V2.

Thanks to the following for corrections/suggestions:

- _jhc, PhD.
- Dr. Avi, MD.
- Alex Malpass, PhD.

Central argument.

Objections.

Supporting arguments.

Bedrock.

Questions.

Answers.

#namethetrait

P1) If all views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait-switching) while retaining moral value, all views in category x are only able to deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p∧¬p.

P2) All views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait-switching) while retaining moral value.

C) Therefore, all views in category x are only able to deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p∧¬p.

- What is "a given human"?
  - Any human who has moral value (on the view being run through NTT).
- What is "a given animal"?
  - Any animal who we want to test for moral consistency with respect to (on the view being being run through NTT).
- What does it mean for a given human to be "reducible" to a given animal?
  - Being reducible refers to a given human being equalized in all its traits to a given animal.
- What is a "trait"?
  - A trait is anything true of the object in question.
- What is "trait-switching"?
  - Trait-switching is the process of altering the traits of one object to match another.
- What is "moral value"?
  - Moral value is the property that causes one to have moral consideration with respect to a given object.
- What makes #namethetrait preferable to Marginal Cases?
  - Multiple things:

    •NTT is valid and sound, MC isn't sound.
    •NTT doesn't assume generalism, MC does by asserting the existence of "property P". Particularists can deny P exists while affirming radically differential moral status for humans and animals on the basis of particulars, thereby rejecting P1 of MC.
    •NTT can process the species normality, species maximality, DNA, and other arbitrary-commonality arguments that enable rejecting P2 and P3 of MC.
    •NTT has fewer premises and words than MC.
    •NTT doesn't require a claim that all humans have moral value.
    •NTT is generalizable to any consistency testing situation via swapping out the words human, animal, and moral value.
- How do I apply NTT to a specific action?
  - As stated above, NTT is generalizable, just swap all uses of the word "moral value" with "stabbing", "killing for burgers", or whatever the specific action may be.

Reject P1.

Reject P2.

Reject C.

α

P1) If all views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait-switching) while retaining moral value, all views in category x are views that affirm the given animal has moral value.

P2) If all views in category x are views that affirm the given animal has moral value, all views in category x are only able to deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p∧¬p.

C) Therefore, if all views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait-switching) while retaining moral value, all views in category x are only able to deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p∧¬p.

You've hit bedrock. Category x is defined as:

The category containing all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait-switching) while retaining moral value.

You've hit bedrock. This argument follows the "modus ponens" rule:

P1) p→q.
P2) p.
C) ∴q.

Reject P1.

Reject P2.

Reject C.

αα

P1) If all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait-switching) while retaining moral value (p) are views that affirm the given animal has moral value (q), then if all views in category x (r) are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait-switching) while retaining moral value (p), all views in category x (r) are views that affirm the given animal has moral value (q).

P2) All views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait-switching) while retaining moral value are views that affirm the given animal has moral value.

C) Therefore, if all views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait-switching) while retaining moral value, all views in category x are views that affirm the given animal has moral value.

αβ

P1) If all views that affirm the given animal has moral value (p) are only able to deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p∧¬p (q), then if all views in category x (r) are views that affirm the given animal has moral value (p), all views in category x (r) are only able to deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p∧¬p (q).

P2) All views that affirm the given animal has moral value are only able to deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p∧¬p.

C) Therefore, if all views in category x are views that affirm the given animal has moral value, all views in category x are only able to deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p∧¬p.

You've hit bedrock. This argument follows the "hypothetical syllogism" rule:

P1) p→q.
P2) q→r.
C) ∴p→r.

Reject P1.

Reject P2.

Reject C.

You've hit bedrock, this premise is just an affirmation of the "modus barbara" syllogism:

P1) All p are q.
P2) All r are p.
C) ∴ all r are q.

You've hit bedrock. It's taken for granted that:

Any traits retained in the given human after switching all their traits to match the the given animal are traits possessed by both beings.

You've hit bedrock. This argument follows the "modus ponens" rule:

P1) p→q.
P2) p.
C) ∴q.

Reject P1.

Reject P2.

Reject C.

You've hit bedrock, this premise is just an affirmation of the "modus barbara" syllogism:

P1) All p are q.
P2) All r are p.
C) ∴ all r are q.

You've hit bedrock. It's taken for granted that:

Views which affirm p are only able to deny p on pain of p∧¬p.

You've hit bedrock. This argument follows the "modus ponens" rule:

P1) p→q.
P2) p.
C) ∴q.