

(*) Required information

PART I - Your Information*

Your selection of the filing option below implies you have reviewed the information and understand the choice you are making.

- I choose to identify myself for the complaint and:
- I give permission for DoD Hotline to release my identity outside the DoD Hotline on a need-to-know basis.
- I do NOT give permission to DoD Hotline to provide my name and contact information outside the DoD Hotline. I understand that in doing so the DoD Hotline may be unable to address my concerns.

I understand that if the Director, DoD Hotline determines the allegation(s) in my complaint cannot be investigated without disclosing my identity on a need-to-know-basis to organizations outside the DoD Hotline, my lack of consent may prevent further action from being taken on my complaint. I further understand that even if I elect confidential status, my identity may be disclosed, if required by applicable legal authority, or the Director, DoD Hotline, determines that such disclosure is otherwise unavoidable.

Prefix (Mr., Mrs., Ms., etc...) Mr.
 First Name* Luis Middle Name* Daniel Last Name* Elizondo

Employee Status* Check one of the following options or list your status if not listed.

- Military Active Duty
- Military National Guard
- Military National Guard
- Military National Guard
- Military - Reserves
- Civilian Employee
- Contractor Employee -
- Contractor Employee -
- Non-Appropriated
- Retiree
- Other _____

Assigned DoD Branch* Check one of the following listed options.

- Department of Defense
- Army
- Navy
- Marine Corps
- Air Force
- I am not a DoD Employee

(*) Required information

Other Agency or Office _____ Job Title / Series _____

Organization/Location _____

E-mail Address _____ Mailing Address* _____ ^{com}

City* _____ State or APO* _____ Zip/Postal Code* _____

Country U.S.A. Home Telephone _____ Mobile Telephone same

Work Telephone (Commercial) same Work Telephone (DSN) _____

Interview* Yes, I am willing to be interviewed. No, I do not want to be contacted.

PART II – Allegation Details

Use this section to clearly describe your complaint. If you wish to file a reprisal complaint, do not use this form.

IDENTIFY THE Person(s) - WHO COMMITTED THE ALLEGED WRONGDOING?

Person's First Name Gary Reid Person's Middle Name _____
Person's Last Name Reid Where does this individual work? USD(C), DDIT&S

Person's Status

- Military Active Duty
- Military National Guard
- Military National Guard
- Military National Guard
- Military - Reserves
- Civilian Employee
- Contractor Employee -
- Contractor Employee -
- Non-Appropriated
- Retiree
- Other _____

IDENTIFY THE Person(s) - WHO COMMITTED THE ALLEGED WRONGDOING?

Person's First Name Susan Person's Middle Name
Person's Last Name Gough Where does this individual work? OSD PAO

Person's Status

- Military Active Duty, Military National Guard (Title 10), Military National Guard, Military National Guard, Military - Reserves, Civilian Employee, Contractor Employee -, Contractor Employee -, Non-Appropriated, Retiree, Other

IDENTIFY THE Person(s) - WHO COMMITTED THE ALLEGED WRONGDOING?

Person's First Name
Person's Last Name
Person's Middle Name
Where does this individual work?

Person's Status

- Military Active Duty, Military National Guard, Military National Guard, Military National Guard, Military - Reserves, Civilian Employee, Contractor Employee -, Contractor Employee -, Non-Appropriated, Retiree, Other

IDENTIFY THE Person(s) - WHO COMMITTED THE ALLEGED WRONGDOING?

Person's First Name Neil Person's Middle Name
Person's Last Name Tipton Where does this individual work? OSD (I) DDI TCSP

Person's Status

- Military Active Duty, Military National Guard, Military National Guard, Military National Guard, Military - Reserves, Civilian Employee, Contractor Employee - S, Contractor Employee - S, Non-Appropriated F, Retiree, Other

IDENTIFY THE Person(s) - WHO COMMITTED THE ALLEGED WRONGDOING?

Person's First Name
Person's Middle Name
Person's Last Name
Where does this individual work?

Person's Status

- Military Active Duty, Military National Guard, Military National Guard, Military National Guard, Military - Reserves, Civilian Employee, Contractor Employee - S, Contractor Employee - S, Non-Appropriated, Retiree, Other

(*) Required information

We can best process your complaint if we receive accurate and complete information. Provide a summary of your complaint, to include an event chronology, if appropriate.

If your complaint involves contractor fraud, provide the name of the primary contractor, subcontractor, type of contract, contract's, date of contract award, and name(s) of agency official(s) if known.

What did the person(s) do or fail to do that was wrong? * Conducted retribution, and provided false information to the public. Abusing government authority. Illegal destruction of information.

When did the incident(s) occur? * 2018 - Present

When were you made aware of the problem(s)? 2017

Where did the incident(s) take place? Pentagon

What rule, regulation, or law do you believe to have been violated? Whistleblower Protection Act, Multiple DoD Directives, Instructions, Freedom of Information Act.

Briefly summarize how you believe our office can assist you regarding your matter. IG should conduct a comprehensive review, inquiry, investigation into abuse of power, lying to the public, destruction of evidence, conspiracy.

(*) Required information

PART III - Other Actions You Are Taking

Please indicate in this section if you have filed your complaint with any other office, to include other Inspector General offices, and your Congressperson. If you have contacted other entities, clearly identify the agency, office, or command, and provide your understanding of the current status of your matter. If you have received any responses from those office(s), provide our office with a copy.

Have you reported this matter to any other organizations/agencies? Yes No

If yes, which Organization / Agency? *

When*

What is the status of that complaint? *

- Open Under Investigation Closed Unknown

Part IV – Additional Document Submission

Mail this form along with supporting documentation to:

ATTN: DoD Hotline
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1900

Make sure to print copies of the forms you submitted and keep for your records.

PART V – Certifications

*I certify that all of the statements made in this complaint are true, complete, and correct, to the best of my knowledge. I understand that a false statement or concealment of a material fact is a criminal offense (18 U.S.C. § 1001; Inspector General Act of 1978, As Amended, §7).

*I have provided my election concerning my filing status in Part I of this form (Release of Identity, Non-Release of Identity, or Anonymous). If I did not provide my release election, I understand that this will cause a delay in the processing of my complaint. I further understand that if I have elected either confidential or anonymous status, it may impact the ability of the DoD Hotline to either conduct an inquiry, if warranted, and/or to appropriately address my issue(s). I also understand that if I elect anonymity, without providing any contact information, I will be unable to request confirmation of receipt of this complaint to the DoD Hotline, or to receive advisements as to open or closed status.

*I understand that if the Director, DoD Hotline determines the allegation(s) in my complaint cannot be investigated without disclosing my identity on a need-to-know-basis to organizations outside the DoD Hotline, my lack of permission to release my identity may prevent further action from being taken on my complaint. I further understand that even if I elect confidential status, my identity may be disclosed, if required by applicable legal authority, or if the Director, DoD Hotline, determines that such disclosure is otherwise unavoidable.

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03, May 2021

Mr. Luis D. Elizondo
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

United States Department of Defense
Office of The Inspector General
Washington, D.C. 20301-1900

ATTN: Inspector General Investigative Personnel

My name is Luis D. Elizondo, and the purpose of this letter is to request an official U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Inspector General (IG) inquiry/investigation into malicious activities, coordinated disinformation, professional misconduct, whistleblower reprisal and explicit threats perpetrated by certain senior-level Pentagon officials, including the Director of Defense Intelligence for Intelligence and Security (DDI I&S), Garry Reid, Public Affairs Officer Susan Gough, and any other officials who were complicit in these acts.

Enclosed with this letter are details of this complaint for your review. The first portion is a comprehensive, chronological listing of events that substantiate my involvement in the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP). The second portion is a detailed listing of events and actions to substantiate this complaint along with evidence which suggests a coordinated effort to obfuscate the truth from the American people while impugning my reputation as a former intelligence officer at the Pentagon. These negative actions against me have resulted in great personal and professional challenges to me and my family.

Over the last three years, attempts to clear the record by some senior officials, serving as witnesses to this abuse, have been ignored by certain elements within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Staff, namely within the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)). Furthermore, evidence exists that substantiates my claim that there may be a deeper conspiracy within the OSD staff to circumvent DoD policy, rules, and regulations, and perhaps even law.

At a very minimum, actions have been taken against me that directly erode the very foundation of our National Security ethos, and the public trust instilled by the American people. I am fully aware of the magnitude of my allegation against certain individuals in the Department, and I am able to substantiate these claims.

As reprisals continue to be levied towards me, I respectfully request DoD IG conduct a comprehensive review of all related activities against me over the last three years and correct the record of my involvement in the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program.

Sincerest Regards/Very Respectfully,



Luis D. Elizondo

Enclosures: See Attached.

Professional History of AATIP (chronological)

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This document is unclassified. Additional classified details/information which provides specific critical context can be provided over an appropriately secure and accredited means and with a demonstrated "Need-to-Know". This portion is provided for the purposes of establishing the facts, dates, and points of contact that can verify and validate my involvement with AATIP.

June 2008 - While assigned as a Chief, to the Information Sharing and Foreign Intelligence Relationships (ISFIR) Office, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI), I was approached by representatives from the Advanced Aerospace Weapon Systems Applications Program (AAWSAP) to provide Counterintelligence (CI) and Security expertise to their office. The two individuals whom I engaged with were identified as both being part of the AAWSAP effort: Mr. Jay Stratton, and [REDACTED]. Both these individuals were an integral part of the AAWSAP effort. Our initial meeting occurred in my office at [REDACTED].

Contact Info: Mr. Jay Stratton - [REDACTED]

Contact Info: [REDACTED]

Contact Info: [REDACTED]

For approximately two weeks, three meetings were held at my office. During the meetings, it was revealed to me that AAWSAP was in need of specific CI and Security support and that my background as a credentialed CI Special Agent was a necessary skill set. Furthermore, they indicated they required expertise in specific aerospace technology. At the time, neither Mr. Stratton nor [REDACTED] elaborated on the purpose or mission of AAWSAP, but they indicated that upon a successful evaluation, I would be referred to the Director of the program for further vetting and consideration.

July 2008 - After several personal meetings in my office space, Mr. Stratton and [REDACTED] invited me to meet with the AAWSAP Director, Dr. James Lakatski. I was subsequently provided directions to an undisclosed Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) facility in the Rosslyn area. **(classified details can be provided over a secure means and with a demonstrated "need-to-know")** During the meeting, I met with Dr. Lakatski, and I was asked to address him as "Jim". Dr. Lakatski introduced himself as an expert in missile technology and as the Director for the AAWSAP program. It was during this meeting that Dr. Lakatski provided me the full name of the AAWSAP portfolio and the focus of the mission. Dr. Lakatski explained to me that my background in the CI career field, along with my experience working with advanced aviation technology from a "tech-protect" perspective, made me uniquely qualified to support him. He further explained that AAWSAP was part of a very sensitive effort that was sponsored by very senior-level individuals at both the Legislative and Executive branches. He further indicated to me that all personnel were "hand selected". During our discussion, Dr. Lakatski asked me what I "think about UFOs". My response was sincere in that "I don't think about UFOs", not because I don't believe in them, but because I simply do not have the luxury to think about them given my mission OPTEMPO and mission focus.

July 2008 - After one additional follow-on meeting with Dr. Lakatski at his office space in Rosslyn, I was officially asked by Dr. Lakatski to assume the role of AAWSAP's Chief of CI and Security. He explained to me that this effort was fully endorsed by senior DIA leadership and he had already received approval by the program's sponsors, Former Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, Senator Ted Stevens, and Senator Daniel Inouye.

August 2008 - While supporting the AAWSAP effort, I was informed by Dr. Lakatski and other AAWSAP personnel about a specific effort within the portfolio known as the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) and that most of my efforts would be focused on that aspect of the project. I was informed that this effort involved collecting data and evidence from military personnel who came into contact with Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP), a term that was then explained to me as the Government nomenclature for Unidentified Flying Objects (UFO)s. Furthermore, I was asked to develop

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a comprehensive CI and Security plan for this effort to protect the program from possible Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) penetrations.

September 2008 – June 2009 – During this time, I created a CI and Security posture for both AAWSAP and AATIP. Furthermore, I attended senior-level debriefings, including one with a former-foreign military member with a General Officer rank, that was arranged by Dr. Lakatski. I was also present for numerous written updates by Dr. Lakatski to the Director of DIA and other Senior DIA officials regarding AAWSAP/AATIP which were well-received. Ample correspondence exists between DIA senior staff and Dr. Lakatski that substantiates DIA leadership was not only supportive, but also in favor of the AAWSAP/AATIP efforts to be expanded. I am personally aware of both meetings and briefings in which AAWSAP and AATIP were discussed, and I was privy to several classified emails that substantiate this fact. Those emails still exist within a specific office at the Pentagon in both electronic and hard copies. **(details and specifics as to this information can be provided separately over a secure means)**. It was during this time, we also conducted a review over a draft 10-Month report, executed by one of the prime contractors, Bigelow Aerospace. **(details and specifics as to this information can be provided separately over a secure means)**

June 2009 – It was brought to my attention that a request was sent by Former Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid to DoD senior leadership to further protect AATIP by requesting the effort be transitioned into a protected, Special Access Program (SAP). Furthermore, I was informed that key individuals that were associated with AATIP were included/listed as part of the request for SAP protection, my name being one of those individuals. The request was sent from Senator Harry Reid to the Deputy Secretary of Defense through official correspondence channels. **(Attachment 1)**

July 2009 - January 2010 – New leadership at DIA began to create challenges for Dr. Lakatski, despite the previous leadership fully endorsing the efforts. [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] of DIA and began attempts to shut down the effort. As was explained to me by colleagues, there was a religious aversion to the subject matter by certain members of DIA and the OSD staff. In September 2009, I was privy to an internal e-mail between [REDACTED] and OUSD(I) Congressional Affairs, [REDACTED] where both were lamenting the existence of the programs and were attempting to "kill the effort" because it involved "...that crazy UFO topic again". In October 2009, I was asked to attend a meeting within the OUSD(I) SAPCO spaces in which I was told specifically that this effort should be discontinued and that although this topic was real, it had supernatural origins not consistent with certain religious views of specific senior leadership. I reported the results of this meeting to Dr. Lakatski.

February 2010 - April 2010 – Dr. Lakatski indicated to me that he was facing increased pressure by DIA leadership and he would be forced to resign from his duties as the Director of AAWSAP and AATIP, and return to Headquarters, DIA. Dr. Lakatski was in poor spirits at the time because he believed he was being unfairly persecuted for his role in an authorized mission.

April 2010 – Dr. Lakatski approached me and asked if I would consider assuming the role of AAWSAP and AATIP, Director. I reminded Dr. Lakatski that most of my experience concerned the AATIP portfolio and that I only worked AAWSAP from a tangential perspective. Dr. Lakatski's response to me was that he already had my name "floated" as the new Director with leadership, and that it was unanimously agreed by all that I should be the new Director. He also suggested that I manage the effort under my authorities as a member of the OSD staff, and not keep it within DIA due to the hostile environment he was experiencing. After a day of considering his offer, I accepted the responsibility provided that all stakeholders supported this decision. I also informed Dr. Lakatski that I would begin to engage with select OUSD(I) senior staff members to gain additional mission support.

May 2010 – August 2012 – In my new role as Director for AATIP and AAWSAP, I made the decision to begin minimizing existing efforts within the AAWSAP portfolio given the negative attention it was receiving by DIA leadership. It was my observation that key elements within DIA were attempting to hide anything

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related to AAWSAP simply due to a perceived sense of stigma. As such, I focused our remaining efforts on AATIP given that there was ample information, data, and evidence which we continued to receive that indicated continued incursions into controlled U.S. airspace, both CONUS and OCONUS. **(details and specifics as to this information can be provided separately over a secure means)** During this time period, my office had multiple meetings with eyewitnesses to include pilots, radar operators, and ship's crew. Furthermore, emails were being sent to my office at the classified level over the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications (JWICS) concerning incidents involving Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) activity. There are numerous emails from senior military service members and leadership that substantiate the fact that the threat was real. The e-mails still exist within the OUSD(I). **(details and specifics as to this information can be provided separately over a secure means)**

September 2012 – As initial funding was exhausted for the AATIP program, we successfully secured an additional 10 million (USD) through Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. This funding was to be used for Fiscal Years (FY) 13 and 14. However, the verbiage used in the appropriations was sufficiently vague wherein another office within OUSD(I), managed by [REDACTED], used the funding to support academic studies involving Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).

October 2013 – While also working as a Chief for the newly formed Intelligence Sharing and Partner Engagement Office (ISPE), under the OUSD(I), I had the opportunity to brief AATIP to the Director of Foreign Material, OUSD(I), [REDACTED]. During 2013, I introduced him to other members of AATIP and its scientists. [REDACTED] attended numerous AATIP meetings where we discussed the role of DoD FMA efforts to support AATIP, along with logistics and facilities. **(details and specifics as to this information can be provided separately over a secure means)** It was at this time, I informed my supervisor, Mr. Neil Tipton, of my work in a "parallel portfolio" and my need to gain expertise from the ISR Task Force given the nuanced nature of analysis we were conducting. Mr. Tipton indicated he had no issue with me working other efforts as long as my duties were not neglected at ISPE. **(details and specifics as to this information can be provided separately over a secure means)**

Early 2014 – My office received a very compelling video in 2011, sent to us on JWICS that was collected by a sensitive U.S. platform operating in a denied area. The video was approximately 18 to 20 minutes in duration and appeared to show three UAPs flying in a distinct triangle formation. After vetting the video through several Intelligence Community experts, I decided to share it with Mr. Tipton in 2014 to see if he was aware of any Blue-Force technology that could explain what was being witnessed on the video. Mr. Tipton's response to me was that the video was "weird and compelling" and that he had no idea what the object was. **(details and specifics as to this information can be provided separately over a secure means)**

2015 – I briefed the AATIP portfolio to [REDACTED], who was at the time a Senior Executive U.S. Air Force Detailee to OUSD(I). At the time, his staff and mine shared office space at [REDACTED] and he was instrumental in providing me advice and assistance. My hope was to use [REDACTED] as an interlocutor with U.S. Air Force [REDACTED] in order to understand the UAP issue from an Air Force perspective. [REDACTED] and I collaborated frequently and had lunch over the matter. I introduced him to several members of AATIP, and he was genuinely interested in the topic. He was also aware that [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was briefed into AATIP and there were a select few individuals who would receive briefings from my staff and me. Upon his departure from OUSD(I), I provided [REDACTED] a small token of our appreciation for his support by providing a one-of-a-kind, original photograph of an Apollo astronaut on the Moon with handwritten note. **(this photo was later shown to Mr. Brennan McKernan, the current UAP Task Force Director, by [REDACTED] as evidence he was aware of our effort and a supporter)**

2014 – 2016 – My office was routinely engaged with other members of the Intelligence Community (IC) in a formal working group, specifically organized for the purposes of discussing and assessing UAP activity.

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This not only included older incidents, the 2004 U.S.S. Nimitz, but recent incidents being reported by U.S. Naval Ship Captains in theaters of engagement. These incidents were often accompanied by video evidence taken from U.S. weapon platforms. In one such instance, a senior member of the U.S. Navy sent an e-mail pleading for guidance as to what he/she should do if they encounter more UAPs. This documentation still exists with OUSD(I). **(details and specifics as to this information can be provided separately over a secure means)** It was, at this time, I also assumed the new role as the Director of National Programs Special Management Staff (NPSMS), a National Security Council effort involving Guantanamo Bay. **(Attachment 2)**

2015 – 2017 – On a regular basis, Mr. Stratton (who was assigned at the time as a STRATCOM Liaison Officer), and Mr. Brennan McKernan (current UAP Task Force Director) and I would discuss new reports that were received and engage in a larger working group discussion with other elements within the IC. These meetings were conducted in designated OSD and Navy Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) spaces, within the Pentagon or Suitland Naval Air Station. Expertise ranging from electrooptical experts to radar engineers would be utilized to try and ascertain some of the observations and what models of physics would be required to explain UAP performance. It was also suggested that a joint Operational Plan (OPLAN) be developed through the Joint Staff to potentially elicit a behavior/response to UAP activity. In 2016, a formal OPLAN was drafted and submitted through Alternative Compensatory Control Measure (ACCM) channels. The OPLAN was significant in detail, including the frequency of incursions by UAP, locations, and type. At one point, a comprehensive listing of UAP activity was included for the entire month. **(details and specifics as to this information can be provided separately over a secure means)**

2016 – During this time, my former supervisor, Mr. Tipton had returned to the OUSD(I), after completing an IC Joint Duty Assignment at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). In his new role, he was assigned under the Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) for Technical Collection and Special Programs, [REDACTED]. In his new role, I believed Mr. Tipton could be a continued value to our AATIP efforts. In late 2016, I sent Mr. Tipton an e-mail on JWICS welcoming him back to OUSD(I). Mr. Tipton responded with an e-mail with Subject Line: "That UFO Video". In his email to me, Mr. Tipton asked me how my efforts were going at AATIP and if we were able to gain additional fidelity on a specific UAP video I shared with him the prior year while he was my supervisor at ISPE. My response was negative. During this time, I also asked Mr. Tipton if his new office could be helpful in our endeavors involving UAPs. He suggested I speak directly with [REDACTED]. In December 2016, I briefly spoke to [REDACTED] and explained that our funding for FY-13 and FY-14 was taken by another office and our resources were very slim, but that the mission was very viable. He shared with me his support for our effort but indicated he would be leaving for another position soon and that I should keep Mr. Tipton "in the loop". I also shared with [REDACTED] my frustration for not being able to brief other senior leadership due to restrictive stove piping, but I had received exceptional support from one of his subordinates, [REDACTED] in the past. [REDACTED] appreciated the compliment.

2016 – During this time, I continually attempted to gain additional Senior-level leadership involvement. My direct supervisor, [REDACTED], was informed by me that I was also involved in another sensitive effort besides NPSMS. [REDACTED] indicated he was fine with my involvement in other Government endeavors provided it did not interfere with my performance as Director, NPSMS. It was during this time, I introduced [REDACTED] to other members of the AATIP staff, including Mr. Brennan McKernan. Although we never specified AATIP involved UAPs, he was aware of the sensitive nature of the effort and the strict "need-to-know" aspects of the program, which he respected. [REDACTED] was later asked to provide information on a 2013 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigation called [REDACTED] for which the sworn statements (302)s would be useful for our efforts. The investigation involved potential UAP activity near a sensitive U.S. Government facility. **(details and specifics as to this information can be provided separately over a secure means)**

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It was during this time I grew increasingly frustrated by the lack of resources and interest by senior leadership. UAP reporting to our office was increasing, yet our resources were minimal, and leadership involvement was almost non-existent. In 2016, we succeeded in having an unclassified academic study performed by a local University in Washington, D.C., regarding signatures of space threats and capabilities, including Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, in hopes that this information could be used to determine the various capabilities and domains in which, technical assets could be used to better detect UAP activity. The author of the study was only told that our interest was "threats from space" (**This study resides on the AATIP share drive known as "Y-Project" on the JWICS**)

Late 2016 – After increased frustration, I became alarmed by the frequency and duration of UAP activity in and around controlled U.S. airspace. The instances seemed more provocative, and during one instance, they came within feet of a U.S. fighter aircraft. **The video of this encounter still exists on the AATIP share drive, known as "Y-Project", within the OUSD(I) JWICS share drive.** Out of desperation, I was willing to break protocol and seek the guidance of the DDI for Intelligence and Security (DDI I&S), Mr. Garry Reid. Mr. Garry Reid replaced [REDACTED] as the new DDI I&S. However, prior to informing Mr. Garry Reid, I was warned by several individuals that Mr. Garry Reid could not be trusted. It was not told to me at the time why he was not trusted among his peers other than he had an "unusual relationship with his subordinate, [REDACTED]. I was also told that this relationship is widely known within OUSD(I) and that both [REDACTED] and Mr. Garry Reid occupied positions of significant influence within the CI, Security, and Law Enforcement communities. For this reason, I hesitated on briefing Mr. Garry Reid on AATIP efforts. At the time, a third-party allegation of sexual harassment was reported to me involving Mr. Garry Reid by one of my office subordinates, [REDACTED], [REDACTED] GG-14. During one of the meetings, he referred to [REDACTED] as "Bunny" and made her feel uncomfortable in the presence of other females including a USD(I) attorney and counsel, [REDACTED]. I later learned that a formal IG Investigation was initiated, to which I was called as a witness.

2016 – 2017 – During this time period, my colleagues within AATIP and I grew increasingly frustrated with the lack of senior level awareness and apathy towards the AATIP. It was decided that an effort to have more analytic expertise be made in order that some of the less-sensitive videos be made available to a broader audience of expertise. Initially, the idea was to include members of the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and other experts to have access to unclassified UAP videos to help determine and assess performance and design characteristics. In 2017, I executed a DoD Form 1910 and submitted through the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review (DOPSR), for a security review of three videos "FLIR", "GoFast", and "Gimbal". Furthermore, I requested through Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) that this review be coordinated through the Original Classification Authority (OCA). Although I wanted to limit the distribution of the three unclassified videos to only certain parties, WHS indicated to me it was easier for them to simply authorize "Unlimited Distribution". A few days later, my request, via the 1910, was officially stamped by DOPSR for unrestricted dissemination. (**Attachment 3 & Attachment 4 *pages 1-7**)

2017 - I was invited by several direct reports to Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, to provide an official AATIP briefing, within the SECDEF suite, E-Ring, River Entrance, Pentagon.

- [REDACTED] SES, Senior Representative to the SECDEF – My initial meeting with [REDACTED] was a result of a direct request by [REDACTED] staff, at the SECDEF's front office. I received a notice on SIPRNet and a telephone call asking if I would be available to provide a briefing on AATIP. During the initial meeting, [REDACTED] was provided detailed, classified information regarding UAP incursions into controlled U.S. airspace, along with photographs, videos and classified reports from the field. A week later, I was asked to return and provide a follow-on briefing to the same individual. During the meeting I was asked for my personal assessment of the situation in which I expressed my frustration of a lack of senior-level visibility and excessive stove piping within the Department. [REDACTED] was sympathetic to our situation in AATIP and asked that we provide a briefing to his colleague, [REDACTED].

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- [REDACTED] to the Secretary of Defense – I received several telephone calls on my personal cell phone (**voice messages saved and available**) from [REDACTED] requesting a briefing on AATIP. As with [REDACTED], my meetings were arranged by SECDEF front office personnel (official calendar invites were executed) and took place in the Secretary's Suite. During the initial briefing with [REDACTED] AATIP data and findings were shared. This meeting lasted for over 60 minutes. At the conclusion of the meeting, a follow-on meeting was requested by [REDACTED].

During the second meeting, [REDACTED] expressed consternation about how to inform the Secretary of AATIP findings, given that there is no permanent USD(I) in place and that the SECDEF was relatively new. [REDACTED] was sympathetic to our program's challenges.

After several meetings, [REDACTED] asked me to arrange a briefing from several of the eyewitnesses from the 2004 U.S.S. Nimitz investigation, namely the F-18 pilots and the E-2 Hawkeye Radar Operator that were on station at the time. As a result of his request, I successfully brought in several pilots and the Radar Operator, along with Mr. McKernan to provide a full description of the encounter. [REDACTED] was concerned due to his previous experience being an F-18 pilot, himself. After the meeting, [REDACTED] asked for us to return and brief his colleague, [REDACTED] (**electronic voicemails are available to confirm meetings with [REDACTED] in the SECDEF suite**)

- [REDACTED] – After several meetings with [REDACTED] I was introduced to [REDACTED] who was the Secretary's Senior Liaison to one of the members of the IC. (**details and specifics as to this information can be provided separately over a secure means**) [REDACTED] expressed her concerns briefing the SECDEF until she had more information from other members of the IC. She indicated that she would reach out to her colleagues and return with additional guidance. After several weeks of briefings, [REDACTED] indicated that her colleagues in other government agencies are also taking this topic seriously but did not know how to proceed at the time. [REDACTED] indicated her concern about briefing the SECDEF until they had a better understanding of the topic and the threat. I explained to [REDACTED] that time was not on our side and that action must be taken to inform the Secretary. I informed them of my previous interaction with the Secretary when he was the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Commander in Kandahar, Afghanistan and my experience with the Secretary is that he would prefer to be informed sooner, rather than later.

July – 3 October 2017 – Based upon meetings within the SECDEF's suite, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] agreed that the AATIP portfolio should be handled by a senior member of OUSD(I), preferably with the rank of a seasoned SES. The reason for this was to ensure sufficient authority could be used to leverage internal resources within the Department to gain additional fidelity on the UAP threat to controlled military airspace. It was at this point, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] agreed that Mr. McKernan and I brief Mr. Tipton about the decision by the Front Office. From July to late September, Mr. McKernan and I had several personal meetings with Mr. Tipton to brief him on the nuances of AATIP. Mr. Tipton agreed to assume the management role of AATIP under the condition that I remain an advisor and part of the AATIP construct. E-mails were exchanged between Mr. Tipton, Mr. McKernan and myself that substantiate Mr. Tipton's awareness of the AATIP program and his new leadership role. Per guidance from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], I drafted an official memorandum assigning my AATIP responsibilities to Mr. Tipton for SECDEF approval and signature. Mr. Tipton received the memorandum and voiced his approval. (**Attachment 5 & Attachment 6**)

3 October 2017 – After nearly a decade of working within the AATIP portfolio, I decided to resign my position within the Pentagon and submit my resignation letter. I deliberately addressed my

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resignation letter to the Secretary himself, knowing my senior supervisor, Mr. Garry Reid would not be able to hide it from him. **(Attachment 7)**

Continued below

The remaining portion of this document relates to negative actions taken against me to discredit, obfuscate, and misconstrue the truth, resulting in attacks on my credibility and my government responsibilities which were a matter of public record.

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5 October 2017 – I received a telephone call on my personal cellular telephone from Mr. Garry Reid's Executive Assistant in which she said Mr. Garry Reid wanted to speak with me. I reminded her that I was now a civilian and that I was under no obligation to speak with Mr. Garry Reid, but in the spirit of transparency, I would do so. She acknowledged my comment and transferred me to Mr. Garry Reid, directly. During the conversation, Mr. Garry Reid asked me what he should do with the letter, and I told him he should do whatever he thinks is prudent, but the letter was intended for the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Reid was clearly upset with me and indicated that he wanted to see me in his office. He also said that he would "tell people you are crazy, and it might impact your security clearance." I responded to Mr. Garry Reid by telling him that he can take any action he thinks is prudently necessary, but that I was not mentally impaired, nor have I ever violated my security oath. I did not meet personally with Mr. Garry Reid after our discussion as I feared he would take retribution against me.

Note: The fact that Mr. Reid told me directly he would make efforts to undermine my credibility and clearance by threatening to officially question my mental health shows his personal targeted vendetta and abuse of power against me from the outset of my departure from DoD. This fact is consistent with continued falsehoods repeated by the Department's statements concerning me and shows a repeated pattern of abuse.

November 2017 – After several telephone calls from former colleagues [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and others within OUSD(I) warning that Mr. Garry Reid and [REDACTED] were "coming after me" and insinuating I was a fabricator, I decided to obtain private legal counsel to ensure my security clearance would not be in jeopardy. I was informed that [REDACTED] was doing the "dirty work" for Mr. Garry Reid, and they were trying to destroy my reputation at the Pentagon. Knowing that both Mr. Garry Reid and [REDACTED] were actively working to hurt my security clearance was and is extremely concerning. **(Attachment 8)**

December 2017 – On 17 December 2017, both the New York Times and Politico broke a story about the AATIP program (Attachment 5 & Attachment 6). In both these stories, Pentagon spokesperson, Ms. Dana White validated the existence of the program and my role as lead. **(Attachment 9 & Attachment 10)**

18 December 2017 – During an interview at CNN Headquarters, in Washington, D.C., former Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, and former Director of National Intelligence, GEN James Clapper, indicated to me and my spouse that he was very happy we had a UFO program at the Pentagon and was proud that I ran it. **(Attachment 11)**

February 2018 – After the publishing of a New York Times article about AATIP, and my role, I received several more telephone calls from former associates who stated that Mr. Reid had launched an investigation against me through the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), in the hopes of finding derogatory information about me and/or to substantiate his claim of mental instability. I was also notified that my DoD computer systems were confiscated in an attempt to determine if I had taken any information with me in an unauthorized manner.

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March 2018 – I was informed by a member of the DoD IG that Mr. Garry Reid was under a formal Inspector General (IG) investigation for inappropriate relations with [REDACTED], and an additional accusation of possible sexual harassment against one of my former subordinates, [REDACTED]. Later that year, I was interviewed by two representatives from DoD IG regarding the conduct of Mr. Garry Reid. I explained that I did not trust Mr. Garry Reid based upon personal observations while employed as a DoD civilian. I also indicated that there was a strong likelihood of Mr. Garry Reid seeking retribution against me for leaving the Department in the manner I did. **(results available within controlled DoD IG channels)** I was assured by DoD IG personnel that this threat was unconscionable.

2019 – Under a Freedom of Information Act request by a member of the media, it was revealed that an official U.S. AFOSI investigation was conducted regarding three unclassified videos that were authorized for release. In this investigation, there were no findings of me conducting any kind of Unauthorized Disclosure **(Attachment 12 and Attachment 13)**.

Note: I was contacted on April 21, 2021, by Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, Special Agent, [REDACTED] advising I was required to submit to a "new interview" for my security clearance even though it was just adjudicated (approved) in January 2021. I engaged with [REDACTED] twice: April 26, 2021 and April 27, 2021 in this new interview. One of the inaccurate allegations [REDACTED] stated was that the three videos were released inappropriately by me. She was unaware of the previous AFOSI investigation that concluded no wrongdoing on my part related to this specific matter.

2019 – Several internet bloggers were notified by the new Public Affairs Officer, Mr. Sherwood, that I had no duties regarding AATIP and that AATIP did not involve the study of UAPs. As a result, the bloggers began to disseminate reporting, accusing me of being a fabricator. At this point, I initiated a telephone call with Mr. Sherwood directly, in which he indicated that he "was not happy with the way this was being handled internally with the Department," and that he "was aware I ran AATIP, but forces within the building were telling him not to admit it". He also indicated that he is trying to write a new statement because the Navy substantiated my claims of working with AATIP, and [REDACTED] had called him personally to express his disappointment about the false claims by the Department. **(Attachment 14)**

2020 – Without any resolution, a new PAO was assigned to respond to media inquiries regarding AATIP: Ms. Susan Gough. Ms. Gough is also a U.S. Army Reservist in Psychological Operations. During Ms. Gough's tenure, the PAO statements became increasingly inaccurate, and continued to change on a daily basis. As a result of the blatantly inaccurate and repeated false statements by Ms. Gough, I wrote an e-mail directly to her on June 3, 2020, where I addressed the specific issues and provided ample sources in which she could verify my position. Despite several attempts to correct the record, Ms. Gough never responded to my email, refused to address the issue, and has continuously provided false statements to the press, even as recently as this week. **(Attachment 15)**

2021 – In January of this year, a FOIA response by the Pentagon confirmed the fact that Ms. Gough has sidestepped Pentagon Protocol and has inserted herself into the official FOIA process to ensure a consistent "message" is maintained. This appears to be circumventing the official FOIA processes that have long been established to protect the American people and the integrity of information being provided to them. FOIA requests and responses are to be submitted to trained and designated FOIA personnel and not a PAO. The fact that Ms. Gough has inserted herself into this process

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preemptively further emphasizes that the FOIA process, enacted in U.S. Law, is being subverted. **(Attachments 16, 17, 18)**

2021 – As of May, I am now under increased scrutiny regarding my security clearance. The investigative body is the Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency (DCSA). Despite a previous favorable AFOSI investigation, I am under accusation of releasing the videos in an unauthorized manner. In addition, other false allegations have been made against me including statements I never made on the History Channel television show, "Unidentified: Inside America's UFO Investigation". It should be noted that DCSA falls directly under the cognizance of Mr. Garry Reid. At one point during my conversation with the investigator, [REDACTED], the discussion involved my role in AATIP. As I explained my former leadership role, [REDACTED] interrupted me and stated, "No one is arguing the fact you ran AATIP; this issue is regarding the videos." I was shocked and surprised to hear this given the current public stance of Ms. Gough. If the investigators at DCSA are aware of my role in AATIP, why is the Pentagon taking a different stance, publicly? Furthermore, why am I being re-investigated over an issue after already being exonerated? See Attachments 12 & 13 **(electronic evidence of this conversation can be provided)**

May 2021 – I was recently informed by a member of the media who was conducting a formal Freedom of Information Act request that upon clarifying my roles in AATIP, DoD PAO Ms. Gough indicated in writing that all my records have been destroyed due to a lack of historical significance and could not be reproduced. I was informed that DoD took this action in 2019, despite portions of my work involving legal discovery and evidence as it relates to the upcoming Military Commissions Trial at Guantanamo Bay, in essence, destroying evidence. If this is true, and my records were indeed destroyed, I am unclear how Ms. Gough can maintain I "had no assigned duties" when in fact no records exist. I remain duly concerned that this statement is not only false, but maliciously deceitful and intended to mislead the American people.

As of today, the Pentagon PAO Officer, Ms. Gough continues to assert to the media that I had no involvement in the AATIP program. Fortunately, the original AATIP sponsor has provided official documentation contradicting this obvious attempt to deceive the public. **(Attachment 19)**

Please note, additional information substantiating the above can be provided. It is my sincere concern that I am being unfairly targeted, along with others formerly associated with AATIP, for retribution and may even fall under Whistleblower Protection. There exists a severe conflict of interest and I am being persecuted by having my reputation and credibility constantly challenged and attacked by elements within the Pentagon. The result has impacted me professionally, financially, and personally. Furthermore, the hardship endured by my family has cost us unimaginable pain and suffering.

As a final thought, the US Government is enjoined and must remain committed to serving the interest of the public. This includes being truthful and transparent in all interfaces. I am certain it would be a surprise to many that Ms. Gough has already publicly stated her position regarding this interface. "...Equally fallacious in today's world of instant, worldwide communications is the notion that you can separate military psychological activities from public affairs and public diplomacy. (p. 36 "The Evolution of Strategic Influence" by Lt. Susan L Gough, US Army). I sincerely hope that my

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government does not believe that psychological manipulation of the public is in the best interest of our government and our country.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7012

June 24, 2009

Honorable William Lynn III
Deputy Secretary of Defense
1010 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1010

Dear Secretary Lynn:

Beginning this past September, the U.S. Senate has mandated that the Defense Intelligence Agency assess far-term foreign advanced aerospace threats to the United States. The scope of program interest covers from the present out to forty years and beyond. In order to further our effort in recognizing emerging disruptive aerospace technologies, technical studies are being conducted in regard to advanced lift, propulsion, the use of unconventional materials and controls, signature reduction, weaponry, human interface and human effects.

Since the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AATIP) and study were first commissioned, much progress has been made with the identification of several highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings. Given the current rate of success, the continued study of these subjects will likely lead to technology advancements that in the immediate near-term will require extraordinary protection. Due to the sensitivities of the information surrounding aspects of this program, I require your assistance in establishing a Restricted Special-Access-Program (SAP) with a Bigoted Access List for specific portions of the AATIP.

In order to support this national effort, a small but highly specialized cadre of Department of Defense (DoD) and private sector individuals are necessary. These individuals must be specialized in the areas of advanced sciences, sensors, intelligence/counterintelligence, and advanced aerospace engineering. Given the likelihood that these technologies will be applied to future systems involving space flight, weapons, communications, and propulsion, the standard management and safeguarding procedures for classified information are not sufficient. Even the use of conventional SAP protocols will not adequately ensure that all aspects of the project are properly secured. Although not every aspect of AATIP requires Restricted SAP read-on, the following portions should be maintained at the Restricted SAP level:

- **The methodology used to identify, acquire, study, and engineer the advanced technologies associated with AATIP.**
 - o Specific methodologies used to study unconventional technology may require nuanced approaches that will undoubtedly be of significant interest if not a top priority for adversarial Foreign Intelligence Security Services (FISS).

- o Undue attention by government, or private sector entities, not involved in AATIP or any international interest will directly or indirectly interfere with the daily AATIP mission and perhaps threaten the overall success of the program.
- **Allocation of personnel, support, and oversight.**
 - o Due to the highly specialized nature of the personnel involved with AATIP, the overt acknowledgement of their participation in the program will lead to an unnecessary security and counterintelligence risk.
 - o Occasional assistance from specialized individuals within DoD, the scientific community, or academia may be necessary from time to time based on demonstrated subject matter expertise. Adequate protection of their identities or affiliation is critical to avoid unnecessary scrutiny.
 - o Without the appropriate Restricted SAP protection, the cost associated with a compromise would be significantly higher than the cost associated with a properly administered Restricted SAP.
 - o Protection of industry partnerships and participation is critical. Public awareness of an industry's AATIP affiliation may discourage that industry's further participation with the U.S. Government in this program.
- **Application and engineering.**
 - o The nuanced manner in which some of these technologies will be collected, engineered and applied by the U.S. may require senior level government approval. These decision makers must be afforded the necessary time to make strategic decisions by restricting access to the "big picture" or overall intent of the program to those on a strict Bigoted List.
 - o Associated exotic technologies likely involve extremely sophisticated concepts within the world of quantum mechanics, nuclear science, electromagnetic theory, gravitics, and thermodynamics. Given that all of these have the potential to be used with catastrophic effects by adversaries, an unusually high degree of operational security and read-on discretion is required.

Due to the expertise required to carry out the objectives of this program, we will require a small, specialized group of DoD personnel, who are dedicated to performing the SAP-related functions and executing programmatic requirements within the program. It is essential that the Government & military personnel who are already involved with this program are assigned to further support this program in a Restricted SAP capacity (see Attachment 1). These individuals all currently possess the appropriate security clearances and are already providing unique support to AATIP.


- o Undue attention by government, or private sector entities, not involved in AATIP or any international interest will directly or indirectly interfere with the daily AATIP mission and perhaps threaten the overall success of the program.
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 - o Due to the highly specialized nature of the personnel involved with AATIP, the overt acknowledgement of their participation in the program will lead to an unnecessary security and counterintelligence risk.
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 - o Without the appropriate Restricted SAP protection, the cost associated with a compromise would be significantly higher than the cost associated with a properly administered Restricted SAP.
 - o Protection of industry partnerships and participation is critical. Public awareness of an industry's AATIP affiliation may discourage that industry's further participation with the U.S. Government in this program.
- **Application and engineering.**
 - o The nuanced manner in which some of these technologies will be collected, engineered and applied by the U.S. may require senior level government approval. These decision makers must be afforded the necessary time to make strategic decisions by restricting access to the "big picture" or overall intent of the program to those on a strict Bigoted List.
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Ultimately, the results of AATIP will not only benefit the U.S. Government but I believe will directly benefit DoD in ways not yet imagined. The technological insight and capability gained will provide the U.S. with a distinct advantage over any foreign threats and allow the U.S. to maintain its preeminence as a world leader.

Thank you in advance from your time and consideration of this request. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact Bob Herbert of my staff at (202) 437-3162.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Harry Reid". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

HARRY REID
United States Senator

HR:rth

Attachment 1

Sponsoring Agency: Undetermined (DEPSECDEF)

Component-level SAP Central Office: Undetermined (DEPSECDEF)

Unclassified Nickname: Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP)

Program Length: FY09-FY13 (Preliminary)

Program Funding: FY09-O&M, FY10-FY13-TBD

SAP Category Designation: Intelligence, DoD Acquisition

FY 10 Preliminary Bigoted List of Government Personnel:

1. Honorable William Lynn III, Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gov't)
2. Honorable Senator Harry Reid of Nevada (Gov't)
3. Honorable Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii (Gov't)
4. Robert T. Herbert (U.S. Senate)
5. Dr. James Lacatski, DIA (Gov't)
6. Jay Stratton, ONI (Gov't)
7. [REDACTED]
8. [REDACTED]
9. [REDACTED]
10. Special Agent Luis Elizondo, USDI (Gov't)
11. [REDACTED]

FY 10 Preliminary Bigoted List of Contractor Personnel funded under the AATIP:

1. Robert Bigelow, Bigelow Aerospace Advanced Space Studies LLC (BAASS), (CTR)
2. Dr. Colm Kelleher, BAASS (CTR)
3. Dr. Hal Puthoff, BAASS (CTR)

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. Exemptions 1 and 5 apply.



Pay Pool Employee Evaluation of Record Report

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| Concurrent Request ID: | [REDACTED] |
| Process Name: | |
| Mock Data: | N |
| Pay Pool ID: | [REDACTED] |
| Restrict to Pay Pool ID: | |
| Performance Year: | 2016 |
| Employee Name: | Elizondo, Luis D |
| Rating Official Name: | Not Provided |
| Execute Date/Time: | 14-NOV-2017 12:17:23 |
| Total Number of Members: | 1 |

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| | | |
|--|--|-------------------------------|
| Employee Name Elizondo, Luis D | Position 0132, SUPERVISORY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS SPECIALIST | Grade/Step GG-15/08 |
| Evaluation Period 01-OCT-15 to 30-SEP-16 | Evaluation Type Annual Appraisal - DCIPS | |
| Rating Official Name [REDACTED] | Pay Pool ID [REDACTED] | |

MISSION GOALS

| |
|--|
| <p>MISSION: Manage on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence a national-level Sensitive activity, ensuring all related national security interests and equities remain protected and White House requirements are satisfied.</p> <p>Goal 1- Manage national-level SAP information as the DoD focal point office</p> <p>Goal 2- Support the National Security Council, DoD, and IC Stakeholders</p> <p>Goal 3- Administer national-level SAP access controls</p> <p>Goal 4- Establish and enforce security policies, processes, and procedures to ensure SAP material and information is protected</p> |
|--|

| | |
|---|--|
| PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE NO. 1 | TITLE: SAP Program Management |
| <p>Lead and direct efforts to build and mature a formalized capability within the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence that manages a national-level sensitive activity.</p> <p>Objective 1: Baseline program requirements and compare to other similar activities across the IC and provide leadership with a comprehensive program strategy - March 2016</p> <p>Objective 2: Identify necessary personnel skills and develop a proposed manning document for leadership review with 80% of necessary skill sets identified - April 2016</p> <p>Objective 3: Develop and promulgate additional SAP SOPs to USG equity holders - Jun 2016</p> <p>Objective 4: Provide I&S Front Office an estimate of necessary budget recourses for FY 2016 (including travel) with a 90% accuracy - Jan 2016</p> <p>Objective 5: Engage OUSD(I) OGC on all legal issues and develop a checklist based on specific legal criteria for all appropriate staff package coordinations requiring legal review - Continuing</p> | |
| PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE NO. 2 | TITLE: Support to the National Security Council, DoD and IC |
| <p>Engage all stakeholders to ensure DoD approaches and strategies to protect critical data are adopted by other national-level partners.</p> <p>Objective 1: Provide projections of all security issues for the next three years, analyze the data for trends, and provide leadership with a briefing with a recommended way forward as trials approach - Jun 2016</p> <p>Objective 2: Identify new office space for NPSMS - Jul 2016</p> <p>Objective 3: Conduct site visits to at least six locations under NPSMS cognizance - May 2016</p> <p>Objective 4: Perform classified inventory of at least two locations under NPSMS cognizance - Aug 2016</p> | |
| PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE NO. 3 | TITLE: National SAP Access Controls |
| <p>Manage on behalf of the Department all efforts to protect and secure all SAP aspects of the program. Provide direction and control over those elements engaged in the protection of SAP equities world-wide.</p> <p>Objective 1: Provide counterintelligence assessment for ongoing SAP efforts and provide to DoD senior leadership - Jun 2016</p> <p>Objective 2: Pursue aggressively any allegations of compromise, leaks, or criminal acts involving SAP information and resolve at least 80% - continuing</p> <p>Objective 3: Conduct at least two SAP oversight site visits each at U.S. SOUTHCOM and GTMO - Jun 2016</p> <p>Objective 4: Outsource necessary expertise (via JDAs, detailees, liaisons, contractors, etc) to achieve at least 70% NPSMS manning requirements - Aug 2016</p> | |
| PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE NO. 4 | TITLE: Security Policies, Processes, and Procedures |
| <p>Develop and maintain policies, processes and procedures necessary to manage the security aspect of the SAP. Ensure guidance is made available to subordinate elements and key USG stakeholders have a universal understanding of available guidance so it is consistently applied across the USG.</p> <p>Objective 1: Draft and publish NPSMS standing charter and obtain USD(I) signature - Aug 2016</p> <p>Objective 2: Identify SAP billet shortfalls for OCP and MCDO and staff a request through DDI&I&S for increase - Sep 2016</p> <p>Objective 3: Update NPSMS mission manager authorities and provide to stakeholders- Jul 2016</p> <p>Objective 4: Obtain SAP read-on authority over all Department of justice trial judiciary and habeas personnel - Aug 2016</p> | |



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|--|--|-------------------------------|
| Employee Name Elizondo, Luis D | Position 0132, SUPERVISORY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS SPECIALIST | Grade/Step GG-15/08 |
| Rating Official Name [REDACTED] | Pay Pool ID 01DDAAINIS | |
| Rating Official Signature [REDACTED] | Higher Level Reviewer Signature [REDACTED] | |

RATING OFFICIAL EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

During this rating cycle, Mr. Elizondo's performance was exemplary as the Director of the National Programs Special Management Staff. Despite his name being known by confirmed terrorists and threats to personal safety, he continues to manage a White House Special Access Program (SAP) in a manner that protects U.S. national security interests on a global scale. During this rating cycle, Mr. Elizondo met and exceeded all his performance objectives. As an example, under Mr. Elizondo's leadership, his office identified and neutralized 6 insider threats, referred two terrorist-related criminal incidents to the FBI, addressed 9 SAP data spills, generated 6 security preliminary investigations, co-authored 4 national-level policies involving Covert Action, responded to 10 White House taskings, conducted 10 Site visits, and executed over 300 SAP indoctrinations. It cannot be overstated the importance of Mr. Elizondo's portfolio to national security and the fact that it is directly centered within the number one priority for the Obama Administration and the White House. Mr. Elizondo's efforts have led to a new understanding of terrorist operations and planning within the USG. As remarkable, is Mr. Elizondo's savvy and tenacity to build a capability during times of increased fiscal constraints. Mr. Elizondo's resourcefulness allowed the USD(I) to remain responsive to White House and National Security Council tasking without additional funding or personnel requirements. In short, Mr. Elizondo's performance was outstanding.

REVIEWING OFFICIAL COMMENTS

EVALUATION RATING DESCRIPTORS

5- OUTSTANDING 4- EXCELLENT 3- SUCCESSFUL 2- MINIMALLY SUCCESSFUL 1- UNACCEPTABLE

**PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
OF RECORD**

4 - Excellent



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| | | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| Employee Name: Elizondo, Luis D | Employee Number: [REDACTED] | Evaluation Period: 01-OCT-15 to 30-SEP-16 | Appraisal ID: [REDACTED] |
|---|---------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|

Performance Evaluation of Record Summary

| Performance Objective | Performance Objective Rating |
|--|------------------------------|
| SAP Program Management | 5 |
| Support to the National Security Council, DoD and IC | 4 |
| National SAP Access Controls | 4 |
| Security Policies, Processes, and Procedures | 5 |
| Average Performance Objective Rating | 4.5 |

| Performance Element | Performance Elements Rating |
|---|-----------------------------|
| Accountability for Results | 4 |
| Communication | 5 |
| Critical Thinking | 4 |
| Engagement and Collaboration | 4 |
| Leadership and Integrity | 5 |
| Managerial Proficiency | 5 |
| Average Performance Element Rating | 4.5 |

Overall Rating: 4.5

Performance Evaluation of Record: 4 - Excellent

| Overall Rating Range (Average PO Rating x .60) + (Average PE Rating x .40) | Performance Evaluation of Record | |
|---|----------------------------------|----------------------|
| | Rating | Descriptor |
| 4.6-5.0 | 5 | Outstanding |
| 3.6-4.5 | 4 | Excellent |
| 2.6-3.5 | 3 | Successful |
| 2.0-2.5 | 2 | Minimally Successful |
| <2 or 1 on any performance objective | 1 | Unacceptable |
| All Minimally Successful and Unacceptable Rating Assessments Must Be Addressed in the Assessment Narrative. | | |



CLEARANCE REQUEST FOR PUBLIC RELEASE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION

(See Instructions on back.)

(This form is to be used in requesting review and clearance of DoD information proposed for public release in accordance with DoDD 5230.09.)

TO: (See Note) Chief, Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155
Note: Regular mail address shown above. For drop-off/next day delivery, use:
 Room 2A634, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155

1. DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

| | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| a. TYPE .mpg File (x3) | b. TITLE "GoFast"; "Gimble"; "FLIR" |
| c. PAGE COUNT 3 | d. SUBJECT AREA UAV, Balloons, and other UAS |

2. AUTHOR/SPEAKER

| | | |
|---|-------------------------|--|
| a. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) Elizondo, Luis D. | b. RANK GS-15 | c. TITLE Director, National Programs Special Management Staff, OUSD(I) |
| d. OFFICE NPSMS | | e. AGENCY OUSD(I), DoD |

3. PRESENTATION/PUBLICATION DATA (Date, Place, Event)

Not Applicable. Not for publication. Research and analysis ONLY and info sharing with other USG and industry partners for the purposes of developing a database to help identify, analyze, and ultimately defeat UAS threats.

4. POINT OF CONTACT

| | |
|---|---|
| a. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) Elizondo, Luis D. | b. TELEPHONE NO. (Include Area Code) 703 571-2393 |
|---|---|

5. PRIOR COORDINATION

| | | |
|---|---------------------------------|--|
| a. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) See below POC | b. OFFICE/AGENCY Navy | c. TELEPHONE NO. (Include Area Code) TSVOIP (b)(6) |
|---|---------------------------------|--|

6. REMARKS

OCA is Navy POC: (b)(6) TSVOIP: (b)(6) **CLEARED**
For Open Publication
 Aug 24, 2017
 Department of Defense
 OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW

7. RECOMMENDATION OF SUBMITTING OFFICE/AGENCY

a. THE ATTACHED MATERIAL HAS DEPARTMENT/OFFICE/AGENCY APPROVAL FOR PUBLIC RELEASE (qualifications, if any, are indicated in Remarks section) AND CLEARANCE FOR OPEN PUBLICATION IS RECOMMENDED UNDER PROVISIONS OF DODD 5230.09. I AM A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE (civilian or military), AND NOT A CONTRACTOR, AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THIS RECOMMENDATION FOR RELEASE ON BEHALF OF:

| | |
|--|----------------------------------|
| b. CLEARANCE IS REQUESTED BY _____ (YYYYMMDD) | |
| c. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) | d. TITLE |
| e. OFFICE | f. AGENCY |
| g. SIGNATURE | h. DATE SIGNED (YYYYMMDD) |

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, August 9, 2017 6:22 PM

To: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US); WHS Pentagon ESD Mailbox DOPSR

Subject: RE: (U//~~FOUO~~) ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 3

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Just to be clear... we should consider these files to be ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ until I am able to establish that they are to be considered U//~~FOUO~~.

Thanks again,
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2017 4:51 PM

To: 'Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US)'; WHS Pentagon ESD Mailbox DOPSR

Subject: RE: (U//~~FOUO~~) ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 3

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

I am checking with NAVAIR to ensure these files are UNCLASS and will relay the response.

Thank you for your time and assistance.

V/r,
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US) [mailto:luis.d.elizondo.civ@mail.smil.mil]

Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2017 4:23 PM

To: WHS Pentagon ESD Mailbox DOPSR

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 3

Greetings, I sent a larger e-mail earlier but it appears it was too large to send all at once. As such, I have sent three (3) separate e-mails to facilitate this review. Thank you again for your continued patience.

V/R
Lue
CLASSIFIED BY: NIA-X
DERIVED FROM: ~~ODNL HUMINT ECC dated 20120703~~
DECLASSIFY ON: 50X1-HUM

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, August 9, 2017 4:51 PM
To: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US); WHS Pentagon ESD Mailbox DOPSR
Subject: RE: (U//~~FOUO~~) ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 3

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Thank you for your time and assistance.

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(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US) [mailto:luis.d.elizondo.civ@mail.smil.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2017 4:23 PM
To: WHS Pentagon ESD Mailbox DOPSR
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 3

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Lue
CLASSIFIED BY: NIA-X
DERIVED FROM: ~~ODNI HUMINT SEC dated 20120703~~
DECLASSIFY ON: 50X1-HUM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Russo, Michael C CIV WHS ESD (US)

From: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US)
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2017 9:43 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Fw: ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 1
Attachments: GoFast.wmv

-----Original Message-----

From: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US)
Sent: Wednesday, August 9, 2017 4:20 PM
To: WHS Pentagon ESD Mailbox DOPSR <whs.pentagon.esd.mbx.dopsr@mail.smil.mil>
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 1

Greetings [REDACTED] and thank you once again for your assistance...One more e-mail to follow (three in total due to size limitations).

Per your guidance, please find the attached three .mpg files for your review. Please note, although the files are UNCLASSIFIED, they are being sent via SIPR in the spirit of extra precaution. No locational data is provided in any of the files and therefore there should be no classification issues.

STRATEGIC ISSUE: Unmanned aerial vehicles (balloons, commercial UAVs, private drones such as quadcopters, etc) continue to pose a potential threat to DoD facilities, equipment, and location. Army, Navy, and Air Force have all acknowledged the potential threat by UAS' to DoD equities but no single UNCLASSIFIED repository exists to share this information across all stakeholders.

PURPOSE: Our collective purpose is to eventually establish an UNCLASSIFIED database or "Community of Interest" of related signature data to be accessible by stakeholders such as DIA, the Navy, Defense Industry partners, and perhaps even State, Local & Tribal authorities to catalog and identify specific UAS threats to national security and/or DoD equities. By creating a virtual library to catalog and analyze each event, our hope will be to better understand the capabilities, and ultimately vulnerabilities of these systems.

Please let me know if I can assist any further with this request.
Sincerest Regards,

Lue

Russo, Michael C CIV WHS ESD (US)

From: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US)
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2017 9:44 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 3
Attachments: Gimble Vid.wmv; Elizondo DOPSR Request 20170809.pdf

-----Original Message-----

From: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US)
Sent: Wednesday, August 9, 2017 4:23 PM
To: WHS Pentagon ESD Mailbox DOPSR - [REDACTED]
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 3

Greetings, I sent a larger e-mail earlier but it appears it was too large to send all at once. As such, I have sent three (3) separate e-mails to facilitate this review. Thank you again for your continued patience.

V/R
Lue

[REDACTED]
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

[REDACTED]
Wednesday, August 23, 2017 9:31 AM
Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US)
RE: (U) ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 3

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Lue,

(b)(6) has been in contact and I've explained the situation to him, but wanted to ensure you knew I was still working the request.

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

-----Original Message-----

From: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US)
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2017 9:44 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 3

-----Original Message-----

From: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US)
Sent: Wednesday, August 9, 2017 4:23 PM
To: WHS Pentagon ESD Mailbox DOPSR <[REDACTED]>
Cc: (b)(6) [REDACTED]
Subject: ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 3

Greetings, I sent a larger e-mail earlier but it appears it was too large to send all at once. As such, I have sent three (3) separate e-mails to facilitate this review. Thank you again for your continued patience.

V/R
Lue

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, August 24, 2017 3:20 PM
To: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US)
Cc: (b)(6) OUSD INTEL (US); (b)(6)@navy.mil
Subject: RE: (U//FOUO) (U) ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 3
Attachments: Elizondo DOPSR Request 20170809.pdf

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Lue,

If the Service-level OCA verifies to me (simple one-sentence email is fine) that removing the metadata from the videos makes them UNCLASSIFIED, please feel free to move forward with release.

Videos referenced:
GoFast.wmv
FLIR1.mp4
Ginble Vid.wmv

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

Defense Office of Prepublication & Security Review
Pentagon Room [REDACTED]

NIPR: [REDACTED]
SIPR: [REDACTED]
JWICS: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

-----Original Message-----

From: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US)
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2017 9:39 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: (U//FOUO) ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 3

Thank you sincerely my friend. If it is easier for you or more streamline, then please consider our request for unrestricted release. However, my intent is to maintain positive control but i know it's a bit unique of a situation so whichever is easier for you and quicker. If at all possible, I would like to have authority to move it down to UNCLASS by tomorrow. Again, sorry for the inconvenience, I owe you a coffee and a donut!
Thanks again!

Best,
Lue

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2017 9:31 AM
To: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US) <luis.d.elizondo.civ@mail.smil.mil>
Subject: RE: (U) ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 3

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Lue,

(b)(6) has been in contact and I've explained the situation to him, but wanted to ensure you knew I was still working the request.

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

-----Original Message-----

From: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US)
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2017 9:44 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 3

-----Original Message-----

From: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US)
Sent: Wednesday, August 9, 2017 4:23 PM
To: WHS Pentagon ESD Mailbox DOPSR <[REDACTED]>
Cc: (b)(6) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: ATTN: Russo - DOPSR Request-Part 3

Greetings, I sent a larger e-mail earlier but it appears it was too large to send all at once. As such, I have sent three (3) separate e-mails to facilitate this review. Thank you again for your continued patience.

V/R
Lue

Classified By:
Derived From:
Declassify On:

=====

Thanks Lue. I'm around next week, but then gone week of the 25th on a/l. For specific date/time, just work with [REDACTED] - I'm not allowed to muck around with my calendar... (but I am in the building all day the 20th).

Yep, have a discussion with [REDACTED] tomorrow.
Thanks
Neill

-----Original Message-----

From: Elizondo, Luis, D., Mr., OSD OUSDI
Sent: Monday, September 11, 2017 3:41 PM
To: Tipton, Neill, T., Mr., OSD OUSDI
Subject: Update

Greetings Neil,
A couple quick items for you...

- 1) Front office is aware that you are now part of this endeavor and they are happy with the decision. We will plan on you meeting [REDACTED] next week.
- 2) How does this Wednesday look for an hour discussion?
- 3) Lastly, [REDACTED] is a friend of the program. I believe you may be speaking with him tomorrow. He is a good man. Just thought you should know...

As always,

[REDACTED]

Elizondo, Luis, D., Mr., OSD OUSDI

From: Tipton, Neill, T., Mr., OSD OUSDI
Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 11:17 AM
To: Elizondo, Luis, D., Mr., OSD OUSDI
Subject: RE: Program Meeting

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

Thanks Lue. All good - although, at some point I need to know what this actually "is"
Thanks
Neill

-----Original Message-----

From: Elizondo, Luis, D., Mr., OSD OUSDI
Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 10:35 AM
To: Tipton, Neill, T., Mr., OSD OUSDI
Subject: RE: Program Meeting

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

Neil, as discussed, thanks for your time with this. As the principal SES in your Directorate, I think you are certainly the appropriate representative to help take our effort to a new level.

I think by now you probably already know I have been managing another "nuanced" effort within the Department for some time. In fact, even when I worked for you years ago you probably guessed I was also working another effort for the Department given some of our discussion and raw video.

I can't overstate how important I believe this portfolio is with respect to our collective National Security. So you are aware, I have already laid the foundations with SECDEF's front office (and they support it) to transfer the portfolio under you given your new focus on Special Projects for the Department and USD(I). The front office will also brief up the new USD(I) once he arrives but id hesitant to brief anyone else at this point so please keep this at our level for now. Initially, I was going to approach [REDACTED] but when he handed over the reigns to you, I figured you would be the perfect fit.

In the coming weeks, I ask you to attend a few meetings with me at the front office in order that you can meet the rest of the players within the building. Later, I will also introduce you to some of our partners in industry and other agencies who are helping lead the charge. Ultimately, I will need your help analyzing and exploiting material (this was the area [REDACTED] was particularly helpful with). I have a facility I need to show you that you will be able to use.

As always, I sincerely appreciate your help with this and look forward to working with/for you once again. I can't think of a better guy to be involved with this.

Best,
Lue

P.S. let me know when you want to go kill some fish! I have access to an awesome 35 Trojan that is a serious fishing machine in the Bay! I'll buy the bait!

-----Original Message-----

From: Tipton, Neill, T., Mr., OSD OUSDI
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2017 8:05 AM
To: Elizondo, Luis, D., Mr., OSD OUSDI; 'McKernan, Brennan P. ([REDACTED])
Cc: [REDACTED] OSD OUSDI
Subject: RE: Program Meeting

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
=====

Thanks Lue.

Added [REDACTED] to help with scheduling.
Thanks
Neill

-----Original Message-----

From: Elizondo, Luis, D., Mr., OSD OUSDI
Sent: Tuesday, August 22, 2017 3:17 PM
To: 'McKernan, Brennan P. ([REDACTED])
Cc: Tipton, Neill, T., Mr., OSD OUSDI
Subject: Program Meeting

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
=====

Greetings Brennan,
I briefly spoke to Mr. Neil Tipton (CC'd above) about our collective efforts and the interest expressed by the front office. Upon your return, I recommend we meet with Mr. Tipton briefly in person. He is amicable for a discussion and is aware of [REDACTED] previous portfolio. Mr. Tipton is now the Acting Director, Defense Intelligence for Technical Collection and Special Programs.

Neil, as soon as Brennan returns from leave, we will schedule a quick meeting as promised. Brennan is our Navy counterpart.

Very Best/Very Respectfully,
Lue

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
=====

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
=====

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US)

From: Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL (US)
Sent: Tuesday, October 3, 2017 8:19 AM
To: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US)
Cc: Mckernan, Brennan P CIV [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: DRAFT DepSECDEF letter (UNCLASSIFIED)
Signed By: [REDACTED]

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Getting spun back up. Will read and get thoughts back today or tomorrow (at Ft Meade half the day today).

-----Original Message-----

From: Elizondo, Luis D CIV (US)
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2017 11:23 AM
To: Tipton, Neill T SES OSD OUSD INTEL (US) <[REDACTED]>
Cc: Mckernan, Brennan P CIV USN DCNO N2N6 (US) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: DRAFT DepSECDEF letter (UNCLASSIFIED)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Greetings Neil,

Per SECDEF's Front Office guidance to you and me, I took the liberty of drafting a memo at the Unclassified level that helps you better assume the new responsibilities for AATIP. At your convenience, please review (it's very short on purpose) and let me know if you want me to put more meet on it. Brennan, same with you please...No pride in authorship, just want to make sure we answer the mail for the front office.

Standing by...

V/R
Lue

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Classified By:
Derived From:
Declassify On:

=====
Thanks Lue. I'm around next week, but then gone week of the 25th on a/l. For specific date/time, just work with [REDACTED] - I'm not allowed to muck around with my calendar... (but I am in the building all day the 20th).

Yep, have a discussion with [REDACTED] tomorrow.
Thanks
Neill

-----Original Message-----

From: Elizondo, Luis, D., Mr., OSD OUSDI
Sent: Monday, September 11, 2017 3:41 PM
To: Tipton, Neill, T., Mr., OSD OUSDI
Subject: Update

Greetings Neil,
A couple quick items for you...

- 1) Front office is aware that you are now part of this endeavor and they are happy with the decision. We will plan on you meeting [REDACTED] next week.
- 2) How does this Wednesday look for an hour discussion?
- 3) Lastly, [REDACTED] is a friend of the program. I believe you may be speaking with him tomorrow. He is a good man. Just thought you should know...



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR: RECORD

SUBJECT: Letter of Resignation & Differed Retirement

Mr. Secretary;

It has been my sincere honor and pleasure to have served with some of America's finest men and women in both peace time and in war. For over 22 years, I have been blessed to learn from, and work with world-class leadership, you certainly being among the very best.

With that in mind, bureaucratic challenges and inflexible mindsets continue to plague the Department at all levels. This is particularly true regarding the controversial topic of anomalous aerospace threats. Despite overwhelming evidence at both the unclassified and classified levels, certain individuals in the Department remain staunchly opposed to further research on what could be a tactical threat to our pilots, sailors, and soldiers, and perhaps even an existential threat to our national security. In many instances, there seems to be a direct correlation the phenomena exhibits with respect to our nuclear and military capabilities. The Department must take serious the many accounts by the Navy and other Services of unusual aerial systems interfering with military weapon platforms and displaying beyond next generation capabilities. Underestimating or ignoring these potential threats is not in the best interest of the Department no matter the level of political contention. There remains a vital need to ascertain capability and intent of these phenomena for the benefit of the armed forces and the nation.

For this reason, effective 4 October 2017, I humbly submit my resignation in hopes it will encourage you to ask the hard questions: "who else knows?", what are their capabilities?", and "why aren't we spending more time and effort on the issue?". As I transition to a new chapter of my life, please know it has been an honor and privilege of a lifetime to serve with you. Rest assure, no matter where the path of life may lead me, I will always have the best interest of the Department and the American people as my guiding principle.

Luis D. Elizondo
Director
National Programs Special Management Staff
OUSD(I)

Glowing Auras and 'Black Money': The Pentagon's Mysterious U.F.O. Program

By Helene Cooper, Ralph Blumenthal and Leslie Kean

Dec. 16, 2017

WASHINGTON — In the \$600 billion annual Defense Department budgets, the \$22 million spent on the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program was almost impossible to find.

Which was how the Pentagon wanted it.

For years, the program investigated reports of unidentified flying objects, according to Defense Department officials, interviews with program participants and records obtained by The New York Times. It was run by a military intelligence official, Luis Elizondo, on the fifth floor of the Pentagon's C Ring, deep within the building's maze.

The Defense Department has never before acknowledged the existence of the program, which it says it shut down in 2012. But its backers say that, while the Pentagon ended funding for the effort at that time, the program remains in existence. For the past five years, they say, officials with the program have continued to investigate episodes brought to them by service members, while also carrying out their other Defense Department duties.

The shadowy program — parts of it remain classified — began in 2007, and initially it was largely funded at the request of Harry Reid, the Nevada Democrat who was the Senate majority leader at the time and who has long had an interest in space phenomena. Most of the money went to an aerospace research company run by a billionaire entrepreneur and longtime friend of Mr. Reid's, Robert Bigelow, who is currently working with NASA to produce expandable craft for humans to use in space.

On CBS's "60 Minutes" in May, Mr. Bigelow said he was "absolutely convinced" that aliens exist and that U.F.O.s have visited Earth.



Harry Reid, the former Senate majority leader, has had a longtime interest in space phenomena. Al Drago/The New York Times

Working with Mr. Bigelow's Las Vegas-based company, the program produced documents that describe sightings of aircraft that seemed to move at very high velocities with no visible signs of propulsion, or that hovered with no apparent means of lift.

Officials with the program have also studied videos of encounters between unknown objects and American military aircraft — including one released in August of a whitish oval object, about the size of a commercial plane, chased by two Navy F/A-18F fighter jets from the aircraft carrier Nimitz off the coast of San Diego in 2004.

Mr. Reid, who retired from Congress this year, said he was proud of the program. "I'm not embarrassed or ashamed or sorry I got this thing going," Mr. Reid said in a recent interview in Nevada. "I think it's one of the good things I did in my congressional service. I've done something that no one has done before."

Two other former senators and top members of a defense spending subcommittee — Ted Stevens, an Alaska Republican, and Daniel K. Inouye, a Hawaii Democrat — also supported the program. Mr. Stevens died in 2010, and Mr. Inouye in 2012.

While not addressing the merits of the program, Sara Seager, an astrophysicist at M.I.T., cautioned that not knowing the origin of an object does not mean that it is from another planet or galaxy. "When people claim to observe truly unusual phenomena, sometimes it's worth investigating seriously," she said. But, she added, "what people sometimes don't get about science is that we often have phenomena that remain unexplained."

James E. Oberg, a former NASA space shuttle engineer and the author of 10 books on spaceflight who often debunks U.F.O. sightings, was also doubtful. "There are plenty of prosaic events and human perceptual traits that can account for these stories," Mr. Oberg said. "Lots of people are active in the air and don't want others to know about it. They are happy to lurk unrecognized in the noise, or even to stir it up as camouflage."

Still, Mr. Oberg said he welcomed research. "There could well be a pearl there," he said.

In response to questions from The Times, Pentagon officials this month acknowledged the existence of the program, which began as part of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Officials insisted that the effort had ended after five years, in 2012.

"It was determined that there were other, higher priority issues that merited funding, and it was in the best interest of the DoD to make a change," a Pentagon spokesman, Thomas Crosson, said in an email, referring to the Department of Defense.

But Mr. Elizondo said the only thing that had ended was the effort's government funding, which dried up in 2012. From then on, Mr. Elizondo said in an interview, he worked with officials from the Navy and the C.I.A. He continued to work out of his Pentagon office until this past October, when he resigned to protest what he characterized as excessive secrecy and internal opposition.

"Why aren't we spending more time and effort on this issue?" Mr. Elizondo wrote in a resignation letter to Defense Secretary Jim Mattis.

Pentagon officials say the program ended in 2012, five years after it was created, but the official who led it said that only the government funding had ended then. Charles Dharapak/Associated Press

Mr. Elizondo said that the effort continued and that he had a successor, whom he declined to name.

U.F.O.s have been repeatedly investigated over the decades in the United States, including by the American military. In 1947, the Air Force began a series of studies that investigated more than 12,000 claimed U.F.O. sightings before it was officially ended in 1969. The project, which included a study code-named Project Blue Book, started in 1952, concluded that most sightings involved stars, clouds, conventional aircraft or spy planes, although 701 remained unexplained.

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Robert C. Seamans Jr., the secretary of the Air Force at the time, said in a memorandum announcing the end of Project Blue Book that it "no longer can be justified either on the ground of national security or in the interest of science."

Mr Reid said his interest in U F O s came from Mr Bigelow In 2007, Mr Reid said in the interview, Mr Bigelow told him that an official with the Defense Intelligence Agency had approached him wanting to visit Mr. Bigelow's ranch in Utah, where he conducted research.

Mr. Reid said he met with agency officials shortly after his meeting with Mr. Bigelow and learned that they wanted to start a research program on U F O s Mr Reid then summoned Mr Stevens and Mr Inouye to a secure room in the Capitol

"I had talked to John Glenn a number of years before," Mr. Reid said, referring to the astronaut and former senator from Ohio, who died in 2016 Mr Glenn, Mr Reid said, had told him he thought that the federal government should be looking seriously into U F O s, and should be talking to military service members, particularly pilots, who had reported seeing aircraft they could not identify or explain.

Luis Elizondo, who led the Pentagon effort to investigate U.F.O.s until October. He resigned to protest what he characterized as excessive secrecy and internal opposition to the program. Justin T. Gellerson for The New York Times

The sightings were not often reported up the military's chain of command, Mr Reid said, because service members were afraid they would be laughed at or stigmatized.

The meeting with Mr. Stevens and Mr. Inouye, Mr. Reid said, "was one of the easiest meetings I ever had."

He added, "Ted Stevens said, 'I've been waiting to do this since I was in the Air Force'" (The Alaska senator had been a pilot in the Army's air force, flying transport missions over China during World War II.)

During the meeting, Mr. Reid said, Mr. Stevens recounted being tailed by a strange aircraft with no known origin, which he said had followed his plane for miles

None of the three senators wanted a public debate on the Senate floor about the funding for the program, Mr. Reid said. "This was so-called black money," he said "Stevens knows about it, Inouye knows about it But that was it, and that's how we wanted it" Mr Reid was referring to the Pentagon budget for classified programs.

Robert Bigelow, a billionaire entrepreneur and longtime friend of Mr. Reid, received most of the money allocated for the Pentagon program. On CBS's "60 Minutes" in May, Mr. Bigelow said he was "absolutely convinced" that aliens exist and that U.F.O.s have visited Earth. Isaac Brekken for The New York Times

Contracts obtained by The Times show a congressional appropriation of just under \$22 million beginning in late 2008 through 2011. The money was used for management of the program, research and assessments of the threat posed by the objects.

The funding went to Mr. Bigelow's company, Bigelow Aerospace, which hired subcontractors and solicited research for the program.

Under Mr. Bigelow's direction, the company modified buildings in Las Vegas for the storage of metal alloys and other materials that Mr. Elizondo and program contractors said had been recovered from unidentified aerial phenomena. Researchers also studied people who said they had experienced physical effects from encounters with the objects and examined them for any physiological changes. In addition, researchers spoke to military service members who had reported sightings of strange aircraft.

"We're sort of in the position of what would happen if you gave Leonardo da Vinci a garage-door opener," said Harold E. Puthoff, an engineer who has conducted research on extrasensory perception for the C.I.A. and later worked as a contractor for the program. "First of all, he'd try to figure out what is this plastic stuff. He wouldn't know anything about the electromagnetic signals involved or its function."

The program collected video and audio recordings of reported U.F.O. incidents, including footage from a Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet showing an aircraft surrounded by some kind of glowing aura traveling at high speed and rotating as it moves. The Navy pilots can be heard trying to understand what they are seeing. "There's a whole fleet of them," one exclaims. Defense officials declined to release the location and date of the incident.

"Internationally, we are the most backward country in the world on this issue," Mr. Bigelow said in an interview. "Our scientists are scared of being ostracized, and our media is scared of the stigma. China and Russia are much more open and work on this with huge organizations within their countries. Smaller countries like Belgium, France, England and South American countries like Chile are more open, too. They are proactive and willing to discuss this topic, rather than being held back by a juvenile taboo."

By 2009, Mr. Reid decided that the program had made such extraordinary discoveries that he argued for heightened security to protect it. "Much progress has been made with the identification of several highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings," Mr. Reid said in a letter to William Lynn III, a deputy defense secretary at the time, requesting that it be designated a "restricted special access program" limited to a few listed officials.

A 2009 Pentagon briefing summary of the program prepared by its director at the time asserted that "what was considered science fiction is now science fact," and that the United States was incapable of defending itself against some of the technologies discovered. Mr. Reid's request for the special designation was denied.

Mr. Elizondo, in his resignation letter of Oct. 4, said there was a need for more serious attention to "the many accounts from the Navy and other services of unusual aerial systems interfering with military weapon platforms and displaying beyond-next-generation capabilities." He expressed his frustration with the limitations placed on the program, telling Mr. Mattis that "there remains a vital need to ascertain capability and intent of these phenomena for the benefit of the armed forces and the nation."

Mr. Elizondo has now joined Mr. Puthoff and another former Defense Department official, Christopher K. Mellon, who was a deputy assistant secretary of defense for intelligence, in a new commercial venture called To the Stars Academy of Arts and Science. They are speaking publicly about their efforts as their venture aims to raise money for research into U.F.O.s.

In the interview, Mr. Elizondo said he and his government colleagues had determined that the phenomena they had studied did not seem to originate from any country. "That fact is not something any government or institution should classify in order to keep secret from the people," he said.

For his part, Mr. Reid said he did not know where the objects had come from. "If anyone says they have the answers now, they're fooling themselves," he said. "We do not know."

But, he said, "we have to start someplace."

POLITICO



Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images

DEFENSE

The Pentagon's Secret Search for UFOs

Funded at the request of Harry Reid, the program probed a number of encounters military pilots had with aircraft they believed didn't operate like anything they had seen before.

By **BRYAN BENDER** | December 16, 2017

he Pentagon, at the direction of Congress, a decade ago quietly set up a multimillion-dollar program to investigate what are popularly known as unidentified flying objects—UFOs.

The “unidentified aerial phenomena” claimed to have been seen by pilots and other military personnel appeared vastly more advanced than those in American or foreign arsenals. In some cases they maneuvered so unusually and so fast that they seemed to defy the laws of physics, according to multiple sources directly involved in or briefed on the effort and a review of unclassified Defense Department and congressional documents.

The Advanced Aviation Threat Identification Program, whose existence was not classified but operated with the knowledge of an extremely limited number of officials, was the brainchild of then-Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.), who first secured the appropriation to begin the program in 2009 with the support of the late Senators Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) and Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), two World War II veterans who were similarly concerned about the potential national security implications, the sources involved in the effort said. The origins of the program, the existence of which the Pentagon confirmed on Friday, are being revealed publicly for the first time by POLITICO and the *New York Times* in nearly simultaneous reports on Saturday.

One possible theory behind the unexplained incidents, according to a former congressional staffer who described the motivations behind the program, was that a foreign power—perhaps the Chinese or the Russians—had developed next-generation technologies that could threaten the United States.

“Was this China or Russia trying to do something or has some propulsion system we are not familiar with?” said a former staffer who spoke with POLITICO on condition of anonymity.

The revelation of the program could give a credibility boost to UFO theorists, who have long pointed to public accounts by military pilots and others describing phenomena that defy obvious explanation, and could fuel demands for increased transparency about the scope and findings of the Pentagon effort, which focused some of its inquiries into sci-fi sounding concepts like “wormholes” and “warp drives.” The program also drafted a series of what the office referred to as “queried unverified event under evaluation,” QUEU reports, in which pilots and other personnel who had reported encounters were interviewed about their experiences.

Reid initiated the program, which ultimately spent more than \$20 million, through an earmark after he was persuaded in part by aerospace titan and hotel chain founder Bob Bigelow, a friend and fellow Nevadan who owns Bigelow Aerospace, a space technology company and government contractor. Bigelow, whose company received some of the

research contracts, was also a regular contributor to Reid's reelection campaigns, campaign finance records show, at least \$10,000 from 1998 to 2008. Bigelow has spoken openly in recent years about his views that extraterrestrial visitors frequently travel to Earth. He also purchased the Skinwalker Ranch in Utah, the subject of intense interest among believers in UFOs. Reid and Bigelow did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

According to a Pentagon official, the AATIP program was ended "in the 2012 time frame," but it has recently attracted attention because of the resignation in early October of Luis Elizondo, the career intelligence officer who ran the initiative. In his resignation letter, addressed to Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Elizondo said the efforts of his program were not being taken sufficiently seriously. The Pentagon official could not confirm Mattis had actually seen the letter.

"We tried to work within the system," Elizondo told POLITICO in a recent interview. "We were trying to take the voodoo out of voodoo science."

He described scores of unexplained sightings by Navy pilots and other observers of aircraft with capabilities far beyond what is currently considered aerodynamically possible. The sightings, Elizondo told POLITICO, were often reported in the vicinity of nuclear facilities, either ships at sea or power plants. "We had never seen anything like it."

But, in his view military leadership did not appear alarmed by the potential threat. "If a Russian 'Bear' bomber comes in near California, it is all over the news," he said. "These are coming in the skies over our facilities. Nothing but crickets."

Shortly after his resignation, Elizondo was listed as one of the key players in a for-profit company called To The Stars Academy of Arts and Sciences, co-founded by Tom DeLonge, an entertainment mogul and former guitarist and vocalist for the rock band Blink-182. An April 2016 profile of DeLonge in "Rolling Stone" magazine described his fascination with theories about extraterrestrial space travel as an "obsession."

In a video advertising the company, DeLonge describes To The Stars as a "public benefit corporation" that has "mobilized a team of the most experienced, connected and passionately curious minds from the U.S. intelligence community, including the CIA, Department of Defense, who have been operating under the shadows of top secrecy for decades."

The founders say they believe "there is sufficient credible evidence of UAP [unidentified aerial phenomenon] that proves exotic technologies exist that could revolutionize the human experience."

The goal of the academy's researchers, it says on its website, is "to use their expertise and credibility to bring transformative science and engineering out of the shadows and collaborate with global citizens to apply that knowledge in a way that benefits humanity," adding "without government restrictions."

Also helping drive the effort is Chris Mellon, a former Democratic staff director for the Senate Intelligence Committee and former deputy assistant secretary of defense for intelligence. Other members of the company include a former high-level CIA official and the former director of advanced systems at Lockheed Martin's super-secret Skunk Works facility in California.

"I think we're all frustrated by the fact that our government and science neglects some of the most interesting and provocative and potentially important issues out there," Mellon says in the video.

POLITICO learned of the Pentagon program earlier this fall, shortly after Mellon and his colleagues rolled out their new private effort, which is now seeking investors with a minimum purchase of \$200 in common stock shares. Its website claims 2,142 investors, who have purchased slightly more than \$2 million worth of shares.

At a recent press conference for To The Stars in Las Vegas, Mellon described one of the sightings reported by U.S. Navy pilots: "It is white, oblong, some 40 feet long and perhaps 12 feet thick ... The pilots are astonished to see the object suddenly reorient itself toward the approaching F/A-18. In a series of discreet tumbling maneuvers that seem to defy the laws of physics, the object takes a position directly behind the approaching F/A-18. The pilots capture gun camera footage and infrared imagery of the object. They are outmatched by a technology they've never seen."

"They did not exhibit overt hostility," Elizondo, listed as director of global security and special programs for To The Stars, explained in a recent published interview of the series of reported encounters. "But something unexplained is always assumed to be a potential threat until we are certain it isn't. On the bright side, I believe we are closer than ever before in our understanding of how it operates."

The Pentagon's AATIP program marked a 21st-century effort to replicate some of the decades of inconclusive research undertaken by the Pentagon in 1950s and 1960s to try to explain thousands of reported sightings of unidentified flying objects, or UFOs, by military and civilian pilots and average citizens—particularly an effort known as Project Bluebook that ran from 1947 to 1969 and is still a focus of intense interest for UFO researchers.

The more recent effort, which was established inside the Defense Intelligence Agency, compiled “reams of paperwork,” but little else, the former staffer said.

Pentagon spokeswoman Dana White confirmed to POLITICO that the program existed and was run by Elizondo. But she could not say how long he was in charge of it and declined to answer detailed questions about the office or its work, citing concerns about the closely held nature of the program.

“The Advanced Aviation Threat Identification Program ended in the 2012 time frame,” White said. “It was determined that there were other, higher priority issues that merited funding and it was in the best interest of the DoD to make a change.”

White added: “The DoD takes seriously all threats and potential threats to our people, our assets, and our mission and takes action whenever credible information is developed.”

But some who were aware of the effort in its earliest days were uncomfortable with the aims of the program, unnerved by the implication that the incidents involved aircraft that were not made by humans.

“I thought it was a little bizarre at the time,” recalled a former senior intelligence official who knew about Reid’s role first-hand. He asked those in the know: “Tell me what this is, and what we are doing and what is going on and that we aren’t doing something that is nonsense here.”

“I was concerned the money was being funneled through it to somebody else who was an associate of Harry Reid’s,” added the former official, who asked not to be identified. “The whole circle was kind of a bizarre piece.”

Reid enlisted the support of Inouye, then chairman of the powerful Appropriations Committee, as well as Stevens, who two sources involved in the effort were told had related to Reid that as a pilot he had personally witnessed similar unexplained aerial phenomenon.

There was also interest among some analysts at the DIA who were concerned that the Russians or Chinese might have developed some more advanced systems. Reid’s views on the subject were also shaped by a book about the Skinwalker Ranch, co-authored by his acquaintance George Knapp, the former congressional staffer said.

“When this was brought to Senator Reid he said, “There is enough here and I am obligated if this is a national security issue to invest some money in this,” he explained. “Stevens and Inouye agreed with this.”

“I still remember coming back from that meeting and thinking of the implications of what Reid said,” the former senior official said. “I remember being concerned about this. I wanted to make sure it was supervised and we were using the appropriation to do actual research on real threats to the United States.

He said he was assured that the research being done was valid. “It was not a rogue individual out of control.”

The former staffer said that eventually, however, even Reid agreed it was not worth continuing.

“After a while the consensus was we really couldn’t find anything of substance,” he recalled. “They produced reams of paperwork. After all of that there was really nothing there that we could find. It all pretty much dissolved from that reason alone—and the interest level was losing steam. We only did it a couple years.”

“There was really nothing there that we could justify using taxpayer money,” he added. “We let it die a slow death. It was well-spent money in the beginning.”

Theodoric Meyer and Gabriel DeBenedetti contributed to this report.



| | | |
|--|--|--|
| FILE NUMBER 3290517356125 | AFOSI INVESTIGATIVE COMMUNICATION | DATE OF TRANSMITTAL 20180421 |
| TO: Office of the Secretary of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301 | | FROM: AFOSI Detachment 334 1165 Air Force Pentagon, Room 5E1037 Washington, DC 20330 |
| SUBJECT (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Air Force Office of Special Investigations Detachment 334, Case#: 3290517356125, December 2017, Det 334, 12/17, Unauthorized Disclosure of Potentially Classified DOD Videos . | | |
| REFERENCES | | |
| ITEM(S) CHECKED ARE APPLICABLE TO ABOVE SUBJECT | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 1. INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN INITIATED AND REPORTS WILL BE FORWARDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. | |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | 2. THIS MATTER IS PENDING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLOSED | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 3. REQUEST REPORT OF ACTION TAKEN (AFR 124-4) | |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | 4. NOTE RESTRICTIVE LEGENDS ON FRONT OF THE ATTACHMENT(S) | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 5. REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS AS TO DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE LISTED BELOW | |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | 6. ATTACHED IS FORWARDED FOR INFORMATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACTION | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 7. INVESTIGATION/SUMMARY ATTACHED | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 8. REQUEST STATUS OF THIS MATTER AND/OR DATE REPORT MAY BE EXPECTED | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 9. REFER ATTACHED TO INTERESTED COMMANDER FOR INFORMATION OR ACTION IF NOT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED | |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | 10. WHEN ATTACHMENT(S) IS/ARE REMOVED, THE CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CORRESPONDENCE WILL BE RETAINED DOWNGRADED TO CANCELED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARKED "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" | |
| REMARKS CASE AGENT: (U) SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) AFOSI Detachment (Det) 334 Pentagon, Washington, DC. | | |
| BACKGROUND: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) This investigation was initiated on 22 Dec 17 following the 16 Dec 17 release of a video of two F-18 Hornets tracking an unidentified flying object (UFO) to the New York Times news agency. The video in question named "Gimble" was previously classified (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and it was unknown if the proper declassification authorization was gained prior to the release of the video. Civ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (SUBJECT), (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) however, a short time later he disclosed his involvement (to several news outlets) with the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program, which focused research issues on Unidentified Flying Objects. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Prior to SUBJECT's departure from the DoD in October 2017, he submitted a request to have three classified videos downgraded via a DD Form 1910, "CLEARANCE REQUEST FOR PUBLIC RELEASE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION," to Civ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Defense Office of Republication and Security Review, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. The videos were "GoFast," "Gimble," and "FLIR," all three videos were classified (b)(6); (b)(7)(C). The downgrade request was submitted on 9 Aug 17, but there was no indication the request was ever granted. (Agent Note: The DD Form 1910 was the form provided, but was not a form used for the declassification process. The DD 1910 is used for the public release of DoD information.) The request for release there was no indication the videos would be release to any news media outlet. The reason for publication was listed as, "Not Applicable. Not for publication. Research and analysis ONLY and info sharing with other USG and industry partners for the purposes of developing a database to help identify, analyze, and ultimately defeat UAS threats." (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) stated he would not have approved the videos for release to the media. Additionally, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) never received confirmation the videos were declassified. | | |
| NAME, GRADE, TITLE, AND SIGNATURE (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) SA, USAF Commander, AFOSI Det 334 | ATTACHMENT(S) | COPIES TO: 1 - File 1 - USD(I) |

REMARKS (Continued)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) On 9 Mar 18, AFOSI Detachment 334 (DET), Pentagon, Washington, DC, received confirmation from Civ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Unauthorized Disclosure Office, 1550 Crystal City Drive, Arlington, VA the videos released by SUBJECT to the media were determined to be (b)(6); (b)(7)(C). (b)(6); submitted the videos to Civ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Division Head, Naval Air Warfare Center - Aircraft Division, Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, who in turn submitted the videos to Civ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Deputy Security Manager, FA-18 Program Office, Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, who sent the lead to the Radar and EO_IR IPT office. The result was "No sensitive symbology or other items of concern."

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) On 12 Mar 18, DET 334 conducted an interview of (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) explained the videos did not go through the proper channels to obtain their declassification, although the videos are (b)(6); (b)(7)(C). (b)(6); stated the videos would not undergo the formal declassification process just because they were inadvertently released to the public. (b)(6); relayed there was no indication the videos were classified in the first place. (b)(6); stated 100% of all F-18 videos go through his office for declassification and public release. (b)(6); stated the videos which SUBJECT released never went through his office. (b)(6); explained there were no identifying features on the videos to determine when or where the videos came from in order to find out who would have originally classified them. This made it difficult to find the exact video. (b)(6); explained individual units kept track of their footage, but did not keep every video. Some videos were kept for training purposes and some for situations such as SUBJECT's public release of unauthorized videos (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) On 13 Apr 18, (b)(6); contacted SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and confirmed that after conducting an official classification review, the three videos obtained by SUBJECT were confirmed to be UNCLASSIFIED. (b)(6); stated the Unauthorized Disclosure Program Management Office considered the matter closed.

CONCLUSION:

AFOSI Det 334 considers this matter closed and will forward the appropriate documentation to the Under Secretary of Defense Intelligence, Pentagon, Washington DC for action.



sherwood



1,848

(OFF THE RECORD/CONFIDENTIAL) Follow-up and Update



Tim McMillan [REDACTED]

to me, CHRIS

Chris and Lue,

It was great to have a chance to chat with both of you this week and I appreciate you making some time f

I will turn in my follow up piece to Popular Mechanic next week. Lue, a I mentioned, I will hare and c handed-off, I intend to start working on the more substantial feature, I've primarily discussed with you C

After speaking with you both this week, I genuinely believe the contention you've faced (especially Lue)

- Going into both your esteemed backgrounds
- The adver ity you've faced tried to get people, politician , or political leader , to con ider the U
- What's not being done, what could be done.

Considering the fact, government coordination is an absolute necessity for TTSA's goals, I understand it with AATIP). That said, when it comes to clearing up some of the contention Lue's faced, I no longer beli

My rea on for aying thi (between u plea e) i today, Su an Gough with OSD (PA), whom handle all U

"The Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) was the name of the overall program. The Advanced Aerospace Weapons Systems Application Program (AAWSAP) was the name of the Bigelow Aero pace Advanced Space Studie (BAASS), LLC. Neither AATIP nor AAWSAP were UAP rel projections over the next 40 years, and to create a center of expertise on advanced aerospace technolog weapons system applications with future technology projections over the next 40 years, and to create c



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REF: AATIP - - ATTENTION: Ms. Gough; Request for Department Action

2 me age

Wed, Jun 3, 2020 at 9:09 AM

TO: [REDACTED]

Ms. Gough,

My name is Luis D. Elizondo, and I am a former staff member of OUSD(I). As you know, since 2017 there has been considerable controversy and confusion generated by your conflicting and often inaccurate statements regarding the AATIP program and my role in it. I am therefore writing today to seek your assistance in correcting the record.

Last fall you released a statement erroneously characterizing the AATIP program, stating, "Neither AATIP nor AAWSAP were UAP related." While I am delighted that you have since corrected the record on this important issue, acknowledging that the program was in fact all about UAPs, you have yet to amend your equally false and misleading comment that I had "no assigned duties in the AATIP program." The truth, as everyone involved in the program knows, is that I ran the program.

After contacting your office to point out the inaccuracy of your statements regarding my role at AATIP, I largely refrained from public comment assuming that you would review this important issue and correct the record. Indeed, your colleague and predecessor, Mr. Sherwood informed me that in light of the Navy's recent admission of my involvement, the Department would be releasing a new statement in the near term that would exonerate me and finally set the record straight.

A year has gone by and I am losing faith in you and your office. Consequently, in a final effort to clarify matters I am providing a list of individuals who can substantiate my lead role in the AATIP program:

The "Honorable Harry Reid"; former Senate Majority Leader and AATIP sponsor

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

“Neil Tipton”; OSD Senior Executive, Director of Defense Intelligence for Special Programs, OUSD(I)

“Jay Stratton”; Senior Executive, Office of Naval Intelligence

“Brennan McKearnan”; GS-15, Office of Naval Intelligence, SAPCO

“Mr. Robert Bigelow”; Lead AATIP Contractor; Bigelow Aerospace

“Dr. Hal Puthoff”; Lead Scientist, AATIP

“Dr. Eric Davis”; Senior Scientist for AATIP

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

“Mr. James Lakatski”; GS-14, former Director of AATIP and AAWSAP-2008-2010, Defense Intelligence Agency

“Mr. Christopher Mellon”; Civilian, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

This is only a partial list of individuals I worked with in AATIP who can substantiate my role. If necessary, I can provide the names of other individuals from the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Senate Staff. Many of these individuals received regular briefings from me and participated in meetings involving the program and its investigation of the UAP phenomenon.

Additionally, I arranged and attended many in person, official briefings for senior OSD staff, accompanied by military pilots and other personnel involved in UAP incidents. Many of these meetings occurred in the Secretary of Defense office

suite which I am certain there are records. If necessary I can supply those names as well, as these meetings occurred frequently and at the behest of senior ranking individuals in the Department. There is also official documentation and records substantiating these meetings and interactions within DoD holdings.

Finally, in the event the above does not suffice, you should know that I transferred my AATIP responsibilities to one of the named individuals above, in writing, and in the presence of other individuals. With this information in hand I cannot imagine any reason you cannot readily clarify the facts and correct the record. As all of these individuals can attest, I remained in the lead role, coordinating and investigating UAP activities in the Department until my resignation from OSD in October 2017.

I have been patient and hopeful for over a year. That is a long time when one's reputation is at stake. Again, I applaud you for finally correcting the record involving AATIP's mission, but your failure to correct the record regarding my involvement in UAP investigations in OSD from 2008 until my departure from OSD in 2017 is contributing to unnecessary misunderstandings and mistrust of both the Department and myself. This is a very serious issue given the impact on my credibility and career prospects, and also the credibility of OSD.

I therefore encourage you to seek whatever information you require (and I am happy to assist you) to ensure the public receives accurate information at the Unclassified level. As you know, there is already great public distrust of the Government regarding the UAP issue. Regrettably, your inconsistent and sometimes erroneous reporting has only intensified the problem.

Although I am confident that via the FOIA process, or through Congressional or press inquiries that the truth will eventually come to light, my hope is to see this issue resolved sooner rather than later. If you are unable or unwilling to correct the record regarding my role on the UAP issue at DoD, I will have no other choice than to seek redress through the press, Congress, and/or the courts.

In that regard, I have to say that my experience and disappointment in your responsiveness is apparently not unique. As distinguished veteran reporter Tyler

Rogoway of The Drive stated in an article in March:

“Simply put, my experience with Susan Gough has been the worst I have had with any of the Defense Department's public affairs personnel, ever. What has transpired, or more accurately what hasn't transpired, over the last six months leaves me with no confidence or trust in this official representing the DoD on the issue.

Having paid a deep personal, emotional, and professional price for your mistakes and inaction over the last year I confess I share Tyler's feelings and frustration. Nevertheless, I am willing to make a final effort to work with you to correct the record in hopes of sparing the Department any additional and unnecessary embarrassment. I hope you will reach out to those above and do so promptly so this matter can be put to rest.

Please feel free to contact me at any time if I can be of assistance.

Sincerely,

Luis Elizondo

To: Tim McMillan [REDACTED]

Wed, Jun 3, 2020 at 9:10 AM

[Quoted text hidden]

Cc: [REDACTED] N CHINFO WASHINGTON DC (USA)
<[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] LT USN CHINFO WASHINGTON DC (USA)
<[REDACTED]>: Gough, Susan L.
(Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) <(b)(6)>
Subject: RE: POC for UAP

Jeff,

Thanks for reaching out...

Megan is correct, from a Public Affairs perspective, all media inquiries on UAPs go to DOD Public Affairs, Sue Gough (cc'd)... keeping me in the loop, as we coordinate closely.

To date, we have not authorized any media interviews on the subject.

Make no comment. The nuances of all this are such that any deviations from the statements that DOD makes result in multiple news stories... and additional FOIA requests at various levels.

If we need to, we'll coordinate with you on specific responses, depending on the questions asked!

Also, generally speaking, we let the normal FOIA process work as it is supposed to... but we have been requesting that FOIA offices coordinate with us on UAP-focused FOIA responses before they hit "reply" so that new terms/language/etc. aren't introduced that complicate the overall messaging efforts.

Additionally, there is now a Security Classification Guidance document (at the SECRET) level, that addresses the UAP issue and what may/may not be discussed publicly. Happy to get that to you if you see the need.

Any questions, feel free to call me!

Regards,

Joe

Joe Gradisher
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret)
N2N6 Strategic Engagements
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] E LCDR USN CHINFO WASHINGTON DC (USA)
<[REDACTED]@navy.mil>
Sent: Friday, July 10, 2020 10:56 AM

From: [Gough, Susan L \(Sue\) CIV OSD PA \(USA\)](#)
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Navy UAP/UFO/Langley AFB/Air Force comment
Date: Thursday, September 19, 2019 10:07:43 PM

Thanks. Are you going to be my main POC on this? Not only do I want to loop you into the team with Navy and CHINFO (as well as DIA, OUSD(I), DOPSR, and OGC when applicable), but there are other reporters asking me for an Air Force contact, for similar questions to what The Drive is asking.

One other thing you need to do is reach out to the Air Force's FOIA office. We need to keep a very, very close eye on FOIA requests for release of UAP videos, to ensure consistency of what does/doesn't get released. Generally so far, at least with Navy vids, we're not releasing them.

Regards,
Sue

From: Singleton, Malinda Maj USAF SAF-PA (USA) [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2019 4:22 PM
To: Gough, Susan L (Sue) CIV OSD PA (USA) [REDACTED]
Cc: Stefanek, Ann M CIV USAF SAF-PA (USA) [REDACTED]; Bailey, Jacob N Capt USAF SAF-PA (USA) [REDACTED]; Mcandrews, Laura M CIV USAF SAF-PA (US) [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] Navy UAP/UFO/Langley AFB/Air Force comment

Hi Sue,

Per our conversation, here is the query we received from The Drive. Understand that we need to coordinate our queries through you before we respond, so you can ensure that we are not unintentionally saying something different than the Navy/other services.

We will keep you posted once we have our draft responses together.

Thanks!

V/R –
Maj. Singleton



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION DIVISION
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155**

Ref: 21-F-0647
CASE SER O3/F0025
March 9, 2021

Mr. Marc Cecotti
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Cecotti:

This is a final response to your January 13, 2021 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Department of the Navy (DON), a copy of which is enclosed for your convenience. We received your request along with four pages determined to be responsive from DON on March 2, 2021 and assigned it FOIA case number 21-F-0647. We ask that you use this number when referring to your request.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD(PA)), a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, has conducted a review of the referred four pages. Ms. Tanya Rose, IM Director, OASD(PA), in her capacity as an Initial Denial Authority has determined that portions of the four pages are exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6), as disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of individuals.

Please note, the Navy Safety Center has instructed that they have provided a separate release determination for the portions withheld in their entirety.

In this instance, fees for processing your request were below the threshold for requiring payment. Please note that fees may be assessed on future request.

If you have any questions or concerns about the foregoing or about the processing of your request, please do not hesitate to contact the Action Officer assigned to your request, Michael Coen at Michael.e.coen2.civ@mail.mil or 571-372-0413. Additionally, if you have concerns about service received by our office, please contact a member of our Leadership Team at 571-372-0498 or Toll Free at 866-574-4970.

Should you wish to inquire about mediation services, you may contact the OSD/JS FOIA Public Liaison, Tonya R. Fuentes, at 571-372-0462 or by email at OSD.FOIALiaison@mail.mil, or the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration. The contact information for OGIS is as follows:



HARRY REID

Senate Majority Leader, 2007-2015
Senate Democratic Leader, 2005-2017

United States Senate, 1987-2017
United States House of Representatives, 1983-1987


April 26, 2021

To whom it may concern:

As the United States Senate Majority Leader, I worked with Republican Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska and Democratic Senator Dan Inouye of Hawaii to secure \$22 million of funding for what would become known as the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP), an unclassified but unpublicized investigatory effort dedicated to studying Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.

As one of the original sponsors of AATIP, I can state as a matter of record Lue Elizondo's involvement and leadership role in this program. Mr. Elizondo is a former intelligence officer who has spent his career working tirelessly in the shadows on sensitive national security matters, including investigating UAPs as the head of AATIP. He performed these duties admirably.

Sincerely,



HARRY REID