ı Cedîde Dâir Bir Risâle*, p. 12 ("dört sınıfın birisinden ya'ni bi'l-fi'l ehl-i ulûm ü zehadet veya hakikaten askerî ve ehl-i kitabet veya tüccar ve eshab-ı sanaat veya harras ve erbab-ı ziraat olmayup...").

[110] For example, Asim, *Tarih*, II, pp. 8-9 (quoted in Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdalaşma*, p. 115).

[111] Cf. Yılmaz, Coşkun, "Siyasetnameler ve Osmanlılarda Sosyal Tabakalaşma", in *Osmanlı*, ed. Güler Eren, vol. IV: *Toplum* (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 1999), pp. 69-81 and esp. 77; Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam*, p. 141 (note 47).

(*taife*): (a) the "superiors" (*efazıl*), on whom the good arrangement of the state affairs depends; these are the judges and *ulema* ("hukema-i kâmil ve ulema-yı amil"); (b) the "possessors of languages" ("zevi'l-elsine"), who advise the people on good and right; (c) the "estimators" ("mukaddir"), who look after the weights and measures, knowing of geometry and mathematics; (d) the warriors ("gaziler ve mücahid, sipahilik"), who protect the state against external enemies; (e) the "men of property" ("erbab-ı emval"), who produce the goods necessary for the people. These are the "pillars of the state" ("erkân-ı Medine"); apart from them, however, there are also the "plants" or "weed" ("nevabit"), those who are like the thorns among the useful trees.[112] However, Kınalızade here is merely copying his intellectual mentors, namely al-Davvani, Tusi and ultimately al-Farabi, as he does in most of his work;[113] the limitations of the literary *genre* he serves do not permit us to reach any conclusions on Ottoman perceptions of state in this point. If we move to more innovating writers (or, in this context, to a more distinctively "Ottoman" *genre*), it is rather remarkable that in the same period Mustafa Ali, a member himself of the financial bureaucracy, speaks nowhere of scribes as a social category although he uses repeatedly various classifications of society.[114] Nevertheless, almost half a century later, Katib Çelebi, a scribe himself, compares the Treasury with the stomach and then the money-changers and coin-weighers ("saraf ve vezzan") with the faculty of taste ("kuvvet-i zaika"), tax collectors ("muhassıl") with attracting power ("[kuvvet-i] cazibe"), treasurers ("hazinedar") with holding power "[kuvvet-i] masike"), finally ministers of finances and scribes ("defterdarân

[112] Koç, *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, pp. 457-8.

[113] Cf. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, p. 218 (on al-Davvani), Lambton, "Islamic society in Persia", p. 3 fn. 2 (on Tusi) and Walzer, *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State*, pp. 436-8 (on al-Farabi; see also Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, p. 323.).

[114] In one point, Ali distinguishes society in four distinct classes, namely: (a) sultans and princes, (b) *vezirs* and governors, (c) notables of the realm who are considered to be among the middling ranks ("evsat-ı nâs addolunan ayan-ı memleket"), finally (d) artisans, merchants and craftsmen ("rencberân ve kâsibîn ve ehl-i san'at"). Brookes, *The Ottoman Gentleman*, p. 137 = Şeker, *Mevâ'idü'n-Nefâis*, p. 371. Cf. Tietze, Andreas, "Mustafa Âlî on luxury and the status symbols of Ottoman gentlemen", *Studia turcologica memoriae Alexii Bombaci dicata* (Napoli: Instituto Orientale di Napoli, 1982), pp. 577-90. In a poem of the same author, the various professions are enumerated as follows: the sultan, the *vezirs*, the *ulema*, the *beylerbeyis*, the *defterdars*, the *şeyhs* and dervishes, the poets, the timariots and military, the *imams*, the preachers and those who serve in *vakıfs* (administrators, doctors, teachers), the big merchants, the shop-keepers, the artisans, the workers and builders, the night-watchers and judicial clerks, finally the peasants: Tietze, Andreas, "The poet as critique of society. A 16th-century Ottoman poem", *Turcica*, 9/1 (1977), 120-60.

ve küttab") with digesting power ("kuvvet-i hazıme").[115] Of course, this simile is little more than a play with words and notions, but the inclusion of scribes together with their highest ministers into the ultimate stage of serving the treasury is rather telling. The growing number of political treatises composed by members of the government bureaucracy, from Ayn Ali to Kâtib Çelebi to Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, is another indicator for the self-consciousness of the state apparatus. A comparative study of correspondence or chancery manuals (*inşa*), compiled by members of the scribal ranks, could further enhance this image.[116]

An excursus: the term *miri*, from sultan to state

A short history of the term *miri* could offer some further elaboration of the development of the ruler-state relationship in Ottoman political thought. As I tried to show elsewhere, authors opposing the statist policies of Mehmed II stressed the moral need for the sultan to be generous, thus identifying the ruler's private wealth with what we know as state property, namely the land and its revenues.[117] In his *kanunname*s, Mehmed himself seems to take the treasury as his own property (*malım*).[118] Indeed, the very naming of the state or public treasury as *miri* implies an identification of the sultan (*mir, emir*, translating Turkish *beğ*) with what we could call his kingdom and government. When the *miri* land theory was formulated, it took over pre-Ottoman definitions of tribute land as "royal demesne" ("aradi'l-mamlaka", "arazi-i memleket"), for example in the *fetva*s of Ibn Bazzaz in the early fifteenth century. The *şeyhülislam* Kemalpaşazade

[115] Ayn-ı Ali Efendi, *Kavânîn-i Âl-i Osman*, p. 133; Gökyay, *Kâtib Çelebi'den Seçmeler*, p. 159. Naima follows him closely (Naima, *Tarih*, I, pp. 30-31; İpşirli, *Tarih-i Na'îmâ*, p. 23).

[116] See Riedlmayer, András J., "Ottoman copybooks of correspondence and Miscellanies as a source for political and cultural history", *Acta Orientalia Hungaricae*, 61 (2008), 201-14. Among Kınalızade's works, one is entitled *Risaletü'l-Kalemiyye* or *Risaletü'l-Kelamiyye ve's-Seyfiyye*; on mss. see Koç (ed.), *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, p. 21. This kind of treatise (a kind of literary antagonism between the sword and the pen) is a common *genre* in Arabic literature but it flourished also in the Ottoman seventeenth century, especially by members of the bureaucracy. I wish to thank Baki Tezcan, Edith Gülçin Ambros and especially Ekin Tuşalp for their help in this point.

[117] Sariyannis, "Ottoman critics", pp. 129-30 and "The princely virtues". Oktay Özel ("Limits of the almighty: Mehmed II's 'land reform' revisited", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 42/2 (1999), 226-46) points out that Mehmed's was a fiscal rather than land reform.

[118] For example, Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri*, I, pp. 318, 322.

(d. 1534) used the term *miri*, which, according to Colin Imber, was "simply an Arabic calque on a Turkish term *beglik*, meaning 'belonging to / at the disposal of the lord'".[119] In the more elaborate thought of Ebussuud, the expression "royal demesne" for *miri* land persists, but the real substance or *dominium eminens* (*rakaba*) belongs to the treasury (*beytülmal*).[120] The same formulation was reiterated more than a hundred fifty years later, when Morea was reconquered in 1716: the real substance was to belong to the treasury, although there was no more need to define *miri* land as "royal demesne" ("arazi-i memleket").[121] In these texts, the ruler *per se* is absent, although Islamic jurisprudence stated that the treasury was at the disposal of the sovereign to administer on behalf of the community.[122]

This implication is corroborated by the fact that the "outer treasury", i.e. the state treasury (in contrast with the Inner one, which belonged personally to the sultan but also –from the late sixteenth century onwards– was used as a reserve) was called *hazine-i amire*, meaning literally "king treasury".[123] The confusion between the two is very well shown in Mehmed III's indignation when he was asked to make a loan from the inner to the outer treasury in order to pay the salaries of the janissaries; the sultan's reply is telling: "Has the *defterdar* made my treasury a *timar* of his? Salaries from the inner, campaign expenses from the inner –what is the use of such a

[119] Imber, Colin, *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), p. 120. The same term (*beğlik*) is used in Mehmed II's documents ("ve yerden her ne gütürürlerse, beğlik tohum çıkarub sonra nısfı beğlik ve nısfı kendülerin ola": Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri*, I, p. 460 and elsewhere), as well as in *Kitabu Mesalihi'l-Müslimin* in the late sixteenth century (see above, fn. 24).

[120] İnalcık, Halil, "Islamization of Ottoman laws on land and land tax", in *Festgabe an Josef Matuz. Osmanistik – Turkologie – Diplomatik*, ed. Christa Fragner and Klaus Schwarz (Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1992), pp. 101-18, at 103; Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud*, pp. 123-4; Barnes, John Robert, *An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire* (Leiden: Brill, 1987), pp. 21 ff. See the original text of the Buda *kanunname* ("arz-ı mîrî dimekle ma'ruf olan arazi-i memleket gibi rakabe-i arz Beyt-i mal-i müslimînin olub") in Barkan, Ömer Lütfi, *XV ve XVIinci Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ziraî Ekonominin Hukukî ve Malî Esasları*, vol. I: *Kanunlar* (Istanbul: Bürhaneddin Matbaası, 1943), pp. 296-7; cf. also ibid., p. 299 and İlgürel, *Telhîsü'l-Beyân*, pp. 108-12.

[121] Barkan, *Kanunlar*, p. 326.

[122] Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud*, pp. 120-1.

[123] See, for example, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., s.v. "Khazîne" (Cengiz Orhonlu); İnalcık, Halil, with Donald Quataert (eds.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), vol. I, pp. 77-8; İlgürel, *Telhîsü'l-Beyân*, pp. 61-3. On the "inner treasury" see Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakki, "Osmanlı Devleti Maliyesinin Kuruluşu ve Osmanlı Devleti İç Hazinesi", *Belleten*, 42 (1978), 67-93 and esp. pp. 73 ff.

defterdar?"[124] Mustafa Ali adds to the confusion: on the one hand, he argues that charitable foundations are to be created only with the personal property of the sultan, i.e. his share of the booty, and not with the public treasury (*beytülmal*); on the other, he claims that the public treasury (*beytülmal-i müslimin*) should be protected from unnecessary expenditures, such as the keeping of numerous palaces in the same city or the waste in the palace kitchen and the court artisans, i.e. 'personal' expenses of the sultan.[125] We already saw that this view was widely held and justified by examples as old as Caliph Umar, for example by Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa; all the more so, already in 1508 Şehzade Korkud had taken issue (in Cornell Fleischer's words) with the "use of communal resources (such as *jizya* revenues) for such purposes as the purchase of personal slaves for the ruler".[126] In practice, moreover, Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi records that the imperial treasury (*hazine-i amire*) was to pay an annual sum of 10,562,359 *akçe* to the sultan for his personal needs and those of his harem, as well as for robes of honour to be bought for the imperial treasury.[127] The issue of the robes of honour is further interesting, as they were kept in and delivered from a sub-section of the inner treasury called "outer inner treasury" ("diş enderun hazinesi"), presumably because they were considered a personal favor of the sultan.[128]

It is not my intention to further explore here the history of the term *miri*, since this paper focuses in political thought and not in administrative

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[124] Orhonlu, Cengiz, *Osmanlı Tarihine Ait Belgeler: Telhisler (1597-1607)* (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1970), pp. 32-4.

[125] Tietze, *Counsel for Sultans*, I, pp. 54 = 146 and 59-62 = 153-57, respectively. On the Ottoman perception of the *beytülmal* see also Naima, *Tarih*, VI, pp. 307 ff.; İpşirli, *Tarih-i Na'îmâ*, pp. 1762-4.

[126] Fleischer, Cornell, "From Şehzade Korkud to Mustafa Âli: cultural origins of the Ottoman *Nasihatname*", in *IIIrd Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey, Princeton University, 24-26 August 1983. Proceedings*, ed. Heath W. Lowry and Ralph S. Hattox (Istanbul – Washington – Paris: Isis Press, 1990), pp. 67-77 at p. 71.

[127] "Şevketlü Padişah-ı âlem-penah hazretlerinin nefs-i nefîsleri içün ve Enderun-ı Hümayun yıllıklarına mübayaa olunan atlas ve çuka ve mühimmat-ı sairesine ve Hazine-i Amire içün iştira olunan semmur kürkler ve mütenevvia seraser hil'atlar bahasına". İlgürel, *Telhîsü'l-Beyân*, p. 99 (copied verbatim in Eyyubi Efendi's *Kanunname*, a few years later: Özcan, Abdülkadir (ed.), *Eyyubî Efendi Kanûnnâmesi* (Istanbul: Eren, 1994), p. 39). On the personal expenses of the sultan see also Uzunçarşılı, "Osmanlı Devleti İç Hazinesi", pp. 79-83.

[128] Uzunçarşılı, "Osmanlı Devleti İç Hazinesi", p. 74; cf. Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, pp. 108-9. On robes of honour cf. Karateke, Hakan, *An Ottoman Protocol Register, Containing Ceremonies from 1736 to 1808* (Istanbul – London: The Ottoman Bank Archive and Research Centre – The Royal Asiatic Society, 2007), pp. 27 ff.

terminology. However, we might arrive to the conclusion that, at least concerning the private budget of the sultan, there came to be a clearer distinction between sultanic and public, or state, property already by the end of the sixteenth century. However, we should note that still in the early 1700s Defterdar still seems to identify the "treasury of the Sultan" with the state treasury ("dahil-i hazine-i padişahî ve lâhik-i beytülmal-i müslimîn"); this is corroborated by his allusion to the "treasuries of the sultan" providing the monthly payment of the *kuls* and the coronation gifts.[129] Besides, one may find it difficult to interpret his warning to the *vezirs* not to covet "the private wealth of the sultan and the public wealth of the subjects and of the army" ("emval-ı hassa-yı Padişah ve emval-ı amme-i reaya ve sipah").[130] Did he mean by "wealth of the sultan" the inner treasury and by "public wealth" the outer, or was he identifying the former with the state treasury and the latter with the private properties of the sultan's subjects? Given that he then speaks of bribes and fines, it seems that we have to do with the second case, which reinforces our cautions.

After all, apart from political authors, there were very real cases of fluidity between state and sultanic property. For one thing, as Gottfried Hagen notes, "[t]he ease with which state land and state sources of income are assigned to a *waqf* which is set up in the name of an individual member of the dynasty calls into question the notion of a state as an institution distinct from the persons who embody it".[131] This has led to the postulation by Ömer Lütfi Barkan and then by İ. Metin Kunt that such *vakıfs* "should indeed be considered state institutions".[132] On the ideological level,

[129] Defterdar, *Devlet Adamlarına Öğütler*, pp. 21, 79. In the first instance, Karl K. Barbir, using W. L. Wright's translation, *Ottoman Statecraft: The Book of Counsel for Vezirs and Governors by Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Defterdar* (Princeton 1935), argues that Defterdar "uses the Islamic term *Beytülmal*, the treasury of the Muslim community, as distinct from the Sultan's private treasury, the *Enderun-i hümayun hazinesi*": Barbir, "One marker of Ottomanism: confiscation of Ottoman officials' estates", in Tezcan and Barbir, *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World*, pp. 135-45 at p. 141. I think, however, that Defterdar here uses a very common rhetorical figure of speech, pairing two expressions of identical meaning (cf. also a similar figure in Mustafa Ali: Tietze, *Description of Cairo*, p. 80). In other points Defterdar uses the expression "treasury of the exalted state" ("hazine-i devlet-i aliye"): Defterdar, *Devlet Adamlarına Öğütler*, p. 67. Bonuses (not salaries) to the janissaries were bestowed from the inner treasury: see Karateke, *An Ottoman Protocol Register*, p. 76.

[130] Defterdar, *Devlet Adamlarına Öğütler*, p. 17.

[131] Hagen, Gottfried, "Review of Singer, Amy, *Constructing Ottoman Beneficence: An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem*", H-Turk, H-Net Reviews, May 2003 (URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=7578; accessed March 2013).

[132] Kunt, Metin İ., "The waqf as an instrument of public policy: notes on the Köprülü family endowments", in *Studies in Ottoman History in Honour of Professor V. L. Ménage*, eds.

Ottoman authors were conscious of the contradiction, as shown by Mustafa Ali's argument on sultanic *vakıf*s cited above; nonetheless, the contradiction did exist, although one may argue that as time passed by the Ottoman government tended to consider these institutions as parts of the state, for instance when it cut down their expenses by half for the needs of the 1688 campaign.[133]

Synopsis: A disappointing confusion

In sum, the boundaries between state and royal spheres seem not to have concerned Ottoman officials as much as we would like them to. Moreover, expecting Ottoman mental categories to match our understanding of social organization carries the danger of incurring a series of bias and distorting lenses, not to mention an "orientalistic" air, while fluidity constituted a standard feature, one may say, of Ottoman political and social categorizations. As Suraiya Faroqhi observes, with the occasion of the festivities held for a prince's circumcision in 1720:

> [d]iscussion revolved around the question whether the circumcision was a state occasion or rather a domestic festivity, the French position being that gifts were only called for in the former and not in the latter instance. [The grand *vezir*] by contrast does not seem to have regarded this distinction between 'state' and 'domestic' as particularly relevant to his concerns. Rather, he offered an inducement on a different, honorific level. If the French ambassador was willing to make the expected gifts, he would be invited on particularly honourable terms.[134]

Colin Heywood and Colin Imber (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1994), pp. 189-98, at p. 190; cf. Barkan, Ömer Lütfi and Ekrem Hakki Ayverdi, *İstanbul Vakıfları Tahrir Defteri, 953 (1546) Tarihli* (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1970), pp. XVI-XIX.

[133] This decision is not mentioned in narrative sources (see other measures taken on this occasion in Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, pp. 308-10; Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, *Silâhdar Tarihi*, ed. Ahmed Refik (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1928), vol. II, pp. 375-8), but it is recorded, together with a list of *vakıf*s with the stipends to be cut (including both sultanic and private endowments) in the court registers of Kandiye, Crete (see Varoucha, Maria, et alii, *Ιεροδικείο Ηρακλείου. Πέμπτος Κώδικας* [Kadi Court of Herakleio: Fifth Register], part II (1688-1689), ed. Elizabeth A. Zachariadou (Herakleio: Vikelaia Dimotiki Vivliothiki, 2008), pp. 461-5 (nos 825-828). The *ferman* specifies that this action would not be repeated; it might be the case that it concerned only Cretan *vakıf*s. The transfer of the collection of *vakıf* revenues to the *defterdar* under Mustafa III (1757-74) can be seen as another step toward control by the state apparatus (see Barnes, *An Introduction to Religious Foundations*, pp. 68-9).

[134] Faroqhi, *Another Mirror for Princes*, pp. 81-2. Unfortunately no such festivity is recorded in Karateke, *An Ottoman Protocol Register*.

Indeed, the examples I cited corroborate the conclusion that Ottoman political thought did not follow the procedure toward the emergence of an independent state mechanism but to a certain degree. However, in my view it is clear that a certain notion of the distinction between ruler and state did emerge after all. From the analysis above it is evident, I think, that it is extremely difficult to locate this development in time; nonetheless, by the beginning of the eighteenth century it seems that a notion of the state as an autonomous entity had been established. Moreover, perceptions of the ruler as a part of society (either in a body simile or in a more "class" or rather "estate-oriented" perspective), usually belonging to the same stratum as the military branch, are to be found in Ottoman texts at least from the late sixteenth century; however, one should stress that this is by no means an Ottoman innovation in the corpus of Arabic and Persian political thought. Of more relevance, perhaps, is the growing importance of the government apparatus within the framework of Ottoman perceptions of society.

On the other hand, it would perhaps be useful to end this paper with some cautionary remarks. First of all, we still are far away from fully comprehending Ottoman statehood and administration in all its development and inner structure. The scholarly discussion I tried to summarize in the first part of this essay on the way toward early modernity shows exactly that this way is far from having been understood and agreed upon; in this aspect, I must stress again that the study of the development of the relevant vocabulary is merely another tool for this discussion, rather than a conclusive argument in favour of any authoritative interpretation.

Besides, it is evident from the examples cited above that Ottoman authors somehow frustratingly tend to use the traditional vocabulary inherited by earlier genres in a way less flexible than one might expect in order to reach conclusions. To cite just one example, even İbrahim Müteferrika, in some aspects a great innovator of political thinking, is the first Ottoman author to describe the Aristotelian three forms of state, but only practically to ignore this discussion short afterwards, as he hastens to dwell on military reforms and the benefits of geography.

A study of the development of the Ottoman empire toward early modern features, one may conclude, should take into account ideological and symbolic aspects as well. Nonetheless, one has to bear in mind that these aspects have a life of their own, being a normative language that influences political practice and in the same time gets influenced by it. This second procedure, i.e. the feedback to ideology, has to be very carefully traced down in an interactive, non-linear way. Same theoretical schemes or

concepts may have been used in different contexts and for different purposes. As an example, let us take the class theory and the limitations (*hadd*) put in the *askeri* class. It is almost with the same phrasing that this theory is expounded, for example, in Koçi Bey and in eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries authors such as İbrahim Müteferrika or Dihkanizade Kuşmani. But while the former uses it to display the need to control the number of janissaries and prevent strangers from entering their ranks, the latter authors use the same theory to justify the need for a new military system distinguished from civilians by the use of uniforms and (in the case of Kuşmani who advocates Selim III's *nizam-ı cedid*) composed entirely by these "strangers".[135]

In sum, political authors cannot be studied properly outside their context; for each text we have to know the author's source, background, purpose and political, social and ideological affiliation. On the other hand, each of the various literary *genres* to which Ottoman political treatises belong has its own limitations that should be taken into account. This is why a synthesis of the history of Ottoman political thought is needed in order to map these currents and study each notion and concept within the framework that they were used.

[135] See Şen, *Usûlü'l-Hikem*, p. 152-4; İşbilir, *Nizâm-ı Cedîde Dâir Bir Risâle*, pp. 12-13. Every source has its peculiarities, though, so in the early nineteenth century Şanizade, who reverts back to earlier tradition elsewhere as well, uses the same formula to protest against newcomers in the military branch: Yılmazer, *Şânî-zâde Târîhi*, I, p. 481-2.