ATATÜRK IN THE NAZI IMAGINATION
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For Beate and Johann,
to whom I owe everything
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The year is 1908, a decade before our main story really begins. The Ottoman Empire is on the verge of revolution. The Young Turks are threatening to march on Constantinople if the 1878 Constitution is not restored immediately. Abdul Hamid II, the infamous bloody “red sultan,” concedes and the Young Turks effectively seize power in the capital and in the empire. The conflict between the sultan and the new regime lingers on until 1909, when a countercoup by the sultan is crushed and Enver Pasha, one of the Young Turk leaders, marches on the capital—the parallels to Caesar’s march on the Roman capital were not lost on German contemporaries. Hitler was to say later that it was only Enver’s march on the capital that could have rejuvenated the Ottoman Empire. That Hitler knew this, and much more, about Turkey was no coincidence. The events of 1908–1909 were closely watched in Europe, especially in Germany, but also, one must assume, in “Hitler’s Vienna.”1 Enver Pasha himself, the hero of the Young Turks, took up a post at the Berlin embassy of the Ottoman Empire as military attaché later in 1909.

German nationalists, especially in Berlin, celebrated the Young Turk Revolution and feted Enver Pasha, so much that some authors speak of a German “Turk fever” (Türkenfieber) immediately after 1908.2 German nationalists believed that what was taking place on
the shores of the Bosporus was akin to what had happened in Germany and Italy in the nineteenth century, a process of national rejuvenation, leading to a strengthening of Germany’s southeastern partner. Enver Pasha was called “the Turkish Moltke,” and Talât Pasha even “the Turkish Bismarck.” But it was Enver Pasha and he alone who became the symbol of this renewed Ottoman Empire and something of a recognizable media figure in Germany. His name, as an advertisement for Enver Bey cigarettes, would feature on Berlin double-decker buses, and a bridge in Potsdam was named after him. German train wagons destined for the Oriental front during World War I often had “Enverland” written on their sides in chalk. And in 1920 German newspapers still could refer casually to Enver’s past war goals without explanation and expect the German public to know what they were talking about.

There was a long tradition of contact with the Turks in the German-speaking lands. The first documents referring to the Turks and “Turkey” originated at the time of the Crusades, around the time when Emperor Frederick Barbarossa drowned in Anatolia. Until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, German and other Western regions had similar perceptions of the Turks and of Islam. But going “a la turca” like Mozart, the various Oriental parks, also known as “Turquerien,” featuring mosque-like buildings as found in the Schwetzingen park and in Potsdam, attest to an older fascination with the Turks, especially after the Ottomans failed in their second attempt to take Vienna in 1683. Prussia had established regular diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire early on, and later Wilhelm II thought the Ottomans crucial in his quest for a “place in the sun.” In particular the post-Bismarckian Kaiserreich had pursued a whole series of policies in connection with the Ottoman Empire. On the one hand, there was the Baghdad Railway and other railway projects, destined to connect Germany with the Indian Ocean and thus combining economic interests with Great Power aspirations. And on the other hand, there was Wilhelm II proclaiming himself protector of all Muslims while on a state visit to the Ottoman Empire, some ten years before the Young Turk Revolution. The special role of Germany for the world’s Muslims was a core ingredient of German World War I propaganda in the Middle East, which has been dubbed the
"jihad made in Germany." There were also various other “German dreams of the Orient,” as embodied in more concrete German settlement projects. Although none of all these projects and dreams were very successful, the two empires were deeply connected at the onset of World War I. The Ottoman entry into the war on Germany’s side was less surprising and “last minute” than often alleged. During World War I there was much German propaganda aimed at promoting the Ottoman Empire as an important ally. In the midst of the Great War the German Kaiser traveled to Constantinople for the third time in his life, thereby underlining the continued importance of his southeastern ally.

Not only the Baghdad Railway, but also various German military missions (Prussian and Bavarian), had by 1908 already brought the Germans and the Ottomans closer together. One of the most important missions was led by Colmar von der Goltz (Pasha), who had previously written the treatise “Nation in Arms” (Volk in Waffen), the title being one of Wilhelm I’s expressions. Goltz Pasha is one of the elements in the deep entanglement of mutual influence between the two countries. What Goltz advocated in his book—increased involvement of the military in societal affairs—would have also been an apt description of how the German right and far right would interpret events and people in Turkey later: “Born rulers are also great soldiers.” People like Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk owed much of their stellar careers to the reorganization of the Ottoman army by Liman von Sanders (Pasha) according to Goltz’s ideas. Enver Pasha and Atatürk studied in the newly transformed Imperial Military Academy, which had just been reformed by Goltz, and read the Turkish translation of Volk in Waffen there.

Another aspect of German-Turkish entanglement was the deep immersion of many German officers in all things Turkish. Prior to World War I, German military advisors had already “gone Turk” while working in the empire. They had not only been integrated into the Ottoman army, but they dressed like their Ottoman colleagues and carried Ottoman titles, such as “pasha.” A photo survives from the opening of the Kaiserbrunnen, a gift from Wilhelm II to Abdul Hamid II, in Constantinople in 1900, showing a crowd of Ottoman dignitaries. In appearance, Kamphövener Pasha was virtually
indistinguishable from the other Ottoman pashas.\textsuperscript{14} Some “German Ottomans” were to carry their Ottoman titles until their death in Germany in the interwar years; in the Third Reich, German Ottomans were still remembered more by their Turkish title “pasha” than by their German military titles. As late as the 1960s, official presidential documents of the German Federal Republic referred to von der Goltz as “von der Goltz Pasha.” But especially in the 1920s German military pashas had become a part of German normality. Consequently, German readers found nothing strange in such headlines as “Enver Pasha Arrested?” or even “Imhoff Pasha Arrested.”\textsuperscript{15}

Yet the continued importance of the German-Ottoman and German-Turkish connection is symbolized less by the German military pashas than by the other “German Ottomans,” those serving below Goltz Pasha and Liman von Sanders Pasha. This is in many ways the story of the adolescent from Baden-Baden who had enlisted by lying about his age and who describes in his memoirs how the trip first to Constantinople and then to the Iraqi front by train and horseback was “a deeply impressive event in the life of a boy not yet sixteen years old.” But impressive as that may have been, what did “clearly imprint” itself on his mind, he continues, was his “first encounter with the enemy”: “We were still being trained in our duties when the British—New Zealanders and Indians—launched an attack.” Now, so shortly after his arrival, he was to have, he said, as he remembered it later in terms reminiscent of Ernst Jünger, “my first battle, my \textit{baptism of fire}” (italics in the original): “Meanwhile the Turks had been driven forward once more, and a counterattack was launched. . . . During the advance I glanced with some trepidation and nervousness at \textit{my dead man}, and I did not feel very happy about it all. I cannot say whether I killed or wounded any more Indians during this battle, although I had aimed and fired at the enemy who emerged from behind cover. I was too excited about the whole thing.” He was to move around quite a bit in the Ottoman Empire. He was there at the time of the Armenian Genocide near where it took place. Yet his memoirs remain silent on the matter, although it is reasonable to assume that he was informed about it, at least secondhand. Besides killing for the first time, he was also wounded and fell in love for the first time, when he was cared for by a “young German nurse”
in Wilhelma, in what is today Israel, not far from Tel Aviv. He was to continue fighting in the Ottoman Empire, in such places as the Hejaz and Jerusalem, and was awarded both the Iron Cross and the Iron Crescent. Later still, killing people in far larger numbers would be an integral part of his job as commandant of Auschwitz. This recruit’s name was Rudolf Hoess.16

Even though it involved love, death, and war, Hoess’s was, arguably, a “peripheral” Ottoman experience. Other German Ottomans had been in the thick of things in the Ottoman Empire, among them a future chancellor of Germany, a future foreign minister of the Third Reich, future ambassadors to Washington, Moscow, and Ankara, as well as political advisors to Hindenburg, von Papen, and Hitler. Indeed, given that only a few thousand German soldiers served in the empire—along with many diplomats—the percentage of German Ottomans within the group of people associated with the ascent and the history of the Third Reich is disproportionately high when compared with those who had served on the Western front.

Back to Enver Pasha, who left Berlin again in 1911, and in a hurry. He was to return to the German capital a different man in a different time. For the coming years, his life was to be full of failures. The Italians had attacked Ottoman Tripoli in September 1911, and Enver was to travel there, incognito via Egypt, because there was no real Ottoman navy to speak of anymore. He tried to get the local Berber tribes to mount a resistance against the Italian invaders—an endeavor that failed, though it was not until the 1930s that Italy could finally claim full control over the troublesome North African province. During World War I Enver formed a triumvirate with Talât Pasha and Djemal Pasha, and they de facto ruled the empire—the Ottoman pendant to Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the de facto German wartime military rulers. When the war ended, the three leaders of the Ottoman Empire left the capital in a German submarine, traveling to Odessa and from there overland to Berlin.17

Enver’s story was to continue in a colorful way—as a German spy, an early Bolshevik, and an Islamist commander in Central Asia—but he was of little interest to the very different Germany that had awakened from the Great War. For the next two decades the Germans’ imagination was captured by the story of another Turk—a military
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officer who had accompanied Enver on his Libyan adventure in 1911, who had visited the German headquarters in 1917 with the Ottoman crown prince, and who had been greeted by Hindenburg with the words: “Ah, the hero of Anafarta [Gallipoli]!” Around the mystique of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk a second German “Turk fever” erupted. While the German public had already been excited about Enver, they were to be in an ecstatic frenzy about Atatürk—a frenzy that would last for two decades. The second Turk fever was to become “chronic” and was still to be felt in the final months of the Third Reich at Hitler’s table.

“Hitler was a friend of the Turks and so is Ude,” an elderly woman shouted into the Munich rain in early 2007, referring to the Social Democratic mayor of that city. This unnamed woman felt threatened by a mosque that was scheduled to be built in her suburban Munich neighborhood. She was old enough to remember the Third Reich—and angry enough to compare Christian Ude to Adolf Hitler. But Hitler as a “friend of the Turks”? That characterization is not easily explained by the current literature on Hitler, the Third Reich, and Turkey.

In a way, this book is an attempt to understand this woman’s memory of Hitler. By reconstructing how the Nazis perceived and portrayed Turkey, especially in the print media, it sets out to change the way we view National Socialism itself. To do so, we must venture deep into the forest of German newspapers, beginning in 1919. That year something new began in Anatolia, a movement closely connected to the name Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—something that was to fascinate Germany from 1919 until the end of the Third Reich.

This is in many ways a journey into a historiographic void. German perceptions of Islam, the Ottoman Empire, and “the Turks” until 1918, as well as German-Ottoman relations until that time, are well studied. But there is virtually no literature on how Germany, still less the Nazis, perceived and portrayed Atatürk and his New Turkey. Yet the New Turkey and Kemalism, this ambiguous creature, this cross between authoritarian dictatorship, Bolshevism, Western democracy, and the French revolutionary tradition, pop up time and again in interwar Germany. Turkey usually receives no mention in
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general accounts of the Nazis or the Third Reich, or in panoramic accounts of the era. It nonetheless appears at many crucial moments and contexts, such as the Hitler Putsch of 1923 and in the ideological worldview of Hitler and Ernst Röhm. The reason is not to be found in foreign policy considerations, which have often guided our attempts to reconstruct the various relationships of Nazism with the rest of the world. “Hitler was a friend of the Turks” not because, like “the Italians,” they set out to conquer the world with him—they did not—but for other reasons that I will explain. Accordingly, most accounts on German-Turkish relations between 1919 and 1945 have overlooked the stories I am about to tell.

Turkey mattered deeply to the Nazis, principally for the new political world that the Nazis liked to think the Kemalist regime represented. The old days of looking at Turkey through Orientalist eyes were long past; the rise of the Young Turks before the war and the events of 1919 had seen to that. For the Nazis, Turkey was not the old East, but a standard bearer for the modern nationalist and totalitarian politics that they wished to bring to Germany. This book, of course, is a history of perceptions and discourses about Turkey, not a study of whether the Nazis were right that the Kemalists displayed fascist tendencies. I leave that discussion to others. Similarly, even if the Armenian Genocide has to be discussed here, I cannot delve too deeply into that difficult topic in this book. Among other reasons, it took place before the period under discussion here and still needs to be studied extensively before we can make more definite statements about it.

What I do show, and what reflects one of the core findings, is that a remarkable unity and conformity of discourse existed from the earliest Nazi, far-right, and nationalist deliberations about Turkey in the early 1920s until the end of the Third Reich. This uniformity allows for a holistic reading of the sources, though I do point out differences in them. Given this book’s focus on Nazism, it is beyond its scope to discuss what, for example, German Social Democrats or Communists thought about Atatürk’s Turkey. Equally marginal to this study is, surprisingly perhaps, the topic of “Islam,” which might have continued from the “jihad made in Germany” during World War I to the Third Reich but had no direct relation to Turkey, at
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least not to Turkey as it is discussed here. “Islam” is important in this context only because of its “absence” in the discourses this book seeks to reconstruct. Similarly, while the history of German-Turkish relations is an important background to the story, this book is neither a sequel nor a companion to recent studies on an alleged “jihad made in Germany” or on the Baghdad or Anatolian Railway. The nature of German-Turkish relations changed so significantly between the two world wars that it cannot be explained by the previous history of relations.

The topic of how Nazis perceived Turkey, and how the Nazis were influenced by developments in that country, has proven too vast to be dealt with exhaustively. Accordingly, I focus mainly on two key periods, 1919–1923 and 1933–1938, and on print media and public statements, as well as on the main leading personae of the Third Reich. I have had to neglect many sources, such as much of the academic literature on Turkey from the Third Reich and German soldiers’ memoirs of their time in the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, I had to largely neglect Alfred Rosenberg, who was, it appears, marginalized and forced into silence on the subject of Turkey and Atatürk, although during the Third Reich he made a yearly public demonstration of solidarity and commonality with the Turkish ambassador at his receptions, where the two men were always seated next to each other. Wherever possible I have also discussed “Nazi practice,” especially in Chapter 3, backed up not only by memoirs and other sources pertaining to the thoughts of important actors, such as Hitler’s “Table Talk” or Joseph Goebbels’s diaries, but also by visual sources.

In my attempt to reconstruct the views of the times, from within the times, I have used the language of the texts as far as possible. This includes the often awkward phrasing of hypernationalist discourse, but also terminology. Thus, Constantinople becomes Istanbul only after it was officially renamed in 1930. And although the German papers used “Angora” for Ankara until the 1930s, I have used the less confusing “Ankara” here. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk features as Atatürk before he had been awarded this surname by the Turkish Parliament, because the person thus referred to is still the same, as is Ismet İnönü (correctly spelled in Turkish: İsmet İnönü). Otherwise I have
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conformed to common English usage wherever possible, though I have preferred “Hitler Putsch” over “BeerHall Putsch” and, despite their possible “mystifying” connotations, such terms as “Führer” and “völkisch” instead of “leader” and “national” or “racial” in order to illustrate how the original sources made sense of Turkey.29

This book offers new perspectives on the history of Germany and National Socialism. It does so not only by exploring the entangled, transnational aspects of that history, but also by working with otherwise often neglected sources: newspapers. The following account rests on the reading and analysis of thousands of articles from German newspapers, especially from the early 1920s and the Third Reich. I invite the interested reader to consult the Note on Sources and Historiography at the end of this book for more information. As the book will show, the discourse on Turkey, from the early Weimar years up to the end of the Third Reich, was surprisingly uniform: whether in the pages of a nationalist paper in the early 1920s, in the Völkische Beobachter in the Third Reich, or in Hitler’s thoughts, the vision of Atatürk and his project were the same.

The detailed analysis in the first chapters lays the groundwork for what follows in the rest of the book. To present the many facets of the Nazi discourse in such an extensive fashion is a strategic choice. Failure to do so would weaken my claim that the book’s analysis rests on thousands of texts. Moreover, the detailed, sometimes repetitious exposition of how first the German center to far right and then the Nazis viewed Turkey gives the reader a sense of how these discourses must have affected the German public: the main points about the New Turkey were driven home again and again.
For German nationalists, World War I and the German-Ottoman alliance ended in a disaster of truly biblical proportions—in the literal sense, as illustrations in satirical journals of the time aptly show with their depictions of the apocalyptic horsemen over Germany, Germany as a “national Jesus” suffering under the degradations of the Entente, or a French Genghis Khan laying waste to Germany. The sense of despair and the failure to understand events must have been paramount in these first years of the Weimar Republic. But World War I did not quite end everywhere in 1918. Violence continued in Russia with the Reds and the Whites fighting over huge stretches of territory. There was Freikorps activity in the Baltics, and there was Fiume (today’s Rijeka), where the men around the poet Gabriele D’Annunzio did not accept the proposed territorial changes, seized power, and tried to annex the city to Italy. If the events in Fiume were already well suited to spark the revisionist and militaristic imagination of German nationalists, then the events in Anatolia simply set it on fire.

The Ottoman army had been in disarray since the final stages of the war, lacking weaponry and ammunition and plagued by a large number of desertions. In the summer of 1919, Allied police patrolled the streets of Constantinople, and Christian minorities flew the flags...
of their nations and dreamed of creating their own states in the territory of the Ottoman Empire. There were plans to set up an independent Armenia, to give huge parts of western Anatolia to Greece, and perhaps even to form a second Greek or a Greco-Armenian Pontic state on the shores of the Black Sea. There was intensive lobbying activity in the United States to rid Europe of the Turks forever and expel them altogether, including from Constantinople. Greater Greek nationalist dreams—the *Megali Idea* (great idea) of reviving the Byzantine Empire, perhaps even with its capital at Constantinople—seemed to be within grasp when the Greek army occupied Smyrna and its hinterland in 1919. The occupation was executed at the behest of the Allies and in advance of a final peace treaty when the world was still “in session in Paris.” Allied gunships were pointing their canons at the centuries-old palaces of the Ottomans, and the sultan and his government gave in to Allied demands time and again in the years following the end of the war.

But then everything was to turn around. In May 1919 Mustafa Kemal Pasha landed in eastern Anatolia and, as the official historiography of the Turkish Republic tells us, the Turkish War of Independence began. Originally sent to reorganize Ottoman troops in the region, Mustafa Kemal began organizing a national resistance movement against the dismemberment of the Turkish heartland of Anatolia. Incited by fears of Greek expansionism and Armenian retribution, and eager to liberate Constantinople, the seat of the sultan-caliph, his movement rapidly gained in strength. The resistance not only had to fight the Armenians and the Greek army, but was de facto at war with all the Allied powers and for brief stretches fought the Ottoman army as well. And yet it was successful. In a struggle that lasted four years, from mid-1919 until mid-1923, the Turkish nationalists secured their homeland in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), thereby revising a Paris peace treaty, the Treaty of Sèvres (1920).

In the eyes of a desperate and desolate Germany, this was a nationalist dream come true, or rather something like hypernationalist pornography. In this chapter, I will explore this German postwar fixation with the events in Turkey that bordered on the obsessive. A fixation that resulted in such an immense amount of newspaper coverage that by all definitions the Turkish War of Independence became
a major media event of the new Weimar Republic. Take, for example, the testimony of Ernst Röhm, Hitler’s leader of the paramilitary SA (Sturmabteilung; Storm Detachment). He wrote in his memoirs that world politics in the weeks before Mussolini’s March on Rome (October 1922) had been entirely “dominated by the Turkish struggle for independence led by Kemal Pasha.” Or as the Nazi paper, the Völkische Beobachter put it at around the same time, in September 1922, Mustafa Kemal’s name was on everybody’s lips.

The Nazis were also part of this desolate and desperate Germany that was watching Turkey obsessively. As we will see in this chapter and in Chapter 2, the Nazis “grew up” with Turkey and were even more excited than other German nationalists about the events in Turkey and the potential “Turkish lessons” for Germany. But before turning to the Nazis themselves, it is crucial to explore the broader German nationalist excitement about Turkey. The newspaper discourse as reconstructed in this chapter is not simply part of the background for the Nazi vision of Atatürk and the New Turkey that I explore in this book; it is much more, and it is directly connected to it all. The völkisch, and especially the Nazi, newspapers usually gave few reports on day-to-day events, and even fewer on foreign events. These papers consisted almost exclusively of running commentary by Nazi and völkisch authors on what was going on but without any actual coverage in these papers themselves. To understand their commentary, the imagined reader of a völkisch or Nazi paper needed to have information on current events, which they would have found only in the bigger, especially national, newspapers. Thus, the nationalist fringe papers presupposed that their readers would get their information about day-to-day events from other newspapers. Furthermore, völkisch authors wrote on Turkey and other topics not only for the völkisch papers but also for more mainstream newspapers. Given that we have little documentation on what the leading Nazis themselves thought of the world for the time before 1923/1924, and given the narrow focus of the Nazi and völkisch papers at that time, we must look at broader tendencies in postwar public discourse to grasp the significance of the topic “Turkey” in the ideas and thoughts of the völkisch and Nazi fringe of the early Weimar years.

“Nationalist pornography” aside—and this aspect unfolded its true force only in the course of the war—what might we expect of the
potential press coverage on Turkey after the end of World War I? On the one hand, Germany had its hands full with the new democracy, the “red menace,” the problems it was facing in relation to the Entente (the winners of World War I), such as reparations and coming to terms with actually having lost the war, and much more besides. With good cause we tend to assume that German public discourse immediately after the war was focused exclusively on Germany—there was little reason to expect many in Germany to have the luxury to care about distant events like those in Anatolia—but, at the same time, we know surprisingly little about German media coverage of international events in these “years of crisis.” On the other hand, there was a specific German tradition of caring about the Orient and the Ottoman Empire, an Orientpolitik even, and a deep entanglement with the Ottoman Empire up until 1919. That empire had been an ally in the Great War and, particularly in Wilhelm II’s time, had been of very special interest to Germany. Not only had many German officers and soldiers fought on the Oriental front, but for much of World War I many different branches of the Ottoman military were under the command of German military pashas. And just like Germany, the Ottoman Empire exited the war as a loser. All this by itself could have merited at least some further attention from the German media. But in early 1919 news coverage of Turkey seemed to peter out. The armistices, to be confirmed by both the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Sèvres, had put an end to official German-Turkish relations and required Germans in Turkey and Turks in Germany to return home. Now that the Germans in Constantinople had left, German Orientpolitik, “to which once great, fantastic hopes had been tied,” seemed to come to a close, as one paper put it on February 5, 1919.5

The German postwar newspaper forest was an especially thick and confusing one, with dozens of large papers, but with none with truly national reach as is the case in most societies today. To give us a good view of German nationalist media opinion, especially on the conservative to far right, I will discuss a whole range of newspapers. One paper in particular served as a backbone of the analysis here, the Neue Preussische Zeitung—called Kreuzzeitung because of the iron cross in its header.6 The Kreuzzeitung had been the flagship of conservatism in the Kaiserreich and had often featured Bismarck himself as a
contributor; it had acquired something of a semiofficial status. In the early Weimar Republic it was a small but still very influential elite paper. Most politicians and other German elites, such as diplomats, priests, and the aristocracy, but most importantly journalists of the other papers, read it and frequently reacted to its articles in their own publications. Although its circulation was small in absolute numbers, it was perhaps the most important trendsetter in the center-to-right spectrum. In any case, as cross-checks with other papers show, its coverage of Turkey was well in line with and indeed representative of that of the other major papers. Like most papers of the time, the *Kreuzzeitung* had a morning and an evening edition. In the early Weimar Republic and therefore during the Turkish War of Independence, it was often a mere four pages thick; sometimes, by including special supplements, it ran up to ten pages. Usually only the first two pages and a small portion of the last page were available for nondomestic news. But within these pages, German topics clearly dominated the overall space available for political news. Thus, for any topic, but especially for nondomestic ones, space was extremely limited. Very often the front page was exclusively devoted to German politics. Furthermore, like other papers analyzed here, the *Kreuzzeitung* was closely aligned with the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP), which was one of the central revisionist, antidemocratic, and, as its championing of the stab-in-the-back myth betrays, also anti-Semitic parties. Because the völkisch and Nazi newspapers did not report much on foreign policy or day-to-day political developments, the *Kreuzzeitung*, the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, and other papers with similar worldviews would have been German readers’ sources for such coverage. I will analyze a rather broad range of newspapers, including the *Deutsche Zeitung*, the *Berliner Lokalanzeiger*, the *Vossische Zeitung*, and the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, and at times also the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and even the Social Democratic *Vorwärts*, in order to draw conclusions about the broader political atmosphere of the time, not just the center right and far right. I will look at not only elite papers but also a variety of “mass papers” and tabloids to shed light on overall media trends. I have also included satirical papers like the *Kladderadatsch*, which by itself already encapsulates all the central points of this German excitement for and obsession with Turkey.
Given the widespread aversion to the new democracy and the Treaty of Versailles, the political center is exceedingly difficult to locate in the immediate postwar years. And even centrist papers, such as the rather republican and liberal *Vossische Zeitung*, often expressed views similar to those of the farther right when it came to Turkey. Surprisingly perhaps, even the Social Democrat *Vorwärts* sometimes, but obviously not always, converged with the overall trends of coverage of the Turkish War of Independence. The whole spectrum of newspapers, from the nationalist center to the fringe far-right, developed an almost monolithic discourse on Turkey in combination with an overall high frequency of reporting.

While it is true that “Germany” was the main prism of all the news, domestic and international, “Turkey” had a very central place in all of this. The press simply turned the Turkish War of Independence into a German media event, ever-present and widely debated. It was relevant to Germany as a fascinating and continuing news story, not least because it had all the qualities of an epic. The events in Anatolia had a larger significance, beyond Turkey, and this was clear to German observers from the start. From very early on, the German press recognized that Turkey could be something of a role model for the Germans. As time progressed, the papers graduated from implicitly pointing out the Turkish case as being merely relevant to Germany, to emphasizing certain Turkish strategies that could and should be replicated in Germany in some way. The papers continually highlighted the relevance of Turkey for Germany through a variety of mechanisms, deeply embedded into and prepared by the overall discussion of Turkey. Even if in the beginning there were no direct calls to “learn from Turkey,” the media strongly conveyed the idea that Germany had something to learn here.

As we will see, many papers frequently used the term “role model” in relation to Turkey; the term isn’t imposed on their reporting retrospectively. As early as 1921 the Nazis, in their *Völkische Beobachter*, featured an article with the headline “Turkey—The Role Model” (*der Vorkämpfer*). Long before the Treaty of Lausanne replaced the Treaty of Sèvres, many of the major nationalist papers argued that Turkey “led the way” in a twofold fashion: The Turkish case illustrated that the treaties of Paris *could* be revised and *how* this could be done. Even the left-liberal *Frankfurter Zeitung* in August 1920
emphatically stressed that the book was not closed on the Treaty of Sèvres and thus also not on the Treaty of Versailles. Many other papers came to similar conclusions already early on in the Turkish War of Independence: Turkey signaled that Versailles could indeed be revised. The *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, in its first major commentary on the treaty talks in Lausanne, summed up this view:

This November 20, the opening day of the peace conference of Lausanne, must have special meaning for us Germans, because on this day one of the Parisian treaties imposed by force [*Gewaltfriedensverträge*] is meant to be revised through a peace conference explicitly summoned for this purpose. This is for us, as well as for all those peoples groaning under the yoke of these enslavement treaties, a [ray of] hope and a serious warning at the same time.¹²

But Turkey had already been dangerously important for some time, as was stressed in the ironic introduction to an article in the left-liberal *Berliner Tageblatt* in May 1920: “Turkey does not concern us any more, because it is not supposed to concern us any more. Wise men advise us to stay away from Turkey even in our thoughts.”¹³ Yet, as will become clear, the nationalist papers—the liberal *Berliner Tageblatt* included—did their best to keep the Germans thinking about Turkey.

**Coverage: The Amazing Story of the Turkish Phoenix**

It is difficult to imagine what the “German psyche” was like in this postwar period. As already stated there was something apocalyptic and utterly desperate and desolate about the German nationalist self-perception at the time. Just a superficial look at the famous German satirical weekly, the *Kladderadatsch*, in these immediate postwar years illustrates this and the whole postwar atmosphere aptly. Here we find a constant stream of depressing end-of-times cartoons and depictions of the German nation: Germany as a victim of all kinds of Entente aggression, France as a vampire sucking the life out of Germany (Fig. 1.1), Germany as a sleeping beauty in the midst of flames about to consume her (Fig. 1.2), and time and again the apocalyptic
Figure 1.1. One of many vampire-themed caricatures in the Kladderadatsch at the time, this one depicting “Clemenceau, the vampire” sucking the life out of a dying Germany.
Kladderadatsch 15 (1919)
Figure 1.2. Germany portrayed as a sleeping beauty about to be consumed by flames.

*Kladderadsch* 14 (1920)
horsemen over Germany (Fig. 1.3). The Kladderadatsch, formerly a rather sophisticated and often somewhat funny and cleverly satirical, was now utterly depressing (as well as revisionist and, despite its Jewish roots, anti-Semitic at times). Postwar Germany was where humor went to die, at least if one looks at the main German satirical papers such as the Kladderadatsch, the Simplicissimus, or the Ulk. In these times of no hope, no leaders, and nothing to be happy about, Turkey was to become the only place the German nationalist reader could turn to for political “entertainment” and an infusion of hope. Turkey was a nationalist miracle, an unfolding drama that led from a Turkish Versailles (the Treaty of Sèvres) to the first revised post-war treaty (see Fig. 1.4). Turkey was a story of almost inconceivable nationalist success in these years.

The first hint about the future Kemalists appeared in the Kreuzzeitung on June 24, 1919, in a short article on the partial Greek retreat that had been demanded by the Allies.14 This article portrayed a wholly passive Turkey, subject to Greco-Allied accords, but ended with a twist and a ray of hope: A rumor was reported that Turkish officers had left Constantinople for Anatolia in order to start an armed resistance against the Greeks. The previous day the whole first page of the Kreuzzeitung had been dominated by a single headline: “Finis Germania” (The End of Germany). On June 29, 1919, the Kreuzzeitung gave its whole front page a black frame, turning the entire paper into one long obituary for Germany: the Treaty of Versailles had been signed! Just a mere two days later the Kreuzzeitung and other papers introduced to their depressed and desperate readers the person who was organizing the military resistance to the “Turkish Versailles” by name for the very first time—Mustafa Kemal Pasha.15 His introduction could hardly have been more dramatic and spectacular.

The German press had found its hero. One month later, in August 1919, Mustafa Kemal was openly heralded as such by Thea von Puttkamer, one of the very few of those writing in the German press who had actually met Mustafa Kemal. Her article began the process of historicizing Atatürk, starting with his heroic feat of saving Constantinople when Entente troops had landed on the Gallipoli peninsula during World War I. She proclaimed that whatever the
Figure 1.3. “The Horsemen of the Apocalypse—Ghosts over the Ruhr.” Kladderadatsch 20 (1921)
outcome, he would be the hero of “the dying Turkish nation.” Other papers such as the Hamburger Courier and the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung followed suit, each featuring articles on Mustafa Kemal’s movement in the morning edition for August 18 and one in the evening edition. The morning article offered yet another introduction to Mustafa Kemal; yet in the evening edition there was already talk of an “independence movement” with 300,000 men in arms. And two months later, in early October, all the major papers expected their readers to be well acquainted with Mustafa Kemal, who from that point onward no longer needed to be introduced to the German reader.

What is further striking is that the transition from the first, vague discussions of “Turkish irredentism” just after Smyrna (Izmir) had been occupied by Greek forces to the later, fixed, and ubiquitous German nationalist interpretation of Atatürk was a winding road, but not
a long one. Something important was happening in Anatolia, and most German nationalist papers were sure of it from the beginning. But what it was exactly, they did not know, at least not in the first six or seven months of the Turkish War of Independence. Initially the interpretations of the German press were somewhat contradictory, but it didn’t take long for them to become stabilized and self-confident. When Mustafa Kemal had “declared himself independent from Turkey,” as reported in August 1919, it was claimed that he was leading two “revolutionary divisions.” The Congress of Erzurum in the same month, where the Kemalists had formulated their goals and prepared the so-called national pact, was called “a revolutionary assembly” and in 1920 there was still talk of “revolutionary troops.” On August 26 the _Kreuzzeitung_ reported Mustafa Kemal’s threat to proclaim a Turkish Republic in Anatolia. One month later his movement was labeled a “patriotic movement,” which needed to be understood, the paper claimed, as “national action” (nationale Aktion). A couple of days later, the movement was for the first time referred to as the “nationalist movement”—a label that would stick in the coming years. Once established, the phrase quickly assumed iconic qualities; it needed no further qualification (such as “Turkish”), and for the various papers to speak just of the “nationalist movement” seemed to have sufficed for their readers to know what they were talking about, the Kemalists became the nationalist movement, par excellence, of the time. Additionally, even before any clear definition had been arrived at, the term “the Kemalists” had been introduced and acquired equally iconic qualities. The consensual and omnipresent interpretation of the new Turkish movement evolved rather rapidly and, it needs to be stressed, without any meaningful intervention from the Kemalists themselves. Furthermore, it evolved in a unitary, analogous fashion; there was hardly any difference in how, for example, the _Kreuzzeitung_, the _Völkische Beobachter_, and the _Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger_ saw the Kemalist movement. The German press was quick to make Atatürk “our Mustafa Kemal.” Even if information reached Germany only via Paris and London, the German press repeatedly made it known to the rest of the world that it knew Atatürk better than anybody else. The press of the German right and far right became champions of and spokespeople for
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, or indeed something akin to a large European Kemalist PR agency.

This involuntary German PR agency for the Kemalists poured out articles and essays in rather astounding quantities in the coming years. The Kreuzzeitung, for example, published 194 items on Turkey in 1919; 369 in 1920; 454 in 1921; 853 in 1922; and at least another 323 up to August 1923. Granted, sometimes, the item in question was a mere two-liner plus a headline, but the overall quantity itself is a significant indicator of the value attached to the topic. Items on Turkey often dominated the first page, and many of these articles consisted of an entire column or even half a page (Fig. 1.5). Thus, at least 2,200 articles, items, and reports in the Kreuzzeitung in a period of about four and a half years is by itself an extraordinarily large amount. It meant on average of at least one article per day or three articles per two days. While there were many days without reportage on Turkey, there was rarely ever a week without Turkey. Often there were many successive days when half of the first page was devoted to Turkey, with additional items in the section “Latest News” on page 3 or 4. Regularly, Turkey featured in both the morning and the evening edition. And even when there was actually little or nothing newsworthy to report from Turkey—simply because nothing of interest was happening—the Kreuzzeitung and other papers kept the topic alive by printing historical essays on Turkey (Bismarck’s Orientpolitik, World War I battles in the Oriental theater, and so on); by reporting on events with little news value, like rabbinical elections in Constantinople; or by carrying agency news that no one actually believed to be true, such as reports that Enver Pasha had been crowned “King of Kurdistan.” The papers of the early Weimar Republic from the center to the far right, and not only the Kreuzzeitung, kept the topic alive, no matter what. There has never been another period with such a huge number of articles in the German press devoted to Turkey, not even during the high points of the recent EU-Turkey debate. Coverage was so extensive that in early 1923 a commentary in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung stressed that in the summer of 1922 one could read about Turkey “daily, a thousandfold” in the German press.

Thus, we can safely assume that the German newspaper-reading public was exceedingly well informed about Turkey, primed on the
Figure 1.5. The front page and Turkey. Example of front-page coverage: half of the front page about the “Entente Notes to Kemal Pasha.”

_Keuzzeitung_ (September 23, 1922)
events in Anatolia almost daily, and indeed interested in Turkey. This is all the more remarkable given the small amount of space generally available for news, much less for foreign news—and given that reporting on Turkey was a rather difficult undertaking in the early Weimar Republic. The Treaty of Versailles did not allow Germany to have diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire, and in the immediate postwar period the German papers had no correspondents in Constantinople, many not even in the wider region. Most news about Turkey reached Germany via Entente news agencies and newspapers from Entente countries—a state of affairs the German papers complained about frequently. While they often carried reports from international press agencies, they always remained rather skeptical about them. Especially in 1919 and 1920, the German nationalist papers repeatedly complained that news from Turkey reached Germany too slowly and only through the Entente’s “veil of lies.”

The Vossische Zeitung, for example, contended in the autumn of 1919 that the Entente was distorting news from Anatolia, and that if one were to believe the Entente, nothing was happening there at all. The fact that papers carried most of these reports despite the charge of Allied distortion and propaganda shows just how committed they were to this topic. The papers also developed a strategy to cope with the origin of these news reports by simply claiming to understand much better than the Entente what was really happening in Anatolia. Interpretation became much more important than factual information, more so than is usually the case. Given the general mistrust the papers showed toward Entente reporting, this also meant that when they decided to reprint French and British agency reports without further comment, they probably believed them to be true or at least agreed with the sentiments they evoked. If the papers did not agree, they commented sarcastically or used hypercritical indirect speech.

The Turkish War of Independence rapidly became, and continued to be, a very German topic. This Germanification of the Turkish War of Independence relied on a series of mechanisms and strategies. The first was, of course, the sheer vastness of its presence in the pages of German newspapers. Another mechanism was the layout and language of the papers. Items on Turkey usually preceded or followed articles that dealt with German topics that the editors
and authors perceived as comparable (extradition of war criminals, occupation of the Ruhr, the Rhineland crises, Silesia, and so forth). Vocabulary and concepts commonly used to discuss German issues—“stab in the back,” “peace dictate,” “rape,” and so on—were also employed in items on Turkey. Words and concepts were also transferred from the Turkish to the German context. Thus, for example, in March 1922 the *Kreuzzeitung* wrote that the Entente wanted to institute a “dette publique allemande”—with the Entente having direct control over German finances—thereby referring to the “dette publique ottoman” about which the paper had repeatedly written.31 In 1921 and 1922, it spoke of the “Ottomanization” of Germany—that is, the transformation of Germany into a semicolon, which was what the paper understood to have happened to the late Ottoman Empire under the Treaty of Sèvres.32

Another mechanism was to put specific German topics parallel to developments in Anatolia. When such topics were discussed side by side, the Turks were usually already in a better position than the Germans. For example, on June 19, 1921, when Count Ernst Reventlow compared Anatolia and Silesia in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, he stressed that the Turkish nationalists had already rejected the Allied peace treaty two years before.33 An article in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* commenting on the Lausanne negotiations claimed that seeing how Germany had fallen under the “economic slavery” of the Entente without any resistance had been a strong motivation for Mustafa Kemal’s tactics and had led to his conviction that he “would resolutely defend Turkish independence against anybody and his army is strong enough for this task.”34

Another feature underlining the importance attached to the Turkish War of Independence was that the war became serialized: News items and reports regarding Anatolia were often presented under the same or similar headlines for many weeks in a row. In late 1919, the headlines were still varied but already appeared with uniform vocabulary, often with phrases such as, “The Turkish Movement in Anatolia” or “The National Movement in Anatolia.”35 Starting in mid-1920, certain fixed phrases—such as “The Turkish Struggle for Freedom,” “The Oriental Question,” and “The War in Asia Minor”—were used frequently for many weeks at a time.36 This suggests a pre-
sumption that the real or imagined readers of the *Kreuzzeitung* and other major papers expected to be kept up-to-date on a regular basis. Other topics were of course also serialized in this period, yet no other international topic was covered with such frequency of repeated or similar uniformly phrased headlines. Only a few domestic issues were serialized as often—and often domestic topics and Turkey were linked by similarities in vocabulary and layout, which made them appear as if they were part of the same overarching topic. Interestingly, across the Alps, Benito Mussolini’s *Il Popolo d’Italia* also reported about the war in Anatolia with heightened frequency and serialized headlines.37

Part and parcel of the German papers’ approach to Turkey was what could be described following, or indeed against, Edward Said, as *de-orientalization*.38 Not only were the papers in general pro-Turkish, but they also tried to make all things Ottoman and Turkish appear as close and familiar as possible. One means of doing so was to avoid all Orientalist language. Instead they used vocabulary and imagery similar to that normally used to describe Central European and German history, society, and politics—vocabulary that emphasized similarity over distance and strangeness. They used “Kaiser” (emperor) and “kaiserlich” (imperial) for the sultan, “Kaiserstadt” for Constantinople, and the “Turkish church” for Islam, for instance. The German nationalist papers made a conscious and sustained effort to portray Turkey, not as distant, but rather as very close, similar, and comparable to Germany.

One of the most interesting features of this Germanification of Turkish topics was perhaps the role the “experts” played, or rather did not play. Because interpretation was so paramount for this subject, all the major papers regularly printed their own commentaries on developments in Turkey, and extensively so. Given Germany’s long involvement and deep entanglement with the Ottoman Empire, one would expect a whole armada of experts to have been at the ready to offer commentary, insights, and interpretations. Yet, as a whole, the “experts” were almost nowhere to be seen or read. Indeed, the overall German media obsession with and interpretations of Turkey developed in spite of the insights and interpretations of the experts rather than because of them. When outside experts were given space
in the papers to write on Turkey, neither their focus on “Islam” or “Bolshevism” in the Middle East nor their attention to German pre-1919 Orientpolitik was picked up by general reporting or commentaries. Not even by the very same papers. Soon most of these “experts” were simply no longer asked to write on Turkey. The only exception was Otto Liman von Sanders, who had been a marshal in the Ottoman army and former military advisor to the Ottoman Empire; he became something of a media figure in relation to Turkey, although it was only in late 1922 that he started to comment on current events rather than tell stories about the previous war.39 Another prominent “expert” was Hans Tröbst, the only German mercenary in the employ of the Kemalist forces. He wrote for Nazi papers, such as the Heimatland and the Völkischer Kurier, and will feature more prominently in our story. Only very rarely did Turkish names pop up in the German media, usually as authors in the bylines of essayistic commentaries on events in Turkey.40

The other experts were too far off the mark for the German media, with their interpretations and with their focus on the Muslim and Bolshevik character of the Kemalists. Also, they were not able to withstand the test of time. For example, one expert, Friedrich Schrader, former deputy editor in chief of the German-language Osmanischer Lloyd (in Constantinople), felt he had to publish a series of articles to right the “wrong impression” circulating in the media that the Kemalists were antireligious and republican—yet, as it later turned out, they really were both.41 The mainstream commentators and journalists, on the other hand, were often spot-on with their interpretations and regarding the nature of the Kemalists’ tactical alliances (with Islam and Bolshevism, for instance). The few “expert analyses” that were published had surprisingly little, if any, impact on the papers’ overall discourse on Turkey.42 This may also have been due to the fact that the editors felt they had a good grip on what was happening in Anatolia, but it also reflected on just how “German” a topic Turkey was becoming. In any case, a process was at work here to consciously sideline potential “experts.”

The initial confusion about the roles of Islam and Bolshevism in the Turkish War of Independence made the Germanification of the topic a bit difficult. The “experts” with their singular focus on these
two aspects did not help this process. Islam as a subtopic simply faded away over time as experts were sidelined. Bolshevism, however, proved to be an especially complicated, confusing, and difficult topic. The incipient Turkish nationalist resistance in Anatolia faced almost insurmountable difficulties. There was a staggering lack of weapons, ammunition, and other resources so desperately needed to fight a war against the Greek army, the Entente, the Armenians, and the Ottoman army. The alliance with the Bolsheviks was an immediate and much-needed solution for Atatürk. But it posed a huge conceptual and ideological problem for the German nationalist papers. For most of their readers, the Soviet Union was an ideological enemy and a superthreat in the making. Never mind that we know today that the German army was seeking a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union around the very same time; the fear of Communism and Communist revolution was deep-seated in postwar Germany. One strategy the center to far-right papers employed was to simply downplay the Kemalist-Bolshevik connection. Especially in the early part of the war, they rarely, if ever, commented on developments in Turkish-Soviet relations, and they kept reports on such matters to an absolute minimum. An example is an exceedingly short note on the Turkish-Soviet military treaty in early 1920. This rather important news item featured in the Kreuzzeitung only as a one-liner inside an entirely unrelated news item on Lithuanian-Russian relations. Another article again reported on the same treaty, also without comment. All this even though by now the papers were convinced that Ankara not only would receive material support from the Soviet Union, but also, so the reports read, would adopt “Soviet laws and constitutions [sic!]”. The papers’ no-comment policy was one means of coping with this difficult topic. Interestingly, it was applied at the same time as the few ideological descriptions and bits of information the papers did offer on this topic squarely placed the Kemalist movement inside the Soviet orbit. On May 15, 1920, for example, Atatürk was called “first commissar” among commissars.

In August 1920 the Kreuzzeitung read the world situation not only as a continuation of World War I but also as a conflict between Russia and Britain. Britain emerged as the villain, and “in its struggle for existence against the Ententist conquerors it [the Orient] has
aligned itself with Russian Bolshevism.” 47 While it seems to have emerged that Russia could be an ally against imperialism, at this point in 1920 confusion abounded, as another news item illustrates: “The Turkish nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal has made an appeal, in which he asks his followers to hate the English and the French as well as to hold high the holy Turkish-Russian-German alliance of 1920 (!) [exclamation mark and parentheses in original]. He declared that Bolshevism was extending a helpful hand and that Turkey as well was ready to help Germany.” 48 Rumors and speculations about a possible Turkish-Bolshevik-German treaty or bloc would be around for some time. 49 However, most papers, including the Kreuzzeitung, remained fervently anti-Bolshevik throughout this period. 50 Only a few weeks later, in December 1920, the veil of confusion was once and for all lifted and the final interpretation was established across the board. Now, and contrary to the truth, the Kreuzzeitung wrote that it had always been of the opinion, and that this had been confirmed many times, that the alliance between Bolsheviks and Kemalists was merely of propagandistic value, mainly against England, and that the Kemalists were no Bolsheviks. 51 From that point onward the paper repeatedly “cleared up” the confusion it had helped to create in the first place and that apparently still prevailed in other papers and in many readers’ minds. A typical example from April 1921 read: “The alliance that Turkish nationalism has entered into with Russian Bolshevism is based, not on the Bolshevik idea, as is often assumed, but upon hatred of the Entente, or, more precisely, of England.” 52 Other papers came around at the same time. In a similar vein, the Völkische Beobachter in January 1921 was sure about the non-Bolshevik ideology of the Kemalists. Although it had called Mustafa Kemal a “neo-Bolshevik” just one month earlier, it now wrote: “This [Corriere della Sera] report merely reaffirms our previously uttered conviction: the Turks are a natural people [Naturvolk] with healthy common sense. ‘National Bolshevism’ is the product of crazy dreamers. A thing as impossible as hot snow or wooden iron.” 53 It reaffirmed this view again a month later by citing a speech by Atatürk, in which he had stressed that the Kemalists were indeed no Bolsheviks. The voice of the Nazi Party continued: “That in the case of the Turks one cannot speak of a so-called National Bolshevism we have already
stressed previously. Turkey, a healthy nation of farmers, which had unfairly been given the name of the sick man, is making the only possible kind of politics: that of a healthy egotism with weapon in hand!”54

As this example illustrates, the discussion of the Bolshevik connection was intrinsically linked to calls to “learn” from the Turkish case. What had certainly made things difficult for the German right-wing press was the ambiguity of Atatürk’s program itself. In November 1922, some papers quoted an interview with the Labour Daily Herald in which Mustafa Kemal described himself as both nationalist and socialist: “The new Turkish idea wants to govern through a system that is not that far from socialism. I do not want to say that we are communists. We are not, because we are nationalists. Personally, I am a socialist as far as this does not conflict with my nationalism.”55 Most papers simply chose to ignore this confusing interview. Yet this and similar statements and reports led many to view Kemalism, Fascism, and National Socialism as similar.

From early 1921 onward most papers chose to view the Bolshevik connection as healthy Kemalist pragmatism. It was also, the Kreuzzeitung claimed in 1922, “an automatic result of the attitude of the allies.”56 This pragmatism, the nationalist papers now claimed in unison, had no ideological ramifications whatsoever. The Deutsche Zeitung, for example, came to this conclusion: “Mustafa Kemal, Enver Pasha, and the other men of action in the Orient will take up any mask that might fit in order to further their völkisch and political goal and to enhance the impotence of the Entente powers in the Orient.”57 This was to be the nationalist press’s second and main strategy for dealing with the Kemalist-Bolshevik connection: The Kemalists were merely using the Bolsheviks for their own goals while at the same time remaining untouched by this dangerous ideology. In 1922 and 1923 the papers still repeatedly “set the record straight” and stressed the purely propagandistic and strategic value of Kemalism’s temporary alignment with the Soviet Union. However, many texts in the coming years were to justify the Kemalist-Bolshevik connection and even attempt to establish it as a possible precedent or model for a German-Soviet collaboration (see Chapter 4).

Similarly complicated, yet baffling for the German press, albeit for an even shorter period than the issues of Islam and Bolshevism, were
the Greeks and the Armenians. The role of these two groups will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 5, as they continued to play an important part in the overall perception of Turkey. It needs to be stressed here, however, just how much the perception of these two groups supplemented, indeed supported, the overall German perception of the Turkish War of Independence and, in turn, how much they were assimilated into this perception. With the Entente exhausted from fighting during the Great War and unwilling to commit too much manpower to the Ottoman Empire, the Greek army bore the brunt of the fighting against the Kemalists, fanned also by neo-imperial Greek ambitions. For the most part the war can be characterized as a Greco-Turkish war. How to portray the Greeks was a problem for many papers, at least initially, probably mainly because elite Germany had traditionally been pro-Greek, with philhellenism especially strong in late nineteenth-century society and the classic Greek language still being part of humanist education. Yet it was the Greeks who were fighting the Kemalists as the proxies of the Entente. One simply could not be pro-Turkish and pro-Greek at the same time. Some papers started out as somewhat or even solely pro-Greek; by 1919 they felt compelled to take sides, and in due course all of them became overtly anti-Greek. They called Greek soldiers in Anatolia “intruders” and described the Greek state as a “war profiteer of World War I”—which carried a quite negative connotation, given the domestic debates on the war. The papers frequently reported massacres of Muslim populations by the Greek army, while they largely ignored the violence of the Kemalist troops against Greek civilians—in the pages of the Kreuzzeitung, such violence did not really happen at all. The way the military events were covered also instantly reveals which side the papers were on. Take, for example, the Kreuzzeitung: Not only did the paper frequently reprint reports from the Turkish army without comment, as if they just had to be true, but conversely it phrased Greek reports in mostly doubtful indirect speech, often labeling them as being probably exaggerated. Negative reports originating from the Greek army headquarters on Greek defeats and retreats, however, were almost never doubted. Furthermore, the Kreuzzeitung simply did not seem to like Greek victories: most Turkish victories were headlined on page 1, while Greek
Entertainment: The Anti-Entente Playground, Turkey

“Anti-imperialism” was another important theme in the early reporting on Turkey and was in line with the developing interpretation of the Kemalist-Bolshevik alliance. Accordingly, the terms “anti-imperialist” and “anti-Western” were often included in descriptions of the Kemalists at the beginning. However, as time progressed, leading up to the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, such adjectives were more or less quietly dropped—unlike in other European countries, such as Italy, where anti-imperialism and anti-Westernism were to be part of the basic paradigm of interpretation for decades to come.61 For the German press, however, it was much more important and indeed fruitful to view the whole Turkish War of Independence through the lens of an “anti-Entente struggle,” as a nationalist rather than an anti-imperialist struggle. And indeed, the key for understanding how the German media public came to be fascinated, if not obsessed, with Turkey in the early Weimar years is the role of the Entente in this period and in the German coverage of the Turkish War of Independence. For depressed German nationalists, Turkey served as a kind of “playground” where they could vent their anger against the Entente. Turkey also served as a mirror for the German situation and as an alternate reality in its own right. How the German press talked about Turkey and the war there was contingent upon three convictions: First, the Entente was imperialist and in essence evil; second, the Turks would be infinitely troublesome for the Entente and later they would be victorious, no matter what; third, there was reason to rejoice, because Turkey exposed the Entente’s weakness and disunity. All three convictions were intertwined and usually were put forward together, in a contingent way, in the articles on Turkey. They all solidly rested upon the Germans’ confidence that they knew much better than the Entente what was really happening in Anatolia.

The first of a whole series of topics that immediately linked Turkey with Germany was the question of the extradition of war criminals to Allied tribunals.62 This was a hotly debated issue in Germany
at the time, and the nationalist right took a very clear stance against it. Indeed, they rejected the whole notion of war crimes altogether when it came to German actions during World War I and attempted to relegate the entire topic to the realm of Entente propaganda. This applied to the Ottoman Empire as well, and Turkey was swiftly integrated into this “German topic” by the papers. It is not surprising that the *Kreuzzeitung* called Enver Pasha and Talât Pasha “the so-called war-guilty”—which was the very same expression it used for German wartime leaders. A happy moment for the papers in this line of reporting was certainly when, in 1920, they were able to quote Atatürk himself saying that there should be no such tribunals for either Germany or Turkey. A couple of days later the *Kreuzzeitung* asked, on the front page, if the former ally would now also be subjected to this shameful treatment (extradition requests) by the Entente. A couple of days later it reported on the Armenian Genocide and possible extraditions of Germans involved in it. Now, it appears, the discursive stage had been set for the paper to treat the topic casually without further explanations, as the already mentioned articles on Enver Pasha’s and Imhoff Pasha’s arrests illustrate.

Entente imperialism and the dubious morality of the Entente in general were explored and emphasized in countless articles on Turkey. The depiction of the Entente policies vis-à-vis Turkey was key here and its deterioration closely reflected what was happening with Germany. At first, in early 1919, Entente policy was described mainly as pursuing the “partition of Turkey”—another one of the serialized titles and themes in the coverage on Turkey. But quickly, as anti-Entente language became more hostile in Germany in general, descriptions of Entente policy became phrased as the “destruction of Turkey” or the “liquidation of Turkey,” and then “the rape of Turkey” (*Vergewaltigung der Türkei*). This was one of many such “rapes”; a frequently used term was “raped nations.” One of the earliest themes and one of the “pieces of evidence” for the Entente’s mistreatment of Turkey was the alleged violation of agreements regarding the future of the Ottoman Empire and the resulting indignation in the whole Muslim world. The breach of promise to the Muslims everywhere was, according to the *Berliner Börsen-Courier*, even worse than the violation of Belgian neutrality at the start of World War I
by Germany. That the whole Orient now was outraged and angry, that it was going up in flames, was no surprise.72

Time and again the German press, and the *Kreuzzeitung* in particular, tried to prove that the Allies were involved in Anatolia only for their own gain—in contrast to all the philanthropic talk and all the Wilsonian principles. It was all merely a question of booty and profiteering, not freedom or self-determination (Fig. 1.6).73 Turkey was being degraded as an “object of exploitation by colonial-political capitalists.”74 Interestingly, in the minds of the German commentators oil was one of the main goals of Western imperialist ambitions vis-à-vis Turkey. This language is very reminiscent of later twentieth- and twenty-first-century language describing Western intervention in the Middle East; a 1922 *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* article put it: “One says protection of minorities and means petroleum.”75

One of the many attempts to discredit the Entente and to deconstruct its pro-minority language was an article in the *Kreuzzeitung* entitled “Armenia and Amritsar.”76 The article discussed how the “alleged crimes” against the Armenians had evoked sympathy not only in Germany but especially in England. Yet, as it pointed out in the first paragraph, nobody seemed to be speaking about Ireland, where “shots are still being fired and people are still being murdered.” It continued: “It appears to us as the greatest irony that the report of the official investigation on the Amritsar case has just arrived from India.” The paper then recounted the Amritsar massacre (April 1919), picking up the metaphor of Britain “ruling by machine gun,” and concluded the second paragraph of this lengthy essay with the exclamation: “If now only the Indians were able to send an extradition list to the English government!” Because Entente requests for extradition of German and Ottoman war criminals was one of the contexts within which both countries were discussed together frequently. This Amritsar article was just one of many intended to show that the Entente was essentially little more than an imperialist club devoid of any higher principles. This was underlined in another article in the *Kreuzzeitung*:

That a “solution” of the Turkish problem as “they” expect in Paris would be possible within a matter of days appears doubtful
Figure 1.6. “The Pinnacles of Civilization on the Turkish-Greek Battlefields.” “Excellent! Superbe! Cher Poincaré—Calculate how much we earn from each corpse!”

*Kladderadatsch* 39 (1922)
to us. . . . If England believes that they do not have to take the nationalist movement in Turkey [last four words are set in bold in the original] seriously, it probably errs. The Turks are no Egyptians or Indians, who can be controlled with whips or machine guns.77

From the beginning it was clear to the German press that the Turks were in a very difficult position, exhausted by continuous wars since 1911, poorly equipped, and disorganized. As we have seen, Thea von Puttkamer early in 1919 proclaimed Mustafa Kemal to be “the hero of a dying nation”—nothing less, but certainly nothing more. Thus, in the most optimistic view the Kemalists were going to be a nuisance for the Entente. Consequently, the coverage repeatedly stressed that the Turks lacked equipment, ammunition, and manpower—basically everything.78 The papers were not sure what to expect of the Turks, especially in the first months of the struggle, but by August 1919 some papers ventured ahead. The liberal-conservative Vossische Zeitung featured a long essay on the various movements opposing the Entente in the Middle East, especially highlighting Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The article drew the following conclusions: “All in all: the Entente will have to struggle quite a bit with this apparently so juicy booty, and it is questionable whether it will be able to enjoy it and to partition Turkey without further military operations.”79

From this point onward the belief that the Turks would be infinitely troublesome for the Entente grew stronger. Slowly the conviction that the Turks would even win established itself across the board. Once this level of certainty had been reached, the newspapers of the right and the far right in countless articles expressed and celebrated their schadenfreude about the Anatolian troubles of the Entente, which had wrongfully assumed that Turkey was a “quantité négligeable.”80 The papers rejoiced in every report that showed the Entente suffering in Anatolia militarily or diplomatically.81 By early 1920 this premonition already had blossomed into the conviction that no matter what, the Kemalists would win. They began portraying the Turks as a David pitted against the Entente Goliath. The Kreuzzeitung in late 1920 casually remarked: “Nor do we believe that the military might and the resources of Mustafa
Kemal are especially large, and neither does he have a real state at his disposal, but how is the Entente to reach him?\textsuperscript{82} Similarly, an article in the \textit{Frankfurter Zeitung}, with the headline “The Situation of the Entente in the Orient,” claimed: “Kemal is in an advantageous situation; because even if the Entente wanted to, and even if Mr. Mussolini comes back into line, without a tremendous effort of men, weapons, and money it will not achieve much against Kemal.”\textsuperscript{83}

Although the papers tended to reject the Entente discourse about Mustafa Kemal as a “robber” or a “gang leader,” in the beginning they had envisaged little more than a guerrilla war (\textit{Kleinkrieg}). Yet they claimed that 50,000 Entente troops in Constantinople would be no match, not even a problem, for the Kemalists—as this early-1920 excerpt from the \textit{Kreuzzeitung} illustrates:

As reported frequently already, recently there have been repeated armed clashes in Anatolia between the French and armed farmers, where the French hordes have received more than just bloody noses. . . . The Anatolians, accustomed and tested by war, will have no problem with the 50,000 allied troops, which are in their greater part meant for the occupation of Constantinople, and which consist mainly of colored [soldiers].\textsuperscript{84}

Above all, the right- to far-right-wing papers and the \textit{Kreuzzeitung} were sure that the Entente did not see the situation in Anatolia clearly, while they themselves, of course, did. At the beginning of this conviction stood a unique German perspective: that of the counsel of the former German military advisor to the Ottomans, von der Goltz Pasha. Goltz’s opinions were presented to the readers in an article in May 1919, the first longer summary of the war up to this date, in the weekly section “Äußere Politik der Woche” (Foreign Policy of the Week), of which one and a half columns were devoted to the Turkish question. Perhaps now Goltz Pasha’s advice to Sultan Abdul Hamid II would come true, the \textit{Kreuzzeitung} exclaimed, that with the retreat to Anatolia the Turks would only become stronger. This was one of the first explanations advanced to make sense of this Turkish miracle. And the paper claimed further: “The Turkish state, the ‘sick man,’ has now died, but the Turkish nation, i.e., the Anatolian peas-
antry (anatolische Bauerntum), which has waged war for eight years bravely and is willing to make all kinds of sacrifice, is neither rotten nor sick. It can and will recover.” At another point the Kreuzzzeitung again picked up this image: “Turkey does not dream of being dead yet.” As early as April 1920 the Kreuzzzeitung maintained that the Allies would not be able to suppress Atatürk’s revolt. A long paragraph began with the assumption that “the misery after these endless war years in Turkey must be unspeakable.” After a summary of the dire situation in Turkey, it concluded: “Yet, Turkey has not been fully destroyed, not by a long shot. The band around the Empire is not torn apart yet.” Mustafa Kemal “has proven that the Turkish nation still has a strong national cohesion, that Turkey despite being sick because of its collapse, is not dead yet.” The image of the undead Turk was picked up and disseminated by all papers and captured in a striking depiction in a Kladderadatsch cartoon (Fig. 1.7). Only later, in 1923, would the Kreuzzzeitung again acknowledge “death” in this context and exclaim that “the Ottoman Empire is dead, long live Turkey!”

From early on the papers also claimed that there was nothing that the Greeks or the Entente could really do about Atatürk; he was just too well entrenched, with his capital so far inland and with mountainous Anatolia under his full control. At some point this conviction took an almost hysterical turn. When it was reported in 1921 that the Greeks were winning and advancing on Ankara, the papers again were quick to minimize the meaning of the apparent Greek victory. Even if the Greeks took Ankara, it would not mean anything, the Deutsche Tageszeitung proclaimed. Another article from a reporter who had the chance to travel with Mustafa Kemal to the front similarly concluded that Atatürk’s troops were in fact invincible. Thus from 1920 onward the papers began to celebrate the fact that the Turks could not be defeated by the Entente, no matter what, and repeated this message again and again until the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. On October 8, 1921, when the Turks appeared to be finally winning again after months in which the Greek army had been advancing relentlessly, for the Kreuzzzeitung everything was clear: “In any case, the Turks, weapon in hand, have proven again that they will not accept just any peace of shame (Schandfrieden).”
Figure 1.7. “The Turk.” A Kladderadsch reading of the world situation: While all the other Central Powers lie dead in their graves, the “un-dead” Turk rises from his grave to attack John Bull.

Kladderadsch 41 (1919)
This conviction seemed to receive more empirical proof the longer the war went on—Greek victories and reports to the contrary were either ignored or downplayed by the papers.96 And then in 1922, after France had shifted toward a rather pro-Turkish position, they were even able to quote French sources: “To take arms up against the Turks, France declares, is pointless and impossible.”97

Once the Greeks had been expelled from Anatolia, the fighting had ended, and negotiations at Lausanne for a treaty settlement had begun, one might have expected that the coverage on Turkey would subside. Again, the opposite was true. Now the newspapers of the right and far right massively stepped up their coverage. The Kreuzzeitung featured around 260 articles and news items on Turkey in September (after Smyrna was taken), and 150 each in October and November. The articles from September until November 20, 1922, when the Conference of Lausanne began, were mostly about the Turkish claims and the preliminaries of the conference. In 1923 coverage dropped to around 30 to 50 articles per month, which was still a lot, considering that not much was actually happening, aside from long, drawn-out negotiations. The total number of articles and news items for the Lausanne negotiations, from November 20, 1922, until ratification of the treaty by the Greek and Turkish parliaments in August 1923, was no less than 450—not counting the many articles on the situation in Greece, which were always also connected to the negotiations.

The reasons for this renewed media attention are manifold. For one thing, the papers were jubilant about the various Turkish successes. But with the negotiations began the hardest part, or so the papers initially thought: “The harvest has not yet been brought in.”98 The obvious question for the German reading public was now: Would the Turks be able to transform their military victories at the diplomatic table into a just peace? Furthermore, even though the papers had championed the belief that the Turks would win in the end, the fact that the Turks actually did win took them a bit by surprise. Nothing of the sort had happened before.99 Although most papers were not sure how this negotiation process would end, they were all very certain that the Treaty of Sèvres would have to be revised. And this in itself was quite spectacular.100 In their essayistic summaries of the
negotiations, the papers concluded that this was in fact “the first real peace treaty negotiation after the Great War,” as the others, in their eyes, were just dictated by the Allies.\textsuperscript{101}

At first the German papers were surprised at how stubbornly the Turkish delegation refused to concede on any points, even minor ones. Over time they began to celebrate this stubbornness and discovered a new Turkish hero for themselves: Ismet [İnönü] Pasha.\textsuperscript{102} Atatürk’s prime military commander and head of the delegation at Lausanne had not received very much attention from the papers during the war; it was always the Turkish Führer who had stood in the limelight. Now Ismet Pasha became a major media star—next to Atatürk, of course, whose voice was still frequently “heard” in Germany. That at this point the Turks were still resisting Entente pressure for concessions impressed the nationalist press considerably. The delegation headed by Ismet Pasha even walked out of the talks and left the astonished Entente powers to discuss alone among themselves. This was possible only because the nationalists were able to negotiate from a position of strength, with much of present-day Turkey under their military control and the Allies feeling unable to enhance their own military position in Anatolia. The strong language of the Ankara government was often reproduced without comment and in bold print.\textsuperscript{103} The German papers became overexcited by the negotiating style of the Turks. Sentences like “Ankara will not tolerate foreign meddling” were repeatedly set in bold print.\textsuperscript{104} Many articles ended with quotes from Atatürk, set in bold letters: “Without faltering we march on to conquer our absolute independence.”\textsuperscript{105} “Life is nothing without independence.”\textsuperscript{106}

In September 1922 articles time and again contrasted the indecisiveness of the Entente with the victorious campaign of Atatürk.\textsuperscript{107} The fact that the Turks stressed that they were still willing to continue fighting even though they were already at the conference table in Lausanne was continuously highlighted by the papers. In a commentary for the \textit{Hallesche Zeitung}, Liman von Sanders claimed that the key to the Turkish success in Lausanne had been this willingness to continue the war if no diplomatic solution could be found.\textsuperscript{108} The Turks’ steadfastness and dignified demeanor were a major theme of press coverage at the time.\textsuperscript{109} Sometimes the papers even reprinted
Kemalists demands as lists on page 1, even though this obviously took up more space than normal text. Indeed, reprinting lists of Kemalist demands was one aspect of the German media’s role as champion and spokesperson for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. From 1921 onward such lists of demands appeared very frequently in the papers. The Greeks or the Entente were rarely, if ever, accorded a similar platform in the German newspapers.

Lessons: Turkey as a Role Model

Naturally the papers were jubilant when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. The success of the Kemalists in revising their very own “Turkish Versailles” by itself underlined the role-model quality of Turkey. All the major papers printed long, mostly front-page essays summarizing the Turkish success story and drawing conclusions from it. The Kreuzzeitung devoted more than half of its front page to yet another of so many discussions of the Turkish miracle. One of the central paragraphs read: “[Their] will not to bend under a slave peace, their martial bravery, and also the favorable constellation of world politics, not to forget the immense native political skill of the Turks, have accomplished this success. This is the way an uprising and victory are possible: This is how Turkey can and must be our role model!” The article continued to find further role-model qualities in more recent Turkish events when it commented on the planned elections in Anatolia, on Kemalism, and the “positive role” the destruction of the minorities had for the völkisch power of the Turks. Because of all this, the paper was confident this would be a lasting peace (in contrast to the Versailles and Sèvres treaties). “Among all the powers of 1918,” an unnamed Kemalist was quoted as saying, “Turkey stands alone today as the only victorious one.” And the Kreuzzeitung joyously remarked that he was right! A cover illustration of the magazine Kladderadatsch had made the same point a year earlier, playing with the traditional “sick man” imagery. Here “the Turk” exclaims that at a time when the European states were suffering under heavy deficits, he was now the only healthy man left in Europe.

As a “logical conclusion” from the inherent contrast between the Turkish “underdog” position and the Turks’ ultimate success, a rather
universalist message emerged in these debates. On the one hand, the Turks had been in an utterly desolate position at the beginning of the Turkish War of Independence, a situation stressed in hundreds of articles from the beginning; on the other, there was the much better precondition for continued war for liberation in Germany—at least from a logistical point of view, or so it was imagined. This message had evolved through one of many lines of interpretation. Already by October 1919, when the struggle had been going on for only a couple of months, the *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger* started to historicize the Turkish “success story” in an article spanning four columns.  

Similarly, a few days later the *Reichsbote* focused its renarration on “the Turkish success”—very prematurely calling it such—and on a direct comparison with Germany. This article, spanning three columns, stressed that unlike Germany, “Turkey is in a different situation today. There as well the government is willing and submissive toward the Entente and silently follows its whip. The nation however has chosen a different path and has taken matters in its own hands, led by nationalist fighters who use their personality enthusiastically and cheerfully for the higher völkisch goals.”

It continued that at first one could not believe the news about an uprising in Anatolia because it was assumed that the Turks were just as exhausted from war as the Germans were. But now it could no longer be denied:

> It is nothing less than the large-scale self-liberation from the chains of servitude that the Entente wanted put on the Turkish nation in order to gag and shackle the Central European states. . . . Only Kemal went into action. He declared the sultan and the government in Constantinople removed from power. . . . Strange that these so often ridiculed and supposedly degenerate Turks can be an example and a lesson to certain other people of how one has to do it in order to protect national honor and völkisch existence against harm.

A bit of envy and a lot of respect was, countless articles stressed, what one needed to have for what was happening in Anatolia. Starting in the first months of the Turkish War of Independence, countless articles retold the Turkish success story and presented Mustafa Ke-
mal in a historicized light as the only one who had stood up to the Entente and who had made sure that the future of the country would be determined by truly völkisch designs. Here is another typical example from the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* from 1921:

The Turks were the only nation that, despite all the weaknesses, despite decades of warfare, found the strength and the idealism not to bend unconditionally to the destructive will of the Entente, but who instead took up their weapons yet again. . . . [The Turkish nation] had the luck to find great leaders who enabled great deeds, which Germany, the formerly so admired and powerful ally of the Turks, was not able to do [and instead] created the conditions for its own destruction by the Entente itself, not having been defeated in the battlefield.

For a long time it appeared as if Mustafa Kemal was fighting for a hopeless cause. What in the end brought success was the sense of honor, the national sentiment, as well as the will for liberty in the Turkish nation and its leaders. The Turks have shown the world that the tough national will of a small and weak nation, strained to the last, if it is directed in a goal-oriented and sustained manner, admittedly under favorable general conditions, can achieve victories even against the might of the Entente.

Countless articles put forth the sort of view expressed in an article in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* in 1920: “From the heroic struggle of Turkey also, Germany can draw its conclusions: If the spirit remains strong enough, then no constraint and no force is powerful enough to subdue it in the long run.” Similarly, in an article in October 1922 the *Kreuzzeitung* expressed its “admiration” for the “moral power and bravery of the Turkish nation, which in this fashion rips apart the chains of servitude and rises again to be an independent sovereign state.” It concluded: “However different the geographic, economic, political, and military situations of Germany and Turkey are, when it comes to the moral energy, the discipline, the love of the fatherland, and willingness for national sacrifice—qualities with which the Turks so successfully are fighting oppression—we would do well to take them as a role model.”
Long before the final victory, the David-against-Goliath image, among others, was used to underline the importance of the Kemalist success and the fact that there was something to learn from it and from the way it was achieved. Count Vietinghoff-Scheel, in his article “The Significance of the Turkish Victory” in early 1921, offered the fitting sound bite: “The assumption that the Turks’ power of resistance has slackened as a result of the long years of war was erroneous. Kemal’s victory is to be valued even more because it was achieved against an apparently numerically superior enemy.” There had been repeated attempts to discredit the Turkish role model by stressing that “circumstances” rather than military or political choices had been responsible for the Kemalist successes. Conversely, the German nationalist press disputed that view by emphasizing that the Kemalist victory was the “success of national will politics.”

A lengthy article from the Hamburger Nachrichten in 1921, which again brought together such themes as the Turkish underdog and pure nationalism, encapsulated this German interpretation:

With that kind of envy that carries no malevolence, we Germans are watching the prudent actions, the brave deeds, and the successes of Mustafa Kemal and of his national warriors, because they provide us with a role model of how a stout band of national fighters led by a determined Führer can oppose the allied bandits and swindlers by fighting a guerrilla war and can prevail. . . . Anatolia, which is populated by five to six million people at most, opposes its enemies, by virtue of its own strength, because within it an undeterred unified national will is at work.

What emerged here was the view that anybody with the “right national sentiment” could achieve what the Turks had—making this “lesson” both more dangerous and more urgent.

As the Turkish War of Independence progressed, the “lessons” of the Turkish role model had been gradually more defined and filled with meaning by the various papers. So when in 1922 the Kladderadatsch published its cartoon “How to Revise a Paris Peace Treaty” (Fig. 1.8), the reader knew how to fill in the blanks. The cartoon, with its text in rhyme, asked the “important question of the day”: 
Figure 1.8. “The Revision of a Peace Treaty”

“The revision of a peace treaty—that is of importance today!

But how does one best carry out a thorough revision?

Should one give historians the contract, so that they can sufficiently . . . oversleep on it?

Should one let the paragraphs be mildly amended at diplomatic conferences?

Perhaps it will be resolved through the whispers of the relevant ministers?

Oh, nonsense! Rubbish! ‘That is ridiculous!’, said Bismarck. Do it like the Turk with Sèvres!”

Kladderadatsch 40 (1922)
How one can revise a peace treaty? As shown in the first three pictures, it was not through the deliberations of historians, diplomats, or politicians, but through “action,” that revision could be achieved, or “as the Turks did with Sèvres”—the Turk here, of course, depicted with sword in hand.

One of the leading metaphors promoting the Turkish role model in Germany was that of the “light from the East.” As early as July 1919 the Weser Zeitung carried the article “Ex Oriente Lux . . . ?” (Latin: Light from the East?). The question mark in the article served only to underline “the incredible reversal of world history,” that today “enlightenment” and political progress were again originating in the East, in Ankara. The article was full of admiration, also expressed by many other papers, for the Ottoman categorical “no” to the first Entente calls for a partition of Turkey:

It has become a matter of fact that after we could not get enough of slandering the former Ottoman ally after the events in the autumn of 1918, today we can learn from him. While Matthias Erzberger [vice-chancellor and minister of finance at the time] is racing into the arms of those dictating in Versailles . . . the sick man of the Golden Horn, who has been at war for seven years now and has suffered accordingly, utters a clear “no,” even though he knows that the benefactors of the small nations [the Entente], whom he was addressing, will not hesitate to bear down on him with saber and garrote.124

The German papers’ continued admiration for the various Kemalist “nos” in this period itself betrayed what they believed was the path to national honor and liberation. The papers accordingly celebrated every Kemalist “intransigence” they were able to report. And they were happy to show just how puzzled the Entente powers were by the fact that the Turks prized national dignity and liberty higher than the sacrifices that would ensue from their intransigence.125 Some papers also stressed that it was only the Turks’ willingness to sacrifice all for their nation that forced the Entente enemies of the Kemalists to muster respect for them. This was especially stressed in the context of the French about-turn and the attempt of the Quai d’Orsay
to forge an alliance with the Kemalists from late 1920 onward.\textsuperscript{126} “The steadfast Kemal Pasha” became a staple of German coverage on Turkey, as one article with the very same title also underlined.\textsuperscript{127} Part of this image was also a Mustafa Kemal who was always willing to continue his war when his demands were not met.\textsuperscript{128} This was the kind of nationalist backbone and martial spirit that many readers wished for Germany and their leaders.

The light metaphor inherent in the “ex oriente lux” article was used time and again in the papers. The Turkish case signaled a new model of politics, if not the advent of a new age, at least for Germany and nationalists in general; not so, however, for the “Entente imperialists.” Accordingly, the \textit{Kladderadatsch} claimed that for Britain it was not “ex oriente lux,” but “ex oriente tenebrae”—darkness from the East.\textsuperscript{129} When in 1921 the Greek army was advancing deep into Anatolia and appeared to be on the path to victory, the \textit{Berliner Tageblatt} opined that “the best” that was in the cards for the Greeks was a “Napoleonic fate”: “Only the danger that the light that leads out of the darkness will be lit at their expense has become smaller.”\textsuperscript{130} In its poem “Bad Mustafa” (\textit{Der böse Mustapha}) the \textit{Kladderadatsch} asked its readers, after having discussed just how impertinent this freedom-loving Mustafa was: “But what shall we do, we, who are daily oppressed and tortured?” It ended with the sentence: “And even if nobody is saying anything . . . ex oriente lux!” (\textit{Und tut keiner doch’nen Mucks! Aber . . . ex oriente lux}).\textsuperscript{131} When negotiations came to a standstill in early 1923 and the Ankara government rejected a first draft of the Lausanne treaty, the German press was again jubilant. The “no from Ankara” was seen again as pathbreaking for world, and especially German, politics. An article in the \textit{Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung} titled “Ankara’s No” stressed again the parallelism of Turkey and Germany as well as the potential lessons from the Turkish tactics for the Germans. Its discussion of the “world-shaking no” concluded:

The rejection of this insidious treaty, which served only the interests of those Western great powers party to the treaty, but not those of the Turkish nation, shall be a stimulus for us to persevere in our resistance and a consolation in most serious and dire times. Like bright lightning, the no from Ankara
illuminates the black political sky, it has the effect of a fire signal in the mist of dawn.\textsuperscript{132}

Again the \textit{Kladderadatsch} offered a fitting illustration of the general mood: The French rooster—France’s extended hand was believed by many commentators to have been instrumental in the Kemalist success—greeted the morning sun (Fig. 1.9), only to find that the morning sun had transformed into the Turkish star and crescent.\textsuperscript{133} Similarly, another cartoon played with the metaphor of light when it depicted the Turkish sultan falling off the Turkish crescent because it was brighter than it used to be. The “half-moon turned into sun” signaled a new age, in which there was no place for halfhearted “fulfillment politicians” like the sultan or those ruling Germany.\textsuperscript{134}

One article, spanning three columns in the \textit{Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung}, in its title heralded Ankara as “the youngest republic.”\textsuperscript{135} It also rejected the claim that there were other “new republics,” such as a Kurdish one, reports of which were carried by the international press. The paper announced: “With one energetic swing we push aside all these confabulations and proclaim: There is only one ‘youngest republic’ and that is the one in Ankara, the navel of the world.” There was no irony in this proclamation; the paper really saw Ankara as the navel of the world at that moment. The article continued to discuss the constitution of the Ankara government, which, the paper claimed, was born under the auspices of the god of war, Mars. It praised the directorial form of government, which it differentiated from other parliamentarian systems. This was early praise for what the papers believed was a more “national democracy,” less divisive and stronger.

Obviously developments in Turkey were regularly used to hold up a mirror to German politics vis-à-vis the Entente. Like the “ex oriente lux” article, other articles played with the reversal of roles. One article used the old phrase, inspired by Goethe’s \textit{Faust}, “far in the backwoods of Turkey,” which originally emphasized the utter absence of German interest in the developments in the Ottoman Empire. Full of irony and contempt for the German fulfillment politicians, those German politicians who allegedly fulfilled every wish of the Entente, the \textit{Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten} used the Turkish case to illustrate what was wrong with Germany:
In this uncultured country, there still exists national spirit. With their well-known laziness and indolence the Turks have still not managed to ascend to such a sublime position as our government, thank God. They are so backward, our former allies, that they still believe in the right of self-determination of peoples and are even trying to turn this belief into reality.¹³⁶

With its ironic tone, it continued that the Germans should not care about these backward people who were obsessed with their freedom and their land: “We [in contrast] have progressed far, carrying out the
practical side of politics for the League of Nations through sacrifices and extraditions; we are the only true member of the new community.” Later on, one author, again in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, while overjoyed at the Turkish success, speculated that from now on the prime locus of “civilization” would again be in the Orient:

It is easily possible that Orient and Occident will swap their roles again. It was just a couple of centuries ago that Central Europe’s swamps and jungles were haunted by a robber barony bereft of all ideals and culture while on the high plateau of Asia Minor the most refined taste and highly intellectual men cultivated the arts and sciences with a precision that is still exemplary today.137

Of the many calls to learn from Turkey, many may appear vague as to what exactly might be transferred or learned. But taken as a whole, the discourses on Turkey and Germany developed by the papers spelled out very clear “lessons.” The Turkish case served as a sphere and an example within which the nature of politics itself was explored. Perhaps the most important concept, present in almost all of the nationalist papers and interpretations of Turkey, was the opposition between “active politics” and “passive politics.” The Kemalist way to “make politics”—to wage war against the Entente for an honorable peace—was viewed as “active politics” par excellence. The opposite was what the papers diagnosed in the case of Germany: fulfillment politics, which in their eyes was either “passive politics” or not even politics at all. The Kladderadatsch cartoon “How to Revise a Peace Treaty” summarized this debate and Turkey’s role-model function perfectly. It ruled out historians, diplomats, and politicians as agents of revision. The one who achieves revision is a Turk, “saber in hand”—“action” instead of “talk.”

This theme of Turkish active politics, and war as politics, was present in Kreuzzeitung articles from early on. From 1922 onward the theme gained ever greater saliency because now the paper also identified a new “world situation.” The Kreuzzeitung’s coverage and discussion of Turkey can serve as a typical example of how such calls for action were put forward in German papers of right-wing and far-
right-wing persuasion. An article from March 1922, almost one and
a third pages long, first recounted the conviction, now presented as
“fact,” that the Entente would not be able to do anything about Tur-
key. In a second step it stressed that “it has to be ascertained as an
outcome with the greatest political implications that the victorious
powers had to revise the dictated terms of Sèvres and to tear down
the edifice of this coerced peace (Gewaltfriedens) with their own
hands.” 138 Now, the paper exclaimed, the “principle of the inaltera-
bility of the peace treaties” had been broken as a result of the Turk-
ish War of Independence. It was to reiterate this message—as one of
the things to be learned from Turkey—many times in the following
months until the signing at Lausanne, and then called upon Ger-
many to also make “active politics” instead of fruitless fulfillment
politics. 139

One of these articles provided a list of the consequences for Ger-
many based on the Turkish example: The Treaty of Versailles needed
to be revised, and not only with regard to reparations. Here the pa-
er stressed that politics was not restricted to economics (connect-
ing the article to the ongoing debate surrounding reparations); in fact
the economy was determined by “politics,” as Mustafa Kemal had
shown. The article called upon the German elite to wake up, and
complained that while Germany, a nation of some 60 million, did
not “make politics,” even the smallest nation did so today. It con-
cluded: “The German Michel [i.e., the German nation] remains in
the last seat in the audience.” Germany as a passive spectator to what
was happening at home and in the world was a ubiquitous theme in
these years.140

On October 12, 1922, in an article with the telling title “Unity!
Why?” the Kreuzzeitung argued that the “substructures of the world
stage” (Unterbau der Weltbühne) had caught fire and that two contem-
porary examples—Russia and Turkey—signaled a new kind of “po-
tency” as a political factor. This was contrasted again with Germany,
which, according to the paper, had no significance in world politics
any more because it was passive, a mere object.141 In the weeks sur-
rounding this article the Kreuzzeitung frequently emphasized that the
Turks were willing to continue fighting if no acceptable treaty was
negotiated. Many articles argued in similar fashion: “It is not because of the fulfillment politics of the Constantinople government but because of the resistance of the Ankara government (Angora-Regierung) that, today, Turkey is not treated by the Entente as a negligible power.”

This was a front-page article running onto the second page and was succeeded by an article on the “pledge of allegiance of the Rhineland.” As I have already stressed, the reporting on Turkey always must be read in connection with the articles on the German situation on the very same pages of the paper. Only six days later an article on a possible German national rebirth, while not referring to Turkey explicitly, asked the question whether the Germans perhaps lacked the “necessary national sentiment”—a question that made sense only within a broader discourse on possible resistance to the Entente, in which Turkey was central. An article on the very same page as one calling for a revision of the Treaty of Sèvres—the centerpiece of the front page—also highlighted the implicit parallel in its discussion of German politics. The paper claimed that if a state could not carry out the conditions of the Entente, its leaders had to put the necessities of the existence of nation and country above the political needs of the enemy. The article left it to the reader to fill in the blanks.

Many articles in many papers used the active-passive distinction to compare Germany with Turkey much more directly than the articles printed in the Kreuzzeitung—for example, one by the priest and DNVP member Max Maurenbrecher in the Deutsche Zeitung in 1922. Titled “What Do the Turks Teach Us?,” his article claimed that if, in 1918 or 1919, German leaders had, like the Turks, decided to fight on for German freedom and borders, they not only would have succeeded but also would have gained the respect of their former enemies, which in turn would have made a good outcome for Germany more probable. The contrast between “active politics” and fulfillment politics is most perfectly illustrated in a Kladderadatsch cartoon titled “Different Organs of Speech” (Fig. 1.10). Here Reichskanzler Wirth, a fulfillment politician par excellence for the German nationalists, was directly compared to Atatürk. Wirth, head downward and shoulders hunched, timidly asks the Entente for their conditions and complains that he receives no answer. Then Atatürk
“Dr. Joseph Wirth: ‘Strange! When I try to establish a connection with the Entente with the telephone, I hear nothing but an unpleasant buzzing in the receiver.’

Mustafa Kemal Pasha: ‘Please, let me see that!’ (Into the mouthpiece:) ‘Here Kemal Pasha! Damn it, when am I going to get your proposals?’ Response (quick, clear and distinct): ‘Immediately! Instantly!’

Kemal Pasha (to Dr. Wirth, smiling): ‘You see, that is how one needs to speak.’”

Kladderadatsch 41 (1922)
grabs the phone and shouts demands. “The Entente” answers right away. “You see, *that* is how one needs to speak,” a smiling Atatürk remarks to Wirth.  

The concept of Turkish “active politics” always also underlined the moral dimension of politics. At any point from 1919 until 1923, the Kemalists would always stand up for their rights, regardless of whether this jeopardized one of the various, or even the Lausanne, negotiations. What the Entente politicians and the Entente press called “intransigence” or stubbornness was celebrated by the German national press as the only way to comport oneself in such situations. The *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger* dubbed the Treaty of Lausanne “the triumph of perseverance.” The German nationalist papers sent a clear message to the reading public and to their fulfillment politicians. This message was highlighted by putting certain key phrases in bold print when discussing the results of Lausanne, such as “totally free and independent” and “equal and recognized,” as was done in one such article in the *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger*.

This same article offered yet another overview of how the Germans should take the Turks as a role model. The author claimed that the Turks were never victims of the pacifist lies of the Entente, but had trusted only their arms and power in order to regain their equal rights and their manly honor. The disunity of the Entente was crucial, but so was the Turkish patriotic willingness to sacrifice and the fact that the Turks had “never renounced the soldierly spirit.” The article concluded that what the Turks had carried out was “Realpolitik.” Here again *Kladderadatsch* most poignantly captured the zeitgeist in relation to Turkey and “politics” in general. One of the various cover pages dealing with the Turkish example entitled “The Pacifist Historian” showed a historian writing the line “Never again war” and read: “Because war is a crime against the pacifist spirit, a nation shall bear malicious injustice rather than. . . .” Then, as in a theater play: “(Mustafa Kemal appears).” This Mustafa Kemal was illuminated in an orange light, again a reference to the “ex oriente lux” image, and carried a sword with the inscription “strength and love of the fatherland” (Fig. 1.11).

The role model Turkey was intrinsically connected to a new style of politics and the person of Mustafa Kemal. As we have seen, the
“The Pacifist Historian”

“Because war is and remains a crime against the pacifist spirit, a nation shall bear the most malicious injustice rather than . . .

(Mustafa Kemal appears).”

Note the sword Mustafa Kemal carries is inscribed with the words “strength and love of the Fatherland.”

*Kladderadatsch* 39 (1922)
early Weimar years were also marked by intense debates about the nature of politics and history. The frequent allusion to historians and philosophers of state and history are in no way coincidental. Was it “the masses” or “the man,” democracy, circumstance, or a single “Führer,” who “made history”? For those participating in it, this was no mere philosophical debate, but a matter of life and death, determining the fate of the nation, politics, and the world as such—at least so the politicians and publicists claimed. Mustafa Kemal was inserted into this context because he was meant to prove beyond any doubt that it was indeed the individual who made history. After extensive reporting on Turkey, the Kreuzzeitung, in an essayistic article, exclaimed: “Men make history!”150 In the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Thea von Puttkamer summarized her article on Atatürk, among other things, with this call to learn from Turkey: “In Germany, where the heroic is worth disgracefully little [nowadays], much more attention should be paid to how much the will of a single man can accomplish.”151 In an article titled “Man and Masses,” Friedrich Hussong argued the case in an exemplary fashion.152 Hussong was a fierce antidemocratic, revisionist, and anti-Semitic publicist, often viewed as one of Goebbels’s main teachers and idols, dubbed “the voice of Hugenberg”—Alfred Hugenberg having been a leading German nationalist politician, industrialist, and press tsar of the 1920s.153 Hussong was writing for the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, openly sympathized with Hitler during the putsch of 1923, and is credited with winning over many readers as voters for Hitler instead of for his boss.154 In his “Man and Masses” essay, he described Germany as castrated and caught in a “delirium of the masses,” by which he of course meant democracy. On the other hand, there was, Hussong juxtaposed, the creative “Führer personality” of Mustafa Kemal—a man who transformed a helpless and disoriented mass into a nation, into an army; a man who gives the masses a purpose: “The man Mustafa Kemal rises and turns a seemingly helpless and unstable, disoriented and faltering mass into a unified nation; a will rises and creates ascent from doom; a Führer rises and shows the way . . . where once one saw only abyss and doom.” For Hussong, Atatürk was a “man of steel,” a man “charged like an accumulator” with a will like “pressed steel,” able to do just about anything. Hussong renarrated Atatürk’s biography
Turkish Lessons for Germany

and his success story in order to “disprove” German democracy, if not democracy as such, and to tell Germany what it needed. Hussong also pointed out that Germany had long been accustomed to valuing personalities such as Atatürk’s and quoted Georg Christoph Lichtenberg and Goethe as proof. In the course of this article Hussong repeated the Lichtenberg quote “To see a man who has head and heart, a most rare phenomenon” again and again. He recounted recent Turkish history in epic fashion, stressed the “will of the man” who was able to break the “chains of servitude” of Sèvres, and listed all the signatories of that treaty in order to emphasize just how impossible Atatürk’s endeavor must have once appeared. Regardless of how Atatürk “completed his fate” in the future, Hussong stressed, “we owe him the rehabilitation of the honor of the man against the idolaters of the masses.” With this Hussong closed his call for a Führer. Before he had arrived at this conclusion he had attacked the critics of the Führer idea and of Atatürk’s example. These attacks also show that the discussion of Atatürk as proof of the Führer idea was not limited to Hussong, but more widespread. Among others he attacked those focusing on Atatürk’s alleged vices (such as “Arabian horses, Armenian women, and Greek boys”) and deemed them utterly irrelevant regarding his role as Führer. He also addressed the debate about circumstance:

Those philosophers of history who, in favor of the demos, want to eliminate the conscious goal-setting will of the man as a factor of historical creation, who want to have count only “milieu,” “circumstance,” and the dull instincts of the masses as creators of the fate of nations, are also quick to point, when it comes to the phenomenon Kemal Pasha, to the trends that alone enabled his appearance and his success. [This is] the philosophy of history from a frog’s perspective. Where were these good trends when in 1918 everything broke down around the man? Where were the good trends when in 1919, with snatched-up shreds of an army, he had to fight his best buddies, the French, in order to defeat them? The man created [set in bold in the original] these trends! His victory is not the result of circumstances, the circumstances are the effects of his victory.155
So frequent and ubiquitous were German calls for learning from Turkey, as well as German euphoria over the Kemalist victory against the Greeks, well before it was actually achieved, that the famous German pacifist Carl von Ossietzky felt obligated to rebut them in a rather angry article in the *Berliner Volks-Zeitung* with the title “The Case of Ankara” in June 1921. While Ossietzky acknowledged the victories of the “military state” of Ankara, he was sure that “the British bulldog” would have no problem “strangling the Ankara cat” in the end. He spoke out against the German hopes that Ankara signaled the coming of a new age. His was a lone voice of sanity in a sea of delirious Germans. Ossietzky spoke out particularly against Liman von Sanders, who had just begun to write admiringly about Mustafa Kemal in a series of articles and also against the völkisch publicist and politician Count Ernst von Reventlow. He tried to discredit the latter’s excitement for the Kemalists by stressing that Reventlow was, in fact, of the very same imperialistic persuasion as the Entente. Interestingly, Reventlow published an article on Ankara, full of praise and excitement, even with first calls for a “German Ankara,” in the *Berliner Tageblatt* on the very same day as Ossietzky’s angry article. It seems that Ossietzky knew that such an article was about to be published and tried to “preempt” it.156

Not only Ossietzky but others as well, such as the *Vossische Zeitung*, which had been just as pro-Turkish as the other papers and had just as often put Turkey parallel with Germany, felt it necessary to distance themselves from the others. In a July 1923 essay in the *Vossische Zeitung* on the Treaty of Lausanne, the guest commentator attributed the Turkish military success almost exclusively to geography—the “possibility of Ankara”—and concluded that this alone would make void all the comparisons with Germany.157 He continued that the comparison of the Turkish with the German nationalists was “just as childish” because the Kemalists had relinquished the Arab territories from the outset, the “national pact” having been a known document in Germany for some time. Thus, he believed, they were not expansionist as German nationalists were. However, that mattered little to those who wanted to make the comparison; they looked at how the Treaty of Sèvres had left Turkey and how greatly expanded and strengthened Turkey now appeared.
It is extremely difficult to reconstruct all the nuances of cross-political debate on Turkey at this time, but an article in the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* from September 1922 sheds some light on this dimension. Under the headline “Mustafa Kemal’s ‘Secret’” a commentary heavily attacked the German fulfillment politicians, and the left in general. It pointed out that to them the Turkish case was very dangerous:

How can this man [Mustafa Kemal] dare, in this age of democracy and of the fraternization of peoples, to make use of these antiquated means from older barbarian times and even succeed in doing so to free his country from slavery! Something like this can be achieved today only through congresses and resolutions, at which lots of speeches are given and loads of pages will be printed.

The article then attacked especially the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Freiheit*, which had recently ascribed the Turkish successes solely to circumstance and by doing so had claimed that there were no lessons from Turkey to be learned by Germany because the preconditions were so very different. The commentary in the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* now attempted to refute such claims beyond any doubt, mainly by stating that the conditions had in fact been the same and that the two papers had never expected the Kemalists to win in the first place. The whole case was altogether different: Had Turkey not taken control of its destiny, nobody in the world would have come to its aid. After further lengthy deliberations on the comparability of the two cases, the commentary concluded: “The paths could have been, probably should have been, different ones, but the moral preconditions of success were and are the same for us as they were for the Turks. Only unity and the strongest national sentiment prepared for all [kinds of] sacrifices can save us as well.”158

Accordingly, Turkey in general, especially the notion of a “Turkish role model,” as well as the various proposed lessons drawn by papers for Germany, provoked many cross-paper debates. Another article documenting such a debate was “Mussolini and Kemal” in the *Vossische Zeitung*, published in late 1922 in the wake of Mussolini’s
March on Rome. The paper here warned against drawing all too quick and direct conclusions from those two potential “role models.” Caution was necessary because neither had really been tested yet, the paper claimed. The article was especially directed against a “Munich nationalist orator” who had recently praised Mustafa Kemal as a great “statesman general”—very probably a reference to Hitler’s speeches at the time. Again the paper mentioned geography—“circumstance”—as a main reason for Mustafa Kemal’s success. It also cited the apparent abolition of the sultanate (one year before it actually happened) by the Ankara parliament as proof of the Kemalists’ lack of “real-political insight” (realpolitische Einsicht) and of their “childish radicalism.” Again, and unfortunately, the voices of reason were to be proven wrong by the course of history.

While this article sheds light upon the overall atmosphere of which both Mussolini and Kemal were part, and identifies a political player who embraced the Turkish role model—that is, Hitler—earlier articles had already identified potential “German Mustafas.” Of those, one from late March 1922 is especially striking because it formulated a very immediate application of Turkish lessons. An article in the morning edition of the Deutsche Tageszeitung on March 28, 1922, triggered a reaction by the Social-Democratic Vorwärts in its evening edition in the article “Mustafa am Rhein?”: “The Deutsche Tageszeitung has the audacity to recommend, in its morning edition, the demeanor of the Ankara Turks . . . as an example worthy of imitation.” The Vorwärts rejected the role-model quality of Turkey with a somewhat confusing commentary:

The Transpomeranian Junker, the Lichterfeld cadet, the Prussian judge, and the other trained high-political average readers of the Deutsche Tageszeitung have to draw the conclusion that if we had assigned the role of Mustafa Kemal to Ludendorff, the revision of Versailles would have been accomplished already. But how are we to expect such deeds of salvation from Wirth, Rathenau, and the treasonous social democrats! They can only “capitulate.” Wimps [Schlappschwänze].

Indeed, in the days of the “Mustafa am Rhein?” article, the calls for learning from Turkey were so ubiquitous and violent that many
other papers in addition to the *Vorwärts* were prompted to respond to such calls. Wilhelm Feldmann, former editor in chief of the *Osmanischer Lloyd*, writing the lead commentary for the *Vossische Zeitung* also saw himself pressured into offering a different reading of the apparent Kemalist success. In his article “The Precedent,” he wrote that all the German papers were full with praise for the Turkish success and most drew the conclusion that this success was almost completely due to the armed resistance of the Turks. He claimed that it was also due to Kemal’s diplomatic clairvoyance and not solely to his victory in the battlefield. But Feldmann’s argument was weak and had little chance of stemming the tide of German nationalists and advocates of the “tough solution,” as he called it. At this point all the major papers had very strong feelings about their very own interpretation and about the “world significance” of the Kemalist success.161

Conclusion

When the Treaty of Lausanne was finally signed in July 1923, it was no surprise to the readers of the center to far-right papers that had regularly followed the events in Anatolia from the beginning in 1919—often on a daily basis and with surprising depth. The “Turkish miracle” was a miracle long before the Turks and the Entente negotiated the Mudanya Armistice or the Treaty of Lausanne. But with the treaty finally signed, it was clear that in this one case it had actually been possible to revise a Paris treaty and to achieve a new peace in harmony with the designs of “the nation.” The Treaty of Sèvres had envisaged reducing the Ottoman Empire to a small Anatolian country, with parts of western Anatolia under Greek and Italian control and southeastern Anatolia under French control, with an enlarged Armenia to the east and an autonomous Kurdistan (Fig. 1.4). The Entente powers would have also had much control over internal Turkish affairs. The Treaty of Lausanne established Turkey in its contemporary borders, leaving outside of its borders only a small part of French Syria, which it would claim in the 1930s under the name Hatay, as well as restrictions on the militarization of the straits. Other than that, the new Turkey was to be entirely free in its internal and external politics, previous special rights of foreign nations
(the Ottoman “capitulations”) had been abolished, and the so-called national pact of the Kemalists had been fully realized.

The Turkish War of Independence was a major Weimar media event, giving the Weimar press not only an extremely fascinating story but also an additional space in which various themes that preoccupied Germany at this time could be examined, expanded, and commented on. The Turkish case was constantly connected with and reintroduced into German contexts and topics. It provided an opportunity to explore the true evil nature of the Entente and the disunity within it (Fig. 1.12). Additionally, there were also the assassinations of Talât Pasha in 1921 and later of other Young Turks in 1922 in Berlin; there were permanent links to the German situation, beginning with the question of war guilt and the Entente extradition lists; and then, at the last minute, the Bolsheviks were excluded from the Lausanne negotiations, followed by the assassination of the leading Soviet diplomat there and by Mussolini’s first performance on the stage of international diplomacy. And then there was also the opportunity for German anti-Semites to think through their ideas about Central European Jewry and the stab-in-the-back myth, with the Armenians standing in for the Jews in the Turkish case. It is not surprising that Turkey fascinated the German public for over four years. The Turkish case was a revisionist-nationalist dream come true, even a fetishized version of it, because it had been achieved by the sword, in the field, with major battles, and many epic twists.

Turkey mattered, dangerously and pressingly so. To bring Turkey closer to their German readers, the major nationalist papers “Germanified” the Turkish topic. But in many ways they did more; they constructed a “parallel Germany,” where things went the way they were supposed to. Germany, in a mirror brightly . . . Calls to learn from Turkey were ubiquitous in the German press of the early Weimar Republic. The Turkish role model was acknowledged by a host of papers, commentators, and politicians from the center to the far right (while the left saw things completely differently, of course). They identified a variety of “Turkish lessons” and propagated them as the only means of saving and liberating Germany. Turkey, and especially the “role-model Turkey,” also became a favorite visual topic. In 1920–1923 the humoristic weekly *Kladderadatsch* devoted at least
Figure 1.12. “The 657th Reconciliation”
“The Frenchman (in Lausanne): ‘Little brother John, you don’t think I have stolen the crescent now, do you?!’”
Kladderadatsch 7 (1923)
five covers, thirty-nine caricatures, and fifteen poems to Turkey.\textsuperscript{162} It even developed its own signature depiction of “the Turk” as an angry crescent-man. Turkey as a topic was closely followed by the Weimar media and attributed the highest political significance for Germany. “Learning from Turkey,” the nationalist papers proclaimed, was the only way out of the contemporary German misery. The Turkish War of Independence served the broader German nationalist right to discredit current politics and to “learn” that international treaties, alliances, and the League of Nations were not mechanisms through which, by themselves, a bright future for Germany could be achieved. National unity, a strong leader, and preemptive and total military action were advanced as crucial policy prerequisites and political means. As suggested by the article from the \textit{Deutsche Tageszeitung} and the various implicit attacks on the fulfillment politicians through the “parallel Germany” they had constructed in Turkey, the Turkish War of Independence was a very dangerous thing for center to left German politicians and indeed for Weimar democracy as a whole. Furthermore, one of the various implicit “warnings” of many articles had been that the time for the Germans to act was now or never.

The “Mustafa am Rhein” article was one among many calling for an application of Turkish lessons. But it is a remarkable one because it illustrates the impatience of the actors and represents an attempt to heat up the debate on the Turkish role model. At an abstract level these discussions show that the “Turkish way” was rather widely accepted as the only way to achieve a revision of the Versailles Treaty. The discussions about the Turkish case have also illustrated how much it resonated within the right to far-right circles, and also how much this was understood in a völkisch and antidemocratic fashion. But apparently such views were also voiced outside of the papers. The \textit{Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger} reported in late 1923—eleven days after the Hitler Putsch—on a lecture at the University of Berlin on the New Turkey that drew comparisons between Germany and Turkey after 1918. The report, and apparently the lecture, ended with a call for Germany to take the Turkish example in order “to learn how a nation regains its place in the sun.”\textsuperscript{163}

Given the ubiquity and resonance of the Turkish “role model,” it is quite surprising that it did not inspire more German politicians
and leaders to act. Perhaps the “shock” of the failed Kapp Putsch in early 1920 held them back. And although, as some of the discussed articles suggested, there might have been “different paths” for a German translation of the Turkish success, some were to take the Turkish example very, very literally and thereby also to highlight the danger of “learning from Turkey.” It was not “on the Rhine,” but rather in Munich, and it was Erich Ludendorff, already proposed for the role of the “German Mustafa” in one article, and Hitler who were to attempt to “translate” the Turkish example by action. In late 1923, after years of obsessing over Turkey, the German media very abruptly stopped to discuss and advance lessons from this role model. As Chapter 2 will show, this was very much Hitler’s and Ludendorff’s fault.
It was an unsuccessful endeavor and failed within five days. “To stage a putsch without a cabinet ready at hand was just childish,” remarked a commentator in Berlin just after the failure of the Kapp Putsch in 1920. This commentator was the former grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire Talât Pasha. Ernst Troeltsch, theologian and politician, was impressed by the clarity of the advice of this Turkish “master of revolution.” Talât Pasha might have been right about the dilettantism of the failed Kapp Putsch, but he was not the Turkish voice the German far right was eager to hear at this time. People had already turned to another Turk for solutions, and also away from Berlin, which had failed to provide remedies, to Munich, the hub of the völkisch right. And there, within three years, the young Weimar Republic would be challenged by yet another putsch from the right—the Hitler Putsch. This attempted seizure of power, contrary to current wisdom in historiography, was inspired much more by Mustafa Kemal and the events in Anatolia than by the example of Mussolini’s “March on Rome.”

Mussolini has often been seen as the Nazis’ prime role model. This view was partly influenced by Hermann Esser’s iconic quote about Hitler being the “German Mussolini.” But there has been little research into how the Italian or the now-forgotten Turkish role mod-
els exerted their influence. Usually the history of both movements, Italian Fascism and Kemalism, if the latter is mentioned at all, is merely recaptured in a sentence, in passing. The assumed role-model function of Mussolini, mainly deduced from the later significance of Fascist Italy, has led many authors to overestimate Italy and the March on Rome, and even to infer that the Hitler Putsch was explicitly intended to copy the March on Rome. Few historians mention Atatürk as part of the general pre-putsch atmosphere, and as a rule the Turkish influence is omitted in studies of Nazism and Hitler. The few studies that do acknowledge Atatürk as an influence tend to get the timeline wrong and place him after Mussolini, whom these authors depict as the paramount influence on the Nazis. Atatürk is merely an addendum in these texts, deemed worthy of perhaps a half-sentence. Franz-Willing, for example, believed that the Nazis were more influenced by Mussolini and that the conservative right, including important generals of the Reichswehr, were influenced by Atatürk (an observation that is not warranted by the few sources we have—he does not cite any at all). This and a similar mentioning by Hans Mommsen (and Eleanor Hancock, citing Mommsen), who also, in passing, explicitly included Röhm as an initial adherent to Mustafa Kemal’s model, seem to be based on Hanns Hubert Hofmann’s account of the Hitler Putsch. Hofmann paid a bit of attention to the Turkish influence and mentioned it briefly, mainly regarding the army (the Reichswehr), but he discarded its importance on the putschists in favor of the Italian model. Similarly, Joachim Fest, Bruno Thoss, and Hagen Schulze acknowledge that both Mussolini and Atatürk helped create the sense of unrest and crisis that signaled possible changes for nationalist circles, again in passing. Only Ernst Nolte, in his Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche, gets the timeline right, but he mentions Atatürk for the year 1919 solely in an enumerative fashion between Gabriele D’Annunzio and the activities of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the future leader of the Romanian Iron Guard. Yet, the twenty-year-old Codreanu had just begun his university studies in 1919 and was hardly an influence on anybody at that time, let alone on German nationalists in far away Munich. Thus Nolte devalues the influence of Atatürk’s “defense dictatorship,” as he calls it, and stresses the “magnificent example of Mussolini” on all interwar
fascisms over everything else. But these are, anyway, the exceptions: usually Mustafa Kemal is absent altogether in historical accounts of early Nazism and only Mussolini’s influence on the Nazis is mentioned.

But Atatürk played a far greater role. The following explores how the völkisch, and particularly the Nazi, press in the time leading up to the Hitler Putsch understood the Turkish example and appropriated it for itself. I suggest that these discussions formed an important and integral part of the background of the Hitler Putsch. If, as we saw in Chapter 1, the German press in general had already and continually proposed learning from Turkey, then the Nazi press went even further. The discussion of Turkey in the general press was the background for the Nazi preoccupation with Turkey. It illustrates how much early Nazi ideas were part of the general zeitgeist. This chapter further develops the argument that the Nazis “grew up” with Turkey.

The papers of the völkisch fringe, which offered comparatively little on foreign policy, foreign events, or major domestic events, were clearly designed as supplementary reading and were thus mainly restricted to commentary. What they did feature, however, was their own commentary on Turkey. As we have seen, their commentary relied on and built upon the broader news coverage on Turkey in other German newspapers; they presupposed that their readers knew about current events in Anatolia. I will discuss two papers here in depth: the Völkischer Beobachter and the weekly Heimatland. The former was the official Nazi paper from January 1921 onward. The Heimatland, a Munich weekly closely aligned with the Nazi movement and not just the party, was the official mouthpiece of the Einwohnerwehren, paramilitary groups in Bavaria, and most importantly it was, according to Ernst Röhm, the “intellectual weapon” of the SA, the radical and paramilitary arm of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP, National Socialist German Workers’ Party). It was thus connected to the Nazi party in more than one way, another being that it was also the official paper of the Vaterländischer Kampfbund, which was also sponsored by the NSDAP. Its editor, Wilhelm Weiß, who had joined the party in 1922, was to be an active participant in the 1923 putsch and would have an influential press career later on, especially in the Third Reich. Between 1927 and 1938 he
held the post of acting editor of the *Völkischer Beobachter* and thereafter became the official editor of the paper. He also served as president of the *Reichsverband der deutschen Presse* for the entire duration of the Third Reich.\(^{15}\)

**Turkey in the Nazi Press: The *Völkischer Beobachter* and the *Heimatland***

The *Völkischer Beobachter* started out being rather anti-Turkish. When, in July 1920, it commented on an assassination plot against the sultan, it exclaimed, “Everywhere the same dirty hands.”\(^{16}\) Additionally, the title of another article in July 1920, “The Witch’s Cauldron in the Southeast,” echoed a rather old-fashioned Orientalist approach.\(^{17}\) It also appeared to be rather pro-Greek, although it did claim that the Greek leader, Venizelos, was a Jew. The paper was rather pro-monarchist or at the very least had sympathies for the Greek nation, which, as the paper saw it, was being fooled by the Entente.\(^{18}\) But it did mention Mustafa Kemal’s general mobilization against “international exploitation” in the summer of 1920 and mentioned Mustafa Kemal once more on December 2, 1920, as “the neo-Bolshevik.”\(^{19}\) However, this was the very last time Atatürk appeared in a negative context in the *Völkischer Beobachter* until the paper ceased publication in 1945. Just a few days later, on December 16, 1920, the very day the paper was bought by the NSDAP, the *Völkischer Beobachter* did a complete turnaround and admiringly called Atatürk’s movement “the Turkish nationalists.”\(^{20}\) Now that it had become the official Nazi party paper, its general interpretation was to change fundamentally. On January 1, 1921, it featured the headline “Heroic Turkey.”\(^{21}\) Barely a month later the paper featured an article with the headline “Turkey—The Role Model” (or “The Pioneer,” *Der Vorkämpfer*). The *Völkischer Beobachter* exclaimed: “Today the Turks are the most youthful nation. The German nation will one day have no other choice but to resort to Turkish methods as well.”\(^{22}\) With such an explicit call to apply “Turkish methods” already in early 1921, the *Völkischer Beobachter* was well ahead of most of the German papers discussed in Chapter 1, and it prefigured similar descriptions of Ankara as “the youngest republic” by half a year.
The *Völkischer Beobachter* echoed many of the themes already discussed in relation to the broader far-right spectrum, but it also seems to have pioneered some themes as well. It too featured articles discussing the alliance with the Soviet Union, and it too, very much like the *Kreuzzeitung* and only shortly afterward, stressed that it had always been of the opinion that the Turks were not Bolsheviks and were in fact only using the Bolsheviks for their own ends (although no such previous statements had actually appeared in print). Furthermore, the term “national Bolshevism” was discussed in two articles in connection with Turkey. The *Völkischer Beobachter* rejected the term and the concept harshly: “[It] is the spawn of crazy dreamers, a thing as impossible as hot snow or wooden iron.”23 And two weeks later it echoed the *Kreuzzeitung*’s concept of “active politics” by writing that “Turkey, a healthy nation of farmers, which had unfairly been given the name of the sick man, is making the only possible kind of politics—that of a healthy egotism with weapon in hand!”24 Within a month it reiterated that at some point Germany would “not be spared” the “practical application” (*Nutzanwendung*) of the Turkish case.25 After April 1921 the paper refocused on Germany and its core issues, such as anti-Semitism, to the neglect of all foreign developments; this was also when Hitler stopped writing for the *Völkischer Beobachter*.26 It then left its readers to ponder by themselves what the “practical applications” of the Turkish case might be.

After neglecting the Turkish topic for almost a year, the *Völkische Beobachter* refocused on day-to-day news from Turkey, especially from early 1923 onward. But while it covered, for example, the Lausanne treaty negotiations very frequently, often daily, it left it up to the *Heimatland*, which had effectively taken over the Turkish topic from the *Völkische Beobachter* in 1921, to flesh out the “practical applications,” lessons, and ideological implications of the Turkish case. The *Heimatland* was to discuss Turkey throughout its existence until it was closed down in the wake of the Hitler Putsch. The following survey of its reporting on Turkey shows that the paper continued to propagate the view that Turkey was a role model and how it created a very specific “Turkish atmosphere” for the events of late 1923 in Munich.

It began in June 1921, almost three months after the last comment on the Turkish role model in the *Völkischer Beobachter*. In an article
on world revolution, *Heimatland* mentioned in passing the “nationalist Turks” as well as the “so-called national pact” of January 1921. Both terms presupposed that the readers already knew about the developments in Anatolia, presumably from other papers. A few days later the topic reached a sudden climax with a two-part series on the “National Self-Help of the ‘Sick Man.’” The scare quotes around “sick man,” and the articles themselves, stressed that Turkey was anything but sick—again in line with the overall far-right trends. Both articles were rather long compared with others in the paper; the first totaled more than a full page, spanning from the front page to the third page of the paper; the second article was just under one page in length, on pages 1 and 2. As its source the article mentioned a “Turkish personality of high standing” who was currently in Germany and had played a very important role in Turkish political life within the last years. Perhaps this was one of the triumvir pashas, Enver or Djemal (Talât had died in March that year), or another prominent Young Turk in Berlin—one can only speculate.

The article began by stressing that, like in Germany, in Turkey “the opposition” had taken power after the end of the war. The article included a variety of themes and interpretations the other papers offered as well at the time. The sultan and the Liberal Party were charged with carrying out fulfillment politics and were branded as being a “willing executive” of the Entente. The Christian minorities, particularly the Greeks and Armenians, were presented as a fifth column, and the Greek “terror” was especially highlighted in the article. The Anatolian stab-in-the-back legend was also expanded upon. Then the article focused on the “national self-help” and the national resistance under Mustafa Kemal. This movement was perceived by the paper as parallel to the Freikorps movement in Germany of 1918 and 1919, with which the paper was very closely aligned. The difference, according to the *Heimatland*, was that the Turkish movement had not been captured and domesticated by the government. “Because of this, the movement could develop fully within its original scope of pure national self-help.” British propaganda and the Entente’s “craving for power” were also constantly highlighted and contrasted with the “steadfast bearing of the Anatolian government.”
The second article of the series described the makeup of the Ankara government and concentrated on the reforms initiated there. This is all the more remarkable because this was in 1921; most of Atatürk’s signature reforms were to take place later. The so-called Ankara government was very much still of provisional character and its activities were dominated by the war against the Greek army. This article, however, conveyed the impression that it was a well-organized state that could already devote itself to solving internal problems. Reforms in the spheres of justice and local self-government were pointed out, and in relation to finances the paper claimed: “Turkish financial management has to be called ideal when compared to the current state of German finances.”

The last part and altogether half of the whole article discussed the relationship between Ankara and the Bolsheviks. Here the Heimatland was addressing the attention this relationship was receiving in Europe. It went into direct a dialogue with unmentioned German papers (just like the Kreuzzeitung or the Völkischer Beobachter did), and justified this collaboration as an “inevitability,” given the government’s foreign policy program—to liberate the country. The article continued that Bolshevism as an ideology stood no chance in Anatolia anyway. The farmers had more land than they could cultivate, there was no real industry, and the population stood behind the government as one.

In the following months Turkey popped up time and again, as in articles doubting news of a Greek advance or in a political survey penned by historian and Orientalist Albrecht Wirth, who also published articles in Dietrich Eckart’s anti-Semitic Auf gut deutsch, the Kreuzzeitung, and the Deutsche Zeitung. Another short report in August 1921 lamented the bad fortune of the Turks and the alleged evacuation of Ankara as the Greek army advanced. The next summary on the “state of the Oriental question,” in March 1922, pointed out how skillfully the Ankara Turks were acting: “It is quite interesting to ascertain how those governing in Anatolia have managed, after the downfall of their Fatherland, to get a lot of trumps into their hands by intelligently waiting, with iron nerves and skillful maneuvering.” The weekly now highlighted how the Kemalists were able to gain more freedom from their Bolshevik allies and to exploit the growing conflict between the Entente powers. This and another two short
discussions of the “Ankara question” in the Heimatland in early 1922 again illustrate that the paper only supplied comments on developments, which the paper expected its readers to keep up on by reading other papers. Time and again Kemalist victories were used to hold a mirror up to German politics, just as in the others papers as well. In this spirit, a long article in April 1922, spanning pages 1 and 2, criticized German fulfillment politics. On this page we then find the column “Calendar of the Week,” where the comparison with Turkey was made again: “The result of the conference on the Orient of the allied foreign ministers in Paris consists of a radical revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. With fulfillment politics according to Wirth’s model Mustafa Kemal probably would have not been successful.”

On the following page the example of Turkey was yet again discussed, now in connection to a Swiss newspaper criticizing German fulfillment politics. Although it had apparently not mentioned Turkey directly, the Heimatland used the occasion to discuss Turkey again, in one-third of the entire text:

Turkey, whose warfare was by no means less impeded than was that of the Habsburg monarchy and whose population suffered hunger and deprivation just as much as Germany’s did, did not give up in 1918. But it organized the last resistance against the Entente states in Asia Minor even though everything was lacking: provisions, clothing for the army, and especially arms and ammunition. And the result: today, after three and a half years of fighting, the Kemalists, who had to fight the Greeks, the English, and the French, have reconquered a large part of stolen territory with guns in hand, have just signed the very advantageous treaty of Ankara with the French and, it appears, will soon be masters of their own country again. In any case, the continued existence of Turkey, this “eternally sick man,” appears to be more secure in the coming years than that of the German Reich. Could the Turks have been as successful with fulfillment politics à la Wirth and Rathenau?

The article ended with this rhetorical question—another instance of the paper demanding the pursuit of “active politics” à la Atatürk.
Besides another mention in the “Calendar of the Week” in late April, the Heimatland grew quiet about Turkey for some time.\textsuperscript{36} Then five months later the paper embarked upon a grand comparison of Germany, Italy, and Turkey. After discussing the relevance of history and of the Italian example (before the March on Rome), it closed with the following two paragraphs, most which were set in bold, which was not done in the rest of the article:

If the Italian example illustrates the victory of the national spirit in domestic politics, then Turkey teaches us victory in the battlefield. The “sick man” has put the “nation in arms” to shame—to an extent that has no counterpart in world history. Turkey had virtually ceased to exist, but then came the hero who overcame the fatalism of the Ottomans by whipping up the national spirit. The nation followed him filled with enthusiasm and the will to sacrifice. In a three-year desperate struggle Kemal Pasha has awakened the Turks to new life, has probably paved the way for Mohammedanism to regain an important position in the world that it has not had for centuries, all this not only by being their commander but also by being an ingenious politician, as the Treaty of Ankara proves. Yet the 60-million-strong German nation has signed its own shame in the Treaty of Versailles with no resistance, it beslobbers and hates its heroes and is being led willingly to the slaughterhouse by the fulfillment politicians.

National instinct, national will, is all that counts; history teaches this on all its pages. A nation that gives up on itself is lost—and rightly so. World history would make no sense, have no logic [to it], if the German nation were not to perish—if it were to remain on the path it has now chosen.\textsuperscript{37}

While the conclusion foreshadows Hitler’s comments on the future of the Germans at the end of World War II, the argument centered on how Italian Fascism compared to Germany and Turkey. Until that point the Heimatland had paid little attention to Italian Fascism, appearing to view it as only partly relevant to the German situation, partly because Italy did not suffer from the policies of the Entente. After all, the paper commented, German malaise was due
not only to domestic politics but also to Germany’s relationship with the Great Powers.

Although the _Heimatland_ championed the Italian case for some time after the March on Rome and called for a German Mussolini, it qualified these claims in August 1923, when it emphasized that the Italian example could not be simply transferred to other countries. National Socialism, the mouthpiece of the SA stressed, could not be put parallel to Fascism because Hitler concentrated more on mobilizing the proletariat. Also, Germany did not have the power of national spirit—a diagnosis shared by other German papers of right and far-right convictions. Moreover, the _Heimatland_ claimed, the Italian government, already before the March on Rome, had recognized that only Fascism could solve the national question, and this had led to a quasi-automatic “union on a national basis.” In Germany things were different, a lack of national, völkisch, and political instinct was leading to the nation’s decay.

Throughout 1922 and 1923 the _Heimatland_ continued to pay special attention to the Turkish case and to champion it as the role model. Just one week later after it first discussed the Italian case, another article explored the role-model character of Turkey: “Now Turkey, long believed to be dead, has pulled out the thorn. Kemal Pasha has torn apart the Treaty of Sèvres and is knocking on the doors of Constantinople.” The article then insisted that something needed to be done in Germany, perhaps at least passive resistance as in India. It concluded: “‘Help yourself and you shall receive help.’ We can again learn the truthfulness of this tried and tested saying from the Turks.” This last quote is one of many examples illustrating just how much the discourse of the Nazis was in tune with the overall center to far-right discourse on Turkey. “Help yourself” was another way of calling for what others referred to as “active politics.”

Two weeks later, the one-time column “Mixed Salad”—a collection of ironic and satirical commentaries—featured Turkey prominently among its epigrams: “A majestic Ankara tomcat is the last fruit of the English ‘victory’ in the World War.” “After bouillon [Henry Franklin-Bouillon had conducted the negotiations with the Kemalists for France] the Turks now want to have meat as well.” The main punch was served up in a poignant criticism of fulfillment politics:
“The fear that the Germans too, like the Turks, might become as ill-behaved vis-à-vis the good Entente is wholly unfounded given the excellent international[ist] education of our leading men.”40 Here again the Nazis echoed both the tone and the language of the wider Weimar Republican discourses.

Another favorite theme of the Heimatland was to compare fulfillment politicians with eunuchs. In the last issue of 1922, it discussed an article by the Vorwärts, which had claimed that eunuchs had fallen from favor in Turkey, given the policies of the Ankara Turks, yet outside of Turkey “political eunuchs” were prospering—a pun intended for the German governing elite.41 Another article in early 1923 again picked up the topos of political and national eunuchs, calling fulfillment politics a “eunuch fantasy.”42 The paper claimed that the fulfillment politicians had succeeded in making the German nation despair of breaking the chains of the Treaty of Versailles themselves. Other articles in the same issue also drew attention to the negotiations at Lausanne and discussed the changed state of affairs since the armistice of Mudanya, ending hostilities in Anatolia in October 1922.43

Two months later an article referenced Turkey to discuss ideas concerning leadership and democracy:

Among historical philosophers, especially Germans, there have been heated debates, for a couple of decades now, about the question: Are the masses or [individual] personalities more important for progress? . . . The incredible rise of the Ankara Turks seems to validate the individualist approach. It was one great man alone, Mustafa Kemal, who woke up the dully brooding, exhausted, and totally desperate Turkish nation and who transformed defeat into a shining victory.

The description of the Turks as “dully brooding” can also be viewed as being applicable to Germany, as many nationalist and völkisch papers used similar terms for Germany’s impotence. The article continued with a short biography of the “dictator of Anatolia” and then renarrated the history of the War of Independence. The author concluded that even if the negotiations at Lausanne were momentarily
interrupted, the Turks had already achieved everything they had ever wanted.44

Yet another discussion of the Turkish role model followed one month later, in May 1923, now in the context of British politics and the relationship between London and Ankara. The article began with a discussion of a possible uprising in Germany against the Entente and then developed a rather confused chess metaphor:

A nation, once it is shattered and without hope, does not jump anymore, it does not run and it does not feel like a rook; but then, after a winterly slumber the awakening of spring comes and the nations feel new juices flowing through their veins and are ready for amazing and unexpected deeds.

We saw this best with the Turks. In one moment they were lying on the ground, shattered and bleeding from a thousand wounds, worn down and weakened by civil war and steady mismanagement for two decades. And then, to the surprise of the whole world, they managed within the shortest period of time not only to regain their independence, but to establish themselves as a Great Power.45

The article speculated that soon all Turkish-speaking territories, encompassing most of Central Asia, would be annexed as well—echoing Enver Pasha’s Pan-Turanist dreams. Furthermore, it debated how it had been possible for the Turks not only to win their war but to align themselves with the United States so quickly. Regarding the economic implications of the so-called Chester Treaty, it argued that in the future “the Yankees will also act as political friends of Turkey.” The article especially highlighted the wisdom of the negotiation tactics used by İsmet İnönü, Atatürk’s second in command. İnönü had replied to the demand that all Greeks in Turkish prisons be freed by insisting that all “Orientals” in Entente prisons must be released, including Mahatma Gandhi—thereby not only creating problems for the Entente but gaining Indian goodwill.

Thus, before the Heimatland ran its great discussion of the Turkish role model in the summer of 1923, it had already discussed the Turkish example in depth and repeatedly. It had kept its readers updated
on the events and their changing significance. The topic had been kept alive as a constant point of reference for German politics in the most important völkisch weekly providing regular, extensive völkisch and National Socialist commentary on current political events. The *Heimatland* had also discussed the Italian case, but in contrast to the Turkish example, it had strong reservations about the applicability of Italian tactics. It had also offered interpretations similar to those found in other right-wing and far-right-wing papers. For example, it shared with the *Kreuzzeitung* the concept of “active politics,” offered similar interpretations of the Kemalist-Bolshevik connection and of the general ideological orientations of Kemalists, and stressed that the Turkish Führer had been the crucial ingredient in Turkish success, sharing the nationalist belief in Führer-led politics and action. The New Turkey was no short-lived, situational flirtation of the paper; it was a continuous topic, discussed in considerable depth before Italian Fascism was explored for the first time, and was altogether much more present than the Italian case.

Three weeks after the article that diminished Italy’s relevance to Germany, the *Heimatland* embarked on what was its greatest feature project in its brief span of publication (1920–1923). And it was dedicated to Mustafa Kemal. This might not seem surprising, given the many articles on Turkey we have discussed here, but this project is crucial for understanding the Nazis’ fascination with the “Turkish methods” and “solutions.” As far as I have been able to determine, it was the largest feature series on Turkey in any German newspaper in the time between 1919 and 1945, and certainly one of the largest feature series on any nondomestic political topic in that period. The series of articles began on September 1, 1923, and ended on October 15, 1923, taking up around one-eighth of the paper each week. Up to this point the Nazi papers had followed the overall center to far-right trends in interpreting Turkey, being distinguished mainly by their continued strong emphasis on Turkey’s role-model character. But with this series and subsequent articles, the Nazis became the most ardent and constant proponents of “Turkish lessons.”

Before we examine this series, it is worth pointing out that other völkisch publications also championed Turkey as a role model. One such paper was *Der Reichswart*, published by Ernst Reventlow, a
founding and leading member of the radical nationalist and anti-Semitic Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei, which was formed in 1922. He was close to the NSDAP from early on, apparently also channeling prospective members in its direction, and finally joined the Nazi party in 1927.\textsuperscript{46} He was important in the Nazis’ electoral conquest of northern Germany and later was a contributor to Rosenberg’s \textit{Nationalsozialistische Monatsbefei}. In his 1921 article in the \textit{Berliner Tageblatt}, which had prompted the article by Ossietzky (as discussed in Chapter 1), Reventlow had already called for Turkish solutions and had concluded his article with the following paragraph:

\begin{quote}
We Germans will probably soon have to face the usual decision to give away our rights and our property to our enemies and will have them signed away by our government. If Mustafa Kemal and his people sat in Berlin right now, they would have a different answer, in 1919 they already had a different one and would have had it implemented. If now, however, the Berlin Jewocracy (\textit{Judokratie}) sat in Constantinople, they would never have gone to Ankara, but would have, motivated by the usual “sober considerations,” capitulated abjectly and today nothing would be left of the Turkish Empire at all.\textsuperscript{47}
\end{quote}

A three-page article “Kemal Pasha’s Fulfillment Politics” in the October 1922 issue of Reventlow’s \textit{Reichswart}—one of its longest features—expressed similar sentiments.\textsuperscript{48} The paper had already reported on Turkey occasionally, and Reventlow also wrote on the topic for other papers, but now his paper offered one great summary of how the Turkish case should be a role model and an inspiration for Germany. It recounted the story of Kemalist opposition and war, juxtaposing it with Germany and continuously highlighting why the German fulfillment politicians had hated the Turkish example and had been continuously embarrassed by the Kemalist success. Reventlow argued against those explaining this success by “circumstance,” found it to be a perfect example of “active politics,” and indeed called it the only true “fulfillment politics”—the fulfillment of the wishes of the nation, not of its enemies. Thus, also within wider völkisch circles, the Turkish case was accepted as a role model. However, while
both articles by Reventlow read like summaries of missed chances—he stressed time and again that the Turkish role model could and should have been followed in one way or another—the *Heimatland* feature series gave the Turkish example a renewed sense of urgency.

The six-part *Heimatland* series was written by “Hauptmann” Hans Tröbst, who had served with the Kemalists during the War of Independence. Although there had been some commotion in the Entente and the German press in 1921 about alleged German attempts to send retired German soldiers to support the Kemalists, this had never materialized. For the first time in many decades there were no German military personnel assisting a Turkish war effort, except for one lonely German mercenary who had made his way to Anatolia: Hans Tröbst. He served in Kemalist employ from 1921 until 1923 and was to return to Anatolia again shortly after the Hitler Trial in 1924. The series in the *Heimatland* was Tröbst’s first step on his future career path as a journalist. And it had been German “war hero” Erich Ludendorff who had motivated Tröbst to write about Ankara and the Kemalists for the Nazi weekly.

The editors of the *Heimatland*, who were quite enthusiastic and jubilant about this series, introduced their largest feature series ever like this: “The fate of Turkey shows extraordinarily many similarities to our own; through Turkey we can learn how we should have done it. If we want to be free, then we will have no choice but to follow the Turkish example in one way or another.” Thus they made clear at the outset that there was a certain timelessness to the Turkish role model.

The way Tröbst himself introduced his series captured its spirit and content in a nutshell:

The political situation of Turkey after the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres is well known. It is the same as our Fatherland is in today, four years after the [signing of the] Treaty of Versailles. The Empire sunk down to be a colony of the Entente, vital provinces severed by the stroke of the pen, the enemy inside the country, imminent anarchy and civil war, and the nation without defense and honor, given “rights and privileges” by the enemy—just as one might give to an intelligent negro tribe.
Four years have passed since the peace treaties of Versailles and Sèvres, but what changes in the world! Turkey, [once] sore to death, now powerfully rising! Germany still with grand strides toward the abyss. While we waste our time fruitlessly debating the “justice” or “injustice” of the strangulation treaty, while one-half of the nation is filing “flaming protests” at the beer table against the rape of a “Kulturvolk,” and while the other half makes appeals to the “world’s conscience” and other things beyond comprehension, events have found their conclusion in Asia Minor. [Events] which are meant to usher into a new age.

While for Germany the Versailles Treaty continues to exist with undiminished severity and the German bourgeois waits for help from anybody but himself, the often pitied sick man, almost without anybody noticing it, has in an heroic effort torn apart the treaty that had been forced upon him and has thus created the foundations for national rebirth. But this outcome, bewildering even to those well acquainted [with Turkey], was not possible with speeches and majority resolutions, not with flaming notes of protest and whimpering appeals... No! This reversal of fortunes... was exclusively due to Bismarck’s tried and tested blood and iron recipe.

He then recounted the “heroic struggle” of the Turks after the fundamental defeat in World War I and the occupation by Entente troops. At this time the Turkish population was in a state of deep lethargy—again a parallel to Germany—which it overcame only when the “archenemy,” the Greeks, invaded. After various national organizations had been created, Mustafa Kemal extended an “iron grip” and “gave the national movement direction and goals.” The last part of the first article then described how Mustafa Kemal dealt with the opposition; Tröbst focused especially on the “special courts” and stressed the “iron energy” with which all Turkish opposition and “pacifism” was “quashed ruthlessly in the bud.”

The second article in the series was devoted to the total mobilization of the Turkish nation for the war. Here again the stress was continually on parallels with Germany. “Sèvres Armenia” was compared to the newly created Poland; Turkish resistance units were
called “Freikorps.” The third article in the series further advanced the narrative of the Turkish War of Independence and discussed inter alia the battle at İnönü and the role of the Soviet Union for the Kemalists. Where other papers had difficulty dealing with the Turkish-Soviet alliance, Tröbst simply claimed that the Turks rejected Soviet support (which was not true).

The third, fourth, and fifth articles were largely devoted to military details (logistics or the lack thereof, equipment, details about the fronts, the battles, and so forth). Time and again it was stressed how abysmal the Turks’ starting situation had been, how superior in number and equipment the Greeks had been, and how the Turks had still managed to win. “National will” was the key term here, just as in the other German papers of the time. It was, again, the Turkish David against the (combined) Entente and Greek Goliath. Tröbst called it a struggle about “being or not being.” The fact that the Turks drove home their victory in “the famous battle at the Sakarya River” was ascribed to their steadfastness:

Because the fate of the battle had really hung by a thread, the Turks kept their nerve and that is how they gained the laurels. The same phenomenon that has been proven in the World War and in the Ruhr struggle. Because in the struggle for life and death the only ones winning are those playing “va banque” and focusing exclusively on the ice-cold, merciless vengeance of their enemy in their considerations and calculations.

When finally Mustafa Kemal had overcome the restrictions of the Ankara parliament and was granted unlimited powers, “the blow of annihilation flashed down out of the clear sky on a totally surprised enemy.” Here, as in many publications of the time, we find not only justifications for “total war” but also anticipations of many Nazi themes of warfare during World War II (such as playing va banque and focusing on the enemy’s potential vengeance).

In the sixth and final article of the series the narrative reached the “liberation of Izmir” and then skipped ahead to discuss the Treaty of Lausanne—the negotiations had just recently been concluded after having dragged on for half a year. Tröbst summarized the result of the peace negotiations as follows: “Through its own power Tur-
key has torn apart its own dictated ‘Versailles Peace’ and has asserted its own will to live against a world of enemies. It has become a state again that has absolute freedom of decision on everything.” The last paragraphs of the article were devoted to a summary of the “Turkish lessons” for the benefit of the Germans. The first point of a three-point list dealt with the “creation of a domestic united front”:

Such a united front can be confined, in the first instance, to a certain part of the country. But there it needs to be established by all available means. The leaders who want to create such a front need to be aware that they are playing with their lives. An awareness of this will give them the ability to destroy anybody working against them ruthlessly and forever. . . . This destruction must take a shape that is final and visible to everyone. This way the movement is preceded by terror, and only terror in its most blatant form today has an impact on unnerved and tired mankind. In this respect the Turks are exemplary teachers.

The next point on Tröbst’s summary list was “national purification” (völkische Reinigung):

Hand in hand with the establishment of a united front must be national purification. In this respect the circumstances were the same in Asia Minor as here. The bloodsuckers and parasites on the Turkish national body were Greeks and Armenians. They had to be [in bold print] eradicated and rendered harmless; otherwise the whole struggle for freedom would have been put in jeopardy. Gentle measures—that history has always shown—will not do in such cases. And consideration for the so-called “long-established” or “decent” elements, or whatever these catchwords may be, would be fundamentally wrong, because the result would be compromise, and compromise is the beginning of the end. . . . Almost all of those of foreign background (Fremdstämmige) in the area of combat had to die; their number is not put too low with 500,000.56

In the next paragraph Tröbst again discussed why this had been absolutely necessary (absolut berechtigt und notwendig). First, the Greek
army had waged a “war of annihilation,” and second, and this seems to have been more important to Tröbst, “The Armenians and the Greeks multiplied very fast in comparison with the Turks, commerce and development were solely theirs and they understood in the most perfidious way how to exhaust (die Auspowerung) the ever more powerless [Turkish] population totally at their mercy.” Then he again stressed the treason committed by the minorities who had enjoyed the “hospitality” of the Turks and who had exploited the working population, the Turks, without shame. The term “stab in the back” was used for what the Christian minorities had allegedly done, just as it was in the other papers of the time. For Tröbst it was all too clear what kind of conclusions the Turks had to draw from this: “Healthy common sense had already forced the Turks, now that they were cleaning their house out anyway, to do this as well, so that they would not need to do the same again after a generation.”

Tröbst also enthusiastically welcomed the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey decided upon in Lausanne, which he, however, depicted as a one-sided expulsion of Greeks by the Turks. He concluded his discussion of “national purification” with the following sentences: “The Turks have provided the proof that the purification of a nation of its foreign elements on a grand scale is possible. It would not be [really] a nation if it were unable to deal with the momentary economic difficulties resulting from this mass expulsion!”

In his third point Tröbst stressed how the Turks had managed to create an army out of nothing and that an industrialized country such as Germany should have no problem doing something similar. Crucial for him, however, was the fact that the Turks had fought with an army of volunteers, which he viewed as a precondition of their success. His final conclusions were these:

A united front, national purification and a true army of volunteers, these are today the essentials for a national rebirth of a nation.

This is, in a few words, the great lesson we can take away from the Turkish struggle for freedom.

When will the savior of our country come, he who will fulfill the demands of the hour? . . .
And if we here all thought as “they [did] over there in Anatolia,” then might would rise against might and we would all enjoy peace.

Although we can only speculate about the impact of these articles on their readers, it is safe to assume that the leading Nazis had read them. After the publication of the first of these articles, Hitler invited Tröbst to speak to him and the SA leadership about Turkey at the offices of the *Völkischer Beobachter*. Hitler’s secretary wrote Tröbst, in Hitler’s name, “What you have witnessed in Turkey is what we will have to do in the future as well in order to liberate ourselves.”

Tröbst’s expertise on the Ankara solution was much sought after. Tröbst received another invitation to speak in Munich about Turkey. This one came from the Nationalverband Deutscher Offiziere, mentioning that crown prince Ruprecht of Bavaria, the “king” as they called him in the letter, was also very keen to hear Tröbst speak on this topic. “The king” was also plotting with Gustav Ritter von Kahr, at the time Generalstaatskommissar of Bavaria with dictatorial powers, to achieve a different solution of the German question at this time. But Tröbst had already left Munich for northern Germany. He was to return only when things had already been set in motion for the Hitler Putsch, now with an important role in the endeavor, assigned to him because of his “Turkish background.” Nevertheless, Hitler’s invitation is an indication that at least he had read the articles and was very much influenced by the Turkish role model.

Another piece of evidence is provided by Ernst Hanfstaengl, who was a close associate of Hitler’s. He wrote in his memoirs that when he heard Hitler for the very first time in a Munich beer cellar, in November 1922, Hitler “spoke about the example of Mustafa Kemal and Mussolini.” This was more than half a year before the article series in the *Heimatland*, but not surprising given the overall attention the German media, including the *Völkischer Beobachter*, were paying to Anatolia. The already discussed article “Mussolini und Kemal” in the *Vossische Zeitung* in November 1922 also made mention of a “Munich nationalist orator” who had been praising Mustafa Kemal. It seems very probable that it was referring to Hitler,
though we have little more than Hanfstaengl's memoirs to substantiate this.

Thus for two months, from September 1 until October 15, 1923, the Heimatland had been dominated by the Turkish topic, which took up one-eighth of every issue, each week. Then in October 1923 the conflict between Reich and Bavaria culminated in the triumvirate of Gustav von Kahr, Otto von Lossow, and Hans von Seißer taking power in Bavaria. The Heimatland now demanded that the conflict and the new concentration of power in Bavaria be used for the liberation of Germany, starting in Bavaria. This was done in an article dominating the front page on October 27, 1923, with the headline “Give Us an Ankara Government!” (“Her die Angora-Regierung!”; Fig. 2.1). This article described the recent inner German conflict and concluded that there was but one “way out that could save us”: “the solution of the German question.” The Heimatland was in dialogue with the Frankfurter Zeitung, which it quoted in bold letters: “A new revolution starting in Bavaria to spread throughout Germany, the establishment of a counter-revolutionary Germany starting from Bavaria—is that the solution?” And the Heimatland responded: “Exactly, that is what needs to be done.”

The article, one and a half pages long, then discussed various ways of bringing about a solution to the German question. “Ankara” had become such an iconic expression—everyone knew or was expected to know what it meant—that for almost the entire first page, no direct connection to Turkey or an explanation of the called for “Ankara government” was given. The article discussed the German situation and then concluded that there were mainly two avenues to go down. One the one hand, one could restructure the Bavarian part of the Reichswehr as a Bavarian army, and then Bavarian military sovereignty would be regained; but this was not really desirable, because then “separation would be the next step.” The solution the Heimatland favored was to view the Bavarian part of the Reichswehr as the nucleus of “a future German army” that “has renounced Berlin and has put itself in service of the German spirit.” What the Heimatland advocated was the following:
The center of gravity would have to be moved from Berlin to Munich, and a counter-revolutionary Germany, to use the terms of the Frankfurter Zeitung, would have to be established starting in Bavaria, just as Kemal Pasha had done in Turkey, when he set up his national government in Ankara in opposition to the government in Constantinople, which had fallen under foreign control. In the swamp of Berlin every German sentiment will be stifled. It can be the capital of Germany again only once it has been rid of foreign domination. There is no telling what kind of völkisch energy would radiate throughout the rest of Germany from such a revolutionary center.

In the next week’s issue, five days before the Hitler Putsch, a series of articles dealt with the topic of national revolution. One contribution in the column “Letter from Berlin” again made the direct connection to Turkey. The author discussed Bavaria’s prominent role in the national revolution—“Bavaria is on everyone’s lips.” Possibilities were opening up, given the conflict between Reich and Bavaria and the nomination of Kahr as Generalstaatskommissar:

The hopes of all good Germans, which includes the good Prussians, are today embodied in Bavaria. . . . Yet those whose sympathies are completely with Bavaria cannot shake the fear that this conflict between Reich and Bavaria will result in just one more rotten peace. But this must not happen! Kahr needs to know that millions and millions here in the North expect the salvation of Germany from him—that all those of the right national spirit are calling upon him: “Become a second Kemal Pasha and lead us to victory. Become a second Kemal Pasha and create a great, united, proud Germania [Germanien]!”

In its further exploration of solutions, the article discussed the feasibility of a “Rechtskabinett.” The favored solution, again, however, was an “iron dictatorship. . . . An iron-eater with unlimited power . . . a chap with red blood pulsing through his veins, a chap who makes for himself elbow room . . . —a man!”
The Hitler Putsch and the Hitler Trial

Only five days after this issue of the *Heimatland* Hitler decided that the time was right for his coup d’état; it would be easy to infer that the calls for a “German Kemal Pasha” and an Ankara government in Munich also influenced him. What has been established here as an additional prehistory of the Hitler Putsch does not change the actual events of November 8–9, 1923, in Munich. It changes context and background, but not what actually happened. Neither “Rome” nor “Ankara” figured much in the recorded conversations, speeches, and declarations during the putsch—if we are to believe one eyewitness in the beer cellar, the only foreign geographic designations mentioned were “South America” and “Mexico” as shouts of protest against the theatrics of the first moments of the putsch. The ex-Kemalist mercenary Tröbst also participated in the putsch, but his diary of the Hitler Putsch mentions no further “Ankara connection.” He was, however, sent to Berlin by the putschists to convince Reichstag parliamentarians to come to Munich to support the putsch and help set up an alternative seat of government there—very much in line with the Ankara idea and with a memorandum authored by Otto von Lossow on the “Ankara solution” in response to the “Give Us an Ankara Government!” article, as discussed below. When, in 1925, it appeared that Tröbst would be asked to testify in another trial in relation to the Hitler Putsch, regarding the involvement of Berlin Reichswehr officers, he was advised by Wilhelm Weiß to say that he had been sent to Berlin solely by Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, Hitler’s friend and advisor at the time, and not by Ludendorff, Weiß, or Hitler. Since Scheubner-Richter was dead at this time, he was an easy scapegoat and potentially a way out of another putsch trial.

It is always assumed that Hitler had a “March on Berlin” in mind when he started his national revolution in Munich in late 1923, but the example of Atatürk and Ankara had captivated the imagination of the Nazis for a much longer time and had been deemed better suited to the German case than that of Mussolini, at least by the *Heimatland*. After all, Mussolini had not formed a “provisional government” in Milan, as Hitler had attempted in the beer cellar. As will be seen in the following discussion, the figures of speech and the
concepts developed in the German right and far-right press in relation to Turkey permeated the discourse surrounding the Hitler Putsch. Foreign inspirations were not much discussed during the trial. It was mainly Hitler who referenced foreign inspirations. But, all in all, no fewer than four direct references to the Turkish example were made. The 1924 Nazi publication of the Hitler Trial minutes also highlighted these references to Turkey.

Two instances involved a rather heated argument between Ludendorff and Otto von Lossow, who had been commander in chief of the Reichswehr in Bavaria at the time of the putsch, in their separate statements on the fourth and eleventh days of the trial. Indeed, this argument reflected the main conflict between Ludendorff and Lossow: Ludendorff held Lossow responsible for the failure of the putsch. Accordingly, this argument needs to be explored before we turn to Hitler himself.

Ludendorff started the argument by recounting that on October 26 or shortly thereafter he had sent Theodor Duesterberg, a leader of the right-wing paramilitary organization Stahlhelm, to Lossow, who in turn “had talked about the Ankara government.” Now Ludendorff summed up the whole argument with Lossow—it appears that already before the trial Lossow had attempted to use his memorandum on the Ankara project to distance himself from the putsch. It is worth quoting Ludendorff at length here:

At the same time the Heimatland had published an article stressing that we needed to establish an Ankara government in Bavaria. Lossow then wrote an essay in response to this Heimatland article. I have to admit that I took away from that article something other than what Lossow thought. With General Lossow I understand an Ankara government in Bavaria as a government that will, as a first step, force the inner regeneration of Germany starting from Bavaria. Then Lossow comes to the following conclusion: “Personalities outside of Bavaria have to be included in the formation of the government who concur with the leading heads of the Ankara government in Bavaria and with whom they can work together.” Thus it is, after all, about an Ankara government in Bavaria that leading personalities from the
North will have to join. Whether these leading personalities from the North have to [come to Munich] to join the Ankara government or whether they can stay in the North, he leaves open. But he talks, after all, about the idea of the Ankara government! General von Lossow then concludes his essay with the following words: “At the same time a path had to be found, which does not lead to certain failure, but [one] similar to the one taken by the Turkish Ankara government.” I have shown this essay to the others. They were not able to find in it what General von Lossow [now] has interpreted into it. . . .

I can only say that because of the final sentence [of the memorandum] I am of the opinion that General Lossow favored the Ankara government with personalities from the North. There are two remarkable sentences in this essay. On the one hand, Lossow talks about the terrifying lack of personalities who are qualified for political leadership, thus how difficult it is to find men. On the other hand, [he talks about] the necessity to take away Marxist teachings and the like from the masses and to provide them with a different content for their spiritual convictions. I have not doubted that this content would be anything else than Hitler’s doctrine.

This appears to have been no minor argument. Many of these sentences, especially those pertaining to Ludendorff’s certainty that Lossow had wanted an Ankara government in Munich as well, are found again, in these very same words, in his memoirs. Ludendorff had felt deeply betrayed by Lossow and wrote in his memoirs that “it was difficult to look into the soul of General von Lossow.” On the day of the putsch itself, however, Ludendorff, despite his deep-seated respect for fellow officers, sounded less conciliatory. After having been arrested by the Reichswehr on November 9, Ludendorff addressed the commanding officer: “Tell your General Lossow: I spit on him! Relay that to him: I spit on him! I spit on him!”

Lossow made great efforts to distance himself from Hitler’s and Ludendorff’s endeavor and their ideas during the trial. When he testified on the eleventh day of the proceedings, he claimed that he had wanted a “directorate” as a solution for the whole of Germany and
then attempted to “prove” this and his opposition to the putsch by his discussion of the Ankara question. He too mentioned the meeting between himself and Duesterberg, where they had talked about “Ankara in Munich.” For some reason Lossow was keen to point out that he himself, and not Duesterberg, brought up the topic, because he had replied to the *Heimatland* article in his memorandum. He then asked the court whether the *Heimatland*’s Ankara article had already been recited—Lossow thought the article to be so central to the proceedings that it had to be read aloud and in its entirety. He now portrayed himself as free of any, even partial, responsibility for the putsch:

Well, this article had been published in the *Heimatland* in which it was demanded that, just as in Turkey a government had been established in Ankara [as the base] from which Constantinople had been conquered, an Ankara government should be constituted outside of Berlin, namely in Bavaria, from where one would conquer Berlin. I had written a memorandum on the matter immediately, [but] not for General Ludendorff or the *Heimatland*. The memorandum was rather meant for the press secretary at the [Bavarian] government. I wanted something to reach the press about the nonsense the *Heimatland* had conjured.73

This attempt to distance himself from the *Heimatland* article is not very convincing, especially given that although he did indeed criticize certain ideas put forward in the article in his memorandum, he had in fact merely refined the proposal by identifying conditions for such an Ankara government’s success. This is perhaps also the reason why Lossow wanted to have only the *Heimatland* article, and not his memorandum, read out in front of the court. Reading this memorandum, one cannot help but agree with Ludendorff: it reads less like a rejection of the Ankara project and more like a refinement of, if not even like a pamphlet for, the Ankara solution. Lossow began his memorandum by pointing out that one could compare Munich with Ankara only if one was not familiar with the state of affairs in Turkey. But then Lossow went on to renarrate the Turkish War of Independence in a fashion that was surprisingly similar to the narratives that had dominated the German nationalist press in the last
three to four years. He stressed that the government in Constantinople was “a willing executive institution of the Entente governors” and that “the Ankara government and its Führer from the beginning were based on everything that was Turkish.” He also talked about a “glacis [buffer zone], one thousand kilometers deep,” that separated Ankara from Constantinople and made it untouchable (the actual distance is around 450 kilometers, about 100 kilometers less than the distance from Munich to Berlin). He concluded his narrative of the Turkish War of Independence with this summary: “The first stage of the Turkish movement for freedom ushered in the reconstitution of total national independence and sovereignty of a now smaller Turkey, within and without. The next step will begin after a certain reprieve that is necessary to gather strength.”

Lossow pointed out that, unlike Constantinople, Berlin had not been occupied by the Entente and that the German nation was deeply divided, whereas the whole of Turkey stood behind Ankara. But then the tone of the memorandum changed and Lossow commenced his conclusion: “The Ankara government that we need for Germany will never be built on such broad foundations as the Turkish one. But a broader one than what has been discussed so far is necessary.” He then stressed what Ludendorff had summarized, verbatim, in front of the court—that leaders from outside of Bavaria needed to be included in the construction of such an Ankara government. He continued, “It has to be guaranteed that the majority of the military is behind this government. Only then is success possible.” And as Ludendorff said in his own statement, Lossow’s concluding sentence had stressed that “a path had to be found, [one that] does not lead to certain failure, but similar to the one taken by the Turkish Ankara government.”

Lossow was attempting to exaggerate slight differences in tactics in order distance himself from advocating the violent seizure of power, which he still advocated in his memorandum and which still was very much in line with an “Ankara-in-Munich project.” An outright rejection of the Ankara approach is nowhere to be found in Lossow’s memorandum. Yet he claimed in his testimony, “If one reads my article as a whole, not just individual sentences, then one can understand that I totally reject an Ankara government in Bavaria from
which the Reich should be reconquered.” Yet the memorandum, especially taken as a whole, strongly conveys the impression that Lossow endorsed an Ankara solution as such, and merely had some different ideas about its execution. Furthermore, we must also doubt his claims about the purpose of the text. Did he really offer the Bavarian government refined plans for a coup d’état and the beginning of a civil war? It appears that the memorandum was circulated widely in völkisch circles—at least Ludendorff had a copy of the text—and that seems to have been its actual target audience.

Thus, the *Heimatland* article, “Give Us an Ankara Government!,” which had been published on October 27, and, perhaps more importantly, the concept of an Ankara government in Munich, had been central to the understanding of the Hitler Putsch for these two important figures. What Ludendorff failed to mention in court was that he had in fact been responsible for the article series in the *Heimatland* in the first place. He had met Tröbst, talked with him about his experiences in Turkey, and suggested that he write about it for the *Heimatland*.

Although Hitler made no direct reference to the *Heimatland* article in court, his first deposition with state prosecutor Ehard on December 14, 1923, already betrays how much he had been influenced by the contemporary German Ankara discourse: “A sick part of the country can never be healed from this very sick part of a country [itself]; recovery can only come from outside [unfortunately the minutes skip ahead here; Ehard noted “excessive elaborations”—SI]. Germany was sick, namely the North of the country. Recovery could only come from a relatively healthy part of Germany, and that was Bavaria.” It is unfortunate that Ehard did not record Hitler’s “excessive elaborations” regarding the role of Munich in the national process of recovery. Given what Hitler and those around him had stated before, it can be assumed that, at least indirectly, he was referring to Ankara. The opposition between sick and healthy parts of the country echoes the elaborations on the Turkish example in the press. Hitler also echoed the debates about an Ankara solution when Ehard asked him about Kahr and Lossow and their relationship to his endeavor. They agreed with him, Hitler stated, and had only insisted upon minor corrections, such as to include more “names
from the North” before embarking on this “March on Berlin” another rather direct reference to the Ankara project, but this time in reference to Lossow’s refinements as advanced in his memorandum, muddled together with the March-on-Rome model.

During this deposition Hitler denied all accusations of treason on his part. This was to change during the trial; indeed, it was via the concept of justified national(ist) treason, which he developed in front of the court, that he pushed himself to the forefront of the putschist leadership. Yet, first, on the third day of the trial, he talked (again) about where national liberation should come from:

Never in world history did a nation rise out of infestation starting from the capital, which was infested. . . . You can see the same in ancient history. A good wave was always carried [from outside] into the heart of the Roman Empire, to Rome. And that is the deeper sense of crossing the Rubicon. You can see this in Turkey. Not from the rotten center, from Constantinople, could salvation come. The city was, just as in our case, contaminated by democratic-pacifistic, internationalized people, who were no longer able to do what is necessary. It could only come from the farmer’s country. . . . Another example you can find in the Young Turk Revolution. Enver Pasha marched on Constantinople and established a new state there, and a new spirit poured over the totally infested capital city. And finally the last, the most classical example in Italy! The Fascist wave came from the North and has conquered Rome.

After thus having mentioned two Turkish examples (Mustafa Kemal and the Kemalists, 1919–1923, and Enver Pasha and the Young Turks, 1908–1909), Hitler continued to discuss the “most superb” example, the establishment of the German Reich. His language was reminiscent not only of the interview with prosecutor Ehard, but also of the nationalist newspaper discourse.

It is striking that Turkey appeared to have been the prism through which Hitler understood the Italian example and not the other way around. And the Italian example deserved only a mere two short sentences. Hitler’s final speech at the trial, on the twenty-fourth day,
focusing on his new concept of “national treason,” also featured Turkey again in a similar fashion:

When, my honorable gentlemen, has high treason been crowned with success? [Here he talked about Bismarck’s establishment of the German Reich.] . . . We have today two new [kinds of] coup d’états in front of us. The first one is the insubordination of the Turkish general Kemal Pasha against the sovereignty of Constantinople, which goes so far that he even rejected the holy authority of the head of the Mohammedan religion. If we ask ourselves: What has legalized Kemal Pasha’s deed in the end? The gaining of liberty for his nation. He could be [considered] a traitor, but he is not, because out of his deed arose the blessing for the Ottoman nation, freedom. We have a second example in the coup d’état of Mussolini. What legalizes this coup d’état? Not the seizure of power as such, but the tremendous governmental activity Mussolini has initiated in Italy. The legalization of the March on Rome is complete only on the day that today’s Italy, starting from Rome, is cleansed of all emanations of decay of our contemporary life. This will be the legalization of this high treason, and only then will it be successful.82

The mentioning of Kemal Pasha before Mussolini is not simply a narrative mishap; there was a hierarchy to Hitler’s reasoning. The high treason of Atatürk had been justified “instantaneously” by his successful liberation of the country, whereas Mussolini had to continue to work hard until his revolution was complete and “legal.”83 Thus, Atatürk’s revolution was, in a way, already complete for Hitler in 1924. The distinction between Atatürk and Mussolini is significant. It highlights the importance not only of establishing a system of government founded on the Führer principle but also of war and of “cleansing” the country of minority populations and the opposition. These were the themes Third Reich texts were to explore through the prism of Turkey in depth.

Hitler’s argument about nationally motivated high treason was more or less in line with what others thought as well. In order to deflect from the very obvious “high treason” verdict, the state pros-
The German press was largely unresponsive to the debates about the “Ankara solution” during the Hitler Trial and Hitler’s references to Atatürk. It appears that the failure of the Hitler Putsch also dampened enthusiasm for the various Turkish lessons. Looking back, the *Berliner Tageblatt* commented in early March 1924 that the excitement for Turkey in Germany had not been a surprising thing and had been a quasi-automatic response. However, the paper stressed, this enthusiasm should not lead to an adaptation of ill-fitting Turkish solutions—a clear reference to the events in Munich. Yet, not much earlier the very same *Berliner Tageblatt* had given a great deal of space in its own pages to Reventlow’s strong calls for Turkish solutions and a German Ankara.

The Nazis, however, felt they had to again take a position on the Lossow-Ludendorff argument and the Ankara solution. The *Völkischer Beobachter* and the *Heimatland* had been closed down in the wake of the Hitler Putsch; indeed, the order from Berlin to close the *Völkischer Beobachter* had been one of the seeds of conflict between Reich and Bavaria that had in the end led to the Hitler Putsch. The torch was passed on to the *Völkischer Kurier*, another Nazi paper, with former *Heimatland* editor Wilhelm Weiß at the helm. And again it was Hans Tröbst who wrote on the subject. His article was the lead commentary on the front page on March 13, 1924, with the headline “The ‘Rubbish’ of the Ankara Government.” Obviously, with this article Tröbst attempted to defend the Ankara solution—and by printing this article the Nazis again gave the Ankara solution the backing of the movement and identified it as the main “design” of the putsch. How much this was coordinated with Hitler’s defense effort, or whether the article had even been written at his behest, cannot be reconstructed. At any rate it was not a peripheral article, for it could have influenced the way Hitler and his co-conspirators were to be perceived at the still-ongoing trial. But then Hitler went even further and affirmed the sentiments expressed in Tröbst’s article in front of the court in his final speech three days after the article was published.
Tröbst began his narrative by explaining the “Ankara government” again with Goltz’s advice to Abdul Hamid II (see Chapter 1) and then again summarized the achievements of the Ankara government as being, first, the creation of a völkisch unitary front, second, völkisch purification, and third, the effective mobilization of the nation. With this the Kemalists had by themselves liberated their nation from Entente oppression. This, Tröbst exclaimed, nobody could deny. He continued that the events in Anatolia had been perceived in Germany as both a warning and a ray of hope. People in Germany had started to call out to “fate” to give them “somebody like Kemal.” Tröbst also mentioned the Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, in which Lossow had been portrayed as having been entirely opposed to an Ankara government in Munich. This, Tröbst answered hysterically, was rubbish, because Ankara was the “textbook example” (Schulbeispiel) for national rebirth. Tröbst not only summarized his previous articles in the Heimatland, but also repeated the same formula Hitler was to use in front of the court: Mustafa Kemal had begun as a traitor in the eyes of the law, but was in fact and according to the voice of the people their savior from misery. Tröbst also attributed the motto “Who doesn’t obey, will be hanged” to Atatürk and championed this style of leadership, “tried and tested by the Bolsheviks,” for Germany.

Tröbst then accused Lossow of wanting to “calculate success” when the nation needed a Führer who “made success happen.” He continued with the underdog myth and the idea that if the Turks could do it, anybody could. He stressed that today the Turks were free and much courted by the world, which now offered to assist Turkish reconstruction. Tröbst closed his pro-Ankara argument by exclaiming: “It is enough!! A couple of months ago, the best of us stood up in order to bring light to a desperate nation following the role model (Vorbild) of the Ankara government—they were shot down, ‘with a laughing face, like dogs!’” He then addressed Lossow again directly: “Herr General, you reject the ‘Ankara government’ [for Germany]? We believe in the Ankara government!”

These were to be the last words by the Nazis on the Ankara project for some time to come, until 1933—though not their last words on Turkey. Tröbst continued to write on Turkish topics in the Völkischer Kurier. And after he returned to Anatolia, he was asked to
cover Turkey more frequently by Weiβ for the *Völkischer Kurier* as well as by Alfred Rosenberg for the reopened *Völkischer Beobachter*. However, the attempt to create a German Ankara had miserably and humilitatingly failed, Hitler was in prison, some had fled, a few had died, and the Nazi party was forced to rethink its strategy.

**The “German Ottomans”**

Not only did early Nazism have some “Turkish connections,” the whole background atmosphere was saturated with “Turkey” in some way. Some “German Ottomans,” like Liman von Sanders, or “German Turks,” like Hans Tröbst, have already surfaced here, but there were many more “German Ottomans” who were influential in creating an awareness about Turkey and who were influential in Weimar as well as in Nazi politics. However, they never represented an organized force—as was the case with the “Russian connection” of Nazism. Even their veterans organization, the Bund of the Asienkämpfer, chose not to surface as a force speaking out on the Turkish role model. However, a closer look at the Hitler Putsch shows that a great number of “German Ottomans” were involved, on all sides. There was the Munich resident Liman von Sanders, who published many articles, but we do not know anything of his involvement in völkisch or nationalist circles in Munich during these turbulent times. Similarly unclear remains the involvement of Friedrich Kreß von Kressenstein, formerly Atatürk’s commanding officer at the Palestinian front and at the time of the Hitler Putsch a commanding officer in the Munich garrisons. An important influence on Nazism was the Thule Society. Its founder, Rudolf Freiherr von Sebottendorf, had lived in the Ottoman Empire for many years and had fought on the Ottoman side in the Second Balkan War. Just before World War I he returned to Munich, now as an Ottoman citizen, having somehow made a fortune in Constantinople. He was to publish much on Turkey, but mainly on mysticism, and was to return there in the 1920s. He eventually committed suicide by throwing himself into the Bosporus when Germany capitulated in 1945.

Lossow, who has featured so prominently in our narrative of the Hitler Putsch and the subsequent trial, was another prominent
“German Ottoman.” He had served in the Ottoman Empire from 1911 until 1918. Lossow became somewhat involved in the Armenian Genocide—having been the main go-between for Enver Pasha and Talât Pasha at the German Embassy in Constantinople, together with Hans Humann. After the Hitler Putsch, Lossow returned to Turkey and worked as an instructor for the Turkish military. And then there was also Hans von Seeckt in Berlin, who was Lossow’s adversary as head of the Reichswehr in the conflict between Berlin and Bavaria, and who had also served in the Ottoman Empire. It was Seeckt who sent his friend Enver Pasha to Moscow in 1919 to negotiate a secret cooperation between the Reichswehr and the Soviet Union, which later would be important for Hitler’s war effort. And then there were the many “media experts,” like Wilhelm Feldmann, the former editor in chief, and Friedrich Schrader, former deputy editor, of the Constantinople-based Osmanischer Lloyd (1908–1918), and Ernst Paraquin, former commander of the Ottoman Eastern Army, and Phillipp Rühl, former translator at the Ottoman High Command. Many of those “experts” had been opposed to a direct transfer of the Turkish example, but they had all helped to keep the topic alive. Later on this special connection between the two countries would be continued by a few German Ottomans who resurfaced as correspondents for German papers in Turkey, such as Hans Rabe for the Kreuzzeitung (at least so in 1933), who had been in the Ottoman Empire from 1903 onward.

And then there were also personalities like Hans Humann, who had been born in Smyrna, son of the famous German archaeologist Carl Humann, who had discovered the Pergamon Altar. Hans had taken part in the Kapp Putsch and had been a close friend of Enver Pasha’s—according to Franz von Papen, they even “grew up together.” And von Papen himself had apparently been a friend of Humann’s since their time in school together in Wiesbaden. He had already served at the Constantinople Embassy before the war, and together with Lossow, who also became a friend of Enver’s, de facto liaised for the German Empire with the Ottoman triumvirate directly, circumventing their superior in Constantinople, the ambassador. It seems very probable that he was the connection between Talât Pasha and the Kapp Putsch. After that putsch, Humann was
handed the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* by Hugo Stinnes and served as publisher (not only editor) of this paper.\textsuperscript{100} Until then the paper had been much more to the left, employing, among others, the Social Democratic Friedrich Schrader, who had apparently fled Constantinople in the same submarine as Enver Pasha and Talât Pasha.\textsuperscript{101} Humann’s *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, along with the Nazi papers and the *Kreuzzeitung*, was one of the papers that had focused most intensively on Turkey and had been one of the most continuous proponents of “Turkish methods.” Humann was later a political advisor to von Papen and took on important roles when von Papen became chancellor. Humann and Lossow had served together with von Papen as military attachés at the German Embassy in Constantinople. It is often forgotten today that in the shady Franz von Papen, Germany had a chancellor who had been a high-ranking Ottoman officer (an Ottoman *Generalmajor*).\textsuperscript{102} Another German Ottoman, Joachim von Ribbentrop, was involved in the making of yet another chancellor, Hitler. Ribbentrop had served with the others in Constantinople and had since then been one of von Papen’s friends. He served as a go-between, and his house was a meeting place for Hitler and von Papen during the process that culminated in Hitler’s *Machtergreifung* in 1933.\textsuperscript{103}

Other important German Ottomans were the future foreign minister Konstantin von Neurath and General Bronsart von Schellen-dorf.\textsuperscript{104} The latter was president of the völkisch Tannenbergbund, founded in 1925. Otto von Feldmann, formerly an officer in the Ottoman High Command and actively involved in the Armenian Genocide, was to become a leading politician in the DNVP and the Alldeutscher Verband and, perhaps more importantly, political advisor to Hindenburg during his election campaign as well as later his personal chief of staff.\textsuperscript{105}

However, at the time of “Ankara in Munich,” Hitler’s own “political advisor” Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter probably had a much greater role in connecting the Nazis with recent Turkish events. He was later to be celebrated as the first martyr of the Nazi movement, because when the putschist procession, and indeed the whole Hitler Putsch, came to an abrupt end in front of the Feldherrnhalle, he was killed by a bullet—dying, he pulled Hitler down with him
and, unfortunately, in so doing saved him. Scheubner-Richter had served as German vice-consul in Eastern Anatolia and had witnessed the Armenian Genocide there. It is often assumed that Hitler knew from him, his political advisor, about the Armenian Genocide and much about Turkey.

I have already mentioned the future commander of Auschwitz, Rudolf Hoess, and his Ottoman connection. Strangely enough, even some of the future Nazis who were too young to have served there during World War I, like Heinrich Himmler, had a special connection to Anatolia. After his studies in Munich in the early 1920s Himmler toyed for a time with the idea of emigrating. One of the places he could see himself starting a new life was in Atatürk’s New Turkey. Even more strangely, what he thought about becoming there was exactly what Hans Tröbst went on to be (at least for a short time) after the Hitler Putsch: a miller in Western Anatolia.106 Himmler had a close university friend from Turkey with whom he kept contact, at least in the early 1920s, and from whom he received news and insights from and about Turkey. They also discussed “Turkish solutions” for Germany’s problems in their correspondence. In one of these letters his Turkish friend asked Himmler if he had already started with his Turkish lessons.107

Not only was Turkey nothing distant for interwar Germany in general and the early Weimar Republic in particular, especially because the Weimar press paid such special attention to it and was to continue to do so until 1933, as was the Nazi press afterward. For many of the important actors in the unfolding great drama, Turkey and the Ottoman Empire were biographically close and connected to them, because they had lived, worked, served, loved, and even killed there.

Conclusion

There was clearly a Turkish, Kemalist dimension to the events of November 1923 in Munich. Turkey helped create an atmosphere that was conducive for the Nazis to think that a putsch might be successful. If we are to believe what Hitler said in a speech in 1936, that between 1919 and 1923 all he ever thought about was a putsch,108 then
he must also have given a lot of thought to Turkey, because there a successful example had played out, and was being played out in the media of the Weimar Republic time and again. Given that we have often projected the influence of Mussolini onto Hitler in this time—in the absence of substantial documentation of Hitler’s own thoughts on the role of Mussolini for him—we also have to insert Mustafa Kemal into this projection. When Ian Kershaw and others speculate that the transition from “drummer” to Führer, which had already begun in Hitler’s self-perception before he was confined in Landsberg Prison in the wake of the Hitler Trial, was influenced by Mussolini when Hitler was increasingly reflecting upon heroic leadership, then we have to add Mustafa Kemal as an important, if not paramount, influence on Hitler in these years. Indeed, we must assume that Hitler had already been thinking intensively about the Führer figure Mustafa Kemal Atatürk for two to three years before the German papers started reporting more extensively on the Italian Fascists and Mussolini in the wake of the March on Rome in late 1922. Thus, Mustafa Kemal Pasha must have been a key influence in the evolution of Hitler’s ideas about the modern Führer and about himself as a political leader. This could also partially explain the Atatürk cult in the Third Reich, which will be discussed in Chapter 3.

What is further remarkable about the Turkish dimension of the Hitler Putsch is the way the Heimatland used “Turkey” as a means of creating a pro-putsch atmosphere, culminating in the “Give Us an Ankara Government!” article. Turkey had been part of the atmosphere too when news of Mussolini’s March on Rome reached the German papers—the two actually became intertwined when, in Lausanne where the new peace treaty was negotiated for more than half a year, Mussolini had his first performance on the international political stage. But Turkey was also part of the internal Fascist atmosphere when the March on Rome took place. Not only did Mussolini’s Il Popolo d’Italia report with great frequency, like the Kreuzzeitung had, on the Turkish War of Independence, it also maintained this frequency in the months before the March on Rome and visually concentrated heavily on Turkey; many of its first cartoons ever (all on the front page) were on Turkish topics, and it printed one of the first pictures of Atatürk to appear in the European press at the time (just
the picture without any text, although the same issue also featured nine articles and a cartoon on Turkey; note that the German dailies had yet to feature pictures). The Fascist monthly and “elite journal” Gerarchia, edited by Mussolini as well, also featured Turkey most prominently at the time. Indeed, in a striking similarity to the Hitler Putsch and the Heimatland, the whole last issue of Gerarchia before the March on Rome, published in late September 1922, stood under the headline “The Crescent” (La luna crescente), an article penned by Mussolini about “Kemal Pasha’s March on Izmir” (la marcia di Kemal su Smirne). Here Mussolini, prophetically, claimed that the events in Anatolia, given that the “peace of the sword” had failed, signaled the need for a real, just peace, which so far had been hindered by Wilsonian principles. The alternative was a new war, which would mean the “catastrophe of European civilization.” This March-on-Rome issue of Gerarchia also featured another article on Turkey, as did the next issues, following the seizure of power. It is perhaps also noteworthy that in the time before the March on Rome, Mussolini apparently liked to call himself “the Mustafa Kemal of a Milanese Ankara.”

Mustafa Kemal and the War of Independence were part of the zeitgeist, not only for German revisionists and nationalists in general, but especially for the National Socialists and the Italian Fascists. There can be no doubt that Mussolini’s March on Rome exerted a great influence on the events in Munich in late 1923. But to ascribe the Hitler Putsch so singularly to Mussolini’s example, as it is done generally by contemporary historiography, seems completely unwarranted. It is not necessary to argue against the influence of the March of Rome here, but there is much to be said for the argument that, for the Nazis and the völkisch circles, both Mussolini and Mustafa Kemal were rather a package deal. Although the Heimatland clearly differentiated between the two and favored the Ankara solution, British journalist G. Ward Price claims that Hitler told him in 1935 that he had copied the Italian example too directly in 1923. Perhaps this statement was influenced by the foreign policy expediencies of the day; what really went on in the heads of the Munich conspirators we will never know. But it is worth stressing that the German center to far-right press, including the Nazi publications, had already been
advocating Turkish lessons for years, long before the German media paid any attention to Benito Mussolini. We do not know whether the articles in *Völkischer Beobachter* from early 1921 about the “heroic Turkey” and the announcement that in the future Germany would also have to resort to Turkish methods were penned by Hitler himself. But it is not improbable, given that they appeared during the time when he wrote for the *Völkischer Beobachter*, and given that the paper’s preoccupation with Turkey stopped very abruptly (at least for a while) after Hitler had quit writing for it. In any event, it is clear that the Nazis grew up with Turkey and had been growing up with Turkey for some time already before Mussolini came along. It is also interesting to note in this context that up until the Landsberg imprisonment, the only documented instances of Hitler mentioning Mussolini in public speeches as a role model were the two speeches in which he also mentioned Atatürk in the same breath: in late 1922 and at the Hitler Trial.115

Thus the Nazis “grew up with Turkey.” Hitler was an avid newspaper reader, especially so in the early days of the movement, in the early 1920s.116 And as shown in this chapter and in Chapter 1, “Turkey” as a topic could not be overlooked, either in the general press of the Weimar Republic or in the Nazi press itself. It was ever-present, incorporated into the sections dealing with Germany, and prominently put on display in the papers—often in first-page headlines. As we will see, the Nazis would not forget this part of their “adolescence”—quite the contrary.
It was a highly unusual and a highly symbolic trip upon which Ernst Röhm, head of the SA, embarked just shortly after the Third Reich came into existence. Unfortunately, it is also a trip about which we know next to nothing. But its destinations are known and they are quite telling. Officially, it was a “private trip,” but one with the highest ideological significance. This significance was further underlined by the fact that after having returned from Bolivia where he had served as a military advisor, Röhm did not often travel abroad. So why now? The answer is as easy as it is surprising: Röhm went on a pilgrimage. The first destination in the summer of 1933 was Rome, where he met Mussolini, and his second destination was Ankara, where he met with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Röhm paid homage to his heroes and reaffirmed his ideological links with them. We know hardly anything about the conversation between Röhm and Atatürk. Although Turkish historiography portrays him as anti-Nazi, and with good reasons, Atatürk seems to have liked Röhm. A surviving document suggests that Atatürk believed Hitler had not needed to dispose of Röhm in 1934—although he himself had many of his former comrades executed. Atatürk thought Röhm would have been beneficial as well as completely loyal to Hitler. Whatever Röhm and Atatürk, or for that matter Röhm and Mussolini, talked
about, Röhm’s trip is in a way very indicative of how the Nazis felt about Turkey.

The Nazis and Turkey until 1933

The Nazis’ fascination with the New Turkey and Atatürk did not end with the failed Hitler Putsch or the end of the Turkish War of Independence. However, after Hitler’s time at Landsberg Prison, where he was incarcerated for his role in the aborted 1923 putsch, and thus during the years of Nazi “legal” tactics, Turkey was not mentioned as often as it had been during the first years of the Nazi movement. This was all too understandable: to talk about Atatürk as a role model would have meant admitting to aspirations of a violent seizure of power, with the promise of war against the Versailles powers, civil war, and the establishment of a strong dictatorship. Atatürk’s Turkey had not transformed itself into a democratic state in the period after 1923. It had launched a massive program of reconstruction and modernization, but its state system was at best an autocratic democracy with a single party; it probably felt more like an outright dictatorship. Opposition was dealt with harshly and swiftly. Throughout the Weimar years it was thus dangerous to proclaim Turkey as one’s role model.

But there was not total silence about Turkey. It appears that Hitler and the others did not change their minds about Turkey in these years. When in 1929, following another of his inflammatory speeches, proceedings for treason were once again initiated against Hitler; he jotted down another speech in his own defense. Although the proceedings were terminated in 1931 without ever going to trial, the speech survives. Here again Hitler draws parallels between himself and Atatürk and between his movement and the Kemalists:

If the Reichswehrministerium today compares the National Socialist movement, [which has] the most ardent love for the Fatherland, to Marxist treason and wants to have National Socialists treated like Communists, then this is a human error analogous to the banishment and the arrest warrant of the old Turkish Ministry of War in Constantinople against the
inconvenient nationalist Kemal Pasha and his followers. History will judge these proceedings as one of the [examples from] the period of the deepest German decline.²

Given this, as well as past and future references to Atatürk, it is not entirely easy to explain Hitler’s omission of Atatürk in Mein Kampf (1925).³ But perhaps this stems from the specific connotation Atatürk and Kemalism had assumed at the time in Germany, which heavily conflicted with Hitler’s new “legality” course. Mussolini was a much more feasible role model during this period because he stood for a seizure of power within the bounds of legality. Yet, Hitler also did not discuss Mussolini in any depth in Mein Kampf.⁴

The only Turkey mentioned in Mein Kampf was the “Old Turkey,” the Ottoman Empire, which for Hitler was similar to the other “ancient state,” the Habsburg Empire; both had already been “pensioned off by world history” when Germany had allied itself with them during World War I. Hitler admiringly mentioned Enver Pasha, whom he credited with making allies of former enemies in the Second Balkan War. That Germany did not achieve anything similar in the aftermath of World War I, when the Entente powers began feuding among themselves, he attributed to the fact that “Germany simply had no Enver Pasha, merely a Chancellor Cuno.” Regarding the Ruhr occupation, he asserted that Germany should have “taken upon” itself “the terror of the moment” rather than the “endless terror” of Entente rule. It seems striking that he cited a Turkish example before referring so cryptically, via the “terrors of the moment” (meaning war), to an armed uprising à la Mustafa Kemal against the Entente. He went on to speak about “active resistance”—again a reference to Atatürk and the early Weimar discourse about “active politics.” Germany, he said, should have seized the opportunity to rearm itself so that when the time came for the future of the Ruhr region to be negotiated across the conference table, Germany would have been in a position of strength—again one of the lessons from the Turkish case that the German press had repeatedly hammered into German minds.⁵ Thus, although this was not a direct reference, it was at least a strong indirect one to Atatürk and the Kemalist struggle against the Entente.
The topic of Turkey also resurfaced on other occasions between 1924 and 1933. Addressing an NSDAP gathering in Nuremberg in December 1928, Hitler discussed the German defeat in and after World War I. Again he compared Turkey to Germany. Turkey, he said, lost incredible amounts of blood. Then the state literally breaks down because of hunger and the lack of everything. A collapse just as monumental as the German one, just translated into Turkish. Five years later it [the collapse] led to the Treaty of Sèvres [here he confused the Treaty of Sèvres with the Treaty of Lausanne], with the result that the Turkish Empire is founded again and that the world speaks with highest respect of this Turkish state. The inner strength had remained, it was instantly mobilized as soon as the man [Atatürk] came who managed to remind his people of its great tradition and who led them forward. That is what was different with us Germans.

He then attributed Germany’s different path to a moral collapse. Hitler went on to discuss various aspects of German political development, including demographics, and then warned that the Germans could possibly descend to the level of Armenians (that is dispersion and eventual extinction)—Hitler was, in a way, mixing Turkish metaphors here. He also argued that a movement to save Germany could have a chance only if it was rooted in the broad masses. Speaking against other elite leaders and about the nation’s willingness to sacrifice itself, he mentioned Turkey once more: “[Today] an Anatolian farmer is worth more than a German man of letters with the highest income. A nation must be able to sacrifice itself for its ideals”—a point Hitler had also stressed in a speech in 1922. The members of a nation gained their worth, Hitler stressed, not by their profession or class but by their willingness to fight for the existence of their nation with their lives. The willingness for national sacrifice was the theme of the rest of the speech and would also become a major theme of the Atatürk biography genre during the Third Reich.

Hitler was not the only one to reinforce the perceived parallelism between National Socialism and Atatürk’s Turkey. In 1924 a book
about the Turkish War of Independence, entitled “Ankara and Constantinople—Struggling Powers,” was published by Karl Klinghardt.8 While not connected to the NSDAP through the author, the book did put forward what was later to be the typical Nazi vision of the New Turkey. The very strong comparison between Kemalism and National Socialism was merely implicit in the book, but it was so obvious that a September 1932 article in the Hamburger Nachrichten attributed to this book the actual “Turkish National Socialism” as a description of Kemalism, although that phrase is nowhere to be found in the book. Thus, the parallelism was also visible to others. This 1932 article in the Hamburger Nachrichten used this apparently established parallelism between National Socialism and Kemalism to warn Germany about Hitler and to highlight National Socialism’s inability to govern. Written by the Constantinople correspondent of the paper, it at first stressed the similarities between the two movements, only to then show that Kemalism was different in that it was very prudent and circumspect when it came to governing—something not to be expected of the Nazis if they were ever to rule Germany. Recent verbal attacks on Hindenburg by Hitler were especially criticized—although by the journalist and not really by Atatürk, as the article tried to suggest with an out-of-context Atatürk quote.9

Others had also, in the meantime, reinforced the discourses that had been prevalent during the media hype of 1919–1923. When the German-Turkish Society celebrated its tenth anniversary in 1927, the main speaker was quoted in Munich newspapers: “It was a true Germanic fate that the Turks had to suffer during the War of Independence.”10 This “Germanic” or similar fate of the two nations was a theme picked up time and again by German media and publications throughout the 1920s and 1930s.11 In 1933 the Völkischer Beobachter re-emphasized both the shared fate and the shared solution: “In this way we see the new ascent of the Turkish nation, which had begun in the same misery as that of the young Germany. It is the deed of this one single man, who with iron will and undiminished determination leads his nation to independence: Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa.”12 Replacing Atatürk’s name with Hitler’s in the last sentence yields a typical Nazi propaganda sound bite about the Third Reich. Five years later, when Atatürk died, the Freiburger Zeitung stressed
that the fates of Turkey and Germany had been basically the same for “the last quarter of a century”: first the lost war and then the status of victim of the Entente. But, the paper continued, with the setting up an alternative seat of government in Ankara and the beginning of the national revolution in Anatolia, “the similarity of events reminds us that also the savior of Germany, Adolf Hitler, began not in Berlin but in Munich with his movement and took his first revolutionary step in Munich.”

Thus, not only the “shared fate,” but also the remedy, initially the Ankara-in-Munich idea as interpreted by Hitler in the 1924 trial, were similar and were not forgotten by the German media. Throughout the Weimar years the nationalist media continued to report extensively about Turkey, highlighting, among other things, the massive efforts of reconstruction, reforms, and rearmament as well as the völkisch character of the new state. Even the history schoolbooks of the late Weimar years mentioned the Turkish War of Independence as a “marvelous example of national devotion [sic].”

What changed with 1933 was not only that now Atatürk could again be admired openly by the Nazis, but also that Germany was now perceived to be on the right track again and finally, as a state, in the same ideological universe as the New Turkey. Atatürk’s Turkey had long become “the symbol of a new world order,” the *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger* remarked in 1933. And as the paper concluded its essay on the first ten years of the Turkish Republic, it stressed, “We Germans have perhaps a redoubled and a new understanding for Turkey now that we are again masters in our own house and live according to our laws.”

Role Model and “Star”—A Minor Nazi Cult

It is not surprising that the *Kreuzzeitung* stressed in November 1933 that “the German National Socialism of Adolf Hitler and Turkish Kemalism are closely related.” Especially not at the end of 1933, because the perceived ideological kinship between National Socialism and Kemalism had found many expressions in the year of the *Machtergreifung* (Nazi seizure of power). For example, in March 1933 the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* reported on a lecture presented at the...
Society for the Study of Fascism entitled “The Nationalist Revolution of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey—An Ideological-Historical Parallel to German Renewal and to German Fascism.”18 The speaker was Johann von Leers, at the time a close collaborator of Goebbels, a party orator, and a journalist for Goebbels’s Angriff. Leers was to hold a series of academic posts in the Third Reich, but perhaps most importantly he was the author of the 1932 biography of Hitler, which for some time was the authoritative NSDAP account of the Führer’s life.19 In his lecture Leers discussed how Atatürk had succeeded in resisting the disarmament of the Turks, won the Turks’ freedom, and founded the new nation based on the “idea of national sovereignty.” In the final part of his lecture he focused on illustrating just how similar the biographies of Atatürk and Hitler really were.

Even more important is perhaps how Leers began his narrative of Hitler’s biography, which was republished many times in the Third Reich in the prestigious series “Men and Powers” (Männer und Mächte). The first lines read: “The old world has begun to become very young. Völkisch movements of rejuvenation characterize our times.” These movements “herald the coming of a new age.” That he perceived Kemalism not only to be one of these movements but their spearhead becomes clear in sentence seven, where he began listing these movements: “In Turkey the heroic representative of the old Turkish soldier spirit, the Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, drives off the foreign pest with the fire of improvised cannons manned by old men and children, in Italy Mussolini succeeds in the renewal of the Roman spirit.”20 He then directly proceeded to his discussion of Germany and Hitler.

That Leers’s interpretations were not far off what was to become the official line became clear a bit later. Around the time of Röhm’s pilgrimage to Rome and Ankara, Hitler himself publicly reaffirmed Atatürk’s role for himself and indeed handed down the official party and state line on how the Nazis and the Third Reich were to perceive Atatürk. In July 1933 Hitler was interviewed by the editor of the Turkish daily Milliyet. What Hitler said here was not meant only for the most important Turkish daily and its editor, who also presided over the Turkish parliament’s foreign relations council. It was at least equally directed at the German public. The interview was
Hitler’s “Star in the Darkness” partially reprinted and summarized in a variety of German papers, most importantly on the first page of the *Völkischer Beobachter* and other national papers, such as the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. It was also carried by the provincial press. In the interview Hitler pointed out that besides good relations, there was “something more” that connected the two regimes—sympathy and understanding based on the shared pursuit of similar goals. Apparently he had also called Atatürk “the greatest man of the century” in this interview. The central sound bite, however, as selected by the *Völkischer Beobachter*, was a sentence about the so-called *Kampfzeit*, the “dark 1920s”: Hitler had said that “the successful struggle for liberation that the Ghazi [Atatürk] led in order to create Turkey had given him [Hitler] the confidence that the National Socialist movement would be successful as well. In this respect the movement of Turkey [sic!] had been a shining star for him.”

Hitler’s statement reaffirmed the iconic role of Atatürk for him and the Nazis. It also reconnected the Nazis to their very own pre-1933 and indeed pre-1924 traditions, directly echoing their descriptions of Atatürk in those “dark years.” For instance, the 1922 *Völkische Beobachter* article “Mustafa Kemal” had said, “In these days of dishonor and infamy . . . there has shone for the past few years one name, which proves what a real man can do. Everyone who feels [truly] German has followed with great admiration the heroic struggle of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.” It concluded: “Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s victory shall give us new strength and fortify our belief in the invincibility of the heroic spirit.”

The fact that the “star in the darkness” sound bite was reprinted on the first page of the flagship of the Nazi press, the *Völkischer Beobachter*, as well as in other papers in July 1933, illustrates that the Nazis assigned value to it. Indeed, the quote was to become iconic in the Third Reich and was repeated time and again in the coming years, especially when Atatürk died in 1938, but also when the German-Turkish Friendship Treaty was signed in June 1941—yet another occasion for the press of the Third Reich to renarrate the story of and express its admiration for the New Turkey. Hitler’s “star in the darkness” quote also sanctioned the “minor cult” around Atatürk that was to unfold in a variety of publications and activities. Hitler
himself also continued to express his admiration for Atatürk. This was also noted by Max Domarus, editor of Hitler’s speeches and proclamations, who pointed out that Hitler sent Atatürk the most cordial congratulatory telegrams on every possible occasion.27 His telegrams were also regularly reprinted in the Völkischer Beobachter. Hitler also continued to openly voice his admiration. For example, in 1938, on his birthday, in a meeting with a delegation of Turkish politicians and journalists, he reaffirmed the primal and original role Atatürk had played for him and in doing so also pinpointed what was the essence of most far-right and Nazi interpretations of Atatürk in interwar Germany: “Atatürk was the first to show that it is possible to mobilize and regenerate the resources that a country has lost. In this respect Atatürk was a teacher; Mussolini was his first and I his second student.”28 This was not a chance phrasing by Hitler. Similar sentences were part and parcel of the existing media discourse. For example, the Berliner Tageblatt wrote in 1938 on Atatürk that “almost 20 years ago [he] had provided the world with the proof that no defeat can be so bad that in a healthy nation sufficient forces cannot be collected for the victorious assertion of the Volkstum.”29 A couple of sentences later the article also repeated Hitler’s star-in-the-darkness metaphor. In meetings with Turkish politicians and journalists, Hitler frequently said that Turkey had been a role model for him. For instance, in April 1939, when he received another Turkish delegation of politicians and journalists congratulating him on his birthday, he said simply: “Turkey was our model.”30 And then in late September 1939 Hitler reaffirmed Atatürk as his role model yet again, but now also in direct relation to current events. In the midst of the war against Poland, Hitler told the newly appointed Turkish ambassador, Hüsrev Gerede, that he “was copying Atatürk” (Atatürk’ü taklit ettiğini): just as Atatürk had demolished the Treaty of Sèvres, so he was now destroying the Versailles Treaty.31 Perhaps Hitler was here also implicitly referring to Atatürk’s example of using the Soviet Union as an ally in the process of revising the status quo, Hitler himself being in the middle of partitioning Poland together with the Soviet Union.

Another example of Hitler’s admiration for Turkey was his speech of May 4, 1941, one of the few speeches Hitler ever gave in the Reichstag (German parliament). This one was occasioned by his Balkan
campaign. Without any apparent connection, Hitler digressed from the current political situation in the Balkans: “Turkey was our ally in the World War. The sorrowful outcome of this struggle weighed as heavy on this country as it did on our own. The great ingenious creator of the young Turkey was the first to provide a marvelous role model for the uprising of the allies then abandoned by luck and horribly stricken by fate.”

Given that the German-Turkish Friendship Treaty was signed shortly afterward, this “role model” quote again provided an “official line” for the renewed media interest in Turkey that summer. That this was indeed the “official” and “binding” (verbindlich) line for the Third Reich was even recognized by the Turkish foreign minister, Saraçoğlu, in a speech two months later. These sentences by Hitler were reprinted in the press in the coming years—for example, in the Frankfurter Zeitung in the summer of 1943. Whenever the Third Reich media wrote extensively on Turkey, the 1933 “star in the darkness” metaphor also resurfaced. An article in the Völkischer Beobachter, after the friendship treaty was signed, claiming to refer to Hitler’s Reichstag speech, paraphrased the older light metaphor again: “The tenacious struggle of Kemalist Turkey for self-determination and honor was the light (Flammenschein) in the darkness of our most gloomy days and gave us confidence that also for Germany the hour of liberation will come.” The first major article on the friendship treaty, three days earlier, had already directly quoted the section on Turkey from Hitler’s Reichstag speech.

The signing of the German-Turkish Friendship Treaty in 1941 was also used by other papers as an occasion for offering a summary of Turkey’s role for Nazi Germany. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, for example, reminded its readers:

The Führer has always thought that the heroic deed of liberation by Kemal Atatürk, the father of modern Turkey, was a marvelous role model for the uprising against this system of coercion of international disorder [as it is] symbolized for us by Versailles. Above all it was two men who had prepared the revision of the dictates of 1919, Kemal through his deed that had already brought him to the conference table as an equal in 1923
Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination

and Mussolini through the manly word with which he has, since the assumption of power of Fascism the year before, rebelled against the politics of inequality and rape.\(^{37}\)

Other papers, like the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, also stressed again in 1941 that Atatürk’s movement had been a “beacon of hope” for similar forces in Germany in the immediate postwar years, again obviously referring to the Nazis themselves:

Lacking a Führer who would have been able to realize the dream of national rebirth, the German nation saw its old ally, followed with a hot heart the unparalleled victorious march with which Kemal Pasha blew away the enemies of the Turkish nation only to lay the foundations for a truly modern state in the middle of the raging battle. The feat of construction (*Aufbauwerk*) of this paramount statesman and military leader impressed the German public in the strongest fashion possible.\(^{38}\)

The Tenth Anniversary of the Turkish Republic

The year of the *Machtergreifung*, 1933, afforded the Nazis more opportunities to celebrate their role model, Turkey, as it was also the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Turkish Republic. The German press covered this anniversary extensively. The *Völkischer Beobachter* featured articles on it for ten days, with nine articles and reports featuring five pictures, beginning with an article on the German ambassador flying back to Ankara to take part in the festivities there on October 28 and ending with an article on the “Echoes of the Turkish Festivities” on November 7.\(^ {39}\) An extensive list of festivities and activities planned in Berlin for this anniversary survives in the archives of the German Foreign Office; it covers many events, from the official reception at the Turkish Embassy to tea parties in honor of the Turkish Republic and a series of radio shows featuring various officials of the embassy.\(^ {40}\) At the tea party at the Hotel Kaiserhof hosted by the Association of the Oriental Veterans and the Association of the Germans Abroad, Werner Daitz, Alfred Rosenberg’s envoy with the convoluted title of main department director in the Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP, spoke at length about
the meaning of the New Turkey for Germany and the world. Daitz saw Kemalism, Nazism, and Fascism all as emanations of the same thing:

The great events of our days, which show themselves as National Socialism in Germany, as Kemalism in Turkey and as Fascism in Italy, and what will follow in the other countries as new forms of state and life, do not stem from “changes of political systems,” but all have a rather common source. It is a great ideological breakthrough, which will bring down its flood wave all across the globe and from which the rest of the peoples will not be able to escape.

National Socialism, Kemalism and Fascism and all that, which in other emanations will follow in other countries, are the first great eruptions, which will cover the antiquated intellectual crust with a new, smoldering and fiery layer, with a new ideology and [a new] cultural layer.41

Vice-Chancellor von Papen also spoke at this tea party. His speech was quoted at length in many newspapers. Stressing that he had made Atatürk’s acquaintance personally during World War I, he spoke with the highest praise of the Turkish leader and the achievements of the Turks. The German vice-chancellor claimed that nobody understood better than the Germans what had been achieved in Turkey. Germany, being in the middle of a “spiritual evolution of historical proportions,” still had to “fight the fight for its freedom and for equality,” which Turkey had already so successfully concluded ten years ago. Germany had learned from Turkey that it could never sign away the foundations of völkisch life with international treaties. He underlined throughout his speech that especially today Germany was applying “Turkish lessons,” that now this was finally possible.42

In a similar vein, an article in the *Völkischer Beobachter* stressed: “The German nation, which is undergoing a spiritual revolution of historic proportions [and] which today has yet to start the struggle for its freedom and equality, feels, among the nations of Europe, the strongest sympathy for the historical development of Turkey.”43 Another article in the *Völkischer Beobachter* toward the end of this news cycle on the tenth anniversary concluded:
Especially important among the reasons for the [international] expressions of sympathy are the sincerity of the New Turkey in matters of peace and its triumph on the national plane. We will do our best to make much more progress in the coming ten years. In 1943, the world's confidence in Turkey and our own belief in ourselves will have been doubled.44

The activities surrounding the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic were not limited to rhetoric and heightened media attention reaffirming the special role of Turkey for Nazi Germany. Interestingly, the list of festivities in the Foreign Office papers neglects to mention one very crucial event. Looking back a couple of months later, in April 1934, another newspaper article in the Völkischer Beobachter was to claim that this event had been a spontaneous show of sympathy.45 However, the event must have been carefully planned. In the morning of October 30, SA men marched to the Turkish Embassy on Tiergarten Street in Berlin.46 A double row of SA men was to stand as honor guard in front of the embassy from 11 a.m. until midnight. After the Berlin police commander had conveyed his best wishes to the Turkish Republic, at around noon, the Turkish ambassador was honored specially by the SA: The general chief of the SA, Röhm, the leader of the SA, Karl Ernst, as well as the chief of the Berlin-Brandenburg region came to the embassy with their adjutants. They were welcomed by the ambassador, who wore his full general's uniform for the first time in Berlin. Röhm conveyed the congratulations of the entire SA and the German Frontkämpfergeneration (generation of World War I veterans) as well as “the German youth unified within the SA.” Röhm then presented the ambassador’s wife with a bouquet of flowers bound with a red ribbon: on one of the ribbon’s ends was a swastika, on the other a crescent.47 When the ambassador, his wife, and Ernst Röhm stepped out on the balcony, an SA band played first the song of the Nazi movement, the “Horst Wessel Song,” then the Turkish and German national anthems. After this the ambassador, Röhm, and the other SA dignitaries walked past the honor guard. The surviving pictures of this event (Figs. 3.1 and 3.2) show that the SA honor guard was no small band of SA men, but numbered at least one hundred men. On the horizon of the second picture
Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The SA celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic, in Berlin, in front of the Turkish Embassy. The Turkish ambassador with Röhm and other leaders of the SA walking past the SA honor guard. Note the spectators on the left, on the horizon, and on the right behind the rows of SA men.

Bundesarchiv-Bildarchiv; Ullstein Bild
one can clearly make out a crowd of spectators cordoned off by the police. This was apparently quite a big event.

It is remarkable that the SA displayed the initiative to stage their very own event at the Turkish Embassy. The playing of the “Horst Wessel Song” as the first song is also telling. It was the song of the National Socialist movement, and although by then it had achieved official status, it was usually played directly after the German national anthem, not before it and never as the first song in a diplomatic setting. But the event was not about official foreign relations; it was a celebration of the proximity and perceived communality of the two movements, Kemalism and Nazism, symbolized by the ribbon on Röhm’s bouquet and indeed by Röhm’s trip to Ankara earlier that year. It was not official Germany, but rather the National Socialist movement, that was honoring the New Turkey here.

An article in Goebbels’s Angriff on October 30, stressing that it had already printed its congratulations on October 28, had interpreted the meaning of the New Turkey and its tenth anniversary in a similar fashion:

And this way a bond of deepest ideological amity spans across the time from the brotherhood in arms in the war, the years of want and struggle to our days when both peoples share the luck of an honorable rebirth under the leadership of great and unique men. Both recognize about the other that the path they have found was not a coincidental one, but one granted by history to brave and honor-loving nations.\(^48\)

Rosenberg’s envoy, Daitz, had also underlined this:

Just how strong the affinity, grown out of the shared painful fate, between the Turkish and the German people is today, is proven probably in the most immediate fashion by the honoring of the His Excellency, the Turkish ambassador, as representative of the Turkish nation, on October 29 by the highest leadership of the SA and the victorious political soldiers of the German revolution.\(^49\)
Fully aware of the difference between official-diplomatic and ideological ceremonies, the first article in the *Völkischer Beobachter* on the celebrations had stressed that “all the SA leaders will also take part in the diplomatic reception later that day.” When this reception took place in the evening, the double-ranked SA honor guard was still standing outside the embassy. And, as the journalist Bella Fromm stressed in her diary, “the Germans were particularly eager to share in the holiday.” She assumed that this was because it was the kind of splendid festivity that the Nazi “roughnecks” had not yet had much chance to attend. But the reason for so “many brown officials” attending may have also been this perceived proximity and perceived shared history and future of the two movements. Of the festivities themselves, not much is known; apparently Hitler himself was supposed to attend. What is known is that the SA men got so drunk that Seeckt, one of the “German Ottomans,” whom we have already met as Lossow’s adversary at the helm of the Reichswehr during the Hitler Putsch, had to have some of them removed. Furthermore, it was at this party at the Turkish Embassy that the personal conflict between Röhm and Rosenberg finally openly erupted, with Röhm showering Rosenberg with insults.

Inclusion by Protocol, Race, and Sculpture

The perceived proximity of National Socialism and Kemalism was not only expressed at special events, in the media, and in countless publications, by Hitler’s telegrams, Röhm’s trip, and the SA event, but also was evidenced by very special attention paid to the New Turkey by Nazi diplomatic protocol. Just a couple of months after the tenth-anniversary festivities, the Turkish ambassador in Berlin, Kemalettin Sami Pasha, died from a car accident. Kemalettin Sami Pasha had been well liked by the nationalist media. The *Kreuzzeitung* had lauded him as being of “truly knightly spirit.” It is uncertain whether this was also related to the fact Kemalettin Sami Pasha had been recalled twice from his post in Berlin, in 1925 and in 1930, to active duty in order to suppress Kurdish uprisings in Eastern Anatolia, or to the fact that he had been wounded eighteen times in combat, but these were the facts that the papers admiringly highlighted.
He was honored by special media attention, including many obituaries in the papers, a particularly large one in the *Völkischer Beobachter*, by the reprinting of the various condolence telegrams from the German government, and by flags flown at half-mast over the Reichskanzlei, the Reichstag, and the German Foreign Office. Later on, the appointment of Kemalettin Sami Pasha’s successor would also receive special attention in the press. Kemalettin Sami Pasha’s coffin was to be taken to Turkey by train, and the transport to the train station was used by the Third Reich to once again celebrate the New Turkey. Apparently Hitler himself ordered the “incredibly festive procession,” as one Turkish witness described it later, for the Turkish ambassador, whom Hitler had also held in special esteem. Şefik Okday, grandson of one of the last grand viziers of the Ottoman Empire and a student in Berlin in the 1930s, goes as far as to claim that Kemalettin Sami Pasha was the only foreign ambassador who was allowed to see Hitler at any time without an appointment.

On April 19, 1934, just a day before the Führer’s birthday, after a ceremony at the embassy Kemalettin Sami Pasha’s coffin was hoisted onto a horse-drawn gun carriage; SA flags were lowered, and a special honor battalion by the Reichswehr gave a last salute. Surviving pictures in the Ullstein Picture Archives suggest that the procession from the embassy on Tiergarten Street to the Anhalter Railway Station was handled like an important state affair (Fig. 3.3). Again, the SA also played a special role with multiple honor guards (*letzte Ehrenspalier*) at four points along the route from the embassy to the station. The coffin was preceded by mounted police, three companies of the SS, and finally three Reichswehr officers directly before the coffin, carrying and showcasing the deceased’s medals. The coffin was followed by many high-ranking officials of the Third Reich—including Röhm, Foreign Minister Neurath, Admiral Erich Raeder, Secretary of State Otto Meißner, and the president’s son, Oskar von Hindenburg. The only significant person missing was Hitler himself. At the end of whole procession there were more mounted police. As the pictures show, crowds lined the street and greeted the passing coffin, draped in the Turkish flag, with the Nazi salute. Once the procession reached Anhalter Railway Station, it had passed through the last of the four SA honor guards; three volleys were fired,
and the coffin was brought to the lobby of the train station, where the SS division “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” had lined up. And then, as if not enough last respects had already been paid, before the train left for Turkey a specially assembled, one-hundred-men-strong company of the Berlin police unit “General Göring” honored the deceased. Göring himself was receiving the Bulgarian prime minister—that was why, the Deutsche Zeitung commented, he had only taken part in the wake at the Turkish Embassy earlier that day. The list of people present at the wake before the procession was even more impressive and included, in addition to those who took part in the procession, Vice-Chancellor von Papen, Minister of Defense Blomberg, Labor Minister Seldte, state secretaries Lammers, von Bülow, and Körner, various generals, such as Fritsch and von Rundstedt, various SA leaders, and the Berlin chief of police. When the former ambassador was finally laid to rest in Istanbul a couple of days later, the Third Reich, mainly through the German colony, was heavily represented at the ceremony, not only with wreaths from Hitler and
Hindenburg, but with a eulogy by German ambassador von Rosen-berg, in which he delivered the final goodbye to Kemalettin Sami Pasha from a Germany “that loved, honored, and admired” him.57

It appears that to pay Turkey special attention and respect, to “include Turkey by protocol” in the inner circle of the Nazi world, was commonplace during the Third Reich, or so the surviving pictures from the time in various archives suggest.58 The Turkish ambassador, at first Kemalettin Sami Pasha and from 1934 onward Hamdi Arpag, can be found sitting in the front row of the diplomatic corps at the opening of the Reichstag in 1933 and 1939, next to diplomats from Austria and Italy in 1933, and next to those from Japan, Spain, Italy, in the seat next to Ribbentrop’s wife, in 1939. At every New Year’s reception at Hitler’s Reich Chancellery the Turkish ambassador was always at the very top of the line of foreign dignitaries. Furthermore, at the yearly dinner of Rosenberg’s Foreign Policy Office the Turkish ambassador was always seated at the most important table—Rosenberg’s—and always in the seat next to him.

Similar pictures survive for a variety of events. At a performance of Wagner’s Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg during the Nuremberg Party Rally in 1936, the Turkish ambassador was again included in the first row of dignitaries and personalities. A photo shows the Turkish and Japanese ambassadors seated directly next to Hitler’s opera box, and Hamdi Arpag in a seat directly adjoining Hitler’s box—an honor shared only with Winifred Wagner, the daughter-in-law of the “master,” on the other side of Hitler’s box (Fig. 3.4). Similarly, the Turkish ambassador pops up again and again in the front row in photos of a variety of functions, such as the opening of an art exhibition presented by Rosenberg in 1934 or the opening session of the Reichsparteitag (Nuremberg Rally) in Nuremberg in 1936. Although the surviving archival sources do not allow any further conclusions, the pictures do suggest that the Third Reich paid very special attention to the Turkish representative. The symbolism of diplomatic protocol at these events conveys the impression that the New Turkey was part of the same ideological universe as National Socialism—even that the New Turkey was a close friend, if not ally, of the Third Reich.
Given the evidence we have explored thus far, we might expect far more expressions of Nazi admiration for the New Turkey. Yet there is one area where we would expect things to be more problematical: that of race. The Nazi concept of race was difficult to grasp, even for the Nazis themselves. Not everybody who looked “Jewish” to the “righteous” and motivated SA man was indeed a Jew, to be ridiculed, terrorized, and denigrated. And especially when it came to foreigners, the whole racial worldview became very confusing—so confusing that SA men, not as rarely as one would expect, beat up the “wrong people” and had to go and apologize later. Enver Celaleddin, a Turkish student at Wismar Technical University, beaten up by SA men in front of his house for “not greeting the flag,” was such a case. Eventually the local SA leadership, as instructed by the district attorney, went to Enver Celaleddin and apologized on behalf of the local SA.59 In a similar case in Berlin the next year, it was the Gestapo that was called to intervene and officially apologize.60 When it
came to race and the New Turkey Nazi ideology, diplomatic considerations as well as the Nazi infatuation with the New Turkey and its leader intersected and produced surprising results.

By projecting what we know of today’s relations in Germany between Germans and Turks, one might jump to the conclusion that “race” was an area in which the semi-cult of the Nazis around Atatürk and the New Turkey came into direct conflict with racial policies and convictions. But neo-Nazi actions today provide poor guidance to Third Reich policies. Although the official answer to the racial question about the Turks was very different from what one might expect today, it was already implicit in everything discussed so far. Hitler had repeatedly stated that he did not approve of comparing the struggle of the Germans with struggles of the “lesser races,” like Indians or Egyptians. Yet he repeatedly approved the comparison with Turkey and made such comparisons, and indeed glorifications, many times himself. So for him the Turks could not have been one of these “lesser races.” The question of how to racially classify the Turks acquired some urgency after the “Nuremberg Laws”—those infamous laws marginalizing and disenfranchising Jews in Germany—were promulgated in late 1935. A circular from April 30, 1936, in the name of the various relevant ministries as well as the NSDAP Office for Racial Policy announced their decision, which was summarized by headlines in the Turkish press two months later as: “The Turks Are Aryans!” The argument made in the circular is disturbingly similar to some arguments used in the EU-Turkey debate of the early years of the twenty-first century, some sixty-five years later, where one of the pro-Turkish arguments had been that Turkey was European because it had aspired for so long to be European. The circular at first stressed that the Nuremberg Laws were to be applied exclusively inside the Reich and as such had little application vis-à-vis other countries. However, then it emphasized that the relevant classifications in this context were “racially related” and in extension “European.” And Turkey was all that because it had for some time been continuously aspiring to be European—something that could not be said about Iran and Egypt, for example—and Germany was supporting Turkey’s European aspirations, the circular furthermore emphasized. Turkey was thus European, partly simply because it wanted to be Eu-
European, and this landed it in a quasi-synonymous category with “Aryan.” This applied mainly to nation and state as well as, in extension, to Turks from Turkey. Jews from Turkey, on the other hand, were Jews all the same for the Third Reich, as the document stressed. A press directive by the Propaganda Ministry two months after the circular, in June 1936, reminded the German press that the Hungarians, the Finns, and the Turks were considered “racially related.”

More importantly perhaps, in most of the printed discourse on Turkey, books, and newspaper articles, the Turks were perceived to have proven their racial worth in the past fifteen to twenty years through the Turkish War of Independence and the construction of the New Turkey. In fact, the “Europanness” of Turkey was not only stressed by various articles in the Nazi press, it was an integral part of the argument for the similarity of Germany and Turkey. Prompted by an article in the London Times, the Wirtschaftspolitischer Dienst in 1941 posed the question “Does Turkey Belong to Europe?” and answered it with a resounding “yes.” What becomes clear in many of the other articles in the Third Reich press is that for the Nazis “Europe” became synonymous with “their Europe” and their project; accordingly a pro-German Turkey was a European Turkey.

Another piece of evidence for the Nazis’ and especially Hitler’s admiration for Atatürk and the New Turkey comes from a sphere that also firmly connected the “New Turkey” and the “New Germany”: sculptures. In one paragraph of his memoirs, Hitler’s personal photographer and close friend, Heinrich Hoffmann, reported what Hitler thought about certain foreign statesmen: Hitler thought highly of Beck and Pilsudski, and obviously liked Mussolini, but also saw Mussolini’s flaws and had “lost all respect for him as a statesman from the moment he saw a photograph of Mussolini in bathing trunks.” Of the Balkan statesmen, or the “Balkan bandits” as Hitler apparently called them, he thought very little. But “Atatürk he admired greatly, and a bust of him by the famous sculptor, Professor Thorak, was one of his cherished possessions.” Hitler not only possessed a bust of Atatürk, but he “cherished” it and in this fashion continued to identify with Atatürk at least privately, but perhaps publicly as well.

Josef Thorak was a famous Nazi sculptor; together with Arno Breker he was responsible for the specific Nazi style of sculptures and
the Nazi body image. Thorak was another “German Turk,” having worked in Turkey in the 1930s time and again; already before World War I he had been to Constantinople as a “wandering apprentice.” In the 1930s he had made many monuments of central importance for the Turkish Republic, such as the Independence Monument in Eskişehir, an Atatürk sculpture at the Security Monument, and busts of Atatürk, İnönü, the minister of the interior and future prime minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu, and of the minister of the economy, Celal Bayar. Thorak had also won important prizes in Turkey. One of his busts adorned the cover of an official portrayal of “Kemalist Turkey,” published in French in 1939. The sculptures he produced in Germany included busts of Hitler, Mussolini, and other “great men,” but also sculptures of the “German worker,” the “German couple,” and so on.68

Besides the one owned by Hitler, Thorak produced a number of other Atatürk busts during the Third Reich (Fig. 3.5). It is difficult to establish just how many busts of Atatürk he made, and for whom. One of his Atatürk busts was included in the 1935 Exhibition of German Art in the House of German Art in Munich, and it appears that he made another one for the exhibition in 1937.69 One of these busts was placed in a room where sculptures of “typical” German men were displayed. This location at least implicitly suggests that Atatürk was viewed as a “typical man” of some kind, perhaps a “typical Führer.” Otherwise, Atatürk’s bust would have appeared lost among the huge sculptures of muscular men. In 1937 Hitler visited Thorak’s Munich workshop and took along with him Goebbels, the famous boxer Max Schmeling, and Heinrich Hoffmann. The pictures taken by Hoffmann document Adolf Hitler casually standing next to two different busts of Atatürk, chatting, or probably rather ranting on (Fig. 3.6). The German Führer next to the immortalized Turkish Führer—Hoffmann had made a whole series of such photos, eleven of which survived the war.70 The bust pictured here is much larger than the exhibition busts. Its final destination remains unknown.

Plastic art was an area that connected and affirmed the perceived similarity between the two movements. The Nazi press made use of Thorak’s fame in Germany to place Turkey in the same ideological sphere as the Third Reich by highlighting his monuments in Tur-
Hitler’s “Star in the Darkness”

His Atatürk busts were featured in newspaper articles and books on Atatürk (Fig. 3.7), as were pictures of his monuments in Turkey. A photo of a Thorak bust of Ismet İnönü was featured in the newspapers when the latter was made president of Turkey following Atatürk’s death in 1938. There were of course many other German artists and architects working in Turkey, but none was as important for the Third Reich as Thorak. The fascist sculpture style and personality cult united the two countries. It was no surprise that the New Turkey requested a German artist for the post of director of the Academy of Fine Arts in Istanbul in 1936. It is perhaps more surprising that the Third Reich tried to have Arno Breker, its most famous sculptor, installed as a lecturer there. Instead it would be Rudolf Belling. In 1942 a celebratory Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung structured an essay commemorating various anniversaries of the Turkish Republic around the fact that Belling was in charge of a new monument honoring Ismet İnönü.
Figure 3.6. Hitler at Thorak’s workshop. Hitler visiting Thorak’s Munich workshop with bust of Atatürk behind him, February 10, 1937 (on the left, Goebbels and Thorak; in the background, the sculpture “The Family,” later part of the German pavilion at the 1937 Paris World Exposition).

Photos by Heinrich Hoffmann; Hoffman Collection, Staatsbibliothek München
Figure 3.7. An Atatürk bust by Thorak on the cover of Hanns Froembgen’s Atatürk biography.

Hanns Froembgen, Kamal Atatürk: Soldat und Führer, 7th ed. (Stuttgart, 1935)
The New Turkey in the Nazi Press and Publications

Of much more central importance than busts or the seating order of diplomats, however, was the fact that the media and a host of other publications (Atatürk biographies, country studies, academic treatises, and so forth) continuously affirmed the special role of Atatürk and the New Turkey for the Third Reich and the Nazis. Atatürk featured prominently in books on contemporary Führers and the new world order. Here, time and again, Atatürk was put on equal footing with Hitler himself as well as with Mussolini. An article entitled “The Face of Modern Turkey” from late 1933 in the Hamburgischer Correspondent expressed how the New Turkey fit into the Nazi worldview, especially in the “takeoff” year of the Third Reich:

The path Turkey has traveled for the last ten years has been austere and difficult, full of opposition and sacrifice, but it is, following an expression of the Turkish Führer, better for a great people to die than to vegetate without honor. A piece of state philosophy that we Germans of today understand only too well; just as in general the face of modern Turkey, perhaps already with somewhat more striking features, bears a lot of resemblance to what Germany looks like in the present.76

Germany and Turkey were similar, but Turkey was still somewhat ahead on the path of völkisch rebirth—modern Turkey’s face had more striking features than Germany’s. There were still things to learn from Turkey. Following this logic—expressed in many articles—that now was the time to learn from the New Turkey and implement “Turkish lessons,” the press of the Third Reich was filled with articles on Atatürk and Turkey. In the period from 1933 to 1938, the Völkischer Beobachter, the flagship of the Nazi press, published hundreds of articles on Turkey. Especially the paper’s “picture reports” section continuously underlined the modernity of Atatürk’s state. The Völkischer Beobachter and its championing of the New Turkey as part of the new völkisch modernity had special significance. The press of the Third Reich was controlled, and public opinion was shaped, not only by the hosts of daily directives issued at the daily press confer-
ences chaired by representatives of Goebbels’s Ministry for Propaganda, but also through the discussions and the topics championed in the *Völkischer Beobachter*. The press was always expected to follow the trends and topic-setting of the *Völkischer Beobachter*. Propaganda is mainly effective in influencing *which topics* the consumers think about rather than *what to think* in relation to certain topics—the “gate-keeper effect.” The Nazis, and especially Goebbels and Hitler, were well aware of this and usually employed their propaganda instruments accordingly.77

Obviously, it was not only the quantity of coverage that underlined the special role of the New Turkey, but also the content of these articles. Except for small and short “newspapers wars” in 1938 and in 1940, which the Nazis mainly attributed to “Jewish” and “foreign” influence over the Turkish print media, coverage was overtly positive and constantly affirmative of Turkey as part of the modernity the Nazis aspired to and thought themselves to be part of.78 Topics of discussion that routinely made use of the Turkish example included the Führer and the Führer principle, Turkey’s overall character as a “modern state,” and how it dealt with the “minority questions.” Turkey was also used as an example of old and new revisionism. In some way or the other Turkey featured constantly in the print media of the Third Reich. Time and again the Nazi press affirmed that Atatürk’s revolution had been the national revolution and the role model for the Nazis and emphasized the similarity between Turkey and Germany.79 Press coverage of Turkey was so positive throughout that the German Ministry for Propaganda had a hard time tones it down whenever it wanted to “punish” Turkey for anti-German tendencies in the Turkish press.80 At one point, in June 1937, this led the representative of the Ministry for Propaganda at the daily press conference to exclaim that the coverage of Turkey was so positive that it was becoming “unbearable.”81 It thus appears that this Nazi admiration was not just part of a concerted propaganda effort, but was more widespread, something of a “grassroots” phenomenon. But we might also want to identify it as another instance of Germans over-zealously working toward the Führer, as Ian Kershaw called it.

In the summer of 1941, retired General of the Artillery Paul Hasse stressed Turkey’s role as a pioneer of the new order in a commentary
in the *Brüsseler Zeitung*, in German-occupied Belgium. Hasse stressed that “thanks to this great Führer,” meaning Atatürk, “Turkey was the first of the countries defeated in the World War that rose up out of its own strength and regained with its independence its national pride.” Almost every possible occasion was used by the German press to underline Turkey’s pioneering role, be it an interview with the Turkish ambassador in Goebbels’s *Angriff* or a Hungarian diplomatic visit to Ankara; even schoolbooks emphasized Turkey’s pioneering role. In early 1938 the *Völkischer Beobachter* summarized: “Since the days of the Lausanne Treaty, the German press has always acted as the spokesperson of the admiring sympathy with which the German nation has followed the great and bold ascent of Anatolia to new strength, might, and prominence. And Kemal Atatürk is in National Socialist Germany one of the most admired statesmen and national Führers of the present day.” Similar summaries were to be published time and again by the paper. In 1941 the *Völkischer Beobachter* wrote about the 1920s: “At a time when our country and our nation were being abused by domestic mercenaries of Judeo-democracy and maltreated by their foreign masters, we envied the Turkish nation its great Führer Atatürk.”

Little was known in Turkey about just how positively the country was viewed in the Third Reich when a debate erupted over a book in late 1933. The book in question was about the Third Reich and about to be published in Turkey. It was perceived to be too overtly pro-Nazi and too cheerful. The Turkish journalist Peyami Sefa asked in his article in the Turkish daily *Cumhuriyet* whether Hitler would ever allow a similar book that was full of overt praise for “the Turkish nation or race” to be published in Germany. He further asked whether Hitler and the Nazis, these “self-styled enemies of all other peoples in the world,” could ever admire another people at all. Little did Peyami Sefa know of Hitler’s sentiments about the Turks. Nazi fandom of Turkey, it appears, was mainly meant for German consumption and did not really reach Turkey. Peyami Sefa could hardly have expected what happened next. Only a couple of days later the *Cumhuriyet* was able to print answers to his questions from an unlikely respondent—Hitler himself. Hitler had transmitted his answers via the German chargé d’affaires in Istanbul to the paper. He answered
that among the books and press articles published in Germany in the last couple of years on Turkey one could find quite a few appreciating and praising the völkisch achievements of Turkey. Especially the various German publications surrounding the tenth anniversary of the Republic were proof of that and were in fact representative of the Nazi view on the subject. And when asked whether he would approve of books full of praise for Turkey, his answer would be a resounding “yes”! Hitler further stated that he had followed the epic struggle of the Turkish nation for many years, and that the genius and energy of Mustafa Kemal had guided him in the years when the NSDAP was in opposition.86

Thus, not only did Hitler yet again reaffirm Atatürk’s role for him, he also affirmed what he thought the image of Turkey in the German press had been in the recent past, was in the present, and what it should be in the future. He did not have to lie about either of them. Neither did Wilhelm Weiß, the president of the Third Reich organization that represented the entire German press, have to lie when he spoke to a Turkish press delegation in 1935 and stressed just how closely Germany had followed the struggle for Turkish independence over a decade earlier.87 After all, it had been Weiß himself, as editor of the Heimatland, who had covered Turkey so extensively and who had aggressively championed Turkish lessons and solutions for Germany. Under his editorship the paper had published Hans Tröbst’s extensive series on Mustafa Kemal in 1923 and the “Give Us an Ankara Government!” article right before the Hitler Putsch.

The various discursive contents of the Nazi vision of the New Turkey and of Atatürk will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, but one aspect of media coverage amounted to much more than its constituent discursive parts taken together, and constituted a final grand Nazi homage to Atatürk: the Nazi media event surrounding his death in November 1938. Atatürk’s health had been deteriorating since the spring of 1938—no surprise to Goebbels, who remarked that Atatürk “had burned the candle at both ends.” Goebbels regularly recorded the current state of Atatürk’s health in his diary, “whose death,” he felt, “would be an irreplaceable loss.” The importance Goebbels attached to the topic of Atatürk’s health can be seen in the immediate context of such diary remarks. His entry on October 21 on Atatürk’s
health directly followed a paragraph on Hitler and Czechoslovakia. This was only three weeks after the Munich Agreement and the very same day Hitler gave the order to prepare for the final “breakup” of Czechoslovakia—and Goebbels was musing about Atatürk’s health. In late October 1938, Goebbels was still full of hope: “Atatürk’s sickness is very serious. But his bear’s nature helps him to fight off an early end at this point.” Goebbels’s optimism yielded to resignation a couple of days later: “Atatürk’s illness is not curable. . . . The end will come soon.”

The German press also displayed a heightened interest in Atatürk’s health. The Völkischer Beobachter, for example, repeatedly ran reports on it, keeping the German public up to date on the latest developments. In fact, the German press displayed so much interest in Atatürk’s health that the Ministry for Propaganda had to ask for caution in a press directive. It feared that reports on Atatürk’s health might be part of a Turkish propaganda campaign. On the day before his death was announced, many papers again ran updates on his health and some even included pictures of him.

On November 11, 1938, Goebbels wrote in his diary: “Kemal Atatürk has died. A great man has passed.” These very words were echoed four months later, in April 1939, when Goebbels was passing by Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul, he was to recollect: “Here Atatürk died. He was a great man.” The official press directive for the day after Atatürk had died was very unspecific: “The death of Atatürk can be reported on [in a] good and extensive [fashion].” While this was not an instruction that the papers had to report on it, the response to Atatürk’s death by the German press was quite overwhelming: As far as I can tell, all the dailies, from national to provincial papers, carried a mix of announcements and essays on Atatürk, his life, his successor Ismet İnönü, and the New Turkey—and most did so for many days in a row. Atatürk’s death turned into a major Nazi media event.

Atatürk died on November 10, and many evening editions that night reported his death, prominently, in most papers dominating the front page. The fact that Atatürk’s death was turned into a media event was also quite remarkable because this was anything but a “slow news day” for the Nazis. November 10, 1938, was the day after the “Night of Broken Glass” (also known as Reichskristallnacht).
The German papers were engaged in a serious propaganda battle against “the Jews,” and at the same time were trying to downplay the brutality of the pogroms of the night before and to seize the moment to prepare the ground for further anti-Jewish measures. In short, the scarce space that a front page provided was needed to “spin” the events and, one would think, was not available for foreign topics such as Atatürk’s death. The front page of the evening edition of the Wiener Neueste Nachrichten illustrates this perfectly—here the “Reichskristallnacht” spin and Atatürk’s death compete for domination over page 1. But Atatürk was no marginal figure in the Third Reich, and most other front pages in those days were clearly dominated by Atatürk’s death (Figs. 3.8 and 3.9), many already on November 10. Furthermore, and despite a press directive asking for front-page coverage on the fifteenth anniversary of the Hitler Putsch (November 9), in most papers, Atatürk pushed pictures and headlines about this crucial part of Nazi history off the front page to page 2 or 3 (on November 10 and 11). All of this occurred less than two weeks after all major papers had featured reports and essays celebrating the fifteenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic. Some papers, like the Berliner Tageblatt, had at that time already featured two essays on the New Turkey and Atatürk. With Atatürk’s health issues, the return of the Sanjak of Alexandrette to Turkey, the remilitarization of the Straits, and the fifteenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic, 1938 had been a particularly busy media year in relation to Turkey. In addition, the Völkischer Beobachter had featured a series of lengthy travel impressions from the New Turkey throughout the year.

The press directive was rather vague on how to report on Atatürk’s death—it only opened the gates. But the other medium of press alignment and control, the Völkischer Beobachter, put out quite an extensive line to follow. It published no fewer than twenty reports and essays, spanning a period of fifteen days, from the first announcement of Atatürk’s death until his coffin arrived in Ankara and his body was finally laid to rest. This “news cycle” on Atatürk’s death in the Völkischer Beobachter included, in addition to shorter articles, twenty-one pictures, three essays, and a long article on Atatürk’s successor, İnönü. So extensive was the coverage in “Hitler’s voice” that Atatürk
Figure 3.8. Atatürk’s death dominating the front page of the National Zeitung on November 11, 1938.
Figure 3.9. Ataturk’s death dominating the front page of the *Germania* on November 11, 1938.
was, in a way, “buried twice”—or so the headlines read (on November 22 and 26). The first report on the funeral had not featured pictures. Four days later another report was printed, now with large pictures. The featured essays were on Atatürk himself, his legacy, and the military collapse of the “Old Turkey” in 1918.

Even though the press of the Third Reich was expected to follow the example of the Völkischer Beobachter, and while all the papers extensively covered Atatürk’s death, they all employed their very own approaches to the topic. Papers differed considerably in the wording, themes, and pictures they used. The Berliner Tageblatt, for example, featured ten articles with no pictures and ended its series with a short report on the departure of the German delegation from Ankara on November 25. One article focused solely on explaining the multitude of names Atatürk had carried over the years (Mustafa, Kemal, Pasha, Ghazi, Atatürk). The Wiener Neueste Nachrichten, which had already reported Atatürk’s death on November 10, featured either a report, a picture, or an essay on each of the first four pages of the November 11 issue. The Neugkeiten-Welt-Blatt chose to print two obituaries, one on November 11, another on November 12, both retelling his life story. The most extensive “coverage package” was that of the Wiener Zeitung, a state-owned and thus official Third Reich paper. This package also illustrated the potential depth and breadth of this news cycle. The Wiener Zeitung featured one essay on Atatürk, one on İnönü, and one on Atatürk’s “achievements”; reports on Hitler’s and Ribbentrop’s condolences; several reports on the mourning in Turkey, the sympathy of the world for the Turks, Hitler’s congratulations to İnönü, the continuity of policies under the new leader, Atatürk’s last voyage from Istanbul to Ankara, the deaths due to a stampede at a mourning event, and the German delegation for the burial; and a very long report on the burial itself as well as the opening of Atatürk’s last will—who fewer than twenty-four articles and reports. By highlighting the alleged importance of the German delegation in Atatürk’s burial—the prominent roles of the crew of the German ship Emden and the German representatives in their SS uniforms—and such facts as that an additional wreath adorned with swastikas was laid down at the central monument to Atatürk in Ankara and that his casket had been shipped on the for-
mer German Panzerkreuzer Goeben, the Wiener Zeitung conveyed the impression that this burial, even if it was taking place in far-away Ankara, was very much a German affair.  

Most papers printed not only a report on Hitler’s condolences, but reprinted the entire text of his, Ribbentrop’s, and von Papen’s telegrams. Hitler’s telegram spoke of “his and the German people’s painful sympathy” regarding Atatürk’s passing and called Atatürk “a great soldier, a genius of a statesman, and a historical personality.” Furthermore, most papers also featured Hitler’s “star in the darkness” quote. The press directive following Atatürk’s death reminded the press of the 1933 Milliyet interview and told the press that they should refer to it. All the German papers, national and provincial, pointed out that flags were to fly at half-mast for this and the following day at the Präsidialkanzlei of the Führer, the Reich Chancellery, the German Foreign Ministry, and the Reichstag. Atatürk’s death spurred a whole array of Nazi diplomatic activity. There were the flags at half-mast, Hitler’s telegram, and another telegram by Ribbentrop to his Turkish colleague. The head of the Office of the President and Führer, Otto Meißner, was sent to the Turkish ambassador to express Hitler’s condolences, as was a delegation from the Foreign Office, because Ribbentrop was abroad. All these activities were topped off by yet another telegram from Hitler, now to İnönü, congratulating him on being appointed president. Contrast the response to Atatürk’s death in Fascist Italy: Mussolini had also sent a condolence telegram to Turkey, but he chose not to have it reprinted in his flagship paper Il Popolo d’Italia. The paper, however, did reprint Hitler’s condolence telegram, making the absence of a letter from Mussolini even more conspicuous. 

None of the other German papers followed the example of the Völkischer Beobachter to include an essay on the “end of the second Reich,” meaning the Ottoman Empire in 1918, but all of them ran essays on Atatürk’s life. The generally very long obituary essays as well as the articles on Atatürk, İnönü, and modern Turkey—most papers carried one of each—varied extensively from paper to paper. It is even difficult to recognize a clear line such as the Ministry of Propaganda would have given out in such cases of concerted media coverage. Furthermore, a whole range of guest authors were invited
to write obituaries for Atatürk, including authors of books on Atatürk and the New Turkey.\textsuperscript{114} But the very fact that the German papers—ranging from tabloids like the \textit{Neuigkeits-Welt-Blatt} to the more essayistic \textit{Nationalsozialistische Landpost}—all ran their own texts, that all covered the topic so extensively, and that no obvious common structure was followed suggests that Atatürk’s biography had been fully appropriated and was a common staple in the Third Reich.\textsuperscript{115} This is not very surprising, given that the German media had followed Atatürk’s life so closely for twenty years. Still, the diversity of themes and topics in these various essays is surprising. The obituary in the \textit{Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung}, for example, focused on the growing solitude of the Turkish Führer in the last years—something rarely stressed in biographical texts at this time.\textsuperscript{116} The \textit{Hamburger Nachrichten} featured a historical narrative, “How Kemal Atatürk Began His Struggle for Freedom,” that focused solely on the events of July 8 and 9, 1919.\textsuperscript{117} Some concentrated on the heroics of overcoming a Paris peace treaty, others stressed the separation of church and state, while yet others focused on the Führer principle, Atatürk’s foreign policy, or Turkish reconstruction. All reaffirmed Atatürk’s place in the pantheon of history and Turkey’s place in the Nazis’ contemporary modernity. The minimum appellation for Atatürk, it appears, was “one of the most important leaders of the postwar era.”\textsuperscript{118} At the other end of the spectrum there was no limit. Furthermore, there must have also been extensive coverage in the \textit{Wochenschau}, the weekly newsreel in the cinemas. This was a memorable “film event” even for a ten-year-old boy at the time—as Cornelius Bischoff, who later emigrated with his family to Turkey, related in an interview many decades afterward.\textsuperscript{119}

Conclusion

Hitler and the Nazis had not forgotten the model role Atatürk and the New Turkey had played for them in the \textit{Kampfzeit}. Hitler’s affirmations of this—the “star in the darkness” quote and the 1941 quote designating Turkey as a role model—became the official line on Turkey. Hitler had also professed to being Atatürk’s student. However, the pivotal role of Atatürk for Hitler was affirmed not only by the
Third Reich. In 1936 *Life* magazine, in the United States, printed a “picture biography” of Hitler. The text below picture no. 15 (of 20), regarding the Hitler Trial, read: “Brought to trial for treason before a Munich court . . . he compared himself to Bismarck, Mussolini and Atatürk. He was sentenced to five years at Landsberg fortress.” Then a couple of days after the Munich Agreement, on October 3, 1938, *Life* ran a “maps report” on the redrawing of Europe’s borders, prominently mentioning Atatürk’s revision of the Treaty of Sèvres before summarizing the German efforts aimed at changing borders.

Atatürk and the New Turkey were constant reference points for the Nazis as part of their own biography, as an example of the perfect Führer story, and as examples of völkisch “good practice” in a variety of aspects—so great a variety that it can be assumed that there was a genuine admiration and a genuine belief that Turkey was “one of us.” When, for example, von Papen was sent to Turkey as ambassador in 1939, the *Völkischer Beobachter* wrote that his transfer “underlines the value the Führer assigns to the continued friendly relations between the young Reich and the young Turkey.” “Young” was set in bold in both cases, underlining the ideological similarity of the two states and their ideologies. Turkey’s role as a model and a forerunner was expressed in a variety of spheres and—in relation to the pre-1924 period—reaffirmed time and again. This “role-model” quality included a variety of subthemes or discursive building blocks, yet the most important one was that the New Turkey and Atatürk had begun traveling down a path that Italy and Germany were to follow later—and that it had overcome a Paris peace treaty. For the Nazis, Turkey was the first to have founded a truly modern, völkisch state and to have implemented the Führer idea in a modern context. These various themes will be discussed in the following chapters. It must be stressed that the overall admiration and constant affirmation of the Turkish role model for the Nazis was part of the public sphere of the Third Reich. It was also something that cannot be explained by propaganda or foreign policy considerations. What has been documented in this chapter can be explained only by a genuine ideological admiration for Atatürk and the New Turkey and for the role both had played in Nazism’s biography as it was expressed in these various statements and manifestations.
Nazi publications also stressed time and again that there was broad sympathy in Germany for the Turkish nation, because Germans admired its rebirth under Atatürk. “Thousands of feverish hearts” in Germany had followed the Turkish miracle, and nowhere in the world had the “apparition of Atatürk” generated as much admiration as in Germany, the *National Zeitung* commented in 1941. The press also constantly reaffirmed that Germany had indeed been an eyewitness to Atatürk’s “wonderful uprising,” and that “nobody better than Germany” and the National Socialists could understand what had been achieved in Turkey. In the entire world, the *Völkischer Beobachter* stressed, it was especially the German National Socialists “who looked with respect and admiration” upon Atatürk’s achievements. Or as Rudolf Nadolny, the German ambassador to Turkey, was quoted as saying in the *Völkischer Beobachter* in 1933, “it was self-evident that it was precisely the German nation, which felt such undivided sympathy and innermost empathy for this phenomenal success of a heroic will of a Führer.”

Atatürk’s death was yet another instance when the Third Reich reaffirmed and reformulated the role-model character of Atatürk and the New Turkey. It was a major media event and a final Nazi homage to the Turkish Führer. The *Wiener Zeitung*, in its third article on Atatürk in a matter of days also reaffirmed that nobody in the world understood Atatürk’s achievements better than the Germans. It concluded: “The German nation sees in the immortalized creator of modern Turkey one of these great personalities, whose historical deed will be a lasting role model and at the same time a warning to all freedom loving peoples.” Atatürk as a “role model and a warning” was also the central tenet of almost all the biographical texts on Atatürk in the Third Reich as we will see in the following chapter. The Nazi cult around Atatürk and the New Turkey reaffirmed the Nazis’ own biography; it underlined where they were coming from. Yet, the ideological building blocks of this cult offered a variety of propagandistic and political tools that emphasized where they wanted to go.
In December 1938 the Hamburger Tageblatt published an essay entitled “Führer and Nation.” The author developed ideas about the perfect Führer and the way he should govern, and about the nation. He then also shared some of his personal insights: “He who thinks more about himself than about the welfare of his country and his nation,” the author wrote, “is only a second-class human being. . . . Only he who works for the future without regard to himself or those around him, can lay the broad foundations for the future happiness and progress of his nation.” While all this was well in line with Nazi ideas about leadership and the nation, the author went on to discuss how the Führer needed to be very circumspect. And in more than half of the essay he emphasized that the Führer needed to further peace in the world for the sake of his own nation’s welfare. Here the author had deviated from Nazi ideas about the Führer principle and foreign politics. Strangely enough, the author was now also way off track about himself, or rather about how the Nazis viewed and portrayed him: for the author was none other than the very recently deceased Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself.¹

Atatürk did not really need to author an article to make his contribution to the Führer idea in Germany. For the past twenty years his life story had frequently, continuously, and very extensively served
German authors, journalists, and politicians as a case study in Führer politics. However, this essay was part of his political testament and of special importance for Germany. In a way its message was a corrective to the Führer cult that had been created around his person in Germany. It is no surprise that the German press, who otherwise jumped at everything Turkish and everything related to Atatürk, largely chose to ignore this essay; apparently only the *Ham-burger Tageblatt* featured it. Given the way the Turkish Führer was otherwise interpreted in the Third Reich, printing Atatürk’s essay was virtually tantamount to an act of open resistance to Hitler.

Atatürk and his New Turkey were understood not only as “one of us” in the Third Reich, but also as forerunners of the new kind of völkisch modernity. Atatürk, this “Turkish Caesar,” this “volcanic” personality, was integral to the Nazi perception of the New Turkey and to the two-part miracle that had unfolded before a transfixed German gaze: first, the Turkish War of Independence, and then the continuous rise of the new, modern, and völkisch Turkey. Atatürk’s biography was used to narrate and explain both miracles; it was the prime prism through which the Nazis and the Third Reich perceived the New Turkey. And it was not a marginal story in the Third Reich; quite the opposite. Thousands of articles and dozens of books, including schoolbooks, admiringly told his story—it continued to exert a tight grip over the German imagination. Rosenberg’s special envoy Daitz had emphasized this in his speech at the tenth-anniversary celebrations: “The vigor with which Turkey has freed itself of its shackles, her struggles, her revolution and [all] her remarkable endeavors together constitute one exceptional deed, which will not be without repercussions for the progress of world history and for the thoughts of mankind. The Turkish revolution is a world-historical example for the racial worth of a people.” And the Third Reich made much use of this “world-historical example.” Atatürk’s story was the perfect Führer story for Third Reich authors. Hitler had repeatedly stressed that he was Atatürk’s student in one way or the other. With the excessive and repeated retelling of Atatürk’s story in the Third Reich, it was now the Germans who were supposed to learn what it meant to follow a Führer, through the Turkish example.
The Perfect Führer—The National Socialist Hagiography of Atatürk

The Turkish War of Independence, the first of the two miracles, was already ten years in the past at the beginning of the Third Reich, or as von Papen put it, it had “already entered the book of history.” Similarly, the struggle over the meaning of Atatürk’s biography had already been fought out long before the Nazis came into power. During the Turkish War of Independence opposing political sides had interpreted Atatürk’s role quite differently. For those like Friedrich Hussong, “Goebbels’s teacher,” Atatürk represented the proof that history was made by great men. Neither “the masses” nor democracy offered a way to greatness, only a Führer. Others—democrats, one is tempted to oversimplify—stressed that the overall circumstances, and not merely this leader figure, had made the Turkish success possible. For völkisch nationalists and those of antidemocratic convictions in general, Hussong’s interpretation was to be the significant one. Time and again in interwar Germany, Atatürk’s story was used to prove that individuals, not the masses, “made history.” Coincidentally, or perhaps not, in 1943, almost exactly twenty-one years after Hussong’s article was published in the Berliner Lokalanzeiger, another lengthy article in the same paper made the same case: “Men make history” and Atatürk and the New Turkey had proved this.

This early struggle over meaning, the resulting clear opposing lines, as well as the fact that the German nationalist press had begun to canonize Atatürk and his accomplishments as early as 1919, all resulted in a remarkably uniform discourse about Atatürk’s biography in interwar Germany. Those opposed to Hussong’s way of reading Atatürk in general simply stopped focusing on the person Atatürk and did not significantly contribute to this discourse. All the other biographical texts, however, whether written during the Weimar years or the Third Reich, were surprisingly similar. But the Nazis not only continued this German right and far-right tradition of interpreting Atatürk’s biography; they truly made it their own. One of the authors of an Atatürk biography published in the Third Reich, Fritz Rößler, stressed that the rulers of the Weimar Republic, who
had been followers of “enslavement politics,” “enemies of the Führer idea,” and “followers of a shady concept of democracy,” had felt repulsed by a figure like Atatürk. He had no place in their worldview. Mustafa Kemal, Rössler claimed, was the antithesis of the mass concept of the state favored by the Weimar elites, because he was one of the few men “who rise above the masses and make world history.”

With its successful overcoming of a dictated peace, revolutionary Turkey had changed the world. Therefore, its system and its progress deserved a great deal of special attention, commented the Kreuzzeitung in 1937. That Turkey was the role model for national revolution, not least because it had been the first of these “new revolutions,” was stressed time and again in these texts.

Germany, and particularly the right and far right, had already paid a lot of special attention to Atatürk’s biography, not only in the years of the media hype between 1919 and 1923, but afterward as well. In 1924 the first German-language history of the Turkish War of Independence and the New Turkey was published in Germany: Klinghardt’s Ankara and Constantinople. In 1925 Hans Tröbst, the Kemalist mercenary turned Nazi, published his memoirs, Soldiers’ Blood: From the Baltics to Kemal Pasha. He had aspired to emulate the success of Ernst Jünger’s World War I memoir, In Stahlgewittern, and had been in correspondence with Jünger in order to get advice from his literary hero. Nonetheless, Tröbst’s book flopped. This did not mean, though, that there was no market for books on Turkey. Countless memoirs and books on the World War in the Ottoman Empire were published as well as Atatürk’s monumental 36-hour speech (the Nutuk) from 1927. The Nutuk summarized Atatürk’s interpretation of the Turkish War of Independence and of the New Turkey and laid the foundations of many key Turkish historiographic tenets. The immediate reception of this famous speech in Germany cannot be reconstructed here, but newspapers in the Third Reich assumed that readers knew about Atatürk’s Nutuk without the paper having to explain it to them. The speech was first published in German in 1928 by the Koehler publishing house in Leipzig, which had also published Tröbst’s book, and was then published in English and French, also by Koehler. In some respects interwar Germany remained the European PR agency for the Kemalists it had already
become during the Turkish War of Independence. It was Atatürk’s life in particular that fascinated Germany, as evidenced by the fact that no fewer than four Atatürk biographies were published in interwar Germany. One of them was produced by an employee of Goebbels’s Ministry of Propaganda (Herbert Melzig), another was published in the prestigious series “Men and Powers” (Männer und Mächte, Fritz Rössler), which was mainly dedicated to glorifying the various key “players” of the Third Reich and which included, among other things, the authoritative Hitler biography by Johann von Leers, as well as biographies and studies on Goebbels, the NSDAP, the Wehrmacht, and Mussolini.\(^1\) In addition, a number of country studies, with titles such as “The New Turkey,” were published. Again, these mainly focused on Atatürk’s life, following the inherent logic of leader-led history and national destiny. And these books seem to have been successful as well. Dagobert von Mikusch’s Atatürk biography, first published in 1929, was republished during the Third Reich and reached its tenth edition in 1935.\(^{18}\) Hanns Froembgen’s Atatürk biography—a “truly folksy book!” exclaimed the blurb from the Kölnische Zeitung on the dust jacket—went to seven editions in the first year of publication (1935).\(^{19}\) Nowhere in the world, except for Turkey itself, were as many books on Atatürk and the New Turkey published as in interwar Germany. A review of Mikusch’s biography in 1929 in the Deutsche Tageszeitung even claimed that this was the very first Atatürk biography ever written.\(^{20}\)

Atatürk’s biography was thus no marginal story in interwar Germany. It was not only part of a media frenzy surrounding the Turkish War of Independence, but was to remain important throughout the whole interwar period. Given the media attention surrounding his death in 1938, it is safe to assume that thousands of biographical essays on Atatürk were published in the German press in the interwar period. As the obituary in the Hamburger Nachrichten stressed, Atatürk’s “paramount personality as military leader, statesman and diplomat” had received the most terrific recognition in Germany in the past years.\(^{21}\) And as we saw in Chapter 3, all of the papers were able to effortlessly produce one or more essays on Atatürk and the New Turkey when Atatürk died in 1938. When Melzig’s Atatürk biography was published in 1937, the review in the Frankfurter Zeitung
was lukewarm. The reviewer was disappointed not to have learned more new things about Atatürk: Atatürk’s story was “all too well known” already in Germany, he stressed, as his story “had been told many times in the past years.”

What is striking is that the features of the German interpretations of Atatürk’s story were always more or less the same—in newspaper articles, academic essays, populist forms like biography, school textbooks, speeches, and interviews. Not only were the Atatürk biographies and country studies in line with what had been written in the nationalist press about Atatürk and the New Turkey, many newspapers also used their book reviews on these biographies to tell the story of Atatürk at length again, invited the authors of Atatürk biographies to write obituaries for Atatürk, or used lengthy quotes from these books to introduce essays on Turkey. Like other collected volumes, the book *Heads of World Politics* (*Köpfe der Weltpolitik*, 1934) made it clear in its introduction that of all the leaders discussed, only Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had a place next to Hitler and Mussolini in the pantheon of the new order. A shortened version of the book’s chapter on Atatürk was also published as a newspaper article in the *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten*. Furthermore, these various Third Reich narratives of Atatürk’s life equally conformed to Hitler’s own interpretation of Atatürk, and vice versa—as evidenced by his early speeches in Munich beer cellars all the way up to the “table talks” at his headquarters during World War II. When it came to discourses about Turkey, little “Gleichschaltung” (forced coordination) was necessary in the Third Reich.

We know little about what kind of effect Atatürk’s life story had on the readers. However there was one reader of a Third Reich Atatürk biography who did leave us some of his impressions. This reader noted in his diary in June 1937: “In the afternoon work. . . . Studied mainly documents. Continued to read about Kemal Pasha’s adventurous life.” And one week later: “A nice flight. While traveling I finished reading the book on Atatürk. A proud hero’s life. Totally admirable. I am happy!” This happy reader, probably of Melzig’s Atatürk biography, was none other than Joseph Goebbels.

It is not surprising that Goebbels would be excited reading one of the German Atatürk biographies; these were truly epic stories cen-
tered on a strong Führer figure. And not by coincidence, the language of these texts often mirrored the language used in Weimar Germany to describe the experience of the Western front. Froembergen, for example, described a battle scene at Gallipoli in a fashion very reminiscent of Jünger’s *In Stahlgewittern*: “A hurricane of iron blew over the fort. A tremendous mass grave. The earth opens and swallows up everything.” War was not only central to the internal logic of the Turkish Führer story, but the Turkish War of Independence was perceived as an event of epic proportions, a “titanic struggle.” “One of the greatest struggles for freedom in world history,” “one of the most glorious victories known to world history,” and again: “one of the most important historical events of our times,” as various Third Reich authors put it. And whenever possible, the Third Reich press told the story of this epic war again and again. These texts contained all the narrative features and techniques needed for an epic and utterly fascinating story. As in the press of the early Weimar Republic, here too the situation of the Ottoman Empire was depicted as totally desolate at the end of World War I. Atatürk, while always presented as the born leader, was depicted as having to make the transition “from unknown soldier to statesman”—the same way Hitler’s career was frequently stylized. It was, again, the epic story of the Turkish underdog, fighting and winning against all odds, but now even more focused on Atatürk than in the early 1920s. After all, “men like him,” as the *Vorarlberger Tagblatt* put it, “every century brings forth only in small numbers. Even smaller is the number of those who succeed.”

All the Third Reich texts tended to call Atatürk simply “the Turkish Führer,” “the great Führer,” or most of the time just “the Führer,” as had been done so often already in the early 1920s. When he died in 1938, Atatürk was frequently lauded as “one of the greatest Führer figures of the postwar years,” to be remembered forever—the “eternal Führer.” Or in retrospect in 1943: “There can be no doubt that Atatürk was such a personality, such a Führer nature of historic proportions, the likes of which are rarely bestowed upon a nation by fate.” More importantly, albeit perhaps obviously: all these texts subscribed to the Führer idea itself; it was one man who liberated Turkey and created the Turkish nation, indeed nation and man
had become synonymous: “His personality embodied the New Turkey.” As the review of Melzig’s Atatürk biography in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* stressed in its first paragraph, the story of Atatürk illustrated that in those difficult times, when humanity had to be saved from incalculable catastrophes, the leadership of nations passed into the hands of outstanding Führer personalities. And, as the same paper claimed after Atatürk died, his career had not been stained by even one mistake. For these Third Reich authors, apparently, he was the perfect Führer, and accordingly the characterization as a “genius” was a regular staple of German texts on Atatürk. There was no limit to the Nazi adulation of this Turkish Führer. Ambassador Nadolny was quoted in the *Völkischer Beobachter* talking about the wise leadership of Atatürk, who had “truly performed wonders.” What is remarkable is that the German Atatürk cult was in many ways in line with what was practiced in the Turkish Republic at that time. In his study on Atatürk, Şükrü M. Hanioğlu lists a number of terms used to glorify Atatürk in the 1920s and 1930s, such as “grand,” “genius,” “savior,” “deliverer,” and “creator.” German texts about Atatürk from the same period used the very same vocabulary. And, of course, Nazi texts also used the same language to glorify Hitler.

Typically in these texts, Atatürk was “the Führer” long before he had anybody to lead; fate, destiny, or even God/the gods had chosen him: a leader by birth and by birthright. One biographer, for example, wrote: “With such eyes, one is born for something greater. . . . He was a born master.” Others claimed that even at a young age Atatürk could feel the spirit of the “grey wolf” (the national/mystical animal of the Turks), of eternal Turkendom, of his blood awakening within himself. He was “inspired” by the “difference in blood,” which he could feel vis-à-vis the “lesser races” (referring to the Greeks, Armenians, and Levantines) who were controlling the Ottoman Empire. Others called him “an Anatolian by blood. That is a core Turk” (*Kerntürke*). The fact that Atatürk was a boy with blue eyes and blond hair made just all too good sense to all the authors: He must be Aryan really, they claimed—and so did Hitler, apparently. These alleged Aryan roots, in the typical circular argument of the time, were reflected in his actions and in turn made them possible in the first place. But also besides the purely “Aryan” features, his overall phys-
The “Turkish Führer”

ical appearance underlined his Führer status: “His soldier’s face, like it was cast in bronze. . . . The steel-colored brightness of [his] eyes shines out of the warrior-like, sunburned brown of [his] face with an uncanny, captivating power. Eyes, within which the supple power and the ruthless will of self-assertion of the Turanian grey wolf twinkles.”

Be it Aryan, Turanian, or even Mongolian, or, again perhaps obviously, Prussian—when, in the narratives, Atatürk meets the Kaiser, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff in 1917—what his appearance and actions reaffirmed was the awakening and the “triumph of race.” Schopen concluded:

He is nothing less than the incarnation of all warrior-like nations. The Turk is, in his moral qualities, one of the best soldiers of the world. For him the victorious military Führer stands above everything else. And Mustafa Kemal, mathematician and carrier of soldier blood from his father’s line, was a genius of the strategic idea.

For most of these texts, Atatürk was the ultimate warrior—“battle was his nature.” Froembgen described him as “a thunderstorm turned man.” Melzig said in his Atatürk biography: “In him a heroic spirit rose to the light from the depth of thousands of years.” Froembgen also stressed, “He is a soldier the like of which seldom comes along.” Atatürk’s prowess in battle was stressed time and again: “The soldiers hesitated to throw themselves into the rain of death. Mustafa Kemal knows, here no order will be enough, here one needs to be a role model, to be a Führer.” The Führer as a role model for everybody—in battle, for the Turkish farmer with his model farm, but also for the ordinary Turk, when it comes to demeanor, dress, and indeed everything—was a constant theme of these texts.

Descriptions of Atatürk’s aura elevated him to messianistic levels. With his deeds at Gallipoli during World War I, Atatürk emerges in these narratives not only as the imminent savior of Constantinople but as a transcendental “savior.” Indeed, the formula “savior and Führer” was frequently put forward by some texts. Some stressed that one could feel a special aura, “a magic circle,” in his presence—he was “the chosen one.” Others drew parallels to Jesus. When Froembgen’s
narrative reached the monumental battle at the Sakarya River—perhaps the most critical moment in the War of Independence—Mustafa Kemal was “surrounded by hired assassins, by spies and traitors who want to gain the Judas-pay.”\textsuperscript{54} Many of the figures of speech suggest a godlike Atatürk walking among mortal men. After the final victory a scene was painted in Froembgen’s book in which crowds of wounded men surround Atatürk, hoping to catch his gaze, perhaps even to kiss his hand. They kept shouting, “A thousand years for the Ghazi! The savior, the messenger of God! Life for the liberator!”\textsuperscript{55} This messianic aura was in turn often complemented with myths of his invincibility in battle. He was hit by a bullet in World War I, but was not even wounded thanks to his pocket watch. He emerged equally unharmed by his various daring feats, as when he stormed ahead of his troops toward enemy lines. Not even a broken rib could prevent him from winning an important battle of the War of Independence. These “proofs” of invincibility had been highlighted since early Weimar times, prominently so in Friedrich Huxley’s 1922 essay “Man and Masses.”\textsuperscript{56} They became important narrative ingredients of these stories, which attempted to show that a true Führer is bestowed upon to a deserving nation by a higher power.

The “true Führer” embodied the nation, knew what to do and what the nation wants before it knew it itself—a formula the German papers were all too happy to attribute to the Turkish Führer himself.\textsuperscript{57} As the obituary in the \textit{Völkischer Beobachter} put it: “Atatürk is one of these men of action, who have in these fateful hours of the nation exercised the inherited order to act and who by doing so became executors of the will, the destiny and the fate of their nations.”\textsuperscript{58} Through such themes, Hitler and Atatürk were linked not only as modern Führers but also by similar biographies. Having the vision and the will to carry it out brought Atatürk into opposition with established power; Atatürk became a “rebel of honor,” as he was frequently called.\textsuperscript{59} This term closely reflected Hitler’s own idea about himself, his own putsch of 1923, and Atatürk. Similarly, some texts stressed that what Atatürk—as the only true nationalist in the late Ottoman Empire and in the immediate postwar period—wanted for the nation was perceived as “high treason” by the governing elites. Again a parallel to Hitler and his failed 1923 coup d’état in Munich. It was Atatürk “alone
who did not give up hope.” Or as the National Zeitung put it: “Only one remained upright in these difficult days: Mustafa Kemal.”

There was a great variety of actual, coincidental, and manufactured parallels between Atatürk’s biography and Hitler in these texts. It was repeatedly emphasized that both came from the periphery of the nation—Atatürk was, among other things, called a “son of the borderland” (Grenzlandsohn)—and, more importantly, from humble backgrounds, both were sons of customs officials. Yet much more important in linking Germany and Turkey, the far right and the Nazis with Turkey, as well as the two Führers, was war experience and the soldierly spirit. In this new age of new leaders there was a community of those who started out as “common soldiers” and ended up leading their nations—the “aristocracy of the trenches” (trincerocrazia/l’aristocrazia della trincea) as Mussolini had called it in 1917. The book Heads of World Politics began its overall narrative by identifying this community and by stressing that Hitler, Mussolini, and Atatürk, as well as Pilsudski and Reza Shah Pahlavi, all had in common “that they all have traveled the path . . . from unknown soldier to revolutionary and finally to Führer of their nations.” “From soldier to statesman” was a powerful motif, used time and again to explain and describe Atatürk, as in the title of Froembgen’s biography, Kemal Atatürk: Soldier and Führer. This motif established Atatürk as being parallel to Hitler and connected him with the experience of the whole Frontkämpfer (World War I veteran) generation. The fact that Atatürk—the “hero of Anafarta,” as Hindenburg was frequently quoted calling him at their meeting in 1917—was already far from “unknown” during World War I, in obvious contrast to Hitler, was often played down in order not to obstruct the overall parallel. Another formula used to compare Atatürk to Hitler, and through Hitler’s use of the formula to the whole Frontkämpfergeneration, was that “Atatürk had been surprised by the capitulation [of the Ottomans] while still in the battlefield.” Hitler made much propagandistic use of himself having been surprised by the end of World War I in a hospital.

But Atatürk was also connected to other established German reference points, not only parallel to the new Führer, but also to well-known ancient stories of leadership. Ankara was often compared to
Sparta, Istanbul to the weak and corrupt Athens, the battle of Gallipoli to the battle of Troy, and finally Atatürk to Caesar. Atatürk was frequently described as always among his subordinates, especially leading them into battle. In Melzig’s words, Mustafa Kemal just “like Frederick the Great gave his troops the biggest example of defiance of death and of heroic courage.” Even though he was portrayed as one of the greatest military leaders of the century, it was stressed time and again that Atatürk behaved like a common soldier and that he was closer to his soldiers than to his fellow officers. Furthermore, and also in line with Hitler’s self-portrayal, Atatürk was often described as leading a very frugal life: “As a real and true son of his nation, Kemal never led a luxurious but always a simple life.” Not surprisingly, the “other Atatürk,” the heavy drinker and womanizer, was not present in these texts. Friedrich Hussong, in his 1922 essay, was the last of the Führer-oriented German writers on Atatürk to attempt to directly address and refute such claims about Atatürk’s private life.

German Lessons from a Turkish Life

Hagiography—glorification and veneration—was only one aspect of the Third Reich narratives of Atatürk’s life. Next to a ubiquitous glorification of Atatürk and the perceived parallelism to Hitler, these texts had a very pronounced didactic quality. Atatürk’s was the perfect Führer story, already completed with a happy ending. This Führer had already achieved what he was meant to achieve and then more. This also distinguished Atatürk from Mussolini, as Hitler himself had already pointed out in his defense speech in 1924. Although the Third Reich canonized many other great leaders to underpin the Führer myth and principle, the Turkish case trumped all others because of its already achieved “happy ending”—full independence, within and without. And because of its modernity and contemporaneity, it also trumped historical Führer stories. For Third Reich authors, and Hitler himself, the successful conclusion of the Turkish War of Independence had by itself already proved the Führer principle in a universal fashion. Said an article in the Kleine Blatt after Atatürk’s death: “With the appearance of Kemal Atatürk world history has provided again
the proof that in present times the foundation and rejuvenation of an empire can only be carried out on a national basis and requires a superior Führer.” Not surprisingly, “the new spirit has prevailed” was a somewhat iconic sentence for Atatürk’s story in the Third Reich. As ambassador of the Third Reich in Turkey, von Papen also referred to the Turkish example as proof of the Führer principle and the new spirit. Although the Turkish War of Independence was already enough “proof” and a happy ending, the second Turkish miracle—the rapid and continued modernization—provided yet further proof that the Führer principle was the only way to go. Furthermore, for these various authors Atatürk was not only a modern, contemporary Führer with role-model qualities in a variety of interesting contexts and like-minded policy areas, he was also one of the first “exponents of the völkisch idea.” Atatürk embodied, as one author put it, the revolutionary ideal of the twentieth century. In this reading the Turkish War of Independence was also a “victory of the völkisch idea.” All this made Atatürk’s example very unique. Along with the many prescriptions and qualities associated with the Turkish Führer and the perfect Führer, such as a martial character and frugality, there were two “educational” areas to which all the texts assigned very special significance: the meaning of the “ultimate war” and the politics of the Führer.

The most basic lesson was very obvious and simple: the Führer idea and following the Führer would, no matter what, pay off in the end. Rössler concluded his book by saying: “We Germans . . . can learn from the most recent Turkish history that a nation is not lost if it follows the Führer [on the path] to freedom and honor in life and death, if it always keeps faith in him and only follows the law of honor, freedom and of the might of the nation.” It was in this manner that Atatürk’s story was a “role model and warning” as Rössler’s opening lines had stressed:

Especially now [1934], that the German nation has finally come to its senses and has reached an important point in the struggle for honor and freedom led by Adolf Hitler, it is necessary to commemorate the warrior and the nation, who, already a decade ago, were victorious against external and internal enemies. . . .
At the same time this book is a warning to the German people: Just as Ghazi Mustafa Kemal was able to ask for the most incredible sacrifices from his people in order to crown the battle for honor and freedom of his nation with a great victory, so we Germans must—just like the Turks—never lose heart and stay true to our great Führer. And when he asks sacrifices of us, then there must be no German who does not perform his sacrifice with just the same joyful heart as did the Turkish nation.

Because no sacrifice is too great when it is necessary to preserve the honor and the freedom of the nation, because both are the greatest goods a nation can have.74

“Incredible sacrifices carried out with a joyful heart” was a key message of all these texts about Atatürk and the New Turkey. They made it clear, implicitly or explicitly, that this would also be expected of the Germans in the near future.75 What the will to sacrifice and an unquestioned following of the Führer could achieve was stressed time and again: “With an abused nation [and] a disarmed army Mustafa Kemal Pasha began the struggle for the birth of a new age and proved right the saying that the power of the soul disables all earthly weapons and that a small nation’s will to sacrifice is stronger than the tricks of the Great Powers.”76 The mobilization of resources for an almost impossible victory in the defining war—this was also how Hitler himself had understood Atatürk’s example. In the 1938 interview he stressed that Mustafa Kemal had demonstrated how a country could regain the resources it had lost in order to fight for its freedom—and that Hitler was his student in this respect.77 And in his 1928 Nuremberg speech he also emphasized that “national worth” was determined by the will to sacrifice and that this was illustrated by the Turkish case.

A cursory look at the German interwar books about Atatürk’s life shows that war was central to their narratives: all devote around 10 to 15 percent of the narrative to Atatürk’s childhood and prewar life, and at most one-third to his role as “state builder” after 1923 (regardless of when they were published), but all of them dedicate up to two-thirds to his experience and role in war (1911–1923). After all, these
texts never tired of showing, the New Turkey had been forged in war. The War of Independence was so important because it was the “ultimate war” for the Turkish nation, it promised national liberation as well as full and final national redemption. This war had decided whether the nation would perish or live, “whether the Turks would be slaves or a free people.” These texts also reprised Atatürk’s comment that it was better for a great people to die than to vegetate without honor. War had achieved the reinstatement of the Turks as an equal at the table of nations. Furthermore, in war, and nowhere else, the “struggle for a new age” had been won. Melzig enthusiastically wrote that only through war and victory did the Turks “become Turks again”; as Bischoff put it, “The soldier went into war as an Ottoman, [and] came home as a Turk.” War “made” the Turkish nation in the first place and at the same time rejuvenated it. Kral emphasized: “The hard school of war, which lasted from 1911 until 1922 almost without respite, mainly the War of Independence with all the privation and the suffering it had to endure, has brought the Turkish nation on its new path faster and further along than it has other nations in similar situations.”

But winning the war was possible only because the Turkish nation had been given such a Führer, had recognized him as such, and had followed him unconditionally. The Turkish nation had laid its fate in the hands of the Führer. It recognized him when he was a “rebel of honor” and continued to do so when he graduated from “rebel to statesman”—another frequent theme of these narratives. Nietzschean absolute will or “will as hard as granite” was promoted, time and again, as the key ingredient of this story, for the Führer as well as for the nation as a whole. In this fashion these narratives explored various aspects of “total war.” The Magdeburger Zeitung put it this way in 1935: The New Turkey had been born “under unprecedented sacrifices” in a “people’s war”; during the War of Independence, the “Turkish underdog,” to have any chance of success, had to mobilize everything and everybody: old men, women, and even children—“the last man and the last piece of metal had to be mobilized.” Leers, in his biography of Hitler, had stressed that Atatürk’s success was achieved with “cannons manned by old men and children.” Sacrifice and hardship, total and ultimate war, were thus
central ingredients of the successful Führer story. Additionally, that
the nation needed to be forged into a “battle community (Kampfge-
meinschaft) of life and death” emerged as the essential prerequisite of a
successful Führer story in these narratives. The Nationalsozialist-
ische Partei-Korrespondenz told the party faithful in 1933 in its essay on
Turkey that this “battle community” needed to be bound “by the
belief in the Führer and the love for the fatherland.” If necessary,
the nation had to dig into the earth and fight to the death, even if the
people had nothing left but the rags on their bodies.

In this fashion Atatürk’s biography, or rather the German and es-
pecially the Nazi interpretations of it, also played a role in the prep-
aration for the ultimate German war. The term Endsiege (final vic-
tory) was also frequently used in this context; Melzig’s Atatürk
biography featured a chapter with this as title. The continued na-
tionalist conscience and mobilization of the Turkish nation was char-
acterized as “total deployment.” But Atatürk’s story also provided
another example that would be much needed later in Hitler’s war.
Many of the texts pointed out that Atatürk had been opposed to En-
ver Pasha’s decision to align the Ottoman Empire with Germany in
the First World War, yet he had fought most loyally and with great
distinction. The true soldier and patriot thus fought for the nation,
even if he did not agree with the choices of its leaders.

In these texts the maxim “to unquestionably follow the Führer”
was expanded upon in a variety of spheres, such as matters of inter-
nal and external policy. This theme was invariably based on the in-
herent logic of these discourses that the Führer was always right. In
Atatürk’s case it was also derived from the characterization of him
as a great tactician and diplomat, which in turn was often explained
by his apparent ability in mathematics. In a way he was the tacti-
cian among the modern leaders, “a master of diplomacy.” One obit-
uary simply summed him up as “Turk, mathematician, soldier.” In
this light the tactical alliances Atatürk entered into with Islam and
Bolshevism were of special interest for many German authors. From
today’s perspective these alliances and the German perspective on
them might appear more revealing than they could have been to the
contemporary reader, but it needs to be stressed that these themes
were explored and repeated countless times in these narratives. Any
The “Turkish Führer” contemporary reader of a Third Reich text on Atatürk old enough to have read the papers of the immediate postwar years must have remembered how much the papers had struggled to make sense of what was happening in Anatolia. Some had initially thought they were witnessing an uprising of Islam. It was only with the successful conclusion of the war and the establishment of the Turkish Republic that Atatürk ended his alliance with religion and not only abolished both sultanate and caliphate, but also thoroughly secularized the New Turkey. Almost all the texts expressed their deepest sympathies for this tactical “trick” and developed elaborate justifications for it. One author stressed that during the War of Independence Atatürk just had no choice but “to be smooth.”

The other tactical alliance of the Kemalists proved to be more difficult to understand. Since the early 1920s most German papers, the Nazi Völkischer Beobachter included, had stressed that the Kemalist alliance with the Soviet Union was only tactical and had no ideological implications whatsoever. Many had also emphasized that it was a quite necessary and understandable alliance. Some even ventured further and suggested that a similar “alliance of outcasts” might be an option for Germany to regain its place in the sun—as did Nazi party activist Gregor Strasser in other contexts. The reading of the Turkish-Bolshevik alliance as something not only understandable, but actually tactically sound and very astute, as already formulated in the early 1920s, was repeated in the press, books, and even school textbooks of the Third Reich. Such an alliance was about covering one’s back, not about ideology. Indeed, as the Völkischer Beobachter stressed in its long feature on Turkish-Soviet cooperation, despite this alliance both state ideologies had been separated in an exemplary fashion, especially through the actions of Ankara. Whatever one may think of the role of the later Nazi-Soviet alliance and possible ideological preparations for it, the extensive discussion of the Turkish völkisch success story, which had relied heavily on Soviet support to achieve “rebirth” and “liberation” yet had not become ideologically contaminated, should have certainly contributed to making the brief German-Soviet alliance more acceptable and seem more sensible. The fact that the reviews of the Atatürk biographies focused disproportionately on Turkish-Soviet relations, as did a review of Melzig’s
biography in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in early 1938, also illustrates that this aspect of Atatürk’s success was thought to be especially relevant to German readers.99

The reason the New Turkey had not become “contaminated” ideologically through its alliance with the Soviet Union was found in another crucial quality of Atatürk: his no-compromise attitude when it came to matters of the nation. What made Atatürk successful was not only that he had a vision, “a fire within him for the Turkish cause,” and the will to fight until death, but that he was not willing to compromise on anything that was vital. This no-compromise attitude was elevated in these texts to be the key characteristic of the modern Führer:

This new Turkey is the creation of Kemal Atatürk. He was able to realize his ideas in spite of all the resistance inside and outside the country; in spite of all the doubt and the rebellions in his own camp; without conceding victory to the old powers and without maneuvering into the foul waters of compromise. That is how one measures the real greatness of a statesman.100

In “matters of the nation,” the Nationalsozialistische Partei-Korrespondenz wrote in a 1933 essay about Turkey that “there can be no compromise” and that Atatürk knew this and acted accordingly.101

The Turkish Führer’s no-compromise attitude applied also to domestic politics. Many of the texts not only discussed, but extensively celebrated, how harshly Atatürk had dealt with opposition.102 As much as the texts stressed that he was a soldier-turned-statesman, they also stressed that he had always remained a soldier, “the first soldier of his nation.”103 Accordingly, opposition was dealt with in a “good soldierly fashion.” Indeed, the metaphors describing him as a soldier and statesman clearly suggested that politics needed to be carried out as a form of war. Equally logical for most texts was Atatürk’s autocratic or dictatorial style and the total obedience he asked not only from his soldiers but also from his nation. This was also in line with the overall characteristic of the Turkish nation: “the soldierly spirit is the true spirit of the Turk.”104 All of these texts highlighted the inherently treacherous quality of political opposition. The leader had to
be wary of those who questioned his power or wanted to depose him. Those opposing him were depicted as either “Jewish” or as “freemasons,” and their eventual hanging seemed like a logical and welcome “solution” within the narrative of these texts. Atatürk’s harsh and swift treatment of opposition had already elicited great interest in the Weimar years—so great that when Hans Tröbst, then in Anatolia as a journalist, wrote for German papers about the “show trials” following an attempt on Atatürk’s life in 1926, the coverage was deemed too extensive and the Turkish authorities asked Tröbst to leave Turkey.

The establishment of a modern, völkisch Turkey was no smooth ride, as all the texts attempted to illustrate. The only security was provided by the Führer, who had the necessary clarity of vision. Everything that was achieved was the result of an ongoing struggle. In these narratives opposition was an obstacle, but not a worry—the true leader, in this case Atatürk, knew what the nation needed and wanted, even before it knew itself. That is why, it was emphasized time and again, the nation needed to follow the leader unquestionably and why the leader had to follow his path without hesitation. Atatürk, in this reading, had no choice but to proceed with all possible severity and ruthlessness in order to free the nation from foreign enemies and the chains of the past. And so did Hitler, underlined the *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger*, linking both Führers again in the lengthy 1943 article that reformulated Hussong’s 1922 “men make history” argument.

Intrinsically connected to the Führer logic was the discussion of the Turkish state and political system; for the Nazi texts and commentators, the New Turkey was a Führer state par excellence. Atatürk’s main instrument of rule was his People’s Party (*Halk Partisi*, translated as *Volkspartei*). Turkey was an example of a successful Führer state as well as of one-party rule in a völkisch setting; it was a total “Gleichschaltung of state and party,” the *Völkischer Beobachter* admiringly highlighted. The unitary party was a natural expression of the authoritarian spirit, and its organization was “entirely völkisch.” From the top down it was described as being party and movement at the same time, organized “tight, along military lines.” As Froembgen put it: “As a living guarantee of the state, [Atatürk]
has the People’s Party whose chief he is. State and party are identical. The organization of the party is military and rests on the principle of authority.” According to the Führer logic, this way the nation was represented in the best possible way. Accordingly, it was often stressed that Kemalism was neither regime nor ideology, but a movement; “not a state theory, [but] a living consciousness of 18 million Turks without exception.” What was instituted in Turkey was “real national democracy.” Quoting Recep Peker, the general secretary of the Halk Partisi at the time, the Berliner Tageblatt readily agreed that “democracy was not something concrete, but a state of mind.”

Again one can cite Hitler himself and his appreciation of Atatürk’s regime. Discussing the future of Romanian dictator Ion Antonescu, Hitler commented in early 1942 that “if Antonescu does not find his way to the people, he will be lost. If he is dependent on the executive, he will not be able to survive. Atatürk has secured his power through his People’s Party. It is similar in Italy.” In Italy in the late summer of 1943, an imprisoned Mussolini, after having fallen from power, penned his “Musings of a Dictator,” as Wilhelm Hoettl called the script discovered by Otto Skorzeny, the SS lieutenant who had freed Mussolini from captivity. No. 50 of Mussolini’s musings read: “Of all the so-called ‘totalitarian’ states that have been founded since 1918, the Turkish State seems to be the most solidly established. In Turkey, there is only one party, the People’s Party, the leader of which is the president of the Republic.” Coincidentally, Mussolini agreed almost verbatim with what his liberal-democrat opponent, Count Sforza, had written in 1931: that “among all the postwar dictatorships” Mustafa Kemal’s regime was the “most successful one.”

Conclusion

It is no surprise that the Nazis made full use of Atatürk’s story. After all, as one author stressed, with the New Turkey Atatürk had become “the pioneer and the one who paved the way for the kind of authoritarian regime that came to be more and more commonplace in Europe.” Having been accepted by the Nazis as the pioneer as well as offering a doubly successfully completed Führer story, the Nazis used Atatürk’s story to explore a whole range of topics connected
to the theme “Führer and nation”: the Führer idea itself, total mobilization and ultimate war, minorities, opposition, religion, and so on. Also, the Turkish case was, propagandistically speaking, relatively safe, as most of these interpretations had evolved and circulated already during the Weimar years. It was a ready-made discourse that was appropriated and developed further in the Third Reich, one that supported the Führer myth, the Führer state, and notions of ultimate war. The themes and ideas explored and affirmed in these texts conformed closely to the self-portrayal of the Nazi regime. Furthermore, Nazi admiration for Atatürk was not just part of the propaganda machine but was for the various authors the perfect Führer story of modern and contemporary times. In this sense the National Socialist hagiography of Atatürk served a double purpose: to pay homage to a role model, and to convey a very refined and powerful message by presenting clear and linear interpretations of this story by portraying it as parallel to the German situation. This story showed just what a Führer and his nation could accomplish. These texts could fully glorify Atatürk and construct a cult around him without “threatening” the cult around the German Führer. Indeed, they could use the glorification of Atatürk to affirm and expand the cult around Hitler by making Hitler seem parallel to, even a disciple of, Atatürk—which was, after all, also how Hitler perceived himself.

The language employed for describing the Turkish Führer, including the stress on the soldierly spirit and the primacy of will, was the same as that used to describe the Third Reich and Hitler in Third Reich publications. Just as the Third Reich employed religious metaphors in relation to Hitler, so it did for Atatürk. Both were portrayed in Third Reich texts as saviors, creators, prophets, chosen by destiny. And just as Atatürk was frequently portrayed, in his authoritative Hitler biography Leers also depicted Hitler as a born Führer, already as a boy ready to lead. Both symbolized the nation—indeed, they were the nation and were synonymous with their parties. And finally, the two were not only of a similar background (soldiers, sons of customs officials, from the periphery of the nation), but each man’s and their nation’s story was a “triumph of will.”

In this light, the constant retelling of Atatürk’s story also assumed a pronounced didactic quality; it educated the Germans about what
it meant to follow a Führer. In fact, Atatürk’s story in the Third Reich played a role comparable to that of the Fürstenspiegel (mirror of princes) in premodern times. Typically for the Fürstenspiegel, the prince or king was told a historically distant story that more or less resembled a present situation or conflict. The story suggested possible courses of action or strategies, heavily concealed by distance of time and often of place. Atatürk’s story fulfilled a similar function, but instead of primarily addressing a potential Führer, it mainly addressed the German nation. It was a “modern” version of the Fürstenspiegel: one for modern mass society, a Führerspiegel. Even though these texts, especially those from Weimar times, also addressed a potential Führer, the most important messages largely related to the nation, especially rationales for total obedience, ruthless treatment of the opposition, and total mobilization. Indeed, they prepared for the later total-war rhetoric by providing a successful model of total national war, of the path to victory in the ultimate war. When dealing with war and opposition, all these texts suitably complemented German domestic discourses justifying Hitler’s role as leader and his decisions—from Carl Schmitt after the “Night of the Long Knives” up to Goebbels’s “total war” speech at the Sportpalast. The Führerspiegel quality of these texts is not just mere interpretation; it is explicitly present in these texts. Mikusch wrote in his preface to the sixth through tenth editions of his Atatürk biography, in 1935, that when the book was first published in 1929, it had been an expression of hope and a silent warning to Germany. Once the hope for a Führer had been fulfilled, what remained of the message was the “warning”—to follow the Führer unquestioningly, especially in the coming ultimate test for the nation, the ultimate war.

When reading texts from the Third Reich on Atatürk and the New Turkey, another thing becomes very clear: there could not be a greater contrast between the 1930s German view and the views prevalent in historiography today, when it comes to Atatürk’s charisma. When authors in recent decades have tried to compare Atatürk’s Turkey with the fascist regimes of Germany and Italy, they have regularly stressed that Turkey was different and in no way comparable to these fascist regimes, because it lacked crucial ingredients of “charismatic rule” and mass mobilization; there were no Nuremberg rallies in Anato-
For Third Reich commentators, as well as for many in the Weimar Republic, the matter was just the opposite: Atatürk needed no mobilization anymore, he had mobilized the entire Turkish nation in the War of Independence, not only successfully, but beyond any expectations and, indeed, beyond precedent. Afterward his leadership position was so unquestioned that he had been able to do just about anything he wanted to do—so unquestioned that apparently the other dictators were envious of his secure leadership position. For Third Reich texts he was a living “national hero” (Nationalheld/Volksheld). They spoke of Atatürk as the true leader of the people and of the magnetism he exerted upon the masses. For these texts he was a “master of rhetoric” who could convince the nation of his ideas so that it felt they were really their own wishes and needs. For them, the mobilization during the War of Independence and its success, and also the subsequent reforms, led to a Turkish nation readily and totally at the disposal of the Turkish Führer. Similarly in Fascist Italy, Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano used Atatürk’s example to make sense of what might become of Franco were he to win the Spanish Civil War, just two weeks before Atatürk died: “And if Franco wins militarily, he will have the necessary prestige required to govern just as Kemal Pasha lived for twenty years on the undisputed merit of having liberated the country with arms.” Charisma and mass mobilization, or the lack thereof, were not a problem for fascist commentators at all. If Third Reich authors were to write a comparative history of fascism, they would have included Turkey as “one of them,” and in fact, as discussed in this book, they regularly did. However, this does not mean that Kemalism was in fact fascist. It only illustrates, on the one hand, how selective and predetermined the Nazi vision of Turkey was and, on the other, how ambiguous the Kemalist project still was, that it could “accommodate” such perceptions. One could argue that Kemalism deserved the label “educational dictatorship” only retrospectively once free elections were held in 1947, establishing a “real democracy” with a multiparty system. But even then, as Dimitris Keridis has recently remarked in his discussion of the role of World War II in delegitimizing and defeating authoritarianism in Europe, Turkey’s political ideology remained “an interwar ideology in a postwar world.”
Obviously, Atatürk was not the only Führer figure used by the Third Reich to support their Führer state. They utilized a whole battalion of historical and contemporary foreign leaders—from Frederick the Great, obviously also Mussolini, all the way to Roosevelt. But because Atatürk’s story was already crowned with a happy ending, had played out in what was portrayed as a parallel situation, and was also contemporary, it was qualitatively superior to the others. Clearly, the reading of Atatürk as a perfect Führer, and one similar and parallel to Hitler, was a highly selective one in the Third Reich. But, more importantly, there were also some major lessons entirely lost on the Nazi commentators. One of these lost lessons was the point about world peace Atatürk had tried to convey in his essay “Führer and Nation.” Although many hagiographic Nazi texts attempted to show that Atatürk’s dictum “Peace at home, peace abroad” also applied to Hitler and Mussolini, they clearly did not understand the idea behind it. Deeply connected with this was another lost lesson concerning the opposition between Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal. Many texts focused on this opposition as if an either/or choice had existed for the Turks, between the pragmatism of an Atatürk and the idealism of an Enver: “Enver is the ambitious man with a fantastically great idea. Mustafa is nothing less than the genius [made] from blood and soil.” Enver Pasha had dreamt of a Pan-Turkish, Turanian Empire during World War I and jeopardized the existence of the Ottoman Empire for it; his excursion into the Caucasus, often compared in these texts with Napoleon’s Russian adventure, and the ensuing catastrophe of Sarıkamış had effectively destroyed a large part of the Ottoman fighting force; at least 10,000 Ottoman soldiers died of cold before ever seeing battle. Mustafa Kemal, on the other hand, started out with a more realistic, “small-Turkish” national plan, concentrating on core Turkish territories in Anatolia. The German texts had discredited the “other choice,” Enver Pasha, this “Turkish Napoleon,” for more than twenty years, in hundreds, probably thousands, of texts. Still, the German army ended up at the gates of Moscow, and not unlike Enver Pasha’s soldiers at Sarıkamış, many German soldiers froze to death in the Russian winter. As it turned out, the Germans had never really left “Enverland” after all. This was a Turkish lesson the Nazis just did not want to learn or understand. So it is not sur-
prising that there were attempts to rehabilitate Enver Pasha during World War II—not an easy endeavor, given that Enver Pasha had failed at almost every one of his political projects. One such attempt to rehabilitate this “Turkish Napoleon” was a brief biography published by Verlag Die Wehrmacht, the publishing house of the German army, in 1943. Yet, this biography’s subtitle, *Struggle and Death in Turkestan*, already betrays the fact that this was perhaps not such a good role model to follow.
Just as Adolf Hitler had created the new Germany, and Mussolini the new Italy,” Reventlow’s Reichswart wrote in 1933, “so the modern Turkey is Mustafa Kemal’s creation alone and at the same time it is proof of what a paramount Führer personality can make out of a country and a nation.”¹ This sentence encapsulates almost every aspect of the Nazis’ perception of the New Turkey. Given that its creation and goals were parallel to Hitler’s and Mussolini’s, that it was proof of the Führer principle, and that Atatürk was considered a model Führer, as we saw in Chapter 4, we would expect Nazi descriptions of the New Turkey to be nothing other than extremely positive. Indeed, the Nazi vision of Atatürk’s state does not disappoint: “Turkey is the most modern state of the twentieth century,” exclaimed Froembgen in his book on Atatürk in 1935.² Kemalism itself was often described as a “national-revolutionary ideology.” The ruling and constituting party was, as Nazi commentators saw it, “republican, nationalist, völkisch, laicist.”³ This was a “modern, authoritarian Republic” that was at the same time extremely revolutionary.⁴ Very similar to the characterization of Ankara as “the youngest republic” in the early 1920s, in the Third Reich the New Turkey was still viewed as a most revolutionary state, where—the Nietzschean influence is conspicuous—what was taking place was nothing less
than a “revaluation of all values” or a “total revolution.” It embodied revolution: “In a revolutionary act the state was born, in an equally revolutionary act it was given civilization.” Similarly Mikusch in his Atatürk biography emphasized:

Turkey in its contemporary form is not a simple copy of Europe or what Europe would look like with the adoption of numerous occidental institutions. . . . Her spirit is, through a reconnection to the oldest traditions of the nation, purely Turkish; the shape of the new state, however, how its founder has created it, refers to the coming time of the twentieth century, beyond the old Europe.

These characterizations of Turkey might not be surprising, given what we have already seen in earlier chapters. But we must remember that Turkey in the 1930s was, by all standards, still a backward country—it was developing rapidly, but it was not comparable to Western industrialized countries. Nazi perceptions about the New Turkey were, thus, far from “objective” and were not about a status quo. Turkey was to them the most modern country because of its ideology, political tools, and goals. It was a work in progress, just like National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy. And obviously Nazi Germany saw in Turkey what it wanted to see. Thus the image of Turkey in the Third Reich also allows us to draw conclusions about the Nazi self-image in relation to National Socialist modernity. This is also explains why Nazi Germany’s image of this revolutionary and rapidly developing country was, paradoxically, rather static. Whether in 1933 or in the middle of World War II, the descriptions do not vary significantly. And this hyperreal, glorified vision of the New Turkey was present in hundreds, perhaps thousands, of newspaper articles and essays, books, and even school textbooks, of which only a few examples can be cited here.

The Nazi vision of the New Turkey involved many topics and themes. Intrinsically connected to the idea of Atatürk as the perfect Führer who had successfully led his nation through the ultimate war, which in turn had rejuvenated the Turkish nation, this New Turkey
now had to be vibrant, successful, and simply amazing. Otherwise these Nazi stories of völkisch Führer success would have defeated their purpose. Two of the main ingredients of this continuing success story, besides the Führer himself, involved the destruction of the Old Turkey: the ethnic cleansing of Anatolia and the elimination of religious power over society. We will look first at how these were perceived and understood within the overall Nazi vision of the New Turkey, and then we will explore the Nazi portrayal of Turkish modernity itself. One focus will be on the various efforts of reconstruction, which were grouped under the catch-all term Aufbau by the Nazis. The other explores the theme of Turkey as a continuously revisionist country.

From the Old to the New Turkey

_Minority Questions_

The backdrop to all these themes was the Nazi vision of the “Old Turkey.” The Ottoman Empire was anathema to everything good or völkisch, and its description was the only discursive sphere where old orientalisms were allowed to live on. The Old Turkey lacked, in the view of Third Reich commentators, “any healthy, sustainable or völkisch foundation” as well as direction or any völkisch goals. It was a “system alien to the people,” and “cosmopolitanism” was its ideology. In order to underline Atatürk’s future achievements, the Ottoman Empire before 1918 was described in the bleakest of terms. Its “backwardness” and economic underdevelopment were especially highlighted. The “Middle Ages” was a widely used description for the Old Turkey. It was often pointed out that this state—“pensioned by history,” as Hitler had called the Ottoman Empire in his _Mein Kampf_—had been dying for a long time. There was a broad consensus among these various texts that the reasons for the dire state of the Ottoman Empire were external to the Turks and their racial character. Three reasons for this situation were generally identified: the multiethnic character of the empire in general, the influence and even rule of “foreign elements,” and the heavily retarding character of Islam.
There is not much need to expand on the völkisch or Third Reich authors’ rejection of multiethnic empires. In their view “the Turk was never sick, but he had to carry the incredible weight of an unorganic empire, which he futilely tried to hold together.” Here “the foreign element was promoted, was favored, lifted up; the foreign element conducted, led, it governed. The foreign element was the pillar and the agent of the sultans against the people.” “Thus,” in Froembgen’s words, “Turkendom was dying slowly but surely of the poison that pours out of the racial mishmash of the subdued peoples, this famous sputum of peoples of the coasts of the Mediterranean Sea, of the Levantines, the Greeks, the Armenians, the Arabs, and the Jews, who like resistant weed cover the ground [everywhere].”

By the beginning of the Third Reich the “minority question” in Turkey had been mainly “resolved.” Most of the Armenians of Anatolia had either perished in the Armenian Genocide or subsequently left the country. And the Greeks had left in the wake of the retreating Greek army in the Turkish War of Independence; most of those who remained at first had been “exchanged” with Greece later, following the Lausanne Treaty settlement. There remained some non-Muslim minorities (Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and others), especially in Istanbul, but in the Nazi vision of the New Turkey they did not matter much: For the Nazis the New Turkey was a “racially” homogeneous state. The Kurds, another relatively large minority group in Eastern Anatolia, did not concern the Nazis much either. In fact, in most news articles and essays, Nazi authors simply chose to ignore this irritating group, lest it destroy the picture of this ethically homogeneous, völkisch success story.

Expectedly perhaps, for the Nazis the murder of the Ottoman Armenians was one of the main foundations of this vibrant new völkisch state. Unfortunately, a proper analysis and contextualization of the Armenian Genocide, and indeed of the influence of this genocide on the Nazis, far exceeds the scope of this book; it deserves a separate and more in-depth treatment. However, to complete our reconstruction of the Nazi view of modern Turkey, it is necessary to briefly survey the discussions surrounding the Armenians. There is still an ongoing debate about the Armenian Genocide as well as about Hitler’s alleged exclamation, “Who, after all, speaks today of
the annihilation of the Armenians?” There is no point debating here whether an Armenian Genocide actually took place, but it is interesting to note that the Hitler quote is used in this context both to either affirm or deny that there had been a genocide. There is another quote from Hitler, referring to the “extermination of the Armenians,” yet both Hitler quotes stem from highly disputed sources. The provenance of these quotes has often been an obstruction to understanding the paramount influence this genocide must have exerted upon the Nazis. But in any case, one does not need either of them to show that the Nazis were influenced by the Armenian Genocide. Indeed, to ask whether the Nazis knew about the Armenian Genocide is altogether the wrong way to tackle this topic; there is no reason to assume that they did not know about it, much less that the Germans had forgotten about it by 1933 or 1939. Because as much as the Nazis grew up with Turkey and the Turkish War of Independence, they also grew up with the Armenian Genocide.

During World War I the German public knew very little about what was happening in Anatolia, but in the years after the end of the war the Armenian Genocide became a prime German media topic. It was an integral part of postwar debates about war crimes, war guilt, and the peace settlements. The topic also involved Germany very directly, as it was alleged by the Entente that Germany not only knew about it but had been its chief instigator. To whitewash Germany’s guilt associated with these “Armenian Horrors,” the German Foreign Office commissioned the publication of a collection of diplomatic documents that it claimed would show that Germany did everything it could to help the Armenians. However, these documents, edited by Johannes Lepsius—who had already been one of the prime champions of the Armenian cause for over two decades—also illustrated, to a horrifying extent, what actually happened in Anatolia during the war. The book, published in the summer of 1919, was widely reviewed and discussed in the German media. Two trends rapidly emerged: Especially papers with leftist leanings were quick to identify what had happened as a genocide—using terms such as “annihilation” or “destruction of a people.” The nationalist papers, on the other hand, downplayed what had happened and advanced justifications for these Turkish “disciplinary measures.” The debate con-
continued in intervals until March 1921, when Talât Pasha, a former Ottoman grand vizier and minister of the interior, was assassinated by an Armenian in Berlin. The murder of a former prime ally of German interests in the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent trial of his assassin, Soghomon Tehlirian, elicited great media interest.20 Especially so, because the assassin was acquitted by a Berlin jury in a spectacular trial in June 1921. The subsequent volleys of drawn-out essays and cross-paper debates focused on the Armenian Genocide rather than the assassination. The right to far-right spectrum justified the “Armenian Horrors” by arguing that the Armenians had “stabbed the Turks in the back” during the war and that the Armenians were a very sneaky, parasitic, and unworthy people.21

These debates were re-ignited in 1922, when another two Young Turks were assassinated in Berlin by Armenians, and continued until the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) was signed.22 These postwar debates were sown on the fertile ground of German anti-Armenianism, which shared late-nineteenth-century roots with modern anti-Semitism, from which it borrowed heavily. In fact, German anti-Armenianism presented the Armenians as the (real) “Jews of the Orient.”23 Although anti-Armenian stereotypes had been disseminated across Europe before World War I, they were especially important in Germany—after all, the Ottoman Empire seemed to promise a way for Germany to achieve its place in the colonial sun. Among a host of publications on the Ottoman Empire that reproduced anti-Armenian stereotypes were Karl May’s novels of the Oriental Cycle—which were still widely read in interwar Germany and were viewed by May himself as the most important part of his oeuvre, some of which had already been turned into movies in the 1920s.24 Hitler was an avid reader of Karl May and reportedly reread all of his works when he was leading Germany.25 It is worth citing a passage from May’s *Im Reiche des silbernen Löwen* (1897), which plagiarized a newspaper article by the liberal politician and priest Friedrich Naumann.26 May’s protagonist in these novels was Kara Ben Nemsi (Karl, Son of the Germans in May’s invented language) as he was called in Karl May’s Orient or Old Shatterhand in the Wild West—the same protagonist, lovably portrayed by the actor, Lex Barker, in the successful movies of the 1960s. At one point Kara Ben Nemsi comments on the massacres of
the Armenians in the late nineteenth century. He says that the following expressed his own opinion very well and quotes approvingly from what is in fact Naumann’s text:

I am a Christian and hold the commandment “Love thy neighbor” as the first among them, and I say that the Turks did the right thing when they beat the Armenians to death. There is no other way for the Turk to protect himself from the Armenian. . . . The Armenian is the worst type in the world. He sells his wife, his young daughter, he steals from his brother. The whole of Constantinople is being poisoned morally by the Armenians. It is not the Turks who started the attack, it is the Armenians. . . . An orderly means of protecting oneself against the Armenians does not exist. The Turk is acting in self-defense. . . . The Armenian is a revolutionary used by the English to overthrow the Sultan.27

Anti-Armenian clichés and stereotypes permeated not only Karl May’s novels of the Oriental Cycle, but also a host of German nationalist and imperialist publications on the Ottoman Empire.28 Another example from a novella by Karl May is, as Hans-Walter Schmuhl has shown, indicative of the late Kaiserreich’s anti-Armenianism and also illustrates how the Armenians, although Christians themselves, were excluded from Christianity in these racial stereotypes: “A Jew dupes ten Christians, a Yankee tricks fifty Jews, but an Armenian even dupes a hundred Yankees. . . . Wherever some malice, some treason is planned, certainly the hawk’s nose of the Armenian is implicated. When even the unconscionable Greek refuses to commit some villainy, there will no doubt be an Armenian who wants to earn the wages of sin.”29 Accordingly, in this transfer of the vilest anti-Semitic stereotypes onto the Armenians, descriptions of them as “parasites” and as a “plague” were commonplace. Such negative stereotypes of the Armenians continued to circulate in the press and publications up until World War II; they were an integral part of the descriptions of the old, pre-Kemalist Turkey.30

The perceived parallel between Central European Jews and Ottoman Armenians further cemented far-right and Nazi interest in
the Armenian Genocide. Hans Tröbst had formulated a series of lessons from the Kemalist success in his six-part series for the *Heimatland* in 1923, as discussed in Chapter 3. One of these key lessons was the “ethnic cleansing” of the country.\(^{31}\) In another article published during the Hitler Trial (1924) on the front page of the *Völkischer Kurier*, the main Nazi paper at the time, Tröbst explicitly pointed out that what had happened to the Armenians might very well happen to the Jews in a future Germany.\(^{32}\) And when the *Völkische Beobachter* warned in 1921 that at some point in the future Germany could and should have no other choice than to resort to “Turkish methods,” one has to wonder if it was not also referring to the Turkish “solution to the minority question.”\(^{33}\)

During the spectacular trial of Talât Pasha’s assassin, one of the witnesses for Tehlirian’s defense, who in the end was not allowed to address the court because too much deliberation on the Armenian Genocide had already taken place, was Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, one of the German Ottomans we have already met. He had served as a vice-consul in Eastern Anatolia during World War I. Not only was he a witness to genocide, but Scheubner-Richter was also one of the few Germans who had protested against the measures taken by the Young Turks and who had helped the persecuted Armenians by, for example, distributing food among them. Yet, paradoxically, Scheubner-Richter was also a Nazi of the first hour and a close friend of Hitler’s, and at the time of the Tehlirian trial he was often referred to as Hitler’s political advisor. He was shot in 1923 when the Hitler Putsch was stopped by the bullets of the Munich police. As he dropped dead, he dragged Hitler to the ground with him, saving Hitler’s life. Hitler was to call him an irreplaceable martyr to the Nazi cause and had him commemorated as such.\(^{34}\)

We can only speculate as to what Scheubner-Richter told Hitler about the Ottoman Empire, the Kemalists and the Armenians, specifically about the Armenian Genocide. The various occasions when Hitler talked about the Ottoman Empire suggest that he was well informed about Turkish history. It is very unlikely that Scheubner-Richter would have failed to discuss Turkey and the Armenians with Hitler. One reason for assuming that the two did exchange ideas on the Armenian Genocide is the fact that it appears that they traveled
together to Berlin for Scheubner-Richter’s testimony at the Tählir-ian trial. It is assumed that Hitler used his time in Berlin to lobby German industrialists for the Nazi cause, while Scheubner-Richter was sitting in the courtroom in Wedding. Whatever Hitler’s sources were in the end, we can infer that newspapers were definitely among them, as he was an avid newspaper reader. Given the media event the trial was, it seems likely that Hitler was well informed on the topic. And, it should be stressed again, the media coverage of the trial had focused much more on the genocide itself than on the assassination.

Throughout the 1920s Hitler was to use the Armenians frequently in his speeches as an example of a “lesser race.” At a general party meeting in Munich in the summer of 1927, he laid out his ideas about the way Jews did business and how they were able to dominate the economy. He concluded:

It is impossible that a non-Jew would be able in the long run to compete with the Jews in a Jewish area [of business]. At least for the Aryan it is impossible. There are peoples who are able to do so, like the Greeks and the Armenians. Sure, these peoples have come so far that they are able to economically even defeat the Jew. However, by doing this they have become Jews themselves. They have these specific, disgraceful characteristics we condemn in the Jews.

In his 1928 Nuremberg speech he warned the Germans of a bleak völkisch future if nothing was done for their liberation and for a higher population growth—if not “we will slowly become a nation of Armenians.” In a 1929 article in the *Illustrierter Beobachter*, Hitler ranted on about “the Jews” and then asked what the Jews could ever do in Palestine, a region where there were already two other peoples with the same qualities as the Jews, “the Armenians and the Greeks.”

In an article a month later, Hitler again painted a bleak picture of the German nation sinking down to the state of a slave nation, and he used the Armenians as the example for such a process. After recounting the various dictates the German nation and its politicians had erroneously accepted since the armistice at Spa, he asked his read-
No, this is all a very consistent development. Once one has given up honor and freedom, one will gradually get used to being a slave. A sense for [what constitutes] national shame slowly gets lost and if the enemy is also sitting inside such a nation and is working against it, abolishes all national traditions, even a healthy sense for national culture, then one should not be surprised if within a couple of decades a formerly heroic nation sinks down to the level of a wretched Armenian. Swine, corrupt, sordid, without conscience, like beggars, submissive, even doglike.

In another article four months later Hitler protested against the German proclivity to identify with the fate of lesser peoples not worthy of German admiration. Along with “misguided” German sympathy for the (modern) Greeks, he especially singled out German sympathy for the plight of the Armenians, which had been produced by “drawn-out depictions of ‘Armenian Horrors.’” But despite Hitler’s slight infatuation with the Armenians as a “lesser race” in 1928–1930, the Armenians were not explicitly mentioned very often during the Third Reich. The reluctance to mention the Armenians in public statements could have been due to the fact that the implications would have been all too clear to the well-informed German public, especially those old enough to remember the early 1920s debates in Germany. Nevertheless, Hitler continued to use the Armenians as an example of a lesser race on par with the Jews.

However, these few utterances about the Armenians by Hitler (and there are similar quotes by Rosenberg) pale in comparison to the role the Armenians were given within the wider discourse about the New Turkey in the Third Reich. The Armenians and what had happened to them were not forgotten by the Third Reich texts on Turkey. And they had an important role in all the deliberations about the New Turkey, because the question of race was central to the Nazi vision of Atatürk’s success. There was nothing coincidental about the frequent attribution of the quality “völkisch” to the New Turkey. “From the mish-mash of peoples to völkisch purity and a vibrant and
potent new state” could have been the byline to all the Nazi narratives of the New Turkey. Just as was the case with other aspects of the Old Turkey, pre-1923 Constantinople was the incarnation of everything that was wrong with the Ottoman Empire. Constantinople featured here as the archetypical multiethnic metropolis, which was never a Turkish city at all and which continued to be a focus of anti-Ankara, and thus un-völkisch, politics, even after 1923. Atatürk’s pre-1919 Constantinople assumed a role in these narratives that was very similar to the role “Hitler’s Vienna” had had for the German leader.

Froembgen’s book on Atatürk, for example, began its narrative with “the hoarse, excited yelling of the haggling Armenians, Levantines, Greeks, and Jews” in Constantinople. When a Turkish gendarme had passed them by, their momentarily humble and submissive demeanor changed again into “a poisonous grimace.” Froembgen’s text continued with the fictive direct speech, “When the English come to Constantinople, we will cut the throats of the Turks.” This in combination with the demeanor of the Entente and their “slave treaty” of Sèvres is the setting of Froembgen’s and many others’ narratives; it described, at least in the minds of these German authors, what Atatürk was really up against when he began his struggle for independence. The choice of the national Ankara over the cosmopolitan Istanbul, broadly and frequently lauded by the Third Reich texts, thus also has clear ethnic undertones. In this context Ankara as the “youngest republic” also receives a different meaning.

One precondition for Atatürk’s success as defined by Nazi and Third Reich texts had been “the destruction of the Armenians,” as Mikusch put it in his Atatürk biography—a “compelling necessity.” Perceiving the Armenians as an “inassimilable foreign body,” he concluded: “If one disregards the human side [of it], then the expulsion of the Armenians from their state for the New Turkey was a no less compelling necessity than—granted there are certain difference in the preconditions—the annihilation of the Indians for the Whites in America.” In his Atatürk biography, Fritz Rössler highlighted that these had not been persecutions of Christians, but the “neutralization of life-threatening foreign bodies.” His book also included a chapter with the telling title “Liquidation of the Annoying Armenia.” The Armenians, as long as they were there, various authors
stressed, remained an eternal threat to the Turks: “And every time the hearts and weapons of the Armenians found themselves on the side of the enemy.” The Armenians were also, again, identified as a major threat during the Turkish War of Independence in some Third Reich narratives of the war—even as perpetrators of massacres against Turks. Needless to say, the various previously existing anti-Armenian stereotypes continued to be used and were reaffirmed in Third Reich publications. Indeed, the continuation of older anti-Armenian stereotypes, of perceiving them as the “Jews of the Orient,” was so strong in Nazi publications and the press that the Ministry of Propaganda felt the need to issue a directive in 1936 stressing that the Armenians were not in fact Jews.

But the “cleansing” of Anatolia of the Armenians was just the beginning of the rise of the New Turkey, in the Nazi vision. Before Turkey could become a state that was “national and only national,” as the Hamburger Tageblatt stressed in 1935, it had to rid itself of the other group that had usually been described almost as negatively as the Armenians: the Greeks. Some nationalist papers had expressed fear in 1922 that the proposed Lausanne exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece might be a dangerous precedent for the German minorities in Central Europe, but the Third Reich texts lauded this exchange as a “totally new way of solving the minority problem.” The Nationalsozialistische Partei-Korrespondenz wrote in 1933: “Something truly unique was accomplished in the sphere of military politics and population science: the resettlement of the foreign nationals in their homelands and the return of Turkish nationals to Anatolia.” This way, the paper continued, the potential seeds of future conflict were destroyed and Turkey could live in peace with its neighbors and rebuild. What was achieved through the population exchange between Turkey and Greece was nothing less than a “harmonization” or “standardization” of their populations, the Völkischer Beobachter claimed. Some authors recognized that the Lausanne exchange was in fact only the official formalization of what had already happened: “The minority problem in Anatolia was solved in a very simple fashion; the fleeing Greek troops had taken the Christian population of Anatolia with them! There was no more Armenian or Greek question in Asia Minor.” A 1925 book on the New Turkey
had already celebrated this “gigantic sweep of the broom” that “hurled the Greek element into the sea.” For most Third Reich authors this double “ethnic cleansing” of Anatolia was the precondition for the success of the New Turkey. One author repeated this point more than once: “Only through the annihilation of the Greek and the Armenian tribes in Anatolia was the creation of a Turkish national state and the formation of an unflawed Turkish body of society within one state possible.”

And as Joseph B. Schechtmann pointed out in his 1946 study of population exchanges in Nazi Europe, the Lausanne Greco-Turkish population exchange agreement had attracted a great deal of attention in the world and also in Germany. It “was referred to expressly as the pattern for the German-Italian agreement [1939] on the transfer of the German minority from South Tyrol, which inaugurated the far-reaching transfer program of the Third Reich.” That it was a model for Hitler himself is widely acknowledged. But while the Greco-Turkish exchange was to serve as a model for Nazi population movements; it also served as the model for the solution of the “German question” in Central and Eastern Europe—as had been feared by the German nationalist papers in the early 1920s. A remark from Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1943 to Anthony Eden stressing that the Allies “should make some arrangements to move the Prussians out of East Prussia the same way the Greeks were moved out of Turkey; while it is a harsh procedure, it is the only way to maintain peace.”

The “Turkish Church”

Concurrent with what the Nazis portrayed as the multiethnic nightmare that was the Ottoman Empire was the role Islam played there. In fact, almost everything regarding the Ottoman Empire was categorized as “foreign to the nation”: from the Persian-Arabic (high) culture, the idea of the Padishah, to Islam itself. The parallel to the “church question” in Germany, especially in relation to the Catholic church, was often prepared and suggested by the use of typically Western and especially Catholic terms for Islamic institutions—“church” for Islam, “priesthood” (Priesterschaft), “monastic orders”
(Mönchsorden), and “monasteries” (Klöster) for the Muslim clergy, mullahs, and dervish orders, as well as the “papal power of the caliph.” The fact that all religions in Turkey, including Christian Orthodoxy, had been severed from their transnational connections was praised time and again, because now the Turkish state could protect its citizens from the fanaticism of those transnational co-religionists—which closely mirrored Nazi aversions toward Catholicism.68

Islam was portrayed not only as a “foreign-born” and transnational religion but also as the main problem of the Old Turkey. Islam was “the great retarder, which prevented all progress.” Such a statement can be found in almost all texts on the New Turkey, albeit in differing phrasing, from academic texts to articles in the Völkischer Beobachter.69 Islam, this great retarder, was responsible for the Old Turkey having been stuck “partly in the Middle Ages, untouched by the developments and the progress of times.”70 Religion and “the church” had become “a farce” and had kept the Turks in a “lower state of the spirit.” “Like a nightmare it made any development of youthful life in the Ottoman Empire impossible.” Said the Völkischer Beobachter, it hindered “any waking of Turkish national strength,” an effect that was also perceived as being parallel to that of Catholic Christianity: “Islam not only prevented the adaptation to the times, it contradicted in its innermost being the national idea, just as the medieval universal church of Europe by its nature already stood in contradiction with the national delimitation of states.”71 Furthermore, the “church” and the “clergy” were not only retarders and opponents of progress, including Atatürk’s reforms, but were also accused by these various Nazi texts of having been the main collaborators of the Entente in the immediate post–World War I years.72

Given the centrality of religion to the descriptions of the Old Turkey and its decline, it is not surprising that Atatürk’s secularist reforms attracted the Third Reich’s utmost interest and were perceived as crucial steps toward setting up a truly völkisch state. The Völkischer Beobachter extensively discussed the “Islamic church question” (islamitische Kirchenfrage) in Turkey and admiringly stressed that “church and state” had been separated completely in the New Turkey, with religion now solely a private matter. The fact that the “church” now had to stay away completely from political matters was implicitly and
explicitly praised by the Nazi press and publications. For many texts the mere fact that Islam was foreign, an “Arabic invention,” was reason enough for the New Turkey to abolish all religious influence over national life. Others focused their animosity on the role of the “clergy,” who were compared to “parasites” who had fed on the nation. It was claimed that the nation sighed in relief when they and this “nuisance of the dervishes and the beggars” were finally gone. With the nationalization of “church” properties these former “parasites” had to learn trades and crafts and were now working as productive members of the nation, and those not willing to work “had perished,” the Berliner Börsenzeitung claimed. Sweeping away the influence of the “church” and closing down the “monasteries” was frequently portrayed as the logical next step on the path toward the true liberation of the Turkish nation. The already cited Völkischer Beobachter essay “Atatürk’s heritage” presented a most typical summary of the Kemalist revolution: Turkey became a truly national state by shedding its Islamic skin and giving up all the leadership rights over the Muslim world inherent in the title of the caliph. All in all, the article concluded this point, “Atatürk was able to get rid of all the weakening influences, which had worn out the Ottoman Empire.”

Though these weakening influences also included the minorities, the German press often focused disproportionately and admiringly on the “church question” in Turkey. The New Turkey was presented as something of a role model in the sphere of religious politics. Although this was never explicitly stated in this context, it was implicit in almost all of the texts describing the separation of “church and state” in this völkisch revolution. One very long essay in the Münchner Neueste Nachrichten made this clearer than most others. It also conferred on the Turks the title “carriers of culture” (Kulturträger), which was almost synonymous with “Aryan.” It described the Kemalist revolution and modernization as a völkisch revolution par excellence and attempted to coin the term “third Turkey” (dritte Türkei) for the New Turkey. Here the separation of state and “church” and the destruction of the political influence of religion were presented as integral and logical parts of such a völkisch revolution. Other examples include two book reviews of Melzig’s Atatürk biography in
the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, which focused disproportionately on Atatürk’s struggle against the church and highlighted it as an area in which one could draw further conclusions—for Germany.79

The way religion and the suppression of religion were viewed in Third Reich texts in relation to Turkey closely conformed to Hitler’s views on religion and Turkey, despite Johann von Leers’s claims in his Hitler biography (1932) that when it came to religion Hitler was not as radical as Mustafa Kemal. Leers went to some lengths to show that Hitler was not planning anything similar to Atatürk.80 But, in fact, Hitler’s own views seem to have been different. Hitler admired Atatürk’s resolve in his fight against “the church.” In the “Table Talks” it is recorded that he said, in April 1942, that “while Kemal Atatürk had outlawed the activities of the dervishes in Turkey, over here [in Germany] they still proliferate under the wings of the Catholic Church.”81 In 1936 Goebbels recorded in his diary a conversation with Hitler: “At the Führer’s for lunch. . . . Foreign policy. Kemal Pasha. He is partly so close to the Russians because of [his] anti-clericalism. The priests are the cancer of politics.”82 And later, in August 1942, Hitler remarked: “How fast Kemal Atatürk dealt with his priests is one of the most amazing chapters [of history]! At one time, he just executed 39 of them. He has eradicated them completely. The Hagia Sophia in Constantinople is a museum [now]! The Duce told me in 1934 in Venice: ‘The Pope will one day leave Italy, there cannot be two masters!’ ”83 Throughout the war Hitler continued to heavily criticize Franco’s Spain and Mussolini’s Italy for the continued and unbroken power of the Catholic Church there.84 Again, Turkey was a role model, again it was “more perfect” than the Italian case, and again the media were well in line with the Führer’s views.

**Aufbau—The Vitality and Potency of Völkisch Revival**

Getting rid of the minorities and organized religion was, of course, not enough to turn the New Turkey into the model that the Nazi texts made it out to be. The New Turkey was such a revolutionary and “most modern” state because of its revolutionary reforms in all areas of society. Although there was a wide range of reforms to
focus on, the Nazi vision of the New Turkey was a highly selective one—there was a host of Turkish nontopics. The language reforms and the new role of women were two prominent nontopics in the Nazi discourse on the New Turkey. They were often present in these texts in an enumerative fashion, but they were rarely, if ever, explored to any meaningful extent. Propaganda was another such topic. Unlike the Weimar press, which had made much of the Kemalists’ creation of the first “propaganda ministry” in history during the War of Independence, the Nazis had little to say on this topic. Even the specific Kemalist propagandistic and educational facilities, the “people’s houses” (*halkevleri*), received very little attention. Similarly, youth organizations, or rather the lack of a comparable fascist-like youth organization, seemed to have irritated the Nazi press and commentators to such an extent that they largely chose to ignore the topic.

However, a slight lack of interest in some areas of reform did not mean that the Nazi press was not ecstatic about the New Turkey—even “unbearably” so, as the representative of the Propaganda Ministry had blurted out in 1937. Nazi Germany perceived the process of reform, reconstruction, and modernization in the New Turkey in a rather holistic fashion. The key term here, only inadequately translated as “construction,” was *Aufbau*. It denoted not only the reconstruction of a country and an economy devastated by war and “ethnic cleansing,” not only the modernization of Turkey, it meant everything—and it was the same term as used for the New Germany. The “will to reconstruct” (*Aufbauwille*) was what characterized both countries under their Führers, the papers commented. Aufbau often included all the cultural and social aspects of the Kemalist reforms as well, but it was also synonymous with “inner renewal.” It was about the transformation into a modern völkisch state. Aufbau was thus the central keyword in the description of the New Turkey, and it was this “powerful Aufbau” that constituted the second Turkish miracle. Turkey was also described as “a country of progress” where Aufbau was taking place at a speed that was “breathtaking.” Still in 1938, visitors, like the minister of the economy, Walther Funk, the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* stressed, could see that there was still energy and courage for even more Aufbau and progress. The new Turkey was potent and “restless” when it came to its revival.
thermore, not only was the language used to describe the New Turkey just as laudatory as that employed to describe Atatürk, but some commentators also transferred some of his characteristics, such as the “tactician” and “mathematician,” to the whole of Turkey. Accordingly it was in a cool, sober, and factual manner that the country was being reconstructed; the New Turkey was all about “clarity and consequence.” A problem was identified and then tackled. It was also an Aufbau “without compromise,” as one article in the *Völkischer Beobachter* emphasized in bold print. But in the end it was still all the work of the Turkish Führer, whose activism for the Aufbau “borders on the fantastic.”

To stress the vitality and potency of the New Turkey, Anatolia was frequently compared to America. The Turkish Aufbau was deemed so successful that some authors speculated that not only would the New Turkey stay ahead of many countries for some time in the future, but that nothing less was happening then a second “America”—“The case of America will be virtually repeated.” In a similar vein in the *Kreuzzeitung*: “In merely ten years in the heart of Anatolia, a second America came into being.” But at the same time Atatürk would prevent the pitfalls of “Americanization.” “Civilization,” Froemgen continued, “is something mechanical, dead, stiff, if it is not built on a foundation of the *Volkstum*, supplied with the vital juices of the soul.”

Moreover, when Hjalmar Schacht visited Turkey, for the fourth time in his life, in 1936 as president of the Reichsbank, he noted that Ankara was “one of the greatest creations of the Turkish spirit” and found that the only comparison was the construction of American cities. This comparison in city construction was also present in a *Völkischer Beobachter* picture report with the title “Two new cities came into existence: Boulder City in the USA and Sinop in Turkey.”

During the Turkish War of Independence the Kemalist capital, Ankara, had already reached iconic status in Germany. The right and far right talked about Ankara in Munich, the Kemalists were also known as the Ankara-Turks, and every reader was expected to know what the word “Ankara” stood for. This iconification of Ankara continued in the 1920s and during the Third Reich. Ankara came to be lauded as the new kind of city, “the miracle of Ankara” (Fig. 5.1). Indeed, Ankara was the new century: “It all is the sober, factual
Figure 5.1. A typical feature about the New Turkey and Ankara in the *Wiener Bilder* (November 20, 1938).
The Nazi vision of the New Turkey is quite aptly captured by a series of photos by Hitler’s friend and personal photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann, at the Staatsbibliothek in Munich (Figs. 5.2–5.5). They show Ankara, this embodiment of the New Turkey, as a modern, new, twentieth-century city with wide boulevards, modern factories, schools, and propaganda marches. They also illustrate how selective the Nazi eye was when it came to the New Turkey. A 1942 picture book by the prominent Nazi publishing house, Volk und Reich, titled The New Turkey, featuring some of the Hoffmann pictures, equally conveys this impression of a hypermodern Turkey. The German press and books, especially the Völkischer Beobachter, similarly used extensive photo material to emphasize the Aufbau and modernity of the New Turkey. The Völkischer Beobachter regularly featured photo reports on various Turkish achievements and of markers of Turkey’s völkisch modernity, such as industrial exhibitions, army maneuvers and the military in general, sports, “women’s equality” and women’s new roles in society, propaganda, and politics, as well as new buildings and infrastructural projects.

A key ingredient of the miracle of the Turkish Aufbau was the economy. Here one could witness the “economic development under national Führertum,” as the vice president of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce in Germany dubbed it in a guest commentary in the Berliner Börsenzeitung. And, as should be expected by now, the results of Turkish economic reconstruction, as presented by Third Reich texts, were just amazing: Turkey had established itself as one
Figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5. Ankara and the New Turkey in the Nazi vision: photos from the Hoffmann Collection.

Hoffman Collection, Staatsbibliothek München
of the most flourishing states in the world and had virtually abolished unemployment. While other European fascist commentators at the time focused on the “corporatist” aspects of the New Turkey, the Nazi press and publications emphasized such aspects as the importance of the farmer and of economic independence for the new state. The Völkischer Beobachter and the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung thought it all too sensible: The economy needed to be “a fortress,” it needed to be a truly national economy. The various texts all stressed that Atatürk had almost nothing to work with in the beginning, no industry, no money, nothing but a totally devastated country. The construction of new factories, of an infrastructure, of vocational training and research facilities, as well as the electrification of the country, was featured in hundreds of articles. And most of these discussed in very excessive detail all the various industrial and infrastructural projects. It was a great battle at the “economic front” and Turkey was clearly winning. Indeed as articles in the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger and the Kreuzzeitung stressed in 1933, the achievement of the New Turkey in the area of reforms and reconstruction was so great that it was impossible to even sketch all of this in a newspaper article.

“Are You Familiar with the Turkish Five-Year Plan?” asked a headline in the Hamburger Tageblatt in 1934, highlighting what many texts identified as the central tool for this rapid economic Aufbau. Even though the 1933 five-year plan of the Turkish government had a flavor of Bolshevik economics, it was lauded by the press as the right way to handle the economy, especially in the Turkish context, but also globally—the Third Reich would institute a four-year plan in 1936. Most articles did not even mention the Bolshevik connotations of such five-year plans, suggesting it was the most normal economic instrument in the world. A state-directed economy, most texts suggested, was the best way to achieve völkisch economic revival. A planned economy was what facilitated the almost ideal development of Turkish resources, while class conflicts were kept at a minimum; some texts even argued that there were no (longer any) classes in the traditional sense in Turkey. With all its economic reforms, these texts emphasized, Turkey was achieving true independence and freedom.
Another often-highlighted part of the New Turkey’s success story was its concentration on the “Turkish farmer,” the agrarian economy being “Turkey’s basis of existence.”\textsuperscript{112} This was also part and parcel of the perceived national spirit, as the Turkish nation was often described as the “nation of Anatolian farmers.”\textsuperscript{113} Other texts connected the farmer cult to the characterization of the Turks as warriors and spoke of the inner nobility of the “Turkish officer and Turkish farmer.”\textsuperscript{114} Atatürk was cited as calling the Turkish farmer his “master.”\textsuperscript{115} Still, the topic “the Turkish farmer” was not such a fertile ground for extensive German news coverage. But the high value of “the farmer” for the nation connected Kemalist Turkey and the Third Reich, at least in the discursive sphere.\textsuperscript{116} Accordingly, for example, the press coverage on Atatürk’s funeral stressed that “Turkish farmers” came to his casket and laid down flowers.\textsuperscript{117}

Revisionism Revisited—Model Foreign Policy?

But of course the New Turkey was not only a model völkisch state when it came to domestic politics. The various characteristics of this revolutionary, völkisch state also extended to foreign policy. Rössler, for example, stressed that the New Turkey was not influenced by any sentimentalism—as, for example, Weimar Germany had been in the eyes of the Nazis and the far right.\textsuperscript{118} And again the New Turkey, it appears, lent itself to drawing all the wrong conclusions. A commentary in the \textit{Hamburger Tageblatt} noted in 1935 that all the countries respected and courted Turkey, and in order to get to this point, Turkey did not have to do anything but look after its own welfare, domestically and in matters of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{119}

With its total revision of a Paris peace treaty, Kemalist Turkey could be considered the revisionist state in interwar Europe, par excellence. But the Treaty of Lausanne had left two issues unresolved for the Turkish state: the demilitarized Straits and the future of the province of Alexandrette, or the \textit{Sanjak} (Turkish for “province”) as it was known at the time. When Atatürk began tackling these two vestiges of the “slave treaty” of Sèvres, the German press had yet another topic by which it could glory the New Turkey “as one of us.” Accordingly, the 1936 Turkish remilitarization of the Straits was
viewed with the fullest sympathy in Germany and was covered very extensively in the German press. The *Völkischer Beobachter* published more than thirty articles on the topic in one and a half years. The coverage in the provincial press was even more extensive, as the example of the *Freiburger Zeitung* shows, where over forty articles were devoted to the topic in just the three months leading up to the remilitarization. And this was also very much in line with what the Ministry of Propaganda wanted: In April 1936, for instance, it had asked for more coverage on the Straits in order to showcase this new revisionism as being parallel to the various German goals. The official motto was: “In the whole world the old problems are being put on the table again.” The situation regarding the Straits was often compared to the demilitarized Rhineland. Yet both topics—the Straits and the Sanjak, which had been so prominently covered in the German press from 1935 until 1939—offered much more. These were the years when Nazi propaganda became dominated by immediate Nazi revisionist goals, such as the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the annexation of Austria, the Sudetenland, the Memelland, and then Danzig. Not surprisingly Turkish developments were also explicitly used to show that the claims of the Turkish nation were just as justified as those of the German nation, and vice versa. The total incorporation of the Straits into Turkey was viewed as a natural next step in the Turkish struggle for freedom. Again, very much as during the Turkish War of Independence, the German press enjoyed the harsh, self-assured, and steadfast language of the Ankara government. “We are not dependent on the decisions of the League of Nations!” was the theme of one such admiring article in the *Völkischer Beobachter*. Another article, two days later in the same paper, stressed that even though Turkey had asked the League of Nations for a solution, this was not “naive credulity” on the part of the Turks. They would take what is theirs with or without the League. The fact that the Turks had been in possession of the Straits since 1326 and that with the defense of Gallipoli during World War I they had “earned them anew” was also stressed as a reason for the reincorporation by the New Turkey.

The second topic of Turkish revisionism—the annexation of the Sanjak of Alexandrette or Hatay, as it was then called in its New-
Turkish name—lent itself even more aptly to support German revisionist issues. The Sanjak had been under French administration since the Treaty of Sèvres and was part of the French mandate in Syria. Turks were the largest group there, but they were not a majority. The Sanjak was often discussed as the “Grenzland Hatay” (borderland Hatay), ascribing it a standing parallel to that of the various German “Grenzländer”—the Sudetenland, the Memelland, Austria, Danzig, and so on. It was a “Turkish question,” one of “life and honor,” to which all the German papers knew the obvious answer. Again, and obviously so, the annexation of Hatay to the New Turkey was viewed with the fullest sympathy and perceived as a natural next step for the new völkisch state. What the press stressed from early on was that in this case, it appeared, the rights of the previous owner of a province were somewhat acknowledged. It was hoped that this would also become part of a broader approach to such matters.

The Völkischer Beobachter covered the Sanjak question especially extensively with over sixty articles, including many half-page special features (Fig. 5.6), from late 1936 until July 1938, when it featured a front-page article announcing that the Turks had marched into the Sanjak—though it continued to report on the Sanjak until its full annexation in June 1939. Many of the bigger papers and journals regularly ran extensive feature essays on the topic. The provincial press also covered the topic to its fullest capability, which is remarkable, given that they usually had merely two pages, rarely three, in each issue for national and international news, and given that other “exciting” things were happening in the world, such as the Spanish Civil War and the Sudeten conflict. Indeed, it appears that the coverage on the Sanjak topic was even more extensive in provincial papers, such as the Freiburger Zeitung, than in the Völkischer Beobachter. In just the two months, starting with Atatürk’s visit to southeastern Turkey, reported on May 20, 1938, until the topic petered out almost two months later after the Turkish army had marched into the Sanjak and after an article on July 13 had speculated about the future of the territory, it featured no fewer than forty articles and reports on the Sanjak question. So broad was the coverage in German papers, apparently, that in mid-1938 the Berliner Börsenzeitung began a long essay on the question with the claim that “everybody knows what was meant with the
Figure 5.6. Feature on the Sanjak question in the *Völkischer Beobachter* (May 26, 1938).
word ‘Sanjak.’” Similarly the *Völkischer Beobachter* stressed around the same time that the “Sanjak of Alexandretta” had already entered the annals of postwar history.\(^{131}\)

Despite the fact that the topic lent itself to obvious comparisons with the Sudeten question, the Sanjak was anything but an easy propaganda topic. Here, Turkish and Arab claims were opposed to each other. The topic could have been a minefield because the German press had simultaneously given broad and sympathetic coverage to the Arab struggle against the mandates and against Jewish settlement in Palestine. In general, the fact that it was Turks against Arabs in the Sanjak was solved by pointing fingers at the Entente and the League of Nations, and by pointing out that there was no clear majority anyway and that the Turks were the relatively largest group. However, the main logic for backing the Turkish claims was summarized in the simple idea that the New Turkey was not willing to give up on their Turkish brethren in the region.\(^{132}\) Another complication derived from the fact that after the death of Atatürk the atmosphere in the German press in relation to Turkey had momentarily changed—and this was precisely at the time when the Sanjak was finally annexed by Turkey. At this point, the Sanjak was used as an example of how corrupt the international system really was, because the Turks were not in the majority there and were still allowed to annex the territory, yet German-majority territories remained outside the German state; Danzig was especially highlighted at that time.\(^{133}\) The only reason the German papers offered for France’s willingness to part with the territory was that it wanted to buy Turkey into an alliance against Germany. The topic proved a bit confusing for the German press, especially for the *Völkischer Beobachter*, which had previously endorsed the Turkish claims to the Sanjak, and had done so for almost two years, especially when doing so fit into its own foreign policy objective regarding the *Anschluss* and the Sudeten question. Now, it feared that France and, by extension, Great Britain were giving away territory merely in order to build up their system of alliances against Germany.\(^{134}\) Had it followed its own logic and interpretations of the New Turkey, the *Völkischer Beobachter* should have been happy for the Turks. Instead it now claimed that the New Turkey was destroying Atatürk’s legacy by entering into an alliance
against Germany. In a remarkable turn of events—yet not all that surprising, given how strongly the Nazis had identified with Atatürk—the *Völkischer Beobachter* now, in the summer of 1939, claimed that it understood Kemalism and Atatürk’s legacy better than those in power in Turkey since Atatürk’s death. This clearly required twisting current events and conveniently forgetting that the annexation of the Sanjak had been Atatürk’s last big project before his death a couple of months earlier. As it turned out, the true keeper of Atatürk’s heritage was neither the People’s Party nor President İsmet İnönü, but the *Völkischer Beobachter*! This claim was often reaffirmed in various ways in the coming years when the *Völkischer Beobachter* assessed current Turkish foreign policy against “Atatürk’s will,” for example, in September 1939, when it found itself reconciled with İnönü’s Turkey following a Turkish statement regarding Turkey’s neutrality. Similar assessments were also to be found in other newspapers and books, even in geography textbooks for the German schools.\(^{135}\)

With such a plenitude of coverage on Turkish revisionism in 1935–1939, it seems all too clear that these topics also played a role in promoting German revisionist claims. And indeed, as one page of the *Freiburger Zeitung* in the summer of 1938 neatly illustrates, these topics were all treated as part of the same theme. A long article on “Czech Procrastination Tactics,” and thus about the Sudeten topic, continued in run-on text about the Sanjak topic. It is also telling that the article on a possible Turkish-French accord did not bother to mention the object of this accord, but given that the papers had already been covering the Sanjak topic for months, the paper just assumed that the readers knew that it was about a topic, which was parallel to the Sudeten problem. On this day the Turkish topic served to suggest that France was, in this particular area, more ready to compromise than “the Czechs” were. A couple of days earlier the paper had casually subsumed a report on the Sanjak under a heading “The Talks in Prague” without even clearly identifying this other, actually unconnected topic.\(^{136}\) The Sanjak question was, unsurprisingly, also used to discredit the League of Nations as well as the Entente concept of “self-determination.”\(^{137}\)

The two revisionist Turkish topics, the Straits and the Sanjak, were thus part and parcel of the propaganda drumroll accompanying the
remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Anschluss of Austria, and the Munich Agreement. The papers went as far as they could to connect the Turkish and the German cases. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, after having discussed Turkish revisionism in relation to the Straits and the Sanjak, cited Atatürk, who, they claimed, had stated in relation to the Anschluss: “Hitler is totally right! German belongs with German.” The paper further claimed that in relation to the Sudeten crisis, Atatürk had refused the Czech representative in Ankara an audience, commenting, “It is not worth taking a stand for this cause.”

Conclusion

The theme “Angora triumphans” (Latin: triumphant Ankara), as developed during the Turkish War of Independence in the early 1920s, not surprisingly resurfaced in Third Reich descriptions of “triumphant Kemalism.” In many ways the German discourses about Turkey from 1919 until 1945 were logical continuations; the language of the nationalist and völkisch press from the time of the Turkish War of Independence came to full fruition during the Third Reich. Many of the ideas about leadership, the Führer, and völkisch revival developed at that time continued to be proposed and refined not only in relation to Turkey, but also, as we know, in relation to Germany. And as was the case with all aspects concerning Turkey, the previous trend of de-orientalization was continued emphatically in the Third Reich. Many authors and journalists pleaded that it was time “to remove the veil of romantic perception from Europe’s eyes.”

The Völkischer Beobachter stressed that the völkisch revival of the New Turkey had necessitated a total reevaluation of old stereotypes about the Turks. But the fashion in which the Third Reich treated the New Turkey went far beyond both de-orientalization and the early Weimar parallelism. In his study of Fascist Italy, Renato Moro described how the media made every effort to compare and to liken developments in Francoist Spain to Fascist Italy. Ideology and politics in Italy were often portrayed not only as similar, but frequently as outright equivalent to those in Spain, and vice versa. Moro calls this process “twinning” (gemellismo). The same process took place in the media and publications of the Third Reich in relation to the
New Turkey. Wherever possible the Nazi media and politicians tried to show just how similar both the New Turkey and the New Germany were: The New Turkey and the New Germany were twinned. While Kemalism and Kemalist Turkey were perceived as something new and revolutionary across Europe, nowhere were they as much appropriated and “twinned” as in Germany. This allows us to draw some conclusions regarding the ongoing debate about the modernity of National Socialism. In many ways the vision of the New Turkey was also a reflection of Nazism’s vision of its own modernity and Aufbau. However one wants to classify National Socialism’s overall project—pre-, anti-, reactionary, or alternatively modern—at least in the sphere of rhetoric and ideology National Socialism came across here as a movement aspiring to a new kind of state. One example of such a new kind of state was identified as the New Turkey, and the Nazis highlighted certain, but not all, aspects of Turkey’s development, such as forced and rapid infrastructural and economic development, a state-directed economy, and the construction of new and monumental cities, as well as a slightly superficial emphasis on sports, propaganda, and youth. Through its vision of the New Turkey the Third Reich was constantly advocating modernism purely for modernism’s sake. One especially interesting fact that emerges from the Turkish case is that, for the Third Reich commentators, an important measure of a successful völkisch state was the speed of and the continued capacity for Aufbau. Language reform and the emancipation of women were mentioned but not marked as areas worth discussing and copying. The way Turkey was perceived as a forerunner in the sphere of religious politics also allows some conclusions for the Nazis’ own relationship with religion. Contrary to Richard Steigmann-Gall’s claims, in its championing of the New Turkey as a model völkisch state the (public) Third Reich emerges as advocating the total separation of church and state. Furthermore, the abolition of the societal and the economic power of the clergy and religion per se was for the Nazi version of recent Turkish history an integral ingredient, if not one of the preconditions, of this völkisch success story. Thus, if this Nazi mirror—the Third Reich vision of the New Turkey—is held up against Germany, the championed solution for the “church question” was quite radical, much more so than often assumed in the research literature.
As we have seen the term “Aufbau” was central for the description of the New Turkey—it was, in a way, what made it “new.” And Germany was a “New Germany” as well—the Nazi papers also reported on Germany using the same language when it came to its Aufbau: “The Aufbau Efforts in the New Germany” was a typical headline in the *Völkischer Beobachter* for this topic. Aufbau deeply connected the two new states and regimes. Imagine how happy the papers must have been when they could report, as the *Völkischer Beobachter* did in 1939, that the New Turkey was also recognizing and admiring the German Aufbau as facilitated by the Führer. The idea that perhaps Turkey was merely “Europeanizing” itself rather than constructing a völkisch state was dealt with by the interpretation that the Kemalist reforms, the Aufbau, and Kemalist modernity were nothing more than an expression of the innermost qualities of “this, at its core, so very young nation,” and that the shedding of foreign forms of organization and culture was an expression of the Turks’ völkisch inner strength. In this light the reforms and reconstruction were about expressing the virtues and the nature of the nation, not about “Europeanization.” For the *Nationalsozialistische Partei-Korrespondenz*, the nationalist revolution in Turkey, 1919–1923, was followed by an “evolution,” albeit a rapid and forced one. The New Turkey represented the “victory of their own [Turkish] national character.” Here, as so often in this context, the “victorious success” of the Turkish project in itself was proof of the viability of both the Führer principle and the one party state concept. And taken as a whole, that was precisely the overall scope of the Nazi twinning of the New Turkey with the Third Reich: the Turkish case showed just what could be accomplished if the völkisch model of the Führer state was followed. If the Turks could do it—in a country with the worst preconditions for a swift and successful rebirth and modernization—then the Germans could do it as well and so much more. The description of the New Turkey as a prosperous and völkisch, modern state, as a success story, provided the second historical proof of the new model of politics—the first having been the successful liberation. Thus, there was something in it for the various German authors, commentators, and politicians too when glorifying Turkey; it was also about themselves, their kind of politics, and their belief in the future.
When it comes to revisionism, Turkey provides another factor in the radicalization of Hitler’s foreign policy. One motivation for the very intensive coverage of both the remilitarization of the Straits and the annexation of the Sanjak was for the German press to show that the cards were being dealt anew. However, the Nazis could not know beforehand that Turkey would be successful. If an inner logic had been dreamed up about the connection between national purity and war, a nationalist no-compromise attitude and the therewith gained respect of the world, as well as about national will and foreign policy success, then the two revisionist successes of Turkey in the years before World War II must have only reinforced all these beliefs. The New Turkey, the revisionist power of interwar Europe until Hitler came along, launched two further revisionist attempts, a mere twelve years after it had revised a Paris peace treaty—and it succeeded yet again, without any detriment or loss, without a military conflict. If Hitler’s successes in Munich and with the Rhineland before had convinced him that he would face little resistance on his march to dominate Europe, the renewed Turkish success must have also reinforced this feeling. In this area, Turkey’s role as a model was also reaffirmed, but this time not only by Nazi propaganda, but by the facts themselves, or at least by how the Nazis chose to understand them. Furthermore, this renewed Turkish revisionism concerning the Straits and the Sanjak had been a constant part of the Nazi propaganda background noise from early 1935 until the summer of 1939; Turkish revisionism, old and new, was in many ways deeply entangled with Nazi expansionist goals in the public discourse of the Third Reich.

The New Turkey was certainly not the only other country that was “twinned” with the Third Reich by the Nazi propaganda machine. Obviously the same was also the case with Fascist Italy. And inversely, there were even efforts in Italy itself to twin Turkey with Fascist Italy, as the cover of a special edition of the Quaderni di Attualità on Turkey, with its focus on paratroopers and women’s gymnastics, illustrates (Fig. 5.7). Inside the Third Reich, even in relation to Franco’s Spain, one finds similar narrative building blocks as in relation to the New Turkey. For example, an article in the Freiburger Zeitung stressed in the summer of 1938 that there was already a national
Figure 5.7. Special issue of the *Quaderni di attualità* (1940) on the New Turkey.
Aufbau under way in the Francoist territory, even though the Spanish Civil War still raged on. This was very similar to the Third Reich narratives, in retrospect about the Turkish War of Independence, as well as to early Weimar, contemporary narratives.

However, by far neither a similar attempt at a “twinning” of the two states nor a comparison of Hitler and Franco was made in these texts. And even though one can find overtly positive Third Reich texts about other leaders and national projects, such as Poland’s Pilsudski, no other cases come even close in quantity or quality to the massive coverage, adulation, and hyperstylization of Atatürk and his New Turkey. And in any case, the Nazi narratives about the rise of the New Turkey were qualitatively very different from all other narratives of parallelism: Turkey had achieved more, had chosen this path first, and was still, after such a long and exhausting time marching on, on the path of völkisch reconstruction and modernization. Even though the “New Italy” was described in very similar and as admiring terms as the New Turkey in Nazi publications, the New Turkey was still a very different case. For one, the developmental gap it had to overcome to become “the most modern state of the twentieth century” was much larger than Italy’s. And then there was also another very different component of this völkisch success story: the “ethnic cleansing” of Anatolia. Part and parcel of this völkisch success story was always the “cleansing” of the new state of any minorities, of anything foreign.

The “fact” that the New Turkey was a real and pure völkisch state, because no more Greeks or Armenians were left in Anatolia, was stressed time and again, in hundreds of articles, texts, and speeches. The “pure national” existence of the New Turkey was crucial for everything that had happened in Anatolia in the 1920s and 1930s, for these authors. Through the topic “the New Turkey,” the meaning and success of the pure völkisch state was constantly illustrated, expanded upon, and reaffirmed. This reaffirmation or validation of the völkisch principle was enhanced through the significance of the “second Turkish miracle,” the fast and astonishing national reconstruction (Aufbau) after devastating wars. In this context, the continuous emphasis on the modernity of the New Turkey, its potency when it came to national reconstruction, also had a clear racial dimension—
this all was proof of what a racially pure state could accomplish, of what national life and a national future could look like if the nation had rid itself of all “parasitic” elements. The vast discussion of the Turkish role model and the New Turkey in the Third Reich media and publications means that the Third Reich had, at least implicitly, continually highlighted the “benefits” of “ethnic cleansing” and genocide. This whole aspect of the Turkish success story removes any veil of “innocence” regarding, for example, the Hoffmann photos showing new boulevards and factories in Turkey. The Armenians, while not visible, were also always there, and explicitly so in the Nazi perception. And thus the harmony of these pictures is destroyed: these were also pictures of a post-genocidal country.

The broad debates on the Armenian Genocide in post–World War I Germany, the already firmly established and reaffirmed German tradition of anti-Armenianism parallel to anti-Semitism, and the connection made through the Turkish case between a rejuvenated nation and national purity—all of these warrant a reevaluation of the role of the Armenian Genocide in the genesis of the Holocaust. Especially the connection to the Turkish case through the “twinned” victim groups, the transfer of the stab-in-the-back myth, and the exigencies of war also contributed to reinforcing what Ian Kershaw calls in another context the “genocidal link between war and the killing of Jews.”153 The Armenian Genocide was nothing distant for interwar Germany, neither geographically nor in time. It had been there with the attention the Turkish War of Independence had received from 1919 onward and continued to be there with the continued infatuation with Atatürk and his New Turkey in the Third Reich. The Armenian Genocide, as perceived by the Third Reich, must have been a tempting precedent indeed: on the one hand, it had paved the way to national rebirth and a blissful völkisch existence, and on the other hand, there had never been any “negative” repercussions for the Turks, such as a Great Power intervention to punish “the Turks” for what they had done.154 Furthermore, discussions of the Armenian Genocide in the 1920s had used the established parallel between anti-Semitism and anti-Armenianism and highlighted the stab-in-the-back myth, transferred to Anatolia, as the rationale of “justifications” for genocide. The continuation of these various trends of perception
in combination with the elaborations on the “ultimate war” through the Turkish example meant that the interwar discourses about Turkey strongly supported the “rationale” of Nazism’s eliminatory projects. Furthermore, taken together with the Greco-Turkish population exchange and the widely discussed repatriation of Turks from the Balkans, the topic of the New Turkey offered a whole array of ethnic population policies.\textsuperscript{155} But even though these various “policy options” might have been models of sorts for what the Nazis later did, this does not in any “Noltean”\textsuperscript{156} fashion diminish their own responsibility for them. Knowledge of one gruesome crime does not absolve a person from guilt if one commits it again or plans something similar yet even more gruesome and “effective.” Quite the contrary.
The Second World War and Turkey
Another Spain?

World War II complicated everything, including German-Turkish relations. Already with the ascent of Ismet İnönü to the Turkish presidency at the end of 1938 things had changed. Various Turkish treaties with the enemies of the Axis furthermore did not favor a continuation of the positive Nazi images of Turkey. Turkish-German bilateral relations, which before 1939 had not significantly influenced the Nazi image of Turkey, took on a real zigzag course during the war.¹ Two photos symbolize this like no others. The first (Fig. 6.1) shows the reception of the new Turkish ambassador to the Third Reich at Tempelhof Airport in 1942. Safvet Arıkan, small in build, was greeted not by the state secretary of the Führer’s Office, Meißner, who usually dealt with Turkish diplomats on such occasions and with whom relations had been especially cordial, but by the over-two-meters-tall Alexander von Dörnberg, who was head of the protocol office at the German Foreign Office and who on this occasion chose to wear his SS uniform. The small Turkey and the towering, menacing Nazi Germany would also be an apt description of how historiography, especially Turkish historiography, has often characterized the relationship between Nazi Germany and Turkey. The other photo (Fig. 6.2) shows a strange tourist in an even stranger land: Turkish general Cemil Cahit Toydemir
Figure 6.1. The Turkish ambassador, Saffet Arikan (left), arrives at Tempelhof Airport and is received by Alexander von Dörnberg (right), August 2, 1942. Hoffmann Collection, Staatsbibliothek München
with other Turkish officers and Wilhelm Keitel at the Gare du Nord of German-occupied Paris in 1943. Toydemir and his rather large military entourage were in the midst of a rather unusual two-week “Eurorail trip,” which included the “Atlantic Wall,” German-occupied Paris, and the Eastern Front, and was topped off by a meeting with Hitler at the Wolfschanze. This now was the Third Reich courting Turkey and treating it almost like an actual member of the Axis. But then again there was also a Third Reich foreign minister, Ribbentrop, one of the German Ottomans, allegedly practicing “yelling at the Turkish ambassador” alone in his office before he went to meet him. There was the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1939 promising mutual military assistance in the case of war, yet followed by a German-Turkish Friendship Treaty in 1941. There was a Turkey happy, if not ecstatic, about the German victories over the Red Army, and then at some point there was German ambassador von Papen, another German Ottoman, threatening the Turks with the total destruction of their cities—the common knowledge having been that one air raid
by the Bulgaria-based Luftwaffe units would have sufficed to make the whole of Istanbul, still made up mostly of wooden houses at that time, go up in flames. And yet it all ended on the very best of terms—at least relatively so—as evidenced, paradoxically, by how Turkey conveyed that it was breaking off diplomatic relations with the Third Reich in 1944 as well as by the tone of the front-page announcement of Turkey’s declaration of war against Germany in the Viölscher Beobachter.

In his discussion of Italy’s role in Hitler’s worldview, Walter Werner Pese stated that while it was true that Hitler admired, at times even idolized, Mussolini, this would be too simplistic as an explanation for the role of Italy in Hitler’s foreign policy conceptions. Something similar is true for Turkey: here, too, ideological admiration and perceived proximity did not necessarily translate directly into a given foreign policy, especially because Turkey and Nazi Germany were never as close as the Third Reich and Fascist Italy were when it came to real relations and not just imagined ones. With their very own “ultimate war” on the Nazis’ minds, ideology often took a backseat for them. This can be illustrated by a number of cases from all over Europe. The primacy of the war effort led to some twisted results when it came to fascist ideology. One example is fittingly reflected in the following passage from a memoir book, taken from the chapter “In the Concentration Camp”: “We were registered and as if we were criminals they took our fingerprints. . . . Finally we marched through the great gate into the actual camp, where we were assigned an empty barrack, made of bricks and reeking of disinfectant. We were accompanied on all sides by soldiers with machine guns and sharp dogs.” Not an untypical account about arriving at the concentration camp, Buchenwald perhaps, if it were not for the fact that these were the memoirs of a Romanian fascist, Stefan Logigan. He was part of the second-tier leadership of the Iron Guard, which had fled Romania after Marshal Antonescu had taken power and brutally suppressed the Romanian fascist movement. They were not as cordially welcomed in Nazi Germany as they had hoped to be. Hitler had chosen the reliable military man Ion Antonescu over the once third-largest fascist movement in Europe, because it served his war effort better and because the Iron Guard was just a bit too revolutionary and unruly
for Hitler’s taste. Ideology, it appears, was not necessarily guiding Germany’s foreign policy in these years. The brutality employed in the Nazi occupation of Italy also sits somewhat uneasily with the previous twinning of the two countries and the Axis rhetoric of friendship. The necessities of the war effort, conflicting with Turkey’s aspirations and geopolitical situation, were reflected not only in rapidly changing German-Turkish relations after 1939, but also in the Nazi discourse on Turkey. While most of the time the previous trends of the Nazi image of Turkey continued unabated, there were also times when anti-German Turkish policies and politicians were judged in the harshest language. They were usually judged against the higher standard of Atatürk himself and “Atatürk’s heritage” by German papers.

Throughout the 1930s Germany and Turkey had become ever more intertwined economically—in many ways contradicting the Nazi press glorification of Turkish economic “autarky.” By 1936 the Third Reich was the destination for 51 percent of Turkish exports and the origin of almost 50 percent of Turkish imports. Before 1939 Turkey had been one of prime buyers of weaponry, including fighter aircraft and submarines, from the Third Reich. Germany used trade and economic assistance to woo Turkey by giving out generous loans—often on Hitler’s own orders and overriding the advice of his economic advisors—and buying highly overpriced Turkish agricultural products. The Third Reich press from early on emphasized that Germany was assisting Turkey, especially economically, in its Aufbau project. Indeed, both countries, in this discourse, were collaborating very closely in their shared endeavor to construct modern völkisch states. The visits of Third Reich officials to Turkey, furthering this common Aufbau, were covered by an immense amount of articles, such as those chronicling Hjalmar Schacht’s visit in 1936. In this context it was, of course, highlighted that Schacht gave Atatürk an autographed portrait of the German Führer, as printed in bold in the article in the Völkischer Beobachter—whether Atatürk cared for it or not.

For the German economy, especially for the war effort, Turkey had become very important. The Nazis were very dependent on chromite, which was crucial for the production of stainless steel. By 1937 more than half of Germany’s chromite imports came from
Turkey. A similarly important ingredient of various metal armaments was tungsten, much of which was imported from Franco’s Spain during World War II. And indeed it is Spain’s role for the Third Reich during World War II that lends itself to comparison with Turkey’s role. Turkey was, in many ways, another Spain. While Leitz juxtaposes Turkey “the active neutral” with Spain “the Axis neutral,” it has to be asked whether there was that much of a difference. Unfortunately this is not the place to deal with this topic extensively, but this comparison allows us to recognize the continuation of the pre-1938/1939 Turkish role for Nazi Germany. Current and especially Turkish historiography has so far been too gentle on Turkey in World War II, barely calling it even an “active neutral.” And recent German historiography stresses in an almost singular fashion Turkey’s role as a safe haven for German refugees from Nazism. It is usually especially emphasized that Turkey was bullied by Germany into all these incriminating alliances and pro-Nazi gestures and that furthermore Turkey astutely maneuvered through the waters of World War II without actually becoming involved in it. After all, Turkey had been devastated by continuous warfare from 1911 until 1923—a fact often also sympathetically viewed as a legitimate excuse for Turkey’s neutrality by Third Reich texts. While the latter is true and indeed Turkey managed to stay out of the war, it did not always appear that it actually would.

In the beginning there was a brief period of suspense: from the summer of 1939, when Turkey signed friendship and mutual aid agreements with Britain and France, until a similar treaty was signed with Germany in 1941. The trade agreement between Turkey and Germany expired in 1939; Ankara was not interested in a renewal, and Hitler had already stopped weapons exports to Turkey. But after the fall of France Turkey yet again became closer to Germany, despite the fact that by now Turkey would have long ago been required to enter the war against the Axis, as per its previous agreements with Britain and France. In June 1940 it declared its “nonbelligerence.” In 1941 Turkish prime minister Saracoğlu even gave permission for the transit of German troops through Turkey toward Iraq, although he had to withdraw this permission later. Shortly thereafter, a ten-year Treaty of Friendship between the Third Reich and the New Tur-
Turkey was signed, promising Turkey’s benevolent neutrality. This was on June 18, 1941, just four days before “Operation Barbarossa,” the attack on the Soviet Union, began. Hitler had thus, as he himself put it, “secured the [southern] flank with the Turkish army” and the Turks were enthusiastic about German victories over their formerly most important ally, without whom the “Turkish War of Independence” would perhaps bear a different name today. Apparently, in these days, Turkish parliamentarians greeted each other in the halls of parliament by wishing each other a “good campaign” against Russia.

The German press heralded the friendship treaty as “one of the great political sensations of this war.” It was interpreted as the logical next step in a relationship “tested a hundred times in the past” between these “two brave warrior nations,” the Germans and the Turks. A couple of months later, the Turkish ambassador, Hüsrev Gerede, also stressed the “soldierly spirit” as something connecting both nations and regimes. And this was something that should have been realized many years ago, because since Hitler came to power, the two had shared a certain community of like-minded Führers, as the Vorarlberger Tagblatt stressed. It was a “friendship of hearts” that connected both nations, the Hamburger Fremdenblatt emphasized.

The treaty was used by the German press, in something of a minor media event, to celebrate both of these “new” nations and their ideological proximity yet again; the Frankfurter Zeitung featured three long articles on it in one day. Naturally, the Völkischer Beobachter reported extensively on this “German victory,” for over two weeks with eighteen articles and reports. One of the echoes of the friendship treaty described the overall foreign policy perspective the German propaganda tried to convey when it came to Turkey: that it was a “natural community of interests” that cemented Germany and Turkey together. The press commentary on the friendship treaty suggested that now Turkey would take part in the construction of the New Axis Europe.

While the old German-Turkish brotherhood in arms had never been forgotten in the Third Reich, the ideological proximity of the two “new” states had been the singularly dominant theme until 1941. However, in the context of Germany’s wooing of Turkey into an alliance, the old brotherhood motif, never absent completely in the prewar
Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination

Third Reich, was again employed in the German press more often. In the context of the 1941 treaty the press cried out that the two old partners had finally found each other again. The Völkischer Beobachter called it the “renewed comradeship.” This perspective on Turkey had, in a way, received direct support from Hitler himself with his letter to İnönü three months earlier in which he had mainly highlighted the common struggle in World War I.

But this theme, German-Turkish brotherhood in arms, and Talât Pasha, whose remains had been returned to Turkey in 1943 from Berlin, were not the only things that were dug up again during World War II. Now the New Turkey also dug up Enver Pasha, ideologically, ushering into the brief flirtation with Turanism by the Nazis and the New Turkey alike between 1941 and 1943/4. Turanism—the vision of a union of all Turkic peoples from the Aegean to northwestern China under Turkish leadership—had once motivated Enver Pasha and had led to the catastrophe at Sarıkamış. Under Atatürk, Turanism was suppressed, but under his successor İnönü new Turanist clubs were opened, apparently even founded on government initiative. And although Enver had not succeeded in traversing the Caucasian passes beyond Sarıkamış, his brother Nuri Pasha had marched into Baku at the end of World War I at the head of the Ottoman “Army of Islam.” Massacres of local Armenians had followed. And it was precisely this Nuri Pasha (now by the name Nuri Killigil) who was sent to Berlin in 1941 and who presented to the Nazis his Turanist vision of a multitude of Turkic states in the Caucasus and Central Asia led by Turkey. Not much was to come of it. The only immediate result was that the Nazis began employing Pan-Turkist propaganda among the captured Soviet soldiers of Turkic ethnicity (Tatars, Azeris, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and so on) in order to recruit them into special SS units. Furthermore, neither various Nazi offers of territorial enlargement nor frequent Turkish hints about “potential territorial wish lists” (northern Syria, Mosul, Aleppo, the Dodecanese Islands, and such) produced any immediate results. The rationale of the Turkish government, as expressed by Foreign Minister Mehmet Şükrü Saracoglu, was that as long as the Nazis had not completely defeated the Soviet Union, for fear of Soviet reprisals against the many Turkic populations inside the Soviet Union, Turkey sim-
ply could not do anything. At least not openly, because even if Nuri Pasha was in Berlin only in a semi-official capacity, there is evidence that it was indeed official Turkey that was extending its feelers. High military officers such as the Turkish chief of staff, Fevzi Çakmak, as well as the generals Hüseyin Erkilet and Ali Fuat Erdem seem to have also been involved in these Pan-Turkish, German-Turkish talks. The latter two, after returning from an almost three-week-long tour of Germany and the Eastern front in late 1941, tried to convince the Turkish president İnönü and other high-ranking Turks that the war was as good as won and that now was the time for Turkey to participate in the German victory. İnönü was hesitant; others were more easily convinced. The Turkish military elite, including the General Staff, seemed to have been especially pro-German and Turanist at the time. Almost a year later, now as Turkish prime minister, Saracoğlu told von Papen how happy he would be if the Third Reich would destroy the Soviet Union, and he advised the Germans that what they needed to do to win this war was to kill half of the Russian nation. Von Papen summarized Saracoğlu’s message: “As a Turk, he yearns for the destruction of Russia; it would be the Führer’s most magnificent deed.” It appears as if official Turkey, at least below President İnönü, was very much tempted by the Turanist possibilities that had opened up with Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union.

Once it was clear that Germany was not winning the war in the Soviet Union, Pan-Turanism was also abandoned by Ankara, at the very least in order to signal its “neutrality” vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In May 1944, after Turkey had been forced by an Allied boycott to stop exporting chromite to Germany and had thus lost almost all its trade with Germany, leading Pan-Turanists were arrested, a concerted anti-Turanist propaganda effort was organized by the government, and Turanist organizations were closed down. Many Turkish authors argue that the Turkish-German Turanist flirtation was merely a safety net for Turkey in case Germany won. But Turkey’s pro-German stance went beyond the Turanist flirtation. As Leitz and others stress, the Third Reich was allowed to transport war material and troops through the Straits, while no other power was allowed to do so—and this was before the attack on the Soviet Union. Various Turkish politicians, including İnönü himself, had also let the
Germans know that once the Wehrmacht reached the Caucasus, Turkey would reevaluate its position anew and in a decisively pro-German fashion. The deputy chief of staff even told von Papen in certain terms that at that point the Turkish army would enter the war on the German side. The High Command of the Wehrmacht also counted on this side effect in its operations toward the Caucasus.\textsuperscript{38}

When pressed by the Allies in early 1944 to end exports of chromite to Germany and to break off diplomatic relations with the Third Reich, Turkey dragged its feet on both as long as possible—on the latter for months, until August 1944.\textsuperscript{39} The way Ankara handled the end of chromite exports to the Third Reich even more clearly illustrates the “real feelings” of official Turkey: After having been forced to end these exports by an Allied boycott, the Turkish government continued them for another two weeks; then on April 21, 1944, it ordered the state railroad company to collect all available wagons and have them loaded with chromite for the Third Reich. That evening 218 wagons crossed the border destined for Germany—not only did the Turkish government in this fashion fulfill its chromite export obligations for the year 1944, but the shipments in early 1944 taken altogether fulfilled almost all, now void, obligations for 1945 as well.\textsuperscript{40}

Throughout the war a series of Turkish actions clearly identified Turkey as another “Axis neutral,” just like Spain. In the summer of 1942, as von Papen had been promised by the Turkish General Staff in the spring, the Turks withdrew their troops from Thrace and amassed twenty-eight divisions at their Caucasus border with the Soviet Union. This forced the Soviets to divert vital troops there and thus indirectly supported the German campaign, resulting in the taking of, for example, Rostov in July. Again in 1943, Saracoğlu strongly urged the Third Reich to trust Turkey and throw against the Soviet Union all the divisions it kept at the Turkish borders.\textsuperscript{41} But there are many, many more aspects one could cite to illustrate Turkey’s close connection with the Nazis—for example, the military exchange program, with twelve Turkish officers serving in the Wehrmacht in 1938; the outlawing of a major Turkish newspaper, the \textit{Vatan}, in 1942 because it had printed a picture of Charlie Chaplin as “the great dictator”; or, for a “neutral” country, strangely “intimate” visits. And there were indeed many visits by a variety of Turkish delegations to the Third Reich,
including military delegations in 1941, 1942, and 1943—such as a delegation of Turkish intelligence officers and police chiefs to Berlin and the concentration camp Sachsenhausen, the latter per request of the Turks. Furthermore, Turkey also took a variety of anti-minority and explicitly anti-Jewish measures, which obviously would have endeared it to the Third Reich. Hatice Bayraktar has recently pointed out that Turkish journalists and caricaturists literally interned with the violently anti-Semitic Der Stürmer and imported back with them to Turkey the Stürmer’s style of anti-Semitism. On the other hand, Turkey provided refuge for a number of Jews from Germany.

Turkey also repeatedly offered to help the Third Reich negotiate a peace with the Western Allies, as in 1940 and again in 1941, in order to free Germany in the West and support its war against the Soviet Union. At the very final meeting between von Papen and İnönü, who met for Turkey to officially break off diplomatic relations, İnönü offered to act as negotiator on Germany’s behalf in the coming time for peace talks with the Allies. Then, with the deadline for joining the United Nations approaching only a couple of days later, Turkey declared war on Germany on February 23, 1945—the reason being, as a leading Turkish journalist commented that day, solely to be able to be part of the UN. Turkey did not take part in any hostile activities against Germany. Surprisingly, or perhaps not, given what has been discussed in previous chapters, the Völkischer Beobachter expressed no anger, not even disappointment, with Turkey when it devoted its front page to the Turkish declaration of war on Germany on February 25, 1945. In three long articles it stressed that Turkey had been forced into this declaration against its better judgment. It was “treason against itself” as one headline exclaimed—again the Völkischer Beobachter claimed to be the keeper of the true and only “Atatürkism” in a long essay on the history of Turkey since 1914. The Turkish nation knew that this decision was wrong, the paper emphasized, but it had to be able to sit at the conference table in San Francisco when the United Nations would be deciding vital aspects of Turkey’s future. It had no choice, it was all entirely the fault of the “Yalta gangsters.” A book published in late 1944 also stressed that the Turkish population did not want to leave
Germany’s side and that the various “Turkish lessons” for Germany remained valid nonetheless.\textsuperscript{49}

Hitler’s designs for Turkey remain somewhat in the dark. Hitler had not thought much of the post-Atatürk Turkish leadership at first, but in due course he changed his mind and respected İnönü as well.\textsuperscript{50} Von Papen, since 1939 the ambassador in Ankara, was under orders to deepen relations with Turkey toward a military alliance.\textsuperscript{51} The minimum goal throughout the war was Turkey’s neutrality, which among other things cut off a potential Allied supply route through the Straits. Some authors argue that there had been plans for German military operations against Turkey.\textsuperscript{52} The Wehrmacht developed scenarios involving Turkey, but Hitler opposed such plans throughout the war.\textsuperscript{53} It has to be remembered that Wehrmacht scenarios existed also against Franco’s Spain, and, as in the case of Spain, they usually had the goal of traversing the country, in this case toward either the Caucasus, Iraq, or Egypt.\textsuperscript{54} From the summer of 1941 onward the High Command of the Wehrmacht clearly excluded any military options vis-à-vis Turkey for the future and championed political solutions—probably also because Hitler had repeatedly spoken out against military action against Turkey. Another reason could also be, as Krecker claims, that the Germans had been so impressed with the Turkish War of Independence that they knew that a war with Turkey would be disastrous, as “the Turks would fight even if they had no chance at all.” This, Krecker claims, was also why German authorities were not allowed to use the language of ultimatums or outright pressure.\textsuperscript{55}

Hitler repeatedly did everything he could to avoid upsetting the Turks. On two occasions he forbade military operations in Turkish waters when chasing the enemy. After Crete was taken, he stressed that except for a Kraft-durch-Freude (Strength through Joy) facility, nothing else, especially not military installations, could be built there, in order not to upset the Turks. The New Turkey was repeatedly invited to take part in the New Order of Europe. And Hitler expressed his hope to Mussolini, in July 1941, that with continuous success in the war against the Soviet Union, Turkey would come ever closer to the Axis.\textsuperscript{56} In May 1942 Hitler stressed that he wanted to hold on tightly to the Crimea, because it would open up the pos-
sibility of a “decisive friendship” with Turkey after the war. This is a very interesting statement by Hitler. On the one hand, the Nazis had selected Crimea to be a settlement area for Germans, but as a prime object of Turanist designs, it had also been used as bait to get Turkey to join the Axis. On the other hand, it showed that Hitler was, for some reason, actually interested in a friendship with Turkey even beyond the war and beyond strategic considerations—something rarely documented about Hitler when it came to other nations.

That a positive Nazi image of the New Turkey remained intact to the very end of this German-Turkish zigzag story is even more remarkable when we remember that, in the prelude to World War II, Turkey had been strongly and vocally opposed to Mussolini’s Abyssinian adventure, had stood in the way of Mussolini’s *Mare Nostrum* designs, and had even been on the other side of the then-nascent Axis in the Spanish Civil War as a supporter of the Republicans. Until the Turkish Foreign Office archives are opened, until somebody has analyzed the image of National Socialism in 1930s Turkey—the Turkish press having been quite obsessed with National Socialism, its policies, and the rebuilding of Germany—and until we know more about pro-Nazi currents in Turkish society at the time, Turkish motivations and goals during World War II will remain clouded in mystery, as do Hitler’s ultimate goals regarding Turkey. Did his admiration of Atatürk influence his policies vis-à-vis Turkey after all? Why did he care about German-Turkish friendship after the war? Given the dearth of sources, we will probably never know.

Perhaps it is not all that coincidental that Hitler’s resigned words about the Germans in the *Führerbunker* as his “thousand-year Third Reich” went up in flames clearly echoed the rationale developed in Nazi publications about the Turkish War of Independence and the “ultimate war” as the test and proof of racial worth. Hitler said that if the Germans lost this war, then they deserved to perish. It also closely echoed the dictum attributed to Atatürk by the Nazi publications: “It is better if a great people dies than to vegetate without honor.” And while Magda and Joseph Goebbels were about to poison their children in the *Führerbunker*, a few streets away soldiers of Turkic descent from the Soviet Union were fighting and dying on both
sides of the Battle for Berlin—Tatars, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Azeris, and others of Turkic origins as part of an overwhelming Red Army struggling over every street of the German capital against Tatars, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Azeris in Turkic SS units on the German side, mobilized by the Turanic vision that Enver Pasha’s brother Nuri Pasha had brought with him to Berlin in 1941.62
If we are to believe Hitler, Atatürk was his “shining star” in the darkness of the 1920s. Atatürk’s revolution and the New Turkey had fascinated the German nationalists and far right in the early Weimar years like almost no other topic during this time. Repeatedly a variety of newspapers had called for the application of “Turkish lessons” to Germany. Foremost among them were the newspapers of the National Socialists, who were strongly motivated by the Turkish War of Independence in their endeavors to “liberate” Germany. “Ankara-in-Munich” is one way to understand the Hitler Putsch. In his 1924 defense speech Hitler identified Atatürk as having carried out the most perfect of the two new revolutions, the other being Mussolini’s. This hierarchy of his role models still echoed on in 1938, when Hitler described Atatürk as the great teacher, whose first student had been Mussolini and whose second was Hitler himself. This early Nazi, nationalist, and far-right “Turk fever” abated after the successful conclusion of the Turkish War of Independence in the Treaty of Lausanne in the summer of 1923, but especially after the failed Hitler Putsch months later. Once the Nazis came to power, the early-Weimar hype about Turkey was continued and the previous exaggeratedly positive image of Turkey was reinstated as an official National Socialist image and as part of party and state propaganda. The Nazis practiced something of a minor cult around the New Turkey and

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Atatürk. Though Hitler did not think highly of other extra-European nations, he did not shy away from repeatedly stressing the role-model character of Atatürk. And this manifested itself not only in Hitler’s “cherished possession,” his Atatürk bust, but also in the integration of Atatürk and the New Turkey as examples of the Führer principle and Führer state, of a modern, völkisch state, even as a modern völkisch success story into the realm of the “Nazi self” and the Nazi worldview. The New Turkey and the “New Germany” were twinned by the German media and publications—continually and encompassing all areas of discourse and ideology—whether the Turks liked it or not, and regardless of what Turkish reality was really like. A book from 1944 reviewed the German literature on Turkey in a similar fashion, stressing that the focus on the exemplariness of Turkey in German publications had eclipsed all “errors of development,” and then proceeded to do the very same in its own narrative.1

This twinning of Turkey and Germany expressed itself in narratives of the Turkish Führer, of the Turkish War of Independence as an example of an “ultimate” and “total war,” of Turkish modernity and the miracle of the Turkish Aufbau, as well as of Turkish revisionism, old and new. But unfortunately the Turkish success story also offered even more disturbing examples of “völkisch good practice” when it came to the treatment of the minorities. Although this topic requires much more research, the Armenian Genocide was not forgotten by the 1930s as might be suggested by the disputed Hitler statement “Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?” The Armenian Genocide and the expulsion of the Greeks were part and parcel of Third Reich discourses about the New Turkey; they were viewed as crucial preconditions for the völkisch success story that was the New Turkey. The Nazis had “grown up” with both the rise of the New Turkey and the Armenian Genocide, and they had not forgotten either.

The Nazi and Third Reich vision of Turkey as a successful example of a modern völkisch Führer state allows conclusions to be drawn about the “Nazi self.” The high degree of twinning of Turkey with the Third Reich suggests that what was perceived to define the New Turkey and what was praised by the press, publications, and leading Nazis was also applicable to the “New Germany.” The
modernity of the New Turkey, as identified by Third Reich texts, was part of the Nazis’ own system of references—indeed, part of their own vision of modernity. In this context, the reference points that emerge are ideas about not only the Führer, the Führer state, minorities, and ultimate war, but also the rapid and revolutionary transformation of state and nation into something new, encompassing such areas as infrastructural and economic development, construction of modern buildings, cities, and factories, as well as the new roles of propaganda, sports, and youth. Through the Turkish case one finds the Nazis advocating modernity and modernization for their own sake. The twinning with Turkey also conveyed a strong sense of a “new beginning,” as Roger Griffin has put it. And although this may appear like a superficial modernity, it was certainly not a “reactionary” one. Whatever conclusions one wants to draw from the Nazi vision of the New Turkey for the still-ongoing debate about Nazi modernity, the key contexts and connections of the Nazi discourse were the Führer principle and the ethnic, völkisch dimensions. Nazis saw the New Turkey as vibrant and hypermodern because it was following its Führer unquestionably and because it had “solved” the “minority question” (as well as the “church question”). Thus, a crucial aspect of the Nazis’ New Turkey was the propagandistic preparation and support for an absolute Führer state and all the other things to come—from various aspects of völkisch Aufbau to a “solution” of the “minority question” and ultimate war. Furthermore, the Nazi vision of the New Turkey clearly promulgated the total separation of church and state, if not the total destruction of religion’s power in society. It promoted no “alternative” designs for the role of church or religion in a modern völkisch society; in this context there is no evidence for claims that the role of religion would simply be modified, as, for example, Steigmann-Gall proposed with the term “positive Christianity.” The Nazi vision of Atatürk and the New Turkey thus also allows us to glimpse ideas about Nazism itself. This vision was highly selective and accentuated only what the authors and the Third Reich wanted to see; it was also extremely settled and rigid, and by 1933 it had turned to stone. Neither Turkish “reality” since 1919 nor any developments in contemporary Turkey were to change this petrified simulacrum of Turkey.
This adulating discourse about the New Turkey was not something the Nazis had to invent in the 1930s; it was already there and only had to be appropriated and continued. This ready-made discourse supported key Nazi policies and ideological components: the Führer principle and myth, the Führer state, the völkisch revolution of state, society, and the economy, “ethnic cleansing,” and the preparation for the coming “ultimate war.” It was there for the Nazis to pick up and continue, but, at the same time, it was also their very own discourse. It is no accident that Goebbels remembered Hitler as a “brightly shining star in the hours of deepest despair” and that conversely Hitler himself remembered the Turkish Führer in these very same terms. The evolution of Nazism, the development of the post-war Führer idea, as well as the Turkish War of Independence and the discourses about Atatürk and the New Turkey had all taken place at the same time and in many ways “together.” Indeed, if Ian Ker- shaw is correct that Hitler had already started his transition from “drummer” to Führer before the Hitler Putsch, then Atatürk must have been a key Führer figure on Hitler’s mind. It is plausible that Hitler had read and talked about Mustafa Kemal many months, probably even two to three years, before Mussolini played any significant role in the media discourse in Germany. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the official discourse in the Third Reich lionized Atatürk as the model Führer.

Hitler, who was once dubbed the “German Mussolini,” would remember and cherish his Turkish role model until the end of his rule. In comparison it is quite remarkable that Benito Mussolini, who once allegedly called himself the “Mustafa Kemal of Milan,” was quick to forget his Turkish role model. Mussolini acted as he did—the many publications admiring Turkey in Fascist Italy aside—because he aspired to ideological leadership in the new fascist world. Hitler’s continued and openly pronounced admiration was, among other things, based upon the very specific “Turkish atmosphere” that had once existed in post-war Munich, and in Germany in general, when the Nazi movement came into being. What is also quite remarkable is that despite the Nazis’ continued and open reverence of their role models, we know little about how, for example, Italian Fascism was viewed in Nazi discourse, how the development of Italian Fascism really influenced
nazism, and more specifically how the various successes and failures of the Italian version were discussed in the Nazi media. As has become clear in this book, when we think of policy development, myths, goals, and the overall ideology of the Third Reich, we should always also think about Turkey’s role for the Nazis. Given how the Nazis connected themselves, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to the other two “kindred systems,” Fascism and Kemalism, a closer examination of Italy’s role is called for. In the minds of the Nazis (and the Italian Fascists, one might add) the three new systems—National Socialism, Italian Fascism, and Kemalism—were engaged in an ongoing dialogue throughout their existence.5

“Turkey” was a topic of public discourse that required little Gleichschaltung (forced coordination), though of course in the Third Reich we find the New Turkey being glorified by papers that had been much more careful or reluctant to do so in the early Weimar years, such as the Berliner Tageblatt or the Frankfurter Zeitung. The Nazis’ petrified image of the New Turkey was able to weather not only Turkey’s opposition to Mussolini’s Abyssinian adventure and its support for the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War, but also Turkey’s back-and-forth politics during World War II. The Nazi press continued to be understanding and forgiving when it came to Turkey, not only when Turkey signed the Anglo-Turkish Treaty in 1939, but even when it declared war on Germany. Here, as often in the last seven years of the Third Reich, the Nazi press, first and foremost the Völkischer Beobachter, readily assumed the role of being the “true keeper” of Atatürk’s heritage and frequently condemned Turkish foreign policy moves on the grounds that they conflicted with Atatürk’s wishes, policies, and everything he had ever stood for. A special kind of Nazi understanding of Turkey seems to have been so ingrained in Nazi Germany, and especially in Hitler, that when von Papen informed Hitler of the Turks’ announcement that they were breaking off diplomatic relations, Hitler’s response was not an angry outburst but instead a statement that he had expected this ever since he had abandoned the Crimea.6 Hitler seems to have cared a great deal about friendship with Turkey, as another of his statements about the Crimea illustrated, where he stressed the importance of having a deep friendship with Turkey after the war.
What this book also illustrates, then, is how foreign topics and foreign events were not only closely watched but also imported into domestic contexts by the modern mass media in the 1920s. So interested was the German public, or at least the newspapers, that despite the many other things Germany had to worry and talk about, Turkey was a dominant ingredient of the newspaper discourse of the early Weimar years, on the front page and always somehow connected to the great domestic and foreign policy issues that concerned Germany most directly—and this at a time when the papers still had no correspondents in Turkey. Similarly, this book shows how much the Nazis, in contrast to Italy, were open not only to following a fellow, or rival, system closely in their media, but also to directly and continuously associating themselves, including their own ideology, their Führer, and their history, with a foreign movement, state, and leader. At the same time Hitler repeatedly and angrily attacked the group around Otto Strasser, for their admiration of Gandhi and for glorifying the liberation struggles of “lesser races.” Röhm explicitly stated in his memoirs that National Socialism needed no foreign role models. Any nationalist movement naturally has inherent problems with linking itself to other foreign nationalist movements. “Prin noi înșine” was a slogan of Romanian nationalism, and its meaning, “Through ourselves, by ourselves,” also applies to National Socialist ideology.

This is also reflected in the immediate context of the iconic quote about Hitler being “Germany’s Mussolini.” Its author, Hermann Esser, had in fact prefaced this by stressing, “We have no need to imitate an Italian Mussolini. We already have our own. His name is Adolf Hitler!” Still, Atatürk was time and again linked to and equated with Hitler; the German Führer himself inscribed Atatürk in his own biography by calling him his shining star and his teacher.

National Socialism does not have only a German prehistory, nor was it influenced only by Italian Fascism. Its origins are more international, and some of them, as I have shown, are Turkish. The often-used technique of narrating each fascism’s prehistory within a merely national context needs to be revised. Interestingly, as comparative works on fascism increase in number, the less they mention Turkey, most not even as part of the general background. But these early twentieth-century mass-media societies, such as Weimar Germany,
were well aware of what was happening in the world around them, made sense of these events in their own ways, and even appropriated many of these events for their own purposes. National Socialism and the Third Reich were thus much more entangled with the various “alternative” new movements and projects of the 1920s and 1930s than is often acknowledged. If we pay more attention to these entangled aspects of Nazism—and to the other aspects of the various national histories in the first part of the twentieth century—we can find much more than an excavation of entanglement itself. A more transnational approach can offer new and important insights into each national history as well.

The Nazis’ chiseled-in-stone image of Atatürk and the New Turkey had withered all vicissitudes of “reality” until World War II. Hitler’s aggressive expansionist war tested the limits of the Turkish analogy; losing the war demolished it. And just as the defeat of the Nazis in 1923—the failed Hitler Putsch—had ended the broad German nationalist hype about Atatürk, so defeat in 1945 quickly turned the Nazi role-model to dust. It seems that by the time Turkish “guestworkers” arrived by the thousands in Germany in the early 1960s, the previous hysteria about Turkey had already been forgotten. The admiration for Atatürk and the New Turkey in the Third Reich as well as during the Weimar Republic also means that, if one includes the first “Turk fever” after 1908 and the German-Ottoman alliance in World War I, for almost forty years the prevalent image in Germany of the Turks and Turkey had been extremely positive—even though after 1918 the discourses markedly changed, qualitatively and quantitatively, and thus were not a mere continuation of previous trends. This and the elderly women shouting in the 2007 Munich rain about Hitler’s love for the Turks conflicts strongly with established views and the historiography on German images of the Turks and Turkey. During the high points of the German debate about Turkish EU membership around 2002, even pro-Turkish researchers, including historians of the Ottoman Empire, emphasized the unbroken continuation of negative images from the Middle Ages, when the Turks were “in continuo” at the gates of Vienna, to the present.13 This supposed continuity brushes over
not only the changes in German images of the Turks after the last siege of Vienna failed in 1683—from a colorful and even playful Orientalism to seeing the Turks as weak, decadent, and despotic up until the late nineteenth century—but also the strategic interests and the close cooperation of the Kaiserreich and the Ottoman Empire. And finally, this view also neglects the “Turk fever” following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the extremely positive image of Turkey and the Turks from 1919 until the end of World War II.

This analysis of Atatürk in the Nazi imagination thus illustrates the flux in images about Turkey in Germany and the very specific societal and political factors that always influence such kinds of perception: Our national, societal, and personal views and discourses about the “Other” are much more about us than about any actual “Other”; they are dependent on time and place, on fears, expectations, plans, and dreams. We must always be wary of alleged traditions and continuities. More often than not they are constructed and imagined rather than real. There is no “eternal Turk” in the German national psyche or in German history. The image of “the Turk” has often changed over the course of the centuries—massively so in the twentieth century—and it will change again.
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The scarcity of sources and of Nazi publications for the early 1920s, as well as the logic of the discourse discovered in those sources, has necessitated a broader focus on the right and far-right print media of the early Weimar Republic. Here especially, but by far not exclusively, the *Neue Preussische (Kreuz-)Zeitung* has been used. I have analyzed the paper in full for the time from 1919 until 1923, as well as the Nazi papers the *Heimatland*, from 1920 until 1923—its entire existence—and the *Völkische Beobachter* during the Turkish War of Independence, 1919–1923, as well as for most of the Third Reich. In addition, I was able to rely on the press cutting collection of the *Reichslandbund* (at the Bundesarchiv) and the various articles collected in the relevant folders in the Political Archives of the German Foreign Office and the Bundesarchiv as well as on some edited collections.1 Furthermore, I have carried out a variety of cross-checks of other papers—aided also by the monthly press digest of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior, *Ayin Taribi*—using the collections at the university libraries in Cambridge, Heidelberg, Regensburg, Berlin (Freie Universität, Otto Suhr Institute), the Staatsbibliothek Berlin and the Staatsbibliothek München, the Istituto Storico Italiano per l’Età Moderna e Contemporanea (Rome), the Atatürk Kitaplığı (Istanbul), as well as various online resources, such as those of the Staatsbibliothek

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Berlin, the university libraries at Heidelberg and Freiburg, as well as ANNO—the online portal of digitalized Austrian newspapers. I have further used the textbook collections at the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research (Braunschweig). In addition to the various relevant documents at the Bundesarchiv (Berlin and Koblenz), the Political Archives of the German Foreign Office, the Archivio Diplomatico Storico of the Italian Foreign Office, the Tröbst Papers at the Institute for Press Research at the University of Bremen have been especially helpful. The photos used in this book, which are often prime sources rather than merely illustrations, stem from the Bundesarchiv (Bild-Archiv), the Ullstein Picture Archives, and the collection of photographs by Hitler’s friend and personal photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann, at the Staatsbibliothek München.

The heavy reliance on the print media might be considered somewhat problematic, as historical newspaper analysis always is to some extent. The print market of the early Weimar years is almost inconceivably large and varied, with very few papers of national reach. While still large, the newspaper market in the Third Reich was, of course, fairly in line with Nazi and governmental objectives, controlled through a series of mechanisms. Both periods present their own problems for the researcher. These are somewhat circumvented here by two approaches: First, the early press discourse of the Weimar Republic is mainly relevant here as far as it provides us with the roots of the Nazi image of Turkey; I have used it to identify certain tendencies from the center to far-right spectrum, regarding the topic of Turkey and the Turkish background to the early Weimar years in general, not to represent the whole of the media landscape with all its nuances. Secondly, for both periods my analysis rests solidly not only on a wide range of papers, including the key Nazi papers, but also on an empirical base of literally thousands of articles, which could be quoted here to support the key tenets in this book. Unfortunately, only a few examples from the press can be cited, otherwise this book would have included hundreds more pages of endnotes. Indeed, the sheer volume of texts supporting the key arguments presented in this book has been the most surprising outcome of my research. And while it is to be assumed that one could find a series of positive articles about
Pilsudski’s Poland or the United States in the nationalist and Third Reich press from the 1920s and 1930s, these cannot compete with the overwhelming volume of coverage, the ideological importance—as evidenced by sources beyond the print media here—and the overall coherence of the Nazi vision of the New Turkey for over two decades. This was a very special case—with which probably only the Nazi vision of Fascist Italy can compete. Similarly, not all the newspapers used can even be properly introduced and situated on the political, national, and print-run scale here; this too would have expanded the text far beyond readability.

This book also has to grapple with the absence of previous studies. This absence is in a way self-explanatory. There exist a number of studies on the images of the enemies of National Socialism and the Third Reich, first and foremost about the image of “the Jews,” but also in relation to the Soviet Union, Poland, and Great Britain. Much more interesting, in the context of this topic, would have been analyses of Nazi perceptions of “kindred” regimes and countries such as Fascist Italy and Francoist Spain, of which we have almost none. The absence is again not surprising, because with the existing literature we have a fairly good idea of how the Nazis perceived Mussolini and his state. Yet, for example, while the role-model character of Mussolini is often presumed, so far few have analyzed how knowledge and ideas traveled across the Alps and into Nazi minds; so that picture, like the one this books sets out to paint, remains incomplete. On the other hand, there are many studies comparing various fascist and totalitarian regimes, as well as some venturing into the entangled history of European and non-European states, many of which have been an inspiration for this book. Furthermore, Ruth Ben-Ghiat’s study on Italian “Fascist modernities” has been an important influence here, as she uncovered the language of modernism extensively for one fascist case. Especially important was Michael Kellogg’s The Russian Roots of Nazism—although had I used a similar approach, and had I relied on organizational structures of associations pertaining to the Turkish-German connection, I would have found very little. It was not in the clubrooms of the veterans’ organization Bund der Asienkämpfer (Association of Oriental Fighters) or the pages of its
yearbook that Turkey was debated. Those who had something to say on the topic were instead invited to speak, for example, at the public lecture house Urania in Berlin or in front of the crown prince of Bavaria and Adolf Hitler. And as this book shows, the topic was debated in the media, again and again—and yet once more.
Notes

All translations, unless otherwise stated, are my own.

Prologue


7. Compare, for example, Aslı Çirakman, From the “Terror of the World” to the “Sick Man of Europe”: European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002); Dietrich Klein et al., eds., Wahrnehmungen des Islam zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2008).


10. Lüdke, *Jihad Made in Germany*; Schwanitz, “Djihad ‘Made in Germany.’”


13. Ibid., 35.


22. Often “Atatürk” and “Turkey” do not even feature in the indices of accounts of the time, of source editions, or relevant studies, even where they in fact are mentioned in the main texts. For example, Werner Maser, ed., Hitlers


28. On the academic literature on Turkey in the Third Reich, compare Ellinger, Deutsche Orientalistik. Among the most important memoirs of German Ottomans: Liman von Sanders, Fünf Jahre Türkei (Berlin: A. Scherl, 1920); Hans Kannengießer Pascha, Gallipoli (Berlin: Schlieffen Verlag, 1927); Friedrich Freiherr Kreß von Kressenstein, Mit den Türken zum Suezkanal (Berlin: O. Schlegel, 1938). For an extensive list of German memoirs in relation to the Oriental theater of World War I, see Jan Christoph Reichmann, “Tapfere Askers” und “feige Araber”: Der osmanische Verbündete aus der Sicht deutscher Soldaten im Orient, 1914–1918 (PhD diss., Duisburg, 2009).

29. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich, xxxi.

1. Turkish Lessons for Germany

1. For example, “Wie es kommen könnte,” Kladderadatsch 4 (1919); “Clémenceau, der Vampyr,” Kladderadatsch 15 (1919); “Prometheus!,” Kladderadatsch 31 (1919); “Im Netz der Entente,” Kladderadatsch 8 (1920); “(untitled cover; German Sleeping Beauty),” Kladderadatsch 14 (1920); “Die apokalyptischen Reiter,” Kladderadatsch 20 (1921); “Michels Leidensgang,” Kladderadatsch 39 (1921); “Es ist beides geworden!,” Kladderadatsch 14 (1922); “Wie Deutschland den dritten Jahrestag von Versailles beging,” Kladderadatsch 28 (1922); “Die französische Bulldogge,” Kladderadatsch 47 (1922); “Der Störenfried,” Kladderadatsch 33/34 (1923); “Die apokalyptischen Reiter,” Kladderadatsch 20 (1923); “Der Vampyr im Ruhrgebiet,” Kladderadatsch 25 (1923); “Scheusal der Weltgeschichte,” Kladderadatsch 33/34 (1923).

2. Compare my discussion of the existing historiography on the topic in note 21 in the Prologue.

3. Ernst Röhm, Die Geschichte eines Hochverräters (Munich: Franz Eher Verlag, 1934 [1928]), 152.


8. The stab-in-the-back myth was developed and put forward by German nationalists and parts of the former military leadership toward the end of the war and in the early Weimar years. It claimed that the World War had been
lost not by reason of military defeats, but rather because the victorious German army had been stabbed in the back by either socialists, Jews, democrats in general, or all of them combined.


30. “Was geht in der Türkei vor?”


36. Compare some examples from 1920: “Der türkische Freiheitskampf,” Kreuzzeitung, May 15, 1920, also on May 26, May 31, June 3, etc.; “Die Orientfrage,” Kreuzzeitung, January 27, 1920; also on February 10, February 11, February 12, February 22, etc.; and “Der Krieg in Kleinasiern,” Kreuzzeitung, April 6, also on April 14, June 11, June 12, June 30, etc. Further examples of serialization below.

37. Some examples from Il Popolo d’Italia in 1921: “La guerra greco-turca,” January 11, 1921, also on March 30, March 31, April 1, April 2, April 3, April 9, June 9, June 12, etc.; “La guerra in Asia Minore,” June 7, 1921, also on June 11, June 17, July 1, July 6, July 9, July 16, July 23, July 24, and by Mussolini himself on November 4, etc.; and “La guerra in Anatolia,” September 25, 1921, also on September 27, September 30, October 4, October 19, etc.


50. Compare an article on Persia, which spoke of the “Bolshevik poison slowly infecting the country, leaving no doubt about the paper’s political convictions: “Der Kampf um den Orient,” *Kreuzzzeitung*, September 9, 1920.


58. See the discussion of German philhellenism, and the conflict between images of the Greeks and German imperial designs before 1919, in Malte Fuhrmann, “Den Orient Deutsch machen: Imperiale Diskurse des Kaiserreiches über das Osmanische Reich,” Kakani Revisited, www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/fallstudie, as well as Malte Fuhrmann, Der Traum vom deutschen Orient: Zwei deutsche Kolonien im Osmanischen Reich, 1851–1918 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2006).
61. See, for example, Cornelio di Marzio, La Turchia di Kemal (Milano: Casa editrice Alpes, 1926); L’Osservatore, “Meridiano di Roma,” Critica Fascista 12 (1932): 234; Ettore Anchieri et al., eds., La Nuova Turchia (Roma: Edizioni Roma, 1939); Diogo Caminha, História Maravilhosa de Kemal Páxi (Lisboa: Argo, 1944); Philippe de Zara, Mustapha Kémal: Dictateur (Paris: F. Sorlot, 1936).
62. See also Mangold-Will, Begrenzte Freundschaft, 74–75.
70. See, for example, “Die gegenwärtige Lage der Türkei” Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, August 14, 1919; E. Obst, “Die Türken in Europa,” Vossische


80. For example, “Unklarheiten und Gegensätze,” Frankfurter Zeitung, August 24, 1919; “Ausdehnung der türkischen Auflehnung,” Deutsch Allgemeine Zeitung,


86. “Die äußere Politik der Woche,” Kreuzzeitung, November 16, 1921.


100. For example, “Lausanne,” *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, November 20, 1922.


104. “Poincaré nimmt das englische Orientmemorandum an,” *Kreuzzeitung*, November 16, 1922.


112. Kladderadatsch 17 (1922).
122. “Mustafa Kemal Pascha,” Hamburger Nachrichten, February 12, 1921.
139. For example, again a week later, “Die äußere Politik der Woche,” Kreuzzeitung, April 5, 1922.
141. “Einigkeit! Warum?,” Kreuzzeitung, October 12, 1922.
147. For example, “Pariser Orientbesprechungen: Die ‘intransigente’ Haltung der Türkei,” Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, April 30, 1923.
155. Hussong, “Mann und Masse.”


162. In addition to those reproduced, mentioned, and quoted here, especially interesting are the depictions of the Turks defying the Entente and assuming a menacing position. Compare the *Kladderadatsch*’s “Weekly Review” in issues 27 (1920), 14 (1921), 41 (1921), 40 (1922), and also “Orientalisches,” *Kladderadatsch* 31 (1921); “Wie’s trefft,” *Kladderadatsch* 38 (1922); “Überraschung in der Dardelenstraße,” *Kladderadatsch* 39 (1922); “Kemal vor den Meerengen,” *Kladderadatsch* 40 (1922); “Morgenaufgang im Buckingham-Palast,” *Kladderadatsch* 41 (1922); “Europäisches Konzert am Bosporus,” *Kladderadatsch* 41 (1922); “Griechenland,” *Kladderadatsch* 43 (1922); “Verfehlte Laufbahn,” *Kladderadatsch* 43 (1922); “In Konstantinopel,” *Kladderadatsch* 47 (1922).


2. “Ankara in Munich”


69, 89, 253. Hofmann also gets some of the facts wrong: His juxtaposition of Atatürk’s alleged “March on Thrace” (69) and Mussolini’s March on Rome completely devalues the Turkish example in favor of the latter, Thrace being a relatively unimportant province. Compare also Mommsen who provides no sources for his one sentence mentioning Atatürk’s influence: Hans Mommsen, *Die verspielte Freiheit: Der Weg der Republik von Weimar in den Untergang, 1918 bis 1933* (Berlin: Propyläen, 1989), 177; Hancock agrees with Mommsen in a half-sentence and cites him, but provides no further evidence or discussion of the notion: Eleanor Hancock, *Ernst Röhm: Hitler’s SA Chief of Staff* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 61.


33. “Auf dem Erfüllungsleim,” *Heimatland* (no date, probably April 1), 1922.
34. “Wochen-Kalender,” *Heimatland* (no date, probably April 1), 1922.
40. “Gemischter Salat,” *Heimatland* (no date, probably October 14), 1922.
49. The debate, it appears, had been started by an article in the French *Journal des Débats*. The paper had reported that the German Foreign Office was being lobbied for German soldiers and officers to join the Kemalists fighting in Anatolia. The documents of the German Foreign Office neither verify nor falsify such claims, though it is not entirely unlikely that some “German Ottomans” were interested in such an initiative. Compare “Deutschland und die Kemalisten: Keine Werbungen für die Türkei,” *Berliner Tageblatt*, July 16, 1921; “Unterstützung der kemalistischen Armee?,” *Freiheit*, July 17, 1921; R 78 484, Political Archives of the German Foreign Office.
52. Hauptmann Tröbst; “Mustafa Kemal Pascha und sein Werk (II),” Heimatland, September 9, 1923.
55. Hauptmann Tröbst, “Mustafa Kemal Pascha und sein Werk (V),” Heimatland, October 6, 1923.
60. Ernst Hanfstaengl, 15 jahre mit Hitler: Zwischen Weißem und Braunem
Hans (Munich: Piper, 1970), 38.
65. Tröbst, Die Ereignisse in München.
66. Compare Gebhardt, who somewhat understates Tröbst’s role: Gebhardt, Mir fehlt eben, 22; Tröbst, Die Ereignisse in München.
68. Der Hitler-Prozeß: Auszüge aus den Verhandlungsberichten (editor unnamed) (Munich: Deutscher Volksverlag, 1924), 57, 263.
70. Ibid.
72. Müller, Im Wandel einer Welt, 169.
74. Lossow’s memorandum is reprinted in Deuerlein, Der Hitler-Putsch, 502–503.
75. Ibid.
76. Gruchmann, Der Hitler-Prozeß, 2743.
77. Ludendorff, Vom Feldberrn, 300.
78. Gebhardt, Mir fehlt eben, 20, 23.
80. Ibid., 302.
81. Gruchmann, Der Hitler-Prozess, 1:196.
83. Pese cites Hitler incompletely and conveys the impression that Hitler said that Mussolini’s work was already finished. Pese, “Hitler und Italien, 1920–1926,” 123.
85. “Der deutsch-türkische Vertrag,” Berliner Tageblatt, March 5, 1924.
88. “Letter from Alfred Rosenberg to Tröbst, September 25, 1925,” no. 96, folder D, Tröbst Papers; “Letter from Wilhelm Weiß to Tröbst, August 21, 1924,” folder A, Tröbst Papers. Besides more articles on political, social, and cultural matters, Weiß wanted Tröbst to find out whether Lossow had already begun his work as an instructor with the Turkish army. Tröbst contributed only a few articles to Nazi papers in the coming years—and many more to the better-paying national press—as he was trying to make a living as a journalist; publications like the Völkische Kurier could not pay for his articles. Compare Gebhardt, Mir fehlt eben, 27–45. Here some of his articles for the Völkische Kurier: “Bleibt Angora Hauptstadt der Türkei? Ein wichtiges Kemal-Pascha-Interview,” May 31, 1924; “Die unsichtbare Macht (I),” pt. 1 on June 4, pt. 2 on June 6, 1924; “Abel Osenburg: Deutsche Abenteurer in der Türkei,” March 17, 1925; “Hodja und Pfaff,” April 12, 1925; “Türkisches Reformfeber,” November 29, 1925. He also wrote on other “Nazi topics” for the Völkische Kurier and on Turkish topics for a number of papers, including the Hannoverscher Kurier, the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, the Deutsche Zeitung, and the München-Augsburger Abendzeitung. Compare folder “HT-Artikel,” Tröbst Papers.
90. Their yearbook, Zwischen Kaukasus und Sinai, featured Turkey regularly and in 1924 was adorned with a portrait of Atatürk, but its articles dealt mainly with the campaigns, actors, and impressions from World War I (see, for example, the yearbook for 1921). However, a rather confusing article about the economic and military-political significance of Turkey in the 1923 yearbook closed with the sentence “Ex oriente lux! From the East comes the light!,” echoing the light metaphor discussed in Chapter 1. Von Frankenberg and Proschlitz, “Vorderasiens handels- und militärpolitische Bedeutung,” Zwischen Kaukasus und Sinai: Jahrbuch des Bundes der Asienkämpfer (1923): 27–57. But even in its great

91. Gruchmann, Der Hitler-Prozess, 4:1636.


98. Ibid, 328.


100. Hosfeld, Operation Nemesis, 13.


115. This only if we are to trust Pese’s analysis of Hitler’s speeches. The August 1922 speech seems to have had the same motif as the cited September speech(es). Pese, “Hitler und Italien,” 116, 120. The mentioning of both Mussolini and Atatürk is evidenced by Hanfstaengl for November 1922 and of just Atatürk by the *Vossische Zeitung* as cited above.


3. Hitler’s “Star in the Darkness”


5. Ibid., 600, 617–619.

6. “Rede auf NSDAP-Versammlung in Nürnberg,” doc. no. 61, December 3, 1928, in Institut für Zeitgeschichte, *Hitler*, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1992), 297–316, here 298–289. In the typescript of the speech it reads: “Das ist das, was uns Deutsche entscheidet,” which makes neither logical nor grammatical sense. Given how the text continues, he probably meant “unterscheidet.” In the first part of the quote Hitler repeats, in very similar words, what had been written in the *Heimatland* a couple of years earlier: Albrecht Wirth, “Die Weltlage,” *Heimatland*, May 19, 1923, as quoted in Chapter 2.


20. Ibid., 5.

Yet this remark was not included in the article in the Völkischer Beobachter.


40. Doc. III O 3790 (October 31, 1933), Konstantinopel/Ankara 441, Political Archives of the German Foreign Office.


42. For example, “Papen an seine Waffenbrüder,” *Kölische Zeitung*, November 1, 1933; “Aus Not und Hoffnungslosigkeit zu neuem Leben,” *Deutsche Zeitung*, November 1, 1933.


58. Compare the Ullstein Archives as well as the Hoffmann Collection at the Staatsbibliothek in Munich.
59. Ankara 539 (April 30, 1934), (August 27, 1934), Political Archives of German Foreign Office.


61. As did, for example, the daily Akşam on June 17, 1936, Ankara 539, A 1378/36 (June 19, 1936), Political Archives of German Foreign Office. The circular: Ankara 539, doc. 82–35.B 8/4 (April 30, 1936), Political Archives of German Foreign Office.


65. “Gehört die Türkei zu Europa?,” Wirtschaftspolitischer Dienst, August 9, 1941; compare also “Europa im Orient: Der Weg der kemalistischen Türkei,” Berliner Börsenzeitung, September 16, 1941.

66. In an exemplary fashion in “Türkei zu Europa gewendet,” National Zeitung, June 20, 1941. Inversely, an anti-German Turkey was not European: “Ankaras Weg in die Knechtschaft: Der Abbruch diplomatischer Beziehungen zum Deutschen Reich durch die Türkei,” Hamburger Tageblatt, August 3, 1944. Earlier, in 1934, the Kreuzzeitung feared that the New Turkey might be part of the wrong Europe and cited the French democratic and revolutionary tradition and its exponents in Turkey: “Die neue Türkei im Kampf der Geisteswelten,” Kreuzzeitung, February 20, 1934.


73. For example, “İnönü türkischer Staatspräsident,” *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten*, November 12, 1938.


88. Joseph Goebbels, *Die Tagebücher*, ed. Elke Fröhlich, vol. 1, pt. 6 (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1998), 170 (November 3, 1938); 152, 155 (October 19, 1938); 164 (October 29, 1938); 170 (November 3, 1938); see also the entries for October 19 (152), October 21 (155), and November 3 (170).

95. In addition to the articles cited below, see the documentation in R 901/58758, *Bundesarchiv* (Berlin-Lichterfelde).


98. Compare the *Vorarlberger Tagblatt* of November 11, 1938: page 1 dominated by “Kemal Atatürk gestorben” and “Atatürk, der Vater der Türkenheit: Aus dem Leben und Wirken eines Staatsgründers.”


104. Thus following exactly Goebbels’s designs for the Third Reich (“Die Presse soll monoform im Willen und polyform in der Ausgestaltung des Willens sein”) as quoted in Norbert Frei and Johannes Schmitz, Journalismus im Dritten Reich (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1989), 35. See also, for a similar Goebbels quote (“in hundert und mehr Variationen dem Leser . . . einzuhamern und aufzuzwingen”): Plewnia, “Völkischer Beobachter,” 383.


115. “‘Nun, die Steuerpächter seid ihr los!’: Kemal Ataturk, der Befreier des türkischen Bauern,” Nationalsozialistische Landpost, November 12, 1938.


4. The “Turkish Führer”


2. See, for example, an article that claimed to be discussing Atatürk’s life story but was in fact telling the story of the Turkish Aufbau (construction): “Kemal Atatürk: Der Schöpfer der neuen Türkei,” *Kreuzzzeitung*, January 10, 1937. The term “miracle” was also frequently used in the literature, as an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* also stressed: “Das deutsch-türkische Einvernehmen,” *Frankfurter Zeitung*, June 23, 1941; compare also “Um die Befestigung der Dardanellen,” *Völkischer Beobachter*, May 24, 1935; “Mustafa Kemal und der moderne Orient,” *Deutsche Zeitung*, September 27, 1934; Reinhard Hüber, *Die Türkei: Ein Weg nach Europa* (Berlin: Verlag Volk und Reich, 1942), 14; Herbert Melzig, *Kamâl Ataturk: Untergang und Aufstieg der Türkei* (Frankfurt am Main: Societats-Verlag, 1937), 213–214; Felix Guse, *Die Türkei* (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1943), 106.


6. Consider the following article from 1922, which presents in a nutshell most of the themes discussed in this chapter for the Third Reich: “Mustafa Kemals ‘Geheimnis,’” *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, September 14, 1922.


43. Ibid., 47.

44. Edmund Schopen, *Die neue Türkei* (Leipzig: Goldmann, 1938), 62.


50. Melzig, *Kamal Atatürk*, 293.


52. Ibid., 30.

53. For example, “‘Nun, die Steuerpächter seid ihr los. . . !’: Kemal Atatürk, der Befreier des türkischen Bauern,” *Nationalsozialistische Landpost*, November 12, 1938; Wulle, *Von Osman bis Kemal Atatürk*, 27.


59. For example, Rössler, *Kemal Pascha*, 53.


66. See, for example, Klinghardt, Angora, 146; Mikusch, Gasi Mustafa Kemal, 73, 119; Egon Heymann, “Zehn Jahre neue Türkei,” Berliner Börsenzeitung, October 28, 1933.
69. Rössler, Kemal Pascha, 26; see also, for example, “Atatürk gestorben,” Berliner Börsenzeitung, November 10, 1938.
72. So, for example, at a speech in Izmir, October 13, 1941: “Deutschland und die Türkei,” Monatsbeute für Auswärtige Politik 11 (November 1941).
74. Rössler, Kemal Pascha, 122, 9–10.
76. Melzig, Kamâl Atatürk, 127; compare “Mustafa Kemal und der moderne Orient,” Deutsche Zeitung, September 27, 1934.


93. Edmund Schopen, “‘Vater der Türken’: Der Schöpfer der neuen Türkei,” Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, November 11, 1938; similarly, Bethke, Im Lande Ismet İnönü, 204.

94. On Turkey and the Soviet Union, see Bülent Gökay, Empyrailizm ile bolşevizm arasinda Türkiye (Istanbul: Agora, 2006 [1997]); Osman Özarslan, Kemalizm, Sosyetler, Sosyalizm (Istanbul: Ceylan, 2008); Emel Akal, Milli Mücadele nin Başlangıcında Mustafa Kemal İttihat Terakki ve Bolşevizm (Istanbul: Tüstav, 2008 [2002]).


113. “Kemal Atatürk und seine Volks-Partei,” Berliner Tageblatt, June 27, 1935; Rössler, Kemal Pascha, 102; Bethke, Im Lande Ismet İnönü, 21.


115. Froembergen, Kamal Atatürk, 195, 220.


118. Picker, Hitlers Tischgespräche, 83.


123. For example, Leers, Adolf Hitler, 59; Kershaw, The “Hitler Myth,” 13–47.

124. Leers, Adolf Hitler, 11.


129. In an exemplary fashion, Bischoff, Ankara, 105, 117–118; Schopen, Die neue Türkei, 92–103.
134. See, for example, Helmut Magers, Roosevelt: Ein Revolutionär aus common sense (Leipzig: R. Kittler, 1934).
135. Compare also the speech by Daitz, “Aus Not und Hoffnungslosigkeit zu neuem Leben,” Deutsche Zeitung, November 1, 1933; also “Interview des ‘V.B.’ mit dem neuen türkischen Botschafter,” Völkischer Beobachter, May 12, 1934.
137. On the comparison of Enver Pasha with Napoleon, see Emil Ludwig, “Unterredung mit Enver Pascha,” Berliner Tageblatt, September 18, 1915; Mustafa Çolak, Enver Paşa: Osmanlı-Alman İttifaki (Istanbul: Yeditepe, 2008), 9; on Sarıkamış, see Alpay Arif Baytın, Sessiz Ölüm: Sarıkamış Günlüğü (Istanbul: Yeditepe, 2007). See also the memoirs of Enver’s general in the field: Sami
5. The New Turkey

7. See discussion below and the debates summarized in Riccardo Bavaj, Die Ambivalenz der Moderne im Nationalsozialismus: Eine Bilanz der Forschung (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003).


27. Karl May, Im Reiche des silbernen Löwen, vol. 2 (Radebeul: Karl May Verlag, 1897), 476–478; see also Melzig, Der “kranke Mann,” 76–77; Schmuhl, “Friedrich Naumann,” 503.


29. From Karl May’s Der Kys-Kapschiji (1896), cited according to Schmuhl, “Friedrich Naumann,” 508; this “saying” was repeated in, for example, “Summarische Lösungen,” Germania, December 13, 1922.


35. Ibid., 153.
44. For example, “Ankara: Herz und Hirn der neuen Türkei,” *Berliner Börsenzeitung*, August 15, 1936; see also Karl Klinghardt, *Türkij ord: Der Türken Heimatland—Eine geographisch-politische Landesschilderung* (Hamburg: Friederichen, 1925), 158.
48. Mikusch, Gasi Mustafa Kemal, 81
49. Ibld.; similarly in Bischoff, Ankara, 225.
53. Compare Bischoff, Ankara, 63, 72, 95–96, 202; Hartmann, “Die neue Türkei,” 102; Melzig, Kamal Ataturk, 94, 149; Froembgen, Kamal Ataturk, 9–10, 16, 66, 87–92, 100–101, 107–109, 137–142; Mikusch, Gasi Mustafa Kemal, 9, 22–24, 63–4, 80–81; Rößler, Kemal Pascha, 61, 78–79; Jäschke, Türkei, 39; Bethke, Im Lande Ismet Inönüs, 60, 169, 172–173; Georg Roedenbeck, Das Türkische Reich; Ein Brennpunkt politischen Geschehens (Berlin: Otto Stollberg, 1939), 57; Guse, Die Türkei, 50–51, 142.
57. Mikusch, Gasi Mustafa Kemal, 338; similarly, Kral, Das Land Kamal Atatürk’s, 170; Bethke, Im Lande Ismet Inönüs, 169–170, 220.


67. Froembgen, Kamal Atatürk, 46; Edmund Schopen, Die neue Türkei (Leipzig: Goldmann, 1938), 49–56; see also Melzig, Kamâl Atatürk, 83; Bethke, Im Lande Ismet İnönü, 38–39; “Kemal Atatürk: Der Schöpfer der neuen Türkei,” Kreuzzeitung, January 10, 1937.

69. For example, “Kemal Atatürk: Der Schöpfer der neuen Türkei,” Kreuzzeitung, January 10, 1937; Schopen, Die neue Türkei, 113; Mikusch, Gasi Mustafa Kemal, 21–22; Theodor Böttiger, Führer der Völker (Berlin: Junge Generation, 1935), 83–84; Froembgen, Kamal Atatürk, 46; “Kamal Atatürk,” (Linzer) Tagespost, November 10, 1938; Roedenbeck, Das Türkische Reich, 33, 40; Wilhelm Koppen, “ Atatürks Erbe,” Völkischer Beobachter, November 22, 1938. It has to be noted that in other contexts, especially when it came to the Arabs themselves, the Third Reich press, propaganda, and politics also offered very different views of Islam. See David Motadel, Islam and Nazi Germany’s War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

70. Froembgen, Kamal Atatürk, 23; compare also, for example, “Die Türkei feiert: Fünfzehn Jahre Kemalismus,” Berliner Tageblatt, October 27, 1938; “20 Jahre Neue Türkei,” Völkischer Beobachter, October 28, 1943; Hartmann, “Die neue Türkei,” 88; Bethke, Im Lande Ismet İnönü’s, 38, 48; Guse, Die Türkei, 107; Roedenbeck, Das Türkische Reich, 23, 34, 41.


75. “ Atatürk gestorben,” Berliner Börsenzeitung, November 10, 1938; see also “ Atatürk, der Begründer der neuen Türkei, gestorben,” Neue Warte am Inn, November 16, 1938; Froembgen, Kamal Atatürk, 214.


78. “‘Vater der Türken’: Der Schöpfer der neuen Türkei,” Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, November 11, 1938.


90. Here just some examples in addition to those cited further below: “Die Türkei im Aufbau,” Wirtschaftspolitischer Dienst, December 29, 1934; “Am Rande


99. Both in the October 1, 1933, issue of the *Völkischer Beobachter*: “Eine Stadt für Kemal Pascha” and “Berlins Traum von einer Triumphstrasse.”

100. Compare here just some of the “picture reports” in the *Völkischer Beobachter* on Turkey: “Erste türkische Industrieausstellung,” November 23, 1934; “Großes Herbstmanöver auch in der Türkei,” September 3, 1935; “Parade-


102. Rössler, Kemal Pascha, 121.

103. See, for example, the Romanian “father of corporatism”: Mihail Manoilescu, Mussolini, Hitler, Kemal (Braila: Tipografi a Româneasca, 1934); also Mihail Manoilescu, Le siècle du corporatisme: Doctrine du corporatisme intégral et pur (Paris: Alcan, 1934).


122. Press directive ZSg. 102/2h/41/38 (3) (April 15, 1936), also ZSg. 101/7/255/ No. 351 (April 15, 1936), in Bohrmann, *NS-Presseanweisungen der Vorkriegszeit*, vol. 5, pt. 1, 400.


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142. Compare, for example, a Spanish volume on modern dictatorships where Atatürk’s dictatorship is discussed along with and in comparison with the other two new kinds of dictatorship, Bolshevism and Italian Fascism: Francisco Cambó, Las Dictaduras (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1929), 101–122; but see also Francisco Cambó, En Torno del Fascismo Italiano: Meditaciones y Commentarios sobre Problemas de Política Contemporánea (Barcelona: Catalana, 1925); Diogo Caminha, História Maravilhosa de Kemal Paxá (Lisboa: Argo, 1944); Amedeo Tosti, Condottieri dei Nostri Tempi (Milano: Tumminelli, 1939), 249–270; Cornelio di Marzio, La Turchia di Kemal (Milano: Alpes, 1926); Ettore Anchieri et al., eds., La Nuova Turchia (Roma: Edizioni Roma, 1939); Corrado Alvaro, Viaggio in Turcia (Milano: Treves, 1942); compare also an Italian novel, Guido Milanesi, Yeni Ay: Romanzo della Turcija Odierna (Verona: Mondadori, 1942 [1934]). Also Gérard Tongas, Atatürk et le vrai visage de la Turquie moderne (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1937); René Marchand, Le rêve d’une race: Dans la Turquie de Mustafa Kemal (Paris: Nouvelle Société, 1927); Philippe de Zara, Mustapba Kémal: Dictateur (Paris: F. Sorlot, 1936); Harold C. Armstrong, Grey Wolf (London: Penguin, 1937); Philip Paneth, Turkey: Decadence and Rebirth (London: Alliance Press, 1943); John Parker and Charles Smith, Modern Turkey (London: Routledge, 1940).


149. “Kemal Atatürk und seine Volks-Partei,” Berliner Tageblatt, June 27, 1935; compare also Manoilescu, who praised Turkey for being the first noncommunist country in the world to introduce the one-party state: Mihail Manoilescu, Die einzige Partei als politische Institution der neuen Regime (Berlin: Stollberg, 1941 [1937]), 134–144.


152. For example, in “Die türkische Verfassung,” Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, July 19, 1921; “Die nationale Selbsthilfe des ‘kranken Mannes’ (II),” Heimatland, June 25, 1921.


155. Examples for the repatriation of Turks in the Third Reich press: “Völker wandern in Südosteuropa,” Schlesische Zeitung, January 29, 1939; “Rücksiedlung der Dobrudscha-Türken: 100,000 kehren aufgrund einer Vereinbarung Ankar
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9. Leitz claims that they were 30 percent over world market prices on average. Leitz, *Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe*, 88; Fleury, *La pénétration allemande*, 132–139.


14. Deringil also used the term “active neutral,” whereas Guttstadt uses the term “one-sided neutrality,” to describe Turkey’s pro-Nazi stance. Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy*; Corry Guttstadt, *Die Türkei, die Juden und der Holocaust* (Berlin: Assoziation A, 2008), 164–167.


Turkey’s Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933–1945 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993); Faruk Şen and Dirk Halm, eds., Exil unter Halbmond und Stern: Herbert Scurlas Bericht über die Tätigkeit deutscher Hochschullehrer in der Türkei während der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus (Essen: Klartext, 2007); but see also Guttstadt, Die Türkei.


17. Leitz, Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe, 85–90.

18. Ibid., 92.

19. Krecker, Deutschland und die Türkei, 172.


31. Leitz, Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe, 96–98; Glasneck, “Die Türkei,” 78; Krecker, Deutschland und die Türkei, 150–151, 237.


33. Krecker, Deutschland und die Türkei, 212–213, 215. See also Önder, Die türkische Außenpolitik, 150 (yet Önder gives too much weight to İnönü’s “post-war statements” in his interview with the author; see the İnönü-Önder interview, 265–268); Leitz, Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe, 94; Glasneck, “Die Türkei,” 109–110.


35. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, 131–132; Glasneck, “Die Türkei,” 87.


37. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, 132.


40. Turkey was supposed to deliver around 47,000 tons per year, but had already exported almost 79,000 tons by March 15, 1944. Özgüldür, Türk-Alman İlişkileri, 161; see also: Krecker, Deutschland und die Türkei, 181, 189.

41. Glasneck, “Die Türkei,” 88; Krecker, Deutschland und die Türkei, 236.

42. Böer, Türken in Berlin, 20; Bozay, Exil Türkei, 62, 67.

43. The most significant of these was the “wealth tax” (Varlık Vergisi) in 1942, but also the sacking of Jewish state employees. Compare Rifat N. Bali,
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44. Hatice Bayraktar, Salamon und Rabeka: Judendestereotype in Karikaturen der türkischen Zeitschriften Akbaba, Karikatür und Mili İnkilâp, 1933–1945 (Berlin: Schwarz, 2006); also Guttstadt, Die Türkei, 170, 184–185.


46. Krecke, Deutschland und die Türkei, 255; Franz von Papen, Der Wahrheit eine Gasse (Munich: List, 1952), 600.

47. Krecke, Deutschland und die Türkei, 254.


49. Martin Bethke, Im Lande Ismet İnönü: Beobachtungen und Streiflichter aus der Türkei (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag, 1944), 6.

50. Krecke, Deutschland und die Türkei, 225.

51. Glasneck, “Die Türkei,” 77; Leitz, Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe, 94.

52. Leitz, Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe, 91; Glasneck, “Die Türkei,” 60, 66, 138; highly overemphasized in Robin Denniston, Churchill’s Secret War: Diplomatic Decrypts, the Foreign Office and Turkey, 1942–1944 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), for example, 38, 144.


54. Compare Mallmann and Cüppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz, 90; for Spain, see Leitz, Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe, 125–126; Payne, Spain, Germany and World War II, 75–81, 94–95.

55. Glasneck, “Die Türkei,” 77; Krecker, Deutschland und die Türkei, 225.

56. Krecker, Deutschland und die Türkei, 125, 172, 225.

57. Henry Picker, ed., Hitler’s Tischgespräche im Führerbauamtquartier: Hitler wie er wirklich war (Stuttgart: Busse-Seewald, 1977 [1963]), 290–291 (May 13, 1942). Hitler also stressed that good relations with Turkey were incredibly important when he sent famous physician Ferdinand Sauerbruch to Turkey on his own plane in order to treat the Turkish foreign minister, Menemencioğlu. Note that Sauerbruch had already been in Constantinople during World War I, having been sent as a secret emissary of the kaiser to the sultan: Ferdinand Sauerbruch, Das war mein Leben (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1956), 413–414, 212, 221–233; see also Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, 249.


59. Leitz, Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe, 86; see also Ekkehard Ellinger, Deutsche Orientalistik zur Zeit des Nationalsozialismus, 1933–45 (Edingen-Neckarhausen: Deux mondes, 2006), 413.


62. Önder and Krecker claim that the 162nd SS Division was composed solely of people of Turkic origin and that it included nineteen battalions and twenty-nine infantry companies. Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik*, 149. Krecker speaks of six Turkic battalions involved on the Nazi side in the battle for Berlin; Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei*, 220–221.

**Epilogue**

1. Martin Bethke, *Im Lande Ismet İnönü: Beobachtungen und Streiflichter aus der Türkei* (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag, 1944), 5.


Notes to Pages 228–235


10. As it was quoted in Heiden’s book, which is often used in the literature as the citation for Hitler being this “German Mussolini.” Konrad Heiden, A History of National Socialism (London: Methuen, 1934), 86. Compare Erich Eyck, Geschichte der Weimarer Republik, vol. 1 (Erlenbach-Zurich: Eugen Rentsch, 1958), 57.

11. Even comparative studies use this narrow national focus. For example, Wolfgang Wippermann, Faschismus: Eine Weltgeschichte vom 19. Jahrhundert bis heute (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009), 50–54 (on Germany), 34–37 (on Italy), 84–92 (on Spain).


Note on Sources and Historiography


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