



PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM MISINFORMATION & DISINFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE

▪ RESOURCE INFORMATION

1. Misinformation/Disinformation 101 materials:

- Jack, C. (2017). Lexicon of lies: Terms for problematic information. *Data & Society*, 3(22), 1094-1096. https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/DataAndSociety_LexiconofLies.pdf
- Wardle, Claire, and Hossein Derakhshan. "Information disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making." *Council of Europe* 27 (2017): <http://tverezo.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/PREMS-162317-GBR-2018-Report-desinformation-A4-BAT.pdf>

2. Materials related to a national strategy around MDM:

- Aspen Commission on Information Disorder's final report: [Commission on Information Disorder Final Report](#)
 - Culmination of an in-depth investigation exploring multidimensional attributes of information disorder; report offers 15 recommendations for increasing transparency and understanding, building trust, and reducing harms.
- Freedom House, CSIS, McCain Institute: [Reversing the Tide Towards a New US Strategy to Support Democracy and Counter Authoritarianism](#)
 - Builds upon interim national security strategic guidance and offers a bipartisan roadmap consisting of seven interrelated strategies.
- John Hopkins Center for Health Security: [National Priorities to Combat Misinformation and Disinformation for COVID-19 and Future Public Health Threats: A Call for a National Strategy](#)
 - Proposes a 4-pillar national strategy – led by the NSC - to ensure an effective response to the COVI-19 pandemic and to prepare for the challenges of future public health emergencies.
- U.S Cybersecurity Solarium Commission: [Countering Disinformation in the United States](#)
 - Recommends building greater individual and societal resilience to disinformation and malign foreign influence by: [1] Congress should establish a Civic Education Task Force, enable greater access to civic education resources, and raise public awareness about foreign disinformation. [2] Congress should ensure material support to nongovernmental disinformation researchers [3] Congress should fund the Department of Justice to provide grants to nonprofit centers seeking to identify, expose, and explain malign foreign influence campaigns to the American public [4] Congress should create a capability within the Department of Homeland Security to actively monitor foreign disinformation [5] Congress should create a grants program at the Department of Homeland Security designed to equip state and local governments with the personnel and resources necessary to identify foreign disinformation campaigns and incorporate countermeasures into public communications strategies[6] Congress should reform the Foreign Agents Registration Act and direct the Federal Communications Commission to introduce new regulations in order to improve media ownership transparency in the United States [7] Congress should grant a federal entity the authority to publish and enforce transparency guidelines for social media platforms,



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- Renée DiResta Presentation-CISA Summit- Responding to Mis-, Dis- and Malinformation ([LINK](#))
 - This talk is underpinned by reports from Stanford Internet Observatory from its [Election Integrity Partnership](#) and the [Virality Project](#) efforts, which detail important partnership collaborations and information sharing channels that would likely be part of a national strategy.
 - Election Integrity Partnership Coalition: [The Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election](#)
- 960th Cyberspace Wing: [Pride of Place: Reconceptualizing Disinformation as the United States' Greatest National Security Challenge](#)
 - The Biden Administration has an opportunity to remedy past national security oversights by including a robust discussion of threats from mis- and disinformation as it crafts its own National Security Strategy.
- JointSecurity: [The Role for DHS in Countering the Disinformation Threat](#)
 - Opinion piece advocating for DHS role in countering MDM.
- Sources Sought: [SAM.gov](#)
- Suzanne Spaulding and Eric Goldstein, [Countering Adversary Threats to Democratic Institutions](#) (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2018).
- Suzanne Spaulding, Devi Nair, and Arthur Nelson, [Beyond the Ballot: How the Kremlin Works to Undermine the U.S. Justice System](#) (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 2019).
- Suzanne Spaulding, Devi Nair, Alexandra Huber, and Jason Gresh, ["Why the Kremlin Targets Veterans."](#) Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 8, 2019.
- Suzanne Spaulding, Devi Nair, and Arthur Nelson, ["Why Putin Targets Minorities."](#) Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 21, 2018.
- Suzanne Spaulding and Devi Nair, ["Restore Trust in National Security Institutions."](#) Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 22, 2021.
- ["Civics as a National Security Imperative."](#) Center for Strategic & International Studies and the National Security Institute at George Mason Law School, March 25, 2021.

3. A list of active or recently-funded research projects that include activities (such as detecting/analyzing disinformation campaigns) that align with CISA's mission.

- Information Integrity Research and Development Strategic Plan
 - **No public [link](#), report is DRAFT//FOUO
 - The report recommends the following research and development (R&D) priorities:
 - *Understand the Information Integrity Ecosystem*: Characterize the socio-technical and cultural landscape of information that provides the context for information manipulation.
 - *Detect and Mitigate*: Efficiently detect and mitigate violations of information integrity across a wide range of information media, forms, and communication modalities.
 - *Measure and Understand Impact*: Measure and understand the consequences and effects of information manipulation on individuals, communities, and institutions.
 - *Adapt and Strengthen*: Develop solutions enabling individuals, organizations, government, systems, and regulatory environments to build resilience to information manipulation activities.
 - *Increase Public Awareness*: Identify the human, social, organizational, economic, and technical factors that are barriers to greater public awareness of information manipulation



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and develop new education and media literacy pathways to build societal resistance to information manipulation.

- *Improve collaboration and coordination* efforts between Federal science and mission agencies to both transition research to practice and focus on mission priorities and needs.

- Global Engagement Center
 - Tech Challenge Awardees: The GEC facilitates regional tech challenges and provides winners a grant to further develop their counter-disinformation technology.
 - UK Tech Challenge: Semantic Visions
 - Taiwan Tech Challenge: Cyabra, TrendMicro
 - Africa Tech Challenge: Alfluence, Congo Check, SeaMonster
 - Paris Tech Challenge: InVid/WeVerify, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Global Disinformation Index
- DHS Center for Prevention, Programs and Partnerships (CP3): [Preventing Domestic Terrorism, American University](#)
 - The Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) Grant Program provides funding for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, nonprofits, and institutions of higher education with funds to establish or enhance capabilities to prevent targeted violence and terrorism.
- DARPA: [SemaFor](#)
 - The Semantic Forensics (SemaFor) program seeks to develop innovative semantic technologies for analyzing media. These technologies include semantic detection algorithms, which will determine if multi-modal media assets have been generated or manipulated.
- European Union: [Funded projects in the fight against disinformation | European Commission \(europa.eu\)](#)

4. Information about strategies that worked for counter-terrorism that might be applicable to counter-MDM efforts.

- [Practical Terrorism Prevention: Reexamining U.S. National Approaches to Addressing the Threat of Ideologically Motivated Violence | RAND](#)
 - This is pretty much the bible by which CP3 was created. Gives a very solid overview of P/CVE in the US and how it can change to become targeted violence and terrorism prevention. Pretty much all of our staff has read this in whole or in part, I know John assigned it as required reading during my onboarding and I give certain chapters to my interns when they start.
- [A Process View of Crisis Misinformation: How Public Relations Professionals Detect, Manage, and Evaluate Crisis Misinformation | START.umd.edu](#)
 - I haven't read this one, but Brooke Liu is a pretty well-respected crisis communications expert and this looked relevant to y'all.
- [How Can a Public Health Framework Be Applied to Preventing Violent Extremism? | START.umd.edu](#)
 - I used to work for Dr. Weine and I have read this brief. How Dr. Weine talks about applying public health principles to targeted violence and terrorism prevention is fairly authoritative and this isn't the only place he has written about this. I think his latest was a book chapter, but I don't know if we can access that so I thought I would share this.
- REDIRECT Method [Psychological Inoculation: New Techniques for Fighting Online Extremism | by Jigsaw | Jigsaw | Medium](#)
- DHS [CP3 Strategy](#)
 - The Center coordinates and builds upon the broad range of prevention activities that are currently undertaken across DHS, including grants, community and law enforcement awareness briefings, threat assessments, and information sharing. CP3 provides technical, financial, and



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educational assistance to whole of society stakeholders to establish and expand local prevention frameworks. Local prevention frameworks connect all segments of local society to prevent individuals from radicalizing to violence and intervene to help individuals who have radicalized to violence. The Center utilizes a diverse set of resources to accomplish its mission across five teams: Policy and Research, Prevention Education, Strategic Engagement, Grants and Innovation, and Field Operations.

- Denmark's [Aarhus Model](#)
 - The Aarhus Model offers a variety of interventions and effort towards individuals, groups, communities and the public in general, i.e. a mentor program, exit program and awareness creating activities.
- European Union [Counterterrorism Strategy](#)
 - The EUCS focuses on four areas: (1) [Anticipate](#): identifying vulnerabilities, building capacity where most needed; (2) [Prevent](#): tackling radicalization at all levels; (3) [Protect](#): increasing security, denying terrorist the means to act, reinforcing external borders; (4) [Respond](#): minimizing impact, allowing prosecution, increasing support to victims
- [Combating Foreign Influence – FBI](#)

5. National Science Foundation (NSF):

- [A Disinformation Range to Improve User Awareness and Resilience to Online Disinformation](#), led by the State University of New York, Buffalo.
- [Actionable Sensemaking Tools for Curating and Authenticating Information in the Presence of Misinformation during Crises](#), led by the Ohio State University.
- [Adapting and Scaling Existing Educational Programs to Combat Inauthenticity and Instill Trust in Information](#), led by Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- [America's Fourth Estate at Risk: A System for Mapping the \(Local\) Journalism Life Cycle to Rebuild the Nation's News Trust](#), led by Temple University.
- [An Algorithmic Observatory to Address Financial Misinformation and Disinformation in Minoritized Communities](#), led by the University of California, Irvine.
- [Analysis and Response for Trust Tool \(ARTT\): Expert-Informed Resources for Individuals and Online Communities to Address Vaccine Hesitancy and Misinformation](#), led by Hacks/Hackers.
- [Building Trust in Communication Systems by Addressing Misinformation-Driven Online Abuse and Harassment](#), led by George Washington University.
- [Co-designing for Trust: Reimagining Online Information Literacies with Underserved Communities](#), led by the University of Washington.
- [FACT-CHAMP – Fact-checker, Activist, and Academia Collaboration Tools: Combating Hate, Abuse, and Misinformation with Minority-led Partnerships](#), led by Meedan.
- [How Large-Scale Identification and Intervention Can Empower Professional Fact-Checkers to Improve Democracy and Public Health](#), led by the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
- [Misinformation Judgments with Public Legitimacy](#), led by the University of Michigan.
- [Verified Information Exchange](#), led by the University of Washington.



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6. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Census trust, safety, and harm teams focused on social listening in public affairs manner
7. Research Houses: Clint Watts, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Research and Development (RAND)